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ARMED INTERVENTION IN TERRORIST HOSTAGE SITUATIONS:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Wallace Curry Gowin
B.S., Park College, 1982

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at

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ARMED INTERVENTION IN TERRORIST HOSTAGE SITUATIONS:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A Thesis

by

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Department of Criminal Justice

ABSTRACT

of

ARMED INTERVENTION IN TERRORIST HOSTAGE SITUATIONS:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

Wallace Curry Gowin

Statement of Problem

Numerous terrorist hostage situations have occurred throughout the world since the explosion of terrorist acts in the late 1960's, and each country involved has had to make a decision on when the optimum time of armed intervention should occur,

This study was conducted to provide a comparative analysis of the methods used by different countries which have dealt with terrorist hostage situations. Such information should enhance future government intervention policies formulated for dealing with these specific hostage situations. The following countries were used as a basis of analysis in this study: United States, West Germany, Israel, Italy, England, Spain, and France,

Sources of Data - Government (Foreign), Terrorism (EG)

The data for this thesis was obtained from an extensive study of the relevant literature that dealt with specific areas in the terrorism field, i.e., terrorists, anti-terrorism forces, legislation and terrorist hostage situations. Furthermore, information was examined in the fields of Criminal Justice, Political Science, Sociology, and Psychology, for an overall insight of the various factors affected

during terrorist hostage incidents.

Conclusions Reached

Although terrorist hostage situations have decreased since the 1970's, this has been mainly due to more countries willing to use armed force to free the hostages when the situation warrants. Better legislation and cooperation between countries in allowing joint rescue operations have also attributed to the decrease in hostage taking incidents. Decreases in hostage taking incidents have also been accounted for by increased security measures placed in effect to curtail skyjacking situations.

This research has shown that when a terrorist hostage situation occurs, a government must take steps immediately to contain the situation. When the site of the incident is a static location, the government and the force responsible for the use of armed intervention, will have a better chance of using sophisticated techniques and equipment to determine specific information about the situation. Information gained from these techniques and devices enable the decision making entity to determine the best course of action, whether it be negotiation, or armed intervention.

Committee Chair's Signature of Approval

Thomas R. Phelps



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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, and especially my late father, John C. Gowin, TSgt—retired, United States Air Force. Without his guidance and encouragement, I wouldn't be where I am today.

And to my wonderful family, especially my wife, who provided support, concern and affection during my past year of academic life. I don't see how they put up with all my crankiness and gruffness as I fought with deadlines on the massive amount of paperwork involved in my school work. I love them all very much.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The words "terrorism" or "terrorists" strike fear in the hearts and minds of many people. Mainly this is due to the extensive media hype that has accompanied each act of this nature. But part of this is also due to many governments using these terms to label groups in a pejorative manner. They deem to use the term "terrorists" when the group commits an act they disapprove of, but consider other groups they approve of which commit the same acts, "freedom fighters" or "Contras."

The acts that terrorists commit are atrocities against the moral consciousness of a population. Nobody condones the wanton killing of innocent bystanders and civilian targets for a cause that is directed against a government or corporate entity. But acts of assassination, bombings, and attacks against military targets should not be considered acts of terrorism if the cause is freedom for a country or people. The problems caused by terrorism are escalating and the acts seem to be more violent and the terrorist targets are becoming more indiscriminate. The inability of the concerned governments to retaliate against the instigators of these crimes is extremely frustrating to the governing bodies and the public which demand that terrorists be captured and punished.

This thesis will deal with that portion of the terrorist act which seems to be the hardest to deal with by governments, anti-terrorism forces, the public, and of course, the victim. That area

is known as the terrorist-hostage situation.

The reason it is the most difficult is because every hostage situation is unique in that one is dealing with people rather than objects. Therefore, no one idea or plan will work with every incident or type of incident. The terrorist-hostage taker has all the advantages: he knows the number of people in his organization, how they are armed, what he is willing to do to accomplish his goals...and yet a government must guess at his every move.

This researcher decided to take the tact that since there is no one way to deal with a terrorist-hostage incident, it would be best to examine the methods used in specific countries for dealing with terrorist-hostage incidents.

Statement of Problem

Since the early 1970's when aircraft hijackings first became a media event, numerous books, articles, and magazines have been published on every aspect of terrorism. A number of hypotheses have been forwarded on everything from what is perceived to be the causes of terrorism, to methods in which even biological factors are said to cause someone to become a terrorist, and concludes with listing the best methods for eliminating terrorism. It also seems that every author of a work on terrorism or terrorists has a different definition on what exactly comprises terrorism or terrorists in general. Even many of the different agencies of the United States Government have published numerous versions of the definition of terrorism!

However, this thesis will employ the definition of terrorism which is used by the United States Department of State:

Terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience. International terrorism is terrorism involving the citizens or territory of more than one country.¹

The above definition should be clarified by adding that the violence must be directed against innocent bystanders and targets. This definition is very useful because it eliminates all the rationalizations which have been used by terrorists to justify their acts.

The causes of terrorism are complex and the elimination of terrorist acts remains an unattainable goal. However, numerous authors have advanced ideas that might be effective when dealing with certain types of terrorist acts.

A serious problem is that there is no one acceptable plan of action developed by all countries to deal with terrorist acts. While it is true that no one plan can be effective with all incidents of terrorist acts, a general plan, on an international scale, should be developed to deal with terrorist acts and the plan should be followed by all countries. For example, some countries refuse to negotiate with any terrorist group, at least openly, (i.e., the United States and Israel), while others gave in to all demands in the hope that the groups would terminate their terrorist activities (i.e., Brazil and Japan). Some countries have learned that one cannot submit to terrorist group demands and a firmer policy is needed to ameliorate the problem (i.e. Brazil and France).

However, as mentioned before, the act which is the most difficult

group holds hostages for ransom in order to achieve certain conditions. The country usually has three choices when this action occurs: (1) ignore the situation (impractical); (2) negotiate with the terrorists for the hostages freedom; or (3) use armed intervention to attack the hostage scene and attempt a rescue of the victims.

Terrorist hostage situations have occurred throughout the world and each country involved has had to make a decision on when the optimum time of armed intervention should occur. It is a decision some countries have been reluctant to make. Sometimes this hesitation has been due to lack of knowledge of all options available to them, but probably the main reason is the possibility of failure and killing of the hostages to world condemnation.

As just one example of the number of hostage situations that have occurred, Professor Yerushalmi found that there were approximately 673 international aircraft hijackings from 1968 to 1985. These acts composed over 23 percent of all terrorist incidents during this time period. Of these 673 acts, there were 9739 passengers of which 340 were wounded or killed during the 114 incidents in which² armed intervention was employed to terminate the hostage situation.

Need for Study

This study is necessary in order to provide a comparative analysis of the methods used by different countries which have dealt with terrorist-hostage situations. Such information will enhance future government intervention policies formulated for dealing with these specific situations. Selected countries that have engaged in hostage rescue attempts will be analyzed to ascertain various factors inherent

in the decision making process. A profile will be prepared for each country outlining the history of legislation of laws directed against terrorist acts, the formation of specific anti-terrorist forces, and this will be followed by an assessment of the hostage situations themselves.

Scope and Limitations of Study

In order to understand how a country responds to a terrorist hostage situation, it is important to examine the policies of a country which are employed when dealing with terrorist-hostage situations. In addition, an examination of how and why the country created their forces that deal with terrorists and how those forces are trained is important in gaining an understanding of how they employ those forces in various situations confronting them. It is important to know the various types of terrorist organizations endangering a country because some terrorist organizations can be controlled more easily. The following countries will be used as a basis of analysis in this study: United States, West Germany, Israel, Italy, England, Spain, and France.

Definitions

The following definitions of terms will be used in this thesis. These specific terms, as they relate to this study, will be used to enhance the clarity of this research.

ARMED INTERVENTION: Overt use of armed soldiers/policemen/anti-terrorist troops used to try and free hostages held by terrorists.

HOSTAGE INCIDENT: Any incident that involves a terrorist who has a hostage(s) in his control in which the location of the hostage and terrorists are known to the authorities. The location can be any static or movable location, such as a car, plane, bus, house, embassy or train. In the case of buildings used in an incident, only the building location has to be known, but not necessarily the exact room. A kidnap victim can become a hostage according to this definition if the location is located later, i.e. General Dozier was KIDNAPED in Italy by a terrorist organization but became a HOSTAGE in this context when his location was discovered by Italy's anti-terrorism forces and was rescued.

KIDNAPING: When a person(s) is/are held against their will in an unknown location to government/police forces.

NON-VIOLENT INTERVENTION: Any act used to try and free a hostage from a terrorist that does not use overt armed intervention. Simple use of armed individuals as a show of force surrounding a scene is NOT armed intervention in this sense. An example of non-violent intervention would be negotiation with the terrorists.

TERRORISM: Is the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience. International terrorism is terrorism involving the citizens or territory of more than one country.

TERRORIST: Any person(s) that commit violent acts, such as bombings, hostage taking, and assassination, against innocent bystanders and targets not associated with the entity they are trying to

influences. The individuals may call themselves anything from a "Freedom fighter", "Contra", to a "Revolutionary."

Methodology

The data for this thesis will be obtained from an extensive review of the relevant literature that deal with specific areas in the terrorism field, i.e., terrorists, anti-terrorism forces, legislation and terrorist-hostage situations. Furthermore, information will be examined from the fields of Criminal Justice, Political Science, Sociology, and Psychology, for an overall insight of the various factors affected during terrorist hostage incidents. The analysis conducted on all information gathered will be disseminated throughout the various chapters of this thesis.

Organization of Remainder of Study

The remaining chapters of this thesis will be composed of the following information: Chapter 2 contains an in-depth review of the literature, to include books, periodicals, newspaper articles, government documents, and publications in the area of terrorism; anti or counter-terrorism; international and individual countries laws regarding terrorism; and armed intervention in terrorist-hostage incidents with special attention to the United States, West Germany, Israel, Italy, England, Spain, and France. Chapter 3 contains a summary, conclusion, discussion and recommendations on how to treat terrorist-hostage incidents.

NOTES

¹

United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism,
1987 (Washington: GPO, 1988), v.

²

Mordechai Yerushalmi, "The Use of Force as a Response to
Airplane Hijackings," American Society of Criminology, Chicago, 11
November 1988.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

Terrorism is one of the most difficult problems confronting a nation, both for the present and the future. The acts committed by terrorists are generally indiscriminate, random, and the effects cross multi-national boundaries. The rates of terrorist acts have increased rapidly over the past 10 years and will probably continue to escalate over the next ten years as we approach the twenty first century.

However, as Neil C. Livingstone states so succinctly:

The term terrorism is widely misused. It is utilized in its generic sense as a form of shorthand by governments and the media and is applied to a variety of acts and occurrences that approximate terrorism in form but not in substance or, worse yet, that have no real resemblance to terrorism at all. Terrorism, if nothing else, is violence, or threats of violence, but it is not mindless violence, as some observers have charged. Usually, when employed in a political context, it represents a calculated series of actions designed to intimidate and sow fear throughout a target population in an effort to produce a pervasive atmosphere of insecurity, a widespread condition of anxiety.¹

There have been tens of thousands of terrorist type acts committed from the mid 1960's to date. Most of the fatalities have been due to the use of explosive devices, however, some of the figures account for casualties of various acts considered as terrorist in nature, although they could rightfully be called military casualties. One example is the suicide bombing of the United States Marines and French soldiers barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. Although there were considerable casualties, it can be safely argued that the bombings were direct-

ed against military targets. As Frederic C. Hof stated in a very provocative article:

...the killing of 241 Americans at the Beirut International Airport was not an act of terrorism, but an unconventional military assault against a military target. (emphasis original)²

Some of the other casualties have been the result of terrorist hostage incidents created by the terrorists wishing to create mass media attention for their cause. This phenomenon is the focus of this study.

By examining terrorism, the profiles that compose the average terrorist, past attempts by countries to control terrorism through regulation, and examine past terrorist hostage incidents, it is possible to gain a better understanding of how to approach a future terrorist hostage situation and successfully defuse the situation with as little loss of life as possible.

This thesis is designed as a descriptive study of the various aspects of terrorism as they relate to terrorist hostage situations. Hopefully, this effort will aid future authorities faced with these type situations, and give them a better grasp of the viable options available to them.

Terrorism

The term "terrorism" originated during Robespierre's reign of terror in France in the late 1700³'s. The same type of indiscriminate acts of terror that are in existence today, were recorded in earlier history.

The reason for terrorism has always been the wish of terrorists

to impose their will by force upon the entity they are trying to influence and control. As the former Secretary of State, George Schultz once stated:

It's (terrorism's) stated objectives may range from separationist causes to revenge ethnic grievances to social or political revolution...But we must understand that the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: with rare exception, they are attempting to impose their will by force—a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear.⁴

The main goal of terrorism is to further its cause while forcing governments to react violently against the civil rights of their own citizens and, therefore, giving rise to citizen revolt against the government. Terrorism tends to embarrass the governments concerned which forces them to use scant resources to handle the problem. On occasion, the government reacts with too much force and cause the average citizen so much grief that the citizens force the government to capitulate their power to another democratically elected regime or⁵ force the military to take over in a coup d'etat, as in Uruguay. In another example, the government may be forced to impose harsher controls upon the citizens, but the citizens willingly go along with the slight impositions of their rights because they believe that it is the only way to eliminate or control the terrorists. One example of this type situation was the crackdown in Peru against the Sendero Luminoso⁶ or Shining Light group.

Historical Aspects of Terrorism

Using the definition of terrorism as defined in this thesis, terrorist groups have been with us for centuries. In a very basic sense, the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. was a terrorist

act determined to change an existing government.

7

One of the first recorded terrorist groups were the Sicarii. This terrorist type group operated between the years A.D. 66 and 73. The group was comprised mainly of Jewish religious zealots, who waged a successful massive revolt of Jews against the Roman occupation of their land through the use of terror and fear tactics. The Sicarii employed hired assassins who would slip through a crowd area or street and, using a short sword or knife, kill or wound Romans or Roman sympathizers. During the ensuing panic they would slip away unseen by the victims and crowd.

Another of the ancient terrorist type organizations were the Assassins, active between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. This group was made up of Shi'ite Ismaili Muslims and led by the "Old Man of the Mountain", Hassan Sibai, a fervent religious leader of the time. The Assassins derived their name from the Arabic word hashashin or hashish-eaters. The Assassins ingested hashish before their murders in order to see the paradise that awaited them. The sect won widespread notoriety through their terror campaign as word of their drug induced murders committed with golden daggers spread through the European and Middle Eastern communities of the time.

The Thugs were another successful terrorist organization of their time period. For over three hundred years, the Thugs or Thuggee's, terrorized the Indian country with their indiscriminate killings using silken handkerchiefs. It has been estimated that the Thugs killed approximately 30,000 people a year for over three hundred years.

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Although not much is known of their political goals, it is thought

that they did have an obscure one and continued their killing of innocents until the British army and Indian aristocracies joined forces to eliminate their sect around the middle of the 1800's.¹¹

Around the time period that the Thugs were being eliminated, another group of terrorists arose, this time upon American soil. The group, formed just after the Civil War, was known as the Klu Klux Klan. Their name, derived from the Greek word kyklos, means circle in English. There were actually three separate Klan periods, the first known as the Invisible Empire, was an extremely violent group opposed to the emancipation of the Negro and ran from about 1865 to 1876. The second Klan period, from about 1915 to 1944, was also against the Negro, but attached other causes to their agenda, such as the Catholics, Jews, foreigners, organized labor and assorted law breakers, such as bootleggers. The second Klan dissolved in 1944 due to a nearly \$700,000 back tax bill due the federal government which financially drained the Klan and they had to disband. The last major Klan era emerged in the 1960's with the Civil Rights movement and ran until about 1975. This era consisted of indiscriminate violent attacks upon civil rights activities and overwhelmed the local law enforcement agencies so much that the federal government was forced to step in and arrest major Klan leaders for civil rights violations to try and ease the violence. Today, the Klan is but a shell of its' former self, and most members are associated with other white supremacist groups, like the Aryan Brotherhood and the American Nazi Party.¹²

Another group formed in the late 1860's was the Fenian Brother-

hood, an Irish movement. This secret society was named after an old

band of Irish warriors led by Finn MacCumhaill. Their primary goal was to start a popular uprising in Ireland against British rule. They garnered support from communities in the United States, Australia, Canada and South America and many of the original terrorists began their training by fighting for both the North and South during the American Civil War. They moved to Ireland and began an assassination campaign against British administrators and Irish collaborators which caused the British to eliminate many civil liberties, to include Habeas Corpus. The Fenian organization ceased to exist when their leader, John O'Mahony, died in 1877.

Perhaps one of the best organized and successful terrorist group¹⁴ of the last century was the Russian group, Narodnaya Volya. Although the group only existed about three years, 1878 to 1881, they succeeded in accomplishing their main goal of assassinating Tsar Alexander II. The group was beset by strife within their own forces over which type campaign should be run to accomplish their goals. There were three separate tacts taken by members within the group. The moderates believed that a propaganda campaign would work in succeeding to undermine the tsar's authority. Another group led by Bakunin, believed in terror through bombings and assassination. A third group led by Tkachev sought a forcible overthrow of the government followed by communist teachings to the general public. Interestingly enough, it was the groups success in intimidating and assassinating police and political leaders, including the tsar, that led to their downfall. Because although they succeeded in their goal of assassinating the tsar, it forced the authorities to crack down hard and imprison the

majority of it's leaders, causing their downfall from popularity.

Since the turn of the century, many terrorist groups have affected major changes in the world as it exists today. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which first appeared in 1893, created so much mayhem in Turkey, that it led to the burning of over 200 villages, thousands of casualties to both antagonists, and forced approximately 70,000 to become homeless.¹⁵

Prior to the First World War, terrorists operated freely in the Balkans until their operations were overshadowed by the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.¹⁶ In fact, it is well recognized that the First World War was started by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a known terrorist trained by the Black Hand, a secret Serbian terrorist organization employed by the Serbian Government as a foreign policy tool.¹⁷

Other terrorist organizations have made their footnote in history with continued violence against perceived oppression of their causes. Some of these have been the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the German Free Corps (later the nucleus of the Reichswehr), and the Zionist underground units called the Haganah and Irgun Zvai Leumi.¹⁸ Since the end of World War II, thousands of terrorist organizations have been created, with some 800 still active today.

Some writers state that the terrorism of today is little more than a century old, commencing with the Narodnaya Volya activities committed in tsarist Russia during the later part of the late 19,20

1800's. However, this researcher disagrees with that assertion. The same tactics that were used in ancient times are being used today

with the same results, only the weapons, and the way they transmit their demands, have changed.

As already mentioned, there are over 800 active terrorist organizations in existence today in approximately 88 countries of the world.²¹ Many of these organizations are interlinked by religious or political affiliations and many train together. They also exchange information, money and equipment and are known to join forces to organize a terrorist act together. A great deal of the terrorist organizations started out with one name and, either changed their name or merged with another group. Many are financed, lent moral support,²² and trained by the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya; but some are self-sufficient and have millions of dollars of their own money to spend on terrorist activities. One of the best examples is the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). A listing of some of the more active terrorist organizations, classified by geographical areas will be found in Table 2.1 on pages 17-21.

The Terrorists

Is the terrorist a monster? Or maybe insane? Are they suicidal maniacs that could care less who dies for their cause? These thoughts run through the mind of the average person when one sees some of the many atrocities committed by a terrorist group. In fact, some authors have advanced theories that the above statements are true.

Albert Parry has alleged that although "Not all political terrorists are insane or mentally disturbed...most are."²³ And he also has stated that "most terrorists are crazy, they have to be crazy. In

Table 2.1

ACTIVE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

EUROPEFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Black Cells (Schwarz Zellen)
 Black Help (Schwarz Hilfe)
 German Action Groups (DA)
 German Empire Party (DRP)
 German Socialist Student Association (SDS)
 Guerrilla Diffusa (Guerrilla Dispersion—GD)
 Holger Meins Commando
 National Socialists Common Action Group (ANS)
 People's Socialist Movement of Germany/Worker's Party (VSBG-PdA)
 Red Army Faction (RAF)
 Red Help (Rote Hilfe)
 Revolutionary Cells (RZ)
 Second of June Movement
 Socialist Empire Party (SRP)
 Socialists Patients' Collective (SPK)
 Union for the Protection of Tyrol (Tiroler Schutzbund)
 Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman (Defense Sports Group Hoffman)

ITALY

Armed Communist Formations
 Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)
 Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR)
 Autonomous Worker's Movement
 Black Order (Ordine Nero-ON)
 Combatants for Communism
 Front Line (Prima Linea-PL)
 Mussolini Action Squads (SAM)
 New Order (Ordine Nuovo-ON)
 October XXII Circle
 Partisan Action Groups (GAP)
 Permanent Struggle (Lotta Continua)
 Proletarian Committee of Subversion for Better Justice
 Proletarian Internationalism
 Proletarian Justice
 Proletarian Squad
 Red Brigade (Brigate Rosa-BR)
 Red Guerrilla
 Revolutionary Action Group
 Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR)
 Revolutionary Fascist Nuclei (NFR)
 Workers' Vanguard

Table 2.1 (Continued)

FRANCE

Action for the Rebirth of Corsica (ARC)
 Action for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries
 Andreas Baader Commando
 Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy (NAPAP)
 Association for Corsican Patriots (APC)
 Autonomous Intervention Collective Against the Zionist Presence in
 France
 Avengers
 Basque Justice (EZ)
 Breton Fight (AB)
 Breton Liberation Front (FLB)
 Breton Nationalist Resistance Movement (MRNB)
 Charles Martel Club
 Committee, for Socialist Revolutionary Unity
 Committee of Coordination
 Communist Youth Movement, Marxist-Leninist (UJC-ML)
 Confrontation (Faire Front)
 Corsican Peasant Front for Liberation (FPOL)
 Corsican Revolutionary Action (ARC)
 Delta
 Direct Action (AD)
 Enbata Galerne
 European Nationalist Fascas (FNE)
 Federation for European National Action (FANE)
 French National Liberation Front (FNLP)
 French Revolutionary Brigades (BRF)
 Group for the Defense of Europe
 High School Action Committee (CAL)
 Hordage (Je Tiens)
 International Revolutionary Solidarity
 International Solidarity
 Iparretarrak (Those from the North)
 Jewish Self-Defense Front
 Masada Action and Defense Movement
 Movement of the Youthward Brothers in War of the Palestinian People
 New Action Front Against the Independence and Autonomy of Corsica
 (FRANCIA)
 New Order (Ordre Nouveau)
 Red Army Faction of Southern France
 Revolutionary Communist Youth (JCR)
 Secret Army Organization (OAS)
 6th of March Group
 Solidarity Resistance Front
 Talion Law
 Twenty Second Marc Movement
 We Must Do Something
 Youth Action Group

Table 2.1 (Continued)

SPAIN

Anti-Fascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista Patriotico-FRAP)
 Anti-Terrorism ETA (Antiterrorismo ETA-ATE)
 Apostolic Anti-Communism Alliance (Alianza Apostolica Anti-comunista-AAA)
 Armed Struggle Organization (Organitzacio Lluita Armada-OLla)
 Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (Commandos Autonomous Anticapitalistas-CAA)
 Catalan Liberation Front (Front d'Alliberament Catala-FAC)
 First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group (Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista de Primero de Octubre-GRAPO)
 Free Land (Terra Lliure-TL)
 Freedom for The Basque Homeland (Euskadi ta Askatasuna-ETA)
 International revolutionary Action Groups (Grupos de Accion Revolucionaria Internacionalista-GARI)
 Moroccan Patriotic Front (Frente Patriotico Maroqui-FPM)
 Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Islands Archipelago (Movimiento para la Autodeterminacion e Independencia del Archipielago de las Canarias-MPAIAC)
 New Force (Fuerza-FN)
 Spanish Basque Battalion (Batallon Vasco Espanol-BVE)
 Spanish National Action (Accion Nacional Espanol-ANE)
 Warriors of Christ the King (Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey)

UNITED KINGDOM/IRELAND

Angry Brigade
 Anti-Nazi League
 Black Liberation ARmy
 British Movement
 First of May group
 Free Wales Army (MAC)
 International Marxist Group (MG)
 Irish Freedom Fighters
 Irish National Liberation Army (NLA)
 Irish Republican Army (IRA)
 Irish Socialist Party (IRSP)
 Keepers of Wales (Cadwyr Cymru-CC)
 Loyal Citizens of Ulster (LCU)
 Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW)
 Nation Front (NF)
 National Party (NP)
 People's Democracy (PD)
 Protestant Action Force (PAF)
 Provisional Irish Republican ARmy (PIRA)
 Radical Student Alliance (RSA)
 Red Flag 74

Table 2.1 (Continued)

UNITED KINGDOM/IRELAND

Red Hand Commandos
 Shankhill Defense Association (SDA)
 Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone)
 Socialist Worker's Party (SWP)
 Tartan Army
 Troops Out Movement (TOM)
 Ulster defense Association (UDA)
 Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
 Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV)
 Ulster Workers Council (UWC)
 Worker's Revolutionary Party (WRP)
 Young Militants

MIDDLE EASTISRAEL

Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
 Abu Nidel Group
 Al-Asifa
 Al-Saeir
 Arab Nationalist Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
 Arab Revolutionary Army-Palestine Command
 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
 Black September
 Black June Organization
 Eagles of Palestine
 Movement for the Liberation of Palestine
 Movement of Arab Nationalists
 Nature Carta
 Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC)
 Palestine Communist Party
 Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine
 Palestine Liberation Army
 Palestine Liberation Front
 Palestine Liberation Organization
 Palestine Action Front in Occupied Territories
 Palestine National Liberation front (Al-Fatah)
 Palestine Popular Struggle Front
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-
 GC)
 Redemption of Israel
 Rejection Front
 Sa'iga (Thunderbolt)

Table 2.1 (Continued)

NORTH AMERICAUNITED STATES

Armed Resistance Unit (ARU)
 Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN)
 Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
 Black Liberation Army (BLA)
 Boricua Popular Army (Ejercito Popular de Boricua-EPB, or Los Macheteros)
 Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations (Coordination de Organizacions Revolucionarias Unidas-CORU)
 Croatian Freedom Fighters (OFF)
 DeBois Club
 George Jackson Brigade
 Jewish Defense League
 Jewish Direct Action (JDA)
 Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)
 Klu Klux Klan
 May 2 Movement
 May 19 Communist Organization (M19Co)
 National Liberation Movement (MLV)
 National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP)
 New American Movement (NAM)
 New World Liberation Front (NWLF)
 October League
 Omega 7/Alpha 66 anti-Castro Cubans
 Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP)
 Organization of Afro-American Liberty
 Republic of New Afrika (RNA)
 Red Guerrilla Resistance (RGR)
 Revolutionary Fighting Group (RFG)
 Revolutionary Action Movement (Movimento de Accion Revolucionaria—MAR)
 Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP)
 United Freedom Front (UFF)
 Venceremos (We Shall Overcome)

Source: Walter N. Lang, The World's Elite Forces (New York: Military Press, 1987), 88-94.

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Asia and Africa, they're all crazy." Parry is incorrect on both counts, the majority of research indicates that most terrorists are psychologically normal, and the hard core members and leaders are well-educated with above normal intelligence and abilities.

Probably the first author to do an intensive review of terrorists, the late Frederick J. Hacker wrote a book entitled Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies in 1976. In his book, he outlined profiles of the terrorist which he had divided into three separate areas: Crazies, ²⁵ Criminals and Crusaders.

He further described two types of terrorism: Terrorism from Below—which are the normal terrorist group or an individual who holds no real power in the in which arena they are operating (Japanese Red Army, Baader-Meinhof Gang, etc.); and Terrorism from Above—which can be described as individuals or groups holding power in the arena within which they operate (e.g. Dictators like Idi Amin, Somoza, the ²⁶ Shah of Iran, and the Doc and Baby Doc of Haiti).

The area this thesis is concerned with, the terrorist hostage situation, would in all likelihood be committed by the first type of terrorist—the Terrorist from Below. Although it could be argued that the hostage situation in Iran was actually controlled by the government of Iran, which would be Terrorism from Above.

The Tables on pages 23-25 outline the various aspects of the three types of terrorists from the category of Terrorism from Below. As can be seen in the Table, the worst scenario in a terrorist hostage situation would be one dealing with a "crazy" terrorist due to his or her instability and irrational behavior. It is also difficult to

Table 2.2

TERRORISM FROM BELOW

MOTIVATIONCRAZY

Self-centered and
sacrificial

Thought processes:
highly personal,
often nonrational
or irrational

Sometimes delusional

Abstract goals

Anticipated gain:
psychological and
idiosyncratic

Often "incompre-
hensible"

Cry for help, self-
dramatization (psy-
chodrama), thera-
peutic attempt, at-
tempt at self-cure

Amateurish M.O.

High risk taking

Predominantly in-
ward-directed, in-
trapunitive, sui-
cidal

CRIMINAL

Selfish and self-
protective

Thought processes:
task-oriented, ra-
tional, convention-
al in terms of pre-
vailing values

Realistic

Concrete goals

Anticipated gain:
personal and mater-
ial

Commonly "understand-
able"

Materially, not psy-
chologically oriented

Professional, mostly
repetitive M.O.

High risk avoidance

Predominantly outward-
directed aggression,
extrapunitive, homi-
cidal

CRUSADING

Unselfish and
sacrificial

Thought processes:
task-oriented, func-
tionally rational but
unconventional in
terms of prevailing
values

Realistic, often in
service of unrealis-
tic ends

Concrete and abstract
goals

Anticipated gain:
collective, symbolic,
publicity, or mater-
ial

"Understandable" to
sympathizers, "sense-
less" to antagonists

Attention-getting,
ostentatious, drama-
tic, spectacular, pub-
licity-conscious

Theatrical M.O. fol-
lows trends and fash-
ions

Indifferent to high
risk

Intrapunitive and ex-
trapunitive, suicidal
and homicidal

Table 2.2 (Continued)

<u>CAST</u>		
<u>CRAZY</u>	<u>CRIMINAL</u>	<u>CRUSADING</u>
Loners or small groups, not organized	Loners or organized in a business-like (e.g., syndicates, corporations) or familylike (e.g., clan, brotherhood) manner, often subject to terror from above (Mafia)	Small or large groups organized in armylike manner (e.g., leagues fronts, units) with hierarchical command structure, often submissive to terror from above
Unstable, immature, often distractible and inept individuals with weak ego and overt behavior disturbances	Detached, often dehumanized individuals, often unstable and inept but also often with seemingly, intact ego and without overt behavior disturbances	Fanatical individuals often with seemingly intact ego, without overt behavior disturbances
Conspicuous through bizarre conduct or attire	Mostly inconspicuous	Inconspicuous
Often overt sexual disturbance	No overt sexual disturbance	No overt sexual disturbance, little or no overt sexual interest
Unpredictable, vacillating, hesitating	Predictable, mostly determined, ruthless	Predictable, unpredictable, determined, ruthless
Indifferent to immediate success	Exclusively interested in concrete immediate success	Predominantly interested in immediate and long-range publicity and success
Frequently imitative	Frequently imitative	Frequently innovative and violence escalating
Eager for alliance with audience, often on any terms	Disinterested in alliances but interested in specific deals	Interested in deal and alliances on their own terms

Table 2.2 (Continued)

CRAZY

Cannot be deterred by ordinary means, can be persuaded but not bought

CRIMINAL

Can be deterred by ordinary means, can be bought but not persuaded

CRUSADING

Cannot be deterred by ordinary means, incorruptible

VICTIMS

Selection: random or according to delusional system (with attraction to the powerful and prominent

Selection: purely instrumental (the rich and prominent for trade and blackmail value

Selection: for symbolic and/or publicity value, often from emotional, highly charged enemy target group as instruments for barter but may become targets for brainwashing and eventual allies

Highly endangered for short periods of time

Danger varying according to response, the more professional the criminal, the less endangered the victim

After initial phase, danger almost entirely dependent upon responses

OBJECTS (AUDIENCE)

Selection: random or vaguely defined target group, visualized as possible allies and helpers

Selection: usually small groups, such as the victim's family

Selection: largest group possible (the nation, the world)

Recipients of moral appeals

Recipients of business propositions

Recipients of specific blackmail threats and vague moral appeals

Source: Frederick J. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1976), 12-14.

negotiate with the "crazy" terrorist because these people are unpredictable and may harm their hostages in intervals of intense rage and frustration.

The "crusading" terrorists can be negotiated with more easily due to their main goals of attracting publicity for their cause to their audience whether it is a nation or the world. The "crusading" terrorist is usually rational and can be negotiated with in some areas. However, the hostage can suffer depending upon the tact taken by responding forces and/or the terrorists' goals at the time.

Hacker goes on to surmise that non-violent means at ending terrorism and terrorist acts are the ultimate way of dealing with the terrorist problem. He sums this thought up as so:

But to tenaciously explore the possibilities of non-violent conflict solution will be the difficult but not impossible mission of modern heroism, neither intimidated nor tempted by terror and terrorism.²⁷

In their article "Profile of a Terrorist," Charles Russell and Bowman Miller, outlined a need for researchers interested in terrorism and terrorists to establish a sociological profile of the average terrorist for various countries or regions of the world. These profiles could then be used to ascertain possible reactions of the group, or individual terrorists, when they are being dealt with in hostage negotiations or other type terrorist activities. Their research in the late 1970's indicated certain trends and profiles of terrorists and possible changes in those trends that were taking place for the 1980's.

Using a data-base of over 350 known terrorist from 18 European,

Japanese, Latin American, and Middle Eastern groups revealed what could be called an "average" terrorist. The terrorist was predominantly male between the ages of 22 and 24 years of age.²⁸ However, these average ages are a composite of all of the groups researched. Certain countries and groups had higher or lower average ages. For example the average age of the Japanese groups were approximately 28 years of age, and some of the terrorists analyzed in Ireland were as young as 11-14 years old.²⁹

The average terrorist is male, with females playing primarily support roles for the terrorist groups as a whole. But on the other hand, females are key leaders in some groups, i.e., the Japanese Red Army and the Baader-Meinhof groups.³⁰

The married terrorist was seen as an exception rather than a rule, with fully 75-80 percent of the terrorists being single.³¹ Married terrorists were seen as a liability rather than an asset because when wives or husbands are captured, pressure is put on the group to try and free them from prison. This in turn can jeopardize the group as a whole, as was done when the Tupamaros's attacked a women's prison in Montevideo, Uruguay in an attempt to free some wives captured by the government. Although thirteen women were freed, there were many casualties among the male attack team.³²

The average terrorist is from an urban atmosphere which is where most terrorist groups operate within. As was pointed out in the article, Carlos Marighella, one of the most widely known theorist of urban guerrilla warfare, once stated that in order to avoid capture or ambush authorities, a terrorist must be completely familiar with the

terrain in which he or she operates.

The terrorists were predominantly middle or upper class backgrounds with approximately two-thirds falling within this category. In many of the cases, the parents were professional people such as doctors, lawyers and government employees.³⁴

The vast majority of the terrorist cadre and leaders were college educated with many majoring in the humanities; such as medicine, sociology, law, and philosophy. However, Turkish terrorists seem to major in harder sciences and technical fields, such as engineering. Coupled with the college education was the fact that the university was the primary place of recruitment for the majority of terrorists. This is probably due to the student becoming aware of the Marxist doctrines and biases of the professors they encountered there.³⁵

The terrorists political philosophy was also analyzed and found to generally fall into three categories: anarchism, Marxism-Leninism, and nationalism. The majority of terrorist groups seemed to fall within the Marxist arena with some groups, like the Japanese Red Army, comprised of both Marxism and anarchism ideologies.³⁶

In another study of the late 1970's, Conrad Hassel outlined various reasons that privileged young people became involved in terrorism. Mainly he reasoned that the many sociological factors had changed at such an accelerated rate that many people had been unsettled by it. The key result of these changes had been a massive rejection of the normal accepted values and cultural mores. The young people had seen their parents strive for upward mobility in their social class, but fail, or seemed to fail, at their goals. In addi-

tion, the privileged felt injustice with their living in more or less style, while three-fourths of the world existed in poverty.³⁷

Hassel goes on to show why he felt terrorism would continue and probably increase due to the statistical chance of success of the terrorist mission. The figures below show that the terrorist has an:

87 percent probability of actually seizing hostages;

79 percent chance that all members of the terrorist team would escape punishment or death, whether or not they successfully seized hostages;

40 percent chance that all or some demands would be met in operations where something more than just safe passage or exit permission was demanded.

29 percent chance of full compliance with such demands;

83 percent chance success where safe passage or exit, for the terrorist themselves or for others was the sole demand;

67 percent chance that, if concessions to the principle demands were rejected, all or virtually all members of the terrorist team could still escape alive by going underground, accepting safe passage in lieu of their original demands, or surrendering to a sympathetic government, and virtually a 100 percent probability of gaining major publicity whenever that was one of the terrorists' goals.³⁸

A study conducted in 1984 by Jerrold M. Post, ascertained that

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there was no one terrorist mind-set. He also found what he considered two separate categories: the "anarchic-ideologues", committed to destroying the world as it now exists, and the "nationalist-secessionists," who wish to carry on the world missions of their forefathers.⁴⁰

He further reasons that there is a tendency for people of troubled backgrounds (i.e. isolated, marginal, and inadequate individuals) to be attracted to a life of terrorism. He ascertains that this is due to the feeling of belonging that the terrorist group brings to them, possibly the first feeling they have ever felt. The terrorist is then thought to feel that disloyalty or betrayal of the group,

would bring ostracism and a loss of the group.

However, the terrorists of the sixties and seventies were different from the terrorists of the eighties. Thomas Strentz outlines the demographics of the different terrorist types of the 1960's and 1970's, and contrasts the difference with the terrorist types of the 1980's in Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.

Table 2.3

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE 1960'S AND
1970'S LEFTIST GROUPS

<u>LEADER</u>	<u>OPPORTUNIST OR CRIMINAL ELEMENT</u>	<u>FOLLOWER</u>
Male/female Male	Male	Male/female
No specific race or religion	No specific race or religion	No specific race or religion
College education or attendance	Limited education	College education or attendance
25-40	20-30	20-25
Middle class	Lower class	Middle class
Urban/ sophisticated	Urban/rural with good street sense	Urban/ sophisticated
Multilingual	Literate in native language	Multilingual
High verbal skills	High verbal skills	Good verbal skills
Well-trained perfectionist	Learned criminal skills	Well-trained
Dedicated	Selfish	Dedicated
Strong personality	Strong personality	Weak personality
Politically active prior to terrorist criminal activity	Years of criminal activ- ity/recruited from pri- son/politics are peri- pheral	Politically active prior to terrorist criminal activity

Table 2.4

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF MIDDLE EAST
LEFTIST GROUPS IN THE 1980'S

<u>LEADER</u>	<u>FOLLOWER</u>
Male	Male
No specific race or religion	No specific race or religion
College education or attendance	Poorly educated/illiterate
30-45	17-25
Middle class	Lower class from a large family of 9-15 children
Urban/sophisticated	Refugee/not comfortable outside of Middle East
Multilingual	
High verbal skills	Poor verbal skills
Well-dedicated perfectionist	Unskilled worker
Strong personality	Training poor to none
Politically active prior to terrorist activity	Limited Education
	Criminally active in street gang
	Politically naive

OPPORTUNIST OR CRIMINAL ELEMENT

Now an infrequent member as a specific entity

Table 2.5

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE RIGHT WINGLEADER

Male

White Protestant

College education or attendance

35-50 plus

Urban/sophisticated

Literate in English

High verbal skills

Well-trained perfectionist

Strong controlled paranoid personality

Politically active and articulate

FOLLOWER

Male

White Protestant

Limited formal education

20-50 plus

Lower and lower middle class

Urban or rural/unsophisticated

Literate in English

Poor verbal skills

Poor work skills

Weak personality/shared para-
noid personality

Politically naive

OPPORTUNIST OR CRIMINAL ELEMENT

Generally his skills are incorporated within the leader

Source: Thomas Strentz, "A Terrorist Psychosocial Profile: Past and Present," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 57, no.4 (April 1988): 15, 18 and 19.

As can readily be seen, the terrorist follower of today is conceivably more dangerous and unpredictable than his predecessor due to their pattern of low intelligence, skills, and training. This makes dealing with the terrorist of today during terrorist hostage situations more difficult. But it is knowledge derived from such demographic profiles that may assist negotiations in successfully terminating a terrorist hostage situation with minimal loss of life.

However, as Post clarifies below, profiling of the terrorist is just one approach used in attempting to understand the terrorist, although not a panacea or a perfect solution to the terrorist problem.

Should the intrepid behavioral knight be so foolhardy as to enter this wilderness to tilt his research lance in search of the holy grail of "the terrorist mindset," he is doomed to failure. For there are nearly as many variants of personality who become involved in terrorist pursuits as there are variants of personality.⁴³

International Laws/Policies on Terrorism

This statement by a former official of the Reagan administration clearly outlines the concerns of any country attempting to control terrorism without the cooperation of other countries:

As to international cooperation, it is clear that combating international terrorism is not a task for the United States alone. The problem is too complex and universal to be dealt with by any one nation. We are committed to working with other nations to establish a peaceful and stable world order, in which we may be free from the threat of political violence...[T]his administration has given a high priority to this task.⁴⁴

Many countries have formed legal and official agreements on dealing with terrorists and terrorist acts. The tables on pages 34-36, provide a historical listing of key agreements and draft treaties concerning the subject of terrorism, terrorists and common aircraft

hijackings.

Table 2.6

HISTORICAL TREATIES/DRAFT AGREEMENTS
AGAINST TERRORISM/TERRORIST ACTS

Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals and for the Protection Against Anarchism, Mexico City, Mexico. 28 January 1902

Police Convention, Buenos Aires, Brazil. 29 February 1920

Agreement Concerning Mutual Defense against Undesirable Foreigners, Quito, Lima. 10 August 1935

Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Geneva, Switzerland. 16 November 1937

Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Geneva, Switzerland. 16 November 1937

Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, Japan. 14 September 1963

Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), The Hague. 16 December 1970

Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) Montreal, Canada. 23 September 1971

Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, Washington, D.C. 2 February 1971

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. 14 December 1973

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. 27 January 1977

DRAFT TREATIES

Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism. Submitted by the United States to the United Nations General Assembly, 26 September 1972

Draft Articles Aimed at Cutting Off Air service to States Which Do Not Punish Hijackers, 1972

Draft Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. Submitted to the United Nations by the Federal Republic of Germany, 22 July 1977

Table 2.6 (Continued)

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

Forcible Diversion of Civil Aircraft in Flight. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2551, 12 December 1969

Aerial Hijacking. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2645, 25 November 1970

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3034, 18 December 1972

U.N. general Assembly Resolution 31/102, 15 December 1976

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 31/103, 15 December 1976

Safety of International Civil Aviation. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 32/8, 3 November 1977

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 32/147, 16 December 1977

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 32/148, 16 December 1977

U.N. Security Council Resolution 286, 9 September 1970 on Aerial Hijacking

U.N. Security Council Decision on Hijacking, 20 June 1972

U.N. Security Council Resolution 332, 21 April 1973

U.N. Security Council Resolution 337, 15 August 1973

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) RESOLUTIONS

ICAO Council Resolution, adopted 10 April 1969. Establishment of ICAO Committee on Unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation and Its Facilities.

ICAO Assembly Resolution A 18-10, 7 July 1971

ICAO Council Resolution on Hijacking, Adopted 19 June 1972

ICAO Assembly Resolution A 19-WP/6, 28 February 1973

ICAO Council Resolution 20 August 1973. Interception of Israeli Military Aircraft of a Lebanese Civil Aircraft Chartered by Iraqi Airways

ICAO Assembly Resolution A20-1, 30 August 1973

ICAO Assembly Resolution A20-2, 21 September 1973

Table 2.6 (Continued)

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) RESOLUTIONS

Annex 17—Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference: Adopted by the Council 22 March 1974, Applicable 27 February 1977

ICAO Assembly Resolution A22-16, 13 September 1977. Strengthening of Measures to Suppress Acts of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation

ICAO Assembly Resolution A22-17, 13 September 1977. Technical Measures for Safeguarding International Civil Air Transport Against Acts of Unlawful Interference

ICAO Council Resolution, adopted 2 December 1977

Sources: Yonah Alexander, Marjorie Ann Brown, and Allan S. Nanes, eds., Control of Terrorism: International Documents (New York: Crane Russak, 1979), 3-215.

Robert A. Friedlander, Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control, 4 vols. (New York: Oceana Publications, 1979)

The first of these agreements was signed by Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Chili, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, the United States of America, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay in 1902 at Mexico City,⁴⁵ Mexico. This treaty is entitled "Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals and for the Protection of Anarchism" and is concerned with the more traditional criminal behavior. However, there is a clause which states that a person will not be extradited for political crimes. Furthermore, the treaty clarifies this action by stating that committing criminal acts for anarchistic purposes (i.e. terrorist acts), shall not be deemed a political crime.⁴⁶

While condemning terrorism, the United Nations actually condones various aspects of terrorism if it is considered a part of internal liberation attempts within a nation. For example, one of the first United Nations resolutions, entitled:

Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and a Study of the Underlying Cause of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair, which Causes some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, including their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Change⁴⁷

condemns armed bands, mercenaries, and groups carrying out armed force against another state, but continues to lend support for these same type activities if it is deemed it is against "colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination."⁴⁸

Many of the referenced agreements and treaties are directly concerned with the subject of this thesis...terrorist hostage situa-

tions. Although the title suggests the treaty is dealing with aircraft hijackings, we know that aircraft hijackings are in reality a massive hostage situation.

One of the first conventions concerning aircraft offenses was the one initiated in Tokyo, Japan, 14 September 1963. The proclamation given at this convention was a first step in trying to combat terrorist hostage situations involving aircraft hijackings. The signatory nations had begun the steps necessary to treat these type incidents as a crime instead of a political statement. However, although the United States initiated this proclamation in 1963, it took until
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October 1969 for the United States to ratify its own proclamation.

Due to an escalating amount of aircraft hijackings to Cuba in the early 1970's, (eighty seven), the United States and Cuba entered into an agreement in 1973 to essentially treat aircraft hijackings as a crime, and to return the aircraft, passengers, crew and the hijacker to the originating country. The agreement was quickly followed by agreements between Cuba and Mexico, Canada, Columbia, and Venezuela
50
over the next two years. In all, over 90 countries have some type of agreements in effect concerning aircraft hijackings and the disposi-
51
tion of the hijacker and innocent victims in such situations.

Although such agreements have lessened the number of aircraft hijackings since the 1970's, the way these agreements are worded and the inconsistencies of the signatory nations in following their own agreements tend to make these type extradition treaties ineffective in eliminating terrorist hostage situations.

Moreover, until approximately 1984, numerous countries seemingly

dealt more stringently with terrorism when it directly confronted them rather than when the terrorism was occurring in other nations. For example, while France initiated the first Council of Europe Convention on Suppression of Terrorism in 1977, which called for a more uniform and strict adherence to extradition of terrorists, France did not⁵² ratify the treaty. In fact, they strongly disapproved of the extradition of known terrorists up until 1984, when they extradited the first Basque terrorists back to Spain. Furthermore, even today, they continue extraditing terrorists back to the concerned country on a selective basis.

The United Nations General Assembly unanimously issued a resolution in 1985 which strongly condemned terrorist type activities of any⁵³ type, but unless more uniform adherence of these international treaties are followed, and the treaties are worded to treat terrorist acts as criminal acts instead of political acts, there is no incentive for the terrorists to terminate their violent activities.

Official Government Policies

While international and bilateral treaties and policies have had limited success in stemming the flow of terrorism, the policies of individual countries have had some success. But official government policies regarding terrorist acts, and especially terrorist hostage incidents, have changed in many countries over the years. Some of the countries below mentioned have retained an essentially "no concession" policy, while others have vacillated between "no concession" to "hands off and they will leave us alone" policy, to no policy at all.

FRANCE

France, has had a record of being a refuge for political exiles since the late 1800's, France has been the most inconsistent of all nations in dealing with terrorism in its various aspects through the years. This is thought to be due mainly because of the French Constitution of 1946 which states in part:

Any person prosecuted because of his action in favor of liberty has the right of asylum on the territories of the Republic.⁵⁴

As already mentioned, France was extremely reluctant to extradite terrorists when it was thought that their acts were conducted in the cause of liberation. However, lately when decades of hands off for the terrorists began to directly affect France in bombings, assassinations, and other type terrorist acts on their own soil, France had to take some type of action. In 1984, France began to extradite some Basque terrorists, but ignored Italy's plea for the return of over 200 terrorists wanted for crimes. In addition, France ignored repeated West German requests for the return of known terrorists who were using France as a refuge for rest and recuperation before crossing borders to strike again at their targets. But, France has also on occasion aided Spain in raiding Basque safe houses in its territory in joint cooperation with Spanish anti-terrorist units. They recently enacted legislation requiring visas for all visitors to France although there has been some relaxation of this requirement in late 1989. But France continues to deal with terrorists and terrorist states when they feel it is to their advantage.

GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain has always taken a firm stance against terrorist acts and terrorism in general, but only when it was on their own soil or that of former colonies. British problems with terrorism began with violence in Ireland as early as the 1860's. But the British have had to deal with terrorists in Cyprus (who forced the British out), Oman, and Malaysia. But terrorism on British soil really accelerated with "The Government of Ireland Act of 1920" which partitioned Northern
⁵⁵ Ireland from Ireland. Since the Catholics present a minority population to the Protestant majority population, conflict due to Protestant abuses of the legal and political arenas has been a problem from the beginning. In fact, Richard Rose has argued that the Catholics are in the same predicament as the blacks in the United States during the
⁵⁶ early 1950's and 1960's. His argument is that the Catholics have the same problems with overt isolation in the political, economic and legal arenas, as blacks experienced in the United States; however blacks were able to overcome their problems using the "Bill of Rights" and the many civil rights acts initiated during the 1950-60's to combat violations of their rights.

The British government has initiated extensive legislative action in efforts to control terrorism. Two such attempts were "The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973 as amended in 1978" and the
⁵⁷ "Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 and 1976." These acts mainly deal with prohibiting membership and contributions to terrorist organizations. They also deal with aiding any such organizations in political actions, wearing masks to conceal identi-

ties, as well as acts of spying on the police, soldiers, judicial and prison officials. The legislation authorizes warrantless searches and arrests pertaining to munitions, weapons and radio transmitters.

But again, although the British have been ambivalent to other terrorist organizations, and have even declared that the PLO is not a terrorist organization,⁵⁸ they have allowed the United States to use their bases in England to launch an attack against the Libyan terrorists planning center.

ISRAEL

Although Israel has maintained a basic policy of not dealing with terrorists, they have had to negotiate with terrorists on many occasions and have even conceded to terrorist demands when the situation dictated. Israel treats all terrorist acts as criminal acts as does the United States and Great Britain, and has advocated the death penalty for terrorist crimes.

As already mentioned, Israel has maintained a no concession policy with terrorists for years, but have been willing to put the policy aside when necessary. For example, in 1974 Israel was prepared to concede to terrorists holding 85 school children at a Maalot school but they were forced to attack the school when a deadline ran out⁵⁹ before concessions could be made. In addition, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Israel surrendered imprisoned terrorists in exchange for captured Israeli soldiers.

However, on other occasions, Israel has been more than willing to use armed force to rescue hostages held by terrorists as was done at⁶⁰ the famous Entebbe raid in Uganda. And they have initiated numerous

pre-emptive raids into foreign territories to attack terrorist camps and locations when it was felt a terrorist strike was imminent.

ITALY

Italy, like France, had been rather reluctant to legislate anti-terrorist type legislation because of existing laws on the books. Their main problem at first was that they weren't enforcing their own laws. For example, although fascism was outlawed in the 1947 Constitution, neo-Fascist parties were active up until the 1960's with no⁶¹ interference from the government. But in 1974, Italy stepped up their enforcement of criminal laws and enacted others with great success. In addition, their first anti-terrorism unit was established in 1974.

However, in 1976, Italy disbanded its anti-terrorism units because of the seeming demise of terrorist organizations of the time. But soon a resurgence of terrorist acts forced the Italian government to take other actions. In 1978, after the kidnaping of Aldo Moro, the first law pertaining specifically to terrorist acts was enacted. The law was entitled "Penal and Procedural Norms for the Prevention and Repression of Grave Crimes." This law enacted strict penalties for terrorist acts and even offered reduced sentences to those terrorists who gave up their old careers and helped authorities to track down⁶² their former associates or hostages. The initiation of such laws resulted in over 350 terrorists surrendering and repenting their crimes. It has been argued that the success of the Italians have been three-fold: (1) policy makers recognized terrorism was a serious threat and took actions to create organizations capable of dealing

with the terrorists; (2) modifications in the law made it easier for those organizations to carry out their tasks; and (3) the laws of 1980 and 1982 made terrorist crime penalties stricter while making it easy for the terrorists to give up their life of crime if they so chose. ⁶³

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Since the Munich disaster at the 1972 Olympics, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), has escalated their anti-terrorism activities and probably have the best anti-terrorist force in existence today, the GSG-9.

West Germany has had numerous laws on the books outlawing many organizations that could cause domestic problems, such as the Nazi Party. They have also enacted tough legislation against terrorism in general and have pursued terrorist organizations such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang with vigor. But West Germany, like many other European states, continues to deal with other states that sponsor terrorism when it suits their purpose. An example of this is the controversy over a West German firm aiding Libya in building a chemical plant which could be used for chemical munitions and poison gasses. West Germany has even refused to extradite known terrorists to the United States for trial, and tried the terrorist themselves, because of pressure from nations like Lebanon.

SPAIN

Due to the amount of Basque terrorism in Spain seeking an autonomous state, the Spanish authorities have had to deal with terrorism many times over the past few years. But at first, the government was

reluctant to deal with the problem and it took an attempted coup by rebel Guardia Civil officers in 1981 to force the Spanish government to enact stricter laws pertaining to terrorism.⁶⁴

Basque terrorist organizations have committed numerous atrocities to include indiscriminate bombings and assassinations of high-level government and military personnel. Most of their safe houses have been just inside the French border, but recent joint raids by the French and Spanish police have changed this situation.

But the Spanish, while dealing stricter with terrorism on their own soil, tried to ignore the Syrians, Libyans and Palestinians who were committing assassinations, bombings and shootings. However, after the 1985 bombing of a night club near Torrejon Air Base, the Spanish have joined forces with the French and Israeli's to reduce the threats imposed by these terrorist organizations.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States briefs that:

The United States Government will make no concessions to terrorists holding official or private citizens hostage. It will not pay ransom, release prisoners, change its policies, or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. At the same time, the United States will use every available resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists.⁶⁵

But the recent Iran-Gate situation involving now retired Marine Lt Col Oliver North possibly belies that statement.

While the United States has been very vocal in advocating various avenues of strict dealings with terrorists and their sponsored states, they have not been able, so far, to get other countries to cooperate

with them as much as needed.

In addition, until recently, United States laws and treaties have allowed terrorists to stay in the United States without having to fear extradition for political crimes. One example was the case of a Provisional IRA member who had escaped from England after killing a soldier. The judge hearing the extradition case ruled that the gunman could not be extradited due to a treaty existing between England and the United States forbidding extradition for crimes of a "political character." In 1986, however, this problem was eliminated when a new treaty was ratified by the United States and England prohibiting criminals, including political offenders, from using either country as a refuge. Because of these treaty revisions, an IRA assassin was⁶⁶ finally extradited in 1986 for the killing of a British policeman.

The United States counterterrorism policy is composed of four sections: The first is to be firm when dealing with terrorists and not to offer concessions for any reason; The second strategy is to make state sponsors of terrorist acts accountable for their actions (example is the attack on Libya in 1986); the third strategy is to try and bring terrorists to trial, disrupt their operations, and destroy their organizations. This strategy also includes various methods of protection for the citizens and property of the United States, i.e., barricades, bomb detection devices at facilities, bullet/bomb-proof automobiles, etc.; and the last strategy is to offer assistance to other countries under the Department of State Anti-Terrorism Training and Assistance Program (ATA) which gives training in anti-terrorism techniques to law enforcement officials around the world.⁶⁷

Moreover, new legislation such as the 1986 Omnibus Antiterrorism Act, seeks to treat all terrorist acts as crimes, and gives the United States jurisdiction over the perpetrator no matter where in the world⁶⁸ the act occurs, as long as the victim was an American citizen.

Anti-Terrorist Forces and Operations

The Table on page 48 lists the anti-terrorist units active in the discussed countries. All units are considered professional, with specialized training in relation to anti-terrorist activities. All unit personnel are volunteers who are specially selected for these type units, and undergo extreme scrutiny and elimination before the best are finally selected for the team.

FRANCE

The French have two major anti-terrorist units available and ready for immediate use in the event of terrorist hostage situations. The first is the Groupement D'Intervention De La Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN). This unit is a police unit formed to handle small scale terrorist hostage situations. The other unit is used only for large scale hostage situations and is the French Foreign Legion's famous Regiment Etranger De Parachutistes (2nd REP). This unit has the capability to be projected to any location in the world within 24 hours.

The GIGN was formed in 1973 and are based in Paris. Although they come under the command of the Minister of Defense, they also have powers of arrest and are used against criminal elements as well as terrorist organizations. All personnel are scuba divers, parachutists, climbing and martial arts experts. They are a 54-man team⁶⁹ divided into 4 twelve man teams with a headquarters element.

Table 2.7

ANTI-TERRORIST UNITSFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG 9)
 Spezialeinsatz Kommando (SEK)—Units in all Major Cities

FRANCE

Groupement D'Intervention De La Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN)
 Regiment Etranger De Parachutistes (2nd REP)—Used only for large scale
 hostage rescue attempts

ITALY

Groupe Interventional Speciali of the Carabinieri Nucleo Operativo
 Central Sicurezza (NOCs—or Leatherheads)

SPAIN

Grupo Especial de Operacions (GEO) of the Policia Nacional Unita Especial de Intervention (UEI) and Grupos Antiterroristas Rurales (GAR) of the Guardia Civil

UNITED KINGDOM

Comacchio Group of the Special Boat Service
 London Metropolitan Police D11 Unit
 Special Air Service (SAS)
 Special Branch of the National Police (Garda Siochana) Irish Republic

ISRAEL

Sayaret Matka (Also known as the General Staff Recon Unit or Unit 269)

UNITED STATES

Delta
 Hostage Response Team (HRT) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Other Units with the US Marshals Service, National Park Police, US Department of Energy (Nuclear Emergency Search Team-NEST), and each of the Armed Forces have teams at each base or post. In addition, almost all police and Sheriff departments have special teams for dealing with hostage and high-risk situations which could be used against terrorist units.

Source: Walter N. Lang, The World's Elite Forces (New York: Military Press, 1987), 14-77.

The GIGN has been used in over 84 operations, most of which involved criminal hostage taking rather than terrorists, since their creation.⁷⁰ Their first operation was in 1976 in the small country of Djibouti. Four gunman had seized a school bus with 31 mostly French children on board. The gunman were soon joined by two more accomplices who threatened to kill the children if their demands were not met. After negotiations broke down, the GIGN assaulted the bus and killed all 6 gunman.⁷¹ In other incidents, such as in 1981, when an aircraft was hijacked by a crazed monk, and in 1980 when the rescued guests at a hotel in Ajaccio, they succeeded in accomplishing their mission without a shot fired and arrested the perpetrators.⁷²

GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain has four units that can be used for hostage situations. These are the London Metropolitan Police D11 Unit, the Special Air Service (SAS), the Special Branch of the National Police (Garda Siochana) Irish Republic, and the Comacchio Group of the Special Boat Service. The Royal Marines have also been trained to deal with terrorist units due to their additional duties of guarding England's nuclear weapons in transit.⁷³

In 1975, four IRA gunman held a couple hostage in an apartment in Balcombe street, London. After negotiating for six days, the negotiating team decided to use psychological warfare on the terrorists and had a radio announcer leak the word that an armed SAS squad was on the scene and about to assault the apartment. The four-man IRA team⁷⁴ surrendered as fast as they could. This shows the fear that this elite unit had earned from their operations in Ireland, Oman, and

Malaysia.

But perhaps the best example of anti-terrorist action on the part of the British, is the famous assault on the Iranian Embassy in 1980, ⁷⁵ Operation Nimrod. After the Iranian Embassy was taken over by terrorists, the British government activated their command post called COBRA. Luckily, the British had practiced with COBRA and various practice operations before, and basic operations went smoothly.

When Arab diplomatic personnel refused to be involved in the negotiations, the terrorists killed one of the Iranians who had been haranguing them since the incident began. The SAS attacked the Embassy and succeeded in killing 5 of the 6 terrorists and capturing the last one. The SAS then turned over the scene to the police and drove away.

The SAS had also assisted in the Moluccan Train incident in the Netherlands, and had two men with the GSG-9 team when they attacked ⁷⁶ the aircraft at Mogadishu, Somalia.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

After the tragic ending of the 1972 Munich Olympics, West Germans formed an elite anti-terrorism force. Using the Border Police as a base, they recruited volunteers for the newly formed Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9). This unit is composed of volunteers supplied with a specially equipped Mercedes Benz automobile and loaded with cryptographic radio gear and weapons. These individuals can be placed into action almost immediately and are based in Hangelar, about 30 minutes drive north of Bonn. The unit is approximately 210 men strong with 120 of the force being combat trained. There are also small individual units of the Spezialeinsatz Kommando (SEK) located in most major

77

German cities.

The Germans most noteworthy operation was the one in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1977. There, 27 members of the GSG-9 team and two SAS members assaulted the Lufthansa aircraft in a 6-minute operation that resulted in three of the four hijackers killed and only three hostages

78

wounded.

The GSG-9 were also ready to go into operation in 1982 in Cologne, when Turkish terrorists occupied the Turkish Consulate. When the terrorists realized that the GSG-9 and the SAS were to assault, the terrorists surrendered.

79

SPAIN

Spain has two main antiterrorism units, the Grupo Especial de Operaciones (GEO) of the Policia Nacional Unida Especial de Intervention (UEI) and the Grupose Antiterroristas Rurales (GAR) of the Guardia Civil. These units have had great success in dealing with the Basque terrorist organizations in both Spain and France.

The GEO is composed and operated along the same lines as the SAS and train together using essentially the same tactics.

In their first operation of any note, the GEO showed promise in the training they received. In May 1981, terrorists took over the Banco Central in the center of Barcelona. Inside were approximately 24 terrorists and over 200 customers and staff. The Spanish government, intent on showing their toughness in dealing with terrorism, made little effort to negotiate with the gunmen.

The 60 man GEO unit assaulted the bank through doors and windows and managed to free the remaining hostages. The GEO killed one

terrorist and captured 10 more. During the assault, most of the hostages managed to escape along with the remaining terrorists. Unfortunately, the GEO didn't have a good internal cordon in place to hold individuals released from the bank.⁸⁰

It has been rumored that the GEO or other anti-terrorist units were involved in clandestine incidents such as the 1980 attack on a known Basque meeting place in France, in which two men were killed and at least 10 others were wounded in an attack by plainclothes men. The men were pursued across the border into Spain by the French police and diplomatic relations were strained.⁸¹

ISRAEL

Israel has employed their special anti-terrorist teams on many occasions to rescue hostages from terrorists. The main unit used in such operations is the Sayaret Matka (General Staff Recon Unit 269).⁸² This unit has been utilized many times in the past for conventional commando type operations across enemy lines. They have also been utilized in numerous unpublished anti-terrorist operations.

One of the first published incidents involving the Sayaret Matka was the hijacking in 1972 of a Sabena aircraft at Lod airport. The aircraft had been taken over by four members of the Black September organization and they had threatened to blow up the plane with all aboard if their demands were not met. While negotiations were going on, the Sayaret Matka practiced an assault on a nearby 707 aircraft, just like the hijacked one. When they were ready, they told the terrorists they would give in to their demands. The assault team, dressed in airport type white coveralls approached the plane and burst

in through the doors. They managed to kill two of the hijackers and wounded a third. One passenger was killed during the assault and one terrorist and one assault team member was wounded.

In the famous Entebbe raid, terrorists had managed to seize an Air France airbus in June 1976, and had it fly to Entebbe, Uganda. There the aircraft and hostages were guarded by Ugandan troops and the terrorists. During the negotiations, the Israeli's stated that might consider some of the demands of the terrorists and the terrorists extended the deadline by three days. They also released all non-jew passengers who were flown to France where they were de-briefed by Israeli intelligence units. Transported in four C-130 type aircraft, the assault crew flew to Entebbe and landed at the airport. Using a car like the dictator Idi Amin used, they managed to get within feet on the hanger where the hostages were held. The assault team killed at least 20 Ugandan soldiers and all the terrorists. Four hostages were killed as a result of the raid and the leader of the expedition.

ITALY

Formed in 1978 after the Aldo Moro kidnaping, Italy has the Groupe Interventional Speciali of the Carabinieri Nucleo Operativo Central di Sicurezza (NOCs or Leatherheads) which earn their name from the close fitting leather head gear used to conceal their identities during operations.

In December 1981, Brigadier General James Dozier, a member of the United States Army, was captured by the Red Brigades at his apartment in Verona. During the forty two days of his capture, the Italian

government conducted a massive search which resulted in more than 20
86
known terrorists being captured.

The main operation in Dozier's freedom, came as a result of information by an informant which led to the location of the hideout Dozier was held. The location was a second floor apartment and Dozier was held manacled in a blue pup tent with an armed guard sitting just outside the tent. After learning of the exact location the NDCS then had to decide how to best assault the apartment.

Using the mid-day activity as a cover, the assault team quickly sealed off the area and cleared the area of pedestrians. The team quickly raced to the second floor, surprised and took out the first guard. However, one of the other terrorists ran into the room where Dozier was held and was ready to kill him when he too was knocked out.
87
The other terrorists quickly surrendered.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States has many different types of units which can be employed in terrorist hostage situations. Almost every major city in the United States will have special weapons and tactics type units that are trained to deal with high-risk situations. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a 50 man Hostage Response Team (HRT) that can be deployed anywhere within the United States. For world-wide use, the Army has Delta Force which was used in the aborted rescue attempt of the hostages in Iran, and the invasion of
88
Grenada in 1983.

Although alerted and airlifted to several terrorist incidents, the only one really reported on was the aborted mission to rescue the

hostages held in Iran, by Delta Force. This is probably due to the accident at the landing site which resulted in many deaths. However, Delta Force was the unit used to assault an Indonesian aircraft held by five terrorists in Bangkok, Thailand. The assault team, aided by local commandos, attacked the aircraft killing four of the five terrorists and capturing the fifth. Delta Force was also called into action in 1984, along with a 12-man Venezuelan commando unit, when a Venezuelan aircraft was hijacked by two terrorists to the island of Curacao. During the assault on the aircraft, both hijackers were⁸⁹ killed and all the hostages were released unharmed.

Delta Force has also been alerted and flown to other hijacking⁹⁰ locations such as the TWA flight 847 and the Achille Lauro incidents.⁹¹ Although events didn't let them assault the hijacked locations, it is probable that they would have succeeded in their endeavors.

Armed Intervention in Terrorist Hostage Situations

Armed intervention into a terrorist hostage situation is one of the most dangerous operations involving terrorist acts. This is due to the fact that the terrorists holding the hostages have all the advantages. The terrorists know how many people they have, what weapons and munitions they possess, their mental attitude and their goals. The government seeking to make a decision on whether to use armed intervention or not is faced with trying to ascertain information on the terrorist group in order to formulate a rational decision or whether to use armed force.

Many writers have advocated using only non-armed intervention

strategies such as negotiation and psychological manipulation. But Szabo and Crenlinsten have suggested that there are two models that can be used in anti-terrorism strategies. These two models are known as the "war model" and the "communication model". They state that:

the war model sees terrorism as a kind of war and counterterrorism necessarily takes on a military or para-military flavor. [Thus], research strategies focus on weaponry, target-hardening and strategic studies. The communication model sees terrorism as a tactic used by those who,...see themselves as excluded from the political process,...Counter-terrorism is viewed as a process of providing channels of communication which alleviate the necessity of using violent force.⁹²

The main controversy today focuses on which of the two types of strategies one should follow in bringing to an end a terrorist hostage situation. But in recent years the number of incidents using armed force to resolve the hostage crisis has increased. The number of armed interventions for aircraft hijackings alone, between the years 1969 and 1974, averaged 5.5 cases a year. During the years 1975-79, there were approximately 6.6 armed interventions and during the years 1980-85, there were about 8 cases a year.⁹³

As already noted in other sections of this thesis, methods for combating terrorist hostage incidents have primarily focused on (1) legal responses—including extradition treaties; and, (2) offensive strategies—attacking the hostage location using armed force. There is a third method not covered in this thesis and that is the use of defensive measures to prevent or lessen the following types of situations—use of barricades, bullet-proof doors leading to aircrew cockpits, skymarshals, and the search of all individuals entering such

sensitive areas as embassies, airports and government legislative bodies.

Success has followed the use of armed intervention in such highly publicized incidents as the Israeli assault on the Sabena aircraft at the Lod airport in 1972, their assault on Entebbe, the German assault of the hijacked aircraft in Mugadishi, the Italian rescue of General Dozier in 1982, and the British Special Air Service (SAS) attack on the Iranian Embassy in London, fuel the emotions of those wanting to permanently end a terrorists criminal career.

But there have been tragedies, also, in using armed intervention. Some of these more tragic cases have been the German attempt to end the hostage situation at the 1972 Olympics, the Israeli assault of the school house in Maalot, the Egyptian assault of an aircraft in Malta and the Pakistan attempt to end the aircraft hijacking situation in Kabul.

Much of the previous research on this subject has concentrated on a few select incidents such as those mentioned above. But to date no complete study has been conducted on the issue of armed intervention in the various types of terrorist hostage situations. One study conducted in 1977 by the RAND Corporation, determined that more hostages are killed during the moment of armed interventions than by the terrorists themselves. However, this study was a statistical study concerned only with determining the number of hostages killed by terrorists and the number of hostages killed during rescue attempts. The only study which has come close in trying to determine whether an armed intervention is successful or not was conducted recently by

Mordechai Yerushalmi and entitled "The Use of Force as a Response to Airplane Hijackings."

In this study, Yerushalmi analyzed 673 aircraft hijackings in which there were 114 attempts at armed intervention to free the hostages. There were 340 killed or wounded hostages out of a total of 9739 passengers and crew during these armed interventions.⁹⁵

After analyzing all available data, he determined that:

(1) There was no significant level of association between the number of hostages killed or wounded and the professionalism of the armed intervening force.

(2) There was no significant relationship between the number of hostages killed or wounded and the number of terrorists involved in the hijacking.

(3) There was no significant relationship between the number of terrorists killed or wounded and the number of hostages killed or wounded during the rescue attempt.

(4) There was no significant relationship between the number of hostages killed or wounded and the number of hostages involved in the incident.

(5) There was no significant relationship between whether the armed intervention took place in the air (i.e., sky-marshals), or on the ground.⁹⁶

Therefore, he argues that the decision to use armed intervention is probably not an important element in the decision process because no significant relationship exists between using armed intervention and using non-armed intervention strategies.⁹⁷ However, this researcher finds that the data in the Yerushalmi study fails to support the author's contention.

The dynamics of every hostage situation is unique and one set plan can't be devised on whether to assault every incident using armed intervention. Some cases can be resolved by negotiation and some

can't. But when armed intervention is warranted, as much information as possible about the chances of success is needed by the concerned government entity.

Yerushalmi has pioneered a study into the complex problem of utilizing force to resolve terrorist hostage situations. However, further studies using all types of terrorist hostage situations are needed before any type of general assumptions can be made in this regard.

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Chapter 3

Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations

Summary

The purpose of this thesis has been to provide an overview of terrorism, terrorists, international and official government policies used to combat terrorist hostage situations, and the anti-terrorist forces themselves, in order to better understand the ways to ameliorate these type situations. Information on armed intervention in terrorist hostage situations is necessary to provide the understanding needed to terminate these type incidents with the least loss of life. Through an examination of literature on many different aspects of terrorism, the researcher has provided an extensive review of terrorism, terrorists, international and national policies concerning terrorism, anti-terrorism forces and some specific acts of armed interventions used by selected countries when responding to the terrorist hostage incidents.

This thesis has described the various methods used by countries when combating the terrorist hostage situation: that is, through legislation, negotiation, and armed intervention. The research shows that negotiation is the preferred choice of action with armed intervention available, and utilized, only if necessary.

The researcher has reviewed various international treaties and policies which have been used in an effort to eliminate terrorist hostage incidents.

Conclusions

Although terrorism has increased dramatically since 1968, many of the acts committed have been indiscriminate bombings, shootings and assassinations of government officials. Terrorist hostage situations have decreased since the 1970's, since more countries are willing to use armed force to free the hostages when warranted by the situation. Better cooperation between countries in allowing joint rescue operations have also attributed to the decrease in these type incidents. The decrease in terrorist hostage incidents can be attributed to the increased number of security measures employed in efforts to alleviate hostage situations. These control measures include the following: security barricades around sensitive structures and buildings; X-ray, metal, and bomb detection devices; armored vehicles; increased use of private security personnel; and the increased awareness of the general public and government officials to vary their everyday lifestyles to more easily deter surveillance by terrorists.

The majority of the terrorist hostage incidents have occurred in the Middle East, Europe and Latin America. There is every indication that more terrorism may come to the shores of the United States in the future. The danger may be from an international terrorist organizations from abroad, or a domestic right-wing extremist group such as the Aryan Brotherhood and the Order which originates in this country.

Examination of pertinent literature has shown that over fifty percent of all terrorist incidents are bombings while only a little over six percent of the incidents are classified as kidnappings or hostage taking situations. However, the general public is more

fearful of the publicity-generating hostage incident.

Very few people expect to be taken hostage and the average individual observing such a drama on television tends to identify with the victim. This produces outrage on the part of the viewer because the victim is an innocent person who was in the wrong place at the wrong time; and the observer knows fear, too, because the victims could have been anyone.

Discussion

The initial step in combating terrorist hostage incidents is to understand many of the underlying aspects of terrorism such as who is the individual terrorist and how do they perceive events around them. Key personnel in the decision process dealing with terrorist hostage situation must understand what options have been tried, and what avenues are available for use in terminating hostage situations with the least amount of danger and fatalities.

Research has shown that the methods used by terrorists in kidnaping and hostage taking situations are essentially the same in all such events. Most incidents involving terrorist hostage situations have occurred while the victim was traveling between one geographical location and another, usually in an aircraft, but these incidents have occurred in other mass transit type vehicles such as buses and trains. In such situations, the victims usually have no control over their environment and must rely on others to protect them. When this security breaks down, the victims must then place their trust in the government responsible for trying to free them.

After the terrorist hostage situation occurs, a government must

take immediate steps to contain the situation. When the site of the incident is a static location, the government and the force responsible for the use of armed intervention will have a better chance of using sophisticated listening devices and other technology to determine information about the situation. These type devices can aid in determining how many terrorists are involved, the kind of weapons employed, type and possible locations of explosive devices, the status of the hostages, and the possible bargaining positions which might be employed in resolving the crisis.

Using information gained through intelligence, it is possible to determine exactly the identity of the terrorists and their past history of violent activities. This information can be critical if the terrorist is found to be mentally unbalanced or a religious zealot. Different tacts must be used with each of the different types of hostage takers in order to terminate the situation successfully.

Negotiations can take place in an effort to free the hostages, while at the same time, such actions can buy time for the armed force to rehearse and prepare for the necessary assault.

The government must also take into account the time factor, because in certain situations, the hostage can become mentally affiliated with the terrorist and thus hinder rescue efforts when they are carried out. On the other hand, hostages can create so much antagonism during their captivity they may be the first victims at a negotiating deadline and thereby cause an armed intervention to occur ahead of schedule.

When hostage situations involving terrorists occur, many options

are available to the government for alleviating the situation: negotiations, concessions, refusal to deal with the situation, and armed intervention. Any can be employed, but some of these alternatives will work in certain situations only.

Recommendation--Implications for Future Research

There is a definite need for further research into the aspect of terrorism before many other questions can be answered regarding the terrorist hostage incident. Although this study has shown that armed intervention into terrorist hostage situations can be successful, additional research into the areas of terrorists, and the use of armed intervention is required before it can be determined which procedures will work in all incidents, with equal success.

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