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A NEW ARMY 21

BY

COLONEL EDWARD J. DEWEY

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ABSTRACT--continued.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

"A NEW ARMY 21"

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
31 January 1990

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ABSTRACT

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Domestic and international pressures will reduce the Army of the 1990's. An Army of 500,000 is likely. How then should this Army that will enter the 21st century, Army 21, be structured? The current 18 division Army is overstructured for the number of soldiers authorized. The 18 division size active force was accomplished by moving most of the CS/CSS into the Reserve Components. The new Army 21 will have nine divisions that are made up of 100% active duty combat, CS, and CSS troops. Army 21 will be composed of a contingency corps and a mechanized/armor corps in CONUS with only one corps in Europe. All three corps will be self-sufficient for 60 days of combat. If the President or Congress commits the Army for more than 60 days than the RC must be mobilized. The RC will be additive to the AC corps, rather than required to round out the AC as is the case today. Such an Army 21 will be lethal, versatile, and deployable while rectifying the current structural imbalances within the Army.

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"A NEW ARMY 21"

The good news for the US Army is the Cold War appears to be ending. The bad news is the heretofore clear and obvious Threat also appears to be vanishing. Besides a perceived diminished threat, the fiscal constraints of the budget deficit have finally caught the military. Peace is breaking out all over Eastern Europe and the future of NATO is in doubt. Secretary of Defense Cheney has told the services that \$180 Billion (\$180B) will need to be cut from the defense budget in the next five years.¹ Reducing the Army's 1989 end strength of 764,000 by 134,000 active troops is being seriously reviewed as a way to achieve such massive defense savings. Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations are also racing toward a successful conclusion before the end of 1990. These converging events will make the Army of the 1990's smaller -- much smaller than it is today.²

The international and domestic pressures to reduce the US Army beyond the projected 630,000 troop level will be enormous. Of utmost concern is, what should the structure of the Army be if these reductions are merely the tip of the iceberg? How should the US Army look as it enters the 21st Century, if it is reduced by one-third as now called for by many?³ Such a reduction would result in an Army of 500,000, smaller than before the start of World War II. This will be a "new Army 21," one very different from the "Army 21" envisioned in current plans. It will be very difficult for the Army to resist such dramatic reductions given the current political, fiscal, and international environment. Therefore, now is the time to contemplate how such a force of 500,000,

this new Army 21, should be designed, organized, and resourced -- starting with a clean sheet of paper.

Merely stating the future Army will be a smaller version of today's Army is not enough. The next few years will be painful for the Army as it downsizes. On the positive side, however, this is also a rare opportunity for the Army to rectify its current force structure imbalances. The changes in the world that are occurring, or are about to occur, are of enormous significance. An equally large vision must be called upon to foresee the changes required in reorganizing the Army.

While American strategic interests will largely remain constant, by the turn of the century the world will be dramatically changed. It is conceivable that Soviet troops will no longer be in East Europe. The Warsaw Pact would be a military pact in name only. East and West Germany could be united in some confederated form, if not a single nation. NATO will likely be much more of a political than a military organization. The European Community of 1992, EC 92, will remove internal trade barriers among twelve European states. EC 92 will present the world with an integrated trading partner with over 320 million citizens and a combined gross domestic product almost equal to that of the United States. This economic confederation will be the world's largest trading entity, ahead of the United States and Japan. The integration of Warsaw Pact member states into the economies of the West also will continue. The West has to date pledged over \$4.4B in economic aid to Hungary and Poland alone. Czechoslovakia has asked for readmission into the International Monetary Fund after a 31 year absence. The iron curtain will be a memory only.

Despite these changes the United States will remain a global power as it enters the next century. American military strategy will continue to require that Army 21 be able to project its combat power anywhere in the world. Even with this need to project itself globally, the Army will have fewer forward deployed forces. Besides the changes in Europe noted above, the Panama Canal is scheduled to be relinquished to Panama and all US forces withdrawn by 1999. In Korea, despite a formidable threat from the North, burdensharing pressures and fiscal constraints will result in a reduced American presence. Concurrently, a reduced US presence in the Philippines seems all but certain. Similar dramatic changes will occur in other parts of the world as the United States sees its role diminishing as other states rise in power.

While the above changes are at work, there will still be a need for the Army to have forces to reinforce Europe. More likely, however, will be the need to respond to threats in other areas of the world that the United States considers vital to its interests. Many of these potential aggressors are well armed with modern aircraft and armored forces. Additionally, these aggressors will likely be equipped with Surface-to-Air Missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, short to intermediate range ballistic missiles, and even chemical weapons. Such high-tech weaponry is readily acquired in the world's arms sales market. These armaments can make almost any small country into a potential, if not actual, threat to US national interests. Finally, the requirement to deploy and insert American forces into third world insurgencies will remain.

To meet these varied requirements, the Army needs to reverse a tenet of General Abrams. When General Abrams became Army Chief of

Staff, as a result of his experience in Viet Nam, he vowed the active Army would never be able to go to war again without calling up the reserve components (RC). The requirement to call up the reserves would be a statement of support of the military. It would represent the national will and support of the American people expressed through Congress. General Abrams' strategy succeeded too well. The current 18 active component (AC) divisions require nine round out reserve brigades to bring them up to full strength. Further, over two-thirds of the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units of the Army are in the RC.

A review of the current Army structure shows that it is predicated upon faulty assumptions. From 1974 to 1987 the Army manpower ceiling remained at the 780,000 troop level. During that same period the Army increased from 13 to 18 active divisions. The Army of Excellence (AOE) process justified this increase in divisions without an increase in end strength. AOE lightened the force from its increasingly heavy emphasis embodied in Division 86. Those in heavy divisions feel that they paid for the brunt of this increase. The object of much of the heavy proponents' wrath, the light divisions, in turn feel that they also paid dearly. The price for light divisions is units that are sorely lacking in staying power due to austere support structures. In reality, the active Army paid for this increase in AC divisions by moving more and more of its CS/CSS into the RC.⁴ In addition, reductions in CS/CSS were based upon labor saving high-tech systems that were to reduce manpower intensive support tasks. These CS/CSS space reductions occurred before the fielding of many of these "new" systems -- some of which still have

not arrived in units, nor left the test community. Only by removing support structure from the AC could the Army increase the number of divisional flags it had while operating under a fixed manpower cap. Today 51% of the total Army structure is in the reserves. The RC provides 52% of all CS units and 67% of all CSS units. Army 21 will rectify this significant imbalance.

Army 21 needs to be self-sufficient. Its active forces must be able to deploy, fight, and sustain without waiting for the mobilization of the RC. By definition, reserve forces are reserves and not as ready as active duty forces. Today's Army, in many instances, must first mobilize reserve forces concurrently with alerting active duty forces to insure that a round out division can be deployed as a unit. Army 21 needs active forces that are able to train, deploy, and sustain themselves without RC augmentation.

The Army needs active forces that can be committed for up to 60 days without relying on the RC. The 1973 War Powers Act prohibits the President from committing US forces for more than 60 days without congressional approval. If Congress approves committing forces longer than 60 days, then the RC must be mobilized to provide that additional support. The RC will then be additive to the committed active forces. This will still support the tenet of General Abrams that requires a reserve call up to maintain sustained operations. Army 21 active forces will be complete in their combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and structure. The entire Army 21 will be configured to fight and support itself for limited excursions of 60 days. As opposed to the current structure, there will be no round out active divisions

with RC brigades or RC battalions that do not train with them on a daily basis.

Active Army Divisions




Figure 1

Active Army End Strength




Figure 2

A review of the authorized personnel spaces in the Army reveals some interesting and supportive facts of the need to restructure. Since demobilization following WWII, the US Army has ranged from a low of 10 active divisions (FY 1950) to a high of 20 divisions (FY 1952). (See Figure 1.)⁵ During that same period, active Army year end strength has varied from a low of 593,167 (FY 1950) to a high of 1,596,419 (FY 1952). (See Figure 2.) Although history is only a guide, superimposing the number of divisions on end strength shows that a force of about 780,000 has traditionally supported 13 active divisions. (See Figure 3.) Or alternatively, a force of over 1,500,000 has been necessary to field 18 divisions. Thus the FY 89 end strength (764,000) historically could support the fielding of only 12 divisions.

AC End Strength/Divisions




Figure 3

Stated in terms of manpower, the Army would need to double its current size to support the fielding of today's 18 active divisions and 8 separate brigades. This doubling in size would be necessary not only to field the 18 divisions and 8 brigades, but the large non-divisional Army as well. This "hidden" Army is found in echelons above corps (EAC) units (e.g., Field Artillery Brigades, Theater Support Commands), the training, transit, hospital and school accounts, combined with the overhead of peacetime, or TDA, headquarters. It is painfully obvious that today's Army is overstructured in numbers of divisions and understructured in support units the total manpower authorizations can support. Only by denuding active CS/CSS units has the Army been able to maintain this legerdemain.

To rectify this top heavy structure, Army 21 needs to field only what it can support. An Army of 500,000 AC troops can support 9 active divisions. These 9 divisions would contain no round out units. Each division would be composed of 100% active duty units. The Corps to command and support these divisions also would be 100% AC soldiers. Further, there would be robust CS/CSS units throughout the active force structure. The sacrifices that have accumulated since 1974 in the Army's ability to sustain itself would be resolved.

The crux of the issue now is, how does the Army structure this 500,000 man force and configure these 9 divisions for Army 21. General Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff, has stated the Army of the future must be versatile, lethal, and deployable. It must have contingency forces that are capable of rapid deployment. It must have Special Operating Forces (SOF) to conduct counter-insurgency, counter-terrorist, and

counter-narcotics operations. It must have heavy forces to defeat armored and modernized threats.⁶ All these forces must be capable of fighting for 60 to 90 days unassisted by the RC. How would such a force look?

A proposal for how Army 21 will look is offered here as a point of departure for the discussions that will become increasingly important as pressures to reduce the Army continue to mount. Beginning overseas, Army 21 will be dramatically smaller than today. In West Germany there will be a 50% reduction, to 100,000 troops.⁷ This will support a corps, two divisions, and one armored cavalry regiment (ACR). In addition, the infrastructure to sustain this force will be all AC and located in-theater. V Corps and the 3d Armored Division will be inactivated because of their now urbanized locations in a major city, Frankfurt. The 8th Infantry Division will be eliminated. Its two brigades malstationed west of the Rhine River have been a problem for decades. Both division forwards (2d Armored Division and 1st Infantry Division) will be inactivated along with the 11th ACR.

United States Army Europe (USAREUR) in Army 21 will contain the VII Corps, the 3d Infantry Division (3d MX), the 1st Armored Division (1st AD), and the 2d ACR. It also will have the requisite theater structure to support this force. The 3d MX and 1st AD will be smaller than they are today. They will be more mobile and have more firepower and countermobility assets to support them. The ability to see and strike deep will increase dramatically.

CFE will have a great impact on not only the forces in Europe, but on the equipment as well. The equipment reduced in Europe, if the CFE

treaty permits, will first fill out existing Prepositioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) shortfalls. The remainder will be returned to the Continental United States (CONUS) to modernize AC and then RC units.

A second option, if CFE equipment must be destroyed, is for the United States to underwrite most of the NATO required CFE reductions. The United States should offer, under liberal Foreign Military Sales (FMS) terms, its equipment reduced by CFE. US equipment that is excess to POMCUS could be transferred to NATO allies who must destroy their older treaty limited equipment to reach NATO's CFE ceilings. This would allow NATO countries, such as Turkey, Spain, and Portugal, to destroy older tanks, e.g., M48s, and acquire US M60 series tanks through FMS. This would not only modernize their tanks, but it would help to standardize the NATO tank inventory. The same process will apply to the other CFE treaty limited items, such as artillery pieces, armored troop carriers, and helicopters.

Army 21 changes in Korea will be even more dramatic. The South Korean military needs US air power more than it needs US ground forces. The South Korean Army is very competent. The 2d Infantry Division will be inactivated and its equipment placed in POMCUS in Korea. POMCUS will allow designated Army units in CONUS to conduct annual Team Spirit exercises and quickly return to help in the defense of South Korea. America's resolve will still be evident. Finally, this will help to disarm the burdensharing critics who point out that the United States has a large trade deficit with Korea as well as with Japan.⁸

Army forces in Japan number only about 2000. A lieutenant

general, dual-hatted as Commander IX Corps and United States Army Japan (USARJ), commands these forces. A force of 2000 does not a corps make. In fact, the corps is skeletal with less than 100 active duty positions. USARJ is a collection of various CS/CSS units. While Army 21 will not save many positions in Japan, the Army will gain several general officer positions by eliminating the corps. The senior US Army officer in Japan, in this primarily naval theater, could then be a colonel.

In Panama, Army 21 will withdraw and inactivate all forces. In accordance with the Panama Canal Treaty, despite US forces then occupying Panama, the United States turned over control of the canal's daily operations to the Panamanians effective 1 January 1990. Now that Noreiga is in custody, the process is well underway to decouple the United States politically from Panama by 1999. The military must do likewise.

In the Pacific the theater Army force is the 25th Infantry Division (25th ID). The 25th ID converted from a roundout infantry division to a light division in 1988. The 25th ID (L) will remain in Hawaii. It will continue to be the major ground force for the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC). The 25th ID (L) provides CINCPAC with a highly deployable force.

For many years in Alaska a separate infantry brigade, the 192d Infantry (192d SIB), was the only Army force. Senator Stevens (R-AK), upon becoming the ranking Republican member of the Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee, lobbied for Alaska to have more than just the 192 SIB. He successfully argued it needed an entire division. Thus the 6th Infantry Division (Light) (6th ID (L)) came into being. Army 21 will

inactivate the 6th ID (L) and return the 192d SIB as Alaska's theater defense brigade.

Turning now to units located in the 48 contiguous states, Army 21 will inactivate four divisions, reorganize two, and eliminate one Corps. The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) (9th ID (Mtz)), a one-of-a-kind unit in the Army that is still in search of a resourced structure, will be inactivated. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) (7 ID (L)) will move from Fort Ord, California, to Fort Lewis, Washington, to replace the 9 ID (Mtz). This will permit the 7th ID (L) to be located at a post that is close to strategic airlift, McChord AFB, and sealift, the ports of Seattle and Tacoma. It also will move the 7th ID (L) from the densely populated and outrageously expensive Monterey Peninsula. Land and noise restrictions at Fort Ord require that most of the Infantry, and 100% of the Artillery, live-fire training be conducted off-post. Relocating to Fort Lewis will alleviate this problem.

The three remaining CONUS divisions to be inactivated are the 1st Infantry Division (1st MX) at Fort Riley, Kansas, the 4th Infantry Division (4th MX) at Fort Carson, Colorado, and the 5th Infantry Division (5th MX) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The 1st MX is well inland and not readily deployable. The 4th MX is suffering from encroaching cities and limited maneuver space. The 5th MX, while closer to the coast, is still not easily deployable and lacks adequate training facilities for a heavy division.

The 101st Air Assault Division (101st AA Div) will be restructured into a light infantry division, the 101st ID (L). The 101st AA Div is also a one-of-a-kind unit. While its tactical mobility is a great

asset, those very helicopters make it difficult to deploy strategically. The helicopters remaining after the 101st AA Div restructuring will be formed into an aviation Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack) (CB (AA)) similar to the 6th CB (AA) at Fort Hood. Any residual helicopters will fill out other underequipped AC aviation units.

The 10th Mountain Division (10th Mtn) will be reorganized into a separate infantry brigade (mountain) (SIB (Mtn)). The current 10th Mtn is another round out division. As the 10th SIB (Mtn) it will be 100% active duty. It will have sufficient facilities at Fort Drum, New York, and will be the premier deployable mountain force in Army 21. Its current RC roundout brigade also will be restructured as a RC SIB (Mtn).

The 2d Armored Division (2d AD) and 1st Cavalry Division (1st Cav) at Fort Hood will remain in Army 21. However, now they will be complete divisions with no round out nor forward deployed units. The 6th CB (AA) also will remain at Fort Hood.

The 82d Airborne Division (82d Abn Div) will remain in Army 21. Despite its being another one-of-a-kind type division, and the only unique division remaining in Army 21, its rapid deployment and entry capability warrant its retention. Likewise, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (24th MX) will be retained. It will be a completely AC division. Its location at Fort Stewart, Georgia, permits rapid deployment by air and sea.

The 3d ACR will remain at Fort Bliss in Army 21 as the III Corps ACR. The 197th SIB and 194th Separate Armored Brigade (194th SAB) also will be retained. Both provide a singularly important service to the Army. While structured as combat units they offer essential school

house training to soldiers and officers learning infantry, mechanized, armored, and cavalry doctrine, tactics, and techniques. The requirement to have a well trained, although smaller force, will always be a priority in Army 21.

The XVIII Corps (ABN) will remain as the Army 21 contingency corps. It will have the 7th ID (L), 82d Abn Div, 101st ID (L), 10th SIB (Mtn), and the 101st CB (AA) assigned. This will be a true light contingency corps. It will be light enough to deploy quickly, composed of 100% active duty soldiers. XVIII Corps (ABN) will have the requisite active CS/CSS at division and corps level to sustain itself in combat for 60 days. Yet it will have enough combat power to defuse or defeat third world low-intensity conflict (LIC) contingencies.

The III Corps at Fort Hood will remain as the Army 21 medium to heavy reinforcing corps. It will be composed of the 1st Cav, 2d AD, 24th MX, 3d ACR and 6th CB (AA). This corps will have the mission to reinforce Europe and NATO, and, if called upon, the light contingency corps. It will have enough firepower to fight in a medium to high intensity conflict (MIC/HIC) theater in which opponents have modern armored and high-tech forces. As with all Army 21 units it will be composed completely of active duty forces. It will have a robust CS/CSS tail to support it in 60 days of committed fighting.

The I Corps at Fort Lewis will be structured as a RC corps in Army 21. At present, virtually all of I Corps, less its headquarters and AC divisions, is in the RC. Its command structure is unique. The commander exercises control over the 6th ID (L) in Alaska, the 9th ID (Mtz) at Fort Lewis, and the 7th ID (L) at Fort Ord. The 6th ID (L) has

a theater (Alaska) defense mission. The 7th ID (L) has contingency missions that cause it to train more with the XVIII Corps than with I Corps. The 9th ID (Mtz) is a round out unit with contingency missions to Europe, the Pacific, and to the XVIII Abn Corps. It is too heavy to deploy rapidly, yet too light to fight against armored forces. Army 21 will eliminate I Corps from the AC. The 9th ID (Mtz) will be inactivated. The 6th ID (L) will become a SIB. Only the 7th ID (L) will remain as a division and it will be assigned to the XVIII (Abn) or contingency corps.

The Reserve Components, composed of the National Guard (NG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) also will be restructured in Army 21. Just as with the AC, the RC must be self-sufficient. The USAR must provide enough CS/CSS units to support the NG combat units so that the RC can fight as a total entity. The role of the RC will be to reinforce the AC contingency or heavy corps if their commitments exceed 60 days in combat. The RC will provide the AC with complete divisions and corps structures that have the ability to add to and reinforce the combat power in the field. Reductions of one-third in the RC, as in the AC, will still permit the RC to field 9 divisions. It will be able to do this in Army 21 because the USAR will no longer be required to round out AC units. RC units primarily will be structured to provide support to fellow RC units. RC units will still provide EAC units to active theater units and the mobilization training base for the Army.

The Army 21 described above will provide the US Army with contingency, special operations, and armored forces.⁹ These forces will be composed totally of active duty soldiers. These forces, in total or

in part, will be capable of deploying and sustaining themselves in combat for 60 days without RC augmentation. Likewise, the RC will be structured so that it is self-sufficient in terms of combat, CS, and CSS forces. If Congress decides that the Army needs to be committed for longer than 60 days, they must then mobilize the RC to provide this additional staying combat power.

This new Army 21 will meet the Chief of Staff's vision of a future force that is lethal, versatile, and deployable. It also will be a smaller, leaner Army as envisioned by the Congress. However, it will be an Army that is in overall balance between its combat, combat support, and combat service support structure and as a result more potent and lethal. This Army 21 is a suggested way for the US Army to enter into the 21st Century. It is a force that will permit the United States to carry out its national strategy by Army forces, should it be necessary. Army planners must begin now to design the Army that, in only ten years, will enter the next millennium.¹⁰ Hopefully, this proposed view of the force of the future will begin public discussion of how today's Army must be structured to transform itself into an Army 21 that is just around the corner.¹¹

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