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MANPOWER, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND MOBILIZATION READINESS: A PEACETIME CADRE SYSTEM FOR THE U.S. ARMY

BY

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MANPOWER, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND MOBILIZATION READINESS:
A PEACETIME CADRE SYSTEM FOR THE U.S ARMY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
1 March 1990

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MANPOWER, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND MOBILIZATION READINESS:
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CHAPTER I

A PEACETIME ARMY

Regardless of how unprepared the U.S. Army proved to be in fighting the first battle of the last war, it is inevitable that once peace is assured the Army's strength is reduced. As a consequence the first battle of the war that follows a peace, is usually a defeat or at best, a costly affair in terms of men and equipment. This cycle of events was acceptable in the past because of the perception on the part of each administration and Congress that there would be time to mobilize from a position of strength through deterrence. Today, time is at a premium and modern war more lethal than in previous wars. The stakes are now higher and this nation can no longer afford the risk of an early defeat. As we enter the last decade of the twentieth century the question of how best to mobilize and fight the first battle of the next war, in light of disarmament negotiations and peacetime reductions in the defense budget, must be resolved with great care.¹

How can the Army maintain a deterrent strength and achieve rapid mobilization and combat readiness should conventional forces be reduced as a result of disarmament

negotiations and budget reductions? This is not a new question and the debate that has already begun in many communities and government agencies is no different than those of earlier decades. However, in the past the solutions decided on have usually resulted in an inadequately prepared military and a needless squandering of lives. This is a price the American public is unwilling to pay in the future. New ideas are needed and options previously rejected should be resurrected to avoid what has become a tradition of military unpreparedness. This study analyzes and discusses relevant past experiences and proposes an intellectual framework to build a peacetime army that can mobilize quickly, fight, and win the first battle of the next high, mid, or low intensity conflict.

BACKGROUND

For the first time since 1938 the U.S. Army is facing a true peacetime environment. Ever since our mobilization for World War II in 1939, the Army has maintained either a prewar, wartime, or postwar force. Over the past year changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have come unexpectedly and rapidly. For the United States military and society, familiar with a political status quo of the Cold War, the events occurring around the world are unprecedented. Prior to these events, beginning in 1972, a subtle movement toward a unilateral reduction of United States military forces was initiated. With the wide-spread

belief that the Soviet threat is rapidly diminishing, a peacetime defense environment is actually on the horizon. It makes no difference if more cautious voices in this nation see the Soviet Union allowing reform in order to survive economically while streamlining its defense establishment and bringing its military technology to a level equal to the United States. Our senior military leadership is very aware of the potential impact of the current situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on U.S. force structure.

When Army General Colin L. Powell succeeded Admiral William J. Crowe as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some observers believed that his primary responsibility would be to restructure the defense establishment. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the impact of the budget deficit and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act on defense appropriations. Second is the stated intent of the Soviets to reduce East West tension. Thus General Powell told the Senate Armed Services Committee that if the international situation continues to improve and there is increasing pressure in Congress to reduce defense spending, he would then "vote in an instant for a smaller but ready force.² Former Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, supporting this prospective, stated that if this latter trend continues and no significant military crisis emerges in the decade of the 1990's, then "All the services are

going to be from one-half to two-thirds of their present size."3

The Regular Army strength today is approximately 764,000 officers and soldiers. Any significant troop reductions, whether brought about unilaterally by budgetary constraints or by conventional force negotiations in Vienna, will, most likely, reduce the Army's strength to its lowest level since the peacetime force of the 1930's. It is unclear exactly what manning level that peacetime force will reach, however, two assumptions must be made; a scaled down Regular Army is inevitable and there will be an even greater reliance on the Reserve Components.

While the certainty of force reductions is fully recognized, it is extremely important that the United States does not demobilize to the point that the first battle of the next war results in a defeat from which the nation cannot recover. As stated, our record in fighting first battles is abysmally poor. In a recent book on ten first battles of past American wars, historian John Shy, in the concluding chapter indicates that five were outright defeats; "Long Island, Queenston, Bull Run, Kasserine, and Osan/Naktong." In his analysis of the other battles; "Four of the five victories were very costly--some might say too costly (San Juan, Cantigny, Buna, Ia Drang)", while the fifth, the opening battle of the Mexican War on the Rio

Grande in May 1846 was a clear victory, it was not accomplished without a high American casualty rate.⁴

In the past geography and time have worked in favor of the United States to insure an unimpeded mobilization that resulted in, if not a victorious conclusion to the war, at least a preservation of the status quo in terms of national security. Today, in the modern age of fast breaking events there is little margin for recovery. Distance and time are no longer defense shields for the United States. Even in a mid to low intensity conflict, rapid mobilization is essential and, therefore, peacetime military preparedness is the key to winning the first battle.

AN OPTION

The question that must be asked as we prepare to restructure our Armed Forces is what may be required to insure mobilization readiness and combat effectiveness are maintained? This paper examines one option available to the Army that has proven to be cost effective, maintains force structure, reduces the time to mobilize, improves combat effectiveness and includes much of the infrastructure already in place. This option is a cadre system for the Army. By definition a cadre is a military unit's peacetime complement of officers and enlisted personnel in selected key positions who provide an internal structure that maintains equipment, plans, and trains for combat. This

peacetime complement of full time soldiers is immediately available upon mobilization to process and train additional personnel required for combat and deploys with their expanded unit.

Examples of cadre systems exist in American military history. The two decades between World Wars are of special interest since at the end of that period the United States mobilized an Army from a peacetime posture to fight a global conflict. In the 1920's and 1930's, based on the experience of World War I, Army mobilization planners emphasized the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC), a force structure that was itself a large cadre of officers. During the actual mobilization for World War II, the U.S. Army used a cadre system to field 8,291,336 men in 89 divisions and other supporting units. While the exact circumstances will not necessarily repeat themselves, it is worthwhile to examine the prewar ORC cadre and the system ultimately implemented upon mobilization.

This study will also examine how one of the most combat ready armies in the world, with sixty-five percent of its combat arms force structure contained in its Reserve Component, prepares for war. This Army is the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). It may be argued there are different requirements placed on the Israelis compared to the United States, and national defense has different implications for

each. However, there are certain aspects of IDF training, force structure, and mobilization procedures that are applicable to a restructured U.S. Army faced with significant force reductions.⁵

General Carl E. Vouno, Army Chief of Staff, states in the preface to FM 25-100, Training The Force, that "...our nation's ability to deter attack or act decisively to contain and de-escalate a crisis demands an essentially instantaneous transition from peace to war preparedness."⁶ The transition, according to the manual, must be made by Regulars and Reservists or what the Army's leadership calls the "Total Army." The question is what exactly is the commitment of the Army's leadership to the doctrine enunciated in the manual that states, "peacetime relationships must mirror wartime task organization to the greatest extent possible"⁷ If we are to train as we intend to fight, as our doctrine indicates, then this affirms that the Reserve Components are an integral part of the Total Army in peace and war.

The force structure cuts occurring now and over the coming decade demand that our senior leadership decide if they are committed to a "Total Army." If they are not comfortable with the use of the current Reserve forces, under the Chief Executive's 200,000 call-up authority, in mid or low intensity conflicts, then they must offer some

other alternative. In the coming years there will not be enough defense dollars to field a Regular Army large enough to fight even the smallest of conflicts on a protracted basis. As a consequence, the adoption of a cadre system can bridge the intellectual gap that now exists over the use of the 200,000 call-up. This cadre system will also allow for the full and complete integration of the Reserve Components into an actual "Total Army" rather than today's force that appears to many to exist as merely senior leadership rhetoric.

ENDNOTES

1. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America's First Battles, pp. ix and xi.
2. George C. Wilson, "Sweeping Restructuring of Military To Be Powell's Mission as New Chief," Washington Post, 30 September 1989, p. A7.
3. Ibid.
4. Heller and Stofft, eds., America's First Battles, p. 329.
5. Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier, p. 43.
6. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 25-100, p. i (hereafter referred to as FM 25-100).
7. Ibid., p. 1-3.

CHAPTER II

BALANCING THE FORCE

Throughout United States history a significant challenge to military and civilian authorities in making budgetary decisions has been to strike a balance between national security and domestic programs. In times where the general public does not perceive an immediate threat, the struggle between the two budgetary claimants becomes even more intense. Understandably, domestic programs have almost always had a clear edge. To save on military appropriations the government has sought ways to include citizen-soldiers as a viable part of the force structure. This balancing act has been in existence since the American Revolution. From the budget apportionments comes the issue of the proper balance of the Regular Army to that of the Reserve Components. The application of the available funding to achieve maximum readiness and deterrence potential of both forces in terms of training, equipment, force structure, and doctrine has been a continuous debate throughout our history.

While this study is not intended to be a history of the Army's force structure evolution, it is appropriate to understand our nation's efforts to provide a balanced force

of regulars and citizen-soldiers capable of executing national military strategy. Of significance to this study is one method, while a concept which has surfaced after almost all of our nation's wars, has never been adopted until we are in the midst of a mobilization. This method is a cadre system. A system, as indicated in the previous chapter, that is a military unit's peacetime complement of officers and enlisted personnel in selected key positions who provide an internal structure that maintains equipment, plans, and trains for combat. This peacetime complement of full time soldiers is immediately available upon mobilization to process and train additional personnel required for combat and then deploys with the expanded unit. This concept is not a new one. After the War of 1812 Secretary of War John C. Calhoun introduced the possibility of the reliance on a small, but expansible army of national troops.

AN EXPANSIBLE ARMY

On May 11, 1820, as the memory of the War of 1812 faded, Congress directed the Secretary of War to plan for Army force reductions. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun confronted with the possibility of executing the Congressional guidance while remembering the Army's previous defeats, including the shameful destruction of the nation's capitol, was concerned with the proper force structure to insure a strong national defense. He reviewed the

consistently poor performance of the militia on many battlefields of the war and also considered the amazing success of the Army at the battle of Chippewa. What impressed the Secretary about Chippewa was that Regulars, in name only, won the battle. The units that fought there, until a few weeks prior to the engagement, consisted only of a cadre of Regular Army officers, while the rank and file consisted of recent volunteers. The commander, General Winfield Scott, molded these citizen-soldiers into such a fighting force that their cool performance under fire evoked an exclamation of surprise from the British commander, "Those are Regulars, by God!"¹

Calhoun must have had Chippewa on his mind when he told Congress that if they deemed it necessary to reduce the strength of the Regular Army then plans must be made for the force to be able to expand rapidly should the need ever exist. In his arguments he challenged the traditional myth of the successes of the militia in the Revolution and War of 1812. Although great reliance was placed on the militia, citizen soldiers were no match for the regular armies of foreign powers. "War," he said, "is an art, to attain perfection in which, much time and experience, particularly for the officers, are necessary."²

Calhoun offered to Congress a cadre system or as he called it, an "augmentation" of the Regular Army.³ Officer

strength was to be untouched in what he believed was a force structure that would speed mobilization of an effective fighting force while each unit of the peacetime establishment had a reduced enlisted strength. Upon mobilization, units would be brought to a full complement of soldiers. Although rapidly trained, the recruits, as in the Chippewa example, would have the potential benefit of going into battle with a well trained and experienced Regular Army cadre. Also, by creating an additional pool of officers and staff headquarters, additional units could be assembled in a relatively brief time. Thus, the militia's purpose was to be "garrison" troops or "light" formations fighting along side Regular forces. Congress rejected the concept and, in a peacetime austerity measure, disbanded some and consolidated other Regular units to reach the new authorized force level.

This idea of an "expansible Army" has remained on the periphery of force structure doctrinal debates ever since Calhoun's attempt to make it policy. For the balance of the nineteenth century all American wars have been fought with volunteers and militia. While Regular Army officers or former officers served in or commanded volunteer units in the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish-American Wars, there was no conscious effort to make this a policy. An issue of whether or not to disperse the Regular Army among the volunteer units was considered at the outbreak of the Civil War but

never implemented. In this war, former Regular Army officers did act as cadre to a great many state volunteer units. Also, it was the serving and former Regular Army officers that very often commanded above brigade level.

At the end of the Civil War, the Regular Army again retrenched, and became a small peacetime force, occasionally conducting Indian fighting operations. However, those that had served in the war were very much aware that, as historian James McPherson noted in a recent study on the Civil War, "the United States has usually prepared for its wars after getting into them."⁶ General William T. Sherman was one senior officer who was most concerned about this dilemma. He wanted to insure that the question of war was studied by the officer corps in an effort to learn from past mistakes. As commanding general, in addition to establishing a professional education system, Sherman encouraged a young officer who had shown promise during the Civil War, Emory Upton, to study the profession of arms. Sherman ordered Upton abroad to examine the military establishments of other nations.

UPTON PROPOSES REFORM

While in Berlin, Upton became infatuated with the German successes in the 1870 Franco Prussian War. He was especially impressed with the German Army's rapid mobilization of its federal reserve forces compared it to

the slow pace of Union mobilization at the beginning of the Civil War. He wrote Sherman that the United States could "...not maintain a great army in peace, but we can provide a scheme for officering a large force in time of war, and such a scheme is deserving of study."⁶ On his return in 1878 Upton wrote and published Armies of Asia and of Europe. The book went beyond his original charter and recommended the adoption of a cadre system similar to that of the victorious German Army. He astutely recognized that the nation would not accept the German Army's peacetime conscription and he modified that aspect when he discussed a similar system for the United States. Basically his proposal called for a skeletonized Regular force that could be expanded by volunteers in war. However, he also called for abandonment of the American reliance on the militia system since success in war, he believed, depended on command of all forces by highly trained Regular Army officers.

He expanded on his ideas in a study titled Military Policy of the United States from 1775 which was completed by a friend after his untimely death in 1884. Upton's thesis was that a coherent military policy for the United States did not exist. A policy was needed and it should be based on lessons learned in past wars. His proposal emphasized creating a regional unit system similar to the Germans. Upton's system rested on the formation of units manned by Regular Army cadre who, in peace, were responsible for

training citizen-soldiers in immediate geographic area. In Germany these citizen soldiers were conscripts and although he spoke of conscription in war, he avoided the issue of where United States citizen-soldiers would come from during peace.⁷

Upton believed that any modification to the existing militia system would not provide a strong defense because members would never have adequate training. The militia's dual role as state and federal forces, he indicated, got in the way of fielding an effective force. He also made no distinction between the militia and volunteers who had fought with great effect during the Civil War although he did acknowledge that given time citizen-soldiers could be molded into an effective fighting force.⁸ While Upton's narrow focus on the importance of the Regular Army doomed his idea of a cadre system, it remained clear to those responsible for national defense that there continued to be a need for a more efficient peacetime force structure.

At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, the need for such a structure was once again apparent. It fell to the new Secretary of War, Elihu Root, who assumed office in 1899, to search for alternatives. Faced with the Army's obvious unpreparedness for that conflict, he realized there was a pressing need for a more efficient alternative to the existing military policy which was equated with peacetime

neglect. The unpublished work of Emory Upton was brought to his attention. In 1904 the Secretary, impressed with Upton's study, had it published at government expense. However, Upton's ideas had no impact on policy makers and the traditional way of mobilizing citizen-soldiers at the onset of war remained in effect. Thus, at the beginning of World War I, the lack of an effective peacetime military force structure was once again apparent. Even though war was declared in April 1917, the first American division did not see combat until over a year later.

LESSONS OF THE GREAT WAR

While the Army was not prepared to fight in Europe; once President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war, personnel mobilization moved forward rapidly. Previous lessons learned in the Civil War were applied to manpower procurement. "For the first time in its history the United States at the beginning of a war created an adequate legislative basis on which to raise an army by scientific and fair methods."⁹ When war was declared in April 1917 the Army, including federalized National Guardsmen, stood at 213,557. By September 1917, the first selective service registrants began to flood the training camps. On November 11, 1918 the Army had grown to 3,685,458 men. The problem was that it was a semi-trained force that learned on the job. The results were inordinately large casualty lists.¹⁰

The tremendous losses can be directly related to the failure in peacetime to maintain a force structure that could expand for war. Again, as in previous wars, the Army attempted to make up for peacetime neglect after hostilities commenced. In May 1917, the War Department made an effort to implement a cadre system. All new Regular Army regiments would contain a cadre drawn from existing formations. Volunteers would then flesh out all the regiments. As the Army grew in size the War College Division of the Army General Staff decided that a minimum of 961 enlisted regulars be assigned to the newly formed Army divisions, which would ultimately achieve a strength of over 18,000 officers and enlisted men. The Adjutant General reduced this figure because the troops were not available.¹¹ Officer cadre for the new divisions came from the Regular Army and the new Officer Reserve Corps. Officers from the latter component received rudimentary training at sixteen stateside camps.¹²

However, these limited stateside preparations were readily apparent when the new divisions arrived in the combat zone. Training for both officers and enlisted soldiers was so poor that the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) had to establish a complete U.S. Army school system, from basic infantry skill training to staff officer education, in France. As they arrived in Europe divisions were immediately sent to training areas. Even after

training, divisions, time permitting, were sent to quiet sectors. In the AEF it was common to find a soldier who did not know how to wear a gas mask or load his rifle. From all accounts many officers who did not learn quickly enough for the pace of events either became casualties along with their men or were relieved. Up until the Armistice, the American Army's performance was consistently poor with the same mistakes repeated over and over again. Attack plans were too rigid, supporting fires were not coordinated or adequate, cover and concealment ignored, there was no initiative in the attack, and the concept of fire and maneuver seemed not to exist. There was, as one historian noted, a lack of "tactical sophistication." At Soissons from 18 to 21 July, the attacking 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division, some 3,000 officers and men, had 200 effectives at the conclusion of the offensive. This number of casualties was a sad commentary on the lack of creative military peacetime preparation for war.¹³

At the conclusion of the Great War the Army rapidly demobilized. In the two decades that followed, budgetary constraints once again repeated previous force structure reductions. Prompted by the experience of World War I, the General Staff and a number of officers again attempted to provide the nation with an efficient peacetime force structure prepared for war.

ENDNOTES

1. Charles E. Heller, "Those Are Regulars, By God! ARMY, Jan 1987, pp. 52-54.
2. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 140.
3. Walter Millis, Arms and Men, p. 82.
4. Weigley, p. 140.
5. James M. McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 312.
6. Weigley, p. 276.
7. Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States from 1775, p. xiv.
8. Ibid, p.xii.
9. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945, p. 246.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid, p. 294.
12. Ibid, p. 283.
13. Heller and Stofft, eds., p. 180.

CHAPTER III

THE STAKES BECOME HIGHER

The officers who served in World War I were acutely aware that the United States Army had not been prepared in 1917 to fight. Not knowing what threat the nation would face next, the Army's leadership attempted to create a postwar force structure that would allow for the rapid mobilization of an Army adequate to fight a conflict similar to the Great War. While a succession of Army Chiefs of Staff and their respective General Staffs knew that peace would bring about a curtailment of funds, they, like their fellow citizens, were totally unprepared for, nor did they comprehend, the impact of the ensuing Great Depression. They also did not anticipate the anti-war mood nor the growing isolationist sentiment of the American public.

Once again the Army faced the challenge of rapid demobilization along with the need for a acceptable national military policy. Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March set about to establish a postwar military policy that would include a large peacetime Regular Army of a half a million men. He wanted to make certain that the United States would not face another war with the small Regular force it had in 1917. In preparing an Army organization

bill, March discounted the role of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves in the peacetime national defense structure. In doing so he ignored the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916 which gave a legislative basis for the Army to be composed of three components; the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves. Intent on maintaining a large Regular Army unit, March dismissed an opportunity to have Congress enact legislation to create universal military service which would have solved the dilemma of where the additional manpower would come from on mobilization to expand the Regular Army.¹

Congress sent a draft universal military service bill to the War Plans Division of the General Staff. There a subcommittee ignored the Chief of Staff's opposition to the pending legislation and, while concurring with the concept, added its own details. To organize the manpower generated by universal military training, the subcommittee recommended the creation of a forty-eight division federal reserve to provide the basis for a cadre of Reserve and Regular Army officers. The subcommittee suggested that the existence of this pre-trained manpower pool would allow for a reduction in the size of the March proposed postwar Regular Army of a half a million. Their report recommended Army concurrence with the pending legislation. The War Department bureaus and the General Staff concurred. March mindful of the problems brought about by a small prewar Army mobilized to

fight World War I, rejected the report and refused to support the legislation. Without the Chief of Staff's support, the legislation died in the Congressional committee. His decision was an unpropitious entrance to the inter-war period and had a significant impact on the Army's readiness to fight any future conflict.²

INTER-WAR PERIOD

Concurrently, at the end of the first global conflict General John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, sent General John McAuley Palmer back to the United States to assist in planning the postwar Army. Palmer sat on the subcommittee that recommended universal military service. In 1920, when Pershing became Chief of Staff he continued to be influenced by Palmer and plans for the peacetime Army took a different turn. The basis for the Army's restructuring during the inter-war period was the National Defense Act of 1920. This legislation reaffirmed the 1916 Act's declaration that the Army of the United States was composed of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves. The man most frequently associated with both pieces of legislation was Palmer. Palmer gained notoriety as a captain on the General Staff when he wrote a staff study, Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States of 1912. In essence, the report called for a national army composed of a small, well trained professional Regular Army, the National Guard,

an army of "citizen-soldiers" organized into units and, when war was declared, an "army of volunteers."³ Palmer believed the Regular Army should be responsible for creating a mechanism to recruit, train, and mobilize the latter component.

Palmer became the chief spokesman for an integrated army of Regulars and citizen-soldiers. Not only was the structure of the nation's Army reaffirmed as having three components, but the actual force composition would be determined by a board composed of an equal number of Reserve Component (National Guard and Organized Reserve) and Regular Army officers. Reserve Component units, formed into brigades and divisions, were to be located within geographical corps areas. The Regular Army corps commanders had responsibility for the Reserve Component units within their boundaries.

Palmer's efforts were ultimately undone in part by his overly optimistic reliance on a volunteer system of recruitment for all the components and the steady decline of Army appropriations. There were never enough funds during the inter-war period to even support the Regular Army's authorized strength. The War Department had no choice but to "shortchange" the Reserve Components.⁴

In 1927 Palmer expanded his ideas by incorporating the Swiss militia system into an American model. As with the Swiss system, part of Palmer's model was a cadre system for the Organized Reserves. Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers made up the cadre of the Organized Reserve units. Upon mobilization this cadre had responsibility for training volunteers or draftees assigned to their units. The Regular Army was responsible for strategic forward deployment and a continental force prepared for immediate deployment. These missions remain intact today. The National Guard's mission was to initially provide continental defense and then reinforce a Regular Army expeditionary force.

Palmer knew the Army was required by the 1920 Act to create what was in essence a Reserve cadre system. As it turned out the ORC during the entire inter-war period was composed almost exclusively of officers with only a few noncommissioned officers in its ranks. The Army staff, however, saw this Reserve officer corps as having significant potential to enhance mobilization readiness of all three components. This manpower pool was assigned two critical mobilization missions. The first mission for the officers was as fillers for the Regular Army units, few of which, because of austerity measures, were at wartime strength. These Reserve officers were also required to fill National Guard units that were in similar straits. Thus, by

the late 1920's the Reserve officer filler requirement was 26,000. These officer's mission was also to serve as a cadre for Organized Reserve units in each of the Corps areas to achieve a mobilized force of thirty-three complete divisions, non-divisional support units, and headquarters staffs. These requirement called for about 136,000 spaces. At this time there were only 90,000 Reserve officers in the program. In addition, the Army hoped to place twenty enlisted Reservist in each company (noncommissioned officers and "specialists") to assist in training upon mobilization.⁵ The Defense Act also called for an enlisted "Army Reserve" as separate and distinct from the Organized Reserve and a mirror image of today's Individual Ready Reserve. However, this potential pool of pre-trained manpower was not organized until 1938.⁶

The Army decided, according to BG Delafeld, an officer in the ORC and a lecturer at the Army War College, that Reserve officers would not have the "necessary time and have the skill level and ability to organize and maintain the federal reserve units....", let alone adequate numbers. To correct these deficiencies, the inter-war Army opted for a cadre within the Organized Reserve cadre using Regular officers in key positions. Each Reserve division would have a "well qualified Regular Army officer as Chief of Staff" with "one or two...Regular Army officers to assist him" and a "suitable Regular Army officer as Executive Officer for

each Reserve regiment." In addition, a number of Regular Army officers and enlisted personnel served at each Corps headquarters "working over Organized Reserve affairs." The Army General Staff believed that these officers and enlisted men were "absolutely necessary to the success" of the Organized Reserve because they could "devote their whole time to the interests, to the development, to the organization, and to the training of the units to which they are assigned without interruption or the distraction of other principal pursuits." The Army was serious about the quality of Regular Army officers assigned to Reserve Component positions. Two noteworthy examples were Omar Bradley and George C. Marshall. Reserve officers commanded the units and "preserve(d) the unit authority and military system" of the Organized Reserve. It was essential that each Regular Army officer be assigned for no less than four years. Since these were cadre units and small in size, there were no armories or Reserve centers for meetings or offices. Regular Army officers were ordered to rent offices "in the same neighborhood as the home or office of the Reserve...Commander." Meetings for many units were held in a variety of public halls.⁷

The inter-war Army's vision for the future was a:

...picture of the completed organized Reserves with their assigned personnel, their cadres, their stores of equipment, and their readiness to function is indeed a great picture of a nation ready to defend itself, not through professional

soldiers or by maintaining an immense military establishment at great cost, but by the intelligent and voluntary cooperation of the citizens themselves at a comparatively small cost.⁸

Unfortunately, the vision was not to be fulfilled. As General Delafield, noted in a lecture to Army War College students in 1925, "In the organization and training of the reserves, as in every other Service, the appropriations are always the limiting factor." The General's audience was well aware that fiscal restraints placed on the peacetime Army were beginning to have an impact on military preparedness. Also, as a result of technological innovations in weapons, postwar procurement costs rose as the nation approached the 1930's. The 1916 fiscal year Army appropriation was \$144,000,000. Even by the end of the 1920's there were obvious signs that the Army's appropriation requests would encounter increasing resistance from the executive and legislative branches of government. In 1930 the figure had grown to \$332,000,000, even with a tremendous war materiel surplus. The new systems were expensive and included: aircraft; large caliber tractor drawn and railway artillery; anti-aircraft guns; tanks; armored cars; trucks; chemical offensive and defensive equipment; and radios. Technology was also more costly in terms of longer training requirements and new schools for personnel who would use the new equipment. These costs impacted on funds available for the ORC and competed with the other demand on the federal budget.⁹

In 1929 President Herbert Hoover asked the current Chief of Staff, General Charles P. Summerall to survey the Army leadership to see where additional budget cuts could be made. Summerall directed his Corps, overseas department commanders, and service school commandants to look at a number of areas. Two are of specific interest. He asked for a cost comparison between an Army of selective service inductees and a small Regular force backed by a substantial citizen-soldier reserve. Second, he directed a response to the value of the Reserve Components and asked if one should be abolished or both consolidated. The responses varied. However, in the final analysis, Corps, overseas department commanders, school commandants, the General Staff, and War Department Bureau Chiefs vigorously defended the Reserve Components. Even in the face of declining Army appropriations this support continued into the Depression years while declining appropriations forced Army plans for the dual cadre Organized Reserve units to languish. There continued to be units with Organized Reserve Corps officers and Regular Army personnel, but membership declined and numerous units existed only on paper. Many drill meetings were nothing more than lectures by fellow Reserve officers. Annual training for these officers and those not in units became a five to six year cycle because the Army lacked funds.10.

The problem, too few defense dollars to accomplish all that was needed. In 1932 General Douglas MacArthur, the new Chief of Staff, told Congress that he would continue to support the Reserve Components even at the expense of force modernization. He believed that modern equipment was of little value if there were no Reservists trained to use it. His approach was to insure that the Army could expand rapidly in size with a large cadre of Reserve officers.¹¹ There was no question that the Regular Army establishment, as a result of the experience gained in World War I, remained convinced that a well organized and trained Reserve was an essential part of national defense.

As the decade progressed, the General Staff, beginning with MacArthur's tenure, began to develop annual Protective Mobilization Plans. The plans were unrealistic and based, as many would contend today's plans are, on nonexistent manpower and overly optimistic time tables. Later, as the threat of war loomed in Europe the planning was more in line with the true state of the Army, but in many instances appear now to be wishful thinking. In 1939 the plan called for the Regular Army and the National Guard, as an Initial Protective Force of 400,000, to "withstand any onslaught" until reinforced by Organized Reserve cadre units.¹²

MOBILIZATION FOR WAR

On September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland and many people in the United States realized the long armistice was at an end. A week following this invasion, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared a state of national emergency and, in an executive order, authorized an increase in the size of the Regular Army. The Protective Mobilization Plans became the basis for early mobilization efforts and the Regular Army's authorized strength continued to grow. This growth, while not activating Organized Reserve Corps units, made a shambles of prewar planning, a situation that was repeated a decade later for Korea and again for Vietnam mobilization. Reserve officers with prewar assignments to Regular Army units and headquarters were most effected. As the Regular Army expanded and the National Guard federalized, Reserve officers were called to active duty on an availability basis, as fillers. When complaints forced the General Staff G-1 to acknowledge the havoc this policy was having, several directives were published to correct the call-up, but original assignment plans were never followed.¹³ Also the structure of the Regular Army and National Guard divisions were "streamlined" from the cumbersome World War I "square division" to the "triangular" division. This change further impacted on Reserve officer assignments. As the situation in Europe worsened when German armor columns swept through France, the General Staff began to prepare for the "First Augmentation" to expand the Protective Mobilization Plan. This called for an Army of

one and a half to two million men by 1942.¹⁴ On September 16, 1940 the Selective Training and Service Act was passed. By June 30, 1941, the Army achieved a strength of almost one and a half million men. During this expansion, the G-3 contemplated a new force structure to absorb the increasing manpower. Before these plans were prepared, on December 7, 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. The Declaration of War on Japan increased the tempo and urgency of mobilization and with it plans were formulated to cadre newly formed units.

Initially, in 1940 and 1941, as units of the Organized Reserve were activated, it was, in reality, their regimental designations not the personnel that were brought on active duty. The Order of Battle for World War II lists twenty-six Organized Reserve Corps divisions. When these divisions were activated, only a few of the previously accessioned peacetime officers remained. Others were either drawn off to fill Regular Army and National Guard units or to serve in a multitude of staff assignments. These ORC divisions then "were not reserve divisions in any real sense of the word."¹⁵ These units and non-divisional units, on mobilization, now had to be assigned cadres from earlier mobilized Regular Army or National Guard units. This is a prime example of the absurd notion popular today of "doing more with less." Initially, the units were formed under

supervision of Corps area commanders and located at Replacement Training Centers.

In January 1942, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, approved an Army General Headquarters (GHQ) organization and training plan for a cadre system. According to the plan, the unit's commanding General and other officers would be selected two and a half months prior to unit activation. These commanders and their staffs reported to GHQ. The commander took a division refresher course at the Command and General Staff School while his assistant received instruction at the Infantry School. The division artillery commander was sent to Fort Sill for training. Later the assistant division commander and special staff officers would join the commander at Fort Leavenworth for another course. Still other staff officers attended their respective branch schools for further training.¹⁶ The GHQ plan authorized a division cadre of 9.8 percent or 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men for an Infantry triangular division whose total authorized strength was 452 officers and 13,425 enlisted men. Cadre sizes increased several times until it reached 216 officers and 1,460 enlisted men or 12 percent of the authorized division strength.¹⁷

The division commander and his staff reported to the new unit's duty station about thirty-seven days prior to its

activation. After a week, the officer and enlisted cadre returned from their training followed by officers from the replacement pool, officer candidate school, and the branch schools. For the next two weeks enlisted soldiers poured into the division's area. Once the last soldier arrived, the cadre was ready to begin training. The Mobilization Training Programs developed by GHQ were thirteen weeks in duration.¹⁸

In the fall of 1942 a decision had to be made to increase the number of troops reporting to a newly activated division by 15 percent. This was necessary because, even prior to the completion of a training cycle, divisions were required to provide cadres for other newly formed units.¹⁹ Division commanders were torn by the need to send the quality soldiers needed as cadre and a desire to retain the best soldiers for their own units. Complaints reached Army Ground Forces, which had taken over GHQ functions, of the resulting poor quality of new cadres. One solution was to have the division commander prepare two lists, "A" and "B", each with a full complement of cadre. Someone other than the division commander would then select one of the lists. In this way a commander was forced to balance both lists with quality soldiers and those that did not meet his standards.²⁰ This method was not always used and it remains a source of amazement that the Army was "as able to obtain

the selection of a very high percentage of superior personnel as nuclei for the new divisions."21

In large measure the cadre system developed for World War II mobilization worked. Although there were instances of poor performance, the majority of units deployed overseas became effective fighting forces. One can only speculate on how much more effective early deploying units might have been in combat if the Army had been able to implement a fully manned and trained prewar cadre system for the Organized Reserve Corps during the inter-war period. A lesson that can serve today's Total Army as it enters a peacetime environment.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ISRAELI ARMY

In the history of modern warfare there has never been a citizen army that has mobilized as rapidly and fought as effectively as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). There are few countries in the world that face a constant threat to their national security and are at such a geographic disadvantage as the state of Israel. The IDF is unique among armies of the world because, unlike other armed forces, it has developed under the constant pressure of a state of war with its neighbors. Except for some British influence, the IDF evolved its own force structure. It created its own strategic and tactical doctrine as it evolved through one conflict and then another. From force structure to basic soldier skills, the Israelis have learned through trial and error what is necessary to survive in a hostile world. This evolution began in the 1948-1949 War for Independence and has continued to the present.

In 1949, when the armistice was signed ending Israel's War for Independence, Chief of Staff Yigal Yadin and his staff were charged by Prime Minister David Ben Gurion with the task of building an army capable of providing the means of survival against overwhelming odds. Yadin spent several

months in Switzerland studying that country's citizen army. Switzerland's force structure suited Israel's needs. The Swiss Army, he found was composed of a small cadre of Regular forces primarily responsible for training, long range planning, and maintenance of a "massive civilian army supported by large quantities (sic) of armor, artillery, air force, etc." Service in the army was mandatory and so was reserve duty. For Israeli purposes the Swiss model required some adaptation, but it was a workable solution for a country whose population and economy could not afford a large standing army.¹ Yadin proposed a small cadre of Permanent Service (Keva) officers and noncommissioned officers; a Compulsory Service (Hova) composed of draftees, men and women; and a large body of Ready Reserves (Miluimm) that included all the soldiers completing their compulsory reserve service.²

A General Staff was created for all the armed services, Army, Air Force, and Navy. The Army is the primary service and is commanded by the Chief of Staff. In peacetime the Navy and Air Force are controlled by their respective commanders. In war their commanders are General Staff officers and report to the Chief of Staff. They function in wartime as advisers. The General Staff currently has five branches; Operations, Quartermaster (logistics), Manpower, Intelligence, and Planning. Reporting directly to the General Staff is a Ground Forces Command that has

responsibility for training. The IDF is divided into three territorial commands, Northern, Central, and Southern. These commands provide the administrative and operational framework for the IDF. Each has a Major General commanding and deputy staff officers responsible for operations, training, and supply. A cadre of Permanent Service officers command units down to brigade level and report to the territorial commander. The commander is specifically responsible for the defense organization of that particular geographic area including the administration, training, and mobilization of the Reserve forces. An important aspect, although the information is classified, appears to be that Reserve and Permanent Service units are intermixed and interchangeable within each command.³

Within these territorial commands are "functional commands" for armor, training, and pioneer and youth. The Armor Command organizes, trains its own units and formations to a certain level of performance, and then turns them over to the Territorial Command. The Training Command is responsible for all land forces training bases and manages instructional facilities. The Pioneer and Youth (Nahal) Command provides a combination of military and agricultural training with settlement security. It also provides reinforcements to the Territorial Command.⁴

Given this force structure the most critical and unique aspect of the IDF is the Reserve which is "its most important operational component rather than just being an appendage to the regular force." The key to the IDF's battlefield successes is its Reserve component which comprises 60 percent of its total strength and 65 percent of its combat units. No other modern army can duplicate the factors that influence and mold the IDF. However, there are some elements of its force structure and organization that may provide a United States peacetime army facing significant troop reductions and budget cuts, ideas to improve the mobilization and combat readiness of its Total Army force structure.

"MILUIMM"

Every Israeli citizen is required to perform military service. A draft announcement is made every month by birth date at age eighteen. About 92 percent of all males and 60 percent of all females are inducted. The standard service is three years for men and twenty months for females, except for individuals who volunteer for special duty as commandos, pilots, and intelligence specialists. Aside from normal exemptions for religion, conscience objections, or physical problems there is an Academic Reserve program which is similar to the Reserve Officer Training Corps in the United States. A deferment is granted for enrollees who then continue their university educations. They train during

their summer vacations as students in the Permanent Service Squad Commander's Course. The objective is to increase the number of trained professionals in the Reserve and upon completion, their total obligation on active duty is extended to five years.⁵ The IDF subjects its soldiers to an extensive battery of tests to determine his or her talents and leadership qualities. Those with the highest motivation and intelligence are usually placed in combat units and are also programmed for leadership training in all branches of service.⁶

At the end of the year after the soldier's Compulsory Service has ended he enters the Reserve. Because the Reserve is so much an integral part of the nation's defense the eleven months between Compulsory Service and the Miluimm is jokingly called "leave." In the Reserve men are eligible for mobilization until age fifty-five and childless women until age thirty-four. Each Reservist is liable to be called up for thirty-one days annually plus time for other training. This additional time is usually one day a month or three days every three months for enlisted soldiers or seven day for officers at the discretion of the local brigade commander. This duty may be to relieve a Regular unit or familiarize with a new weapon. At the age of thirty-nine for men and twenty-nine for women, the annual requirement is dropped to fourteen days a year for enlisted soldiers while officers and noncommissioned officers can

serve an additional twenty-one days per year. The Minister of Defense has broad discretionary power to call reservist up for longer period than stated. At age forty-five Reserve officers are asked to join the local defense unit (Haganah Merchavit). Combat unit membership is restricted to enlisted soldiers under the age of forty-five.⁷

Reservists are automatically assigned to a unit near their homes in a position to match their military occupational skill. The IDF exercises close watch over military skills. If a soldier has a civilian skill that matches a military specialty, he is certain to be placed in that specialty when conscripted. If it is likely a certain specialty will be understrength in the Reserve, the IDF will overstrength it in the active force. The Israelis firmly believe that it is not efficient to change a soldier's specialty once he has acquired the skills on active duty. There are exceptions, but in practice soldiers maintain their initial specialties throughout their service.⁸

As indicated earlier in the study, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies "the reserve corps forms the bulk of the combat forces of the IDF." It is estimated that approximately 65 percent of the IDF's combat units are in the Reserve compared to 52 percent in the U.S. Army today. The basic unit in the IDF is the brigade, either armor, infantry, or airborne. The brigade is a self contained tactical unit made up of three

battalions with combat service and combat service support units. A soldier back from "leave" after Compulsory Service is assigned to one of these units in the immediate vicinity of his/her home. Each unit has its own armory. Training might be conducted at the armory or at special centers. . Other periods of active duty may find the Reserve unit relieving a Regular unit on border patrol or internal security patrols. Unlike the Swiss system Reservists do not keep their personal weapons at home, but unit equipment is never switched between individuals or crews who perform their own maintenance when training. Since the armory is local, the Reservists live in the same neighborhood and know one another. There is an obvious civilian tone to the Reserve units and a familiarity not common with the Permanent Service. However, officers at all levels, Regular and Reserve, know their men personally.9

Reserve soldiers are mobilized in one of three ways. Annual training is announced by mail. For emergency mobilization the radio is used; each unit having a special call sign. Finally, unit commanders are notified by higher headquarters by messenger or telephone and they activate teams of soldiers who speed through neighborhoods with alert rosters until the lowest private is notified. Soldiers report to their units and are issued equipment. Reserve unit mobilization can take place in about twenty-four hours. Mobilization is the one aspect of the IDF's planning that

has always worked even in the confusion of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.10

CADRE SYSTEM

To maintain the Miluimm in such a high readiness posture, the IDF relies on a cadre system. The specifics of this system are not exactly known, as in so many other aspects of the IDF, much of the information is classified. However, the general outline of this system is available from open sources. First there are administrative, headquarters, and service positions within the Regular Army that are occupied by Reservists not serving in the combat brigades. This is a relatively late, 1970's, practice for the IDF. At what level these units function in peacetime is unknown nor is there information available on the number of Permanent Service soldiers and Reservists assigned. Even though the IDF is a reserve establishment, its senior officers are in the Permanent Service Corps. Division commanders are Regulars. Divisions, while having no organic forces permanently assigned, do coordinate the activities of the brigades assigned. Some brigade commanders and their staffs are also Regulars and some are commanded by Reservists assisted by Reserve staffs. Israeli service school instructors are also assigned as cadre to Reserve formations. They spend five days in the classroom and the sixth day with a Reserve unit. The exact numbers and ratios

of Reservist to Permanent Service cadre are not available.

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Regardless of the brigade commander's component and his staff's, each Reserve brigade has a small cadre of Regular soldiers responsible for administration, the maintenance of stores, and equipment. The Reserve brigade has a Permanent Service liaison officer who functions as a personnel manager and maintains contacts with the Reserve soldiers. This officer has counterparts in each unit of the brigade. He has a direct line to the battalion commanders who might be either a Regular or Reserve officer with staffs that may also be a composite of the two components. One of his most important jobs is as an "address-hunting operator." Teams of Regulars and Reservists constantly go through the neighborhoods verifying the addresses and phone number of unit members. This must be done by face-to-face contact to guarantee the validity of the information on the alert roster. These teams are also used for secret mobilizations.12

Because of the need to have equipment ready for immediate use and because of modern weapon sophistication another cadre exists within each Reserve unit. This is a cadre of Permanent Service Corps noncommissioned officers and enlisted men who are the day-to-day "maintenance, repair and supply specialists." This information is also

classified and one can only guess at the actual numbers involved throughout the IDF. Israeli soldiers take great pride in the fact that during any given inspection an officer can point to a vehicle and the operator can start it immediately. It is this cadre system that gave the Israelis in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the ability "to have substantial elements of four reserve divisions fighting actively on both fronts within 30 hours of the surprise Arab offense and is proof of the general efficiency of the system, and of its overwhelming success in this instance."¹³

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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Emory Upton may have been a bitter man when he said the United States had never had a coherent military policy, but he was correct. His frustration is the price paid as a military officer defending a democratic society. Upton was, as he clearly stated, moved to speak out when he considered the needless deaths of young Americans during the Civil War. The founding fathers feared a large standing army while Upton believed the freedoms these men gave the nation could only be preserved by this type of army. Upton thought his compromise was to use a standing army as a cadre to absorb citizen-soldiers in time of war. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, from whom Upton borrowed the "expansible" concept, was not a military professional, but his idea came from extensive study and a strong desire to avoid a repetition of the military disasters that befell the Army during the War of 1812.

Whether or not an "expansible" army force structure would have worked in the nineteenth century is open for speculation. The Army did expand from a little over hundred thousand into the millions for both World War I and II. The Army, under the most ideal situation would not have been

large enough to cadre the number of units mobilized for both wars, but peacetime cadre units could have provided the basis for a more rapid and orderly mobilization. Upton's concept of an expansible army impressed Secretary of War Elihu Root and was why he published Upton's manuscript. It is clear that, like Calhoun, Root sought to avoid the mistakes of the past war, in his case the Spanish-American War. Root, during his tenure, concentrated on officer education and the creation of a professional general staff. His efforts certainly lessened the problems of creating the army that fought World War I, but not how well that army was prepared to fight, as evidenced by the excessively high casualty rates. Prewar unpreparedness was overcome by the bravery and tenacity of the American citizen-soldier. American forces overwhelmed their opponent by a sheer weight of numbers. In World War I materiel would have helped accomplish the same results, but industrial mobilization was only beginning to have an impact in France when the German Army collapsed in the fall of 1918. In World War II with several years to mobilize, industrial production had a direct impact on the war's outcome along with the massive army fielded by the United States.

In the period between World Wars, John McAuley Palmer emerged as the spokesman for a modification of Uptonian philosophy. Palmer's appreciation of the citizen-soldier was heightened when he served along side Reserve Component

soldiers in World War I. In the inter-war period Palmer saw a need to create a force that was well trained and could mobilize rapidly in time of war. He recommended a Total Army as it exists today. Palmer believed there was a need for a small Regular Army to garrison the overseas possessions and provide a first line of national defense. He did not share the Uptonian criticism leveled against the National Guard. His primary concern was their control by the individual states. However, Palmer soon realized that the Guard had a very strong lobby in Congress and any plan of national defense must include state forces. His answer was to assume immediate federalization of the National Guard as part of the Regular Army after a declaration of war. However, Palmer's real interest was a federal reserve with its own units and officers and a third component, a volunteer army of citizens. During the inter-war period Palmer, by default became an advocate of a small Regular Army, a well equipped and trained National Guard, and a large federal Organized Reserve.

Palmer's ideas appeared in the 1920 National Defense Act. The creation of the Organized Reserve Corps was part of the dream. The intended purpose of the Organized Reserve was to have a federal reserve cadre while relying on the Regular Army and the National Guard for early mobilization. The Organized Reserve was really a dual cadre formation, an all federal reserve. Units were to have a frame work of

Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers. It was also intended to place twenty Enlisted Reserve soldiers in each company. The intended participation of Regular Army cadre officers and noncommissioned officers provided administration, training, and maintenance support to the units. On mobilization Regular Army cadre would have provided an extra element of expertise in mobilization, post-mobilization training, deployment, and ultimately combat. There was no attempt to denigrate the Organized Reserve officers or noncommissioned soldiers within the units, but Regular Army participation, it was believed would enhance mobilization readiness. Even if there had been more resources available and the Organized Reserve citizen-soldiers better trained, the addition of the Regular Army cadre provided an even sharper edge on force readiness.

The Israeli Army's force structure provides the example of just how sharp that readiness edge can be honed for mobilization. The United States does not have the need to mobilize its reserve in the thirty hours the IDF requires, but does need a more responsive system than the one in place today. In reality, the citizen-soldiers of the IDF are not a reserve, but very much a part of a total force structure much more so in word and deed than the U.S. Total Army. The number of days the Israeli citizen-soldier trains varies a great deal and is dependent on the political climate of the region. However, the amount of time that is required as a minimum by law in a realistic peacetime environment is very

close to the 48 drill days for the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units. If the IDF has accepted this time as a standard and fields its Reserve immediately into combat, is it not possible for the U. S. Army Reserve to shorten its mobilization time?

The IDF, as an army, has a very positive attitude towards its Reserve. Obviously with the bulk of the force in the Reserve the emphasis has to be there. The IDF cadre system appears to be extremely successful and assignments of Regular Army officers to reserve units are accepted as the norm and apparently do not affect career mobility. In fact these assignments might even enhance advancement. Regular Army officers are assigned down to battalion level in staff and command positions. These cadre appear to be placed in IDF Reserve units with no particular motive other than finding the best officer for the assignment. There appears to be no official or unofficial ratio of Reserve to Regular command positions. Reserve officers who show promise can command at brigade level and are on some division headquarters staffs. The elements of stability, experience, and knowledge of Regular Army officers is one factor that produces superior battlefield results for Reserve units.

Little is available concerning the Regular Army cadre that man the unit armory maintaining equipment and handling the daily administration. Indications are that IDF

equipment is in a very high state of readiness at all times. Since these Regular Army soldiers mobilize with the unit, their expertise is of extreme value in combat and add to the combat efficiency of the unit. The number of individuals assigned is unavailable, but it appears to be significant. This arrangement appears to be similar to our Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites/Equipment Concentration Sites (MATES/ECS) and Area Maintenance Support Activities (AMSA). The most significant difference being the IDF emphasis on driver and crew responsibility for an assigned vehicle.

The IDF cadre system is battle proven. Reserve unit readiness, rapid mobilization, and combat effectiveness are partially the result of the influence of high caliber Regular officers and enlisted personnel assigned as commanders, staff officers and support personnel. While the exact detail of the cadre and Reserve structure are classified, the Israelis have proven that a cadre system can be effective even with an Army with 60 percent of its total force and 65 percent of its combat arms units in its Reserve. In comparison to the U.S. Army with 42 percent of the total force in the Regular Army and 58 percent in the Reserves.

A cadre system is a viable option for the U.S. Army and Army Reserve. The Israelis have made the system work. Some might say that they have no alternative but to make it work

because of their unique situation as a small nation surrounded and outnumbered by powerful neighbors. However, the cadre system conserves what all nations would like to conserve, money and manpower. While the United States continues to have the luxury of more time to mobilize than the Israelis, reductions in forces and the global environment dictate an improved or more viable system than we have today. The U.S. Army has never made a commitment to a cadre system, not because the need did not exist but because of conflicting philosophies and preconceived attitudes. Fortunately, the twentieth century conflicts this country was involved in were either small or far removed geographically. This meant that regardless of how long and halting mobilization was, our national security was never threatened to the extent that the nation's survival was at stake. The United States may have more time to mobilize than the Israelis, but it has less time than ever before. Now the Army is going to face budgetary cuts that it has not seen since the Great Depression. The cuts come at a time that is more dangerous than the 1930's and with global commitments not imagined in the inter-war period. The time has arrived to reexamine our traditional force structure and breakthrough the conflicting philosophies and preconceived attitudes to develop a viable force structure for the future.

CHAPTER VI

RECOMMENDATIONS

The current world and domestic situation have combined to necessitate the adoption of a cadre system for the Total Army. The Army must develop such a system to preserve the last decade's force build up in the face of budgetary constraints and conventional force reductions in Europe and Korea. Based on the history of past peacetime force reductions, if such a system is not implemented, this country's security and global commitments will be at serious risk. As the threat of global nuclear war subsides, conventional war at the mid to low intensity level remain real possibilities as evidenced by the recent United States invasion of Panama. Dictatorships such as those in Iraq, Iran, and Syria can field conventional forces much larger than the U.S. today. Threats to national security while not as obvious as those posed during the post-World War II era with the Soviets, are more probable with Third World nations. The world remains a dangerous place and the Army and the nation cannot afford to duplicate past peacetime force structure reductions.

On the basis of my research, I recommend a dual cadre system for a portion of the Army, Army National Guard, and

Army Reserve. There must continue to be a Regular Army of sufficient strength for immediate deployment, a Ready Reserve of Troop Program units, and units of the Army National Guard. The actual size of each must be determined by the national command authority. The recommendation for the cadre system is a concept, the actual numbers, units, and geographical location will require a significant amount of staff work beyond the scope of this paper. Some consideration must also be given to the mix of these cadre units within larger units. In the Israeli Army, Reserve brigades form part of Regular Army divisions. Troop reductions and budgetary considerations will have a significant impact on what the cadre systems will look like and how the entire force is eventually packaged. The cadre concept must be introduced now as the Army enters the 1990's.

One cadre system will consist of a number of Regular Army units selected to be withdrawn from overseas and units currently stationed in the United States. The cadre will consist of key command, staff, and support personnel, both officer and noncommissioned officer. The cadre will maintain the unit's integrity and equipment. To be efficient there must be another mission to make the system cost effective. This may mean some geographic dispersion of units. The cadre in this system will not only be responsible for equipment maintenance and routine

administration, but also the screening and training of Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) within a reasonable commuting distance.

Members of the IRR are pre-trained soldiers who have usually completed an initial tour with the Regular Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard and still have a remaining service obligation. To date they have had no requirement to train other than a one day screening at a recruiting station. The Secretary of the Army has the authority to call them to active duty for two fifteen day periods for training. The IRR can only be called to active duty if Congress declares war or a state of national emergency. If either should occur IRR soldiers are now scheduled either to be used to meet European shelf requirements, those trained in the previous twelve months (RT-12), and fillers for deploying units regardless of the component of the receiving unit. The balance of IRR soldiers will be used as casualty replacements. After 120 days, Selective Service inductees will reach deployed units as replacements or fill units activated in the continental United States. This means that the sole source of pre-trained manpower in a crisis beyond the Regular Army and the Selected Reserve is the IRR. With the advances in computer technology, cadre units could provide refresher training during screening or during additional active duty for training periods. The IRR then takes the place of the

conscripts Upton had in mind and the national military service soldiers in Palmer's plan.

The second cadre system involves units of the Army National Guard, Army Reserve and some Regular Army units. No mobilization has required all the nation's manpower immediately. All mobilizations have occurred in phases. As with current Time Phased Deployment Schedule, some units will be selected because current planning requires their earlier mobilization perhaps as part of a contingency corps/ Rapid Deployment Force. Units that have early deployment requirements can have a cadre of Regular Army and Active Guard/Reserve officers and enlisted personnel. The percentage of cadre would vary based on the deployment requirements and the complexity of the weapons systems or support equipment. High priority Regular Army cadre units could be composed of drilling Mobilization Augmentees. Upon mobilization these units would have the priority once given to the European Shelf Requirements for IRR RT-12 soldiers. An enhancement to the program could see the pre-assignment of these IRR soldiers in peacetime, especially those in the same geographic location as the unit.

Some cadre units will have to be assigned based on population density to insure sufficient Ready Reserve participation and IRR soldier involvement. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command does an excellent job of locating their

battalions and stations according to population density. The IRR Screening program was very successful in pulling in most IRR soldiers using a fifty mile radius from each recruiting station. Other cadre units can be located at existing posts and camps. Constant monitoring of demographic factors is essential, but this is done now by the Army's Recruiting Command. Palmer envisioned management of his citizen army in Corps areas. Perhaps the Army should return to a Corps concept within the continental United States as opposed to the current Army areas. This concept will make sense as the Army is reduced in size.

The impending change in the command and control of the Army Reserve is ideal for a cadre system. The Army Reserve Personnel Center which now manages all Reserve officers, by regulation, will be able to manage them in fact as well. Currently the Center manages Active/Guard Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentee, and IRR officers and enlisted soldiers. In addition the Center will now, for the first time, manage Troop Program Unit enlisted soldiers. This fully centralized management for the Army Reserve will enhance a cadre system. GUARDPERCEN (Army National Guard Personnel Center) will function in much the same way as it does today.

One problem the Army faces now that would also impact on the two cadre systems, is the Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) mismatch. The Israeli Army, as indicated

earlier, deliberately over strengths certain MOSs to insure that these skills appear in their Reserve units. They do not believe in reclassification for the obvious reason that once a soldier obtains an MOS, and serves in it during his active duty time, his retention of the skill and performance in combat will be much greater than reclassification and occasional Reserve duty. To introduce such a program would be an act of faith on the part of the Regular Army for it implies a true Total Army concept of mutually supporting components. This leads to another pressing problem also evident today.

There still remains a lack of understanding about, a true commitment to the Reserve Components on the part of a significant portion of the Regular Army, especially the senior leadership. If the nation continues to support the force structure in existence today, then this problem will remain an irritant. However, as the impact of a peacetime environment becomes greater, budget adjustments will continue in a downward spiral and the Regular Army will diminish in size. To plan any size operation, even a Grenada or Panama, will, given the past history of peacetime force reductions, require the rapid mobilization of Reserve units. Greater emphasis must be placed on a flexible force structure that is economically sound and professionally responsive. A balanced combination of Regular Army units, Regular Army cadre units, Army Reserve and Army National Guard units with Regular and Active Guard/Reserve cadre will

provide a force that has rapid mobilization and deployment capability. These forces will give the follow on Army Reserve and Army National Guard units time to mobilize, conduct post-mobilization training and then, if required, deploy.

The United States has never followed through on plans for an effective peacetime force structure. Peacetime force structure debates have always been interrupted by the inevitable budget reductions. The cadre system proposed in this paper offers an opportunity to create a viable force within peacetime budget constraints. A cadre system for the U.S. Army can work, perhaps not with the rapidity of the Israeli Army, but effective enough to meet this nation's defense requirements. What is needed first is a commitment and dedication to a true one Army concept.

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