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
## RESEARCH REPORT

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF EXERCISE PROGRAM:  
A REVIEW

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AIR UNIVERSITY  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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A REVIEW

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A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY TO THE FACULTY

IN

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REQUIREMENT

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**TITLE:** THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF EXERCISE PROGRAM: A REVIEW

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This study is a review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Program and evaluates its utility in helping achieve readiness by warfighting forces. A description of the program structure preambles a detailed discussion of the program's historical transportation management problems. This discussion outlines mechanisms leading to much improved program management. The discussion also describes three new Title 10 funding programs that expand the role of the exercise program. A survey of the findings of a 1988 JCS Exercise Review Working Group is followed by discussion of additional problem areas and recommendations for resolution. A concluding chapter outlines several themes that emerge from the review. (14) ←



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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Peyton P. Lumpkin served as Exercise Program Director with the Joint Exercise and Training Division, Directorate of Operational Plans and Interoperability (J7), Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1985 to 1988. In this capacity, he initially served as focal point for the coordination, planning, programming, and scheduling for the United States Pacific and Atlantic Commands, and later directed exercises for the larger Central and European Command programs. He annually planned and chaired the JCS Worldwide Exercise Conference and developed the JCS Five Year Exercise Schedule and the Quarterly Significant Military Exercise Schedule. Lt Col Lumpkin also served at Headquarters, Military Airlift Command from 1977 to 1981 as a Tactical Airlift Director in charge of planning, scheduling, and monitoring the worldwide application of C-130 capability and C-141, and C-5 joint airborne operations. From 1982 to 1985, he served as Director of Operations for Detachment 1, 1400 Military Airlift Squadron, McClellan AFB, California. Lt Col Lumpkin graduated from Air Command and Staff College in 1981 and Air War College in 1989. He is a Command Pilot with 4000 total flying hours in the C-130 and CT-39, including over 400 combat flying hours in the Republic of Vietnam.

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Lieutenant Colonel Ronald E. Owens served as JCS Exercise Program Element Monitor, Combat Operations and Exercise Division (AF/X000E), Directorate of Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, from 1985 to 1988. In this capacity, he was the HQ USAF single manager for operational programming and policy for Air Force-wide participation in the JCS Exercise Program. From 1977 to 1982, he served as an Exercise Airlift Director at both Headquarters 21 Air Force, and at Headquarters Military Airlift Command, where he was responsible for planning, directing, and controlling airlift participation in JCS Exercises. From 1974 to 1977, Lt Col Owens served as an Airlift Control Element (ALCE) officer with the 438 Military Airlift Wing. He is a Senior Pilot with both C-141 and C-9 flying experience. Lt Col Owens graduated from Squadron Officers School in 1977, Army Command and General Staff College in 1985, and Air War College in 1989.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Bonn, Jr. served as Exercise Program Director with the Joint Exercise Division, Directorate of Operations (J3), Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1983 to 1985. In this capacity he was the OJCS liaison with the JCS Exercise Program elements of HQ NORAD, USCINCPAC, and CINCSAC. He was also in charge of coordination and development of the JCS Five Year Exercise Schedule. From 1979 to 1983 he served as a JCS Command Post Exercise Director with the Contingency and Exercise Management Division, Directorate of Operations, Headquarters, Military Airlift Command (HQ MAC). He was responsible for coordinating and planning all MAC participation in JCS CPXs and developing policy and procedures for the HQ MAC Crisis Action Team. Lt Col Bonn served as Commander, 1403 Military Airlift Squadron, Yokota AB, Japan, from 1986 to 1988. He flew EC-47s in the Republic of Vietnam and subsequently flew the C-141, HH-43, CT-39, and C-21 aircraft, accumulating 3700 flying hours. Lt Col Bonn is a Command Pilot and graduated from Squadron Officer School in 1974, Armed Forces Staff College in 1983, and Air War College in 1989.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
DISCLAIMER . . . . .	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . .	iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES . . . . .	iv-vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . .	ix
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II. EXERCISE PROGRAM GUIDANCE . . . . .	6
Congressional Guidance . . . . .	6
Specific Program Guidance . . . . .	7
III. STRUCTURE OF THE JCS EXERCISE PROGRAM . . . . .	12
JCS Exercise Types . . . . .	12
JCS Command Post Exercises . . . . .	13
No-Notice Interoperability Exercise . . . . .	15
Field Training Exercises . . . . .	16
CINC-Sponsored Exercises . . . . .	17
IV. EXERCISE PLANNING CYCLE . . . . .	22
V. FUNDING . . . . .	28
History . . . . .	28
1969-1982 . . . . .	28
1982-Present . . . . .	31
New Roles for the JCS Exercise Program . . . . .	45
VI. THE 1988 JCS EXERCISE PROGRAM REVIEW . . . . .	48

VII.	ADDITIONAL PROBLEM AREAS. . . . .	54
	Definition . . . . .	54
	Exercise Schedule Deconfliction. . . . .	54
	JCS and Service Exercise Funding	
	Disconnects . . . . .	63
	Exercise Planning Process and POM	
	Desynchronization . . . . .	66
	Focus on Low Intensity Conflict. . . . .	66
VIII.	RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .	68
	Exercise on a Biennial Basis . . . . .	68
	Balancing JCS Transportation Funding and	
	Service O&M Funding . . . . .	69
	JCS Exercise Program Development. . . . .	71
	Definitions . . . . .	72
	Exercise Schedule Deconfliction . . . . .	72
	Joint Exercise Planning Group . . . . .	73
	Low Intensity Conflict Exercises. . . . .	74
IX.	CONCLUSION . . . . .	75
	GLOSSARY . . . . .	79
	BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	81

ILLUSTRATIONS

	PAGE
1. CONFLICT AND EXERCISE SPECTRUM. . . . .	2
2. THE JCS JOINT EXERCISE SCHEDULE CYCLE . . . .	24
3. USAF OTHER COSTS . . . . .	34
4. PROGRAM FUNDING . . . . .	35
5. AIRLIFT GROWTH . . . . .	36
6. GROWTH OF THE JCS EXERCISE PROGRAM . . . . .	39
7. FY 88 AIRLIFT ALLOCATION . . . . .	41
8. JCS EXERCISE PROGRAM . . . . .	43
9. HISTORICAL DATA ON MAJOR JCS EXERCISES . . . .	57
10. ORGANIC FLYING HOURS . . . . .	58
11. LOST CAPABILITY . . . . .	59


## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Federal law requires the Secretary of Defense to exercise and evaluate our national mobilization capability, to include both the active and reserve forces, with emphasis on sustainability. The Congress also charges the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the warfighting readiness of the Unified and Specified Commands (US Commands) and the Department of Defense (DOD) combat support agencies. Exercises sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the US Commands are the vehicles by which we meet these requirements. In the process, military exercises also provide training for commanders, staffs, and warfighters in joint (multi-service) and combined (multi-nation) operations. An important goal of these exercises is to uncover problems, and to separate them into areas such as doctrine, planning, training, or materiel. Then, through a vigorous corrective action program, the problems are addressed. (5:2)

Exercises are planned and executed along the entire spectrum of conflict in which US forces may be involved. The context ranges from today's peace, in which our armed forces maintain their presence around the world, to the spectre of global nuclear war. (See illustration 1.) Regardless of the

# Conflict and Exercise Spectrum



impact of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Glasnost, or Perestroika, our troops will be operating somewhere on the globe along this spectrum for the foreseeable future. They must develop and maintain the necessary skills to be effective along the continuum of conflict. (12:4-5)

The worldwide JCS Command Post Exercise (CPX) program helps fill that need. Although JCS has been conducting CPXs since 1961, the JCS Exercise Program was formally established in 1969 to provide a means to examine, at the national level, the procedures, policies, plans, and systems that support our warfighting capabilities. JCS-sponsored CPXs--those planned within JCS with Service and CINC coordination--have three basic types of scenarios: nuclear war; general war focusing primarily in the NATO arena; and mobilization exercises which target actions prior to the onset of hostilities. These three types of JCS CPXs are worldwide in scope and are conducted in a biennial rotation, one every eight months.

At the low-level-of-violence end of the spectrum is the newest JCS-sponsored exercise, the No-notice Interoperability Exercise, (NIEX). This type of exercise was added by the Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Crowe, to address more likely military responses at the lower end of the crisis spectrum as well as to address significant issues of joint

force interoperability. Approximately two NIEX's are accomplished each year. (25:2)

In addition to the JCS-sponsored exercises, each U&S Command develops his own program of CPXs and Field Training Exercises (FTX's) to support specific requirements in his regional area of responsibility.

These exercises cover the entire conflict spectrum, but they test only regional aspects of global war at the high violence end of the spectrum. While regional exercises support all program objectives discussed earlier, their greatest value comes from the actual deployment of forces for training and are a visible reminder of our commitment to maintain a worldwide presence and satisfy US treaty obligations. These exercises are tailored to meet national strategy in geographic regions and encompass specific objectives from the JCS Exercise Planning Guidance.

The situation in the world today and the tempo of worldwide commitments dictates that our forces be in the highest state of readiness to react to the unexpected. Joint exercises are the most effective forum for accomplishing the readiness training which ensures the capability of war-fighting forces to deploy and fight as a unified team.

This paper will review the JCS-managed Joint Exercise Program to determine how well it fulfills its goals. We will

begin with a look at program guidance and continue with a look at the genesis and progress of the program since its formal inception in 1969. After we outline the program as it currently exists, we will summarize the findings of the 1988 JCS Exercise Review Working Group (JERWG). Then we will identify some additional areas we consider to be program problems. The paper will detail recommendations for improvements to the exercise program with the goal of more closely aligning it with joint readiness training objectives. Finally, we conclude with a statement of the trends highlighted by this review of the JCS Exercise Program.

## CHAPTER 11

### EXERCISE PROGRAM GUIDANCE

The JCS Exercise Program has an important and essential charter. In its broadest statement, the program exists for the purposes of evaluating joint readiness for the Chairman, JCS, and providing joint readiness training for the forces of the CINCs and commanders of the U&S Commands. The JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercises consist of joint and combined exercises that are scheduled by the JCS, the U&S Commands, and the Services to meet evaluation and readiness training objectives.

#### Congressional Guidance

Congressional direction for the JCS Exercise Program is provided by two sources. The first is the requirement stated in the Defense Authorization Act of 1985:

The Secretary of Defense shall conduct at least one major mobilization exercise each year. The exercise should be as comprehensive and as realistic as possible and should include the participation of associated active component and reserve component units. The Secretary shall develop a plan by June 30, 1985, to test periodically each active component and reserve component unit based in the United States and all interactions of such units, as well as the sustainment of the forces mobilized as part of the exercise, with the objective of permitting an evaluation of the adequacy of resource allocation and planning. (5:2)

The second source is the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 which states in part:

Participation in Joint Training Exercises. The Chairman shall:

(1) provide for the participation of the combat support agencies in joint training exercises to the extent necessary to ensure that those agencies are capable of performing their support missions with respect to a war or threat to national security; and

(2) assess the performance in joint training exercises of each such agency and, in accordance with guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense, take steps to provide for any change that the Chairman considers appropriate to improve that performance. (5:2)

#### Specific Program Guidance

Specific joint objectives are developed for each of the 70-plus JCS exercises conducted each year. However, these specific joint objectives fall within the parameters of a broader statement of program objectives as contained in SM48-84, Procedural Guidance for the JCS-Directed and the JCS-Coordinated Exercise Program. This document states that the JCS Exercise Program exists for the purpose of:

a. conforming to national policy and military strategy guidance

- b. conforming to guidance from the JCS or higher US government authority
- c. participating in mutual defense arrangements with allied nations
- d. testing operations plans or contingency plans
- e. meeting command joint readiness and training objectives as required by JCS Pub 2, 1 December 1986, Unified Action Armed Forces. (26:1)

Procedural guidance also specifies that the JCS will annually issue Exercise Planning Guidance (EPG) for a five year period. This EPG provides a refinement of the broad program objectives statement in the JCS procedural guidance (SM48-84) for the exercise program. This annual upgrade and refinement serves as the single document for JCS exercise planning guidance objectives and incorporates national policy and military strategy as defined in the Defense Guidance as well as readiness requirements defined by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Unified Command Plan. (26:A1-A2)

The EPG for Fiscal Year (FY) 1989-1993 has the following refined statement of the purpose of the JCS Exercise Program:

- a. improve combat readiness and warfighting capabilities of assigned forces

- b. improve interoperability of doctrine, planning, procedures, systems, materiel, and training among joint and combined forces in conventional, nuclear, and special operations environments
- c. ensure existing military capabilities conform to the national policy and military strategy guidance
- d. ensure existing military capabilities conform to guidance from the JCS and the National Command Authority as described in the Defense Guidance, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the Unified Command Plan
- e. satisfy treaty obligations to allied nations
- f. test Operations Plans, equipment and force capability
- g. maintain presence
- h. meet U&S Command joint readiness and training objectives as required by the Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub. 2). (7:4-5; 11:1-2)

The EPG for FY 1989-1993 is a marked departure from prior issuances. For the first time objectives were assigned by the JCS to the U&S Commands as command exercise objectives. In prior years the JCS assigned specific objectives to specific exercises. This change meant that the individual CINC no longer had to tailor his specific exercises to meet JCS-directed objectives. The CINC now has the flexibility to adapt these objectives to meet his exercise needs. As stated

in the EPG, "This change is intended to allow the CINC exercise planners more flexibility in the objective-setting process for each exercise and enable them to tailor their exercise programs to meet annual command training goals and objectives." (7:5)

In other areas, the EPG lends emphasis to the need to incorporate joint tactics, techniques, and procedures in all exercises as objectives for training, testing, and evaluation. The EPG also reflects the constraints of a military budget under stress and calls for efficiency in exercise design and execution. (7:5) The guidance calls on commanders to consider:

- a. relocation to less expensive locales
  - b. less frequent scheduling intervals
  - c. inexpensive transportation modes for equipment and personnel
  - d. reducing the number of personnel attending
  - e. reducing the amount and type of equipment
  - f. reducing exercise duration
  - g. using automated simulations for all or portions of exercises in lieu of force and equipment movements.
- (7:5-6)

In addition, the EPG calls on commanders: to avoid redundancy in objectives and overcommitting forces; to combine and link exercises when possible; and to eliminate marginally beneficial exercises. (7:6)

Having reviewed the general objective statements, a review of how the JCS and U&S Commands have designed their exercise programs around these objectives is in order. Specifically, this paper will review how joint readiness training and evaluation objectives are designed into JCS and U&S Command exercise programs.

CHAPTER III  
STRUCTURE OF THE JCS EXERCISE PROGRAM

JCS Exercise Types

JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercises are the primary vehicle through which the theater commanders meet their regional readiness requirements and represent the highest level of training possible for their warfighting role.

JCS-directed exercises are those joint and combined exercises that are specifically directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have priority for funds, forces, transportation and scheduling. All JCS-sponsored exercises are JCS-directed. (7:2)

JCS-coordinated exercises are other joint and combined exercises whose scheduling requires coordination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both types of exercises receive JCS funding for transportation and are Service funded for Operational and Maintenance (O&M) costs. (7:2)

By virtue of the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act, the Chairman, JCS, became responsible for development of joint training policy. (5:2) The JCS Exercise Program is the primary tool by which the Chairman, through the warfighting CINCs and their components, accomplishes that responsibility.

The JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercise program includes three distinct types of exercises: JCS command post exercises; no-notice interoperability exercises; and field training exercises.

### JCS Command Post Exercises

The first type of JCS exercise is the DOD-wide, JCS-sponsored command post exercise which routinely involves other federal departments and agencies and US allies. This type of exercise has been conducted since 1961 and was the first of the JCS exercise series. The JCS-sponsored CPXs are held in response to JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 177 and DOD Directive 5100.30, (Worldwide Military Command and Control System), "and to a degree congressional direction". (5:1) JCS CPXs are designed to exercise command, control, communications, and procedures inherent in managing military responses to various crises along the spectrum of warfare. They are globally oriented and are primarily focused toward national-level-of-effort responses.

There are three different kinds of JCS-sponsored CPXs. (See Chapter 1.) Each is held once every eight months in a 24-month rotation. Each type of exercise provides a different focus for the DOD community. The rationale is "to do the least number of exercises possible while touching upon

as many policies, procedures, plans, and systems as possible." (5:3)

The first is known as the WINTEX-CIMEX series and tests NATO and US warfighting procedures in a simulated context. The US has been participating in these winter NATO CPXs since 1961. This exercise normally focuses on a build-up phase, which concentrates on deployment, and a warfighting phase, which concentrates on sustainment. (4:6; 14:16-17)

The second kind of JCS CPX exercise is a nuclear procedural exercise, or NUKEX. These exercises look at the execution of procedures related to use of nuclear weaponry. A NUKEX CPX normally includes a scenario of increasing world tension, culminating in indications and warning that exercise weapons employment decision matrixes. (4:10; 14:18-19)

The third kind of JCS-sponsored procedural CPX is the Mobilization Exercise or MOBEX. This exercise not only looks at aspects of mobilization that directly relate to conducting military operations in a crisis, but also at civil sector mobilization and its impact on our ability to conduct and sustain a large force in a conventional war scenario. MOBEXs also serve as a test of the surge capacity of our industrial base. (4:13-14; 14:14-15)

Because of the large scale of JCS-sponsored CPXs and the senior staffs involved, these exercises have been crucial in training National Command Authority and senior military decision makers in managing military responses to global crises. As a result, evaluations of the exercises typically result in macro-system and procedural improvements that focus around Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I), and contingency management systems.

#### No-Notice Interoperability Exercise

A second major type of JCS-sponsored exercise, the No-notice Interoperability Exercise, or NIEX, was created in 1986 by Admiral Crowe, the Chairman, JCS, to bridge the void between CPXs and FTXs. The NIEX scenario tests capabilities and procedures to jointly respond to short notice contingencies. This type exercise is designed to improve our ability to respond without notice to a situation that requires close-hold planning and a short-fuse coordinated response by one or several CINCs. NIEXs normally last for two to five days and may include the deployment of a representative number of forces and weapon systems. (25:2; 14:12-13)

The NIEX realistically exercises procedures and capabilities while evaluating solutions to documented

problems in both the headquarters and the field components. Therefore, the NIEX is a small, inexpensive exercise that tests the CINCs' ability to respond to small regional contingency operations.

### Field Training Exercises

The third major type of exercise is the U&S Command-sponsored Field Training Exercise. These FTXs came under JCS purview in 1969 and respond to DOD directives and JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces. FTXs are guided by JCS SM48-84, Procedural Guidance for the JCS-Directed and JCS-Coordinated Exercise Program. (22:4)

The FTX program is worldwide and is the most extensive of all exercise types. FTXs within the JCS program include between 70 to 80 exercises per year with over 1.1 million US and 3.3 million allied servicemen participating. Over 48 foreign countries and every major region of the world are represented annually. More specific and concrete issues of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as interoperability are found most often at the level of U&S Command-sponsored exercises. These exercises may be either JCS-directed or JCS-coordinated. (12:4-7)

### CINC-Sponsored Exercises

Exercises of the U&S Commands range from theater-wide FTXs to small CPXs and unit FTXs. These exercises are designed to provide joint and combined readiness training, as stated in EPG objectives. These theater exercises also serve to provide Service component commands with opportunities to test and train their own unique Service doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The Unified and Specified Commands exercises also have several significant impacts on readiness that directly support our national objectives and foreign policy goals. These objectives and goals bring into focus reasons for CINC exercises. These are:

- a. in the exercise of war plans for feasibility and proficiency
- b. the benefit derived from joint training in combination with our allies
- c. familiarity and proficiency in operating in diverse and particular terrains and waters
- d. integration of new weapon systems and equipment into a joint and combined operational environment
- f. exercise of US and combined command and control structures
- g. fulfillment of international treaties and obligations

h. show-of-flag opportunities that demonstrate US prerogatives and resolve to protect them. (7:A1-A3)

Of the CINC JCS Exercise Programs, the largest is the US European Command, which reflects the high priority the United States places in this theater. Exercises range from those in the northern flank, with amphibious operations supported by carrier battle groups, to the southern flank, with an annual air-land-sea exercise with five other NATO countries. The largest by far is the annual REFORGER (REturn of FORces to GERmany) deployment exercise which deploys US-based forces to Europe in a NATO reinforcement scenario. These "dual-based" forces are returned annually to link up with their prepositioned combat equipment and in-place allied and US forces. The REFORGER series has been an effective display of the US military's ability to quickly build up force levels in Europe to meet any Warsaw Pact threat. (12:37-38)

But REFORGER is by no means the largest JCS exercise. That distinction goes to TEAM SPIRIT, the US Pacific Command's annual reinforcement of Korea FTX. Although US level of participation may decrease in the future, this is the largest military exercise in the free world and has included over 130,000 allied and 70,000 US participants in an

annual demonstration of the US commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea. (12:43)

The US Pacific Command's JCS exercise program is centered around capability exercises demonstrating US commitment to various theater treaty and defense obligations. For example, exercises support our security pacts with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia. Sea control and power projection exercises also figure heavily in this oceanic theater with long sea lines of communication. (12:43)

Closer to home, the US conducts combined exercises with 17 of 21 Latin American states, under the auspices of the US Southern Command and the US Atlantic Command JCS exercise programs. These exercises support the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 1947. (12:44-46) In Central America these exercises rely heavily on the US military Reserve Component forces. The proximity of the region to the US and the heavy commitment of active duty forces to exercises in other theaters provides an ideal opportunity to provide realistic, short-term deployment and employment training for Reserve Component forces in their own "backyard". Engineer construction and airlift/tactical fighter Reserve Component Forces figure highly in these joint and combined exercises. Specific humanitarian and civic

assistance has also been funded in support of these efforts. (See Chapter U.)

The US Central Command rounds out the final significant exercise theater (aside from exercises within US territory) with responsibility for readiness training and operations in Southwest Asia. United States interests have expanded rapidly since the establishment of the US Central Command. Since there are no US bases in Southwest Asia, these exercises are the only opportunity US forces have to achieve familiarity with this remote region. Exercises in this region are an extension of the Nation's commitment to regional security and to insure US and allied access to the region's oil supply. The centerpiece is BRIGHT STAR, a combined air-land-sea exercise conducted biennially. Most other exercises in this region are relatively small and are tailored to host nation capabilities. During even years, US Central Command conducts FTX GALLANT EAGLE and CPX GALLANT KNIGHT within the continental United States. (12:39-41)

Within US territory, the US Forces Command conducts a series of readiness training exercises designed to enhance warfighting capabilities in any region of the world. Chief among these are BRAVE SHIELD and BOLD EAGLE, as well as cold weather FTXs in Alaska, such as BRIM FROST. (11)

The extensive experience gained by the JCS and CINCs

in planning and executing JCS exercises to meet EPG objectives has proven invaluable. These exercises are the single best means to improve both short-term readiness and overall military capability. They train players from the National Command Authority down to soldiers in the field. Most importantly, warfighting CINCs get to work their component forces in their assigned combat roles. Perhaps most important is the enhancement of readiness at the small cost of one-tenth of one percent of the annual DOD budget.

(8:14)

## CHAPTER IV

### EXERCISE PLANNING CYCLE

The JCS Exercise Program has grown substantially in recent years due to the concurrent increase in global operational commitments. Besides the traditional NATO and US Pacific Command exercises, tensions and developments in Southwest Asia and Latin America have placed additional demands on exercising our readiness in these critical regions and have tested the flexibility of program management.

An explanation of the planning cycle will aid in understanding the overall complexities of program management. The CINCs have the responsibility for planning and executing the exercises with oversight, funding, and issue support provided at the JCS level. As outlined earlier, continuity for the exercise program from year to year is maintained through the JCS Exercise Planning Guidance, designed to provide the strategic setting and direction for exercise planning over a five year period. While the EPG is published annually and is developed from the military requirements stated in the latest Defense Guidance, Unified Command Plan, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, inputs from the CINCs are also provided through their annual program assessments.

The EPG condenses national policy and military

strategy relevant to exercise planning into a single document, and translates them into objectives and priorities for the exercises. The primary purpose of the EPG is to provide the CINCs with the guidance necessary to preclude unintended redundancy in exercise objectives and over-commitment of forces. (7:A1-A2)

Taking the exercise process from planning stage through execution to after action requires an immense coordination effort through all levels beginning from the JCS and CINC staffs to the operators in the field. (See illustration 2.) The process begins with EPG distribution each summer with exercise objectives. This is followed by the CINC exercise conferences held in the fall of the year to plan their exercises in line with the EPG. The CINCs then submit their schedule in January to JCS for draft publication to be worked at the annual worldwide JCS scheduling conference held in February. All parties with an interest in the JCS Exercise Program are represented at this worldwide conference. These include: the US Commands, the military Services, defense agencies and other appropriate government agencies. (7:A2-A3)

The purpose of the conference is to field the five-year draft exercise schedule to resolve conflicts, coordinate the overall exercise program, firm up funding data

# THE JCS JOINT EXERCISE SCHEDULE CYCLE




Illustration 2  
Source (7: A-20)

for near-year exercises and to discuss future program objectives. The conference produces a clean product that needs one more iteration of CINC approval before processing the schedule as a JCS MOP 132 action for JCS approval and publication. (7:A3)

During the formal approval process at JCS, each Service determines supportability of the schedule with forces and O&M funds. If a reduction must be made, specific recommendations will be made by that Service.

JCS approval and publication means that the first fiscal year of the five-year program is approved subject to congressional appropriations and final allocations. Exercises in the second fiscal year are approved for continued planning only, and units are identified to enable coordination. The third, fourth, and fifth years into the future are approved for planning, refinement, and development. (7:A5-A7)

The JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated five-year exercise schedule translates the EPG into a viable program which contains dates, locations, objectives, and forces. Annual transportation cost estimates are also incorporated which tie the exercise program into the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System and provides the CINCs a yardstick with which to measure their budget.

JCS provides assistance and works issues and modifications as required during the planning phase. During the execution phase, each CINC executes as planned and JCS monitors. Selected exercises are evaluated to ensure readiness training is maximized. Exercise evaluations are made available to the US Commands and Services to prevent recurrence of deficiencies. An after-action report to JCS from the CINCs is required on every JCS-directed exercise and those JCS-coordinated exercises each CINC deems appropriate. Of particular importance are matters of doctrine and tactics that warrant attention; problems encountered and solutions employed; problems requiring Service or JCS assistance; and the extent to which the purpose and objectives in the EPG were achieved. Significant problems are identified as remedial action projects for resolution or presentation.

(7:AB-A14)

Along with the exercise after-action reports, the CINCs are required to submit an annual program analysis that assesses program accomplishment and provides recommendations to modify objectives. The JCS will also conduct an annual analysis of the previous year's program. These analyses and recommendations are the conclusion of the previous year's program but also lead into the first step of the next year's cycle. To complete the circle of readiness training, the

lessons learned are incorporated into the Remedial Action Program, analyzed and disseminated. The results are incorporated in the annual update of the JCS Exercise Planning Guidance for future exercise correction. (7:A4)

## CHAPTER U

### FUNDING

Since formal inception in 1969, the JCS Exercise Program has undergone a considerable period of growth--both in number and size of exercises and cost. The current JCS Exercise Program exceeds \$400 million annually in direct funding provided by the JCS and the Services. (8:1) This section will trace the history of program funding, look at some of the major funding management decisions, and assess the impact that current funding has on the JCS Exercise Program.

#### History

1969-1982:

When the JCS Exercise Program was formalized in 1969, there was no centralized funding management. Each Service budgeted funding requirements for their participation in exercises. In addition, each Service provided airlift and sealift transportation dollars to meet the joint community's exercise transportation costs. For example, the Air Force was responsible in its annual budget to fund for all exercise related airlift costs as well as Service-unique exercise costs in support of Air Force forces.

Lack of centralized funding management of the JCS Exercise Program created a unique situation in which the exercise requirements of the CINCs of the U&S Commands were not always being met--primarily due to lack of funding to meet their specific exercise needs, particularly airlift and sealift transportation costs. At the same time, Service exercise funding, which included airlift and sealift transportation funds, went unused each year. This dilemma had been created by major unprogrammed changes by the U&S Commands to transportation requirements for their exercises that caused significant fund misallocations, in turn resulting in unused Service funding each year. (8:1-3)

By 1979, the JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercise program had grown to approximately 39 exercises per year. The CINC exercise requirements versus Service funding dilemma became unmanageable. As a result, a 1979 Government Accounting Office audit of the JCS Exercise Program identified several major problem areas. These included:

- a. a need for JCS to assume a greater role in the overall management of the program
- b. a need to provide expanded guidance to the CINCs on program direction
- c. the need to develop and provide an in-depth evaluation of CINC-sponsored exercises

d. the need to provide a uniform system to disseminate exercise lessons learned

e. JCS should have a larger role and participation in exercise funding decisions. (8:2)

This chapter will deal only with the greater need for JCS management and participation in exercise funding decisions.

During the early 1980s, the JCS Exercise Program doubled in size. The number of exercises jumped from 49 in 1980 to 89 in 1981. Service transportation funding in support of the exercise program increased from \$114 million to \$199 million during the same time period. (17:6) This growth was primarily caused by expanded roles and missions as prescribed by the Unified Command Plan and the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). RDJTF exercises, with deployments to the Southwest Asia region, were heavily transportation dependent (primarily airlift). The resulting heavy increase in transportation costs to meet RDJTF exercise requirements reduced the funds available for the other CINCs' exercises.

This rapid expansion of RDJTF exercises had a collateral effect on other CINC exercises schedules: they expanded despite budget considerations resulting in major management problems for Service-funded transportation

dollars. Now CINC transportation requirements exceeded Service-budgeted programs. (16:9)

As a result of CINC transportation requirements exceeding Service-funded requirements, the Services were caught in the middle of competing CINC priorities. For example, the Air Force, as single manager of airlift flying hour budgeting, was often accused of not supporting one CINC's needs in order to support another's requirement. The same was so with the other Services as managers of their respective Transportation Operating Agencies (Military Sealift Command and Military Traffic Management Command). In addition to shortage of transportation funding, exercise scheduling conflicts impacted on the Services' day to day "real world" mission requirements (ie, airlift and sealift). (17:4)

1982 - Present:

Competition for funds, difficulties in prioritization, conflict of interests, and need for centralization was behind the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1982. This Act mandated that JCS assume management of the exercise program. Exercise transportation funding was transferred from the Services to JCS in order to provide

centralized management and better oversight and control of exercise resources intended for the CINCs. This strengthened the CINCs' position in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process by moving their requirements out of the Services' control. Transportation dollars for the JCS Exercise Program were now under JCS control, and they no longer had to compete with Service budget requirements during periods of austere funding. Service-unique exercise funding remained the responsibility of the individual Services.

(17:2)

Under this new procedure, the JCS was now responsible for the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of all transportation dollars required to support the JCS Exercise Program. This included three categories of transportation funding: airlift, sealift, and port handling/inland transportation. CINC exercise transportation and port handling requirements were now submitted directly to the JCS. Exercise transportation dollars were no longer in competition with individual Service budgets, but now were submitted by JCS as part of the overall DOD budget submission process.

(8:3)

Each Service was left with its own O&M funding to support its respective force participation in the exercise program. However, each Service O&M account which supports


the JCS Exercise Program is different. For example, Temporary Duty (TDY) costs for Air Force participation comprises approximately 70 percent of the total Air Force exercise budget. The Army exercise budget does not include TDY costs for exercise participants. Approximately 30 percent of the annual Army budget is for maneuver damage incurred during FTXs. The Navy does not budget separately for exercise costs. Costs incurred by participating naval exercise forces are considered part of the day to day fleet operations tempo.(13:5) Illustration 3 provides categories of Air Force funding supported in the Air Force program.

In addition to creating centralized management of the exercise program under JCS control, the 1982 Appropriations Bill intent was to add stability to the growth of the program. However, the JCS Exercise Program continued to see extensive growth during the 1982-1985 period. Program funding, including JCS, Army, and Air Force, increased from \$355.3 million in 1982 to \$464.7 million in 1985, a 30 percent increase. (See illustration 4.) Impact from 1980 to 1985 on budgeted airlift requirements (as expressed in C-141 equivalent (Eq) flying hours\*--note next page) is shown by the increase from 45,000 to 76,500 funded hours, a 67 percent increase. (17:3) (See illustration 5.)

# USAF OTHER COSTS

- PER DIEM ALLOWANCES
- EXPENDABLE SUPPLIES
- OTHER MINOR EXERCISE COSTS
  
- PLANNING CONFERENCE TDYS
- PARTICIPANTS TDY
- PER DIEM
- VEHICLE RENTAL
- CONTRACT BILLETING
- COMMUNICATIONS RENTAL
- ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATING SUPPLIES
  
- NON-FLYING POL REQUIREMENTS
- REPLENISHMENT OF WRM EQUIPMENT
- GROUND TRANSPORTATION COSTS
- OVERHIRE OF KP/DRIVERS, ETC.
- RANGE COSTS AND RENTALS
- ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEYS
- ALL ADDITIVE COSTS...

# PROGRAM FUNDING



# AIRLIFT GROWTH

## C-141 - EQUIVALENT HOURS




Illustration 5  
Source (13:6)

In addition to the rapid growth that the exercise program experienced during the first half of the 1980s, the program also experienced management and execution problems. Rapid growth of the program was primarily due to the maturity of the RDJTF into the US Central Command and changes to the political situation in Central America. In addition, JCS exercises became a vehicle for political and national objectives. Taskings from outside the control of the US Commands, such as the National Command Authority, Department of State, and Department of Defense added to the number of exercises per year.

\*NOTE: The JCS Exercise Program is managed in C-141 Equivalent (Eq) flying hours vice airlift dollars. C-141 Eq hours are derived by dividing total budgeted airlift dollars by the current C-141 Airlift Service Industrial Fund (ASIF) rate. The ASIF rate is the price that the airlift user is charged per flying hour. Each airlift aircraft has a different ASIF rate (1988: C-141, \$2247; C-5, \$6588; and C-130, \$1466). These rates change each year for each type of aircraft. Since the majority of airlift hours are actually C-141 hours (approximately 80 percent per year), it is easier for the CINCs to manage the exercise program in C-141 Eq hours vice airlift dollars. Problems with using C-141 Eq hours as a management tool are discussed in the text. (6:23)

For example, in 1985 fifteen exercises were added to the program without any additional funding.\*(see note bottom page) With primarily a zero-based budget, this required the sponsoring exercise CINC to reduce or cancel other exercise commitments in order to free funding and forces to support these new exercises. (16:5)

JCS management of exercise transportation funding during 1983 and 1984 (following DOD Appropriations Bills) warranted a follow-up to the 1979 General Accounting Office report. This follow-up report stated, "Management has been strengthened, but more needs to be done." (19:16) (See illustration 6.)

Through 1984 the JCS managed the exercise program by allocating funding on an annual basis to each CINC as a proportioned share of the total exercise budget. This provided each CINC the flexibility to manage their own program. However, due to exercise cancellations and other problems, the CINCs continued to under-use allocated funding. For example, in 1983 the JCS returned \$23 million (6,043 C-141 Eq hours) to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. (See illustration 6.) Although the CINCs' exercise

\*NOTE: Sheer numbers of JCS exercises can be misleading due to the range of exercise size and distance traveled. Many smaller exercises may be supported by the same cost of one large REFORGER or TEAM SPIRIT exercise.

GROWTH OF THE JCS EXERCISE PROGRAM

(C-141 E HOURS)

<u>HOURS</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>	<u>FY 85</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>
FUNDED	52,904	54,603	64,772	53,900 <sup>1</sup>	71,000	76,500	74,990	74,000
EXECUTED	39,800	52,400	61,527	54,400	63,000	75,000	66,000 <sup>2</sup>	71,169

NOTE 1 REFLECTS \$23.0M (6,043 C-141 E hours) turned in to OSD due to cancellation of exercises and underfly of program.

2 Reflects \$22.1M Gramm-Rudman and OSD reduction to the program.


requirements now had visibility and were funded separately from Service budgets, there was still excessive program underspending. Programmatic oversight was minimal. (7:4; 6:18)

Underspending the exercise program compounded the following year's exercise budget process. The JCS had to fight program cuts (use it or lose it policy) in the five year budget cycle each year due to the previous year's poor program execution.

In 1985 the JCS changed its management policy. The CINCs were now required to state requirements for each exercise in terms of airlift hours and sealift days, vice dollars. This enabled the JCS and the CINCs to establish historical records for each exercise. Thus each CINC was now able to validate his exercise requirements based on historical transportation allocations. (See illustration 7) The JCS now maintains central management control, and funds (in terms of airlift hours, sealift days, and port handling/inland transportation) are programmed and executed on an exercise-by-exercise basis. (12:14)

In addition, a "use it or lose it" transportation management policy on a quarterly basis was adopted. If a CINC underspent transportation allocations on a particular exercise, these dollars reverted to JCS control at the end of

# FY88 AIRCRAFT ALLOCATION 76,500 C-141 EQUIVALENT HOURS



each quarter. A CINC could no longer "bank" these dollars for future exercises during the current fiscal year. All funding recaptured by the JCS at the end of each quarter was then used to satisfy unfunded requirements (those exercises planned but not funded at the beginning of the fiscal year due to low CINC priorities, and/or lack of adequate funding and forces to meet all exercise needs). (See illustration 8) All CINC unfunded and/or new exercise requirements were prioritized, and recaptured funding was then re-allocated quarterly to the CINCs for program execution. As a result of this new management policy, the program execution rate was over 99 percent in FYs 1986 and 1987. (12:14; 17:19) (See illustration 6.)

These new management policies resolved the program execution concerns, but did not solve the CINCs' program requirements. By FY 1985, identified CINC exercise requirements totaled over 90,000 C-141 Eq hours. The JCS, with Service concurrence, determined that the program could no longer continue to grow at an unconstrained rate. A baseline needed to be defined for the exercise program. (8:5-7; 19:17)

Three primary constraints--funding, airlift, and forces were identified. It was determined that forces and airlift were the limiting factors. (19:17; 8:6)

# JCS EXERCISE PROGRAM

## DEVELOPMENT/EXECUTION PROCESS




Illustration 8  
Source (17:20)

The Services concluded that current force levels committed to the JCS Exercise Program could not be increased without interfering with unit training requirements. In addition, some special purpose forces, such as Special Operations Forces, were already committed to the maximum. The airlift required to support the current level of force commitment was approximately 75,000 C-141 Eq hours. The Military Airlift Command (MAC) also determined that 75,000 airlift hours was the maximum exercise commitment that could be made using peacetime operational planning factors. At the FY 1985 CINCs' conference, 75,000 C-141 Eq hours was established as the JCS Exercise Program baseline. (17:9)

The 75,000 C-141 Eq hour baseline was further adjusted by the Defense Review Board in August 1986. This baseline was adjusted to 78,000 hours per year (starting with FY 1988) in order to exercise the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF), which became operational in FY 1986. This additional 3,000 hours provides the minimum essential joint readiness training required to exercise the MPF as stated in the current Defense Guidance. (13:6; 16:5)

Department of Defense budget constraints, however, have prevented the JCS Exercise Program funding from reaching this new baseline. Referring to illustration 4, funding for

the program dips to the FYs 1982-1984 levels in 1990, but increases to 74,000 hours for the fiscal outyears 1992-1994. Operational and maintenance funding for the Army and Air Force funding in support of the exercise program reached its peak (including inflation) in FY 1985. (See illustration 3.) Although Army O&M funding shows growth for inflation only throughout the Five Year Defense Plan, funding is still below the FY 1985 level in which 75,000 C-141 Eq hours were flown in support of the program. Air Force O&M funding, on the other hand, is at the FY 1980 level, in which 39,000 C-141 Eq hours were flown in support of the program.

#### New Roles Funded for the JCS Exercise Program

As a function of the experiences of conducting US Southern Command FTXs in Central America, policy makers gained an appreciation for the great positive impact these small-scale exercises had on the development of military capabilities by allied nations and the equally positive impact humanitarian activities by US personnel had on local populations. As a result, Congress approved three new Title 10 authorities for the Department of Defense in the FY 1987 budget authorization bill. These initiatives were designed to allow the CINCs to expand their cooperation with friendly governments.

The first two of these programs are managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with the JCS/J-5 Security Assistance function as the executive agent for the JCS and the CINCs. These programs include Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (H/CA) efforts and a program to fund the personal expenses of foreign personnel. The H/CA program was authorized \$16.4 million over five years to provide medical and dental care, construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, basic sanitation facilities, well drilling, and repair of public facilities. These must be used in conjunction with authorized military operations. The personal expense program authorized \$800,000 a year for three years to pay travel, subsistence, and similar expenses of defense personnel of developing countries during attendance at conferences, seminars, or meetings. (12:16-17)

The third program is the Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program, managed by JCS/J7. This program authorizes the Secretary of Defense to pay the incremental expenses of a developing country participating in a combined exercise. These expenses include such items as transportation, rations, fuel, ammo for training, etc. The exercise does not have to be a part of the JCS Exercise Program, but it must enhance US security interests and the country must be unable to afford to pay the expenses of participation. First

year money spent was \$1.3 million in FY 1987 for exercises by five CINCs with 17 countries. \$2.9 million was approved for FY 1988 exercises with 30 countries participating. The controls for this program are tight: program initiatives derived from the CINCs are submitted through JCS for validation, then are forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for coordination with the State Department prior to approval by the Secretary of Defense. (12:18-19)

These three programs involve modest funds but provide excellent dividends. They have enabled poorer nations to participate in regional readiness training exercises that are consonant with US security interests. For the first time, many less developed nations are participating in joint and combined exercises, developing new skills and capabilities for self and regional defense.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE 1988 JCS EXERCISE REVIEW

The JCS Exercise Program is the principal means by which the Chairman's responsibility for joint training is achieved. However, by the end of 1987 the program had grown rapidly to a size and tempo that was being challenged by declining fiscal, transportation, and manpower resources. (22:1) (See Chapter U.) In early 1988, reflecting frustration from the growth of the number of exercise-related funding and transportation issues, the Director of the Joint Staff, OJCS, directed a review of the program to provide recommendations related to the following areas:

- a. size and tempo of the program
- b. airlift and support constraints
- c. balance of JCS transportation and Service O&M funding, to include alternate funding of Service O&M support
- d. flexibility of program to meet changing requirements, priorities, and national strategy
- e. administrative workloads
- f. manning levels at CINC staffs
- g. resource allocation by CINC
- h. CINC/Service input (22:2)

After approval, recommendations based on the study by the Joint Exercise Review Working Group (JERWG) were to be incorporated in an update of two joint publications--the JCS Exercise Procedural Guidance for the JCS-Directed and JCS-Coordinated Exercise Program, and the JCS Exercise Planning Guidance.

A synopsis of the 1988 JERWG recommendations are as follows: (22:atch 1-7)

A. The current program funding baseline of 74,000 C-141 Eq flying hours (as validated by the DRB in 1988) should be retained until a zero-based program can be formulated based on total training requirements and capabilities. The review group recommended that the U&S Commands develop Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLS) to determine specific joint training requirements predicated against the Joint Strategic Capability Plan force assignments and missions.

B. The annual cycle of large FTXs strain service resources and precludes adequate planning both to incorporate lessons learned from recently concluded exercises and to prepare forces to take maximum advantage of the training opportunity presented by the exercise. Scheduling of large-scale recurring exercises on a biennial basis was recommended to allow time for lessons learned from the

previous exercise to be incorporated into the next. Force availability, transportation constraints, real world operational tempo, and geopolitical concerns must be given careful consideration when changing to this biennial cycle.

C. The US Commands should be required to list, in order of priority, their JCS Exercise Program requirements, including treaty obligations and regional initiatives. This prioritization would make program objectives visible to all parties and aid in determining resource allocations and resolving conflicts.

D. Effective management of the JCS Exercise Program and determination of the CINCs' resource allocations require visibility of all joint training and operational events that can satisfy JMETL requirements. The CINCs should identify all training events that met JMETL requirements. With the requirements thus quantified, the establishment of a zero-based JCS Exercise Program baseline and subsequent CINC allocations should follow a review of all training events available to meet each CINC's approved JMETL requirements.

E. The JCS should retain the responsibility for transportation funding with the Services managing O&M costs for the program. These allocations must balance and the Services must program, protect, and provide adequate O&M funds and forces to meet JCS five-year exercise schedule

requirements. Withdrawal of funding or force allocations by the Services, for any reason, should be approved or disapproved by joint action through the JCS.

F. The JCS Exercise Program requires greater flexibility to respond to critical new requirements after funds and forces have been allocated. Following the development of a zero-based program, the review group recommended that the terms "JCS-directed" and "JCS-coordinated" exercises be discontinued. All exercises in the JCS program would be referred to as "JCS exercises". Prioritization of requirements would be accounted for in the zero-based program.

G. To provide maximum efficiency, and preclude unsupportable requirements, months with peak airlift taskings must be identified. This will require close coordination between the CINCs and the Military Airlift Command prior to the fall series of CINC planning conferences.

H. Commands should ensure that they have a program to develop and evaluate exercise objectives. This will aid in determining their joint training requirements and any remedial actions needed to improve warfighting capability. While JCS may assist in some aspects of evaluation, evaluation programs administered by the CINCs are necessary to the JMETL development process, fulfillment of joint

training responsibilities, and determination of other requirements.

I. The current JCS-sponsored command post exercises as outlined in JCS MOP 177 satisfy national level requirements and should be retained on the current biennial basis.

J. Reporting requirements are adequate. However, some small changes are warranted to reduce administrative burdens. Some reports may be combined and others are being reviewed for reduced frequency. Teleconferencing was recommended for pre-exercise conference planning.

K. Manning is adequate throughout the commands and the Joint Staff for current requirements. Additional responsibilities without concurrent offsets or additional manning would jeopardize effective management of the program.

The JERWG acknowledged the training challenges faced by the US Commands and the severe resource constraints placed on the Services. They felt that the implementation of recommendations would result in a program focused on Joint Strategic Capability Plan force and mission assignments, with quantifiable CINCPAC joint training requirements and identifiable joint training capabilities. With the addition of regional and national priorities in the EPG, training resources may be allocated in the most cost-effective manner.

(22:13)

This was an excellent, comprehensive review by the Joint Exercise Review Working Group. However, subject areas for further discussion and additional problem areas meriting resolution are outlined in the following chapter. We feel these items warrant consideration by any group assigned to oversee future reviews of the JCS Exercise Program.

CHAPTER VII  
ADDITIONAL PROBLEM AREAS

Definition

The definition of a JCS exercise needs to be expanded upon. Presently the definition lies with each CINC and his interpretation of how to best fulfill his region's objectives as outlined in the Exercise Planning Guidance. For example, a uni-Service exercise may qualify as a JCS exercise when it best fulfills CINC readiness training and geopolitical requirements. With the current emphasis on jointness and the interest by CINCs in seeing their exercises included in the JCS program, there is almost an automatic tendency to think every exercise must be joint. The danger in this type thinking is that it leads to jointness for jointness sake without regard to the best means to efficiently accomplish the CINCs' warfighting mission. This subtle distinction was recognized when the JERWG recommended renaming the JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercise program as the "JCS Exercise Program" instead of the "Joint Exercise Program". (See Chapter VI.) A better definition of a JCS exercise is needed to clarify and legitimize this distinction.

Exercise Schedule Deconfliction

Although the 1988 JERWG recommended that exercises be

scheduled on a biennial basis and earlier coordination be effected with MAC, the current development process for the five-year exercise schedule has no mechanism for deconflicting one CINC's exercise schedule from that of another. As a result, exercises are scheduled on top of each other, creating peaks and valleys in terms of exercise transportation and force requirements. The heavy spring and fall timeframes exceed MAC's peacetime airlift capabilities.

The Defense Resources Board (DRB) agreed to limit the size of airlift in support of the exercise program in 1985. However, it did not address the problem of overtasking airlift assets during the Spring and Fall timeframes. (17:9) Historically, most JCS exercises occur during the February-May and August-October timeframe, with very little exercise activity during the months of June, November, December, and January. Large scale exercises, such as the spring TEAM SPIRITS and the fall BRIGHT STARS and REFORGERS, generate smaller supporting exercises which occur simultaneously. For example, during the fall of 1987, 23 JCS exercises with overlapping dates were scheduled during the same period. Airlift tasking requirements for the month of August exceeded 13,000 C-141 Eq hours, nearly triple MAC's peacetime exercise airlift capability. (6:34-35) Several independent factors contribute to this problem:

A. The "Bigger-is-Better Syndrome", wherein exercises tend to increase in size and scope each year. The rapid growth of the exercise program during the early 1980s saw the emphasis on making exercises such as the TEAM SPIRIT, REFORGER, BRIGHT STAR, and GALLANT KNIGHT/GALLANT EAGLE series expand rapidly in size. For example, REFORGER troop deployment doubled during this time, culminating in 1987 with the deployment of two division-equivalents involving over 31,000 troops. This corps size exercise represented a three-fold increase over the 1977 REFORGER exercise. (27:3) (See illustration 9.)

B. A decrease in organic airlift capability due to the transfer of airlift airframe assets to the Air Force Reserve (AFRES) and Air National Guard (ANG). (See illustration 10.) During FY 1985, MAC began to transfer C-5, C-141, and C-130 aircraft to the AFRES and ANG. In addition, aircrew ratios per aircraft for C-5 and C-130s were reduced. By 1992, these reductions will reflect a loss of 58,000 flying hours per year for MAC organic (i.e., MAC-owned) airlift. (29:1-6) (See illustration 11)

Use of Air Reserve Force (ARF: AFRES plus ANG) assets during large-scale exercises is difficult due to aircrew availability. Large-scale exercises usually involve aircrew staging operations (where the aircrew may be in the

HISTORICAL DATA  
ON  
MAJOR JCS EXERCISES

<u>EXERCISE NAME</u>		<u>CY 84</u>	<u>CY 85</u>	<u>CY 86</u>	<u>CY 87</u>	<u>CY 88</u>
REFORGER	HRS <sup>2</sup>	11,872	10,593 <sup>3</sup>	9,770 <sup>3</sup>	14,518 <sup>4</sup>	10,189
	PAX	18,948	19,028	20,000	31,268	22,185
	TONS	1,399	481	1,079	458	
TEAM SPIRIT	HRS	7,380	10,669	11,438	9,830	8,741
	PAX	16,216	21,000	23,473	24,864	32,600
	TONS	3,894	5,900	5,142	4,400	5,700
BRIGHT STAR <sup>5</sup>	HRS		13,753		13,555	
	PAX		10,104		10,736	
	TONS		3,188		2,638	
GALLANT EAGLE/ KNIGHT <sup>5</sup>	HRS	9,361		7,500		9,500
	PAX	19,225		16,300		
	TONS	6,336		4,689		

- NOTE: 1. Hours are C-141 Equivalent Hours
2. Projected requirements for FY 88 exercises.
3. Winter exercise occurring in Jan-Feb.
4. REFORGER 87 figures reflect a deployment of two division equivalents. Future REFORGERS are planned to return to one division equivalent.
5. BRIGHT STAR and GALLANT EAGLE/KNIGHT, USCENTCOM sponsored exercises, alternate during the even/odd years respectively.

# ORGANIC FLYING HOURS (C-17 SLIPPED 2 QTRS)




Illustration 10  
Source (30:3)

# LOST CAPABILITY

BY FY 92:

- TRANSFER: 40 C-5 =	14,920 HRS
32 C-141 =	25,888 HRS
- C-5 CREW RATIO 4.0 TO 3.6 =	3,007 HRS
- C-130 CREW RATIO 2.0 TO 1.75 =	6,309 HRS
- 1 C-130 SQ DEACTIVATED =	5,402 HRS
- 1 C-130 SQ REDUCED 8 PAA =	<u>2,701 HRS</u>
	58,227 HRS

system for 10-14 days) to maximize airframe use and minimize troop/cargo movement times. AAF aircrews normally are not available for these extended timeframes. As a result, the loss of organic airlift capability combined with the rapid growth of the exercise program severely overtasked MAC's ability to support its peacetime, worldwide airlift commitments.

C. Reliance on the purchase of commercial airline augmentation to alleviate overtasking of MAC organic airlift during peak times has in turn overtasked the commercial airline industry. Historically, approximately seven percent of the total commercial augmentation to MAC's organic airlift is directed towards the JCS Exercise Program. The majority of commercial lift has been used in the passenger carrying role during suitable exercises such as REFORGER. The airlift benefits MAC gains from the use of commercial augmentation are limited to exercises such as REFORGER in which troops deploy without unit equipment and debark at suitable airfields. Therefore, commercial augmentation has utility for only a specific few exercises. (1:1)

During the airlift spike in the Fall 1987 airlift spike, (due to BRIGHT STAR and REFORGER), heavy airlift tasking exceeded the availability of commercial augmentation

as well as MAC organic airlift capability. This spike reflected the largest airlift demand since the Vietnam War. (1:1)

D. Lack of adequate JCS transportation funding has resulted in the Services using their own transportation funds to purchase MAC's Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) flying hours in order to deploy additional exercise forces. Funding for SAAM flying hours derives from non-exercise funding categories intended to support real world transportation requirements. During the Fall 1987 airlift spike, nearly 4,100 C-141 Eq hours were flown as SAAMs in support of one exercise alone. As a result of the heavy organic airlift taskings, MAC was unable to support 284 other missions in support of Department of Defense requirements worldwide. (1:1)

Special Assignment Airlift Missions also provide direct support to Air Force Major Command training programs, such as Tactical Air Command's CORONET/CHECKERED FLAG series. These programs provide additional fighter and other forces as augmentation to JCS exercises, but are Service, not JCS, funded. Current figures are not available as to the total contribution that SAAMs provide to the exercise program. However, what is known is that these requirements compound MAC's airlift problems during peak exercise periods.

E. Exercise scheduling conflicts unique to each CINC's region create special time windows in which to conduct exercises. The majority of JCS exercises are conducted as joint/combined exercises in conjunction with host country forces availability. Religious holidays, such as the Moslem Ramadan, further complicate the scheduling process since the date varies each calendar year. Climate, weather, planting and harvest seasons also dictate exercise scheduling in order to reduce collateral damage to crops and land. And in certain cases, joint/combined exercises with one nation must be de-conflicted with a neighboring country for political reasons.

As a result, a CINC becomes somewhat limited as to when certain exercises can be conducted. For example, the spike of 23 exercises being conducted simultaneously during the fall of 1987 was a result of many of the above factors. (11:C1-C2)

In addition, US forces, primarily in the ARF components, are only available during certain times of the year. For example, during exercise REFORGER, many Army Reserve component forces were available for only a 14-day period. This severely constricts airlift deployment and redeployment scheduling options, adding to airlift spikes.

The cumulative effect of these independent factors

has seriously impacted MAC's capability to support the JCS Exercise Program as well as its day-to-day airlift support to the defense community. In January 1988, MAC imposed new restrictions on airlift availability in direct support of the JCS Exercise Program. These include a desired level of 3900 C-141 Eq hours per month, with the capability to surge to 5500 C-141 hours per month during peak periods. Due to further transfer of organic airlift to Air Reserve Force units in FY 1990, the peak period effort is further reduced to 5000 C-141 hours per month. However, the current JCS exercise schedule shows an airlift requirement of 12,295 C-141 Eq hours for the month of September 1990. (1:1; 30:18)

#### JCS and Service Exercise Funding Disconnects

The JCS Exercise Program funding process is disjointed in that Service Program Objective Memorandums (POM: prioritized lists of Service, JCS, and CINC funding requirements used to develop OSD's input for the President's budget submission to Congress) and the JCS POM are submitted independently of each other although they support the same exercise program.

As stated in Chapter U, the JCS has had the responsibility for all transportation funding in support of the JCS Exercise Program since 1983. The JCS develops and

manages the program in terms of airlift hours, sealift days, and port handling and inland transportation dollars. This provides a stable base from which the CINCs' forecast future requirements. However, during the POM process, budget submissions are expressed in dollars.

Airlift Service Industrial Fund rates for airlift (used as the prime example since airlift costs constitute approximately 90 percent of the JCS exercise transportation funds used each year.) change from year to year for each type of airlift aircraft. (i.e., fluctuating fuel costs cause like fluctuations in the ASIF.) Funding is appropriated in terms of dollars, not airlift hours. As a result, a given funding level in dollars buys a different amount of airlift hours each year, depending on the current ASIF rate for that year. The turbulence created by fluctuating ASIF rates impacts on the availability of exercise transportation for each CINC and each exercise. Historically, ASIF rates are inflationary in nature; thus increased funding is required to buy the same amount of airlift hours from one year to the next. In as much as the ASIF is a revolving account (operating costs and expenses equal the tariff rate charged to the operating customer), new rates are usually not available to be included in the Five-Year Defense Plan

budgeting process. Thus, there is little stability to the exercise program budgeting process.

Implementation of the 1982 Appropriations Bill, which transferred JCS exercise transportation funding to the JCS, left Service-unique O&M exercise funding the responsibility of each Service. The JCS transportation and Service O&M exercise budget requests are submitted annually as separate documents. Service exercise budget submissions are part of the Individual Service POMs; thus they are susceptible to independent scrutiny. There is no linkage between any of the separate submissions in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. As a result, JCS and Service funding may not support other's exercise program efforts. For example, Air Force O&M exercise funding for FY 1989 (\$29.1 million) is the same amount as it was in FY 1983. However, in fiscal year 1983, Air Force O&M for the program supported 74 exercises; in fiscal year 1989, the same amount supports Air Force participation in 93 exercises. Obviously, if funding is not increased to compensate for a larger commitment, Air Force's participation levels must be reduced or the Major Commands are forced to use their own O&M funding to support the same level of participation. Use of Major Command O&M funding to support the JCS Exercise Program adversely affects unit basic proficiency training. (13:4)

### Exercise Planning Process and POM Desynchronization

The five-year exercise planning process is out of synchronization with the POM process. Each February, the JCS conducts an annual worldwide exercise scheduling conference. At this conference, the following fiscal year's schedule is resolved. Conferees discuss current issues, resolve conflicts, and confirm exercise dates, forces, and transportation allocations by exercise. However, the corresponding President's budget for that fiscal year had already been submitted the previous month. Therefore, the JCS five-year exercise schedule under discussion was finalized without any regard for the already submitted budget.

### Focus on Low-Intensity Conflict

The post-World War II era has seen the steady growth of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). With stability by virtue of deterrence at the higher ends of the spectrum of conflict, LIC has emerged as the form of warfare US military forces are likeliest to see. Unfortunately, US military LIC force employment doctrine, force structure, and training has yet to face this reality in any significant way. (21:11.13) We are still focused on general war in Europe.

Admiral Crowe recognized the important need to develop a strong LIC warfighting posture when he directed creation of the NIEX series of JCS exercises. In addition, US Southern Command's series of Central American exercises underscored the rich dividends from use of US forces in humanitarian and civic action programs. These activities teach some valuable lessons in proper use of the military in LIC conflicts. Recognition by Congress of this fact resulted in the Title 10 programs outlined in Chapter V.

While these efforts have been useful, the fact remains that the JCS Exercise Program does not have a consistent LIC warfighting readiness training program that encompasses all the warfighting theaters. Even in the Central American exercises, US forces are employed in roles reflecting conventional Western military models. This is a repeat of the errors we made in Vietnam.

## CHAPTER VIII RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper has documented an important readiness training program that is still in a dynamic, evolutionary stage, with all the inherent problems involved with program maturation. Much has been accomplished in identifying and responding to problem areas. However, much more needs to be done.

At this point, we will comment on actions taken by the JERWG and point out possible avenues of improvement. Additionally, we will comment and recommend actions in additional areas we have identified in the previous chapter.

The JERWG has identified significant problem areas and has recommended workable solutions. Much work and scrutiny went into their review, and it is not our purpose to second guess their discerning examination. However, we do submit comments on areas we think the JERWG needs to include in their findings.

### Exercise on a Biennial Basis

To prevent future airlift spikes, the JERWG has emphasized closer and earlier coordination between MAC and the US commands. In effect, little has changed. The recommended JCS prioritization of exercises by the CINCs may

alleviate some of the problems. However, less MAC organic airlift in the future will compound the problem and host country date restrictions will not go away. The biggest aid to solving this problem is the recommendation that current large-scale exercises such as REFORGER alternately be large-scale one year and small-scale the next, or held on a biennial basis such as US Central Command's BRIGHT STAR Exercise. Due to future airlift problems and the benefit to be gained from the time available to properly incorporate the joint universal lessons learned from one exercise to the next, we recommend large exercises be held only on a biennial basis. Anything more frequent reduces the effectiveness of training, overcommits forces, strains already declining DOD budgets, and, in general, degrades the effectiveness of the entire exercise program. Treaties such as the Tri-lateral Agreement between the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the United States for REFORGER need to be renegotiated to reflect these realities.

#### Balancing JCS Transportation Funding and Service O&M Funding

When reviewing the success JCS has had in recent years in managing transportation funds for the JCS Exercise Program, the question arises: can the same success be duplicated by centralizing exercise O&M funding under JCS

management? The concept seems parallel. However, due to inherent complexities in O&M unit funding management and manning requirements at the JCS and US Command level, we feel as the JERWG, that the JCS should remain charged with transportation funding while the Services retain responsibility for O&M funding in support of exercises.

A possible correction to the current budget disconnects between the JCS transportation and Service O&M POM submissions may be possible without creating manning and other problems by expanding the JCS program element so that Service program elements for O&M are incorporated. This could be accomplished similar to the current funding arrangement for service port handling and inland transportation accounts. Services would still manage the day to day use of funding in support of their Service forces participation with JCS oversight.

Regardless of management, JCS transportation funding and Service O&M funding must remain in balance to maintain a viable exercise program. Service O&M funds supporting JCS exercises should not be withdrawn without JCS approval. It does no good to have transportation funding without O&M funding to support the exercise.

### JCS Exercise Program Development

Recommendations of the JERWG imply that the U&S Commands are required to prioritize their exercise programs based on JMETL criteria. (22:6) Funding for the exercise program will then be allocated based on the priority of the JMETL and training events to accomplish them. Historical funding percentages will no longer be used by JCS to allocate exercise transportation dollars to the U&S Commands. Funding will be predicated on the significance of the JMETL. However, there currently is no procedure or precedence for the JCS to determine which CINC's JMETL is more important.

We recommend the JCS conduct an in-depth review of the prioritization issue and establish criteria and procedures by which JMETL priorities can be established. In addition, many CINC exercises are conducted primarily for geopolitical reasons, not accomplishment of joint training. These geopolitical exercises will also need to be prioritized, and the order of precedence must somehow be merged with JMETL priorities.

The above three recommendations bear on the JERWG findings. We offer below recommendations also on the non-JERWG areas of concern outlined in the previous chapter.

### Definition

In our Chapter VII discussion, we argued for the need for a redefinition of a JCS exercise. This new definition would enable CINCs to identify single-Service exercises to be incorporated into the JCS Exercise Program when they support EPG and JMETL objectives. A definition is required that acknowledges that joint exercises are not the only valid means for a CINC to meet regional training and geopolitical concerns that support national policy and strategy.

### Exercise Scheduling Deconfliction

We recommend scheduling large-scale exercises on a biennial vice an annual basis to alleviate much of the current peak scheduling periods. Scheduling of exercises should be spread evenly throughout the year by a deconfliction session at quarterly JCS-hosted meetings. Any scheduling conflicts which overtask transportation assets (primarily airlift) can be resolved by the JMETL priority system which JCS proposes to use in the development of the new exercise program. Large-scale exercises should be tailored to meet mission-essential joint training tasks and economized to minimize the "bigger is better" syndrome that spawns numerous collateral exercises.

Forces which must use SRAM funding to support JCS exercises should be considered as additional and not primary forces, and allocated a lower priority than primary forces for exercise movement. These additional forces must be identified to MAC by the user soon after the deconfliction effort. This will enable MAC to develop and efficiently integrate SRAM and exercise deployment airlift flows, thus reducing flying hours and airframe commitments. Additionally, degradation of real world airlift support requirements will be minimized.

#### Joint Exercise Planning Group

We recommend that the JCS form a Joint Exercise Planning Group to meet on a quarterly basis. This group would be composed of exercise planners from the US Commands, Services, transportation components of US Transportation Command, and the OJCS. The purpose of this group would be to surface and resolve issues such as scheduling conflicts (both forces and overtasking of transportation assets), geopolitical issues, etc., before they become major problems. Currently these issues are not discussed until the annual JCS Exercise Scheduling Conference is conducted when it is usually too late to resolve conflicts. These issues need to

be resolved prior to the conference in order to finalize the five-year exercise schedule in a more efficient format.

#### Low Intensity Conflict Exercises Training

The lack of cohesive LIC doctrine and agreement on LIC warfighting strategy and tactics precludes development of a logical approach to LIC warfighting readiness training within the JCS Exercise Program. This deficiency is systemic and begs for a DOD-wide dedicated search for a new LIC doctrine that will give direction to funding, force structure, strategy, tactics, and importantly, increased readiness through exercise training.

We recommend a JCS-directed effort, with collaboration by the CINCs and Services, to establish LIC terms of reference and doctrine. A subset of such an effort, and necessarily sequential to the main effort, should be development of LIC training doctrine based on the emergent basic LIC doctrine. This training doctrine will be used to develop JMETL criteria for prioritizing exercise activities within the JCS Exercise Program.

## CHAPTER IX

### CONCLUSION

In the course of this paper, we have outlined the genesis and history of the JCS Exercise Program since its formal establishment in 1969. We have described the structure of the current program, the guidance that directs it, and the purposes the different types of exercises serve in meeting national policy and US strategic goals in promoting military readiness. Turning to program dynamics, we outlined the exercise program planning cycle and the key element for JCS management of the program--transportation fund management to enable the CINCs to meet their exercise commitments.

The final chapters of the paper outlined the findings of the 1988 JCS Exercise Review Working Group and listed additional areas of concern regarding the exercise program we identified. Our recommendations addressed these concerns.

This review of the JCS Exercise Program has surfaced several themes. The first of these is that JCS Exercise Program management has vastly improved since centralization of program transportation funding under JCS in 1983. We no longer see non-expenditure of available transportation funds. However, problems with uncentralized Service management of O&M funds for JCS Exercise Program use are still ripe for resolution.

A second theme is the significant impact the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act is starting to have on the direction and refinement of the program. This act gave the Chairman, JCS, the responsibility for: 1) exercising combat support units to ensure combat readiness; and, 2) assessing performance against standards the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman establish. The Chairman added the NIEX series of exercises to the exercise program to help him in this assessment. Establishment of a viable JMETL program will focus the warfighting community on meeting specific prioritized readiness training goals. The trend over time will be to build efficiencies into the program that work to eliminate nonproductive redundancy in exercises. No longer will an exercise be conducted quarterly, semiannually, etc., unless such frequency can be supported by the JMETL or another geo-political requirement. This priority of essential tasks to meet readiness objectives will determine allocation of funds, forces, transportation, and scheduling priorities to ensure the CINCs warfighting requirements are met. The Chairman, in coordination with the warfighting CINCs, will have the key say as to how the JMETL list evolves to meet readiness requirements.

A third theme is the strain of exercise schedule spikes on limited lift resources is being consciously

addressed. Unconstrained exercise program growth has been brought under control, easing the dilemma MAC has in trying to meet real world airlift demands concurrent with large exercise airlift flows. While the cap has been effective, significant problems with leveling the exercise load over a 12-month period has met with only limited success. Many diverse external factors, including geopolitical, climatic, and force availability concerns, result in exercise clumping and remain difficult to resolve. Attempts to do so at the annual JCS exercise planning conferences are generally fruitless since this forum is ill-timed for that purpose.

A fourth theme is that long standing complaints by CINCs over such issues as insufficient time between exercises to incorporate findings, overcommitment of forces to numerous repetitive exercises, and low return in conducting large scale exercises on an unvarying repetitive basis, are finally being heard. The 1988 JERWG findings and recommendations will go far to end or reduce the level of these problems.

The 1988 JERWG convened at a pivotal point in time for the JCS Exercise Program. As we enter an era of austere budgeting and declining resources, initiatives to focus the exercise program to meet specific readiness objectives and eliminate redundant and nonproductive exercises will enable

the program to continue to have viability despite reduced funding.

In our view, the JCS Exercise Program is in good shape and getting better. Steady centralization of program management and the focus on productive warfighting readiness training facilitated by the Chairman's new responsibility and authority under the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, are working to identify and eliminate inefficiencies and nonproductivity that long plagued the program. As the impact of the 1988 JERWG is felt over the next few years, we should see even more evidence that the right forces are exercising the right strategies, tactics, and procedures in the right exercises at the right times and places--for the right objectives.

## GLOSSARY

ASIF	Airlift Service Industrial Fund
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CPX	Command Post Exercise
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
DOD	Department of Defense
DAB	Defense Resources Board
EPG	Exercise Planning Guidance
Eq Hours	Equivalent Hours
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FY	Fiscal Year
H/CA	Humanitarian/Civic Assistance
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JERWG	Joint Exercise Review Working Group
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MOBEX	Mobilization Exercise

MOP	Memorandum of Policy
MPF	Maritime Prepositioned Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NIEX	No-Notice Interoperability Exercise
NUKEX	Nuclear Exercise
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OJCS	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
SARM	Special Assignment Airlift Mission
TDY	Temporary Duty
U&S Commands	Unified and Specified Commands
US	United States

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