Flawed Policy: Suez 1956
Abstract
Successful military operations are the culmination of careful planning based upon clearly articulated national and operational objectives. When planning the campaign, The commander must be completely aware of the political sensitivities and objectives so that his operation achieves the national objectives. Additionally, The commander must have the required forces available when needed so that he can quickly and forcefully execute his operation and successfully terminate military involvement. These key factors required for successful military operations were absent during the planning and execution of the Anglo, French and Israeli intervention in Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956. As a direct result, the operation was a political and military failure which failed to achieve the objectives of the nations involved. The United States must apply the Lessons learned from the 1956 Suez Crisis as it resources its military forces in the wake of looming budget reductions. Nowhere is the necessity to ensure adherence to Army Chief of staff's imperatives for the future of the Army more clearly identified than in the lessons of the 1956 Suez military operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 30, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA222479
Entities
People
- Michael L. Warner
Organizations
- United States Army War College