United States National Strategy in Panama
Abstract
The spectacle of the United States being defied by someone who was little better than a street thug in the fall of 1989 was the beginning of this paper. How did we get to the position where General Manuel Antonio Noriega could laugh at our threats? This paper reviews the stated U.S. national interests and then looks at several informed observers opinions of national strategy in Latin America. Next a strategic appraisal of Panama is presented. This appraisal also looks at domestic politics which plays such a vital role in our strategy toward Panama. Following this a chronology of the crisis between the U.S. and General Noriega, culminating in Operation Just Cause in December 1989. Additionally the effects of the U.S. economic sanctions was detailed and an analysis of why our policy failed. An analysis of whether Operation Just Cause met the tests of the Weinberger Doctrine is also included. Based on the strategic appraisal and the differing views of the U.S. policy a national strategy for Panama is developed. This includes specific national objectives, and concepts and resources linked to these objectives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 05, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA223089
Entities
People
- Michael K. Evenson
Organizations
- United States Army War College