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STUDENT REPORT

A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND HOW LEADERSHIP

IS EVALUATED THROUGH THE USE OF

THE READ/ACT MODEL

MAJOR RICHARD G. EASTERLY

88-0815

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REPORT NUMBER 88-0815

TITLE A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND HOW LEADERSHIP IS EVALUATED
THROUGH THE USE OF THE READ/ACT MODEL

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

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PREFACE

Squadron Officer School evaluates student leadership performance using the Read/Act Model. In this study five warrior leaders are evaluated using the Read/Act Model. Each leader's "read" of a situation or people and his follow-on "act" on resources or methods led to subsequent success or failure.

By reading this research paper, Squadron Officer School students will have a better understanding of the application of the Read/Act Model. In addition, they themselves will be better equipped to lead as well as evaluate leadership.

I would to thank Mr. Len Daley for his time and efforts in developing this model and sharing his expertise with me on leadership and the proper use of the Read/Act Model.

This research project will be used either in whole or part as a reading as part of the Squadron Officer School leadership studies.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Easterly [REDACTED]. He graduated from Glassboro State College in May 1973 with a BA degree in Education. In July of 1973 he entered the USAF through OTS and was commissioned a second lieutenant. In December of 1973 Major Easterly started Undergraduate Pilot Training at Craig AFB, Alabama, and completed this course in January 1975. During his pilot training class he was selected by his classmates as the Outstanding Second Lieutenant. After pilot training he was a T-37 Instructor pilot at Craig, followed by an assignment to ATC HQ, Randolph AFB, Texas. While at ATC HQ he worked as an Instructional Program Developer. In 1980 Major Easterly was reassigned to the 20th Special Operation Squadron, 1st Special Operation Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida, flying UH-1N helicopters. After three years in special ops, he went to Osan, Korea, and flew HH-3's in the 38th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron. After completing his tour in Korea he was assigned to the faculty at Squadron Officer School (SOS). While at SOS he was a section commander for seven classes and a squadron commander for seven classes. During his tour at SOS he was deeply involved with leadership evaluation and the proper application of a leadership assessment tool: the Read/Act Model. During this period, Major Easterly graduated from Troy State University with a MS degree in Business Management. After SOS Major Easterly was assigned to Air Command and Staff College as a student in the Class of 1988.

Major Easterly's free time is used to improve his physical fitness. He competes in triathlons during the spring and summer and trains during the fall and winter. Needless to say he enjoys running, bicycling, and swimming.

He is married to a captain in the USAF, who also competes in triathlons. He has one daughter.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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"insights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER 88-0815

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR RICHARD G. EASTERLY, USAF

TITLE A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND HOW LEADERSHIP IS
EVALUATED THROUGH THE USE OF THE READ/ACT MODEL

Chapter 1 sets the ground work for this historical analysis. Parameters for correctly using the Read/Act Model are defined, and the five warrior leaders discussed in this analysis are introduced; Sun Tzu, Napoleon, Lt Col Doolittle, Gen Giap, and Fidel Castro.

Chapter 2 discusses each of the five leaders, except Sun Tzu, in a specific battle, and how their leadership is evaluated using the Read/Act Model.

The paper first presents Sun Tzu with an evaluation of his philosophy and conduct of war. Next is Napoleon. His leadership, good and bad, at Boracino is analyzed. Then Lt Col Doolittle and his leadership leading up to the raid on Tokyo is assessed. Gen Giap's leadership is evaluated at the battle of Khe Sahn. Finally, Fidel Castro's leadership is evaluated by studying his successful bid to overthrow the government of Batestia.

Chapter 3 reviews the research and looks closely at leadership evaluation through the Read/Act Model.

Chapter 4 is the conclusion and closing remarks. The Read/Act Model is an effective leadership evaluation tool used by Squadron Officer School and is applicable to the whole Air Force.

Chapter One

A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND HOW LEADERSHIP IS EVALUATED THROUGH THE USE OF THE READ/ACT MODEL

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The study of military leadership is basically a history lesson, since most great military leaders are studied posthumously. In the time before Christ, Sun Tzu was a great warrior leader but no one recognized his leadership or assessed why his people followed him (5:--). Also, Sun Tzu developed some of the basic military doctrine used by today's United States Air Force (USAF) (5:39-43). To make a quantum leap to the 19th century, why was Napoleon Bonaparte victorious at Borodino, yet this battle was also a defeat which contributed significantly to his fall from power (8:13)? During World War II, why was Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) James "Jimmie" Doolittle so successful in his raid on Tokyo (3:--)? How did General (Gen) Vo Nguyen Giap survive the Tet Offensive, a poorly led battle from a leadership perspective (4:189)? How did Fidel Castro defeat the U.S. backed Batista government in Cuba (6:41-42)? What are the common threads of leadership these warrior leaders possess? If one understands the past, can one project the present and future potential leadership ability of a given soldier? What do leaders do when they lead and how do they do it? This paper explores leadership assessment using the Read/Act Model to connect past, present, and future leadership evaluation. Squadron Officer School (SOS) uses the Read/Act Model to assess present student performance and this paper will make the connection between past, present, and future leadership evaluation for the students.

DEFINITIONS

Leadership style is an integral part of effective leadership. There are four styles which comprise a "matrix": directing, coaching, supporting, and delegating (Atch 1). These styles represent how much leadership to employ in a given situation, and there is no one best style to cover all situations (1:2).

Situational leadership combines the willingness of the individual, the maturity level of the individual and the ability of the individual (1:--). Each quadrant of the matrix (Atch 1) represents a style of leadership (directing, coaching, supporting, delegating).

Knowing which style to use in a given quadrant requires the leader to be able to read the situation (7:3-11,19). A leader's "read" skill is two fold: read people and read situations. Reading is just one half of the equation for leadership assessment; the other half is, of course, the ability to take action. Just as in "read" skills the successful leader also has "act" skills (7:3-11,19). A leader must "act" with resources and "act" with methods. Observation of these reading and acting skills by Gus Economus and Len Daley, both former USAF SOS lecturers, led to the development of the Read/Act Model (11:--). The model is presented in Attachment 2 and Figures 1 and 2.




FIGURE 1 and 2; The Read/Act Model

In its most simplistic terms the horizontal and vertical axes represent behavior and the quadrants bounded by the axes represent the result/outcome. It is through proper read/act skills that effective leadership results (11:--). Combining all four quadrants correctly is successful leadership. There are, of course, other combinations that result in ineffective leadership. The possible combinations are referred to as big or small read skills and big or small act skills. These people have big "R's" or big "A's" depending on their skills (7:3-11,19; 11:--). A small "r" person cannot read either the situation or the people, and a small "a" person cannot act either on the situation or the people. There are four possible combinations of leadership one might have using the read/act model: big "R"/small "A", small "R"/big "A",

small "R"/small "A", and big "R"/big "A". The big "R"/small "A" person knows what is going on but lacks the power to take action. The small "R"/big "A" person cannot read the situation, has no idea what is going on but is going to take action no matter what. The small "R"/small "A" person has no idea what is going on and could care less about it. Finally the big "R"/big "A" person understands the problem and knows exactly what has to be done. This is the leader (11:--)!

DELIMITATIONS AND FRAMEWORK

The remainder of this paper focuses on the warrior leader and why he/she is successful or not. This study centers around leadership assessment through the Read/Act Model. Both successful and unsuccessful leadership must be studied in order to have a complete study of leadership. The battlefield is the predominate arena for this study of warrior leadership. The remainder of this study is organized into three chapters. Chapter Two delves deeply into a few of the great warrior leaders. Again, it is important to realize there were successful and unsuccessful attempts at leadership. Through the Read/Act Model the study looks at both winning and losing using the same person. Chapter Three shows what has been learned through the study, and what is applicable to today's warrior leader and more importantly the assessment of leaders for tomorrow. Chapter Four presents the conclusion of this study by briefly reviewing the problem and highlighting the findings based on the research.

All great historical warrior leaders usually did the right thing at the right time. These leaders correctly read the people as well as the situation and correctly acted with the resources and methods. More specifically this study looks at how Sun Tzu led before the time of Christ, Lt Col Doolittle's ability to lead a unique mission during World War II, and guerilla leader Fidel Castro and his overthrow of Batista. This study also looks at unsuccessful leadership: Napoleon's ultimate failure at Borodino and Gen Giap's failure at Khe Sahn. What are the common traits tying these historical leaders to present leaders and the future leaders of tomorrow?

Chapter Two

REVIEW OF RESEARCH

Sun Tzu wrote about war and the art of leadership many years prior to any formal study of war, or more importantly for this study, any study of leadership. His writings, The Art of War, reflect some of today's basic philosophies on unconventional warfare and why it is best to fight an indirect war. His ability to study a given situation and act accordingly is testimony to his leadership (10:7-26). As previously mentioned, the study of leadership includes knowing how to read people as well as situations and to act with resources and methods. Also, situational leadership requires the leader to know and react to his people according to their abilities, willingness, and finally their confidence (11:--).

The indirect approach for conflict, as taught by Sun Tzu, is the first example of a warrior leader looking at the abilities of his people and applying their strengths against an adversary (5:--; 10:7-26). In order to conceptualize this idea of the indirect approach Sun Tzu had to understand leadership and the proper application of leadership skills. The indirect approach (6:--) is discussed more fully in The War of the Flea by R. Taber and lends itself to the present day study of situational leadership and the Read/Act Model. Suffice it to say Sun Tzu understood that success on the battlefield was a combination of knowing your people (read: people), and recognizing the battlefield arena as a fluid encounter (read: situation). To further apply the indirect approach (6:--) to the battlefield and situational leadership Sun Tzu had to act according to the abilities of his troops (act: resources) and then bring their abilities to bare on the battlefield (act: methods). The successes of Sun Tzu on the battlefield set the ground work for his philosophy on the indirect approach and its application to the situational leader (5:--). Proper application of the Read/Act Model forms the initial impression that leadership is based more on knowing your people, their strengths as well as their weaknesses, than brute force or any other ingredient thought to be necessary for effective leadership (11:--). The study of history allows one to look at Sun Tzu and how he may have effectively employed leadership; as we move closer in time to modern history this study of leadership becomes more concrete with more recent warrior leaders and more accurate accounts of the battlefield. Napoleon Bonaparte is a very good example for this study since he

employed both effective and ineffective leadership; sometimes during the same battle.

In the battle of Borodino, Napoleon was effective in his leadership style and his employment of his forces. But, simultaneously, he proved to be ineffective during this battle as Napoleon turned a sure victory into a nagging defeat. The battle of Borodino took place in September of 1812 with the initial outcome a victory for Napoleon.

Napoleon tried for two months to bring the Russians to battle in an attempt to win a decisive victory of annihilation. Finally on 5 September, Napoleon's forces found the Russian army entrenched at Borodino, blocking Napoleon's advance to Moscow less than 100 miles away (8:13).

As far as leadership goes, Napoleon inspired his men to fight for the cause of peace in the name of France. However, his leadership at times changed a certain victory into a nagging defeat. At Borodino, Napoleon had all the players in place necessary to annihilate the Russians but his failure to act (act: resources/methods) proved to be costly. Also, his read (read: people/situations) of the battle area was faulty. Specifically, Marshal Devout felt through his assessment of the battlefield that the frontal attack planned by Napoleon would prove costly to the French (8:14). The Russians were entrenched in fortified earthworks in and around Borodino. Marshal Devout suggested a powerful encirclement of the Russian left flank. Napoleon's decision to attack head-on cost Napoleon 30,000 casualties (8:14). Napoleon acted as the leader but his actions were inappropriate for the situation, which is ineffective leadership. This action, plus Napoleon's unwillingness to commit his reserves for the final blow, gave the Russians the chance they needed to regroup and retreat to Moscow (8:14). Again his unwillingness to act proved to be a form of ineffective leadership.

As we look at the Read/Act Model, specifically, act resources and act methods are extremely important for mission success. Napoleon's read/act of the situation and resources proved costly as did his read/act of the situation and method. Situation/resources translates to task efficiency. Ineffective use of time and materials contributed to Napoleon's short-lived victory at Borodino. Furthermore, Napoleon failed in mission success because he misread and acted improperly as far as the situation and methods are concerned. By not committing his reserves and not listening to the tactics of his field marshals, the French were victorious at Borodino, but the decisive blow that Napoleon wanted to deliver never developed. The Russians retreated to Moscow destroying all food and shelter behind them. On 24 September 1812 Napoleon took Moscow but the city had no provisions and Napoleon's army was too weak and exhausted to face the Russians and the coming winter (8:14). In October, Napoleon began the long and costly retreat to France, harassed and

attacked by the Russians he failed to conquer at Borodino (8:13-18).

Just as Napoleon stands out in military history for the French, the history of the United States (US) and its success on the battlefield lends itself to the study of Lt Col Jimmie Doolittle and his Tokyo Raiders. On December 7, 1941 the Japanese delivered a blow to the US' military which destroyed its ability to project power in the Pacific. On this day the US Navy and the Army Air Corp suffered a crippling blow. Since the US no longer had the ability to patrol the Pacific, the Japanese expanded their empire without interference from the US. The Japanese at this time were all offense with no need to have any defense for their homeland (3:2-48). The need to take the fight in the Pacific to the Japanese mainland was imperative if the US ever intended to regain control of the sea lines throughout the Pacific. Lt Col Jimmie Doolittle had the solution to the problem (read: people/situation) and after much thought had the way to enact the solution (act: resources/methods).

In an effort to take the fight to Japan, the US had to hit the Japanese mainland. Lt Col Doolittle and other planners realized an air attack was the only way to solve the US' dilemma. But the long range bomber had yet to be developed. The answer was to fly Army Air Corp bombers off the flight deck of a naval aircraft carrier (3:26). Three bombers, the B-26, B-24, and B-25, were all considered for the mission but each had characteristics that made them unfavorable for the mission. The B-25 was chosen because its problems, as seen by Lt Col Doolittle, were the most fixable (read/act: situations) (3:26). With the technical problems fixed, the need for Army pilots to fly the mission was the next order of business (read: people/situations). The place to find B-25 pilots was Wright-Patterson Field, Ohio, where they were flying and training. All one needed to do was ask for volunteers for a dangerous mission, and volunteers would offer. The place to train was Eglin Field in Florida. At Eglin the training could be done in secrecy as well as simulate the mission as closely as possible (3:31).

The training required the airplane to fly heavier than normal and to take-off using a distance of only 500 feet. The plane was heavy because of the additional fuel tanks required for the long mission. Armament was removed to allow more weight for fuel (3:26). The training of the crews was more than just getting airborne in 500 feet off of an aircraft carrier. The training included navigation training for the long mission, arriving over the desired target, dropping the bombs using a new and different bomb sight, bombing from just 500 feet, and then flying an escape route to China (3:31). Each plane carried four 500-pound bombs on the mission. And the targets were chosen for their military significance (3:47). Of all the crews that trained at Eglin only the best were chosen for the actual mission (3:31).

Lt Col Doolittle lead Task Force 16 on the Raid on Tokyo

which meant taking-off first on the day of the mission. A Japanese patrol ship spotted Task Force-16 nearly 700 miles from Japan causing Doolittle to launch 150 miles further from Japan than planned (3:48). Doolittle's read of the situation was right on target. He knew the success of the mission was the number one priority. Launching early meant that the escape to China, because of low fuel, was now questionable but the bombs on Japan would still be accomplished (3:--).

The raid was April 19, 1942 and the amount of physical destruction inflicted by the bombers was not very significant; however, it was the psychological blow that the US needed to force Japan into rethinking its war efforts (3:30,31). And it was Jimmie Doolittle who correctly read the situation and people and acted using appropriate resources and methods to deliver this crucial blow.

Referring to the Read/Act Model, Jimmie Doolittle effectively employed all four quadrants, most significantly, his people efficiency and organizational support. The mission succeeded because of all participants' level of effort, talents and energy. Additionally, Doolittle instilled within the crews the high level of esprit-de-corps required to practice and perform under the constraints of secrecy to ensure mission success (3:2-48). Doolittle's reading and acting skills were finely tuned for this mission. This mission required a leader who could read people and situations and also act with the proper resources and methods. It would be easy to continue discussing the leadership traits of Lt Col Doolittle, but there are other warrior leaders who through their efforts lend themselves to the study of leadership and the application of the Read/Act Model.

General Glap was the commander of troops for the North during the US involvement in Vietnam. One particular battle of significance displays General Glap's read/act skills: the battle of Khe Sahn.

The siege of Khe Sahn held importance to both the US and the North Vietnamese. General Glap wanted to take Khe Sahn because he felt if he could, he would seriously undermine the already precarious level of US support for administration policies in Vietnam, and by taking Khe Sahn that would cause the US to pull-out of Vietnam and clear the way for a swift Communist takeover of South Vietnam (9:--). The US wanted to hold Khe Sahn because of its relative closeness to the demilitarized zone, Laos, and major North Vietnamese supply routes to Laos and the South. The US also had an underlying reason for wanting Khe Sahn: "It became the bait General Westmoreland decided he could use to entice a large North Vietnamese force in order to inflict the single dramatic blow that would cripple the North Vietnamese beyond any doubt (9:13-14)." Herein lies the leadership application and the read/act skill of General Glap; both parties wanted Khe Sahn but for different reasons. Because of the relative position of Khe Sahn, the US forces held the superior

position. The Viet Cong outnumbered the US 30,000 to 6000 and the siege continued for 80 days, with the US forces finally prevailing (9:14). General Giap needed and wanted Khe Sahn so badly his strategy neglected to take into account the position held by the US or the need for operational security (9:--). For effective leadership to occur, General Giap needed to read the situation correctly and then take proper action. Initially brute force and sheer overwhelming numbers was the tactic of General Giap. If he had properly read the situation, he would have seen that the position held by the US favored the US and worked against the Viet Cong. It would appear on the surface Gen Giap had good support from his troops in his effort to take Khe Sahn. But in reality he lacked the situational awareness to give him the mission success he so dearly needed. He failed in task efficiency because of poor use of time and materials. After 80 days of trying the same tactic and meeting the same result, he should have tried something new. Improper use of people also spells failure. His troops and their efforts were committed to victory but again it was the superior position held by the US that prevented General Giap from attaining his desired objective. His organizational support dealt several blows to his efforts. It was not the lack of commitment to the mission, but the lack of security on the part of the planners and organizers. The friendly forces knew the next move of General Giap and his future plans because of good intelligence (9:--). General Giap did not have the professional standards within his organization necessary to carry out secretive plans without compromising the goals and objectives of the Viet Cong. With glaring downfalls in three of the four read/act quadrants it is no big mystery that quadrant four, mission success, was also a failure in General Giap's leadership at the siege of Khe Sahn. Gen Giap was a guerrilla fighter who lost because of poor read/act skills, but as we will see Fidel Castro effectively employed guerrilla tactics.

Fidel Castro believed in the war of attrition. He felt the indirect approach was the only way to defeat the powerful army of Batista, and thus take control of Cuba (6:38-39). Taking control of Cuba was all a part of Castro's plan to bring a better way of life to the Cuban people. In order for Castro to overthrow the government of Batista, Castro first had to convince a small group of followers his way would be better. Castro had to read the situation correctly initially for any subsequent action to be effective. He saw a life style that was not good for the majority of the people and benefiting only a select few. For action, his first task was to organize his followers into believers for the new cause. The people who lived in the country proved to be his best supporters. Castro also knew he could not walk into the capital and tell Batista to leave because he was taking over. In his book, The War of the Flea, Tabor describes the tactics of the guerilla fighter as analogous to a flea and a dog (6:13). Castro employed this tactic of hit and run, always confusing the standing army of Batista. When Batista attacked, Castro retreated. When Batista retreated, Castro attacked. When Batista rested, Castro harassed (6:34-44). Castro's guerilla army also blended into the

local surroundings. The revolution headed by Castro worked because Castro knew when to attack, when to hide, when to rest, when to harass, and when to speak out openly against Batista. This revolution headed by Castro had to confront the formal government sometime. Castro through his well developed read/act skills knew exactly when and where to confront the Batista government. The leadership of Castro in Cuba is equal to the leadership of the US forces at Khe Sahn. Both scenarios pitted unequal forces against each other. And both conflicts resulted in victory for the smaller force. The leadership easily fits into the Read/Act Model. Both Castro and the US Commander read the situation on the battlefield correctly. Knowing where to position the troops and how to engage the enemy resulted in victories. Knowing their troops and their abilities maximized the efforts put forth in any given battle. Castro in particular knew the value of correctly employing resources. Castro did not have a huge standing army, but had to rely on the support of the local people. Castro had to convince the people his way was better and the fight they were about to enter would make their life better if they were victorious (6:34-44). The final result speaks for itself. Castro had the people efficiency and organizational support necessary to successfully overthrow the standing government of Batista. As far as organizational support goes, Castro's personal involvement and commitment to the mission were his biggest assets (6:34-44). The people could see and feel his commitment and those feelings are contagious. Because Castro worked his people at peak efficiency and used his people according to their abilities and he, foremost, supported the organization and its goal, it's no wonder that Castro was successful in his bid to overthrow the Batista government.

Chapter Three

ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH

What has been learned through our study of warrior leaders and their ability to lead? Read the people and the situation plus act with the resources and the methods in order to have effective leadership. Leadership requires a combination of read skills and act skills playing in concert continuously. Each quadrant requires the leader to read and to act. Task efficiency involves reading situations and then acting using the given resources; people efficiency involves reading people and, again, acting using the given resources; organizational support involves reading people and acting methods, and finally mission success involves reading situation and acting methods (11:--) (Atch 3). The model can be further defined by top and bottom halves and left and right halves. The top half relates to resources (people or things) while the bottom half relates to methods (what or how). The left half is situational and the right half is people (11:--).

Sun Tzu knew the value of reading/acting for both the people and the situation. In The Art Of War the theme constantly running throughout the book is to know yourself and to know your enemy (10:7-26). Before organized studies of leadership existed Sun Tzu mastered the four quadrants of the Read/Act Model. Napoleon, on the other hand, mastered individual quadrants, but failed to master the whole concept of battlefield leadership. Lt Col Doolittle, as the man in charge of the Tokyo Raid, worked all four leadership quadrants letter perfect. Gen Glap, on the other hand, never really worked any of the four quadrants to his advantage. Finally, Castro, who is a current leader, has command of all four quadrants.

Sun Tzu understood the need for complete leadership as opposed to dictatorial styles. Lt Col Doolittle and Castro understood the need for people and task efficiency as well as an overall support for the organization. Their mission success flowed naturally from their efforts. But Napoleon and Gen Glap tasted only hollow victories. Why were these leaders successful? Knowing how to read and act is 99% of leadership and the other 1% is knowing how much leadership is required. These warrior leaders all possessed the basic read/act skills and they also understood when and how to apply their leadership. Knowing the situation (reading) is 49.5% of the leadership equation, doing something (acting) is another 49.5% of the leadership equation, and the

remaining 1% is situational awareness, knowing how to apply the read and act skills (11:--). Directing, coaching, supporting, and delegating encompass the final 1% of effective leadership.

Refer back to Napoleon and Marshal Devout. Napoleon, truly the leader of the French, was surrounded by capable warriors who supported him. Marshal Devout, a loyal warrior of Napoleon, gave vital information to him to help serve the French cause. Napoleon rejected Marshal Devout's inputs and the French, particularly Napoleon, failed to meet their objective. Napoleon delegated to Marshal Devout command of his troops and then rejected his plan of action which resulted in failure. Napoleon read the situation and acted properly by making Devout a Field Marshal and then misread the battlefield arena and acted improperly. Napoleon's improper action was not listening to the inputs from Marshal Devout (2:757-759).

Lt Col Doolittle demonstrated his leadership long before he was chosen to lead the Tokyo Raid. Proper use of all four quadrants of the Read/Act Model was the equation for success for this mission. His effective use of time and peoples' talents along with their and his commitment to the mission supplied the necessary fuel for total mission success. Lt Col Doolittle orchestrated each and every move leading to the Tokyo Raid.

For Gen Giap his effort to lead was one failure after another. The battle of Khe Sahn is just one example where Gen Giap misapplied the read/act skills necessary for not only effective leadership but also successful leadership. Trying to take a hill for 80 days using the same tactic with the same result is neither task or people efficient.

When Castro first started his fight against Batista, he was the only one who knew the plan. He could not do all the work plus fight alone. He had to direct his followers on the whys and ways of the fight. As Castro's band of followers became stronger in number and ability, his duties became more in line with coaching. Castro did not have to tend to the everyday workings of the revolution. There were now others capable of carrying on the fight. In the further development of the organization Castro needed only to support his followers. Castro no longer had to be at the front of each conflict, rather his chosen Generals could now carry on the fight. And finally when Castro became the new formal leader of Cuba he could delegate the work to his faithful followers knowing that the cause would always be served (6:33-44).

Each of the warriors studied understood the importance of reading people and acting plus reading situations and acting. They also understood the need to apply just enough leadership, situational leadership. How they employed their read/act skills usually spelled mission success or mission failure. Remember, too, that situational leadership and the Read/Act Model do not operate in a void; these two models operate simultaneously together. Gen Giap had all the necessary skills for effective

leadership, but through his battlefield exploits we find at times his read/act skills were questionable. Not only is it important to read/act to the current situation but also to read/act based on learned experiences. Gen Glap's misapplication of learned experiences spelled defeat for a few of his military undertakings.

History and learned experiences are great teachers. However, knowing what makes an individual a leader, and then applying those skills is alot easier to say than do. Throughout the study of history it is easy to recognize the effective leader. Knowing these skills and applying them is the task of present day and future leaders. Effective leadership is the combination of knowing what has to be done and doing whatever that is, and making just the right amount of inputs at the right time. The Read/Act model has the formula for effective leadership. Reading situations and acting on the situation plus reading people and acting with the people is the key for success.

Is it necessary as an effective leader to be able to read/act in all four quadrants 100% of the time? No!! The answer is "No" because an effective leader could very easily surround him/herself with the right kind of people who can perform in the areas where the leader is deficient; Napoleon is an example. Being aware of your limits is extremely important as a leader. How your limits are manifested and who is aware of them will definitely affect the impact you will have as a leader. Too often effective leadership is negated because the leader is unaware of personal limitations or the limitations are known to the leader but masked. In any case this leader will eventually be ineffective (11:--). Battlefield leadership does not afford the leader the opportunity to sit down and study the situation and then take action. The study of leadership must occur in the confines of a controlled environment (reading) so that when it is time to act in the heat of battle (acting) the leader will know what to do.

Chapter Four

CONCLUSION

Throughout history a few warrior leaders actually displayed ineffective leadership during some rather crucial moments in critical battles. The errors committed were in the improper reading of a situation and subsequent action. Also, the application of the action was suspect in that either too much direction was given or not enough.

Sun Tzu was an early writer on the philosophy of war and how it should be conducted. If the Read/Act Model was available way back then, he would have taught one to read the battlefield situation and then take the action that would best serve the cause. The Read/Act Model fits Napoleon's leadership skills but for some reason, personal pride maybe, he often acted ineffectively which thwarted the continued leadership of France. Lt Col Doolittle knew what had to be done and how to get it done. Using the Tokyo Raid, Lt Col Doolittle is a case study in effective dynamic leadership. General Giap applied, at times, effective leadership but in the battle of Khe Sahn he misread the situation and subsequently acted improperly. Castro, in his effort to overthrow Batista, did everything correctly according to the Read/Act Model. To Castro's credit he continues to read/act properly.

In order to have effective leadership the leader must be able to identify the problem, if one does exist. Then the leader must act. The action needs to be the right kind and on the correct level. Leadership does not occur in a vacuum. Leadership is fluid and continual. Reading and acting are ongoing events. Every read skill has a subsequent act skill. Improper reading or acting results in ineffective leadership. Also, failure to act is acting in the most ineffective way. And, finally, acting without reading is another form of destructive and ineffective leadership.

Squadron Officer School, United States Air Force, Maxwell Air Force Base uses the Read/Act Model as a tool to assess leadership in this professional military education environment. In the Air Force, leadership is measured in terms of mission success. Mission success is one of the four quadrants of the Read/Act Model, and in order to have mission success there must be success in people efficiency, task efficiency, and finally organizational support. Squadron Officer School offers the young officer in

today's Air Force a unique opportunity to practice leadership skills in a controlled environment. For each new experience the price of freedom does not hang in the balance. Leadership studies makes up 45% of the SOS curriculum at Squadron Officer School. And, evaluation of leadership is extremely important to the future of the Air Force. Past, present and now future leadership can be evaluated using the Read/Act Model.

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
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SITUATIONAL LEADERSHIP MODEL




High		Moderate		Low
Able and Willing	Able But Unwilling or Lack Confidence	Unable But Willing	Unable and Unwilling or Insecure	
D4	D3	D2	D1	
DEVELOPED		DEVELOPING		
DEVELOPMENT LEVEL OF FOLLOWER(S)				

SOS LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK

TOP PERFORMER: Within the small center circle.

HIGHLY EFFECTIVE - EFFECTIVE: Between the center circle and outer circle.

INEFFECTIVE: Outside the outer circle.




Name: _____ SECTION: _____ CLASS: _____

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