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
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
RESEARCH REPORT

THE NEED FOR SOLDIER - STATESMEN. A RARE BREED?

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LT COL MICHAEL WEITMAN

1988



AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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THE NEED FOR SOLDIER - STATESMEN. A RARE BREED?

by

Michael Weitman
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: THE NEED FOR SOLDIER-STATESMEN. A RARE BREED?

AUTHOR: MICHAEL WEITMAN, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF

The degree of success and influence on policy of senior military leaders is measured by their demonstrated ability to be both a soldier and a statesmen. Karl Von Clausewitz demonstrated that war cannot be conducted in a political vacuum. The exceptional leader maintains an objective view of his military role -- a role that is capable of achieving a balance between military and political objectives. In the classical sense, this leader is a political general who practices the principles of Clausewitz. A profile examination of two highly regarded military leaders, Generals George C. Marshall and William C. Westmoreland, helps to illustrate the need for military commanders to become soldier-statesmen.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lt Col Michael Weitman was born in New York in 1948 and graduated from high school in 1966. In 1970, he graduated from the University of Missouri with a BA in Mathematics. He received his Air Force commission through OTS in 1970. He attended Comm-Elect school at Keesler AFB, Mississippi and became a Chief of Maintenance officer at Grissom AFB, Indiana and Anderson AFB, Guam. In 1976, he was assigned to Gunter AFS as an Audit Manager and in 1978 was reassigned to Maxwell AFB, Alabama as Division Chief, Cost and Management Analysis, HQ AU. In 1979, he earned a MBA from Auburn University. In 1981, he was assigned to HQ TAC, Langley AFB, Virginia as Division Chief, Management Information and Analysis and Executive Officer, DCS/Comptroller. In 1984, he was assigned to Davis-Monthan AFB as Base Comptroller and selected as the 1986 TAC Comptroller of the Year. His decorations include the Air Force Meritorious Service medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Joint Service Commendation medal and the Air Force Commendation medal. Lt Col Weitman is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1988.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Senior military leaders are required to play a non-partisan role in politics. However, they rarely can afford to be if they are committed to affecting the outcome of policy decisions. Power or influence melts principle, and those who hold to definite, dogmatic and rigid military ethics are excluded from power in a liberal pluralistic civilian society. (13:94) The price which the military leader must accept for acquiring power depends upon the division between his traditionally conservative military values and the prevailing dominant liberal ideology shared by civilian lawmakers. The success of a military leader's ability to influence strategy and policy is dependent on this gap. Although there are formally established roles of military and political leaders, even Clausewitz would agree that there is a fine line that separates military and political roles in policy making. (6:86-89)

Top military leaders operate in a world that intermingles strategy and policy, and tend to mix both their actions. They must be attuned to the political

implications of their military attitudes and actions and be willing to accept the final decisions of their statesmen.

Obviously a considerable gray area exists where strategy and policy overlap. This gray area gives top military leaders the most trouble. Senior military leaders cannot ignore the political implications of strategy. Considerations of strategy must yield to considerations of policy.

Conceptions of the military and political role have produced conflict throughout American history. Where conflict of opinion has occurred, it has traditionally been a conflict between the civilian and military leaders over the point at which policy, as determined by political considerations, and strategy, as determined by military capabilities, interface to formulate strategy. With few exceptions, the military leadership has historically maintained that war is a military matter, that the civilian role is to provide the maximum means possible to prosecute the military campaign and that policy guidance has taken the form of political interference. In contrast, the civilian argument has been that military leaders do not understand political implications. If this charge is true, these contrasting positions may explain why the advice of our senior military leaders has rarely been sought during the formulation of policy since World War II. (17:23)

One can conclude that success is measured by a leader's

ability to operate as both a Soldier and Statesmen.

If one agrees with the premise that military leaders must play an active role in shaping policy, then it is equally important to understand the four main points outlined in this paper. They help support the need to develop future military leaders to become Soldier-Statesmen.

First, civilian and military leaders tend to have liberal and conservative ideological beats respectively. The degree of success of military leaders stems from their ability to recognize, cope with and to effectively balance these differences. Secondly, in the Clausewitzian context, the division of roles between the military and civilian leaders in developing policy and strategy is fuzzy. Third, there are traditional conceptions of the role of military leaders that have roots in historical practice. Finally, the most effective military leader is conservative in strategy, but open-minded to political considerations. Two prominent military leaders, Generals George C. Marshall and William C. Westmoreland, have been selected to illustrate these four points and support the thesis that the success and influence demonstrated by top military leaders is measured by their ability to be both a Soldier and a Statesmen.

CHAPTER II

CIVILIAN-MILITARY DILEMMA

A Matter of Perspective

Military and civilian leaders approach issues and policy from much different perspectives. To examine these fundamental differences may help to improve an awareness of the civilian-military dilemma.

LIBERAL VERSUS CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

Civilian liberal thinking contrasts in many ways with the military ethic. Liberalism has dominated American thinking from the Revolution through the first half of the twentieth century, and it has generally been associated with the development of U.S. policy. By and large, liberalism also does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and the military function. Conversely, the military ethic is fundamentally conservative and has no political pattern. This ideological difference between the soldier and statesman has had a significant impact on the civilian-military relationship. (13:90,91,144)

Even today, liberal ideology seems, for the most part, to be the common denominator among members of the Reagan administration. The liberal politician tends to be an extremist on the subject of war. He either embraces war or rejects it completely. The liberal also associates war with the military institution. This outlook explains in part the underlying dilemma faced by many military leaders. American

thought has not viewed war in the conservative-military sense as an instrument of national policy. (13:151) Moreover, the military, as the instrument of policy, receives the blame for wars. The liberal extremist paints the professional soldier as a warmonger who promotes conflicts to enhance his career goals.

From a historical perspective, liberalism is deep-rooted and may explain the difficulty and challenges faced by top military leaders to win support from the American people and appointed civilian leaders. The realization of a harmonious civilian-military relationship depends upon the attainment of an equilibrium among military conservative thinking and civilian liberal thought.

CLAUSEWITZ'S PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY ROLE

The assertion that a military campaign should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor is it acceptable for civilian leaders to request a purely military advice. Clausewitz saw the role of the political leadership as establishing national policy and providing political guidance. He viewed the military commander as responsible for making the political leadership aware of the capabilities and limitations of the national military instrument. No major proposal in war, however, can be worked out in ignorance of political factors. (6:605-610)

My point is that military leaders must operate like soldier-statesmen. The military commander has a voice in the

formation of policy insofar as it may place demands on a nation's military power.

MILITARY ADVICE AND INFLUENCE

Traditionally, military advisors are supposed to be non-players in politics. In practice, they rarely can be if they desire to make an imprint on policy decisions. The potential for military advisers to wield influence also depends on their relationship with executive and legislative officials. (5:32)

For example, the Joint Chiefs, constituted by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1939, form a nucleus of important military figures that can have a direct influence on policy decisions. The Joint Chiefs are legally non-partisan professionals but normally political actors with potential leverage against their superiors in the administration. However, the Chiefs can be politicized in two different directions. Positive politicizations -support and advocacy of administration policies - characterized them under President Harry S. Truman; negative politicization - opposition to administration policies -characterized them under President Lyndon B. Johnson. (5:33)

Unfortunately, both politicization and non-politicization can have risks and drawbacks. The pro-administration Truman Chiefs suffered the most from their politicization because their administration placed them in the position of

spokesman for policy. (5:54) In contrast, President Kennedy was disenchanted with his Joint Chiefs' political insensitivity. Therefore, he circumvented them by hiring a more responsive military advisor. He brought retired General Maxwell Taylor out of retirement to the White House in the specially created job of military representative to the President. (5:55)

SELECTING THE MILITARY MINION

Post-war JCS appointments have followed two general patterns:

a. The routine - professional soldier. Compatibility with an administration's political goals is not a central consideration in his selection. This is the most common pattern, but men selected in this manner have considerably less power and influence within the administration than those selected by the next method.

b. The exceptional- political. This type of person is a military professional who has gained the complete confidence and admiration of political leaders and becomes a valuable member of the inner circle of the administration. It is this pattern of appointment which calls for the Soldier-Statesman.

The selection of a routine professional exacts minimal political cost in terms of congressional opposition. However, it presents considerable concern to the administration since this type of military leader is likely

to respond more to professional and organizational loyalties, which may conflict with administration priorities. (5:56)

General Westmoreland, for example, was perceived as an organization man. This caused some strain on his relationships with his civilian leaders.

Conversely, the exceptional-political pattern of selection is the more difficult because there may not be any political devotees in the ranks when the president wishes he had them. These constraints reflect the essence of the problem: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and top posts of respective military service institutions are with political import, but an administration cannot easily control its membership politically. Presidents have made few political military appointments. Most military advisors incur an administration political role but remain an organizational political orientation." (5:57)

The overwhelming number of JCS appointments have been from the routine -professional track rather than the exceptional - political track.

The administrations of Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, however, sought to improve military leadership by compromising the seniority system and encouraging military leaders to develop political sensitivity.

When the professional soldier becomes politically insensitive to administrative policies and public support,

the president must affirm his own control by either reforming him, replacing him, repressing or ignoring him. The Kennedy -Johnson Joint Chiefs did not adapt well to Kennedy's directive to consider political factors in their recommendations. (5:50)

THE PRICE FOR INFLUENCE

Professional soldiers who have been politically influential have generally conformed to a civilian liberal pattern of thinking. Their popularity has depended on the extent to which they have become men of the people rather than men of the military. (13:159) In particular, they have not tried to impose definite policy views on the government, but have maintained close political ties and paid great deference to the desires of the legislative and executive branches of government. The price which the military professional must pay for power and influence depends upon the extent of the gap between the military ethic and the prevailing ideologies of the civilian leadership. (13:306)

UNDERSTANDING THE TYPES OF MILITARY INFLUENCE

The styles of influencing civilian leaders can be conceived in terms of three general categories. Some military leaders can influence policy in certain situations precisely because they do not attempt to interpret their

military roles broadly but maintain a narrow military perspective. In some cases this means acting purely as a typical military soldier -- giving expert military advice based strictly on strategic considerations. In contrast are professional soldiers who maintain a low profile. They define their roles narrowly because they are attuned to the perspectives of their services and have little interest in politics. Westmoreland closely resembles this description.

The most successful military leaders take advantage of opportunities to increase their access and involvement in policy making. These leaders are skilled bureaucratic manipulators who cultivate contacts and expand the inner circle of their patrons. (13:354) One leader that epitomizes this category is General Marshall. He was regarded with awe not only by the men who served under him but by the Presidents who served over him. This exceptional military leader made his impact on policy not by just succeeding as a soldier at war but because he created roles that would not otherwise exist. This type of leader is rare, for he goes farthest toward abandoning the professional military ethic. (13:355)

CHAPTER III

GENERAL MARSHALL - THE SOLDIER - STATESMAN

OVERVIEW

There are many military officers who have enjoyed a phenomenal rise in rank, but none has had the degree of success of General George C. Marshall. The best description of General Marshall's success as a military leader is that of President Harry Truman:

...In a war unparalleled in magnitude and in horror, millions of Americans gave their country outstanding service. General of the Army George C. Marshall gave it victory. Statesman and Soldier, he had courage, fortitude and vision, and best of all a rare self-effacement. He has been a tower of strength as counselor of two Commanders in Chief. His standards of character, conduct and efficiency inspired the entire Army, the nation and the world. To him, as much as any individual, the United States owes its future. He takes his place at the head of the great commanders of history. (19:1-2)

Marshall projected an image that commanded the attention of even notable politicians. Marshall was an icon to Dean Acheson, as he was to Robert Lovett, and to Charles ("Chip") Eohlen, George Kennan, W. Averall Harriman and John J. McCloy. Everyone felt his presence. (14:390) There are many, like myself, who believe that General Marshall's success stemmed from the sweep of his thinking, his attributes of statesmanship, and his use of these attributes to his advantage.

General Marshall was a brilliant soldier. I would

describe him as a disciple of Clausewitz -- a military genius. However, the most important trait that contributed to his success and placed him in a special category of military leaders, was his extraordinary ability to recognize quickly the political, economic and social implications of policy and strategy. He had a rare ability to separate policy and strategy -- not an easy task for most people. This ability not only facilitated his harmonious relationships with the "political circle of elites," but made him an influential leader on policy decisions. Marshall was a perfect blend of soldier and statesman. He was always aware of the importance of the Army's role to the nation. Yet, he was equally aware that he was a servant of the American people and accountable to them for his actions. Dean Acheson stated, "Marshall explored all elements of the problem before reaching a decision. Not merely military judgments, but judgments in affairs of state." (1:141) A close resemblance to Clausewitzian prophecy.

CHARACTER PROFILE

General Marshall was without doubt a superb military leader in a straightforward military sense. A description of the intellectual qualities needed in a military genius might have been written with General Marshall in mind.

General Marshall had the courage of a military genius. Courage, said Clausewitz, is of two kinds:

...Courage in the presence of danger to the person.

and courage in the presence of responsibility, whether before the judgement of external authority or before that of the internal authority which is conscience." (6:100-112)

Marshall showed in France during World War I that he was not lacking in courage. Then a colonel, he planned and executed three major offensives under General John J. Pershing that eventually forced the Germans out of France. General Pershing said:

...So brilliantly did Marshall plan the concentration, so precisely did it occur under the assiduous supervision of this colonel who seemed to be everywhere at once and know everything that happened, that the enemy had no inkling of the pending attack until the barrage started which signaled its beginning. In the space of two weeks, nearly a million men and their supplies had been moved in absolute secrecy. It was recognized at the time, and the judgment has stood through the years, as the most magnificent operation of the war. (8:160)

An aloof, confident, self-disciplined man, Marshall impressed Allied military leaders during World War II with his breadth of command. He led the opposition to Winston Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, pressing instead for a cross-channel invasion route for the conquest of the Axis powers. His diplomatic ability broke many deadlocks between the Allied leaders. (24:362)

ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR

Aware of the costs of waging war and the price tag for success, Marshall always remembered that the ultimate cost of victory lay in the loss of men's lives. Many of his decisions were controlled by his deep concern for American

casualties. The battle for the Ruhr near the end of the war provides an excellent case in point. Hitler had decided that the Ruhr would be treated as a fortress; Goering stated after his capture that the troops in the Ruhr were given orders not to surrender for any reason. This meant that in capturing the Ruhr there would be heavy casualties near highly developed and populated industrial areas. Hitler anticipated that approximately twenty-one Allied divisions would be committed to the takeover of the Ruhr; but General Marshall, to avoid the costly in-fighting, ordered the Ruhr encircled. (20:333)

General Marshall's deep concern for people was well known to members of his staff and to many back home in the United States. In one of his last recorded interviews, he said that he saw to it that the President was reminded weekly of casualties with the losses listed in vivid colors. It is essential, he declared, to remember the sacrifices. (20:xiv)

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

General Marshall's political philosophy mirrored that of Clausewitz. He maintained a strong conviction that political chiefs should make political decisions involving military policy. Many detractors of General Marshall criticized him for his failure to think politically about military decisions. However, General Marshall's actions were motivated not by disregard for political matters but by his

loyalty to his Commanders in Chief and his strong belief that such matters belong to political chiefs of staff. For example, it has been charged that in contrast to the British, the American military paid insufficient attention to politics, with untoward and ill-considered effects on the postwar world, but this was not accurate. General Marshall stated, "My Joint Chiefs of Staff and I discussed political matters more than anything else...I repeat again that I doubt if there was any one thing that came to our minds more frequently than the political factors. We didn't discuss politics in the public because we were not in anyway putting our necks out as to political factors which were the business of the President -who is also the Commander In Chief."

(20:320-324; 15:10-11) General Marshall was clearly attuned to political considerations, but kept his political views away from his critics and to himself.

MILITARY MIND VS POLITICAL INSIGHT

Nothing could be further from the truth than to believe that General Marshall's mind was purely a military mind dominated by only military considerations -- that is, considerations relating to the use of force. It was not chance that his name is given to the Marshall Plan. Even more than this, when Marshall thought about military problems and solutions, nonmilitary factors played a key role. The debate between the advocates of the cross-channel invasion of

Hitler's European fortress and the advocates of the Mediterranean invasion through the Balkans clearly illustrates this point. General Marshall did not believe that the southern approach favored by Winston Churchill was desirable, for he doubted that what Churchill called "the soft underbelly of Europe", was soft at all. His principal argument was that the "southern approach" would require additional shipping in the European theater and more troops and would delay victory in Europe by possibly a year. He also believed that it would stretch the time for decision in Asia into the Congressional elections of 1946. He reminded his political leaders of the obstacles which were faced during the elections of 1864 and of 1918, and of the great strain of five years of war. (2:163-164)

Churchill was moved by General Marshall's political considerations. It is this rare trait possessed by General Marshall that greatly enhanced his credibility among his political leaders and constituents. A rare Soldier-Sstatesman.

CULTIVATING RELATIONSHIPS

General Marshall's rise to prominence was not only the result of his excellence as a soldier, but also his long associations and friendships with influential military and political figures. For example, General Marshall knew all the senior American generals of World War II, all the Allied

leaders and their staffs, and the American President and his advisors. He had known many of them for a long time. (4:112)

General Marshall had risen in part because of his connection with General Pershing as a planner in World War I. Before World War I was over, then Colonel Marshall, was "handpicked" by General Pershing as his aide-de-camp, a position he held for six years. For four of those years, 1920 - 1924, Pershing was Chief of Staff of the Army. (20:48)

In 1933, then Colonel Marshall was assigned as Senior Instructor for the Illinois National Guard. Major General Roy D. Keehn was the Commander of the Division. In civilian life, Keehn was a very successful lawyer among whose clients was the Hearst Syndicate -- thus, a man with a great deal of political influence. (20:60) General Keehn was impressed with Colonel Marshall, and he went to see Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur to tell him that Marshall was too good to be wasted in a Guard position; he should be promoted to Brigadier General.

The assignment in the Guard was also a political baptism for Marshall. Since the officers assigned to the Guard were political appointees, and the Guard was under the Illinois Governor command, the tour with the Illinois Guard was a political education for Marshall and would help him in later years. (20:62)

Marshall's assignment to Washington in 1938 was the first clear sign that he was learning how to maneuver, not as a

soldier on the battlefield but as a political statesmen.

(18:124) Then Brigadier General Marshall, became special assistant to General Craig and was subsequently appointed to the position of Deputy Chief of Staff. One of his jobs as Deputy Chief was to push President Roosevelt's plane-building program and at the same time campaign to get additional appropriations for Army manpower and armaments. This interested Harry Hopkins, the Secretary of Commerce, who had charge of the building program. (18:125) Hopkins was impressed by the caliber of Marshall; Marshall made a friend in court.

The Chief of Staff's job was soon to become vacant. Many of the "big guns" were lobbying for the job, but not Marshall, for obvious reasons -- he was too junior. However, Marshall was not without his own friends eager to campaign for him. The Secretary of War, Harry Woodring was a close friend of Marshall. A senator from Pennsylvania spoke up for him. The retiring Chief of Staff, General Craig, told Marshall he would be prepared to recommend him as his successor. (18:127)

In 1939, Marshall went from brigadier to four - star general, jumping the ranks. He was the second non-West Pointer to achieve the position of Chief of Staff. In June 1940, President Roosevelt offered Henry L. Stimson the position of Secretary of War. Stimson and Marshall were old acquaintances. During World War I, Stimson had met Marshall

at the Staff College in Langres, France, and had developed the utmost respect for him. When Stimson became governor of the Philippines, he asked Marshall to go with him as his aide.

As World War II progressed, a warm and close relationship developed between Marshall and Stimson. Seldom during the war was there a difference of opinion between the two. When the U.S. entered the war in 1941, Stimson realized how indispensable was General Marshall. (20:86) Among all the high brass, Marshall was the favorite of the White House secretaries and staff. (4:99)

General Marshall was highly respected by both President Roosevelt and President Truman. Marshall had the complete confidence of both Presidents and seldom during World War II did either ever go against the advice of General Marshall. President Roosevelt gave Marshall complete responsibility for military strategy. In the making of military strategy, he played a prominent part, attending all the great conferences with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. (15:102-106) The dramatic course of WWII left no doubt of Marshall's leadership abilities.

So highly did President Truman admire and trust General Marshall that one week after Marshall retired, Truman asked him to go to China to make peace. Truman's respect for Marshall's diplomatic and military mind were key to the President's decision.

Eisenhower believed Marshall's success with both Congress and the American people was due to his resolute determination to eschew any part in political decisions. Marshall established a solid rapport with Congress to lobby for the Army. He maintained close ties with many prominent senators and congressman. In Marshall's case, however, there were no underhanded actions or selfish motives. He saw the political value in being scrupulously honest and non-partisan in dealing with Congress. Congress knew he was speaking to them straight, with no politics involved. During the war, Congress granted the Chief of Staff an allocation of \$100 million to use for any purpose he wished, without having to account for it in detail to the House. (18:292-293) In short, Marshall commanded the confidence of representatives and senators alike.

General Marshall's public image was equally positive. American public opinion was gauged in part by the attitude of the press. His conduct of press conferences was superb. His candid comments took the press into his confidence and won any doubters to his support. Marshall's masterful conduct with the press certainly enhanced his cause and promoted the cause of not only the Army but also the Administration. (20:94-95)

Marshall's success was not just pure luck. His aloofness self-discipline, and confidence as a soldier coupled with his commitment to his leaders certainly had a lot to do with it.

However, equally important, in my opinion, was his diplomatic ability to gain the confidence of respected politicians and his network of friendships with members of the inner circle of politics.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL WESTMORELAND - THE CONVENTIONAL SOLDIER

Most senior military leaders have been politically attractive after every war. Presidents Washington and Eisenhower wore stars in combat, not to mention others who reached political office such as General Marshall.

In my opinion, General William Childs Westmoreland, a superb combat leader, will not be considered in the same class of soldiers mentioned above. General Westmoreland probably will not be remembered as a combat leader who served with distinction in the North African and European campaigns of World War II but will likely be remembered as the commander of American and Allied forces in Vietnam.

President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed Westmoreland's experience as West Point superintendent showed he could take a scholarly, rather than dogmatic approach. (9:286) He was also a general who obeyed his orders. President Johnson selected him in part because he had sensed in Westmoreland a man who would not play games or try to circumvent him. (12:552) They were proved wrong.

Westmoreland's apparent weakness as a military advisor, in my humble opinion, was his tunnel vision in conducting war. He thought in purely military terms, failing to anticipate the political consequences of his strategy. For example, he was unable to balance military objectives against

political aims during the Vietnam campaign; he was not a close disciple of Clausewitz but, simply, a conventional combat soldier -- a corporate general rather than a political general. Yet, Westmoreland did not become Chief of Staff of the Army without some support, influential friendships, and some luck along the way.

EARLY YEARS

Westmoreland, the son of upper-middle class parents in South Carolina, had an enviable boyhood and career. The Westmorelands were well connected with the local hierarchy. General Westmoreland knew the right people, went to the right church, and had the right Sunday school teacher -- James Byrnes, then a congressman, later a senator, and subsequently Secretary of State. Byrnes was a family friend who kept an eye out for Westmoreland. (12:553)

At West Point, Westmoreland was not the most brilliant member of his class but he had character. The first challenge of his character came in the North African campaign with the 9th Division. He gained a Presidential Unit citation. Westmoreland wanted more action and struck up a friendship with then Colonel James Gavin, a comer and leading proponent of airborne tactics. Westmoreland's reputation as an aggressive, ambitious soldier would eventually result in relationships with Generals' Mathew Ridgeway and Mathew Taylor, two prominent military leaders. Westmoreland became chief of staff of the 9th Infantry Division throughout World

War II under General Craig. Sponsored by his friend General Gavin, Westmoreland subsequently commanded the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team in Korea, the only paratroop unit to see action in the war. (12:554-557)

As superintendent of West Point, a position once held by Generals MacArthur and Taylor, he always sought out political figures, and would take every opportunity to impress and reassure them. In 1963, Westmoreland left West Point and assumed command of the 18th Airborne Corp. He was considered one of the three top generals in the Army, a future contender for Chief of Staff. Westmoreland was being considered for the command in Vietnam as far back as 1961. (12:559)

POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS OF WESTMORELAND

President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara were both impressed by Westmoreland for purely selfish reasons. Westmoreland was efficient and straightforward and spoke in terms even McNamara understood. Westmoreland was a Southerner, which certainly enhanced his relationship with President Johnson. But it was General Taylor, who had known Westmoreland for so long, who influenced the decision makers to choose Westmoreland as the successor to General Harkins to command the troops in Vietnam.

A MODEST PROFILE

Westmoreland was not a man of subtlety but rather a conventional ambitious corporate general chosen for the most complex unconventional war this country had ever fought.

(12:540) For instance, he was not a forceful personality. Methodical rather than imaginative, an organizer rather than a creative military genius, he was another organization man tied to the tradition and principles of the Army. (4:1182) He kept a modest profile with his political leaders. His esteem by politicians stemmed from his crisp military bearing, rather than his brilliance or outspokenness. McNamara chose Westmoreland because he was an efficient manager of people who would help McNamara rather than hamper him. When Westmoreland was given a vaguely defined mission, beyond his military capability, he did not reject it. He would be polite to his political leaders and reserve his opinions for his memoirs. (5:179)

This passive role does not meet the test of a strong forceful leader and military advisor to the Commander in Chief. His performance of this role, may partially explain his lack of success in influencing policymakers.

WEAK ROLE AS MILITARY ADVISOR

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson lost considerable confidence in their military advisors and relied heavily on key civilian advisors for military advice and direction. Johnson and McNamara felt no awe of the recommendations of William Westmoreland. (5:184) The military chiefs including Westmoreland were, for the most part, sophisticated yes men to the president's policies. For example, they seldom addressed their views on military consequences in Vietnam

relative to political restrictions. (21:336)

Westmoreland was better suited to be a tactician than a grand strategist. His strategy in Vietnam was so inflexible that it offered few alternatives in the political realm. If this was his intention, he not only failed as a military advisor, but he also violated a Clausewitzian principle by placing military strategy above political objectives. Military strategy exists to serve political ends. It was his duty and responsibility to advise the President of the likely consequences of political restrictions, to recommend alternatives rather than to be a passive instrument of faulty policy. As Westmoreland later reflected:

...In my press conferences and public appearances both during my service in Vietnam and after my return, I recognized that it was not the job of the military to defend American commitment and policy. I may have veered too far in the direction and devotion of supporting an assigned military task even more than to a cause and of loyalty to the President as Commander in Chief. (21:337)

Even Westmoreland's well wishers maintained that once he was armed with well-trained, mobile, responsive American divisions, he forgot his original role of advisor and became so engrossed with assimilating and deploying his own troops that he allowed deterioration of the forces on whom long-range success depended (9:327)

Some critics say that Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs maintained and even articulated their sharp differences in opposing policy in Vietnam. There is little evidence.

however, that Westmoreland or the military service chiefs threatened or contemplated resigning to dramatize their differences concerning the conduct of the war. (25:75) It certainly appears that the military advisors played a weak role during the Kennedy-Johnson years.

MILITARISM HAS NO PLACE

Westmoreland characteristically showed little understanding of the interrelationships between politics and strategy. For example, he attacked the Johnson administration by stating, "What special audacity prompted civilian bureaucrats to deem they know better to run a military campaign than did military professionals?" (16:642) Isn't this attitude toward war what got MacArthur in hot water with President Truman? Westmoreland's continued requests for large - scale commitments of forces and the use of search and destroy tactics irrespective of political consequences were not the act of a military genius. The political objectives of Vietnam, although somewhat ambiguous, called for gradual escalation of the war effort. Westmoreland's conduct of war in Vietnam further alienated him from Congress, the press, and the American people.

OLD OPTIMISM BREEDS SKEPTICISM

In addition, Westmoreland's continued optimistic statements about the progress made in Vietnam met with widespread skepticism back home. He provided few results to show his critics. He had created a severe credibility gap.

gap that would cause grave criticism and doubt.

For example, Johnson Administration officials questioned Westmoreland's request for 200,000 additional troops following the Tet offensive. (16:311, 12:235-693) As SUN TZU put it, "...There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefitted." (14:409) Many of President Johnson's closest advisors disagreed with Westmoreland's attrition strategy and expressed deep concern about its political consequences. Despite Westmoreland's optimism, the Tet offensive had increased the opposition within the country toward the war. Indeed, further escalation was not acceptable to a large and influential segment of the American public sector. Repeated briefings by advisors such as Clark Clifford, Dean Acheson, Arthur Goldberg and William Bundy revealed their disagreement with the views of Westmoreland's strategy. The President was visibly impressed by the change in view of his trusted advisors. He put greater stock in their opinions than in those of his military advisors including Westmoreland. (21:253-265)

Even as the Vietnam War scaled down, the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, also appeared to distrust his military advisors (26:387) There comes a time when the politicians and the people become discouraged by a seemingly endless requirement for more effort, more resources, and more faith. (26:409)

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Civil-military relations in the United States have varied greatly over the years. Some civilian heads of government have regarded the professional military with suspicion. Who is at fault?

It is partially military leaders, not totally Congress, the changing administrations, or the non-military civilians at large. The root of our problem lies with ourselves - the need for military officers to be better informed politically, and to understand and articulate military theory, principles, history and doctrine in coherent and unambiguous terms that can be understood and appreciated by our civilian leaders and the American people. (25:115)

Essentially, the highly successful, influential soldier must mold himself into a Soldier-Statesman and be persuasive in articulating political, economic, and military interests. Over-reliance on pure military dogma means that political objectives become forgotten. If our military leaders are committed to affecting policy decisions, they must develop political sensitivity.

There is no possibility today, if there ever was, of achieving a neat and precise dividing line between political and military considerations. In fact, there are no clear lines of demarcation among military, political, economic aspects. Therefore, we cannot approach our problems, as we

once tried to, by seeking to isolate, ignore or deal separately with each of these aspects of decision-making. We cannot afford to cultivate compartmentalized minds.

If these are acceptable conclusions, then what can be drawn from them? First, the compartmentalization of military and political thinking has become outdated and conflicts with national security interests. Second, final decisions in the realm of grand strategy must remain with responsible civilian authority. (10:72-73)

This study of military leadership however, was undertaken for two quite specific purposes:

(1) to explore the characteristics necessary to successful military leadership today and

(2) to demonstrate that a military leader's influence on policy is determined by his ability to be both a Soldier and Statesman.

The leadership profiles of Generals Marshall and Westmoreland indicate that there are common leadership qualities but also significant differences that contributed to their ability to influence policy decisions.

In my opinion, civilian chiefs today demand more from our top military leaders than tactical skills. They expect our leaders to think and act as Soldier-Statesman. General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the JCS and ambassador as well, was a firm believer that "...Nothing is so likely to repel the civilian decision-makers as a military argument which

omits obvious considerations which the President cannot omit." (26:165)

Few military leaders in the post-World War II era have thought in strategic-political terms. Marshall was an obvious exception. Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, 1941-1945, and Secretary of State, 1950-52, stated in his memoirs:

....It is not by chance that General Marshall served his country not as soldier-President, we had many of these, but as General of the Army and Chief of Staff, as Ambassador, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. He truly was a Man of All Seasons, a man who understood the relevancy to military decision and action of considerations transcending those of the service in which he had been trained. (1:141-142)

We need to groom more Marshalls!!

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