A Potential Soviet Compromise on Ballistic Missile Defense
Abstract
The body of this research memorandum was written before the Baker- Shevardnadze meeting in Wyoming. It presented evidence suggesting that the Soviet Union might agree to a compromise at the Wyoming meeting that defers the issue of ballistic missile defense (BMD) negotiations to a later stage in arms reductions, thus facilitating a first-stage cut in offensive arms without an explicit Soviet endorsement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Through this compromise, offensive arms reductions should first be delinked from an agreement on BMD, and then be relinked during the second stage of deeper cuts. Therefore, negotiations on limiting BMD systems, though deterred, are deemed 'inevitable' if the U.S. persists in deploying a strategic defense system (SDS). Moreover, some Soviet arms controllers already look beyond the first stage to the prospect of negotiated transition into a strategic defense environment (i.e. , a reliance on defensive deterrence). In this approach, Wyoming, then, was expected to be only a first move in the Soviet negotiating strategy for a grand compromise on strategic defense. As explained in the afterword added to the paper, the actual events at Wyoming seem consistent with that interpretation. (jhd)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA218924
Entities
People
- Hung P. Nguyen
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses