


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ARE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES PREPARED FOR
THE CIVILIAN WORK FORCE LOSSES THAT WOULD OCCUR
DURING MOBILIZATION?

BY

COLONEL ROBERT A. FRIZZO

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

ARE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES PREPARED FOR THE CIVILIAN
WORK FORCE LOSSES THAT WOULD OCCUR DURING
MOBILIZATION?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Robert A. Frizzo

Colonel Jerry Y. Draper
Project Advisor

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release; distribution is unlimited.**

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
15 March 1990

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ARE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES PREPARED FOR THE CIVILIAN
WORK FORCE LOSSES THAT WOULD OCCUR DURING MOBILIZATION?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

President Bush's FY 1991 Budget proposes reducing Active, Reserve, and civilian Army manpower. Department of Defense planners forecast Armed Forces reductions during the next several years and major troop withdrawals from Europe and Asia. Congressional leaders have even more ambitious reduction plans than the Administration. The reduced Soviet threat permits planners to cut forces and to rely on mobilization of forces to meet future threats as they arise.(1) Historically, the United States has been slow and unprepared to mobilize for war. Successful mobilization requires a combination of many elements: national commitment, industrial production, raw materials, trained forces, manpower availability, and many more. This paper focuses on one of the major mobilization elements--manpower availability.

This paper explores the impact of mobilization on governments' civilian work force. Nine percent of all Army reservists are full time federal civilian workers.(2) The number of reservists working for state and local governments is unknown, but likely to be equal to or greater than the numbers working for the federal government. Reservists participate as "citizen soldiers", in part, because of a deep rooted desire to serve others, the nation, and mankind. Consistent with their unselfish

desire to serve others, many are employed by government as policemen, firemen, postmen, educators, and so forth. This paper refers to reservists who are also government civilian workers as "dual-status" workers.

During times of national military crisis or during statewide natural disasters or civil unrest, selective or partial mobilization at the federal and/or state level is very probable. Recent state level examples are the 1989 California forest fires and earthquake, the South Carolina hurricane, and the Pennsylvania State prison riots at Camp Hill PA. In each case, many government emergency workers--utility, police, fire, medical, administrators--were involved solving problems. If the governors had activated nearby National Guard units; a number of these same emergency workers would have been removed from the emergency to report for military duty. In cases like these, such action probably would be counterproductive and wasteful.

BACKGROUND

This paper does not evaluate or judge whether a worker is best used in a civilian or a military role. Instead, it discusses the policies and procedures, if any, used by federal and state governments to preclude the double reliance on dual-status workers. Further, it reviews the areas of concern and possible solutions to the shortfall of civilian workers during mobilization. In the Department of Army alone, civilian workers

provide a major contribution to the total Army mission. Civilians comprise 18 percent of the total Army (active and reserve force). Their participation involves every aspect of the Army and is especially supportive of mobilization mission tasks. They manage and operate base operations, depots, laboratories, stocks, in-processing stations, and clothing warehouses. They also support logistics, maintenance, supply, acquisition, transportation, security, training, and management functions.(3)

HISTORICAL REVIEW

World War II demonstrated the tremendous manpower demands placed on a warring nation. Demands came from every sector--state and local governments, military services, civil defense, defense industries, and many more. Because of the draw of males from the workplace, women were pressed into the labor force to support not only direct wartime industries, but other areas, such as, food, service, and consumer industries. The chain-reaction demand for additional laborers occurred at every skill level from research to child care to farm work. Mobilization of reserve units created instant competition between the military and civilian sectors for workers. Mobilization procedures were faulty or lacking and many reservists were deferred from military service because they could make more meaningful contributions to the war effort or to societal needs in their civilian positions. Of course, those last minute decisions to delete soldiers from military service affected the combat readiness of the military units to which they were assigned.

After the war, procedures were established to preclude some of these problems from recurring. The National Security Act of 1947, which reorganized the Department of Defense, included several provisions to improve civil defense preparedness.(4) Although manpower issues were a concern, civil defense planners focused on surviving a nuclear attack. A series of international events: the first detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, the Soviet and China backed Korean war, the Soviet launching of a intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957, the Berlin crisis in 1961-2, and the Cuban missile confrontation in 1962, all contributed to the growing belief that war would be short, violent, and nuclear. Responding to these events, Congress created several agencies and directed other existing departments to assume some of the mobilization and preparedness responsibilities.(5)

In 1978, Congress passed Reorganization Plan Number 3 creating the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA was to be a single agency responsible for preparedness. It was created by merging five agencies from Department of Defense, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, and General Services Administration. The Reorganization Plan specifically gave FEMA responsibility for emergency manpower planning.(6)

Chapter II discusses FEMA and current laws and regulations concerning mobilization manpower requirements.

ENDNOTES

1. Tom Donnelly, "The 1991 Budget: The First Step Toward the Future," Army Times. 12 February 1990, p. 6.
2. Frank C. Conahan, Army Reservists: Peacetime Screening to Identify Key Civilians Employers is Inadequate (393315), General Accounting Office Draft Report, (OSD Case 8148), 1989, p. 6.
3. Department of Defense, Manpower Requirements Report--FY 1990, February 1989, p. III-67.
4. Eugene F. Sullivan, Colonel, et. al., Manpower Mobilization Policy: Impact of Reserves and Retiree Call-up on Federal Government Agencies, Thesis, Fort McNair: National War College, April 1983, pp. 17-21.
5. B. Wayne Blanchard, American Civil Defense 1945-1975: The Evolution of Programs and Policies, Thesis, University of Virginia, May 1980, pp. 26-35, 206-8, 230-5, 444-7.
6. Jonathan Mc Mullen, Federal Emergency Management Planning, Thesis, Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, March 1987, pp. 1-7.

CHAPTER II
LAWS AND REGULATIONS

Today, after several changes, Title 10, USC, requires continuous screening of reserve personnel to ensure their availability for mobilization during crises. Screening can be accomplished by record reviews, personal interviews, briefings or any other procedure which achieves the intended purpose of the law, that is, to determine the status of the worker. The code states that reservists whose mobilization in an emergency would result in an extreme personal or community hardship are not to be retained in the Ready Reserve and reserve members having critical civilian skills are not to be retained in numbers beyond the Army's need for those skills. Members who are designated not to be retained are to be transferred to the Standby Reserve, discharged, or, if eligible and apply, to the Retired Reserve. Those personnel transferred to the Standby Reserve may return to the Ready Reserve when the conditions which caused their transfer no longer exist.(1)

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Titles 44 and 5, USC, establish and outline the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) responsibility for emergency preparedness.(2 and 3) These laws are further explained and implemented through executive orders and agency regulations. Executive Order 12656, 18 November 1988, defines (paraphrased) a national security emergency as any occurrence, including natural

disasters, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergencies, that seriously degrade or threaten the national security of the United States. The Director of FEMA serves as an advisor to the National Security Council (NSC) on issues of national security emergency preparedness, including mobilization preparedness, civil defense, and continuity of the government functions. He coordinates the government's preparedness plans with other federal departments and with state and local governments.(4) FEMA has an enormous responsibility for mobilization preparation.

SCREENING REQUIREMENTS

Part 44, Code of Federal Regulations 32, updates and clarifies these laws. This regulation requires all reservists to be screened at least annually to ensure their availability upon mobilization. Once mobilization is directed, all screening ceases and those remaining in the Ready Reserve shall be considered immediately available for active duty military service. It states specifically, "after a mobilization is ordered, no deferment, delay, or exemption from mobilization will be granted because of civilian employment."(5) The regulation also directs military services to screen their civilian employers to determine which positions are held by reservists. Likewise, Federal Preparedness Circular-11 requires all federal agencies to screen their civilian work force to ensure federal employees essential to the continuity of the federal government are not retained as members of the Ready Reserve.(6)

There are many laws governing screening activities. The requirements are stated and restated many ways. They are summarized below:(7)

--Each reservist must tell his employer that he is in the reserves and is subject to immediate mobilization.

--Each reserve unit must screen personnel annually and brief them of the laws and regulations concerning availability for mobilization.

--Each federal agency must screen its work force for reservists and determine if they are in "key positions."(8)

--All reservists are considered to have either federal or nonfederal employers.(9) That is, there is no special category or consideration for defense industry or state employees. A reservist working for Pepsi-Cola is in the same category as a state Director of Health and Safety. Both are considered nonfederal employees.

--Federal agencies are required and nonfederal employers are encouraged to implement procedures to preclude conflict between emergency manpower needs of civilian activities and the military during mobilization.(10)

KEY POSITIONS

Federal agencies are required to evaluate positions occupied by reservists and report, by name, those reservist who are filling "key positions" to the military service for removal from the Ready Reserve force.(11) Key positions are those which

cannot be vacated during national emergencies or mobilization without seriously impairing the capability of their agency to function effectively. The following should be considered in the determination of a key position:

--Can the position be filled in a reasonable time after mobilization?

--Does the position require the technical or managerial skills possessed uniquely by the incumbent?

--Is the position associated directly with defense mobilization?

--Is the position directly associated with industrial or manpower mobilization?

--Are there other factors related to national defense, health, or safety that would make the incumbent of the position unavailable for mobilization?(12)

Nonfederal employers are to use the same "key position" criteria to determine if they have reservists in key positions. Reservists in federal and nonfederal key positions are to be reported to the Department of Defense (DOD) for removal from the Ready Reserve. If DOD does not recognize an employer's designation of a key position and will not agree to remove the reservist from the Ready Reserve, FEMA is authorized to adjudicate the issue, before mobilization.(13)

The above procedures attack the mobilization preplanning problem from several directions. Under the various laws and

regulations, individuals, reserve units, DOD, FEMA and other federal agencies all have specific responsibilities. To efficiently protect critical workers in state and local governments, defense industries, and human services, nonfederal agencies are encouraged to participate in this system.

The above identification and reporting system concerning key position employees is only a small part of the total civilian manpower concerns.

For reservists occupying nonkey positions, Title 44, Section 333, directs employers to prepare other employees to assume the essential functions of reservists, or transfer the functions to other employees, or develop plans to fill positions vacated during mobilization. Paragraph 333.5 of Title 44, specifically advises state and local governments and private industry of these procedures.(14)

The laws and regulations discussed in this chapter indicate that Congress, the Executive Departments, and the military services are aware of the potential problems and have enacted procedures to reduce the impact of mobilization. However, alone, regulations solve nothing unless properly implemented. The next chapter discusses what is working well and what is not.

ENDNOTES

1. United States Code, 1988, Volume 3, Title 10, Section 271, p. 92.
2. Code of Federal Regulations, Volume 44, Part 333, 1985 ed., p. 463. (Hereafter "44 CFR 333").
3. United States Code, 1982, Volume I, Title 5, Section 101, p. 1161.
4. "Executive Order 12656," Federal Register, Volume 53, 23 November 1988, pp. 47491-4.
5. Code of Federal Regulations, Volume 32, Part 44.4, 1985 ed., p. 61. (Hereafter "32 CFR 44").
6. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Preparedness Circular 11, 9 August 1984, pp. 1-7. (Hereafter "FPC-11").
7. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 1200.7, 6 April 1984, p. 5. (Hereafter DOD 1200.7).
8. FPC-11, pp. 3,4.
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10. 32 CFR 44, p. 61.
11. FPC-11, pp. 3,4.
12. 32 CFR 44, p. 61.
13. Ibid., p. 63.
14. 44 CFR 333, p. 464.

CHAPTER III

APPLICATION OF THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS

The House Appropriations Committee has been concerned about the civilian worker mobilization issue for some time and has directed DOD to report annually on the status of reservists and key positions requests. The following historical data was submitted in the 1989 report:

FIGURE 1:
READY RESERVISTS IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CY 1979-1988 (1)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Officers*</u>	<u>Enlisted*</u>	<u>Total*</u>	<u>Key Position</u>
1979	28.3	106.4	134.7	981
1980	28.3	106.3	134.6	322
1981	28.1	103.5	131.6	63
1982	29.3	101.9	131.2	153
1983	33.0	98.3	131.3	268
1984	31.4	107.1	138.4	1192
1985	32.0	104.9	136.9	1821
1986	31.2	115.3	146.5	1235
1987	30.7	114.6	145.3	2673
1988	30.8	113.7	144.5**	1670

* In thousands.

** During 1988, 144,490 Ready Reservists were employed as civilian federal workers. Of those, 86,000 would be required to leave peacetime jobs and report for military service during mobilization. The remainder, 58,000+, serve as NG and USAR technicians and would continue to serve the same units upon mobilization, but as military personnel.

Approximately nine percent of all reservists work for the federal government, whereas less than three percent of the federal work force are reservists.(2) This relatively small percentage of the federal work force, coupled with the few key position requests--1670 in 1988--seem to indicate that the impact

of mobilization would be rather slight. However, other considerations are necessary to accurately judge the severity of the issue. They are:

Key positions: It is difficult to determine if the number of key position personnel reported for removal from the Ready Reserve accurately reflects the true number of reservists filling critical positions. Both employers and employees may be reluctant to designate a position as key. To do so requires reservists filling these positions to be removed from the Ready Reserve, thereby forfeiting all realistic chances for promotion. This procedure of designating key positions might scare off many talented workers who might otherwise apply for and excel in these critical positions. A DOD Inspector General audit reports that the loss of 96 critical workers--nuclear engineers, electronic mechanics, physical science technicians, and marine machinery mechanics--would seriously impair shipyard operations at Charleston Naval Shipyard. But managers did not tell the reservists to get out of the reserves or transfer them to less critical jobs because they feared the employees would quit rather than forfeit reserve pay and retirement benefits.(3) Similarly, reservists might be reluctant to surface their reserve status with employers, lest they not be considered for or accepted for higher level positions. The "key position" designation system makes sense in terms of mobilization manpower procedures; however, it is reasonable to believe many positions are not properly reported.

Coupling: Certain positions do not meet the key position criteria, but warrant special consideration due to the number of reservists in a single office, department, or agency--federal or state. For instance, a single state policeman is unlikely to be considered a key position worker, however, if 40, 60, or 80 percent of the state police in an area; or firemen in a city; or medical crews in a locality are all reservists, mobilization might have a devastating affect on that agency's ability to function upon mobilization of the armed forces or activation of the national guard by a governor.

Rank structure: Of the 86,000 civilian federal workers mentioned above, more than one-third hold positions of GS-11 or higher.(4) These are the middle-to-upper skill and management level workers. Again, this is a concentration of specific workers. To remove 30,000 governmental middle managers on short notice within days after mobilization would have a compounding effect. As horizontal agencies lose middle managers, cooperation and coordination between supporting offices and agencies would become far more difficult and would negatively affect continuity of governmental operations. Coordination and cooperation would be interrupted horizontally between agencies and vertically from top to bottom within agencies.

Expanded governmental operations: Mobilization would cause severe civilian manpower shortages. The problem is exasperated because, not only does the government need to continue operations, it must expand operations quickly. The DOD IG audit

mentioned above also reported that one branch of the Defense Logistics Agency would lose nearly 300 civilian workers at the same time attempting to hire 2000 additional workers to perform its wartime work load.(5) The Army currently employs 303,000 full time civilians, 70,000 would be lost immediately due to activation of the reserves and implementation of selective service. The wartime civilian manning requirement is for 448,000 civilian workers. Just to meet Army needs, 182,000 additional civilian workers would have to be hired.

FIGURE 2:
ARMY CIVILIAN WORK FORCE (6)

Current peacetime force	303,000
<u>Losses due to mobilization</u>	<u>-70,000</u>
	233,000
Current part time workers	
<u>Available for full time</u>	<u>+33,000</u>
Workers available	266,000
<u>Wartime work force needed</u>	<u>448,000</u>
Shortfall--Wartime	<u>-182,000</u>

THE FEDERAL SECTOR

Although the above statistics pertain to the Army, they portray a problem confronted by all services. Filling the positions will be difficult considering the competition from other services, defense industries, and nonfederal governmental agencies. The Federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Department of Defense have been working on solutions to these problems.

Upon full mobilization the federal government's primary effort will be directed toward security of the nation and prosecution of the war. Those government functions which do not contribute to the war effort or meet the survival needs of the nation will be reduced or discontinued. As government functions are changed or terminated, civilian workers will be freed up for other higher priority wartime positions. The single greatest weakness with this concept is the relationship of location of the worker to the workplace. A job discontinued at Yellowstone National Park does not necessarily free a worker for jobs in the Washington D.C. area or for private industry in Seattle, Washington.

To address the location problem and to identify which jobs would be vacated specifically, OPM and DOD conduct annual computer data file screenings of the federal sector (these screens are separate from those already mentioned). Each year a cross-match of computer personnel listings maintained in the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) file for reservists and military retirees and the OPM file of federal employees is conducted to identify all reservists who work for the federal government. From this cross-match a composite personnel roster is developed which lists, by department or agency, by location, by grade, and by skill category, all federal employees who have military mobilization missions. These lists are provided to the appropriate personnel administrative office of all federal agencies and departments. This permits the agencies to verify their own screening data. This procedure is a backup to the

normal screening required by Federal Preparedness Circular-11, and should ensure that all dual status workers are identified by federal agencies. Further, DOD requests the names be screened to ensure they are not in key positions.

The computer data file screen also generates for each agency a list of retired federal workers and military retired personnel (over 60 years of age) living within a 50 mile radius of each DOD installation. This provides a starting point for finding potential manpower replacements for mobilization. (7) Representatives of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, US Army Western Command, Hawaii; and The Personnel Office, Oakland Army Depot, Oakland, California; and the Director, Civilian Personnel Office, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; confirm that the lists are received annually at the user level.(8)

DOD Instruction 1400.32, 15 January, 1987 directs that where two or more DOD installations share a common civilian recruiting area (within 50 miles of the installation), each installation will participate on a local recruiting area staffing committee to conduct premobilization coordination and planning for civilian workers. One significant issue of concern is the duplication of names of potential retired workers on the DMDC rosters provided to each installation in the same area. To address the problem, recruiting area staffing committees devise methods to best use the names provided. For instance, the Oakland-San Francisco Committee divided the area geographically into sub-areas for each installation's recruiting effort.(9)

Installations are encouraged to contact the retirees and determine their willingness to work and availability, if needed, during mobilization.(10) This procedure has been on going for several years and is addressing some of the anticipated shortage problems. Overall, success will depend on the impact of unknown requirements which will surface at the time of mobilization, such as, state and local government and private industry requirements. These competing jobs may offer greater financial rewards; and, more importantly, they may be closer to the homes of the workers. For elder workers, proximity to work place may be more important than any other consideration.

Other initiatives to prepare for civilian manpower losses:

- re-verifying and refining projected wartime demands by specifying occupations, grades and locations.

- converting part-time workers to full-time employees.

- increasing work hours to 60 hours per week initially.

- re-hiring retired civilian personnel who volunteer.

- securing additional personnel using multiple employment sources.

- considering recalling military retirees to fill civilian positions.

- expanding planning to identify foreign national civilians.

--expanding use of civilian contractors to meet manpower requirements.(11)

A good civilian work force mobilization plan minimizes disruption of government functions and increases operational capacity. Upon mobilization, requirements increase quickly. The civilian manpower demand surges immediately when active units are being fielded and deployed; reserve units are being mobilized, filled, trained, and deployed; and early logistical demands are straining our resources. The Army will have to increase direct hire civilians by 182,000 while the other DOD agencies will need to add 132,000 civilians, most of which, are needed within the first 30 days after mobilization. The peak demand for military personnel occurs later--between 120 and 150 days after mobilization.(12)

A recently published US General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report on this subject disclosed that DOD is appropriately addressing the federal civilian work force problem. GAO does acknowledge there are likely to be some reporting errors because many employers as well as reservists are reluctant to report key position employment. The report concludes that the system is generally working well within federal government agencies. The system for the nonfederal sector, discussed in the next section, is not as effective.(13)

THE NONFEDERAL SECTOR

The previous section covered the federal civilian mobilization planning process. The nonfederal sector is not as

well prepared for full mobilization and the sudden loss of civilian workers. Although laws permit and encourage identification of nonfederal key position reservists, not one person has been reported to DOD for removal from the Ready Reserve in the last three years. In the 1st and 2nd Continental Armies, not one nonfederal key position has been reported in the last 15 years. GAO faulted the Army for relying on soldiers to notify their employer of their reserve status and for not ensuring that employers are aware of their right to identify key position personnel. GAO recommends DOD or each military service institute a system to directly notify nonfederal agencies and corporations of reservists in their employment, and to inform employers of their rights to declare key positions and request removal of reservists from the Ready Reserve.(14) Although every agency, including the Army, has a responsibility to make the system work, FEMA has the overall responsibility for coordination with the state and local governments and ensuring the continuity of governmental functions. Interestingly, GAO did not mention FEMA's overall responsibility for preparedness as discussed in Chapter 2.


FEMA's involvement with emergency planning at the state and local level does not focus on the nonfederal civilian manpower problems addressed above. FEMA has 10 regional offices which coordinate with states for emergency planning. State emergency management agency personnel in Delaware and Pennsylvania indicate this is not an area of active interest at their level. They do not know how many state civilian workers or which workers would

be lost due to mobilization or activation of the NG by their governor. They reasoned, there is little probability of ever requiring full mobilization. During emergencies they avoid the problem of double reliance on emergency personnel by only bringing volunteers to active duty status rather than directing specific units be mobilized.(15)

The Delaware and Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agencies (DEMA and PEMA, respectfully) are part of the executive branch of their state governments. Each operate an Emergency Operation Center (EOC) in times of crisis. Each EOC is responsive to a state crisis council consisting of members of various state departments involved in the crisis.(16) These Councils are chaired by the Lieutenant Governor in Pennsylvania and by the Governor in Delaware. When the EOCs are in operation, they have tasking authority over other state agencies on behalf of the governor. To support emergency operations each state also has military representatives from the federal military services in liaison with the state Adjutant General office or the state National Guard. During emergencies, the NG provides liaison personnel to the PEMA EOC for coordination. When tasks are assigned to the National Guard, the designation, size, and type of unit are not specified in the tasking. Only the mission to be accomplished is stated. This allows the National Guard the flexibility to call for volunteers, select units not in the area to avoid manpower conflicts, or to use part of, or combinations of, units to accomplish the mission. Delaware has a very similar operating philosophy. In addition, the PEMA and DEMA offices

have direct coordination with regional FEMA office if external assistance is needed. An example of Delaware's emergency organizational structure follows:

FIGURE 3



CODE:(- - -)Coordination, (—)Command

NOTE: REMC--Regional Emergency Management Cell. This cell is composed of military service liaison personnel.

The military services provide Army, Navy and Air Force liaison personnel to the state AG or NG and Regional FEMA EOCs. These cells provide technical expertise and advise on employment and capability of military forces and equipment. The above

diagram shows the looping coordination which occurs between federal and state agencies.

The two state examples and the GAO report indicate the nonfederal sector, both governmental and civilian, are not participating in mobilization preparation systems which have been established by laws and statutes to preclude competition between civilian and military agencies for workers.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense, Ready Reservists in the Federal Government Report, September 1989, pp. 2,4. (Hereafter "Ready Reservists Report").
2. Frank C. Conahan , Army Reservists: Peacetime Screening to Identify Key Employers is Inadequate (393315), General Accounting Office Draft Report (OSD Case 8148), 1989, p. 6.
3. William Mathaws, "Ready Reserve Members Still Occupy Jobs Critical in Wartime, Audit Say," Army Times, 15 January 1990, p. 20.
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11. Manpower Report-FY1990, p. II-18.
12. Ibid., pp. II-17,III-1.
13. Conahan, p. 7.
14. Conahan, pp. 2,7,11-13.
15. Telephonic interviews with Mr. Joseph Jordan, Planning Office, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, 13 November and 12 December 1989, and with Mr. Dennis A. King, Planning Coordinator, Delaware Emergency Management Agency, 13 November 1989. (Hereafter "Jordan and King interview").
16. Pennsylvania Manual, Volume 108, Department of General Services, Pennsylvania, 1987, pp. 384-5.
17. Jordan and King interview.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS

This report explores the civilian manpower mobilization requirements. It shows that the federal government, after years of slow progress and pushing from Congress, has instituted procedures to identify and anticipate manpower shortfalls problems. Further, it has taken action to establish procedures in response to potential manpower shortages and has provided guidance to installations throughout the nation. Additional conclusions follow:

1. The laws requiring mandatory screening of federal workers are appropriate and sufficient.

2. The laws pertaining to nonfederal workers are inadequate to ensure preparation for mobilization because they encourage participation rather than direct specific actions by the civilian sector.

3. The identification of key positions by federal employers is working, but judgement is subjective and less than perfect.

4. The key position reporting system does not address the problem of density of reservists in a particular job sector or location. This was referred to as the "coupling problem" in Chapter III, page 12 of this report.

5. Nonfederal government employers have not taken action to identify reservists in key positions for the federal

government, nor have they established a similar safeguard system to prevent similar problems at the state and local level.

6. Nonfederal nongovernment employers are not aware, or are not exercising their right, to report reservists who are in key positions to DOD for removal from the Ready Reserve.

7. There is no feedback system to ensure reservists are notifying employers of their mobilization responsibilities.

8. FEMA has implemented measures to fill vacant federal civilian jobs during wartime. However, there is no feedback system to ensure the names provided to installations are adequate to fill projected vacancies. FEMA has not exercised its greater responsibility in the area concerning nonfederal employers.

Evaluating the total effectiveness of the steps taken to date cannot be done accurately until the total civilian manpower demands of the nation are known. To date, this has not been done. During war, demand for and supply of civilian workers for the federal government will not occur in a vacuum. FEMA, as the nation's emergency planners, must recognize and support the competing demands from private industry and state and local governments. Until FEMA sorts out the requirements and establishes a priority system to evaluate and allocate these limited manpower resources we cannot, as a nation, be confident of our civilian manpower preparedness.

CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS

The mobilization manpower preparation system can be improved by the following actions:

1. Reservists should be required to notify employers of their reserve status and provide employers a mail-back card to be sent to the reserve unit commander, confirming proper employer notification. The commander can use the information to ensure the employer is notified of the key position designation procedures. Thereafter, perhaps annually, commanders can reaffirm continued employment.

2. FEMA must publicize the intent of the screening and key position designation process to civilian agencies.

3. FEMA must establish clear-cut procedures for state and local governments to identify reservists and report key personnel to the military services. The same information about dual status --National Guard members/state workers--could assist emergency planners at the state level. Lacking laws requiring such action, FEMA could withhold available emergency funding until states comply.

4. DOD and FEMA need feedback from installations on the status of identified local civilians available to fill vacated mobilization positions. Once done, geographical personnel shortages and surpluses can be known and avoided or exploited, as appropriate.

5. Defense contractors and subcontractor should be required to identify all reservists in their employment and identify "up-front" those positions which are key. This should be part of every government contract.

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