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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO ARMS CONTROL

BY

MR. AUSTIN E. GRISHAM, JR.

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO ARMS CONTROL

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Mr. Austin E. Grisham, Jr.

Dr. William Stockton
Project Advisor



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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO ARMS CONTROL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

This paper will identify and describe the roles of intelligence in arms control, describe the existing intelligence organizational structure for arms control support, and identify issues, strengths, and shortcomings in this support. It will argue that intelligence support to the arms control process is critical to the success of arms control. To contribute to such success, the Intelligence Community and related agencies and activities must actively participate in all phases of the process.

It is widely recognized that good intelligence reduces the inherent risks of arms control and contributes to the maintenance of peace. Intelligence support to the U.S. Government's arms control process is most easily identifiable in the area of monitoring for compliance verification. But while monitoring for compliance is important, there are other roles for intelligence within the arms control process. Intelligence must also define the threat and support various decision-makers--policymakers, negotiators, and politicians. In order for the Intelligence Community to accomplish these missions, it must be properly organized, staffed, resourced, and directed.

In this introductory chapter I will focus on definitions and suggest that arms control is essentially a political process. Before defining terms, however, it is important to emphasize that

the sources used in the preparation of this paper are entirely unclassified. Therefore, the analysis and views reflected in this paper are based on unclassified sources of information. This paper reflects the author's views and not those of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

DEFINING INTELLIGENCE

The term intelligence is most fundamentally defined as evaluated information that provides insight into capabilities and possible intentions. Clausewitz defined intelligence as "every sort of information about the enemy and his country--the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations."¹

In JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, intelligence is defined as "the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas."² This intelligence is produced through the intelligence cycle, a conceptual model that graphically reveals how the "product" (intelligence) is generated. The intelligence cycle is defined as "the steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. There are five steps in the cycle: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination."³

To make intelligence useful, it must be "subject to evaluation and analysis to put it into the context of ongoing U.S. national security and foreign policy concerns."⁴ In other words, intelligence products must support user requirements.

After raw intelligence information is collected in response to prioritized requirements, it must be processed into usable data. Then the all-source data must be exploited, evaluated, and analyzed--all of which yields intelligence products. These products can vary according to the media most appropriate for presentation--hardcopy, database, fiche, electrical transmission, or audio/visual materials. During the analytic phase, the information must be evaluated for accuracy and credibility "in light of its source or its collection method, for [its] validity and significance" in comparison to other intelligence. These analytical findings can result in hard data about military, political, economic, or socio-psychological capabilities or intentions; they may suggest the pattern of future developments or events, or "provide the evidential base for making estimates about" future developments. This latter function, estimating, includes constructing scenarios of foreign actions and assigning probabilities to them.

DEFINING ARMS CONTROL

"Arms control is the process by which nations with adversary interests agree that their individual national security is better served if the arms competition between them is managed under agreed covenants."⁵ These agreed covenants are negotiated between the countries toward the goals of reducing the likelihood of war, making war less destructive if it occurs, and reducing the costs of preparing for war. Hopefully, the agreed covenants will make available scarce resources for other uses.

Negotiated arms control thereby avoids the unacceptable alternatives to arms control--an unlimited arms race or unilateral disarmament. But agreement to an arms control treaty is really only the beginning of the arms control process. In the final analysis, "the test of arms control's success is whether the parties to an agreement abide by its terms over time, and whether each side recognizes and credits the other side's compliance."⁶

A determination of compliance or noncompliance is arrived at through allied functions--monitoring and verification (both will be analyzed in depth later in this paper). If compliance is indeed verified and recognized by both sides, then "compliance is the actual practice of arms control."⁷ For the arms control process to be successful both sides must comply as well as recognize that the other side is complying with the terms of the agreement. When compliance issues arise, however, they must be dealt with to the satisfaction of both parties. Otherwise, the process will break down. In order to better deal with compliance issues, the treaty must include provisions which will contribute to verification of compliance. In the following section I will describe why arms control generally, and verification specifically, are considered political decisions.

ARMS CONTROL: A POLITICAL DECISION

Much professional literature emphasizes that arms control is a political process. As such, it involves making policy decisions. In the arms control arena, those policy decisions

which relate to treaty compliance are termed verification, and the amount of confidence we feel we must have in the decision is a political issue.⁸ "Verification . . . is a decision-making process for making compliance related judgements."⁹ During the verification process data reported by the monitoring process is reviewed to "compare its multiple meanings with . . . a treaty's language, and suggest tentative conclusions as to whether or not observed conditions represent compliance from an arms control standpoint."¹⁰

Monitoring, by contrast, takes place through the actual collection of data from various sources that relate to treaty obligations, analyzing that data, and then reporting the conclusions. Intelligence analysts perform the monitoring role by examining monitoring data and posing threat-assessment questions, using the traditional intelligence process. Through monitoring, "intelligence specialists examine information collected from many sources and with many possible meanings, and they offer conclusions" based on what they observe and from the standpoint of national security.¹¹ Therefore, while both monitoring and verification involve looking at similar information, these processes assess the information from a different viewpoint, toward a different goal.

This issue of monitoring versus verification lies at the heart of the contribution intelligence makes to arms control; therefore, it will be dealt with again in other chapters of this paper. Monitoring, however, is only one of several roles for intelligence in the arms control process. In the next chapter I

will outline a structure for thinking about the varied roles of intelligence in the arms control process, including the activity of monitoring.

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CHAPTER II
INTELLIGENCE ROLES IN ARMS CONTROL

OVERVIEW

Monitoring is an important role for intelligence in the arms control process. But what other roles should intelligence perform in this process? Dr. Karl K. Pieragostini, Professor, Defense Intelligence College, suggests that intelligence support to arms control should be viewed in four phases.¹ First, intelligence supports policy formulation and national security by defining the threat. Second, during negotiations, intelligence must support negotiators by providing and updating data, evaluating the adversary's data, and defining monitoring capabilities. An allied activity concerns counterintelligence, wherein the Intelligence Community keeps negotiators and "policymakers aware of what is being given up/what is at jeopardy." Then during ratification, the U.S. Senate becomes the primary intelligence customer. Finally, intelligence moves into the monitoring phase, supporting the implementation of the treaty. This model thus assigns intelligence three roles prior to the activity of monitoring: support for policy formulation, support for negotiation, and support for ratification.

POLICY FORMULATION

Within government, as elsewhere, "informed policymaking and decisionmaking requires adequate information and analysis."² In arms control, accurate knowledge about the enemy threat and precise identification of opportunities for compromise are

required to protect the best interests of the U.S. In a general sense, this role of intelligence in the arms control process is the primary mission traditionally assigned to intelligence--identifying the threat and/or opportunities relating to national interests. As we have noted, intelligence involves the collection, processing, analysis/production, and dissemination of information about threats and opportunities relating to our military, economic, political, and social interests and structures. That is, "intelligence can uncover a new military threat" or "reveal an opponent's specific weakness."³ Through this foreign intelligence, national security policymakers realize and appreciate threats to U.S. interests. The utility of this intelligence depends also upon its quality and timeliness. If, for example, the intelligence is timely and accurate, we will have a better chance to understand the nature, quality, and quantity of Soviet strategic or conventional forces, which in turn helps determine requirements for U.S. strategic weapons. Understanding the quality of the enemy force contributes to defining an acceptable balance of power, which can be codified in a treaty. Much of this type information is also critical for other steps of arms control--negotiation and monitoring.⁴

The relationship between policymakers and intelligence officers is critical if both parties are to be well served. In his authoritative book on intelligence, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions, Roger Hillsman argues that "analysis is inseparable from policy."⁵ There must be communication between the two parties, and the intelligence officer must "have

a continuing understanding of the requirements, priorities, and assumptions of the policymaker."⁶ That is, the intelligence officer must understand and attempt to meet the needs of the consumer. However, at the same time the Intelligence Community must guard against the politicization of intelligence. Both "political and ideological judgements have [at times] diminished greatly the ability of the Intelligence Community to perform effectively its tasks of information gathering and analysis."⁷ Stated differently, the intelligence officer must not be expected to provide only facts that prove or support the policymakers program. If intelligence becomes politicized, it all too often will be used "to reinforce the preconceptions and the assumptions of policymakers rather than as a source of information leading, where needed, to their timely modification."⁸ Such misuse of intelligence is common. But one example of catastrophic consequence was the U.S. failure to predict the fall of the Shah of Iran. In that case, intelligence that pointed in the direction of the Shah's overthrow was disregarded as inaccurate because our policymakers and intelligence managers wanted to believe in the Shah's on-going rule of Iran. This disregard led to self-deception. Stated another way, "the problem for gathering and interpreting intelligence arises from the general inclination of those gathering and interpreting it to accept what they want to hear."⁹

The policymaker must also remember "the key lesson . . . that intelligence is not the key. There are no magic formulas; one must live with uncertainty."¹⁰ Intelligence, like

everything else in this world, is imperfect. Mistakes can be made at any or every stage--collection (insufficient information), processing (not timely), analysis and production (wrong or incomplete conclusions) and dissemination (sent to wrong consumers and/or wrong form). Any of the above flaws can result in inadequate or misleading intelligence for the decisionmaker. But even if the intelligence is accurate and well presented, the consumer must accept it and translate it effectively into policy or other appropriate actions. He or she sometimes must be told what "they really don't want to hear-- facts and assessments that may conflict with their policy, program, or personal agendas."¹¹ Thus, intelligence is an art in which "failures" can occur for many reasons, ranging from a lack of data indicators to the failure of the policymaker to accept intelligence not to his or her liking.

NEGOTIATION

The requirement for intelligence support for policy formulation never really ends, even after the process moves to the negotiation table and beyond. But while support to the policymaker continues during the negotiation phase of an arms control treaty, during negotiations the Intelligence Community must focus its support on the negotiator. This support includes on-site support in the foreign capital where the negotiations are being held; concurrently, working groups in Washington and elsewhere may provide on-going support to the negotiating team and other parties indirectly related to the negotiations.

Intelligence support can be critical to the success or failure of the negotiations. The most apparent tasks are to evaluate adversary positions and data. Any differences in the negotiating parties' data must be identified and explained, if possible.¹² The Intelligence Community must try to be as conclusive as possible, but everyone must accept a degree of uncertainty. A secondary task, often the most critical, is to clarify our "ability to monitor provisions proposed."¹³ In order to insure that our proposals are verifiable, the Intelligence Community must actively participate in the formulation of arms control proposals. Often certain tentative treaty provisions cannot be monitored well, but for political reasons they are nonetheless proposed. This unfortunate situation was identified by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in its 1987 report, Intelligence Support to Arms Control:

There was a disturbing inconsistency, however, in the decisions made by policy planners concerning recommendations by U.S. intelligence on the monitorability of treaty provisions under discussion. In some cases, favorable judgments by U.S. Intelligence on its ability to monitor Soviet forces were not taken advantage of in developing proposals. In other cases, judgments by U.S. intelligence on its inability to monitor were apparently discounted in the formulation and adoption of proposals.¹⁴

From the viewpoint of a negotiator, really how valuable is intelligence support? Major General William F. Burns, USA (Ret.), former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, served as the JCS representative to the INF negotiations with the Soviet Union between 1982-86.¹⁵ In his view, intelligence

performs a critical role in support of the negotiator. His experience was that support overseas was "supurb"; only in obtaining support from the agencies in Washington did "bureaucratic inertia" at times adversely hinder the negotiations. Intelligence had its most useful role, in his view, in advising negotiators on our ability to monitor certain proposals. MG Burns stressed that the "Intelligence Community often must raise the question in the policymaking process; then lay out the consequences of a decision."¹⁶ His assessment of the role of intelligence in arms control negotiations clearly reveals the critical role intelligence must play in the whole process.

Another negotiator, Ambassador Paul C. Warnke, stated that "Arms Control negotiators are, of course, . . . dependent on good intelligence. Without it, they don't know where they want to go or when they're there."¹⁷

Both as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as chief arms negotiator in the first half of the Carter presidency, I found myself inescapably reliant on intelligence. As I am sure you know, our arms control positions are neither developed nor reformulated by the negotiators in Geneva. They are put together by an interagency working group In the Carter years, the draft positions were then submitted to the Special Coordinating Committee on which the secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of the Arms Control Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the President's National Security Adviser, and the Director of Central Intelligence all sat. The intelligence input was a major factor in the Special Coordinating Committee's deliberations.¹⁸

Ambassador Warnke also made favorable comments concerning his intelligence support in Geneva:

In addition to having Central Intelligence Agency officials on both the Washington working group and the Special Coordinating Committee, a CIA representative was a key member of the SALT delegation in Geneva. Both of the CIA officials with whom I had the pleasure of serving were highly competent and made major contributions to the negotiating process in addition to supplying the chief negotiator with daily briefings.¹⁹

RATIFICATION

The ratification phase of the arms control process involves intelligence support to a different body of decisionmakers--the U.S. Senate. The Senate participates by holding hearings on the treaty and advising and consenting to the President. In Calculated Risks, Bruce D. Berkowitz offers a succinct summary of the impact of intelligence on the Senate:

The hopes and fears of technology meet the reality of politics in arms control and the issue of verification. At a bare minimum, any arms control treaty adopted by the United States requires the signature of the President and ratification by two-thirds of the Senate. Yet such approval is unlikely unless the President and Senate believe U.S. intelligence is able to determine whether the Soviets are keeping their end of the agreement. And in order to succeed, arms control must maintain the confidence of the American public on verification, too.²⁰

During the ratification phase, the Intelligence Community must focus its full attention upon "critical support to the Congress during the ratification process."²¹ But it must be understood that, by its very existence, Senate ratification has profound impact on the entire arms control process. First, this phase must be considered during the policy development phase. Without anticipating political consequences, the policymaker can develop a proposed policy that is politically untenable. On the positive side, political pressure in its best form can prevent

arms control policies that are long on expediency (i.e., getting an agreement for agreement sake) and short on true arms control (i.e., enhancing security). Secondly, ratification plays a significant role in what is considered and accepted in the monitoring and verification phase. As the HPSCI has pointed out, "if monitoring requirements set by the executive branch can no longer be met by U.S. intelligence, it is a matter of great concern to Congress, and especially to the intelligence oversight committees."²² It follows that if the intelligence committees question whether a treaty can be verified and monitored, then the Senate will have similar concerns during the ratification hearings.

MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE

Finally, intelligence support to the arms control process makes its best known input in the monitoring-of-compliance phase. As head of the Intelligence Community, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has overall "responsibility for the monitoring of arms control agreements."²³ In contrast, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is responsible for the verification of arms control agreements.

The difference between monitoring and verification is very important when trying to understand and "assess the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence in its technical monitoring of arms control agreements."²⁴ The HPSCI noted the following differences:

Monitoring, which is the responsibility of U.S. intelligence, is one basic element of the verification process and involves the collection, exploitation, analysis, and reporting of information on Soviet

activities covered by arms control treaty limitations. Verification is the larger political process whereby policymakers determine whether the Soviet Union is or is not complying with arms control agreements.²⁵

The HPSCI also emphasized that National Technical Means (NTM) is the primary method used to monitor arms control agreements. According to the report, "NTM is a term which encompasses the technical collection means used for monitoring compliance with arms control agreements. These means include satellites and aircraft, as well as sea and ground-based reconnaissance systems."²⁶ The HPSCI report also indicated the important role of on-site inspection in the monitoring effort. The report asserts that "on-site inspections are generally regarded as a way to supplement NTM," but they caution not to expect on-site inspection to solve all verification problems. At best, they provide only a helpful supplement to other means of monitoring.²⁷ The role of the On-Site Inspection Agency will be presented in the next chapter.

The distinction between verification and monitoring was accepted back in the late 1960s, when SALT became a prospect. The DCI, Richard Helms, was very reluctant to commit the Intelligence Community to guarantee detection of any Soviet cheating.²⁸ During early discussions on how to approach the SALT negotiations, two basic questions arose: what constitutes adequate verification and what constitutes significant cheating? Helms realized that both were political questions and therefore refused to promise the ability to verify any agreement. This refusal might have stopped the agreement. But under presidential

pressure for an agreement, a compromise solution was worked out. Verification of compliance was subdivided into monitoring (what are they doing?) and compliance judgements (is it important?). Concerning the question about what constitutes significant cheating, it was agreed that before a suspected violation was considered to be "strategically significant," a predetermined number of a certain kind of missile would have to be involved in the possible violation, along with determination of the probability of such a deployment without detection. Most significantly, "it was agreed that the CIA should not have to make the final judgement on compliance. It was accepted that this was a policy decision, not . . . a 'technical' finding."²⁹

For several reasons, therefore, intelligence cannot be expected to do the actual verification of an arms control treaty.³⁰ First, the "degree of confidence" is always a political issue, especially in the ratification phase. Carefully distinguishing between monitoring and verification helps to limit the pressure on the Intelligence Community to promise more than it can produce. Second, the degree of verifiability is often directly related to policy provisions in the agreement (e.g., whether or not to allow missile telemetry encryption). Third, the traditional problem of ambiguity in the agreement, which easily leads to different interpretations of the rules, is extended to the problem of uncertainty in monitoring. Fourth, there is the possibility that monitoring assets could be lost after ratification. Examples are loss of listening sites, such as happened to the U.S. in recent years in Iran and Pakistan.

Fifth, intelligence confronts increasingly complex problems in monitoring strategic forces. The problem is no longer one of numbers but of more subjective questions in the areas of qualitateness and reliability. Finally, and possibly most significantly, intelligence operators frequently need to protect sources and methods even if they have "unambiguous proof" of violations. For the above reasons, the Intelligence Community should be required to monitor evidence pertinent to an arms control agreement but must be required to stay out of verification judgments which by their very nature are usually politicized.

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23. Ibid., p. 27.
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27. Ibid., p. 2.
28. Richard K. Betts, "American Strategic Intelligence: Politics, Priorities, and Direction," in Intelligence: Policy and National Security, ed. by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., p. 249.
29. Ibid., p. 250.
30. Ibid., pp. 250-251.

CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

OVERVIEW

The National Security Act of 1947 was a landmark act; it created a formal structure through which the President could conduct foreign affairs, to include the conduct of foreign intelligence activity. The act created the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency; it unified the military services within the Department of Defense.¹ The act put "authority for foreign intelligence activity on a statutory base."² It gave both the President and the Congress specific authority and responsibilities, although Congressional oversight was relatively limited until "the great intelligence investigation[s]" of 1975-77.³ National security policy formulation within the executive branch culminates in the NSC. In this chapter I will review NSC structures for arms control and intelligence policy within three structures--the policy community, the Intelligence Community, and the On-Site Inspection Agency.

POLICY COMMUNITY

The National Security Council is the primary forum for national security policy formulation and integration, to include arms control and intelligence policy.⁴ Statutory NSC members include the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) also participate

as statutory advisors. Normally NSC meetings are also attended by the Attorney General, Secretary of Treasury, the White House Chief of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.⁵

The NSC has been internally organized and operated to reflect the personal style of each President, although certain standing committees endure through successive administrations, including an intelligence committee and an arms control committee. In the Bush administration, National Security Directive 1 (NSD-1) established three subgroups: The NSC Principles Committee (NSC/PC); The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC); and ten policy coordinating committees (NSC/PCCs). "The NSC/PC is the senior interagency forum" while "the NSC/DC is the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security."⁶ Four of the PCCs are functional (intelligence, arms control, international economics, defense) and six are regional. The DCI chairs the Intelligence PCC and is a member of the Arms Control PCC, which is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The Arms Control PCC is responsible for formulating interdepartmental policy for arms control as well as for conducting oversight of the arms control process. This responsibility has been accomplished by responding to decisions and taskings from the more senior groups and overseeing the preparation of recommendations and papers.⁷ The Arms Control PCC accomplishes much of its work through subcommittees which

provide guidance for ongoing negotiations (START, CFE) and implementation of treaties (SALT, INF).

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In the realm of intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) or his representative participates on several NSC committees. His overall task has been to direct the activities of the CIA and the Intelligence Community, improve products, and recommend levels of resources.⁸ In actuality, the DCI never had more than coordinating authority over the Intelligence Community. However, this role was further weakened during the 1970s. But the DCI's responsibilities were strengthened by Executive Order 12333, signed by President Reagan on December 4, 1981.⁹ This gave the DCI full authority to approve the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget, which funds most intelligence activities.

The Intelligence Community is composed of elements of several departments and agencies of the executive branch:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Offices within the DOD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs [a euphemism for the National Reconnaissance Office], the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the intelligence elements of the Military Services, the FBI, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence constitute the Intelligence Community.¹⁰

The Intelligence Community is an "administrative apparatus composed of specialized agencies" who have evolved within various government departments.¹¹ The status of the Community can be summarized as follows:

This Community reflects the basic intelligence concept contained in the National Security Act of 1947. This established the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council to advise the National Security Council concerning foreign intelligence activities of the other governmental departments and agencies, to recommend to the National Security Council the coordination of the intelligence activities of other departments and agencies, and to perform services of common concern centrally. It was provided, however, that other departments and agencies should continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate what was identified as departmental intelligence, that is, intelligence for department purposes.¹²

The Community has traditionally encouraged a certain amount of "healthy competition" and "diversity of views." But there are procedures to coordinate a community view when needed. Examples are interagency coordinated national estimates and national daily current intelligence products. Assisting the DCI in coordinating the activities of the Intelligence Community is the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), which was established in 1972. The ICS is the principal DCI support staff for NFIP budget matters and day-to-day operating activities.¹³ The staff consists of 230 personnel who are involved in evaluating and monitoring programs and determining customer satisfaction with intelligence production.

Within the Intelligence Community, there are several elements that support arms control. The primary community staff is the Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS), CIA.¹⁴ According to unclassified sources, the ACIS has offices which

support strategic negotiations and multilateral negotiations, as well as a Treaty Monitoring Center. The ACIS also has integrated intelligence officers from other elements of the Community, which contributes to coordination.

The Treaty Monitoring Center is responsible for Intelligence Community arms control monitoring activities and intelligence support to the interagency policy process that guides treaty implementation and compliance analysis. Individuals who work at the center perform analysis and reporting of Soviet activities related to the INF Treaty and other existing treaties; coordination of collection requirements for monitoring; intelligence support to the on-site inspection process; and representing the Intelligence Community and the INF Treaty Monitoring Manager on interagency committees or working groups.¹⁵

Within the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency also provides intelligence support for the arms control process. The Directorate for External Relations (DI), has primary operational support responsibility to both policy offices and U.S. delegations.¹⁶ Specifically, the International Negotiations Division (DI-5), one of six divisions in DI, has the mission to provide direct intelligence support to negotiators and policymakers, both in Washington and overseas. Many of the major analytical offices within the Directorate for Foreign Intelligence, which produces the majority of the intelligence products in the agency, also contribute direct or indirect support.

ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY

While the Intelligence Community, utilizing its various sources of intelligence to include NTM, plays an important part

in monitoring for verification, the on-site inspection regime adds a complementary source of compliance information. Although the U.S. has traditionally demanded on-site inspections, the INF Treaty was the first Soviet agreement to such intrusive inspections.¹⁷ On-site inspections will no doubt be an integral part of all future arms control agreements.

The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) was established in 1988 specifically to "conduct inspections of Soviet intermediate nuclear forces (INF) facilities and [for] overseeing Soviet inspections of U.S. INF facilities in the United States and Western Europe."¹⁸ OSIA is staffed as follows:

OSIA uses 133 headquarters personnel, some 200 inspectors and 200 aircrew for baseline and closeout inspections involving 133 known sites, and needs 200 more inspectors available for portal monitoring at one production facility.¹⁹

OSIA and its counterpart Soviet agency accomplish their missions as follows:

Both the United States and the Soviet Union use the data base provided in the treaty's memorandum of understanding (MOU)--which details the number and location of INF missiles, launchers, and facilities--as a guideline for inspections."²⁰

The director of OSIA, Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, states that "the primary mission of the organization is to monitor on-site compliance. We do not make the broader verification judgements, which are done here in Washington by the policy community."²¹ Information collected by OSIA is consolidated with other data from other sources to arrive at a formal verification judgment by the verification bureaucracy.

While OSIA has added an important new dimension to monitoring, BG Lajoie emphasizes that "most of us involved in this process understand that it's not a panacea."²² This is especially true for INF, wherein OSIA is limited to 133 sites. "We can go to specific sites in search of specific information and return with more confidence than before concerning compliance at that particular site."²³ The most important point is that on-site inspection is not a replacement for NTM, but a supporting mechanism. In short, "it gives us more confidence, but under restrictive circumstances."²⁴ We are able to observe Soviet forces and gain knowledge, which gives us a better understanding of their capabilities and a better feel for the status of our relationship.

Although on-site inspection has become an indispensable part of arms control, U.S. enthusiasm for this means of monitoring has declined somewhat with experience.²⁵ There are several reasons for this decline: First, "the expense and complexity of on-site inspection arrangements are just being understood." For example, the present OSIA, which was established for the INF agreement, has the relatively simple task of monitoring the elimination of a class of weapons. Any Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement, by contrast, will involve inspecting hundreds of declared and suspect sites, which will require hundreds more inspectors and more complex inspection strategy. Since the CFE is a multilateral endeavor, our allies in NATO will of course be encouraged to participate in any CFE verification system, which will reduce U.S. costs and strengthen

the alliance. But coordinating this multilateral verification approach will be no easy matter. A second reason for declining enthusiasm for on-site inspections is the realization that any on-site inspection arrangement requires extensive information exchanges, not only prior to the start of any restructuring but afterward as well. The problem of verifying force levels in an unfamiliar situation necessitates further exchange of data.²⁶ Finally, some of the enthusiasm for on-site inspections has been tempered by the realization that inspections of our own facilities have their negative effects. "American industry has begun to worry about downtime during inspections, and about revelations of classified and proprietary industrial information."²⁷

ENDNOTES

1. Tyrus G. Fain, ed., The Intelligence Community: History, Organization, and Issues, p. 15.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy, pp. 39-45. A full accounting of the Rockefeller Commission, the U.S. Senate's Church Committee, and the House Pike Committee resulted in significant changes in intelligence oversight. As a result, the SSCI was established on 19 May 1976, and the HPSCI followed in July 1977.
4. "National Security Council Organization," USAWC Student Handout, 17 April 1989, p. 1.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Fain, p. 26.
9. Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 379.

10. Ibid., p. 9.
11. Ibid., p. 24.
12. Fain, p. 26.
13. Richelson, p. 379.
14. U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, Intelligence Support to Arms Control, p. 10.
15. Career Opportunity Announcement No. 89-27a, Defense Intelligence Agency, 21 Dec 89.
16. Defense Intelligence Agency, Organization, Mission and Key Personnel, DRS-2600-926-87, November 1987.
17. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., "The On-Site Inspection Legacy," Arms Control Today, November 1988, p. 2.
18. BG Roland Lajoie, Interview, "Insights of An On-Site Inspector," Arms Control Today, November 1988, p. 3.
19. Thomas J. Hirschfeld, "The Toughest Verification Challenge: Conventional Forces in Europe," p. 21.
20. Lajoie, p.3.
21. Ibid., p. 8.
22. Ibid., p. 10.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Hirschfeld, p. 21.
26. Ibid., p. 18.
27. Ibid., p. 21.

CHAPTER IV

ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

This essay has defined terms, defined and explained the roles for intelligence in support of arms control, and described in general terms the communities involved in policy, monitoring, and verification. During my research of unclassified sources, I have also identified several issues that appear to affect the ability of the Intelligence Community and the OSIA to support arms control. For discussion purposes, these issues and challenges have been divided into three subgroups: First, issues and challenges inherent in the intelligence discipline; second, issues and challenges inherent in arms control bureaucratic relationships; third, the nature of Soviet activity in arms control agreements--both before and during the Gorbachev era.

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

Within the Intelligence Community itself, there are several structural and procedural problems that can adversely impact the quality of intelligence. First, the Intelligence Community has since its inception in 1947, been faced with the difficult task of coordinating its efforts.¹ The diversity of organizations and the frames of reference that they reflect inherently present a challenge to providing a valid and coordinated view--no less so in arms control support. "Each analysis reflects the variety of values, perspectives, and goals of the producing unit."² While all the elements of the Community share the common goal of providing intelligence to policymakers, the members of the

Intelligence Community serve diverse policymakers. Therefore, each element inevitably brings a parochial orientation to its attempts to logically interpret raw intelligence data. It is not unusual, therefore, that CIA may often view military related matters differently than DIA, such as the level of quality of Soviet strategic missile systems and the significance of that quality. Therefore, the challenge of coordinating different views will always exist. "The dilemma between too much or too little coordination is a problem that cannot be solved, but can only be managed, and it requires an adroit, pragmatic, and experienced President and DCI."³

Another challenge, one of the most serious facing the Community, is the "glut of information" which it has faced in recent decades due to ever-increasing collection and processing technology. "Intelligence analysts in the United States can already detect far more than they can absorb, and it is the problem of digesting all the available data" that has nearly overwhelmed the Intelligence Community the last three decades.⁴ The Community is engaged in a continual struggle to process, evaluate, analyze and report in a timely fashion the ever-increasing amounts of collected data. Not only is there more data, "more expertise is required to assess or evaluate the increasing amounts of data."⁵

Another issue of continuing concern is compartmentation--limiting access to intelligence in order to protect sources and methods. This is often a critical requirement but it can weaken the arms control process by limiting access of "people who can

offer thoughtful judgments either about arms control proposals or about verification risks."⁶

The problem is compounded by "the frequent lack of expertise by the policy makers."⁷ Rarely does a high level policymaker, military or civilian, have extensive intelligence experience. They rarely have a sophisticated appreciation for the inherent uncertainties involved in estimates of what is occurring, nor have they encountered the reality of having conflicting intelligence analysis. Too often, an estimate is accepted as fact without understanding the uncertainties nor appreciating how different conclusions can be derived. Uninitiated consumers don't realize or else they ignore warnings that intelligence is only an estimate based on fragments of information and experience of the analyzers. Quite often, the personality, rank, and/or agency of the intelligence officer is the sole basis for selecting one view over another.

BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIPS

Intelligence and arms control, while different functions, actually help each other. Their relationship has been termed "a marriage of convenience."⁸ Intelligence provides evidence of treaty compliance, which then generates confidence in the arms control process. Arms control, however, often "complicates intelligence work. It forces greater precision and more effort than is normally needed just to monitor and analyze opposing forces."⁹ This need for greater precision and more effort translates into adding more targets for collection systems and

raising the collection priority for other targets. Both of these actions can distort and overload a collection system, resulting in other important mission areas not being satisfied.

The other side of the equation is that arms control can make the intelligence job easier "because the limitations established by verifiable agreements make the size, composition, and deployment of the force elements that have been limited or reduced by arms control easier to keep track of and more predictable."¹⁰ That is, both the data exchanged as part of the agreement and various confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) makes the monitoring job much easier.

There are, of course, issues inherent in the monitoring and verification relationship which together constitutes treaty implementation. Keep in mind that monitoring requires the examination of Soviet military activities as they relate to treaty obligations, while "verification requires judgements on compliance, taking into account not just the raw data but also negotiating history and policy considerations."¹¹ In order for treaty implementation to be successful, we need "the establishment of an effective U.S. management system for handling treaty implementation and compliance questions."¹² That is, there must be "improved cooperation and coordination . . . within the executive branch to insure that treaty implementation and compliance questions are handled expeditiously and properly."¹³

First and foremost, we must keep monitoring and verification as separate functions--with the Intelligence Community responsible for the former and ACDA responsible for the

latter. Blurring of the line between monitoring and verification--never entirely distinct--can often lead to the politicization of intelligence.¹⁴ In the early years of the Reagan administration, according to some critics, politicization led to the misuse of intelligence to support the bias that the Soviets habitually cheat on arms control. These critics argued that the Reagan administration allowed too much policy representation in the monitoring analysis process, which inprudently put undue pressure on the Intelligence Community to interpret data to provide "facts" in support of policy. The arms control structure thus "produced reports of Soviet noncompliance of very uneven quality."¹⁵ The results might have been different had the monitoring community operated more independently. Therefore, "it is logical to place the main responsibility for treaty interpretation [and verification] in the hands of the policy agencies with negotiating responsibility, while the Intelligence Community focuses on monitoring Soviet military activities and intentions."¹⁶

A final issue is the view held by many that the U.S. needs better net assessments.¹⁷ This view holds that there needs to be a better system "for comparing the forces of both sides." These critics argue that "in the design phase of arms control agreements, the U.S. position is largely determined by what we assume the Soviets have, how threatening we think the force is, and what we might therefore wish to trade against these elements."¹⁸ Although for years there have been similar proposals for better net assessments, these never materialize

because of the difficulties of "inertia and fears of what a Pentagon-CIA agreed net assessment might do to weapon programs."¹⁹ In my view, producing a single structured net assessment is unrealistic, given the realities of our political and bureaucratic systems and the inherent uncertainties of intelligence. We are again in the area of political decisionmaking where the outcome most often reflects the political philosophy of the decisionmaker which can greatly increase our risk.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

The third general subgroup of issues relates to Soviet behavior in the arms control process and the U.S.-Soviet relationship. In previous years there was justified concern that the Soviet Union would cheat on agreements, or at least comply in an ambiguous manner, trying to gain advantage at the margins. Over the years, when indicators of possible violations were detected, the verification question was whether the activity was "militarily significant."²⁰ If the activity was determined to be militarily significant, then steps were taken to file complaints with the Soviets.

A related question, whenever violations are detected, is what is the source of the alleged cheating?²¹ That is, does the violation represent a calculated policy directed by the Soviet Politburo or by persons much further down the chain of command? Or is the alleged violation a blunder by someone? Or is the alleged violation actually the result of a disagreement

over interpretation of terms in the treaty? As was the case in the past, I suspect that even during the Gorbachev era of glasnost there will be many instances of ambiguous indicators which point to cheating. Our task will continue to be to decide the probable source of the alleged cheating and what to do about it, if anything. The inherent Soviet desire for secrecy and their use of deception will undoubtedly continue, adding to the problem of compliance verification. Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN (Ret.), former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, clearly states that "it is not unusual for military forces to practice cover and deception, trying to obscure the nature of their activities and their plans for using their operating forces."²² Therefore, even in the Gorbachev era I would expect a certain level of deception, although not to the extent previously. This deception will continue to add to the challenge of monitoring and verification.

Ambassador Warnke identified the important issue of flexibility, which the U.S. attempts to build into all agreements. In most agreements this flexibility is usually in the form of provisions for modernization. This desire for flexibility is often reflected in "ambiguous treaty language that the Soviets have exploited."²³ Thus flexibility is always a difficult trade-off in any treaty, since in the long run an ill defined treaty can result in less security, rather than more security.

Another issue in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is the fact that historically "the ability to monitor and verify a treaty is

much more important to the United States than it is to the Soviets," for two reasons:

First, the Soviets do not need nearly as good a technological intelligence system as we do because so many other ways of gathering intelligence exist in the United States than in the Soviet Union. Second, the differences between our respective political systems make it much easier for the Soviets to find out what is going on in this country than it is for us to find out what they are doing. . . . The Soviets simply do not have to worry about the question of monitoring and verifying treaties in as much detail as we do. They have good information about our activities.²⁴

A final issue in the U.S.-Soviet arms control relationship has to do with trust. "The U.S. approach to arms control has historically been based on an explicit assumption of Soviet untrustworthiness."²⁵ Historical experience has taught us to be very leery of Soviet behavior and statements. Their declaratory statements often are what we want to hear, while their behavior is contrary to the statements. History should teach us that trust is not enough--not even in the era of glasnost. The stakes are too high to rely on trust alone. We must make verifiable arms control agreements that add to our security. The political atmosphere, of course, between the two countries will contribute to a definition of what is adequate verification.

As we continue to pursue arms control with the Soviet Union, we must take into consideration the changes in the world. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev has made some abrupt turnarounds in behavior. For example, the INF agreement allowing on-site inspection was a dramatic change for the Soviets. There is reason to believe that the Soviets want effective arms control

agreements as badly--or more desperately--than the West. Therefore, it is time to adjust our verification approach. In future arms control agreements we should follow the guidance set forth by Mr. Allan S. Kress in 1985:

First, we must assume that the Soviets have an objective interest in the success and preservation of agreements. Second, we must be willing to be reassured by evidence of Soviet compliance. Third, we must maintain confidence in our own intelligence capabilities and recognize that the more militarily significant a violation is, the less likely the Soviets can keep it hidden. Finally, we must treat ambiguities, technical violations, and misunderstandings in a calm, businesslike, and confidential manner on the assumption that the other side has an interest in clarifying and correcting any incidents of noncompliance.²⁵

ENDNOTES

1. Stafford T. Thomas, The U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 65.
2. Ibid., p. 67.
3. Ibid., p. 74.
4. Allan S. Krass, "The Politics of Verification," pp. 739-740.
5. Thomas, p. 66.
6. Bobby R. Inman, Admiral, USN (Ret.), "The Military Perspective," in Intelligence and Arms Control: A Marriage of Convenience, ed. by Thomas J. Hirschfeld, p. 47.
7. Thomas, p. 67.
8. Thomas J. Hirschfeld, "A Marriage of Convenience," in Intelligence and Arms Control, p. 14.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Michael Krepon and Sidney N. Graybeal, "How to Streamline the Arms Control Bureaucracy," p. 14.
12. Ibid., p. 11.
13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 14.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Hirschfeld, p. 97.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 98.
20. Douglas George, Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, "The Estimative Process," in Intelligence and Arms Control: A Marriage of Convenience, ed. by Thomas J. Hirschfeld, p. 22.
21. Inman, p. 52.
22. Ibid.
23. Hirschfeld, p. 96.
24. Hans Mark, "The Technological Dimension," in Intelligence and Arms Control: A Marriage of Convenience, ed. by Thomas J. Hirschfeld, p. 72.
25. Krass, p. 749.
26. Ibid., p. 750.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This paper began with definitions of intelligence and arms control. It then set out to argue that intelligence support to the arms control process is critical to the success of arms control. This thesis was supported by identifying and describing the roles of intelligence in arms control. These roles include support to policy formulation, support to treaty negotiation, and support to ratification. Finally, during verification, intelligence supports the implementation of the treaty through monitoring.

In the U.S. Government's approach to arms control, there is a distinction made between monitoring for compliance and the actual verification of compliance. The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for monitoring, while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has responsibility for verification. Adjudication of conflicting interpretations occurs within the NSC committee structure. For several reasons, intelligence cannot be expected to do the actual verification of an arms control treaty. Most importantly, determination of an acceptable degree of confidence is always a political issue, although based on military judgement. Assigning intelligence responsibility for monitoring, rather than verification, helps to limit the politicization of intelligence. Second, the degree of verifiability is often directly related to policy provisions in the agreement. Third, the traditional problem of ambiguity in the agreement will always be there to some extent, which leads to

different interpretations of the treaty rules. Finally, there is the need to protect sources and methods, even when we have "unambiguous proof" of violations.

The organizational structure for arms control was then reviewed. Analysis of the structure began with the policy community--NSC and ACDA; then it proceeded to the Intelligence Community; finally, the On-Site Inspection Agency was described.

To conclude, issues identified during the research for this paper were analyzed within three subgroups: Issues and challenges inherent in the intelligence discipline; these must be managed successfully to limit adverse impact on intelligence products. Second, issues and challenges inherent in arms control bureaucratic relationships; these are best managed by keeping separate the actual monitoring analysis and verification structures. Third, the historical nature of Soviet behavior; this gives the West justification for caution, and reinforces the need for continued emphasis on verification.

Concerning the historical nature of Soviet behavior, we must appreciate that Soviet behavior has changed under the Gorbachev regime, and we can hope that the cooperative attitude experienced during the INF agreement will continue. For the future, our continued emphasis on verifiable treaties, supported by cooperative Soviet behavior, should result in arms control agreements that truly strengthen peace and provide enhanced security. Within the "marriage of convenience," intelligence will continue to have a key part to play in the arms control process.

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