


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
RESEARCH REPORT

A SOUTHERN COMMAND MILITARY CAMPAIGN
AGAINST DRUG OPERATIONS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRUCE R. SUTHERLAND

1989

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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A SOUTHERN COMMAND MILITARY CAMPAIGN
AGAINST DRUG OPERATIONS

by

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LtCol, USAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel Michael E. Heenan

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

MAY 1989

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE; A Southern Command military campaign against drug operations.

AUTHOR; Bruce R. Sutherland, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

The destabilizing criminal and social problems associated with illegal drug trafficking is threatening United States national security. President Bush has said "The war will be waged on all fronts...let this be recorded as the time when America rose up and said no to drugs. The scourge of drugs must be stopped." A description of the threat and what is being done will be the background for projections of what might have to be done in the future. Indications are that more US military involvement and action will be required. This paper analyzes options available to the Commander-in-Chief of US Southern Command (USCINCSO) and recommends an option to be used.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce R. Sutherland received his Bachelor's degree in Biology from the State University of New York at Geneseo, in 1969. Colonel Sutherland is a command pilot with over 4000 hours. The majority of his hours are in trainer, bomber and airlift aircraft. He has spent staff tours at Headquarters Military Airlift Command and Headquarters United States Air Force. Colonel Sutherland's last assignment prior to Air War College was as the commander of the 310th Military Airlift Squadron, Howard Air Force Base, Republic of Panama.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The use of illegal drugs in the United States (US) has become a greater threat to US national security than communism.¹ The war against drug traffic in the US is viewed as of vital interest and illegal drug use continues to be defined as a threat to national security at the social, economic, and military level.² President Bush is continuing the tough stand that the Reagan administration had on drugs. President Reagan threw down the gauntlet during his term and President Bush threw it again when he said in his 20 January 1989 inauguration address to Congress, "The war will be waged on all fronts...let this be recorded as the time when America rose up and said no to drugs. The scourge of drugs must be stopped."³ The scourge and war he was referring to was the undermining of the US culture and its' values by the effects of illegal drugs and illegal drug trafficking.

The US has been concerned with drug use off and on for one hundred years. It is only from the late 60's and early 70's that drug use has increased dramatically and with it increased corruption, undermined values, and disruption of governments.⁴ Former President Ronald Reagan, declared illegal drugs public enemy number one and called for stepped up law enforcement to include military support.⁵

The effort against illegal drugs has been commonly called a "war on drugs" because it is threatening US national

security. The term "war on drugs" conjures up thoughts of full scale military action with tanks moving across fields and aircraft strafing well defined targets.⁶ The majority of Americans do not envision this type of scenario and may be unwilling to have it happen, especially on US soil.

Most Americans believe the "war on drugs" to be a crusade rather than a military conflict. The drug war is considered a higher level of action against the problem and more reminiscent of how a war against poverty would be waged.⁷ That is, one waged with dollars and programs and not tanks, aircraft, and soldiers.

Then what is the "war on drugs?" Who is the enemy and where does he come from? Are there military applications of power available to fight this enemy, and if so, which ones? Could they be used if available? What is the military doing right now and is this drug war really a threat to US national security?

I will attempt to answer these questions by looking at the threat, the size of the effort combatting it, and if this effort can do the job. Finally, I will explore and recommend a military option the United States Commander-in-Chief of Southern Command (USCINCSO) can consider.

CHAPTER 11

THREAT

Former President Ronald Reagan stated in his January 1988, National Security Strategy, White House publication "...that drugs pose threats not only to the integrity and stability of governments to our south, but to the social fabric of the United States itself."¹

President Reagan stated during an August 4th 1986 press conference that "...Drug use threatens the health and safety of millions of Americans. It extracts a high cost, the cost of crime stemming from drugs, the cost of drug related health problems, the cost in productivity, the cost in the quality of American manufactured goods we compete on the world market. But most of all, the cost in lives. Drugs in one way or the other are victimizing all of us."²

In the 1980's the drug problem increased dramatically. The main drugs of concern are marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and cocaine spin-offs such as crack.³ In March 1987, the US State Department estimated the number of users or addicts in the United States to be; marijuana, 20 million; cocaine, 5 million; and heroin, 500,000.⁴ Americans consume about 18 tons of marijuana every day and 2-3 tons of cocaine every week.⁵ Admiral Yost, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard (CUSCG), estimates drugs to be a \$240 billion problem per year for the US: \$140 billion as the estimated street

value and another \$100 billion worth of lost productivity, medical treatment, jails, law enforcement and other costs.⁴ The US State Department indicates that in terms of dollar value brought into the US each year (70 billion), narcotics ranks second behind petroleum which is the United States' largest import.⁷ This \$70 billion represents hidden US public support to the international drug network as US consumers smoke, snort, and shoot themselves into oblivion. On the other side, the US government spends in the vicinity of \$100 million annually to fight against drug traffickers and to help some 100 countries to counter the threat.⁸

Sources

Mexico and Columbia are the Primary foreign sources of marijuana, but an increasing amount is being produced in the US. Eradication efforts in Jamaica and Belize in 1986 successfully reduced the supply from those countries.⁹

A 1987 National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) sponsored survey found that marijuana use by high school students fell to its lowest level.¹⁰ Marijuana, when used alone is considerably less harmful than cocaine or heroin, but figures compiled by the 1987 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee show that hospital emergencies for marijuana use involved the mixing of alcohol or cocaine with marijuana 91 percent of the time.¹¹

Heroin used in the US originates from three areas:

Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and Mexico. Asian heroin is made from opium grown in the respective regions and Mexican heroin is made from a morphine derivative.¹² Based on laboratory analysis, Mexican heroin was the predominate heroin in the US in 1987.¹³

Heroin has been a problem in the US for some time. But, since statistics on heroin addiction have been kept, heroin use has not increased dramatically. It has been around 500,000 for the last several years. An additional problem associated with heroin addiction is the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) caused from the intravenous method of heroin use and needle sharing.¹⁴

At the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, that was convened by the United Nations in Vienna, the participating nations agreed that more drugs than ever are flooding the world and the focus should be on the fastest spreading one, cocaine.¹⁵ The rest of this paper will focus on cocaine.

The majority of US bound cocaine is produced in three countries: Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia. Peru continues to be the major source for coca leaves and coca paste. The principle growing area in Peru is the Hualaga Valley. Most of the Peruvian and Bolivian cocaine is refined in Columbia and transported to the US. Although, some of the cocaine is also transported through Brazil and Argentina.¹⁶ The primary

entry point for cocaine into the US continues to be the South Florida area. Other significant points include New York City, Los Angeles, and states along the Mexican border. (See appendix for map)

The major drug threat in the US comes from cocaine and cocaine associated products. The number of cocaine related hospital emergencies increased 60 percent in 1987 from the previous year. Since 1980 there has been a ten fold increase in the number of cocaine related emergencies.¹⁷ Cocaine use has spread through all strata of the US, from rich to poor. The total amount of cocaine seized by US authorities in 1966 was 12 kilos. In 1969 it was 53 kilos; in 1970 it was 267 kilos; and in 1986 it was 27 tons.¹⁸

Doctors say the effects of cocaine are unpredictable. There have been cases of a single use bringing death. In 1986 cocaine poisoning took the life of football star Don Rogers and then basketball star Len Bias.¹⁹ Cocaine is the biggest problem because it can be so deadly, and the traffickers are always introducing new products, more deadly than the last.²⁰

Crack is the latest and probably the worst. It is easy to make and can be sold in small dollar amounts. An ounce of cocaine bought on the street for \$1,000 , plus 60 cents for baking soda, can turn into \$7,000 in crack sales. This menace has infested low-income housing projects and poor

neighborhoods (crack houses), terrifying residents.²¹ A survey done for NIDA showed 5.8 million people having used crack within the previous month. Many experts think there are more regular users. They put the maximum number a retailer would want to supply at 25, so there may be as many as 230,000 dealers supplying the US market. That means there are more dealers than there are dentists and taxi drivers combined.²² What is the process and how does it get to the US?

Cocaine Traffic

The transportation process for cocaine starts with harvesting by the farmer in countries like Peru, Bolivia, and Columbia. It is on the farms that the coca leaves are put into plastic pits with water and sulfuric acid and made into a cocaine base. It takes a little more than an acre of coca leaves to yield almost one pound of cocaine base that is about 75 percent pure.²³

The cocaine base is transported through several middlemen until it finally reaches the processors at the laboratory. These middle men are small transporters that take the base out of the back country via mule or the like, to the boatman on the river or the pilot at the remote airstrip.²⁴

Once the base is at the lab, it is again processed with chemicals and transformed into cocaine hydrochloride, the

white crystalline powder or final product.²³

The cocaine hydrochloride is then smuggled via air and sea to market in the United States and Europe. (See appendix map) The distributors and pushers take the product to the users/consumers. There could be as many as 15 or more middlemen in this process. Each middleman and especially dealers, only handle certain quantities. Some may only deal in 500 kilo lots, others in measures of tens, and others from pounds to ounces. These phases or disconnects make it difficult to track and apprehend the larger dealers because they are so insulated.²⁴ So how do you identify the enemy?

The Enemy

The drug enemy is the coca leaf farmer, processor, distributor/pusher, and many middlemen or traffickers, and of course the consumer. The enemies are diverse and found on several fronts, foreign in the case of the farmer and processor, international in the case of the trafficker, and domestic in the case of the distributor and consumer. These three fronts do not act independently but are actually woven together by the profit motive right up to the consumer. In this paper we will primarily be concerned with the foreign front and eradication of crops and destruction of processing plants, airfields, and staging points for the drug traffickers.

The one common objective that drives each enemy to the

consumer, and is the fabric that holds them together, is the potential for profit. The amount of money is spectacular. According to the Journal of International Studies and World Affairs, the wholesale value of illegal drugs smuggled into the US in 1986 was about \$25 billion. The retail value has been estimated at about \$150 billion with 90 percent of that money going to the distribution process in the US. Only about eight to ten percent of that money goes to the Latin American country or transit country.²⁷

An additional by-product of international drug dealers that ties in with the profit motive, is support of terrorism. Monies from drugs are used to finance arms buys and used for subversion and insurgency roles. Dealing in drugs or protection to drug dealers provides the finances for terrorist operations and also causes great problems in the US with its destabilizing effects.²⁸

Conclusion

Congressman Bill Dickinson said in his "Reports To The People" article in the Montgomery Advertiser "...America is at war. We are in the midst of a battle with a special kind of terrorist, the drug smuggler. He is an unconscionable breed of criminal determined to tear apart the fabric of our communities, taking every risk to turn a profit."²⁹

Drug use in the US is a threat and the enemies are the drug growers (farmers), processors (refiners), traffickers,

dealers, and consumers. These enemies work on three fronts; foreign, international, and domestic (US). The enemy is driven by profit and his operational network is financed better than the US counter-drug force. Peru and Bolivia are the major coca growing areas for US consumption and Columbia is the major processing and transporting country to the US. Cocaine is transshipped via several methods but air transport is the most common.³⁰ Cocaine is the most dangerous drug because of its widespread use and deadly nature and will be the focus of this study.

The methodology for analyzing the cocaine problem and the strategy to combat that problem will have certain applications across the board for combating all drugs.

With the threat and transportation process having been discussed it will be necessary to look at the history of the counter-drug effort and the direction that effort is leading the US.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY

According to Admiral Paul Yost (CUSCG), the Coast Guard has been interdicting drugs since the early 70's. Now the issue has become one of great importance.¹

In 1968, President Johnson's reorganization plan no. 1 established the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Justice Department, giving the Justice Department the primary responsibility for drug investigations.²

In 1971, President Nixon created the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control with the US Secretary of State as the head. Primary responsibility was to develop a strategy to check the illegal flow of drugs into the US and coordinate efforts abroad. President Carter abolished the Committee in 1977.³

In 1971, President Nixon created the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention, responsible for coordinating and overseeing all federal drug programs that were scattered among 14 agencies. Drug law enforcement responsibility was not included in this office.⁴

The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972 authorized permanent establishment of the National Institute on Drug Abuse in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to handle demand reduction. It also created the Strategy Council on drug abuse to develop a federal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug trafficking.⁵

Nixon's reorganization plan No. 2 of 1973 created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that was designed to investigate all drug law enforcement cases under federal drug law. When DEA was established similar bureaus and offices previously established in the Department of Justice were abolished.*

In 1976, Congress established the Office of Drug Abuse Policy when it amended the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972. Congress was displeased with inconsistent and sometimes conflicting federal drug abuse policies.' So as early as 1976, Congress demonstrated that it was not happy with the national drug effort and very willing to take action.

In 1981 the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 that restricted the use of the military in civilian law enforcement was changed under title 10, US code. The following stipulations applied to military use in drug operations:

- Military may loan equipment, facilities, and people.
- Military may operate military equipment used in monitoring and communicating the movement of air and sea traffic.
- Military may operate military equipment in support of law enforcement agencies in an interdiction role overseas only if a joint declaration of emergency, signed by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General, states that a serious threat to US interest exists.

-Military may not conduct searches, seizures or make arrests.

-Use of military cannot adversely affect readiness.*

The original Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 said that it is illegal to use the regular military establishment to perform internal police functions, except in limited emergencies, and pursuant to specific authorities.* Furthermore, the law was enacted to stop using military troops to serve legal summonses, to collect taxes, and even before the Civil War, to ride in posses pursuing fugitive slaves.10

There is precedence for the use of the military for civilian law enforcement. Take the Army surveillance of civilian anti war activity and military occupation of American university campuses during the early 70's.11 It can be done if civilian law enforcement agencies are overwhelmed, and can't effectively do their job, and the US Congress perceives the need to declare an emergency.

The National Narcotics Act of 1984 established the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board to coordinate US drug law enforcement policy and operations. The Attorney General was designated the chairman of the board.12

In 1986 President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on Narcotics and National Security. He clarified direct military involvement of US forces by stipulating that if they are used in an interdiction role overseas, they must be invited by the host government,

directed by US agencies, and limited to a support function.¹³

In 1987 the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board was absorbed by the National Drug Policy Board by Executive Order (EO) 12590. This EO expanded the board's authority to include drug prevention, education, and treatment programs into the federal governments' anti-drug responsibilities.¹⁴

In October 1988, Congress passed the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to step up the war on drugs. In conjunction and response to criticism on the leadership of the drug war, Congress also passed legislation to appoint a Director of National Drug Control Policy, more commonly called the "Drug Czar." The Drug Czar, recently appointed by President Bush and confirmed by Senate, is tasked to provide direction and leadership for US policy, resources, and operations of the entire US drug effort.¹⁵

The 1989 NDAA assigned the Secretary of Defense the following responsibilities:

- To serve as the single lead agency of the federal government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the US.

- To integrate US command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets dedicated to drug interdiction into an effective communications network.

- To approve and fund state governors' plans for expanded use of the National Guard in support of drug interdiction and enforcement while in the states.¹⁶

The 1989 NDAA will increase the involvement of the military and task it to provide leadership in guiding the organization of the command, control, communication, and intelligence capabilities of the drug effort. But, what has been the level of military involvement up to this point?

Military Involvement

The Department of Defense is prohibited from entering into direct law enforcement efforts such as; arresting, detaining, frisking or in the case of vehicles, seizure and search. But it does contribute in other ways. It loans equipment, provides training, airlift, and radar coverage to the tune of about \$389 million in fiscal year 1987.¹⁷ A June 1987 General Accounting Office (GAO) report indicated that the total cost of the DOD interdiction effort rose from \$4.9 million in fiscal year (FY) 1982 to an estimated \$397 million in FY87.¹⁸

In FY88 the Navy and Marines provided 2,037 ship days to support Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) for a cost of over \$24 million. Coast Guard LEDETS ride aboard Navy ships and provide the legal arm to arrest drug smugglers once the vessels have been apprehended. Additionally, the Navy and Marines flew for a combined total of almost 8,000 hours and over 1500 sorties in support of drug interdiction.¹⁹

The Army flew 1,836 hours and 339 sorties to assist drug law enforcement in FY88. Additional support was provided

instructing law enforcement students on deployment techniques for ground sensing devices and operation of the land based aerostat site at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The Army also approved the loan of 30 helicopters, four UH-60 Blackhawks for Customs, and 26 helicopters for counter-narcotics programs outside the US.²⁰

The Air Force continued testing of their Over-the-Horizon Back-Scatter (OTHB) radar and operation of aerostat radars at Cudjoe Key and Patrick AFB, Florida. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft flew 4,967 hours of surveillance for counter-drug efforts. Overall, the Air Force flew 5,111.5 hours and 697 sorties in support of counter-drug operations in FY88. Other items loaned in FY88 included radars, fuel trucks, and secure communication equipment.²¹

The National Guard and Air Guard continued support with military police units assisting customs agents along border entry points and reconnaissance personnel assisting in collection and identification of potential drug targets. Further support was given through the loan of night vision goggles and specialized equipment. The Air Guard also logged more than 14,000 flying hours in eleven different aircraft in support of counter-drug operations.²²

Total federal spending on drug control, including civilian agencies, more than tripled from FY81 to FY88, from \$1.2 billion to \$3.9 billion.²³ Pentagon expenditures in

the drug effort rose from one million dollars in 1981 to 196 million dollars in 1986.²⁴ The majority of this money going to interdiction even though some US narcotics experts believe that interdiction programs catch only 10 percent of cocaine imports. The reality is that more drugs, not less are being smuggled into the US. This conclusion is strengthened by looking at the price of cocaine from 1981 to 1988, it fell from \$60,000 to \$10,000 per kilo, indicating a glut of cocaine on the market.²⁵ Part of this problem is caused because drug profits are so huge that smugglers have every incentive to brush aside any federal attempts to interdict the drug flow.²⁶

If current drug interdiction efforts are not adequate, then what should be the future effort and what should be the military involvement in that effort?

Future Military Involvement

Considerable military support has already been provided to the drug enforcement effort. To date this support has been primarily directed toward support of interdiction efforts. Admiral Yost the CUSCG, indicates that the US Coast Guard is interdicting only five to seven percent of the drugs being brought into the US. He also states, "...there isn't enough equipment in the whole American arsenal to seal the borders of the United States." ²⁷ It appears that the desired results of sealing the borders will never equal the effort or expense put forth in its attempt. The profit motive

and the learning curve for innovative smuggling techniques is so high and the area to cover is so immense that meaningful interdiction is next to impossible.²⁰ It appears that stopping drug trafficking by interdiction efforts alone is a losing proposition. Additional pressures must be put on the trafficker to make him take chances and be more visible and therefore more vulnerable. Right now , drug smugglers can buy a \$100,000 airplane, use it once and leave it, and still clear a \$250,000 profit. The average cargo of a small plane is 100 kilos and brings \$ 35,000 per kilo for a \$350,000 gross profit. A great incentive to keep improvising and smuggling.²¹

Interdiction alone will not win the war. The war must be fought on all fronts. Like any major conflict, to win will take aggressive action on all fronts. First, on the domestic front with more emphasis on education of US youth to reduce demand and provide a long term fix. Secondly, tougher enforcement on the major dealers to include the death penalty and seizure of assets due to ill-gotten gains. Included in tougher law enforcement should be accountability for those that use drugs, make them pay for their choice to support the drug criminals. Thirdly, continued interdiction of drugs as part of a coordinated strategy and not a stand alone effort. Finally, eradication on the foreign front as a coordinated attack to increase the risks to the drug smuggler. This frontal attack should engage the coca growers, the cocaine

refineries, airstrips, and put pressure on the drug system kingpins.³⁰

By applying pressure to all fronts simultaneously this will have a synergistic effect on the enemy. Current adult users will keep demand up and exert demand pressure on the system while tougher laws continue to put away dealers and traffickers. The eradication front and the attack against the growers, processing plants, and trafficking ports will put increased pressure on the drug transportation system to get a dwindling supply to the user. These actions together will cause the trafficker to take more chances to move the product, making interdiction more effective. The pushers, dealers, and drug king pins will be under increased pressure from the users for the product and under additional pressure from law enforcement officials. This will increase even more as their criminal associates are dealt debilitating legal blows and loss of assets through tough zero tolerance and asset confiscation programs.³¹

This entire effort should be driven from the Director of National Drug Policy Office, and should be the US national strategy implemented and directed from the top. The military involvement in this effort should be as a supporting agency on the domestic and interdiction fronts, but as the supported agency on the eradication foreign front.

Problems exist with any strategy, especially one involving operations with so many agencies on several fronts.

The first problem is the dollar cost of fighting this enemy on three fronts when the federal budget is already under great strain. This is a problem that will have to be settled but beyond the scope of this paper.

The problem with direct military involvement in law enforcement under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 needs to be resolved. It could easily be resolved if the drug problem goes out of control, beyond civilian law enforcement capabilities, and Congress declares an emergency to enlist the efforts of the military to bring it under control. Secondly, assuming Congress would react to a deteriorating drug problem faster than that, Congress could direct the military to engage the drug enemy on the foreign front. This would keep the military from participating in direct law enforcement activities in the US. Under this approach it could be substantially argued that the intent of the Posse Comitatus Act would still be upheld.

There are numerous additional problems that could be raised but the primary concern of this paper is in analyzing potential military options. Further discussions will center on the military options that the US Commander-in-Chief of Southern Command (USCINCSO) will have in preparing for a counter-drug mission against the Colombian drug community.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY_OPTIONS

USCINCSO is an agent of the National Command Authority (NCA) and responsible for wielding the cutting edge of the military sword in Central and South America. The military options available to USCINCSO, and the NCA, cover a wide range of force. CINCSO will have to select a military option or series of options based on his commands' overall capability and how that capability fits in with the global strategy of the NCA and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In this case, CINCSO's campaign against the drug problem will be one of several drug campaigns waged on several fronts.¹

Before selecting his options for action, CINCSO must refer to the policy guidance and strategy given to him from the NCA through the JCS. It can be assumed that the following questions have been answered in the affirmative by the NCA prior to employing military force;

-Is the situation vital to US national interest or US allies national interest?

-Have the political and military objectives been precisely defined and is the strategy consistent with those objectives?

-Is the US willing to commit sufficient forces and resources to win, and are the size, composition, and disposition of these forces appropriate for achieving the objectives?

-Is there reasonable assurance that the American people and Congress will support the decision to use military force?

-Have all other instruments of national power been employed and the use of the military the last resort?

We will assume that the war on drugs has reached a critical point and military action must be considered. CINCSO would be tasked to plan courses of action (COA) based on military options available and then forward those COA to the NCA for approval.³ We will look at the military options available to the CINC and recommend COAs to be considered by the NCA.

During the CINCs' analysis of what COA to use, he may consider the following military mission options; presence, show of force, demonstration, quarantine, blockade, force entry, and special operations. These options run the gamete from minimum involvement to full scale invasion.⁴ A brief description of each option follows.

Presence

Troops stationed in a country, security assistance programs, or a ship in port would be considered a presence. Deployment of strategic or rapidly deployable forces, such as AWACS aircraft or rangers to the Middle East would be an example of a military presence. The timely appearance of these forces has more to do with its success than the size of the force. The close proximity of Southern Command in Panama could be considered a military presence exerted on Columbia.

The US has used military presence as an instrument of foreign policy on more than 200 occasions since World War II.*

Show of Force

A show of force is an extension of a presence that stops short of bringing troops into conflict. Operation Golden Pheasant, the deployment of US troops to Honduras, was a show of force. It was directed at influencing Nicaragua. The operation actually coincided with a planned exercise but was timed perfectly and became credible in the eyes of Nicaragua.*

Demonstration

A demonstration is similar to a show of force but it differs in the degree of implied threat. Like the show of force, it is designed to threaten or warn, rather than engage. But, it does give a tougher look at US capability and represents a warning that the US will get as tough as necessary for the situation. A demonstration can also be used as part of a deception plan, normally to cover an invasion.*

Quarantine

The World Book Encyclopedia defines quarantine as "...to isolate certain persons, places, and animals which may carry danger of infection."* Carrying this definition to the drug problem, it could be stated as; to isolate certain persons, places, and transportation modes which may carry cocaine to the US or its' allies. The 1986 Joint Staff Officers Guide

defines quarantine as, "a collective, peaceful process involving limited coercive measures interdicting the unreasonable movement of certain types of offensive military weapons and associated material by one state into territory of another." This was the definition applied to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis quarantine.⁹ Using either definition, quarantine is an act designed to stop specific items from moving in or out of a country. Commonly thought of as an action short of war.

Blockade

A blockade is usually referred to as a nautical barrier. A barrier set up by patrolling war ships on a countries coast. In the military sense, several types of blockades exist. An absolute blockade is designed to cutoff all communication and commerce.¹⁰ It would isolate the target country and must be formally declared. No nation has the right to declare a blockade unless it has the naval power to enforce it.¹¹ An absolute blockade is generally considered as an "act of war."¹²

Another type of blockade, of lesser severity, is called a Pacific Blockade. Even though this may also be considered as an act of war, it often limits its measures to the flag carriers of the nation it is blockading and is not as severe as an absolute blockade.¹³

During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 the US conducted a blockade operation against Cuba but officially termed it a

quarantine. In essence, that operation against Cuba was really a major blockade, but was labeled as a quarantine for the purpose of circumventing international law. The US took it to vote in the Organization of American States (OAS) and won a unanimous decision to go ahead with the action. That affirmative vote by the OAS gave the legal basis for the quarantine. It was actually the Russian movement of missiles into Cuba that was the target and not the Cubans.¹⁴

Force entry

Force entry can be the most extreme option and can involve actual use of force with some or all of the other options. It involves the movement of troops with the intent of going to battle. It can be an administrative landing or an Operation Blast Furnace type mission, designed to assist friendly forces, at a friendly governments request. It can also be a police type operation or and outright invasion like Grenada.¹⁵

Special Operations

Special operations can be planned for use from very early on in a crisis right through to war termination. Special operation forces can be used for psychological operations (PSYOPS) when trying to create attitudes and behaviors favorable to achieving objectives. Unconventional warfare (UW) forces can be used in a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in clandestine to overt operation modes. An additional area of special

operations is civil affairs (CA). Civil affairs operations are those activities used to facilitate relationships between US military forces, civil authorities, and civilians in the objective area.¹⁴

These military options or combination of options are only effective if they support the objective and mission assigned. A look at the CINC's mission and discussion of options are necessary to come to a recommended course of action.

Discussion

As previously mentioned, the situation in Columbia has deteriorated and the cocaine and effects of its' trafficking out of Columbia are effecting US vital interests. This has caused the NCA to go to CINCSO and request military action in Columbia. The CJCS has issued a WARNING ORDER to CINCSO that states or implies the following mission: develop a COA to stop the flow of drugs, primarily cocaine, from leaving Columbia by sea or air for six months. (Note; 95 percent of all cocaine movement from Columbia to the US is via sea or air)¹⁵ Work with Columbia and neighboring nations (if possible) to destroy processing laboratories and eradication of coca crops. Minimize disruption on local citizens and minimize US casualties.

Taking into consideration the list of military options previously discussed we will look at those options and test them for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability.¹⁶

In determining suitability of a selected COA, the big question is will the COA actually accomplish the assigned mission if carried out successfully. In determining feasibility, it must be determined if the required resources such as troops, ships, planes, etc., are available or can be made available within the time frame given. Acceptability will be determined if the COA fulfills the objective with minimum or acceptable losses. These losses are not limited to military losses like men, material, and time. But, also the political losses that could be inflicted with unfavorable US and world opinion. After consideration of these areas, the bottom line is, can the US live with its' decision?'

In previous chapters the enemy on the foreign front was identified as the grower, refiner, and the numerous middlemen or transporters. Additionally, Columbia has many drug kingpins that push and pull the above soldiers that make the drug machine operate. These kingpins are most formidable because they direct the tempo of the drug operation and will guide or initiate any major force against the counter drug operation. The forces available to the kingpin are mainly guerrilla in nature and lack the sophisticated high energy assets such as tanks, ships, or aircraft capable of inflicting any severe damage. In Operation Blast Furnace, in Bolivia, the resistance that was thought might surface against the counter-drug operation never materialized. The drug sponsored forces decided to go into hiding and wait until the

operation was over. An operation of equal or greater magnitude in Colombia would probably be treated in much the same way, with little resistance and a wait and see attitude.²⁰

The kingpins and their organizations have good communication and intelligence sources. Carlos Lehder, in a testimony to congress, indicated that the Medellin cartel of Columbia possessed better communication and intelligence capabilities than any Central or South American counter-drug force.²¹

Initially the enemy can be expected, if Blast Furnace experience holds true, to pull back and try to wait out the counter-drug operation. Relying on their good communication and intelligence sources to know when to resume operations. If communication sources of the kingpins are not disrupted, they may know the next move before the military commander in the field knows.

Presence, Show of Force, Demonstration

These three military options differ only in degree. The US already maintains a small presence in the area with Southern Command. An additional show of force or demonstration would not provide a sustained deterrent to drug smuggling. The drug profit motive is so strong that threats or muscle flexing would have very little effect on operations. All of these first three options fail the suitability test because even if they are carried out

successfully they would not accomplish the eradication and destruction objective. Eradication and destruction require some action and not just a mere presence.

Quarantine, Blockade

A quarantine is a peaceful coercive measure to keep undesirable items either in or out of a country. A quarantine of Columbia could be a suitable action to stop the flow of drugs by sea and air. Whether it is a quarantine, an absolute blockade, or somewhere in between is open for discussion. Whatever decision is made, it should be packaged as a quarantine for world or OAS consumption. Just as discussed in the Cuban missile crisis, a blockade labeled as a quarantine would be easier to convince regional governments that this type of action is warranted. A quarantine is a legitimate use of force that would be used against an undesirable drug element in Colombian society and not as an act of war against a sovereign nation²². Colombia might even pursue OAS support for the operation because the government of Colombia is being overwhelmed by massive corruption and growing power of the drug traffickers.²³

It is feasible that the US could undertake such an operation. The US possess the naval capability to enforce the operation, although, redistribution of forces and priorities would have to be performed before committing to such an operation.

In terms of acceptability, the commitment would be a

long term commitment (6 months or more), causing problems if forces were needed to respond to other crises. The loss of men and material should be minimal because the opposing force is weak. Weak in terms of counter capability to sink ships, destroy planes and affect operations at sea. The impact of naval operations on the local citizens would be minimal because US naval presence would be at sea and less visible than a strong in country force. A force in country would have a higher signature and will be discussed when analyzing force entry. US public support should be high for a maritime operation because casualties should be low and impact on the US citizen would be low. World opinion would be mixed but mostly favorable, especially if host nation support was given to the operation.

Outward Colombian support is a must to gain OAS support and for the operation to get any world or regional support. The advantage of a blockade is that it offers the blockading force control of the environment. The impact on the blockaded nation can be small or great depending on the level of enforcement applied. But, a blockade by itself is usually not effective in obtaining required results. If it is used in conjunction with other coordinated land operations it can be very effective.²⁴

One of the difficulties with a drug quarantine or blockade is that once the air or sea vessel is detained there still remains the problem of finding the drugs. Drug

smugglers have become very sophisticated in hiding substances in commercial containers, building materials, and structures.²⁵

Force Entry

This is the most extreme series of mission options available and will require extensive planning. It can range from an administrative landing through police operations to an outright invasion.²⁶ Assuming that host nation approval for an operation on their soil is given, then an invasion would not be necessary.

For crop eradication and destruction of laboratories to progress at a pace acceptable to the US, US forces are going to have to participate. The Colombian government anti-drug forces have been exposed to massive corruption and can not be trusted to get the job done alone.²⁷ The level of US participation will be dependent on the level of host nation participation in the operation. As a minimum, trusted host nation forces or guides will be needed to interface with US in country experts to provide tactical intelligence, target locations, and indigenous type information.

Another level of force would be to put an Operation Blast Furnace type support system in place. A US force consisting of helicopters and transportation personnel to move and assist host nation troops to their targets.²⁸ I don't think a blast furnace type operation would do the job because of the corruption and lack of resolve that can be

expected from the host nation troops. Even though some success was obtained from the original blast furnace, long term reduction in cocaine did not occur. That would have required simultaneous strikes against remote mountain labs and a sustained effort of up to two years. A large US ground force is needed to provide self sufficiency and mass enough to be effective and reach the remote mountain areas.²⁹

The ground force should be sizeable enough to repel any resistance it meets. Resistance can be expected to be guerrilla in nature using hit and run style tactics. Chances are good that once the operation is kicked off the resistance will be very light with most opposition going into hiding to wait out the US intruders.³⁰

The use of US ground forces should be concentrated in rural objective areas where they are less visible and less irritating to the Colombians. Operations in these areas should concentrate on destruction of labs, crop eradication, and blockading of rural airstrips. A major effort should be made to be self sufficient, allowing Colombian forces to concentrate on blockading roads, urban airports and airstrips, and self protection against drug assassins and terrorists. When extradition efforts threatened the drug kingpins, they resorted to extreme violence. They were responsible for assassination of one minister of justice, one attorney general, more than 50 judges, at least a dozen journalists and more than 400 police and military personnel.

It is possible, that when serious inroads are made into the drug network, that initial resistance from drug kings would be directed against Colombian officials using terrorist style operations. Terrorist pressure would attempt to influence local and national government officials to expel the US forces and stop the operation.³¹

A US ground force meets the suitability test because it can accomplish the destruction and eradication mission and contribute to the effectiveness of the naval blockade. The US possesses the capability and resources to sustain and meet the challenge. Some forces may have to be drawn from other theaters or other mission expertise. It is feasible that with the possible withdrawal of forces in Europe, some forces could transfer to a drug related mission. On paper and in a politicians view this probably looks like an easy solution, but for European troops to transfer to a drug mission would certainly require additional time. Time for training in a new theater and mission. This is time that may not be available and time that may make this option less feasible. Unless, on-the-job training was envisioned or these forces were to be used to back fill troops already trained for the theater.

Would US forces engaged on Colombian soil be worth the cost? If US loss of life is minimized, yes! How many casualties would be tolerated? That is hard to answer and depends on how bad conditions in the US have deteriorated and

how effective the operation in Colombia has been.

World opinion, concerning US forces occupation of Columbia, would be mixed. Regional countries would be watching closely for US improprieties and unwarranted influence being exerted on Columbia. It could be expected that allies and those countries experiencing difficult drug problems of their own would support the operation. Also, it could be expected that adversaries would always find ways to condemn any US operation that could result in greater US influence in a region. Overall, acceptance or at least toleration would be the feeling, provided US casualties were low, results were being made, and long term occupation and undue US influence of Columbia was not perceived.

Another option available to meet the destruction and eradication mission could be the use of tactical air strikes. This type operation would reduce US loss of life because US ground forces would be exposed less and would not be needed in great numbers. A smaller mobile force could be used for protection of communication and liaison forces. Air strikes could feasibly achieve the stated objectives, is within the capability of the US, and would be a timely option because airman are trained to do that now. The possible loss of life of innocent civilians goes up dramatically as does the detrimental political impact that such an action would have on the local people and regional governments. America could be viewed negatively as the big imperialist power not willing

to get its hands dirty, but would rather throw its immense firepower at the problem not even caring about the innocent people of the region. For that reason, to start out with air strikes would be a mistake. Now, if US ground forces encountered heavy resistance during missions, or excessive loss of life occurred, then the US could more easily justify air strikes in support of the troops and mission. As a stand alone option, mission air strikes pass the military acceptability test, but fail the political acceptability test.

Special Operations

As operations are being executed, psychological operation (PSYOPS) teams could be deployed to work with the Colombians creating attitudes and behavior favorable to achieving the stated mission. The PSYOPS team could be a forerunner to a crop substitution program that would be needed to replace lost earning power after the drug crops have been destroyed. The poor Colombian farmer is not going to stop growing his coca as long as he can make an easy profit.³² The US can make a major contribution by helping provide crop and income substitutions programs for drug farmers.³³ The head start the PSYOPS team can provide will work towards the long term solution. Unconventional warfare (UW) troops could be enlisted to work with local teams targeting terrorist organizations for destruction or destabilization. This could undermine their effectiveness to mount a campaign

against Colombian politicians and officials, truly contributing to a successful US Colombian operation. Civil affairs (CA) personnel could work with the local media to bolster favorable relations between Colombians and US forces in objective areas.³⁴

Conclusion

The above discussion leads to a joint US operation with the Navy and Army as the prime participants. The Air Force would have a supporting role with airlift and backup offensive air operations.

The operation would be a sea and air blockade, but called a quarantine for legal purposes. The quarantine would use naval assets on the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts of Columbia with US facilities in Panama as the main supporting and logistical area. Naval communication jammers and intelligence assets would target drug communications and radar targets. Additional surveillance and communication support could come from the other services as needed.

The US Army with Air Force logistical support would mount a campaign in conjunction with Colombian forces against processing laboratories, coca crops, and airfields. Colombian forces would be responsible for quarantine of commercial aircraft departures and main operating bases. US forces with minimum Colombian participation would interdict, control and destroy labs, crops, and rural airstrips.

Additional friendly nation support would be worked

through the US State Department and Colombia in an attempt to have neighboring countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, enter in the fight. Colombia's military experience (blockade by Army and Navy) in their Guajira Peninsula left them with several important insights. The operation put a serious dent in the marijuana trade but only for a short period because the operation only displaced activities to other locations. Based on those experiences, it would be reasonable to assume that Colombia would be inclined to pursue neighboring country support to make an even more effective force.³⁵ A likewise operation in Venezuela and Ecuador would increase the effectiveness of the Colombian operation by denying drug operators safe havens that would allow them to move operations to those countries. This would increase pressure on the drug smuggler making it more difficult to move his product, causing him to take more chances, therefore increasing his risks and likelihood of getting caught. A combined effort of this type would be a great step forward to rid the world of the scourge of drugs forever.

A quarantine of sea, air, and disruption of drug communications, coupled with a ground force operation to destroy labs, and eradicate crops would be the basis for a CINCSO operation in Columbia. US forces would concentrate in the rural areas while Colombian forces work the urban areas. Special operation PSYOPS, UW, and CA, teams would work with

the Colombians to create a favorable climate, target terrorist organizations and improve the image of US serviceman with Colombian civilians. The US State Department and Government of Colombia would work with neighboring countries to enlist similar operations in their areas creating a synergistic force against the drug culture in South America.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The US government has been talking a pretty tough fight against drugs. Congress has been displeased with several administrations handling of the national drug problem as far back as 1972, and has passed legislation to improve the effort.¹

Recent legislation (1989 National Drug Appropriations Act) has been passed to increase the role of the military in the drug fight. The effort has been directed at supporting interdiction efforts of the other agencies. Interdiction of drugs at or near the US border is extremely difficult and found to be near impossible because of the immense area and resources of the smuggler.²

The military support effort has been fairly substantial, \$389 million in FY87, but this only scratches the surface of the immense capability available.³ Certain Congressionally imposed restrictions, such as posse comitatus, have been limiting further involvement of military forces beyond a supporting role. Posse comitatus was enacted to restrict the use of military forces in a law enforcement or police role in the US. It may never have been intended in its original form to apply to US forces overseas, but some civil libertarians have chosen to interpret it that way.⁴ It would take just a stroke of the Congressional pen to empower the military to operate in a drug capacity outside the US. The new "Drug

Czar" could be the driving force behind stronger military involvement. When he was the Education Secretary he wanted to increase the Pentagon's role in the war against drugs. Now that he is the Director of National Drug Policy, it may happen.⁹ The majority of the US public would probably support that effort.

The drug enemies are bombarding the US on the domestic front while being supplied from the international and foreign fronts. The US military support to the drug effort has concentrated on the interdiction front while increased emphasis is being directed domestically through tougher convictions, and demand reduction education. To have a more immediate effect on the drug problem, efforts will have to continue on the domestic and international fronts, but a strong effort will be required on the foreign front. This is where the military can contribute effectively.


With a strong military effort on the foreign front, disrupting the flow of drugs out of Colombia, this would put added pressure on drug operators on the other fronts. The drug users on the domestic front would pressure the dealers for more cocaine which in turn would put pressure on the traffickers to move the cocaine. The dealers and traffickers would be forced to take more chances moving the dwindling supply to the users. These additional chances could highlight their operations and make them more susceptible to detection from law enforcement and interdiction officials. The

combined effects of a coordinated three front assault on drug operations would have a synergistic effect on the entire campaign.

Although discussions have centered on stopping the flow of cocaine, smuggling of heroin and marijuana would also be affected. The methods and modes of transportation are similar and many of the drug kingpins handle all drugs. The benefits of a CINCSO operation would be felt across the spectrum.

A CINCSO directed quarantine against sea and air movement out of Colombia, coupled with disruption of drug communications and destruction of cocaine laboratories and crop eradication, will cripple drug operations. If neighboring countries join in the fight, and a strong US operation may be just the motivating push, a synergistic force could develop and rid the region of drug operations for a long period. A period that could allow education and tough enforcement to wipe out demand and the illegal element in US society.

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