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ARI Research Note 90-16

Improving Re-Enlistment Through Decision-Making Modeling and Intervention

AD-A221 718

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March 1990



United States Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS ---		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY ---			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE ---					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) ---			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) ARI Research Note 90-16		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Wyvern Research Associates		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ---		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 335 Beach Road Burlingame, CA 94010			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 5001 Eisenhower Avenue Alexandria, VA 22333-5600		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) PERI-R		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER MDA903-87-C-0611	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 5001 Eisenhower Avenue Alexandria, VA 22333-5600			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. 65502M	PROJECT NO. 770	TASK NO. 241
			WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO. C8		
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Improving Re-enlistment Through Decision-Making Modeling and Intervention					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Sullivan, William P. and Bartlett, Thomas E. (Wyvern Research Associates)					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final		13b. TIME COVERED FROM 87/08 TO 89/12		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1990, March	
				15. PAGE COUNT 172	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION Paul A. Gade, Contracting Officer's Representative.					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	Military operation--U.S. Objective judgment quotient		
			Grenada Special operations		
			Urgent Fury Rapid mobilization		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Fifty-nine Grenada veterans currently assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment rank ordered twenty-five factors in order of their importance in contributing to the success of Operation Urgent Fury. The data were analyzed using the Objective Judgment Quotient (OJQ*) analysis system developed by Wyvern Research Associates. The results showed that Grenada veterans attributed their eventual success in Grenada to Personnel Factors such as teamwork, small unit leadership, and physical conditioning. Equipment and hardware performed adequately, while those factors relating to Intelligence Information and Interservice Communications were very little help in the overall success of the operation.					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Paul A. Gade			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (202) 274-8119		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL PERI-RP

FOREWORD

This study was funded by the Defense Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program, Phase I, under the direction of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). The report summarizes the results of objective surveys and followup discussions with active Army veterans of the Grenada campaign. Factors discussed include those that may have contributed to or detracted from both individual and unit successes and failures in Operation Urgent Fury. Participants in the survey are currently assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division and both the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The survey was analyzed using an Objective Judgment Quotient (OJQ*) analysis system that ranked the major factors according to relative importance in adding to or detracting from the overall success of the Grenada operation. This report focuses on Phase I of the current project. The goal of Phase I is to produce a model of major factors and subfactors relating to combat effectiveness in an interservice, rapid mobilization, limited combat operation. Phase II of this research effort will apply that model of combat effectiveness to the training and preparation of Army National Guard and Reserve combat units. The ultimate goal of this research program is to determine how well current Army Reserve and National Guard training programs match up with those factors seen as most critical by participants in the Army rapid mobilization combat effort in Grenada. In a much broader and much more widespread rapid mobilization effort requiring a much larger commitment of combat troops, could we count on select Army Reserve and National Guard combat units to make a significant contribution and would they be capable of eventual success?

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	21

IMPROVING RE-ENLISTMENT THROUGH DECISION-MAKING MODELING AND INTERVENTION

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IMPROVING RE-ENLISTMENT THROUGH DECISION-MAKING MODELING AND INTERVENTION

OVERVIEW

According to the most recent research conducted on re-enlistment, one of the most critical factors in determining whether soldiers are more likely to re-enlist and remain in the Army or whether they are more likely to serve out their enlistments and leave the service depends on their perception of whether the jobs they are doing are meaningful and worthwhile. Job tenure depends a great deal on whether an individual sees real value and accomplishment in his/her efforts. Conversely, turnover is often associated with the feeling that the work one is doing is unproductive, unrewarding and that it serves no real purpose.

Past research on work motivation indicates that the essence of the job itself, the actual accomplishments and the achieved goals are at least as important to job satisfaction as more tangible rewards of pay and benefits. It is not surprising then that actual or near combat situations are more likely to boost Army enlistments and re-enlistments and that regular Army as well as Reserve and National Guard personnel are likely to express greater feelings of satisfaction in taking part in real combat, near combat and support operations. Such has been the case in recent years in Grenada and more recently in Honduras and Panama.

While a great deal of research has been accumulated and much is known about the myriad of factors relating to extended combat in Korea and Vietnam, very little objective research has been done on the sudden, short-term, limited combat and near combat operations like those in Grenada, Honduras and Panama. The Army research machinery has tended to move far slower than the action in those operations, each of which was characterized by fast action and abrupt termination. In the case of Grenada, while a great number of facts and information were known immediately, and often publicly, there was no organized, scientific research program covering the entire operation at the time. Months and years later we were left to piece together, in retrospect, the old reports and reminiscences about what took place in Grenada, what went right and what went wrong, and how this all reflects on broader issues concerning the readiness and effectiveness of our combat forces. This seems to have led to rather broad speculation and armchair conclusions as to how effective the Army was in performing its mission and whether the Army units involved could have been better prepared, better trained and better organized. Perhaps so much focus on the deficiencies in the operations has caused us to ignore the critical, positive factors that led to the mission's eventual success. In the current study, an attempt was to focus on all factors, those that contributed to and those that detracted from the overall success of the Grenada operation.

While the overall Grenada intervention was successful, all reports have indicated that both individual and unit performances were far from perfect. Those units involved in the Grenada operation were the most highly trained and best prepared regular Army troops--Army Rangers and the 82nd Airborne. Considering the tactical mistakes, intelligence deficits, communications problems, and potentially serious weaknesses that were uncovered in that relatively minor operation with our most elite troops, the question is what might have happened in a much broader, much more widespread rapid mobilization effort? What would have happened if less intensely trained troops were either called in or were caught in a combat zone? What if it required the use of select Army Reserve and National Guard combat units? Would they be ready? How would they fare? And would they be capable of eventual success? While the answers to these questions may be speculative, there is a more practical question that may be asked and answered with relatively hard facts. That is, has the knowledge and information on the strengths, weaknesses, and the successes and failures of the Grenada operation filtered down to impact on the training, development, organization, and preparedness of Army Reserve and National Guard forces, or are we likely to perpetuate the same weaknesses and limitations that might have a much more serious and perhaps disastrous consequences if transposed to a much larger scale with much more formidable opposition?

The purpose of the present research study is to define a set of factors, a conceptual framework, of all the factors, both positive and negative, that may have contributed to or detracted from individual and unit successes and failures in the Grenada operation. These factors may be classified under the general headings of: Planning and Strategy, Intelligence Information, Communications, Transportation, Weapons, Combat Training, Leadership and Psychological Readiness for combat. Having identified such factors and subfactors as having potential impact on both the preparedness and eventual success of the Grenada operation, the present study included both an objective survey and followup discussions with Grenada veterans currently assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division and to both the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the 75th Ranger Regiment. The OJQ* analysis system was applied to the survey data in order to measure the relative importance of each of these factors as related to both unit and individual performance in the Grenada intervention.

Having identified, measured and ranked the most critical factors relating to success in Grenada in Phase I of this project, Phase II would proceed to the development of rating scales and questionnaires in order to determine the effectiveness of training of current Army Reserve and National Guard combat units for a rapid mobilization combat effort. Considering both Phase I and Phase II of this study, we would anticipate the outcomes will be: (1) a

conceptual framework of the various factors and subfactors inherent in a real life rapid mobilization combat operation, (2) a rating of the relative importance of those various factors on the success of the overall combat mission in Grenada by persons actually involved in the operation, and (3) a general evaluation of current Army Reserve and National Guard combat training procedures as to how they match up in terms of training hours and training effectiveness with those areas that were seen as being the most critical to the success of the Grenada operation.

The goal of this research is to determine how well current Army Reserve and National Guard training matches up with and benefited from actual combat experience in the Grenada operation. The ultimate goal is to insure that Reserve and National Guard Combat units are prepared, ready to take part in, and ultimately succeed in any future fast action, rapid mobilization, multiservice combat operation in which they are called on to participate.

I. INTRODUCTION

Relative to its limited scope and duration, probably more has been written about and publicly known regarding the 1983 American intervention in Grenada than any other U. S. military operation. Detailed accounts of the less than two-week battle for Grenada started immediately after the conclusion of the operation in November of 1983 and more and more detailed accounts and analyses of the operation have continued up to the present time. (Ayres, 1983; Whitaker, Moreau & Prout, 1983; Gilmore, 1984; O'Shaughnessy, 1984; Payne, Sutton & Thorndike, 1984; Department of State, 1985; Dunn & Watson, 1985; Gabriel, 1985; Gabriel, 1986; Manning, Emerson & Kaylor, 1986; Crocker, 1987; Bolger, 1988; Burrowes, 1988; Adkin, 1989). The most recent publication, Urgent Fury--The Battle for Grenada, written by Major Mark Adkin and published in 1989, appears to be even more complete than earlier publications in starting with the history and events leading up to the Grenada crisis and continuing through the American intervention through mopping up and stabilizing activities at the end.

The extensive and voluminous literature on the Grenada intervention that has been introduced to the American public over the past six years shows both a remarkable degree of detail and a broad-based consensus regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the overall mission. Looking at the entire operation, it was extremely successful, if not militarily, but certainly politically. American military personnel were victorious and it showed our resolve to maintain security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and, from a distance, it also showed that our military could act quickly, decisively and secure all desired military objectives with relatively little difficulty and relatively few casualties. However, the details of the operation, which were publicly available even before the area was secure, were more negative and more troubling. All reports indicate that both our military and non-military intelligence of Grenada was woefully lacking and, while it might have been available at some level, it was certainly not passed down to the combat troops. Too, while there may have been some forgivable misjudgments with regard to strategy and tactics, all the reports seemed to agree that there were major deficits and weaknesses in the overall communications system. Particularly noted were major gaps in our interservice communications. There was a positive though less publicized side too. Small unit leadership resiliency and resourcefulness as well as individual courage, determination and discipline were cited by some authors as being a major force behind the overall success of the mission. Too, while there was some criticism of the choice of transportation systems and the selection of weapons, there were no significant negative comments regarding the performance of the transportation or weapons hardware.

Summarizing the public literature on the Grenada intervention that has been published over the past six years, we would conclude that proponents of military and critics alike would agree that the Grenada intervention was a major political success and considering the overall outcome, a military victory as well. However, on analysis and in retrospect, this battle that could not be lost uncovered major deficiencies in our military system. Of the major factors that might have contributed to or detracted from the success of operation Urgent Fury, the writers and analysts were most critical of our intelligence gathering and dissemination systems and they also pointed to major flaws in the overall communications systems, particularly interservice communications. While there seemed to be some criticism of high level strategy, planning and decisiveness, individual and combat unit performance and effectiveness were most often seen as exemplary and, as a rule, the hardware or equipment selected for this operation performed as expected under the specific combat conditions encountered. There was also a major concession from all quarters that there were lessons to be learned from the Grenada conflict that could have a critical bearing on future military operations. However, despite the broad based support of the factual contents of the Grenada invasion and despite the very clear, concise and detailed case studies of what transpired, the conclusions and recommendations set forth in the mass of Grenada literature seem based more on opinion and less on rigorous scientific analysis.

The purpose of the present study was to introduce a degree of scientific rigor into the assessment of the various factors that contributed to and detracted from the success of the Grenada operation and to use that information as the base for studying the combat readiness of Reserve and National Guard combat units. It was decided that in the light of all the factual material and expert testimony in the Grenada intervention to go directly to veterans of the Grenada campaign and, using an objective measurable survey format, find out from them what they felt were the major factors that both enhanced and detracted from theirs and their unit's effectiveness in the ultimate success of the Grenada operation. Primarily for expediency and cost containment, it was further decided to draw the sample of Grenada veterans from active Army personnel still assigned to the major Grenada combat units, 82nd Airborne Division and both the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

II. PROCEDURES

Choosing the Factors

Following a comprehensive review of the literature as well as meetings and discussion with both civilian and military experts on Grenada, the first step was to define a set of hypothetical factors that may have had a significant impact on the success of the Grenada operation. The result was 25 major factors in four general areas: Intelligence, Communications, Personnel and Equipment. These factors under the general headings are as follows:

Intelligence

- Knowledge of the size and location of enemy forces
- Knowledge of the size and location of friendly forces
- Knowledge of the composition and location of the civilian population
- Knowledge of the total interservice operation
- Knowledge of the terrain and important landmarks
- Knowledge of enemy strongholds and armament
- Knowledge of changes in strategy and tactics

Communications

- Communications within our own unit
- Communications with other Army units
- Communications with Air Force/Navy transportation units
- Communications with close combat Air Force/Navy support
- Communications with Marines/Commando combat units
- Communications with the civilian population

Personnel

- Our mental preparation for combat
- Our ability to use combat skills
- Our ability to operate as a team
- Our ability to use weapons
- Our ability to adjust to varying conditions
- Our ability to identify the enemy
- Our unit's leadership
- Overall operational strategy and tactics

Equipment

- Our weapons
- Our communications equipment
- Our transportation equipment

At that point, the list of factors was hypothetical. No pretense was made regarding the specificity or completeness of the list and particular attention was given in the design of the study to ensure that no major factors would be overlooked and that the factors could be more clearly defined by the Grenada veterans in the discussion sessions following each OJQ* administration.

The Sample

Participants in the present project consisted of Grenada veterans currently assigned to one of the three major combat groups that took part in the Grenada campaign. Considering the time lag between the Grenada invasion and the current study, it was hoped, but not confirmed, that the sample would be representative of the population of all U. S. Army combat soldiers who took part in the Grenada operation. More specifically, the sample consisted of volunteers who were Grenada veterans and who are now on active duty with either the 82nd Airborne Division or with the 1st or 2nd Battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Unfortunately, due to time and cost restraints of a wider geographic dispersal, this study was unable to include other Grenada veterans assigned to smaller units of the First Special Operations Command.

The Objective Judgment Quotient (OJQ*) Analysis System

The Objective Judgment Quotient (OJQ*) Analysis System developed by Wyvern Research Associates was used to measure and rank the various factors outlined above as to their importance in contributing to the success of the 1983 battle for Grenada. The OJQ* is an advanced comparative rating system based on sophisticated linear programming techniques. More advanced than the conventional OJQ system based on scaled pairs, the OJQ* system presents the rating decisions to raters in triads rather than pairs and develops very high levels of precision with a much more parsimonious and less tedious task for each of the individual raters. This advanced OJQ* system allows for the measurement and ranking of a relatively large number of factors or criteria at a high level of precision but with the requirement for fewer raters and less demanding rating procedures.

The OJQ* instructions used in the present study are shown in Appendix B and a sample of a single rater's individual rating sheet is shown in Appendix C. The criterion explained in more detail at the beginning of each OJQ* session was (Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury?) The raters were asked, keeping in mind the criterion to look at the three factors in the first row, decide which of the three factors was in the middle of the three in contributing to the success of Operation Urgent Fury. The rater was then asked to place a three (3) in the box to the left of that factor. If two items were of equal

importance, the rater was asked to place a three (3) next to both factors. Again, looking at the three factors in a single row, the rater was asked to determine which of the remaining factors was more important. If much more important, the rater was to place a one (1) in the box to the left of that factor. If slightly more important, the rater was asked to place a two (2) in the adjacent box. For the remaining factor in the row, if it was less important, the rater placed a five (5) in the box to the left and if slightly less important, a four (4) was placed in the box. Each rater then continued with succeeding rows until the end of the page.

An example is shown below:

3	Commun. with civilian population	4	Our weapons	1	Knowl. of size and location, enemy forces
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An interpretation of this individual example would be that the rater felt that the "knowledge of size and location of enemy forces" was much more important than their "communications with civilian population," and "communications with civilian population" was slightly more important than "our weapons." Based on the linear programming concept, computer generated rating sheets were developed for each individual rater so that each rater in turn was given a differently randomized listing.

When the questionnaires had been collected and entered into the computer, the final ratings were calculated using the special goal programming mathematics of the OJQ* system. OJQ* system calculates a consensus measurement which most closely matches all of the raters. In the present study, all the factors were measured and ranked in accordance with their importance to the success of Operation Urgent Fury. The OJQ* output provides not only the ranking and score, but also lists exceptions where individual contributors disagree substantially with the consensus. A special analysis termed the Delfi Analysis allows for the investigation of unique or differing viewpoints and a clearer view of the variance between individuals and between major components--82nd Airborne Division and Army Rangers.

The Discussion

Prior to and following each of the three ratings sessions, there were discussions between the author and survey participants in order to clarify and give more substance to their observations, recollections and conclusions regarding all the factors that may have added to or detracted from the success of the Grenada operation. The sessions were also designed to uncover any other factors that the participants felt were critical but overlooked in the OJQ* session. While each discussion session covered the four major areas of Intelligence, Communications, Personnel and Equipment, no attempt was made to introduce a standardized set of questions.

III. THE RESULTS

The Participants

The first OJQ* survey session involved current members of the 82nd Airborne Division and the session was held at 82nd Headquarters, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Thirty Grenada veterans took part in that survey and the discussion that followed. The second OJQ* session was conducted at the Hunter Army Airfield with volunteers from the 1st Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment; 19 Grenada veterans participated in that survey and discussion. The last session with the 2nd Battalion of the 75th Rangers was delayed from May until August 1989 due to the entire unit being placed on alert and moved to another location. On their return to their base at Fort Lewis, Washington, the high rate of soldiers on leave reduced the available pool of Grenada veterans. Only ten participated in the final OJQ* session and discussion.

A total of 59 active Army Grenada veterans participated in the present study. Since their Grenada experience was five and a half years past, all of the participants were experienced, veteran soldiers of various ranks. At the time of the Grenada Campaign, many had been little more than raw recruits taking part in their first live combat action. However, despite the time lapse, the participants seemed to vividly recall their experiences in the Grenada Campaign.

The OJQ* Analysis

The results of the OJQ* Analysis on the relative importance of factors contributing to the success of the Grenada operation are shown in Appendix D. Table 1, below, is a summary of the major findings.

TABLE 1

THE RANK ORDER OF FACTORS, IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE
IN CONTRIBUTING TO THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION URGENT FURY

	All Parts. (N=59)	82nd Airborne (N=30)	75TH Ranger 1st Bn. (N=19)	75TH Ranger 2nd Bn. (N=10)
Our ability to operate as a team	1	1	2	1
Our unit's leadership	2	3	1	3
Our mental preparation for combat	3	2	4	6
Our ability to use combat skills	4	6	3	2
Our ability to adjust to conditions	5	5	5	8
Our ability to use weapons	6	7	7	4
Commun. within our own unit	7	4	8	5
Knowl. of our unit's objectives	8	8	6	7
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	9	14	9	9
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	10	18	10	10
Our weapons	11	9	18	11
Our commun. equipment	12	10	11	18
Overall operation strategy & tactics	13	13	12	14
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	14	12	13	16
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	15	16	14	12
Comm. with other Army units	16	11	19	17
Our ability to identify enemy	17	15	15	19
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	18	20	16	13
Knowl. of terrain, landmarks	19	21	17	15
Commun. with civilian population	20	19	10	21
Knowl. of total inter- service operation	21	22	21	20
Our transportation equip.	22	17	24	24
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	23	23	23	22
Knowl. of comp. & location, civilian population	24	24	22	25
Commun. with Marine/ Commando units	25	25	25	23

It is quite apparent from the data in Table 1, that of the four major areas addressed, Intelligence, Communications, Personnel and Equipment, the Personnel factors were considered to be the most critical in contributing to the overall success of the Grenada operation. Of the seven factors dealing with the personnel themselves, their performance, resourcefulness, training and preparation, six received the highest ratings of importance. Of all the factors dealing specifically with personnel, only "our ability to identify the enemy" was given a lower rating.

"Communications within our own unit" was considered to be an important factor and "Communications Equipment" received a rather neutral response, but other communications factors received relatively low rankings in terms of either their insignificance or possibly their negative impact on the success of Operation Urgent Fury. As amplified in the discussions, "communications with other Army units," with "close combat Air Force and Navy Support," with "a civilian population" and particularly "communication with Air Force and Navy transportation units" and "Marine and Commando" combat units were seen as far less significant factors, or perhaps negative factors, in the Grenada operation.

Several Intelligence factors got moderately high ratings and these included the "knowledge of our unit's objectives," "knowledge of size and location of enemy forces," and "knowledge of enemy strongholds and armament." However, while these factors were seen as being critical to the success of the overall operation, the greater part of this information was not available prior to landing, but was picked up during the course of the battle. Too, the later discussion also suggested that there may have been some confusion in rating "our transportation equipment," which received a rather low ranking in order of importance. Apparently, many respondents considered "our transportation equipment" to mean Army transportation equipment and did not include in that category the Air Force planes that transported them to the battle site.

Aside from minor variations, it is apparent that both the Army Rangers and 82nd Airborne soldiers, while performing somewhat different operations and having different objectives in the battle for Grenada, all agree that the various personnel factors were the ones most responsible for the success of Operation Urgent Fury. Individual and unit training, teamwork, leadership, and individual courage, skills and resourcefulness were the key factors that led to the overall success of the Grenada operation. This was amplified in the discussion sessions reported on below and as all the objective reports had indicated, most of the communications factors, particularly interservice communications, and most of the prebattle intelligence information factors were far less important in determining the eventual outcome of the battle and, in some cases, actually hindered or detracted from the overall success of

the operation. Appendix D provides a much closer view of the ratings of the factors with regard to precision, inter rater variability, and variance between the three participating units.

Discussion Sessions

The one thing that was abundantly clear in each of the three discussion sessions was that the time period of five and a half years since their participation in the Grenada operation did not cloud their memories of what transpired and what they felt at the time. All the participants agreed that they had vivid recall of not only the major factors, but also many minutiae and details of that operation.

Starting in a longitudinal sequence, the first topic discussed was intelligence information. While it was obvious from the discussion that intelligence information may have been available at some higher levels of command, it was practically nonexistent for most of the lower level combat soldiers. Briefings were, at best, sketchy and many reported they didn't even receive basic information on the climate, terrain and language let alone the enemy, their armament, and their location and strength. Apparently, many soldiers landed in Grenada without even knowing what language was spoken by the Grenadians. Several reported they were only told that the enemy wore blue armbands and spoke Spanish, but they soon found out that in active combat, the enemy was seldom, if ever, visible and most often ditched their uniforms when they decided to give up. Most of the soldiers felt they were going into a complete unknown and they felt that the new recruits were most affected by this. They felt that particularly the younger troops, not knowing what they were getting into, tended to become anxious and jumpy and at embarkation may not have been as mentally prepared to go into combat as they might have been.

Like intelligence information, most participants felt that communications, particularly electronics communications, was practically nonexistent. While, again, conceding that at some level of command, communications may have worked, if it did, it was not passed on to the combat soldiers. They reported that communications with the Navy and Marines was practically nonexistent and that communications with the Air Force, while practically nonexistent at first, improved as the battle went on. As it has been well-documented elsewhere, communications with air combat support improved throughout the battle, but they had great difficulty coordinating and pinpointing targets. Primarily in the early stages of the battle, face-to-face communication was the order of the day and even within small units, electronics communication was very poor. Those closest to the communications system said the equipment worked fine but there were major problems

with the communication systems, particularly interservice communication systems. Some of the participants in these discussions felt that interservice communication is still a major problem and was apparent even in more recent operations such as Golden Pheasant.

All the participants seemed to feel that their weapons and weapons systems performed as expected, though some reported that support groups were sometimes very poorly armed. Too, those that were closest to the communications equipment felt the equipment itself worked okay and didn't present them with any significant problems. It was seen as far less critical to the overall outcome of the battle but many of the Grenada veterans reported having significant problems with logistics and supplies. Some people said they brought the wrong clothing for the climate and were forced to dump it early on in the battle. Others said they were drinking the local water for three days before it was tested and declared potable. While C rations and other supplies were available, they often didn't get to the right units. A number of people claimed that every unit seemed to be forging for itself and, while teamwork, cooperation and individual support were quite obvious within the particular units, there was less evidence of sharing and cooperation among the units.

With reference to air transportation, participants agreed that they got better cooperation and better performance from their own pilots. Some were quite critical of Air Force pilots who were unwilling to commit themselves in cases of intermittent and sporadic sniper fire. Many complained that the Air Force pilots tended to be too inexperienced and they seemed to be working on different wave lengths in drawing the line between safety and getting the job done in the combat situation. As was evident in the OJQ* analysis, all the Grenada veterans in all three groups, both the Rangers and 82nd Air Borne, were all agreed on what carried the day in Grenada.

Overcoming all obstacles of poor intelligence, poor communications, and all the difficulties encountered in interservice operations it was the small unit teamwork, small unit initiative, their intense training, their leadership and ability to adjust to changing conditions that made the Grenada operation a success.

Having just finished advanced combat training with an emphasis on teamwork, meeting the unexpected and overcoming obstacles, most of these soldiers felt they were ready for Grenada. Excellent leadership was the other major factor that they all agreed was a critical element in their eventual success. However, the leadership they referred to in this case was not necessarily formal leadership. They said that under live combat conditions and far less than ideal conditions, and perhaps only themselves to count

on, they looked to experienced combat veterans for leadership. When it came right down to what shall we do next, it was the combat veterans everyone seemed to look to regardless of their place in the chain of command.

The Missing Factor--Physical Conditioning

It was apparent from the first discussion session on, that the factors outlined above missed one factor that the Grenada veterans felt was very critical. They felt that physical conditioning, which was hardly mentioned or no more than obliquely referred to in the great mass of literature on the Grenada Campaign, was a major factor in the success of the Grenada operation and probably ranks somewhere under teamwork and leadership. They felt that on top of the physical demands of combat, the climate, humidity, heavy loads, as well as the stress and sleep deprivation all placed a heavy physical toll on the Grenada combatants. The Grenada veterans said it might have been easy to overlook the physical demands since the major participants, the 82nd Airborne and Rangers were physically ready for the job. They also feel strongly that good physical conditioning gave them a better chance to tolerate battlefield wounds and injuries and allowed them more options and advantages in combat tactics and strategy.

Summary

The discussions with Grenada veterans paralleled the findings of the OJQ* Survey. They said that teamwork, good leadership, a strong, active training program, and good physical conditioning were the factors that led to our success in Grenada. Intelligence information and communications, particularly interservice communications, were so poor they not only offered no help, but in many cases may have detracted from the overall success of the operation. The 82nd Airborne and Ranger participants in the Grenada operation were proud of their overall performance in Grenada, but many felt that the total interservice operation was a below average performance on the part of the United States.

Active Army Grenada Veterans on the Readiness of U. S. Army National Guard Reserve Combat Units

Asked to comment on their feelings about the readiness and potential effectiveness of U. S. Army Reserve and National Guard Combat Units in a rapid mobilization combat operation like Grenada, the response of the Grenada veterans was not very positive. Those who had incidental contact with Reserve and National Guard units in training or in other operations such as Golden Pheasant, felt first of all that there was a great variance in combat readiness of the various National Guard and Reserve units. They felt that some were much better prepared than others and, while they felt

some might make a creditable showing in a Grenada-type combat situation, others probably wouldn't have much of a chance. They felt that so much movement in and out of reserve units would work against them in establishing good teamwork and, as the years go by, there would be less and less chance of them having experienced combat veterans in potential leadership assignments. Finally, they felt that the limited amount of training time and limited training demands would not allow them to have the level of physical conditioning and combat skills that they felt were so critical for success in the Grenada operation. Too, many Grenada veterans who were more familiar with Reserve and National Guard training, felt that their training exercises were too idealistic and allowed for less testing of individual and small unit initiative and resourcefulness. In order to cope with situations like Grenada where so many external factors like interservice transportation, interservice combat support, intelligence and overall electronics communications broke down, they felt that they benefited from training to expect adversity, to not count on outside support, and to rely on their own and their combat team's resources.

IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Grenada campaign in 1983 was somewhat of an enigma. While history will show that it was a political and military victory for the U.S. conducted with relative ease and with few casualties, the details of that operation reported to the public by a variety of writers and journalists seemed to focus more on the variety of things that went wrong, and less on the eventual successful outcome. Congress as well as the military and the administration were alarmed and all seemed to recognize the danger signals, particularly if a Grenada-type operation was transposed to a much larger scale against more formidable competition. Now, 6 years later, the facts on Grenada are clear and there is a whole body of literature on the Grenada intervention. Steps have been taken to address and solve the problems encountered in that campaign and presumably the lessons learned in Grenada have not been forgotten, at least among the active Army units in that campaign. The question is have those lessons learned, not only the negative lessons, but also the positive lessons, been filtered out to the rest of the Army? Has all of this information impacted on the training, organization, evaluation, and preparation of the Army's Reserve and National Guard combat units that could be called upon to support a much broader multi-service rapid mobilization Grenada type combat operation? If select Reserve and National Guard combat units were ordered to support a Grenada-type intervention would they be capable of avoiding past mistakes and take advantage of their strengths? How would they fare? And would they be capable of eventual success?

The present study is separated into two phases. The purpose of Phase I is to introduce a measure of scientific rigor into the analysis of the Grenada campaign and to find out, in an objective sense, what went right, what went wrong, and what major factors helped, or hindered, the Army's performance. Taking that objective model into Phase II we propose to evaluate select Army Reserve and National Guard combat units to see how they measure up in terms of preparation, training, and overall readiness with regard to each of the major factors.

For answers to the questions in Phase I we went directly to Army veterans of the Grenada campaign currently assigned to the major Grenada combat units, the 82nd Airborne Division and to the 75th Ranger Regiment. The Grenada veterans were asked to rank a number of factors as to their importance in contributing to the overall success of the Grenada invasion. There were 25 factors to be rated under the major headings of Intelligence Information, Communications, Personnel and Equipment.

Responses were analyzed by the OJQ* analysis system, which is a relatively new, linear programming based, triad rating system. The OJQ* rating sessions were followed by open-ended discussion sessions that centered on various factors which either added to or detracted from the ultimate success of the Grenada operation.

Results of the OJQ*score analysis clearly showed that the Grenada veterans attributed their overall success in Grenada to the Personnel factors as opposed to Intelligence, Communication or Equipment. They felt that small unit teamwork and leadership were the primary factors that led to the success of the operation and allowed them to overcome the shortcomings and obstacles in the overall operation. They also felt that well-trained combat skills, ability to use weapons and mental preparation were also key factors in the eventual outcome of the battle. Individual resilience, resourcefulness and their ability to adjust to conditions were also key factors in leading to success.

In all, of the 25 factors analyzed, six of the seven Personnel factors held the top six spots. Those factors relating to Intelligence Information, Communications and Equipment were distributed among the lower rated 19 factors.

The discussion sessions following the OJQ* rating sessions both added to and clarified the survey findings. The principle finding of the discussions was that they felt that their own physical conditioning was a primary factor in the overall success of the operation. While physical conditioning was not included among the 25 OJQ* factors, the Grenada veterans felt that physical conditioning probably ranked in importance right after small unit teamwork and small unit leadership. They felt that their physical conditioning allowed them to tolerate the physical demands of combat made even more burdensome by heat, humidity, sleep deprivation and stress.

They agreed with all of the reports in saying that Intelligence Information and Communications were major problems in Grenada. Particularly the frontline troops said that Intelligence Information and Communications were hardly there for them at all, and for that reason, they felt that the overall inter-service operation in Grenada was a below average effort. They felt that high tech support simply wasn't there at the beginning though both electronic communications and intelligence information improved as the battle wore on. Though this study focuses on combat operations, the Grenada veterans also had a lot to say and complain about regarding logistic support.

It was interesting to note that in active combat situations devoid of outside guidance and communications these soldiers looked more toward combat veterans and not necessarily to ranking leadership in determining how to proceed and what to do next. Too, the advance combat troops did not seem as well trained or prepared to deal with enemy prisoners or to maintain early organized processes for separating out the enemy from the civilian population. They felt the void of intelligence information and lack of communications was the hardest on the "green" troops. They felt that poor intelligence and poor communications impacted on the confidence and mental preparedness of the younger combat troops particularly at the onset of the battle.

Many of these Grenada veterans had worked with National Guard and Reserve combat units in either training exercises or in other operations, and they were also asked to comment on Phase II of this study which was directed toward the readiness of the National Guard and Reserve for a larger scale rapid mobilization, inter-service combat operation. They responded that they felt some National Guard and Reserve units were much better prepared than others to enter a combat situation. Although they weren't willing to comment on how individual National Guard and Reserve soldiers might respond to active combat, many of these Grenada veterans felt that most of those units simply don't have enough training time to develop the combat skills, the teamwork, or the physical conditioning that they found to be critical in the Grenada operation. Referring back to the important role that experienced combat veterans played in the Grenada invasion, they felt that as time goes on there would be fewer and fewer of these experienced combat veterans assigned to the National Guard and Reserve units, resulting in less and less potential for the combat veterans to assume leadership positions if the units were called on to participate in live combat operations.

Too, while major Grenada combat units have addressed and attempted to resolve all the major problems that occurred in Grenada, some of these veterans say that some of those problems still exist. They particularly pointed to problems in inter-service communications and inter-service cooperation which surfaced again in Honduras in Operation Golden Pheasant. Finally, they suggested more inter-service and more realistic training exercises for both active Army as well as National Guard and Reserve combat units. They felt that the exercise could include planned breakdowns, snafus, and failures in order to more realistically mimic actual combat situations.

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OJQ & OJQ★

OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT



Measurement technologies for
decision making and problem
solving for

- Strategic Planning
- Marketing
- Production & Productivity
- Purchasing
- Credit
- Public Opinion
- Planning & Forecasting
- Human Resources
 - Performance Appraisal
 - Training Needs Analysis
 - Succession Planning
 - Down Sizing
 - Team Building

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OJQ

Objective Judgment Quotient EFFICIENCY AND RELIABILITY

A new tool for managers and decision makers

OJQ is a computer assisted tool for selecting people, products, programs or strategies best suited to your organization. It allows you to access easily and quickly all useful facts and opinions. It then synthesizes these data into a consensus which is far more reliable than that achieved by more conventional methods such as interviewing or conferencing. Unlike statistical techniques, OJQ is not influenced by how popular an idea is among the decision makers, but only by the overall logic of the information available.

In addition to pointing out logical solutions to operating or planning problems, OJQ provides complete documentation, an easily followed audit trail and rich organization of the data for further analysis. You will be able to defend the results from legal challenges and easily convert those results into *actions*.

A wide range of application

OJQ is currently being used for personnel administration, strategic decision making, environmental scanning and organizational climate studies, to name but a few applications. Almost every organizational decision lends itself to this unique method. For OJQ to be useful, it is only necessary that the management action be viewed in the following ways:

1. A group of alternatives is under consideration, or a decision to be made can be compared with other related decisions. Typical examples include personnel considered for promotion, products to be marketed or production processes to be chosen.
2. There are people available who know about some or all of the alternatives. For personnel decisions there are supervisors, peers and subordinates. For products there are users or others who know the competition. For production processes there are engineers, production and QC personnel.

3. There are useful measures for evaluation of the alternatives. While cost and profit are usually paramount, these may be broken down into characteristics more easily observed. With people, these might be technical skills; with products, appearance; and with production processes, quality.

The most reliable way to measure

It has long been known that the best decisions are based on comparison. In everything from politics to finance to sports, decisions are not based on whether something is good, but whether it is *better than the alternatives*. Psychologists and others who work with measurement are well aware that direct comparison is the most reliable method. Prior to OJQ, systems which tried to capture this reliability have been cumbersome and approximately correct. OJQ overcomes these weaknesses.

CONVENTIONAL OJQ

(Scaled-Pairs)

WONG	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	JONES
JONES	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	SMITH
	Much Better	Slightly Better	About Equal	Slightly Better	Much Better	

Indicates which person produces
a higher quantity of output.

OJQ★

(★ TRIPS – OJQ★ Triplets)

☐ JONES	☐ SMITH	☐ WHITE
☐ HARRISON	☐ WONG	☐ JONES

For "Quantity of Output," indicate:

- The middle performer ("3")
- The highest performer ("1" or "2")
- The lowest performer ("4" or "5")

HOW INFORMATION IS EXTRACTED FROM THE "EXPERTS" USING OJQ OR OJQ★

Questions are put to knowledgeable people in the form of direct comparisons. Respondents are never asked to judge on an absolute basis (such judgements are notoriously unreliable) but on a comparative basis. See "Comparison of OJQ and OJQ★."

Example A.

A unique way to gain the advantage

In order to capitalize better upon the principle of comparison, Wyvern Research Associates turned to recent mathematical developments and computers. A system was developed in which every comparison is included exactly as made unless it conflicts with other information. Unlike statistical methods which amount only to vote counting, OJQ seeks out the solution which is more consistent with all of the comparisons. The answers are not distorted by information which is either well-known or little-known. As an example, suppose a news service is picking the best player in a sport. Using conventional or statistical methods, an inferior player in a well-known league is frequently picked over a better player in a less well-known league. Using OJQ the best player would be picked regardless of how well-known.

1. Team A beats Team B.
2. Team B beats Team C.
3. Team C beats Team D *Twice*.

Using statistics, Team C is better than Team B because it has two wins and one loss (.667). Team B only has one win and one loss (.500). Using OJQ methods, Team B is rated better than Team C, a fact which is consistent with the information we have.

OJQ is consistent with the information and conventional methods may lead to erroneous and costly decisions. OJQ makes more logical use of mathematics.

Example B.

Scientific but simple to use

If you know you have a problem or you just want to improve your performance as a manager, you can easily use OJQ. To take advantage of this powerful and logical methodology, you only need to complete a couple of simple forms. From there, Wyvern Research Associates will prepare a set of OJQ questionnaires completely tailored to you for your contributors to complete. The data is then processed by Wyvern and the final reports with their built-in analyses are returned to you. These reports are simple, easy to interpret, and may lead to direct and profitable action.

Help is available if you wish

Many users of OJQ have completed major projects with no more assistance than a telephone call. Others have taken advantage of the excellent field service which the Wyvern Research network of Associates provides. These experts are located in most major cities in the United States and the list is growing internationally. Associates of Wyvern Research are closely screened firms or individuals who have a proven record of successful consulting. They can assist you to start up and implement the results of an OJQ project and in many other ways as well.

Quick turn around at reasonable cost

The time and cost involved in an OJQ project will depend to a great extent on the size of the project and priority set by the user. Projects take from three weeks to six months, with the median time at about six weeks. Costs are based upon consulting time, if any, plus a formula which takes into account the number of alternatives, the number of dimensions involved and the number of people participating. The user knows in advance exactly what it will cost.

Getting the right answers

The first consideration in any corporate consideration should be whether any change is possible. If no change is possible, it is a waste of resources to study the problem. Even when a problem seems intractable due to influences beyond control of the organization, there are strategies to accommodate or adapt, to turn liabilities into assets. Key action for successful decision making is the early determination of those elements which can be modified or changed. Having determined which elements are to be considered, information must be gathered about the elements from reliable information sources. The valuation of the alternatives must be done so that it relates to the rest of the corporate logic.

There is a simple way of thinking of almost every corporate decision which falls naturally into the OJQ process for insuring that the most profitable, legal and practical decisions are made. This can be condensed to the acronym "ARC," for "Alternatives, Raters and Criteria."

Alternatives

The first step in a successful management decision is to select all of the possible alternatives or contenders to serve the purposes of the organization. Even when something appears obvious at the start as being unworthy of consideration, it may, when considered under objective scrutiny, turn out to have some features which had been overlooked or disregarded in the past. There may sometimes be a legal consideration as well. Is there the possibility that someone may charge that one of the options was (illegally or erroneously) excluded from the selection? Even if the risk is low, the low cost of OJQ is good insurance.

It is also useful to include those items or people about whom information is already well known. It will relate more reliably the scores of the unknown to those already known, and to each other as well.

Raters

Raters are the persons who will supply the information about the alternatives. The best information sources may not be those who have supplied the information in the past. Peers may, for example, be much more knowledgeable about an employee's performance than the boss is. Technicians or production workers may know more about some materials than the inspectors.

The important thing to keep in mind is that the number of raters is large enough to wipe out individual biases and that together they have knowledge of all aspects of the people or things being measured. Sometimes it may be desirable to have enough raters so that the views of different groups, such as different geographic divisions, are known. Other times it may be necessary to include raters for the sake of acceptance by users. Management may, for example, be much more willing to accept results if they have been a part of the process.

Criteria

Criteria are the measures upon which the ultimate choice between alternatives is made. In some situations, it may be more appropriate to use other terms such as "measure" or "dimension."

In setting up an OJQ program, a temptation to use conventional criteria should be resisted. The opinion of users of the results is much more useful than are the measures that come from the textbooks of the past seventy-five years. In the case of performance appraisal it makes much more sense to relate performance to the understandings of the job holders and the supervisors than to try to fit measures of effectiveness into an academic study done twenty years with a different group of workers. Common sense language, job relatedness and economic effect are the keys to successful and acceptable decisions.

OJQ is frequently used to assist in the selection of appropriate criteria — particularly where a work force is being evaluated for some particular purpose. Otherwise, a representative committee, provided its members are knowledgeable and conscientious, will probably arrive at much the same criteria.

Obtaining Information from the Raters

Once the fundamental elements are determined, the data are assembled for presentation to the experts. OJQ presents to each of the raters a series of choices to be made between ★TRIPS or scaled-pairs. These are prescribed in a random-appearing listing for a question which refers to the criterion as:

"Which of the following is better at *communication*?"

(Communication is a valid criterion of work performance.)

The ★TRIPS or scaled-pairs are randomized in different patterns for each criterion on which the decision is to be based. Each rater in turn is given a differently randomized listing.

It is important to note that in this form great reliability is obtained even when responses are made very rapidly. It is also possible to submit questionnaires in this form safely to lower levels of literacy than is practical with multiple choice questionnaires or "yes/no" types of questionnaires. Almost equal reliability is obtained from busy intellectuals and disinterested semi-literates.

Administration of the Questionnaires

Excellent results have been obtained from administration by mail using instructions tailored to the raters. Many clients choose to conduct orientation sessions with the raters and allow questions to be answered while the questionnaires are being completed. It is important, however, that there be *no interaction between raters concerning their evaluation of the persons or items and the questions*. This is neither a committee nor a "team" effort, but a group acting in concert to provide completely independent opinions.

Determining Consensus – Greater than the Sum of the Parts

Once the questionnaires have been completed, the results are entered into the data processing equipment under rigorous control. Total accuracy is insured by parallel entry and numerous in-process audits. The final values are calculated using the special mathematics of OJQ and OJQ★ (Goal Programming).

OJQ calculates a consensus which most closely matches all of the contributors. The process differs dramatically from conventional processes where either the most votes cast determine the outcome or standard statistics are used. Counting votes gives undue values to the better known alternatives (good or bad) and statistical procedures give undue weight to the rater who disagrees with the mainstream. With OJQ the majority-rule principle is utilized only when there is a disagreement among raters. Otherwise, the principle of consistent logic prevails. If one alternative is chosen or preferred to another and *there is no conflicting information*, it will always appear with a higher score.

The results of the OJQ calculations are printed in high to low ranking and scores (interval scale). These scales may differ to suit the needs of the decision process. They may be in points, dollars, probability values, or whatever is useful. A typical scoring sheet on a point scale can be seen in Figure 2.

In addition to the scores for every criterion, an analysis is printed out as an appendix. It reveals much about the behavior and knowledge of the raters and the reliability of the individual scores.

WRA CORPORATION OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT
TECHNICAL EXEMPT APRIL 84
CRITERION 1 COMMUNICATION SKILLS
OJQ SCORES IN SCORE ORDER

1	A ADAMI	83
2	G KAT	79
3	D DEVINE	77
4	L LAYTON	77
5	E YELLIN	74
6	B CALL	71
7	B WAGE	68
8	T J SCULLY	68
9	D VINEGAR	67
10	D WHOLEY	65
11	M READ	62
12	K TETLEY	61
13	T FINK	61
14	R KAGEN	58
15	R ASHLEY	58
16	Z XAVIER	58
17	M ZUFFALJA	57
18	J RABBIT	55

Figure 2.

It also lists exceptions where individual contributors may disagree substantially with the computed consensus. Termed a "Delphi Analysis," it permits examination of the results to insure that the best possible answers are arrived at and that unique or differing viewpoints may be investigated. Thus, the results will be *even greater than the opinions of even the most knowledgeable expert*. This arises from the fact that all information upon which the experts agree is left intact, but where one rater may have some portion of correct information the others do not have, it is opened to admission.

Putting the Results in a Useful Form

The numerical values obtained for a single criterion may be sufficient to justify a decision. In many cases, though, the values for all of the criteria may be required for a good decision. There are many situations, furthermore, in which simple numeric tables do not communicate the meaning properly. For these reasons, the results of the OJQ process are printed in a variety of ways to achieve effective decision making and better acceptance of results.

The displays of output are essentially limitless and may be tailored to the user's needs. OJQ is designed to print out three standard reports in addition to criteria reports with the Delphi Analysis.* Although these reports are sometimes thought of as the essence of OJQ, they represent only a small sampling of the various ways in which the results can be configured to achieve understanding, acceptance, utility, and profit to the organization.

The first report is the Composite Score. In appearance it resembles the Criteria Scores:

VRA CORPORATION		OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT
TECHNICAL EXEMPT		APRIL 84
COMPOSITE SCORE		
1	A ADAMI	84
2	R TETLEY	75
3	D DEVINE	74
4	G RAT	74
5	E YETMAN	69
6	B CALL	68
7	E LAYTON	67
8	T S SULLY	66
9	E HELLESKOV	60
10	T RINK	62
11	D VINEGAR	62

Figure 3.

Figure 3.

In the simplest form, the Composite Score is the sum of the Criteria Scores divided by the number of criteria. In other cases, the Criteria Scores may be a weighted average of the individual scores. It is sometimes useful to calculate the composite score from various algebraic contributions of the criteria scores. The composite scores can also be calculated with different formulas for different classes of the alternatives or class of alternatives used. One can, for example, rate different job classes together and apply different percentages to the criteria used for the different jobs.

*Credit is acknowledged for assistance in developing the original formats. They were jointly developed with Vince Ceriello, now of VRC Associates, a Wyvern Associate, and his staff at Bank of America where the first major application of OJQ was made in 1971.

The Summary Report is a recapitulation of the criteria scores and composite score. In this form it lends itself to such things as "spread sheet" calculations and incorporation into accounting records or a human resource information system. It may be reported to the user in both hard copy form and upon request as magnetic tape. In some instances it may be transmitted over communication lines to the user's data bank.

The usual form of the Summary Report is:

OJQ SUMMARY		TECHNICAL EXEMPT		APRIL 84	
1	A ADAMI	84			
2	R TETLEY	75			
3	D DEVINE	74			
4	G RAT	74			
5	E YETMAN	69			
6	B CALL	68			
7	E LAYTON	67			
8	T S SULLY	66			
9	E HELLESKOV	60			
10	T RINK	62			
11	D VINEGAR	62			

Figure 4.

Another standard report is the Profile, which shows in easy to comprehend form the relative standing of the alternatives for each of the Criteria and the Composite Scores. While numbers are sometimes more useful, this form is frequently better for communicating with some types of personalities. It has been particularly effective in communicating results to employees *where reviews of personal performance are conducted*. A typical profile appears as:

OJQ PROFILE			
NAME	A BELLOTT		
RATING GROUP	TECHNICAL EXEMPT		
SIZE OF GROUP	40		
RATING DATE	APRIL 84		
CRITERION	PROFILE		RANK
COMMUNICATION SKILLS			
CORRECTNESS OF WORK			
OBJECTIVITY			
PROBLEM SOLVING			
QUALITY OF WORK			
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE			
THOROUGHNESS			
COMPOSITE SCORE			
PREPARED BY	VRA CORPORATION		

Figure 5.

Other Variations — A Flexible Tool

As shown in the appendix, there have been many different applications of OJQ in many different settings. Useful application can be made in almost every situation where a decision must be made.

Formats of printouts and analyses can be arranged to suit the user, sometimes on short notice. Your OJQ representative can show you variations and recommend the formats which will be most useful to you.

OJQ or OJQ★ ?

As OJQ has become more popular, others have tried to copy the process under a number of names. There is confusion among the copiers as to whether OJQ is the scaled-pair, the use of multiple raters or the format of the questionnaires as outputs.

The essence of OJQ is in fact the Goal Programming solution to multiple forced choices. In 1957, T.E. Bartlett, then at Purdue University, developed the method to eliminate bias in job evaluation. It relies on special mathematics to resolve conflicts among multiple raters presented with forced choices.

Initially, the simple pairing was used. Later the scaled-pair was used to reduce the number of pairs that were needed to obtain reliability. Subsequently the OJQ★ format and its "★TRIPS" was introduced to reduce the administration cost and to improve reliability and validity.

The OJQ★ is superior in every respect to OJQ except that some think an explanation of the scaled-pair choice is easier than the ★TRIP. All things considered, the favored format is OJQ★. Over 90% of present users now prefer this format.

Benefits

Among the outstanding benefits of OJQ are the following:

1. Saves managerial time in training and administration.
2. Provides an effective data base for future planning and is easily incorporated into MIS if desired.
3. Gives both a quick snapshot and in-depth analysis.
4. Provides complete documentation and audit trail.
5. Gets maximum participation from specialized information sources without loss of managerial control.
6. Is personality independent — free from biases, prejudices and authority of elite staff.
7. Reduces risk and covers all bases.
8. Enhances and encourages creative thinking.
9. Dramatically reduces legal costs.

About the Wyvern

Wyvern Research Associates was established in 1967. As a group of professionals from widely diverse backgrounds and formal training, the goal of this organization is to bring a multidisciplinary perspective to the solving of organizational problems. This philosophy is symbolized by the mythical WYVERN, an animal equally at home in the water, air and on land. Wyvern Research Associates has had wide experience in a variety of organizational situations.

If you would like to know more

To find out more about OJQ or Wyvern, drop us or one of our Associates near you a line or give us a telephone call. We can send you additional information pertaining to your needs, or someone will call on you only if you request it. You will always be informed in advance if there is a charge for service.

Applications of Objective Judgment Quotient

Over 300 organizations have used OJQ. The following uses are representative of actual OJQ applications:

- Succession planning
- Performance appraisal
- Cost reduction analysis
- Productivity improvement
- Employee and customer attitudes
- Training needs analysis
- Determining best production process
- Selecting best subcontractors
- Determining corporate and departmental goals
- Determining corporate and departmental strategies
- Organizational diagnosis
- Economic forecasting
- Selecting marketing strategies
- Image study of products
- Image study of company
- Subjective probabilities/risk analysis
- Political forecasting

Most of these applications contain proprietary information, but a Wyvern representative will be able to help you develop similar analyses. Better still, they will assist you to improve your own operations easily and efficiently.

Job Evaluation - JEBOR

OJQ was originally developed for job evaluation — establishing internal equity on jobs within an organization. The implementation and enrichment of OJQ took place within other applications. After OJQ had matured sufficiently, Wyvern Research Associates formed JEBOR ("Job Evaluation By Operations Research") which is owned jointly by Wyvern, A.S. Hansen, of Deerfield, Illinois, and A. Charnes and W.W. Cooper, the developers of Goal Programming. While JEBOR makes use of the OJQ★ procedure, it has many other state-of-the-art features which make it clearly the preferred method of evaluating jobs both reliably and validly. Possibly the greatest benefit of JEBOR to the user is the rapid turnaround combined with low administrative costs. JEBOR is growing rapidly and is being used both to replace more expensive systems and to audit existing systems. For information you may contact your nearest Wyvern Associate or A.S. Hansen office.

Representative Clients

Included among the users of OJQ are both small and large organizations. A representative sample includes the following:

- A.E. Staley Manufacturing
- The Aerospace Corporation
- Aid Association for Lutherans
- American Express Company
- American Family Insurance
- American Telephone & Telegraph
- Amfac
- ARCO Chemical Company
- Arizona Public Service
- Austin Industries
- Bancroft Whitney Company
- Bank of America, N.A.
- Bank of Montreal
- The Bank of New York
- Bechtel Corporation
- Bell Northern Research
- Boise Cascade Corporation
- Borg Warner Corporation
- Brunswick (NC) Public Schools
- Burdines
- Burger King Corporation
- The Burke Company
- Burroughs Corporation
- Cal-Farm Insurance Company
- Caterpillar Tractor
- Central Bank of Denver
- Center Companies
- Century Resources
- Charles Schwab & Company
- Charter Manufacturing Company
- Chase Manhattan Bank
- Chemical Bank
- Ciba-Geigy Corporation
- City of Akron, OH
- City of Casper, WY
- City of Greensboro, NC
- City of Oakland, CA
- City of Palo Alto, CA
- City of South Bend, IN
- Club Corporation of America
- Colgate-Palmolive Company
- Comerica, Inc.
- Consolidated Edison
- Copper Range Company
- Crown Trust Company
- Crown Zellerbach
- Defense Logistics Agency
- Demet Engineering
- Denny's
- Dible Management Development Systems
- Diebold, Inc.
- Disneyland
- Disney World
- Dow Chemical Company
- Dresser Industries
- Duke Power Company
- Duquesne Light
- Edison Electric Institute
- Electrolux
- Emanuel Medical Center
- Epton Industries

The Equitable Life Assurance
 Fairchild Control Systems
 Federal Aviation Administration
 Federal Executive Institute
 Federal Mogul Corporation
 First Wisconsin Corporation
 Florida Power and Light Company
 Ford Motor Company
 Foremost Foods Company
 Foremost-McKesson Company
 GA Technologies
 General Electric Company
 General Motors Corporation
 General Telephone of Illinois
 Georgia-Pacific Corporation
 Goldblatt Tool Company
 Gray Drug Fair
 Greensboro (NC) Public Schools
 GTE
 Gulf Canada
 Gulf Oil Company
 H.B. Fuller Company
 H.J. Heinz Corporation
 Herman Miller, Inc.
 Hewlett Packard Company
 History Book Club
 Household International
 Idaho First National Bank
 Industrial Indemnity Company
 International Association of Personnel Women
 International Harvester
 InterNorth
 Interstate Electronics Corporation
 Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company
 Kaiser Steel
 Kirk Paper
 Laventhol & Horwath
 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
 Levi Strauss & Company
 Litel
 Lockheed Aircraft
 Lomas & Nettleton
 Louisiana Land and Exploration
 Lybrand Ross Brothers & Montgomery
 M/ACOM, Inc.
 Management Decisions Systems
 Marin Independent Journal
 Martin Marietta Corporation
 MCI
 Memorial Health Systems
 Merrill Lynch Royal Securities
 Miami-Dade Community College
 Michiana Area CETA Consortium
 Mobile (AL) Mental Health Center
 Monsanto Company
 Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
 National Bank of North America
 Navy Point Mugu, Pacific Missile
 Nestle, Inc.
 Nestle, Puerto Rico
 New York Civil Service
 Nordson Corporation
 Northern Illinois Gas Company
 Northrop Corporation
 Ontario Civil Service Commission
 Ontario Hydro
 Ontario Ministry of Transp. and Comm.
 Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Pacific Lighting Company
 Pacific Stereo
 Phototron
 Portsmouth (VA) Public Schools
 Proctor & Gamble
 Prudential Life Insurance Company
 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
 Raychem Corporation
 Reynolds Metals Company
 Royal Dutch Shell
 Royal Insurance Canada
 Royal Securities
 Rural Insurance
 Ryder Truck
 Scallop Corporation
 Seattle First National Bank
 Sebastiani Vineyards
 Shelburne (VT) Middle School
 Shell Argentina
 Shell Oil Australia
 Shell Oil Puerto Rico
 Sherwin-Williams Company
 South Bend School Corporation
 The Southland Corporation
 Southwest Indiana CETA Consortium
 Spreckel Sugar
 St. Joseph Co. (IN) Job Training Program
 St. Johnsbury Trucking Company
 Stanford Research International
 State Farm Insurance Company
 Sterling Pharmaceutical
 Stouffer's Inc.
 Syncrude Canada Ltd.
 Syntex Corporation
 Syva Corporation
 T.J. Maxx
 Technicare Corporation
 Tektronix, Inc.
 Temple, Barker and Sloane
 Thomas J. Lipton, Inc.
 Touche Ross & Company
 TRW Space & Technology
 T.W. Oil, Inc.
 Union Pacific Railroad
 United Telephone
 U.S. Navy
 UTI Inc.
 Valmont Industries
 Virginia Electric Power Company
 Virginia National Bank
 Waldenwood (WCP)
 Wang Laboratories
 Warner-Lambert
 Warner-Lambert Puerto Rico
 Washington Water Power Company
 Wells Fargo Bank
 Westamerica Bank
 Western Union Telegraph Company
 Westinghouse Electric Company
 Wayne Supply Company
 White Pine Copper Company
 Williams Pipeline
 Woodside Offshore Petroleum
 Xerox Corporation
 Yosemite Insurance
 Zellerbach Paper Company



OJQ

OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT



INSTRUCTIONS FOR OJQ * TRIPS

1. Read the criterion at the top of the page.
2. Keeping in mind the criterion, look at the three factors in the first row.
3. Decide which of the three factors in the first row is in the middle of the three in its contribution to the success of Operation Urgent Fury. Place a "3" in the box to the left of that factor. If two items are of exactly equal importance, place a "3" next to both.
4. Determine which of the remaining factors was more important. If much more, place a "1" in the box to the left. If slightly more, place a "2" in the adjacent box.
5. For the remaining factor: if much less important, place a "5" in the box to the left; if slightly less, place a "4" in the box.
6. Continue with the succeeding rows to the end of the page.

Example:

3	Commun. with civilian population	4	Our weapons	1	Knowl. of size and location, enemy forces
---	-------------------------------------	---	-------------	---	--

Means: "Know. of size & location, enemy forces" is much more important than "Commun. with civilian population," which is slightly more important than "our weapons."

Department of the Army
U. S. Army Research Institute

March 1989

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY
U.S. Army Research Institute
OJQ* - Objective Judgment Quotient - Star Version
Professional Services by PSP

1 MAR 89

010911
3788
Page. 1

1 factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	Our unit's leadership
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	Commun. with other Army units
Our communications equipment	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks
Commun. within our own unit	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	Our ability to identify enemy
Our ability to adjust to conditions	Our weapons	Our ability to use combat skills
Our mental preparation for combat	Commun. with civilian population	Overall operation strategy & tactics
Our transportation equipment	Knowl. of total interservice operation	Our ability to use weapons
Our ability to operate as team	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	Our ability to identify enemy	Our mental preparation for combat
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	Our communications equipment	Commun. with civilian population
Knowl. of total interservice operation	Our weapons	Our ability to use weapons
Commun. with other Army units	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	Our unit's leadership
Our ability to adjust to conditions	Our ability to operate as team	Knowledge of our unit's objectives
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	Commun. within our own unit	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support
Our transportation equipment	Overall operation strategy & tactics	Our ability to use combat skills
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	Our weapons
Our ability to operate as team	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	Our ability to identify enemy
Our communications equipment	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	Our ability to use weapons
Knowl. of total interservice operation	Commun. within our own unit	Commun. with Marine/Commando units
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	Our ability to use combat skills
Commun. with civilian population	Overall operation strategy & tactics	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units
Our unit's leadership	Commun. with other Army units	Our transportation equipment
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	Our mental preparation for combat
Our ability to adjust to conditions	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	Our mental preparation for combat
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks
Knowl. of total interservice operation	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	Commun. with civilian population
Commun. within our own unit	Commun. with other Army units	Our ability to use combat skills
Our ability to adjust to conditions	Our weapons	Knowledge of our unit's objectives
Our ability to operate as team	Our ability to use weapons	Overall operation strategy & tactics
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	Our communications equipment	Our transportation equipment
Our unit's leadership	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	Our ability to identify enemy
Our ability to operate as team	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	Commun. with other Army units
Our weapons	Our transportation equipment	Commun. with Marine/Commando units
Commun. with civilian population	Our ability to use combat skills	Our ability to identify enemy
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	Commun. within our own unit

OJQ*[®] REPORT

U.S. Army Research Institute

prepared for

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

March 1989

Professional Services by:
PSP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY

Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ORGANIZATION UNIT - SEE CODE ->	1	2	3	4
Our ability to operate as team	1	1	2	1
Our unit's leadership	2	3	1	3
Our mental preparation for combat	3	2	4	6
Our ability to use combat skills	4	6	3	2
Our ability to adjust to conditions	5	5	5	8
Our ability to use weapons	6	7	7	4
Commun. within our own unit	7	4	8	5
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	8	8	6	7
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	9	14	9	9
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	10	18	10	10
Our weapons	11	9	18	11
Our communications equipment	12	10	11	18
Overall operation strategy & tactics	13	13	12	14
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	14	12	13	16
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	15	16	14	12
Commun. with other Army units	16	11	19	17
Our ability to identify enemy	17	15	15	19
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	18	20	16	13
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	19	21	17	15
Commun. with civilian population	20	19	20	21
Knowl. of total interservice operation	21	22	21	20
Our transportation equipment	22	17	24	24
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	23	23	23	22
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	24	24	22	25
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	25	25	25	23
⌘				
DONE				

CODE

1. All Respondents
2. 82nd Airborne Soldiers
3. 75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion
4. 75th Ranger Regiment, Second Battalion

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

OJQ (*) SCORES IN ORDER

1. Our ability to operate as team	100
2. Our unit's leadership	97
3. Our mental preparation for combat	89
4. Our ability to use combat skills	89
5. Our ability to adjust to conditions	82
6. Our ability to use weapons	79
7. Commun. within our own unit	79
8. Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
9. Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
10. Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
11. Our weapons	54
12. Our communications equipment	52
13. Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
14. Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
15. Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45
16. Commun. with other Army units	43
17. Our ability to identify enemy	39
18. Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37
19. Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
20. Commun. with civilian population	18
21. Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
22. Our transportation equipment	14
23. Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
24. Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
25. Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 >	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Commun. with other Army units 43 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our communications equipment 52 >>	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Commun. with other Army units 43 <	Commun. with civilian population 18
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our ability to operate as team 100 <<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our unit's leadership 97 <	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to operate as team 100 <	Our communications equipment 52
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 68. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 32 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 13.5% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our transportation equipment 14	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	--	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with other Army units 43	--	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>>>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>>	Our communications equipment 52
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our transportation equipment 14	--	Commun. within our own unit 79
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. within our own unit 79	<	Our communications equipment 52
Our transportation equipment 14	>	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our weapons 54	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our transportation equipment 14	>	Our communications equipment 52

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, 24 were omitted.

Decision index was 55. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 31 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 20.7% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

Omissions are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our transportation equipment 14 >>		Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	--	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>		Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Commun. with civilian population 18 --		Commun. with other Army units 43
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >		Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Our communications equipment 52	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with civilian population 18 >		Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Commun. with civilian population 18 >		Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 68. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 26 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 8.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our communications equipment 52	>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our communications equipment 52	--	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. with other Army units 43	--	Our unit's leadership 97
Our unit's leadership 97	<	Our weapons 54
Our ability to use combat skills 89	--	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with civilian population 18	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Commun. within our own unit 79	--	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to use combat skills 89	--	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our communications equipment 52	--	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our transportation equipment 14	--	Our ability to use weapons 79

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 48. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 35 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 18.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment	14	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37
Commun. with other Army units	43	<<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Our unit's leadership	97	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50	>	Our mental preparation for combat	89
Commun. with civilian population	18	--	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>	Our ability to identify enemy	39
Our ability to use weapons	79	--	Our weapons	54
Our mental preparation for combat	89	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	<<	Our transportation equipment	14
Our ability to adjust to conditions	82	<	Commun. with other Army units	43
Our weapons	54	>	Commun. within our own unit	79
Our ability to identify enemy	39	<	Commun. with civilian population	18
Our ability to identify enemy	39	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Our transportation equipment	14	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37
Knowl. of total interservice operation	16	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	82
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55	<<	Our transportation equipment	14

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 33 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 17.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION. 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with other Army units 43 >	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 <<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our weapons 54 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >>	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <	Commun. with other Army units 43
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Our ability to use combat skills 89 <	Commun. with other Army units 43
Our ability to use combat skills 89 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our transportation equipment 14 >	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 <<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 57. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 37 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 21.6% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION. 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with civilian population 18	>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our ability to use weapons 79	<	Our weapons 54
Commun. with civilian population 18	>>	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Our ability to identify enemy 39	=	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	<<	Our transportation equipment 14

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 69. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 30 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 8.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION. 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	< Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our communications equipment 52 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<< Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our ability to use combat skills 89	< Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. with other Army units 43 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	< Our transportation equipment 14
Our unit's leadership 97	< Commun. with other Army units 43
Our communications equipment 52 >	Our unit's leadership 97
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	< Our communications equipment 52
Our communications equipment 52 >>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<< Our transportation equipment 14
Our weapons 54	< Our transportation equipment 14
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	< Our transportation equipment 14

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 60. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 35 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our communications equipment 52 >		Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. within our own unit 79	<	Our weapons 54
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>		Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 <<<		Our transportation equipment 14
Our weapons 54 >		Our mental preparation for combat 89
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>		Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >		Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >		Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 65. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 24 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 10.8% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	< Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to operate as team 100	< Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	< Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our weapons 54 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with other Army units 43	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	< Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Our unit's leadership 97	<< Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Commun. with other Army units 43
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >	Commun. within our own unit 79
Commun. within our own unit 79	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our transportation equipment 14 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. with other Army units 43	< Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<< Our transportation equipment 14

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 57. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 37 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 17.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our communications equipment 52 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to operate as team 100 <<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Our ability to identify enemy 39 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >	Commun. within our own unit 79
Commun. within our own unit 79 <<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Our ability to use weapons 79 <	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with other Army units 43 <<	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with other Army units 43 <	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <	Our weapons 54
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 >>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our mental preparation for combat 89 <	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Our transportation equipment 14

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 57. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 43 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 18.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with civilian population	18	>	Our ability to operate as team	100
Our communications equipment	52	>>>	Our unit's leadership	97
Our ability to identify enemy	39	>>	Our unit's leadership	97
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55	=	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8	=	Our weapons	54
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	=	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our weapons	54	>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Commun. with civilian population	18	=	Our ability to operate as team	100
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	=	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Knowl. of total interservice operation	16	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Our communications equipment	52	>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our unit's leadership	97	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50	>>	Our unit's leadership	97
Our unit's leadership	97	<	Our transportation equipment	14
Our ability to adjust to conditions	82	<	Our weapons	54
Our ability to use weapons	79	>	Our ability to operate as team	100
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	<<<	Commun. with civilian population	18
Commun. with civilian population	18	>>>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
Commun. with civilian population	18	>	Our ability to use weapons	79

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 43 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 18.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use combat skills 89	<<	Our transportation equipment 14	
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<<<	Our transportation equipment 14	
Our communications equipment 52	>	Our unit's leadership 97	
Our ability to identify enemy 39	>>	Our unit's leadership 97	
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	=	Our weapons 54	
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	=	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	
Our weapons 54	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	
Commun. with civilian population 18	=	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<<	Our transportation equipment 14	
Our communications equipment 52	=	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	
Our communications equipment 52	<<	Our transportation equipment 14	
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<<	Our transportation equipment 14	
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	
Our unit's leadership 97	<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	
Our ability to use weapons 79	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	<<<	Our transportation equipment 14	
Our unit's leadership 97	<<	Our transportation equipment 14	
Commun. with other Army units 43	=	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Our ability to use weapons 79	>	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<<<	Commun. with civilian population 18	
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	
Our communications equipment 52	=	Our mental preparation for combat 89	
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Our ability to use weapons 79	
Our ability to use weapons 79	<<	Our transportation equipment 14	
Our weapons 54	=	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>	Our communications equipment 52	
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	=	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 54 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 27.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0 >	Commun. with other Army units	43
Our communications equipment	52 >>	Our unit's leadership	97
Our ability to identify enemy	39 >	Our unit's leadership	97
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	82
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50 >>>	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37 >	Our ability to operate as team	100
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0 >	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Knowl. of total interservice operation	16 >>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Our ability to identify enemy	39 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our ability to identify enemy	39 <	Our transportation equipment	14
Our communications equipment	52 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76 <	Our transportation equipment	14
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50 <<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0 >	Our ability to operate as team	100
Commun. with other Army units	43 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions	82
Commun. within our own unit	79 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37
Our ability to adjust to conditions	82 <	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Knowl. of total interservice operation	16 >>	Our weapons	54
Commun. with other Army units	43 >	Our ability to use weapons	79
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our communications equipment	52 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Our ability to use weapons	79 <	Our transportation equipment	14
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0 >	Our weapons	54
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47 <	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 43 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 23.4% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our mental preparation for combat 89	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	=	Commun. with other Army units 43
Our communications equipment 52	=	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37	>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	=	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	=	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Commun. with other Army units 43	=	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our weapons 54	=	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Commun. within our own unit 79
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	=	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	=	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	=	Commun. with civilian population 18
Our ability to use combat skills 89	=	Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to use combat skills 89	=	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our mental preparation for combat 89	=	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Our mental preparation for combat 89	=	Our communications equipment 52
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Commun. with other Army units 43
Our ability to identify enemy 39	=	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to operate as team 100	=	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 39. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 48 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 28.8% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our unit's leadership 97	--	Our communications equipment 52
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Our weapons 54
Our transportation equipment 14	--	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to identify enemy 39	--	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our weapons 54	--	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our unit's leadership 97	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our unit's leadership 97	--	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our transportation equipment 14	>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our communications equipment 52	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	--	Commun. with civilian population 18
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	--	Our weapons 54
Our transportation equipment 14	>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	--	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37	--	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	--	Our communications equipment 52
Commun. with civilian population 18	--	Commun. with other Army units 43
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 39. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 49 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 24.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 ==	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 ==	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our unit's leadership 97 ==	Our communications equipment 52
Our communications equipment 52 ==	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 ==	Our weapons 54
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 ==	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our transportation equipment 14 >	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our ability to operate as team 100 ==	Commun. with other Army units 43
Our ability to operate as team 100 <	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. with civilian population 18 ==	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 ==	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with other Army units 43 >>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to identify enemy 39 ==	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 ==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 <<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our weapons 54 ==	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our weapons 54 ==	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our ability to operate as team 100 ==	Commun. within our own unit 79
Commun. with civilian population 18 ==	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 ==	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 ==	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 <<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 ==	Our communications equipment 52
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 <<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our transportation equipment 14 ==	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with other Army units 43 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our communications equipment 52 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 <	Commun. with civilian population 18
Our ability to operate as team 100 <	Our weapons 54
Our transportation equipment 14 >>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our ability to use combat skills 89 <	Our communications equipment 52
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Commun. with civilian population 18
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 ==	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to use combat skills 89 ==	Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to use weapons 79 ==	Our transportation equipment 14

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 58. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 62 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 36.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with other Army units 43 >>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 <	Our transportation equipment 14
Our weapons 54 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our weapons 54 >>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our mental preparation for combat 89 <	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our mental preparation for combat 89 <<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 ==	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our unit's leadership 97 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Our communications equipment 52
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 <	Our transportation equipment 14
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our transportation equipment 14 >>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 ==	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Commun. with other Army units 43 ==	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our communications equipment 52 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 <<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >	Our weapons 54
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >>	Our weapons 54
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Our weapons 54
Our transportation equipment 14 ==	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 <<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 ==	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our ability to use combat skills 89 <<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our ability to use combat skills 89 ==	Our communications equipment 52
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >>	Our communications equipment 52
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>	Commun. with other Army units 43
Our unit's leadership 97 <	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 >	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 ==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 <<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our ability to use combat skills 89 <	Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to use weapons 79 <<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our unit's leadership 97 <<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our weapons 54 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 49. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 65 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 45.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	< Our weapons 54
Our mental preparation for combat 89	< Commun. with civilian population 18
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<< Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our ability to operate as team100	<< Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Our ability to operate as team100	< Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our communications equipment 52 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	< Commun. with civilian population 18
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	< Our weapons 54
Our ability to operate as team100	< Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to operate as team100	< Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our ability to use weapons 79	== Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Our ability to operate as team100	< Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our ability to operate as team100	<< Commun. with other Army units 43
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Our ability to identify enemy 39

Rater 1 was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 59. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 32 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 19.8% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	>	Our unit's leadership 97
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Commun. with other Army units 43
Commun. within our own unit 79	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>>	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	--	Our weapons 54
Our weapons 54	--	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with civilian population 18	--	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our transportation equipment 14	--	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	--	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	--	Our communications equipment 52
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	--	Our weapons 54
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	--	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our weapons 54	--	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with other Army units 43	--	Our unit's leadership 97
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. within our own unit 79	--	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	--	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	--	Our weapons 54
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our communications equipment 52	>>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	--	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	--	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our unit's leadership 97	--	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with other Army units 43	<<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	--	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with other Army units 43	--	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our ability to use weapons 79	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Our ability to identify enemy 39

Rater I was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 39. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 52 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 33.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Commun. with other Army units 43
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	==	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our weapons 54	>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	>>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our ability to identify enemy 39	>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>	Our weapons 54
Commun. with other Army units 43	>>	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	>	Our unit's leadership 97
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our transportation equipment 14	==	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our transportation equipment 14	==	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	==	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	==	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Our ability to operate as team 100	==	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to operate as team 100	==	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	==	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with other Army units 43	==	Our transportation equipment 14
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	==	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	==	Our weapons 54
Our ability to use weapons 79	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our unit's leadership 97	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our unit's leadership 97	==	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to operate as team 100	==	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our ability to operate as team 100	==	Commun. with other Army units 43
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	>	Commun. within our own unit 79

Rater 1 was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 43. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 40 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 24.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 14 >>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 <<	Our transportation equipment 14
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 <	Our transportation equipment 14
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 ==	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our ability to use weapons 79 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 <<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our transportation equipment 14 >>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our ability to use combat skills 89 <	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 55. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 28 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 13.5% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with other Army units 43	==	Commun. within our own unit 79	
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Our communications equipment 52	
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	>>>	Our ability to use combat skills 89	
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	==	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	==	Our mental preparation for combat 89	
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	==	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	
Our weapons 54	==	Commun. with civilian population 18	
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<<	Commun. with other Army units 43	
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	
Our ability to use weapons 79	==	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	==	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Our unit's leadership 97	==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	
Our unit's leadership 97	==	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	==	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	
Our ability to use weapons 79	==	Our ability to identify enemy 39	
Our mental preparation for combat 89	==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	>	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Our ability to use combat skills 89	==	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	>	Our unit's leadership 97	
Commun. with civilian population 18	==	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	
Our communications equipment 52	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	==	Our ability to use weapons 79	
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	==	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	==	Commun. with other Army units 43	
Our ability to use combat skills 89	==	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	
Our ability to identify enemy 39	==	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 44. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 48 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 27.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our communications equipment	52	--	Commun. within our own unit	79
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	<	Commun. with civilian population	18
Our unit's leadership	97	<<	Our weapons	54
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our ability to use combat skills	89	--	Our ability to identify enemy	39
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	<<	Our transportation equipment	14
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76	<	Our transportation equipment	14
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Our mental preparation for combat	89	--	Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Our ability to adjust to conditions	82	--	Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Commun. with civilian population	18	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
Our ability to use weapons	79	--	Our ability to operate as team	100
Our communications equipment	52	--	Our ability to adjust to conditions	82
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Commun. with civilian population	18	--	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45
Commun. with civilian population	18	--	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35	--	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 49. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 30 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 18.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our ability to operate as team 100	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our weapons 54	>	Our ability to use combat skills 89

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 21 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 6.3% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 14 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. within our own unit 79 <<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >>>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our ability to identify enemy 39 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 <<	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Our communications equipment 52
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our transportation equipment 14 >>	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our ability to identify enemy 39 <<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with other Army units 43 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 78. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 32 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 15.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our communications equipment 52	>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37	--	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	--	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	--	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our weapons 54	>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with other Army units 43	--	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our weapons 54	--	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	--	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Our unit's leadership 97	--	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. within our own unit 79	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	--	Commun. with other Army units 43
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Commun. within our own unit 79	--	Our transportation equipment 14
Our transportation equipment 14	--	Our ability to use weapons 79

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 40. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 34 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Our weapons 54
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >>>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our transportation equipment 14 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. within our own unit 79 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >>	Our communications equipment 52
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our ability to use weapons 79 <	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our weapons 54 ==	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our ability to use weapons 79 <	Our transportation equipment 14
Our transportation equipment 14 >>	Our communications equipment 52
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our unit's leadership 97 <	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <	Commun. with civilian population 18
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our unit's leadership 97 <	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 32 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 18.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with other Army units	43	--	Commun. within our own unit	79
Our communications equipment	52	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55	--	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Our weapons	54	--	Our ability to use weapons	79
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	--	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8	--	Our ability to identify enemy	39
Our ability to identify enemy	39	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Commun. within our own unit	79	--	Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Our ability to adjust to conditions	82	--	Our weapons	54
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8	--	Our ability to identify enemy	39
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37	--	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Commun. with civilian population	18	--	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	--	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	--	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	--	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	--	Our transportation equipment	14

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 29. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 42 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 17.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our weapons 54	<<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	=	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. within our own unit 79	=	Our communications equipment 52
Our communications equipment 52	>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our ability to use weapons 79	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Commun. within our own unit 79
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	=	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our unit's leadership 97	<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 56. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 34 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 >>	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 <<	Commun. with other Army units 43
Commun. within our own unit 79 >	< Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our mental preparation for combat 89 <<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our ability to operate as team 100 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >>	Our weapons 54
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to operate as team 100 <	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >	Our weapons 54
Our ability to operate as team 100 <<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to operate as team 100 <	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our ability to operate as team 100 ==	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to operate as team 100 <<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our ability to use weapons 79 <<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 ==	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Our communications equipment 52 ==	Our transportation equipment 14
Our unit's leadership 97 ==	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our unit's leadership 97 <<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to use combat skills 89 ==	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >	Commun. within our own unit 79

Rater I was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 52. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 44 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 25.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	< Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	< Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. within our own unit 79	< Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	< Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our communications equipment 52 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our transportation equipment 14 >	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 21 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 7.2% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to identify enemy 39 >> Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 > Our weapons 54

Rater II was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 70. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 12 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 1.8% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our mental preparation for combat 89	<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >		Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our communications equipment 52 >		Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >		Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >		Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Commun. with civilian population 18 ==		Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 ==		Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >>		Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Commun. within our own unit 79
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >		Commun. with other Army units 43
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18 >		Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>		Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our ability to identify enemy 39 ==		Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 ==		Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>		Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 53. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 38 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 19.8% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to operate as team	100	< Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our mental preparation for combat	89	< Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	> Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Our mental preparation for combat	89	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Our ability to adjust to conditions	82	< Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8	> Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Our ability to use weapons	79	< Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35	< Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Commun. within our own unit	79	< Our ability to identify enemy	39

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 51. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 23 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 8.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Our ability to identify enemy	39	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our ability to identify enemy	39	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45
Our weapons	54	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Commun. within our own unit	79	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
Commun. within our own unit	79	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50	>	Our ability to use weapons	79
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 26 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 == Our weapons 54
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 == Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our ability to identify enemy 39 < Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to identify enemy 39 < Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Commun. with civilian population 18 > Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 == Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 52. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 27 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 5.4% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use weapons	79	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Commun. with civilian population	18	>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Commun. with civilian population	18	>	Commun. with other Army units	43
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8	=	Our ability to identify enemy	39
Our ability to identify enemy	39	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55	>	Commun. within our own unit	79
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	=	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8	>	Our ability to identify enemy	39
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	=	Our ability to use weapons	79
Commun. with civilian population	18	>	Our ability to use weapons	79

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 55. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 20 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 >	Commun. within our own unit 79
Commun. within our own unit 79 <<	Our communications equipment 52
Our ability to identify enemy 39 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our transportation equipment 14 >	Commun. with other Army units 43
Our ability to use weapons 79 <	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our weapons 54 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our weapons 54 >>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Commun. with other Army units 43 <	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our weapons 54 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Our weapons 54 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Our unit's leadership 97 <	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. within our own unit 79 <	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Our ability to operate as team 100 <	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Commun. within our own unit 79 <	Our transportation equipment 14
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >>	Commun. with other Army units 43

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 35 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 19.8% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use combat skills 89	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our communications equipment 52	>	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>>	Our weapons 54
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Our weapons 54
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our unit's leadership 97	<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our ability to identify enemy 39	>>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our ability to use weapons 79	<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>	Our unit's leadership 97
Commun. within our own unit 79	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Our ability to use combat skills 89	<<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>>	Our weapons 54
Commun. with other Army units 43	>>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with other Army units 43	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our communications equipment 52	>>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with civilian population 18	>>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our ability to use weapons 79	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Our weapons 54
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	>>>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>>	Our communications equipment 52
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 55. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 60 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 34.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. within our own unit 79 <<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Commun. with other Army units 43
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Commun. with other Army units 43 <	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our mental preparation for combat 89 <<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37 >>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Commun. within our own unit 79 <	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 68. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 34 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use weapons 79 >>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to identify enemy 39 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our mental preparation for combat 89	< Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our mental preparation for combat 89 <<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	< Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Our weapons 54 >	Commun. within our own unit 79
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Our transportation equipment 14 >	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	< Our transportation equipment 14

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 65. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 30 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 14.4% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Overall operation strategy & tactics	50	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Our ability to identify enemy	39	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	>	Our ability to use weapons	79
Our communications equipment	52	>	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37	>>>	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Our ability to identify enemy	39	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45
Our weapons	54	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Commun. with other Army units	43	>	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Our ability to operate as team	100	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
Commun. within our own unit	79	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	=	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	=	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Knowl. of total interservice operation	16	=	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Our weapons	54	<	Our transportation equipment	14

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 41 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use weapons	79	>	Our ability to operate as team	100	
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50	<	Commun. with civilian population	18	
Commun. with other Army units	43	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.		8
Our weapons	54	>	Commun. within our own unit	79	
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.		8

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 66. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 22 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 4.5% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<< Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18	> Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	< Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 71. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 22 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 2.7% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with civilian population 18	>>>	Our weapons 54
Commun. with civilian population 18	>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>>>	Our ability to use weapons 79
Our transportation equipment 14	>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our transportation equipment 14	>	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	>>>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to operate as team 100	<<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. within our own unit 79	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37	>>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55	>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with other Army units 43	>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Commun. with other Army units 43	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>>>	Our communications equipment 52
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	>>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our ability to use weapons 79	<<<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	<<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	>>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. with civilian population 18	>>>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	>>	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Our communications equipment 52
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>>	Our unit's leadership 97
Our communications equipment 52	>	Our unit's leadership 97
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8	>>>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with civilian population 18	>>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our transportation equipment 14	>>>	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our weapons 54	<<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Commun. within our own unit 79	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Commun. within our own unit 79	<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop 8
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our ability to use weapons 79	<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to use weapons 79	<	Our communications equipment 52
Our transportation equipment 14	>	Our communications equipment 52
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with other Army units 43	<<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with civilian population 18	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our ability to operate as team 100	<<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our unit's leadership 97	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to operate as team 100	<<	Our communications equipment 52
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<<<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with civilian population 18	>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Commun. with other Army units 43	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our unit's leadership 97	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 66. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 68 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 49.5% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

1 MAR 89

U.S. Army Research Institute

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62 >>	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our unit's leadership	97 <<<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our communications equipment	52 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Commun. within our own unit	79 ==	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our mental preparation for combat	89 ==	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 74. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 21 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 5.4% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our mental preparation for combat 89	< Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Our ability to operate as team 100	< Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	< Our ability to identify enemy 39
Commun. with other Army units 43	< Our transportation equipment 14
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	< Our transportation equipment 14

Rater I was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 69. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 21 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 5.4% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our unit's leadership 97	<	Our communications equipment 52
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Our weapons 54
Our weapons 54	>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our unit's leadership 97	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	--	Our communications equipment 52
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37	--	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	--	Our communications equipment 52
Our unit's leadership 97	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	>>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our ability to use combat skills 89	--	Our transportation equipment 14

Rater II was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision Index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 29 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)
 U.S. Army Research Institute
 (All Respondents)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
 ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 >>>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Commun. with other Army units 43 >>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45 >	Our mental preparation for combat 89
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	< Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to use combat skills 89	< Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Our ability to use weapons 79 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. within our own unit 79 <<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Our unit's leadership 97 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our mental preparation for combat 89 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to use combat skills 89 <<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62 >>	Our unit's leadership 97
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>	Our communications equipment 52
Commun. with civilian population 18 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to use combat skills 89	< Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Commun. within our own unit 79	< Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our ability to identify enemy 39	< Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 62. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 38 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 22.5% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37
Commun. with other Army units	43	=	Our unit's leadership	97
Commun. with other Army units	43	=	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Our unit's leadership	97	=	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Our ability to use weapons	79	>	Our ability to operate as team	100
Our ability to operate as team	100	=	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Commun. within our own unit	79	=	Our ability to identify enemy	39
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	82
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50	=	Our mental preparation for combat	89
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>	Our weapons	54
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	=	Our communications equipment	52
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	=	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55	>	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Our ability to operate as team	100	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45
Our ability to operate as team	100	=	Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	=	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Our weapons	54	>	Our ability to use weapons	79
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55	>	Our ability to use weapons	79
Commun. with other Army units	43	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Our mental preparation for combat	89	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Our ability to adjust to conditions	82	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37	=	Our unit's leadership	97
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55	>	Our unit's leadership	97
Our ability to use combat skills	89	<	Our weapons	54
Our ability to use weapons	79	<	Our weapons	54
Our mental preparation for combat	89	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Our mental preparation for combat	89	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics	50
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	>	Our ability to operate as team	100
Knowl. of total interservice operation	16	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	82
Our ability to adjust to conditions	82	<	Commun. with other Army units	43
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Our ability to use weapons	79	<	Our weapons	54
Our ability to use combat skills	89	<	Commun. with other Army units	43
Our ability to use combat skills	89	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	55
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35	=	Our ability to operate as team	100
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	>	Our mental preparation for combat	89
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	>	Our mental preparation for combat	89
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76	=	Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
Knowl. of total interservice operation	16	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	82
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	=	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our communications equipment	52	=	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our ability to operate as team	100	=	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45
Our ability to operate as team	100	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8
Our ability to use weapons	79	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our ability to use weapons	79	=	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	35

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 45. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 67 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 42.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

"Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Our communications equipment 52
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35 >	Our ability to use weapons 79
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Our communications equipment 52

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 80. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 18 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 3.6% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Our weapons 54 >		Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>		Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<	Our ability to identify enemy 39
Our communications equipment 52 <<		Commun. with civilian population 18
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >		Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >		Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>		Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Our weapons 54 >		Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >		Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 55
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 8 >>>		Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with civilian population 18 >		Our ability to use combat skills 89
Commun. with civilian population 18 >>		Our ability to identify enemy 39

Rater 1 was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 78. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 30 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 13.5% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our unit's leadership 97	<<	Our communications equipment 52
Our communications equipment 52 >		Our ability to operate as team 100
Overall operation strategy & tactics 50	<	Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >		Commun. with other Army units 43
Our ability to identify enemy 39	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our communications equipment 52 >		Our ability to use combat skills 89
Our transportation equipment 14 >		Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. with other Army units 43	<<	Our transportation equipment 14
Commun. with other Army units 43	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >		Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 30 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 11.7% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics 50
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	< Our transportation equipment 14
Our ability to use weapons 79	< Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62	>>> Our mental preparation for combat 89
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	> Our communications equipment 52
Our mental preparation for combat 89	< Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our transportation equipment 14	> Our communications equipment 52
Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics 50

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 74. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 23 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 7.2% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to identify enemy	39	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our ability to identify enemy	39	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62	<<<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	37
Our mental preparation for combat	89	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 86. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 23 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 3.6% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to adjust to conditions 82	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37	>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 62
Our weapons 54	>>>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our weapons 54	>>	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Commun. within our own unit 79
Our weapons 54	>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Our weapons 54	>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Our mental preparation for combat 89	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 37
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>>	Commun. with other Army units 43
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Commun. with other Army units 43

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 74. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 25 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our weapons 54	<	Commun. with civilian population 18
Our unit's leadership 97	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35
Our unit's leadership 97	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 45
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our unit's leadership 97	<	Our communications equipment 52
Our ability to use weapons 79	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our communications equipment 52	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 35	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our communications equipment 52	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 82

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 27 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0 >	Commun. with other Army units	43
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8 >	Our weapons	54
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50 >	Our ability to use combat skills	89
Overall operation strategy & tactics	50 >>	Our unit's leadership	97
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	62 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 74. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 21 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 4.5% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY MEASURES

ARITHMETIC MEAN OF RATEE SCORES: 50

STANDARD DEVIATION: 29.6883

AVERAGE VARIABILITY OF ALL RATEES: 1

Name	Score	Stability	# Times Presented	# Times Omitted	# Times Scored
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	61	1	496	2	494
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	1	518	2	516
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	8	1	532	0	532
Knowl. of total interservice operation	15	1	506	0	506
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76	0	518	4	514
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	34	1	532	0	532
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	54	1	530	0	530
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	45	1	530	0	530
Commun. within our own unit	78	1	518	0	518
Commun. with other Army units	42	1	520	2	518
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	9	1	506	2	504
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	36	1	506	4	502
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	1	578	2	576
Commun. with civilian population	17	1	534	4	530
Our weapons	53	1	522	0	522
Our communications equipment	51	1	532	2	530
Our transportation equipment	13	1	558	0	558
Our mental preparation for combat	88	1	506	2	504
Our ability to use combat skills	88	1	554	4	550
Our ability to operate as team	100	1	544	4	540
Our ability to use weapons	78	1	532	0	532
Our ability to adjust to conditions	81	1	494	4	490
Our ability to identify enemy	39	1	518	4	514
Our unit's leadership	96	1	508	2	506
Overall operation strategy & tactics	49	1	506	4	502

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(All Respondents)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

RATER DECISION RECAPITULATION:

RATER NAME	Pr/equiv. Presented	Pr/equiv. Omitted	Decision Index	% Major Inconsistencies
A	111	0	68	13.5
A	111	24	55	20.7
B	111	0	68	8.1
B	111	0	48	18.0
C	111	0	64	17.1
C	111	0	57	21.6
C	111	0	69	8.1
D	111	0	60	16.2
D	111	0	65	10.8
E	111	0	57	17.1
E	111	0	57	18.0
F	111	0	64	18.9
F	111	0	50	27.9
F	111	0	50	23.4
G	111	0	39	28.8
H	111	0	39	24.3
H	111	0	58	36.0
H	111	0	49	45.0
I	111	0	59	19.8
I	111	0	39	33.3
I	111	0	43	24.3
J	111	0	55	13.5
J	111	0	44	27.9
B	111	0	49	18.9
D	111	0	64	6.3
A	111	0	78	15.3
G	111	0	40	16.2
A	111	0	50	18.0
E	111	0	29	17.1
G	111	0	56	16.2
I	111	0	52	25.2
J	111	0	50	7.2
H	111	0	70	1.8
G	111	0	53	19.8
B	111	0	51	8.1
D	111	0	50	9.0
F	111	0	52	5.4
E	111	0	55	9.9
G	111	0	50	19.8
F	111	0	55	34.2
E	111	0	68	9.9
C	111	0	65	14.4
D	111	0	64	16.2
C	111	0	66	4.5
B	111	0	71	2.7
A	111	0	66	49.5
J	111	0	74	5.4
I	111	0	69	5.4
H	111	0	64	9.9
J	111	0	62	22.5
C	111	0	45	42.3
H	111	0	80	3.6
I	111	0	78	13.5
E	111	0	64	11.7
A	111	0	74	7.2
O	111	0	86	3.6
G	111	0	74	9.0
B	111	0	50	9.0
F	111	0	74	4.5

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

OJQ (*) SCORES IN ORDER

1. Our ability to operate as team	100
2. Our mental preparation for combat	95
3. Our unit's leadership	92
4. Commun. within our own unit	85
5. Our ability to adjust to conditions	81
6. Our ability to use combat skills	81
7. Our ability to use weapons	80
8. Knowledge of our unit's objectives	74
9. Our weapons	70
10. Our communications equipment	65
11. Commun. with other Army units	62
12. Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	52
13. Overall operation strategy & tactics	51
14. Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	48
15. Our ability to identify enemy	47
16. Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	41
17. Our transportation equipment	40
18. Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	39
19. Commun. with civilian population	30
20. Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	27
21. Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	26
22. Knowl. of total interservice operation	21
23. Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	21
24. Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	18
25. Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION. 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	>	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Commun. with other Army units 62	>	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	>	Commun. with other Army units 62
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Our communications equipment 65	>>	Our unit's leadership 92
Commun. with other Army units 62	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Commun. with other Army units 62	<	Commun. with civilian population 30
Our ability to operate as team 100	<<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Our communications equipment 65
Commun. with civilian population 30	>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 68. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 37 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 11.7% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION. 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 40	==	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	==	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Commun. with other Army units 62	==	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	>>>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	>>	Our communications equipment 65
Our ability to identify enemy 47	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	>	Commun. with other Army units 62
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	>	Commun. within our own unit 85
Our transportation equipment 40	==	Commun. within our own unit 85
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our weapons 70	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	>>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Our transportation equipment 40	>	Our communications equipment 65

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, 24 were omitted.

Decision index was 55. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 26 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 17.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

Omissions are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 == Our ability to identify enemy 47
Commun. with civilian population 30 == Commun. with other Army units 62
Our communications equipment 65 < Our transportation equipment 40
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 > Commun. with other Army units 62

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 68. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 22 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 3.6% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to operate as team	100	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	74
Commun. with other Army units	62	--	Our unit's leadership	92
Our unit's leadership	92	<	Our weapons	70
Our ability to adjust to conditions	81	<	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	48
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	39	>	Our communications equipment	65
Our ability to use combat skills	81	--	Our ability to identify enemy	47
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	48	>	Commun. within our own unit	85
Our ability to adjust to conditions	81	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics	51
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	39
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Overall operation strategy & tactics	51
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	74	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	26
Commun. within our own unit	85	--	Our ability to identify enemy	47
Our ability to use combat skills	81	--	Knowl. of total interservice operation	21
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	74	<	Our transportation equipment	40
Our transportation equipment	40	--	Our ability to use weapons	80

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 48. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 34 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 13.5% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 40	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	27
Commun. with other Army units 62	<<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	21
Our unit's leadership 92	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	21
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	>	Our mental preparation for combat	95
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	>	Our ability to identify enemy	47
Our mental preparation for combat 95	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics	51
Our ability to identify enemy 47	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with civilian population 30	=	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	81
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	<<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	27

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 26 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

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CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with other Army units 62 <	Our unit's leadership 92
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >>>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 <<	Commun. with civilian population 30
Commun. with civilian population 30 >	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Our weapons 70 <	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 >>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Our unit's leadership 92
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 >	Our unit's leadership 92
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to use combat skills 81 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Commun. with other Army units 62 <	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Our transportation equipment 40 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 >	Our communications equipment 65
Our communications equipment 65 <	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 57. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 42 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 18.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 40	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	>	Our ability to use combat skills	81
Commun. with other Army units 62	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	27
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	>	Our ability to identify enemy	47
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	>	Our communications equipment	65
Our transportation equipment 40	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	18
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	>	Our communications equipment	65

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 69. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 27 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 6.3% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Our ability to identify enemy 47 >		Knowledge of our unit's objectives	74
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >		Our ability to use weapons	80
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	52
Our ability to use combat skills 81	<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	52
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 >		Our ability to operate as team	100
Our ability to identify enemy 47	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	26
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >>		Our ability to use weapons	80
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >		Our ability to use weapons	80
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	<	Our transportation equipment	40
Our unit's leadership 92	<	Commun. with other Army units	62
Our communications equipment 65 >		Our unit's leadership	92
Our communications equipment 65 >>		Our ability to operate as team	100
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >>		Our ability to use combat skills	81
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 >		Our ability to use combat skills	81
Our weapons 70	<	Our transportation equipment	40
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >>		Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	21

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 60. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 30 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 15.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use combat skills 81	<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Our weapons 70	>	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 65. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 16 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 2.7% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 >	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	< Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Our ability to operate as team 100	< Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 >>	Commun. with other Army units 62
Commun. with other Army units 62	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >	Our unit's leadership 92
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	< Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Our unit's leadership 92	<< Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Commun. with civilian population 30 >	Commun. with other Army units 62
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 >	Commun. within our own unit 85
Commun. within our own unit 85	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Our transportation equipment 40 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Commun. with other Army units 62	< Our transportation equipment 40
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 57. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 31 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 14.4% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

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(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 40	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 >		Our ability to use combat skills 81
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 >>		Our weapons 70
Our weapons 70	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Our communications equipment 65 >		Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to operate as team 100	<<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 >		Commun. with other Army units 62
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Our ability to identify enemy 47	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 >		Commun. within our own unit 85
Commun. within our own unit 85	<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Our weapons 70	<<<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >		Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Our mental preparation for combat 95	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our ability to use weapons 80	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Commun. with other Army units 62	<<	Our transportation equipment 40
Commun. with other Army units 62	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our weapons 70	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 >>		Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 >		Our ability to use combat skills 81
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >		Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	=	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >		Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >		Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Our mental preparation for combat 95	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 57. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 45 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 24.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with civilian population 30	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our communications equipment 65	>>>	Our unit's leadership 92
Our ability to identify enemy 47	>>	Our unit's leadership 92
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	=	Our weapons 70
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	=	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	=	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Commun. with civilian population 30	=	Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	=	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Our unit's leadership 92	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	>>	Our unit's leadership 92
Our unit's leadership 92	<	Our transportation equipment 40
Our ability to use weapons 80	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to identify enemy 47	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. with civilian population 30	>	Our ability to use weapons 80

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 37 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use combat skills 81	<<	Our transportation equipment 40
Our communications equipment 65	>	Our unit's leadership 92
Our ability to identify enemy 47	>>	Our unit's leadership 92
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	=	Our weapons 70
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	=	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	=	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Our weapons 70	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Commun. with civilian population 30	=	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our communications equipment 65	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our communications equipment 65	<<	Our transportation equipment 40
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	<<	Our transportation equipment 40
Our ability to use combat skills 81	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Our unit's leadership 92	<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Our ability to identify enemy 47	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Our ability to use weapons 80	=	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Our unit's leadership 92	<<	Our transportation equipment 40
Commun. with other Army units 62	=	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to use weapons 80	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our communications equipment 65	=	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Commun. with civilian population 30	>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our ability to use weapons 80	<<	Our transportation equipment 40
Our weapons 70	=	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	>	Our communications equipment 65
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	=	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our communications equipment 65	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 49 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 24.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Commun. with other Army units 62
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Commun. with other Army units 62
Our communications equipment 65 >>	Our unit's leadership 92
Our ability to identify enemy 47 >	Our unit's leadership 92
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 >>>	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 >>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Our ability to identify enemy 47 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with other Army units 62 <	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Commun. with other Army units 62 <<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74 <	Our transportation equipment 40
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 <<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 ==	Our weapons 70
Commun. within our own unit 85 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81 <	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 >>	Our weapons 70
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our ability to identify enemy 47 <	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Our communications equipment 65 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our ability to use weapons 80 <	Our transportation equipment 40
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Our weapons 70
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 <	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21

Rater f was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 47 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 23.4% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >>	Our weapons 70
Our mental preparation for combat 95 <<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our ability to identify enemy 47 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 >	Our transportation equipment 40
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 >>	Commun. with other Army units 62
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Commun. with other Army units 62 >>	Our unit's leadership 92
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26 >	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our weapons 70 >>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >>	Our unit's leadership 92
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >>	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Commun. with civilian population 30
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Our communications equipment 65
Our ability to use combat skills 81 >>	Our transportation equipment 40
Our ability to use combat skills 81 >>	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our transportation equipment 40 >>	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our mental preparation for combat 95 >>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Our mental preparation for combat 95 >>	Our communications equipment 65
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Our communications equipment 65
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >>	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >	Commun. with other Army units 62
Our ability to identify enemy 47 >>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to operate as team 100 >>	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 39. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 53 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 27.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
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1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our unit's leadership 92	--	Our communications equipment 65
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our transportation equipment 40	--	Commun. within our own unit 85
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Commun. with civilian population 30	>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our ability to identify enemy 47	--	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our unit's leadership 92	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Our unit's leadership 92	--	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Our transportation equipment 40	>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	--	Commun. with civilian population 30
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	--	Our weapons 70
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	--	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27	--	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	--	Our communications equipment 65
Commun. with civilian population 30	--	Commun. with other Army units 62
Our mental preparation for combat 95	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Our weapons 70	--	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 39. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 43 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 20.7% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 --	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 --	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26 --	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Our unit's leadership 92 --	Our communications equipment 65
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 --	Commun. within our own unit 85
Our transportation equipment 40 >	Commun. within our own unit 85
Our ability to operate as team 100 --	Commun. with other Army units 62
Our ability to operate as team 100 --	< Our ability to identify enemy 47
Commun. with civilian population 30 --	Our ability to use weapons 80
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 --	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our ability to identify enemy 47 --	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our weapons 70 --	Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. with civilian population 30 --	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 --	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 --	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 <<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 --	Our communications equipment 65
Our transportation equipment 40 --	Our ability to use weapons 80
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	< Commun. with civilian population 30
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	< Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Our ability to operate as team 100	< Our weapons 70
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	< Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 --	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to use combat skills 81 --	Our transportation equipment 40
Our ability to use weapons 80 --	Our transportation equipment 40

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 58. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 52 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 27.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26 >	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our ability to identify enemy 47 >	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our weapons 70 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our mental preparation for combat 95 <	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Our mental preparation for combat 95 <<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74 ==	Commun. with civilian population 30
Commun. with civilian population 30 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Our unit's leadership 92 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 >>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >	Our communications equipment 65
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26 >	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our transportation equipment 40 >>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 ==	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 <<	Commun. with civilian population 30
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 ==	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 >	Our weapons 70
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >>	Our weapons 70
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 >	Our weapons 70
Our transportation equipment 40 <<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 <<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 ==	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our ability to use combat skills 81 <<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 >>	Our communications equipment 65
Commun. with civilian population 30 >>	Commun. with other Army units 62
Our unit's leadership 92 <	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26 >	Commun. within our own unit 85
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81 ==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 >>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Our ability to use combat skills 81 <	Our transportation equipment 40
Our ability to use weapons 80 <<	Our transportation equipment 40
Our unit's leadership 92 <<	Commun. with civilian population 30
Commun. with civilian population 30 >>	Commun. within our own unit 85
Our weapons 70 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our weapons 70 <<	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 49. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 67 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 38.7% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Our mental preparation for combat 95	< Commun. with civilian population 30
Our mental preparation for combat 95	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Our ability to identify enemy 47 >	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Our ability to operate as team100	<< Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our ability to operate as team100	< Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 >	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	< Commun. with civilian population 30
Our ability to operate as team100	< Our ability to use weapons 80
Our ability to operate as team100	< Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Our ability to use weapons 80	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our ability to operate as team100	< Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Our ability to operate as team100	<< Commun. with other Army units 62

Rater 1 was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 59. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 29 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 13.5% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	>	Our unit's leadership 92
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our communications equipment 65	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Commun. within our own unit 85	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	>>	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Commun. with civilian population 30	--	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Our transportation equipment 40	--	Our ability to use weapons 80
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	--	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our ability to operate as team100	--	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Our ability to operate as team100	--	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	--	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	--	Our communications equipment 65
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	--	Our weapons 70
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	--	Our ability to use weapons 80
Commun. with other Army units 62	--	Our unit's leadership 92
Our ability to operate as team100	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	--	< Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Commun. within our own unit 85	--	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	--	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	--	Our weapons 70
Our ability to operate as team100	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	--	Our ability to use weapons 80
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	--	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	--	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Commun. with civilian population 30	>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Our unit's leadership 92	--	Our transportation equipment 40
Commun. with other Army units 62	<<<<	Our transportation equipment 40
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	--	Commun. with civilian population 30
Our ability to use weapons 80	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	>	Commun. with other Army units 62
Our transportation equipment 40	--	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0

Rater I was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 39. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 55 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 30.6% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	--	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>>	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Our ability to identify enemy 47	>	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	>	Our weapons 70
Commun. with other Army units 62	>>	Our unit's leadership 92
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	>	Our unit's leadership 92
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our transportation equipment 40	--	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	--	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	--	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Our communications equipment 65	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with other Army units 62	--	Our transportation equipment 40
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	--	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	--	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Our ability to use weapons 80	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our unit's leadership 92	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Our unit's leadership 92	--	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Commun. with other Army units 62
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	--	Commun. with other Army units 62
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>>	Commun. within our own unit 85
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	>	Commun. within our own unit 85

Rater I was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 43. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 41 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 23.4% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Commun. with civilian population 30 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	< Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 --	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Our ability to use weapons 80 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41 >	Our ability to use weapons 80
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 --	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 --	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Our ability to use combat skills 81	< Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 55. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 29 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 40	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Commun. with other Army units 62	--	Commun. within our own unit 85
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Our communications equipment 65
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>>>	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	--	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	--	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our weapons 70	--	Commun. with civilian population 30
Our communications equipment 65	--	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Our ability to use combat skills 81	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Our ability to use weapons 80	--	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	--	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our unit's leadership 92	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	--	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our ability to use weapons 80	--	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Our mental preparation for combat 95	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to use combat skills 81	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>	Our unit's leadership 92
Commun. with civilian population 30	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	--	Our ability to use weapons 80
Our ability to use combat skills 81	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	--	Our ability to operate as team 100
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	--	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Our ability to use combat skills 81	--	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21
Our ability to use combat skills 81	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Our ability to identify enemy 47	--	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	--	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 44. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 49 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 30.6% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	>>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	==	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Our unit's leadership 92	<<	Our weapons 70
Our ability to use combat skills 81	==	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	<	Our transportation equipment 40
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27	>	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Our mental preparation for combat 95	==	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	==	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our ability to use weapons 80	==	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	==	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27	>	Commun. with other Army units 62

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 49. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 41 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 12.6% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>	Our ability to use weapons 80	
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74		<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Our ability to use combat skills 81	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	>	Our ability to operate as team 100	
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	>>	Our mental preparation for combat 95	
Our weapons 70	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	
Our ability to operate as team 100	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>	Our weapons 70	
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Commun. with civilian population 30	
Commun. with other Army units 62	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 22 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 40 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26 >>	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Commun. within our own unit 85 <<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>>	Our ability to use combat skills 81
Our ability to identify enemy 47 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Our communications equipment 65
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 <<<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Our ability to identify enemy 47 <<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Commun. with civilian population 30 >	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Commun. with other Army units 62 <<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 78. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 25 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >	Our weapons 70
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 >	Commun. within our own unit 85
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 ==	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 ==	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81 ==	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 >	Our ability to use weapons 80
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 >	Our ability to use weapons 80
Commun. with other Army units 62 ==	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >	Commun. with civilian population 30
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >	Our communications equipment 65
Our communications equipment 65 <	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our transportation equipment 40 ==	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51 ==	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81
Our unit's leadership 92 ==	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. within our own unit 85 ==	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. within our own unit 85 <	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 ==	Commun. with other Army units 62
Our ability to operate as team 100 ==	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Commun. within our own unit 85 ==	Our transportation equipment 40
Our transportation equipment 40 ==	Our ability to use weapons 80
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26 ==	Commun. with other Army units 62

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 40. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 37 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 20.7% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with civilian population 30 >	Our weapons 70	
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18 >	Our weapons 70 <<<	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21 >>>	Our ability to use weapons 80	
Our transportation equipment 40 >	Our ability to use weapons 80	
Commun. within our own unit 85 <	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74	
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27	
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 >	Our ability to use combat skills 81	
Knowl. of total interservice operation 21 >>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	
Our ability to identify enemy 47 >	Our communications equipment 65	
Our weapons 70 <<	Our ability to use combat skills 81	
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	
Our ability to use weapons 80 <	Commun. with other Army units 62	
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48 >	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	
Our weapons 70 =	Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	
Our weapons 70 <	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21	
Our ability to use weapons 80 <	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	
Our transportation equipment 40 >>	Our transportation equipment 40	
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27 >	Our communications equipment 65	
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81 <	Our ability to use combat skills 81	
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81 <<	Commun. with civilian population 30	
Our unit's leadership 92 <	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	
	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 37 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 19.8% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our transportation equipment 40	==	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Our transportation equipment 40	==	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	==	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Our weapons 70	==	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Commun. with other Army units 62	==	Commun. within our own unit 85
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	==	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	==	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	==	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	==	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	==	Commun. with other Army units 62
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	==	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	==	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Our ability to identify enemy 47	==	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Commun. within our own unit 85	==	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	==	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	==	Our ability to identify enemy 47
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 27	==	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	==	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21	==	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	==	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	==	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	==	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	==	Our transportation equipment 40

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 29. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 44 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 20.7% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	>>	Our weapons 70
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21
Our weapons 70	<<<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 21
Our mental preparation for combat 95	<	Commun. with civilian population 30
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52	=	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 74
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 18	>	Our transportation equipment 40
Our ability to adjust to conditions 81	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 26	>	Our mental preparation for combat 95
Our ability to use weapons 80	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 51
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 41	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 21
Overall operation strategy & tactics 51	>	Our ability to use weapons 80
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39	=	Our ability to use weapons 80
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 48
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>>	Commun. with civilian population 30
Our ability to identify enemy 47	>	Our weapons 70
Our communications equipment 65	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 39
Our transportation equipment 40	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our unit's leadership 92	<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 52

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 56. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 33 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY MEASURES

ARITHMETIC MEAN OF RATEE SCORES: 53

STANDARD DEVIATION: 27.4968

AVERAGE VARIABILITY OF ALL RATEES: 1

Name	Score	Stability	# Times Presented	# Times Omitted	# Times Scored
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	47	1	252	2	250
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	51	1	260	2	258
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	18	2	268	0	268
Knowl. of total interservice operation	20	2	256	0	256
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	73	2	264	4	260
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	26	2	270	0	270
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	39	1	270	0	270
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	40	1	266	0	266
Commun. within our own unit	85	1	262	0	262
Commun. with other Army units	61	1	266	2	264
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	20	1	258	2	256
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	27	2	258	4	254
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	2	294	2	292
Commun. with civilian population	30	2	274	4	270
Our weapons	70	1	266	0	266
Our communications equipment	65	2	272	2	270
Our transportation equipment	40	2	284	0	284
Our mental preparation for combat	94	1	256	2	254
Our ability to use combat skills	80	1	282	4	278
Our ability to operate as team	100	2	278	4	274
Our ability to use weapons	79	1	270	0	270
Our ability to adjust to conditions	80	1	252	4	248
Our ability to identify enemy	47	1	264	4	260
Our unit's leadership	91	1	260	2	258
Overall operation strategy & tactics	51	2	258	4	254

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(82nd Airborne Soldiers)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

RATER DECISION RECAPITULATION:

RATER NAME	Pr/equiv. Presented	Pr/equiv. Omitted	Decision Index	% Major Inconsistencies
A	111	0	68	11.7
A	111	24	55	17.2
B	111	0	68	3.6
B	111	0	48	13.5
C	111	0	64	9.9
C	111	0	57	18.9
C	111	0	69	6.3
D	111	0	60	15.3
D	111	0	65	2.7
E	111	0	57	14.4
E	111	0	57	24.3
F	111	0	64	16.2
F	111	0	50	24.3
F	111	0	50	23.4
G	111	0	39	27.9
H	111	0	39	20.7
H	111	0	58	27.0
H	111	0	49	38.7
I	111	0	59	13.5
I	111	0	39	30.6
I	111	0	43	23.4
J	111	0	55	9.9
J	111	0	44	30.6
B	111	0	49	12.6
D	111	0	64	9.9
A	111	0	78	16.2
G	111	0	40	20.7
A	111	0	50	19.8
E	111	0	29	20.7
G	111	0	56	16.2

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

OJQ (*) SCORES IN ORDER

1. Our unit's leadership	100
2. Our ability to operate as team	99
3. Our ability to use combat skills	95
4. Our mental preparation for combat	93
5. Our ability to adjust to conditions	86
6. Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
7. Our ability to use weapons	70
8. Commun. within our own unit	68
9. Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64
10. Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58
11. Our communications equipment	54
12. Overall operation strategy & tactics	53
13. Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
14. Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44
15. Our ability to identify enemy	40
16. Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39
17. Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38
18. Our weapons	31
19. Commun. with other Army units	23
20. Commun. with civilian population	11
21. Knowl. of total interservice operation	11
22. Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5
23. Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2
24. Our transportation equipment	1
25. Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44	>>	Our unit's leadership 100
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5	>	Our unit's leadership 100
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<<	Commun. with other Army units 23
Commun. within our own unit 68	<	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Our mental preparation for combat 93	<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 53
Our ability to operate as team 99	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64	>>	Our mental preparation for combat 93
Our ability to identify enemy 40	>	Our mental preparation for combat 93
Knowl. of total interservice operation 11	>>	Our weapons 31
Knowl. of total interservice operation 11	>	Our ability to use weapons 70
Our ability to operate as team 99	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Overall operation strategy & tactics 53	>>	Our ability to use combat skills 95
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5	>	Our weapons 31
Our ability to operate as team 99	<<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to operate as team 99	<	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	>	Our ability to use weapons 70
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	>	Our ability to use combat skills 95
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 58	>>	Our mental preparation for combat 93
Our ability to adjust to conditions 86	<<	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64	>	Our mental preparation for combat 93
Commun. within our own unit 68	=	Our ability to use combat skills 95
Our ability to operate as team 99	=	Our ability to use weapons 70
Our ability to operate as team 99	<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 53
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5	=	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39
Our communications equipment 54	=	Our transportation equipment 1
Our unit's leadership 100	=	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44
Our unit's leadership 100	<<	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Our ability to use combat skills 95	=	Our ability to identify enemy 40

Rater I was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision Index was 52. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 41 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 25.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our unit's leadership	100	< Our ability to use weapons	70
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44	< Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Overall operation strategy & tactics	53	< Our transportation equipment	1
Our unit's leadership	100	< Commun. within our own unit	68
Overall operation strategy & tactics	53	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5
Our communications equipment	54	< Our weapons	31
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64	< Our ability to identify enemy	40
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5
Our communications equipment	54	< Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our transportation equipment	1	< Overall operation strategy & tactics	53

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 24 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to identify enemy 40 >>	Our ability to use weapons 70
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5 >	Our weapons 31
Our weapons 31 >>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 70. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 8 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 2.7% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64	<	Our weapons 31
Our mental preparation for combat 93	<	Commun. with civilian population 11
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	<<	Commun. with civilian population 11
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our communications equipment 54	>	Our ability to use combat skills 95
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64	<	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 58	>	Our ability to operate as team 99
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	<	Commun. with civilian population 11
Commun. with civilian population 11	=	Our mental preparation for combat 93
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5	=	Our ability to use weapons 70
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5	>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 53
Our ability to operate as team 99	<	Commun. within our own unit 68
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64	<	Commun. with civilian population 11
Commun. with civilian population 11	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. with civilian population 11	>>	Our ability to use weapons 70
Overall operation strategy & tactics 53	<	Our weapons 31
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5
Our ability to identify enemy 40	=	Our ability to operate as team 99
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	=	Our ability to operate as team 99
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Our ability to identify enemy 40	<	Commun. with civilian population 11
Commun. with civilian population 11	>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 53. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 40 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 22.5% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to operate as team 99	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to adjust to conditions 86	<<	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64
Our mental preparation for combat 93	<	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Our mental preparation for combat 93	<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 53
Our ability to adjust to conditions 86	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 53
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5	>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2
Commun. within our own unit 68	<	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47	<	Commun. with other Army units 23

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 51. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 20 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Our ability to identify enemy	40	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2
Our ability to identify enemy	40	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44
Our weapons	31	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	11
Commun. within our own unit	68	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	11

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 27 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 7.2% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our mental preparation for combat	93	<<	Commun. within our own unit	68
Our mental preparation for combat	93	==	Our ability to use weapons	70
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5	==	Our weapons	31
Commun. with civilian population	11	==	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39
Knowl. of total interservice operation	11	==	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64
Our mental preparation for combat	93	==	Our ability to use weapons	70
Our ability to identify enemy	40	<	Our transportation equipment	1
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39	<	Commun. with civilian population	11
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	<	Commun. with other Army units	23
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64
Our ability to identify enemy	40	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5
Commun. within our own unit	68	>	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Commun. with civilian population	11	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5	==	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 52. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 32 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 12.6% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

1 MAR 89

U.S. Army Research Institute

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use weapons 70	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2
Commun. with civilian population 11	>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38
Commun. with civilian population 11	>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics 53
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44	<<	Commun. with other Army units 23
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5	=	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Our ability to identify enemy 40	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64	=	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38
Our ability to use weapons 70	>	Our ability to use combat skills 95
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5	>	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39	<	Commun. with civilian population 11
Commun. within our own unit 68	>	Our unit's leadership 100
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2	=	Our ability to use weapons 70
Commun. with civilian population 11	>	Our ability to use weapons 70

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 55. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 27 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 12.6% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Our ability to adjust to conditions 86	<< Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44
Our ability to adjust to conditions 86	< Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39
Our ability to identify enemy 40	< Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 58 >	Our ability to operate as team 99
Our ability to adjust to conditions 86	< Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44
Our transportation equipment 1 >	Commun. with other Army units 23
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	< Commun. with civilian population 11
Our weapons 31 >	Our ability to operate as team 99
Our weapons 31 >>	Commun. within our own unit 68
Our weapons 31 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 86
Overall operation strategy & tactics 53 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 86
Our weapons 31 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions 86
Our unit's leadership 100	< Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47
Commun. within our own unit 68	< Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44
Our ability to operate as team 99	< Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44
Commun. within our own unit 68	< Our transportation equipment 1
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	< Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 33 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use combat skills 95	<	Our transportation equipment 1
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44	<<	Our transportation equipment 1
Commun. with civilian population 11 >		Our ability to operate as team 99
Our communications equipment 54 >		Our unit's leadership 100
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 58	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2
Overall operation strategy & tactics 53	<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5 >>		Our weapons 31
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >>		Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Overall operation strategy & tactics 53 >		Our ability to adjust to conditions 86
Overall operation strategy & tactics 53 >>		Our ability to use combat skills 95
Commun. with civilian population 11 >>		Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39
Commun. with civilian population 11 >>		Our ability to operate as team 99
Commun. with other Army units 23 >		Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44
Overall operation strategy & tactics 53 >		Our ability to operate as team 99
Our mental preparation for combat 93	<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38
Our mental preparation for combat 93	<<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 11
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 11
Commun. with civilian population 11 >		Our weapons 31
Our ability to use combat skills 95	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5
Our unit's leadership 100	<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5
Our ability to identify enemy 40 >>		Our ability to use weapons 70
Our ability to identify enemy 40	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5
Our ability to use weapons 70	<<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5
Overall operation strategy & tactics 53 >		Our unit's leadership 100
Commun. within our own unit 68 >		Our ability to use combat skills 95
Commun. within our own unit 68	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39
Our ability to use combat skills 95	<<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39
Knowl. of total interservice operation 11 >>		Our weapons 31
Commun. with other Army units 23 >>		Our ability to use weapons 70
Commun. with other Army units 23 >		Our ability to operate as team 99
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44	<<	Commun. with civilian population 11
Commun. with civilian population 11 >		Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 58
Our communications equipment 54 >>>		Our mental preparation for combat 93
Our mental preparation for combat 93	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0
Commun. with civilian population 11 >>		Our ability to use weapons 70
Our ability to use weapons 70	<	Our transportation equipment 1
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 0 >		Our weapons 31
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 47 >>>		Our mental preparation for combat 93
Our mental preparation for combat 93	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 11
Our ability to use combat skills 95	<	Commun. within our own unit 68
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5 >>		Our communications equipment 54
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 5 >		Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 58

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 55. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 58 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 38.7% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39 >>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39 >>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76
Commun. within our own unit 68 <<	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Our ability to identify enemy 40 >>	Our ability to use weapons 70
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64 <	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39
Our mental preparation for combat 93 <<	Our ability to identify enemy 40
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39 >>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64
Commun. within our own unit 68 <	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 68. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 27 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 7.2% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute
(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

1 MAR 89

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use weapons	70 >>	Our ability to operate as team	99
Our ability to identify enemy	40 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Knowl. of size & location enemy forces	64 <<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44 >	Our ability to adjust to conditions	86
Overall operation strategy & tactics	53 >	Our mental preparation for combat	93
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2 >>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2 >	Our ability to identify enemy	40
Our mental preparation for combat	93 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Our mental preparation for combat	93 <<	Commun. within our own unit	68
Our mental preparation for combat	93 <<	Overall operation strategy & tactics	53
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64 <	Our transportation equipment	1
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2 >	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38
Our weapons	31 >	Commun. within our own unit	68
Commun. with other Army units	23 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47 >>	Our mental preparation for combat	93
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64 >	Our mental preparation for combat	93
Our transportation equipment	1 >	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2 >	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58 <	Our transportation equipment	1

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 65. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 32 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 17.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Overall operation strategy & tactics	53	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Our ability to identify enemy	40	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44	>	Our ability to use weapons	70
Our communications equipment	54	>	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39	>>>	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Our ability to identify enemy	40	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44
Our weapons	31	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	11
Commun. with other Army units	23	>	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Commun. with other Army units	23	>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics	53
Our ability to operate as team	99	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	=	Knowl. of total interservice operation	11
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	=	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Knowl. of total interservice operation	11	=	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Our weapons	31	<	Our transportation equipment	1

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 40 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 16.2% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to use weapons	70	>	Our ability to operate as team	99
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44
Overall operation strategy & tactics	53	<	Commun. with civilian population	11
Our weapons	31	>	Our communications equipment	54
Our weapons	31	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58
Our ability to use combat skills	95	<	Our ability to use weapons	70
Our weapons	31	>	Commun. within our own unit	68
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 66. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 18 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 7.2% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44	<<	Commun. with civilian population 11
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 11
Commun. with civilian population 11	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 58
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 58	<<	Commun. with other Army units 23
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 44	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 64

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 71. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 17 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 5.4% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with civilian population	11	>>>>	Our weapons	31
Commun. with civilian population	11	>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5	>>	Our ability to use weapons	70
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2	>>>>	Our ability to use weapons	70
Our transportation equipment	1	>>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our transportation equipment	1	>	Our unit's leadership	100
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38	>>>	Our ability to operate as team	99
Our ability to operate as team	99	<<	Our ability to identify enemy	40
Commun. within our own unit	68	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39
Commun. within our own unit	68	>	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39	>>	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58	>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	86
Our ability to adjust to conditions	86	<<<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics	53
Commun. with other Army units	23	>	Our mental preparation for combat	93
Commun. with other Army units	23	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Our mental preparation for combat	93	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Knowl. of total interservice operation	11	>>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Knowl. of total interservice operation	11	>>>>	Our communications equipment	54
Our ability to identify enemy	40	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2	>	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38	>	Commun. within our own unit	68
Our ability to use weapons	70	<<<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Overall operation strategy & tactics	53	<<	Commun. with civilian population	11
Overall operation strategy & tactics	53	>>	Our ability to operate as team	99
Commun. with civilian population	11	>>>>	Our ability to operate as team	99
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64	>>>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	86
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64	>>	Our mental preparation for combat	93
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>>	Our communications equipment	54
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>>	Our unit's leadership	100
Our communications equipment	54	>>	Our unit's leadership	100
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5	>>>>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39
Knowl. of total interservice operation	11	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39
Commun. with civilian population	11	>>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	44
Commun. with civilian population	11	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58
Our ability to operate as team	99	<	Our transportation equipment	1
Our transportation equipment	1	>>>>	Our ability to identify enemy	40
Our weapons	31	<<	Knowl. of total interservice operation	11
Commun. within our own unit	68	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38
Commun. within our own unit	68	<<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5
Our ability to use weapons	70	<<	Our transportation equipment	1
Our transportation equipment	1	>	Our communications equipment	54
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39
Commun. with civilian population	11	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Our ability to identify enemy	40	<<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2
Our ability to operate as team	99	<<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our unit's leadership	100	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our ability to operate as team	99	<	Our communications equipment	54
Our ability to adjust to conditions	86	<<<<	Commun. with civilian population	11
Our ability to adjust to conditions	86	<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics	53
Commun. with civilian population	11	>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics	53
Commun. with other Army units	23	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2
Our unit's leadership	100	<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 66. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 66 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 48.6% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64 >>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	86
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64 >>	Our ability to use combat skills	95
Our unit's leadership	100 <	Commun. within our own unit	68
Our unit's leadership	100 <<<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our communications equipment	54 >>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76
Our ability to use weapons	70 >>	Our mental preparation for combat	93
Commun. within our own unit	68 ==	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58 <	Commun. with other Army units	23
Our mental preparation for combat	93 ==	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	2

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 74. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 20 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 8.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our mental preparation for combat	93	<	Overall operation strategy & tactics	53
Our ability to operate as team	99	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64	<	Our ability to identify enemy	40
Commun. with other Army units	23	<	Our transportation equipment	1
Knowl. of total interservice operation	11	>	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64	<	Our transportation equipment	1

Rater I was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 69. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 21 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 5.4% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our unit's leadership100	<	Our communications equipment	54
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 76	<	Our weapons	31
Our weapons 31	>	Commun. within our own unit	68
Our unit's leadership100	<<	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 2	=	Our communications equipment	54
Our unit's leadership100	=	Commun. within our own unit	68
Commun. with other Army units 23	=	Our communications equipment	54
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 39	=	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0
Knowl. of total interservice operation 11	=	Our communications equipment	54
Our unit's leadership100	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	38
Our unit's leadership100	=	Commun. within our own unit	68
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 38	>>	Commun. within our own unit	68
Our ability to adjust to conditions 86	=	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	58
Our ability to use combat skills 95	<<	Our ability to use weapons	70
Our ability to use combat skills 95	=	Our transportation equipment	1
Our unit's leadership100	=	Commun. within our own unit	68

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 31 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 14.4% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY MEASURES

ARITHMETIC MEAN OF RATEE SCORES: 47

STANDARD DEVIATION: 32.6309

AVERAGE VARIABILITY OF ALL RATEES: 2

Name	Score	Stability	# Times Presented	# Times Omitted	# Times Scored
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	64	2	160	0	160
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	47	2	170	0	170
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	5	2	174	0	174
Knowl. of total interservice operation	10	1	164	0	164
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	76	2	166	0	166
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	37	2	172	0	172
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	57	1	170	0	170
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	43	2	174	0	174
Commun. within our own unit	68	2	168	0	168
Commun. with other Army units	23	1	166	0	166
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	1	1	162	0	162
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	39	1	162	0	162
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	0	2	186	0	186
Commun. with civilian population	11	1	170	0	170
Our weapons	31	2	168	0	168
Our communications equipment	53	2	170	0	170
Our transportation equipment	0	2	180	0	180
Our mental preparation for combat	93	2	164	0	164
Our ability to use combat skills	95	2	178	0	178
Our ability to operate as team	98	2	174	0	174
Our ability to use weapons	70	1	172	0	172
Our ability to adjust to conditions	85	2	158	0	158
Our ability to identify enemy	39	2	166	0	166
Our unit's leadership	100	2	162	0	162
Overall operation strategy & tactics	52	2	162	0	162

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Ranger Regiment, First Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

RATER DECISION RECAPITULATION:

RATER NAME	Pr/equiv. Presented	Pr/equiv. Omitted	Decision Index	% Major Inconsistencies
I	111	0	52	25.2
J	111	0	50	9.0
H	111	0	70	2.7
G	111	0	53	22.5
B	111	0	51	9.0
D	111	0	50	7.2
F	111	0	52	12.6
E	111	0	55	12.6
G	111	0	50	16.2
F	111	0	55	38.7
E	111	0	68	7.2
C	111	0	65	17.1
D	111	0	64	16.2
C	111	0	66	7.2
B	111	0	71	5.4
A	111	0	66	48.6
J	111	0	74	8.1
I	111	0	69	5.4
H	111	0	64	14.4

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

OJQ (*) SCORES IN ORDER

1. Our ability to operate as team	100
2. Our ability to use combat skills	94
3. Our unit's leadership	90
4. Our ability to use weapons	88
5. Commun. within our own unit	83
6. Our mental preparation for combat	82
7. Knowledge of our unit's objectives	78
8. Our ability to adjust to conditions	77
9. Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	74
10. Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	66
11. Our weapons	57
12. Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	56
13. Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	53
14. Overall operation strategy & tactics	47
15. Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	42
16. Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	40
17. Commun. with other Army units	40
18. Our communications equipment	38
19. Our ability to identify enemy	29
20. Knowl. of total interservice operation	16
21. Commun. with civilian population	11
22. Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
23. Commun. with Marine/Commando units	5
24. Our transportation equipment	0
25. Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	0

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42 >>>	Commun. within our own unit 83
Commun. with other Army units 40 >>	Commun. within our own unit 83
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 74 >>	Our ability to use combat skills 94
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Overall operation strategy & tactics 47
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56 >	Our mental preparation for combat 82
Overall operation strategy & tactics 47 <	Our transportation equipment 0
Our ability to use combat skills 94 <	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 77
Our unit's leadership 90 <<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66
Overall operation strategy & tactics 47 <	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 0
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40 >	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our ability to use combat skills 94 <<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42
Commun. with civilian population 11 >>	Our communications equipment 38
Commun. with civilian population 11 >	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 78
Our ability to use combat skills 94 <	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42
Commun. within our own unit 83 <	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 5
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40

Rater J was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 62. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 41 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 15.3% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with Marine/Commando units 5	>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 53
Commun. with other Army units 40	--	Our unit's leadership 90
Commun. with other Army units 40	--	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our unit's leadership 90	--	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42
Commun. within our own unit 83	--	Our ability to identify enemy 29
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 77
Overall operation strategy & tactics 47	--	Our mental preparation for combat 82
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Our weapons 57
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	--	Our communications equipment 38
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40	--	Our ability to use combat skills 94
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66	>	Our ability to use combat skills 94
Our ability to operate as team 100	<<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Overall operation strategy & tactics 47
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40	--	Our ability to use combat skills 94
Our weapons 57	>	Our ability to use weapons 88
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66	>>	Our ability to use weapons 88
Commun. with other Army units 40	--	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 0
Our mental preparation for combat 82	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 5
Our ability to adjust to conditions 77	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 0
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 53	--	Our unit's leadership 90
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66	>>	Our unit's leadership 90
Our ability to use combat skills 94	<<	Our weapons 57
Our ability to use weapons 88	<	Our weapons 57
Our mental preparation for combat 82	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units 5
Our mental preparation for combat 82	<<	Overall operation strategy & tactics 47
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 74	>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 77
Our ability to adjust to conditions 77	<<	Commun. with other Army units 40
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42
Our ability to use weapons 88	<	Our weapons 57
Our ability to use combat skills 94	<	Commun. with other Army units 40
Our ability to use combat skills 94	<<	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42	--	Our ability to operate as team 100
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40	--	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 74
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40	>	Our mental preparation for combat 82
Knowledge of our unit's objectives 78	--	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 77
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our communications equipment 38	--	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56
Our ability to operate as team 100	--	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 0
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56	--	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop. 0
Our ability to use weapons 88	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our ability to use weapons 88	--	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42

Rater C was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 45. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 62 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 41.4% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >	Our communications equipment 38
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42 >	Our ability to use weapons 88
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 53	< Our ability to identify enemy 29
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >	Our communications equipment 38

Rater H was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision Index was 80. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 17 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 5.4% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION. 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	0
Our communications equipment 38	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	66
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	42
Our weapons 57	>	Our ability to use combat skills	94
Commun. with civilian population 11	>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics	47
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 74	<	Our ability to identify enemy	29
Our communications equipment 38	<<	Commun. with civilian population	11
Our ability to adjust to conditions 77	>	Our ability to operate as team	100
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 5	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	56
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	0 >	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	53
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40	<	Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	0
Commun. with civilian population 11	>>	Overall operation strategy & tactics	47
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40	<	Commun. with civilian population	11
Our weapons 57	>	Knowledge of our unit's objectives	78
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	0 >	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	66
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	0 >>>	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	53
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 74	<	Our communications equipment	38
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56	<<	Our ability to identify enemy	29
Commun. with civilian population 11	>	Our ability to use combat skills	94

Rater I was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 78. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 29 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 17.1% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our unit's leadership 90	<<	Our communications equipment 38
Our communications equipment 38 >		Our ability to operate as team 100
Overall operation strategy & tactics 47	<	Our transportation equipment 0
Our ability to operate as team 100	<	Knowledge of our unit's objectives 78
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 74	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 53
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16 >		Commun. with other Army units 40
Our communications equipment 38 >		Our ability to use combat skills 94
Our transportation equipment 0 >		Knowledge of our unit's objectives 78
Commun. with other Army units 40	<<	Our transportation equipment 0
Commun. with other Army units 40	<	Knowl. of total interservice operation 16
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10 >		Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces 40
Our mental preparation for combat 82	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56

Rater E was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 64. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 32 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 10.8% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to adjust to conditions 77	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics 47
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66	<< Commun. with other Army units 40
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks 42	< Our transportation equipment 0
Our ability to use weapons 88	< Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics 56
Commun. with Marine/Commando units 5 >	Our communications equipment 38
Our mental preparation for combat 82	< Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10
Our transportation equipment 0 >	Our communications equipment 38
Our ability to adjust to conditions 77	<< Overall operation strategy & tactics 47

Rater A was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 74. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 25 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 7.2% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to identify enemy	29	<<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	5
Our communications equipment	38	>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	74
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	74	<<<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	53
Our mental preparation for combat	82	<	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	56
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	40	>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	74

Rater D was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 86. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 16 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 4.5% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our ability to adjust to conditions 77	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 53
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 53	>>	Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces 74
Our weapons 57	>>>	Our ability to operate as team 100
Our weapons 57	>>	Commun. within our own unit 83
Our weapons 57	>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 77
Our communications equipment 38	>	Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament 66
Our weapons 57	>>	Our ability to adjust to conditions 77
Our mental preparation for combat 82	<	Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support 53
Knowl. of total interservice operation 16	>>	Commun. with other Army units 40
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units 10	>	Commun. with other Army units 40

Rater G was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 74. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 24 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.0% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION. 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Our weapons	57	<	Commun. with civilian population	11
Our unit's leadership	90	<<	Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	42
Our unit's leadership	90	<	Commun. with Marine/Commando units	5
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	>	Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	56
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	42	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	66	<	Our communications equipment	38
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	66	<	Commun. with other Army units	40
Our unit's leadership	90	<	Our communications equipment	38
Our communications equipment	38	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	77
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	42	<	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10
Our communications equipment	38	>	Our ability to adjust to conditions	77

Rater B was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 50. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 23 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 9.9% of the total choices actually made.

COMMENTS:

Major inconsistencies are on the high side.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?
ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

Commun. with Marine/Commando units	5 >	Commun. with other Army units	40
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	0 >	Our weapons	57
Overall operation strategy & tactics	47 >	Our ability to use combat skills	94
Overall operation strategy & tactics	47 >>	Our unit's leadership	90
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	74 <	Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10

Rater F was presented with 111 direct comparison equivalents.

Of these, none were omitted.

Decision index was 74. (Range is zero to 100. Normal range is 30 to 80.)

A total of 24 decisions were inconsistent with the consensus.

Inconsistencies printed above exceeded the 20.0% of score range used as a test.

This represents 4.5% of the total choices actually made.

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES AND RATER BEHAVIOR

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY MEASURES

ARITHMETIC MEAN OF RATEE SCORES: 50

STANDARD DEVIATION: 31.7119

AVERAGE VARIABILITY OF ALL RATEES: 2

Name	Score	Stability	# Times Presented	# Times Omitted	# Times Scored
Knowl. of size & location, enemy forces	73	3	84	0	84
Knowl. of size & location, friendly forces	40	3	88	0	88
Knowl. of comp. & location, Civilian pop.	0	2	90	0	90
Knowl. of total interservice operation	15	3	86	0	86
Knowledge of our unit's objectives	78	3	88	0	88
Knowledge of terrain, landmarks	42	2	90	0	90
Knowl. of enemy strongholds & armament	66	3	90	0	90
Knowl. of changes in strategy & tactics	55	2	90	0	90
Commun. within our own unit	83	2	88	0	88
Commun. with other Army units	40	2	88	0	88
Commun. with AF/Navy trans. units	10	3	86	0	86
Commun. with close combat AF/Navy support	53	3	86	0	86
Commun. with Marine/Commando units	5	3	98	0	98
Commun. with civilian population	11	0	90	0	90
Our weapons	57	2	88	0	88
Our communications equipment	37	1	90	0	90
Our transportation equipment	0	3	94	0	94
Our mental preparation for combat	82	2	86	0	86
Our ability to use combat skills	94	3	94	0	94
Our ability to operate as team	100	3	92	0	92
Our ability to use weapons	87	3	90	0	90
Our ability to adjust to conditions	77	3	84	0	84
Our ability to identify enemy	29	2	88	0	88
Our unit's leadership	90	2	86	0	86
Overall operation strategy & tactics	47	2	86	0	86

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY - OBJECTIVE JUDGMENT QUOTIENT - OJQ (*)

U.S. Army Research Institute

1 MAR 89

(75th Range Regiment, Second Battalion)

CRITERION 1 - Which factor contributed most to the success of Operation Urgent Fury ?

RATER DECISION RECAPITULATION:

	RATER NAME	Pr/equiv. Presented	Pr/equiv. Omitted	Decision Index	% Major Inconsistencies
J		111	0	62	15.3
C		111	0	45	41.4
H		111	0	80	5.4
I		111	0	78	17.1
E		111	0	64	10.8
A		111	0	74	7.2
D		111	0	86	4.5
G		111	0	74	9.0
B		111	0	50	9.9
F		111	0	74	4.5