


2

DTIC FILE COPY



The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STATING AIR DEFENSE TASKS AND MISSIONS

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM L. CARR

AD-A223 398

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

14 MAY 1990

DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 02 1990
S EB D



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

80 06 20 087

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Stating Air Defense Tasks and Missions		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Study Project
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC William L. Carr		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		12. REPORT DATE 14 May 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 55
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) A commander's statement of his mission and the tasks he specifies for his subordinates to perform are the results of his decision making. Discussion and illustrative examples published in doctrinal literature assist commanders with the preparation of statements. This paper reviewed doctrinal standards then applied them to prescriptions and illustrations that address air defense operations. It found that published air defense task and mission statements fail to meet general doctrinal standards. Following an analysis of		

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

illustrative examples, the paper suggests improvements. Examples that meet standards are presented to illustrate statements that encourage commanders to consider air defense operations in clear and precise terms. Examples include an air defense mission statement, and tactical tasks for both Air Defense Artillery and other types of units. Operational and strategic tasks are discussed and possible tasks are formulated.

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STATING AIR DEFENSE TASKS AND MISSIONS
AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel William L. Carr

Colonel Ralph L. Allen
Project Advisor

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
14 May 1990

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: William L. Carr, LTC, AD

TITLE: Stating Air Defense Tasks and Missions

FORMATS: Individual Study Project

DATE: 14 May 1990 PAGES: 48

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

A commander's statement of his mission and the tasks he specifies for his subordinates to perform are the results of his decision making. Discussion and illustrative examples published in doctrinal literature assist commanders with the preparation of statements. This paper reviewed doctrinal standards then applied them to prescriptions and illustrations that address air defense operations. It found that published air defense task and mission statements fail to meet general doctrinal standards. Following an analysis of illustrative examples, the paper suggests improvements. Examples that meet standards are presented to illustrate statements that encourage commanders to consider air defense operations in clear and precise terms. Examples include an air defense mission statement, and tactical tasks for both Air Defense Artillery and other types of units. Operational and strategic tasks are discussed and possible tasks are formulated.

(SDW)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	ii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION	1
Purpose	1
Scope	2
Limitations	2
II. DOCTRINAL BASIS	6
Background	6
General Doctrinal Guidance	9
Air Defense Guidance	11
Summary	15
III. THE STATE OF ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES	19
An Air Defense Artillery Mission	
Statement Analysis	19
Air Defense Artillery Task Statements	21
A U.S. Command and General Staff College	
Illustration	23
Conclusions	26
IV. DOCTRINAL CHANGES	28
An Improved Mission Illustration	29
Use Field Language	30
Avoid the Expression "In Priority"	35
Add definitive Purposes	36
Illustrate Non Air Defense Artillery	
Tasks	37
Illustrate Strategic Tasks	38
Illustrate Operational Tasks	41
Conclusions	41
V. RECOMMENDATIONS	46
BIBLIOGRAPHY	49



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification _____	
By _____	
Distribution/ _____	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

STATING AIR DEFENSE TASKS AND MISSIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States Army greatly improved its air defense doctrine during the past decade. AirLand Battle doctrine was incorporated into air defense guidance.¹ All levels of war were addressed during doctrinal treatments of concepts and planning. Air defense operations were defined as one of seven battlefield operating systems. Most significantly, the Army's traditional defensive air defense posture was expanded to include offensive concepts.² Over the past ten years the Army has changed its air defense philosophy and guidance more than all its changes since the beginning of World War II.

PURPOSE

In one critical aspect, the stating of air defense tasks and missions, the Army has progressed little since World War II. Current Army doctrine offers little explanation to guide the stating of definitive air defense tasks. Students working to become proficient with the integration of air defense and other battlefield systems have only limited doctrinal discussions and examples to help them professionally specify task and mission statements. There are prescriptions for tactical missions but examples are written in general, vague terms that do not reflect incisive decision making. Doctrine addresses strategic and operational tasks but provides no examples at all.³ Illustrative

examples published in doctrinal publications are influential guides for students seeking personal proficiency. Published doctrine and air defense examples should guide students to develop clear, concise air defense tasks and missions that precisely reflect the decision and basic intent of the issuing commander. Current doctrine falls far short of this mark; published examples are all understated. The purpose of this paper is to convince senior Army leaders to improve doctrinal guidance regarding the stating of clear, precise air defense tasks and missions at all levels of war and to revise illustrative examples published in doctrinal publications.

This paper addresses both operational tasks and mission statements. Tasks specified by a commander to a subordinate commander and the essential tasks contained in the subordinate's mission statement are often the same. While conducting his mission analysis, the subordinate commander determines the tasks specified by the higher commander. These tasks include the operational tasks in the operation plan or order of the higher headquarters. The subordinate commander also determines the implied tasks his unit must accomplish to satisfy either the overall mission or any of the specified tasks. From his list of specified and implied tasks, the subordinate commander identifies those tasks that are absolutely essential to accomplish the mission. These tasks he includes in his mission statement.⁴ This close relationship between essential tasks and mission statements infer that their basic characteristics should be similar. The paper discusses each separately but also applies guidance directed towards one to the other if logic so suggests.

Additionally, the term "task" throughout the paper includes the essential tasks of the mission statements unless otherwise indicated.

SCOPE

To demonstrate the status of current Army doctrine this paper presents general doctrinal guidance for stating the operational tasks and missions of any type of unit and specific guidance for stating air defense tasks and missions. The paper then analyzes the air defense guidance using the general guidance as a standard. Chapter IV suggests points for preparing improved task statements. Finally, the paper's conclusions propose how the Army's leader can revise doctrine to improve upon the current situation.

LIMITATIONS

A commander's decision consists of more than a statement of the essential task to be performed. He also states his concept and his intent and issues planning guidance. These instructions result from some problem-solving process that consists of situation estimation, alternative consideration, and solution selection.⁵ This paper focuses only on task statements rather than discussing the other elements of the commander's decision or the decision-making process. The premise is that the ultimate quality of task statements depends upon the quality of the estimations, analysis, and decisions that preceded their formulation.

Doctrine is discussed, debated, and clarified in media other than standard military publications. Academic lectures, seminars, and classes, official and unofficial magazines, and studies are just some of the sources available to enlighten a student. This paper only describes doctrine as it is disseminated in standard military publications. Over time, only these documents remain readily available to military students, staff, and commanders. The contents of current Army air defense and staffing publications form the basis for the status of guidance relative to stating air defense tasks. Officers and soldiers have reasonable access to such documents. Current and draft joint publications and current Army publications form the basis for the discussion of strategic and operational tasks.⁶ Joint publications are undergoing significant revision as joint doctrine is formulated and coordinated with service doctrine.⁷ Officers developing air defense tasks at operational or strategic levels should have access to these sources.⁸

United States Army and Army Air Corps operation plans and field orders of the European Theater of Operations are possible historical sources of the World War II examples of air defense tasks. Cited tasks are from plans and orders issued before or relatively shortly after the invasion of Northwestern Europe. After this time, written instructions for air defense operations disappeared as rapidly as the enemy air threat. Although an enemy air threat existed in the North African Theater of Operations, American field orders containing air defense instructions were not available.

This paper liberally transposes doctrine from World War II to the current time. Today's emerging joint doctrine is applied to the situation as it existed during World War II. The paper's intent is to relate historical tasks in current doctrinal terms.⁹

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-1, p. i. (hereafter referred to as "FM 44-1").
2. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-100, p. i. (hereafter referred to as "FM 44-100").
3. In this paper the adjective "operational" refers either to an action which occurs during the conduct of military operations or to the operational level of war. To distinguish between the two usages, an endnote will indicate when the adjective refers to the operational level of war.
4. Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5 (25 May 1984), pp. 5-8. (hereafter referred to as "FM 101-5")
5. Ibid., p. 5-1 - 5-10.
6. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war. See endnote 3.
7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1-01, pp. I-1 - I-4.
8. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war. See endnote 3.
9. For example, The Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive, 12 February 1944, appointed General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. His area of operations was called the European Theater of Operations. He was responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In current doctrinal terminology he would be the commander-in-chief of a theater of war and would accomplish strategic tasks received from alliance leadership.

CHAPTER II
DOCTRINAL BASIS

BACKGROUND

On the eve of World War II Major G. deL. Carrington, an instructor at the Army War College, delivered a lecture on the employment of antiaircraft artillery in a theater of operations.¹ To illustrate the doctrinal portion of his presentation, Major Carrington developed an antiaircraft artillery plan that supported a hypothetical attack by a Blue state into a Red state's territory. He established a prioritized list of objectives by considering the relative importance to the Blue theater commander of Blue assets that may be attacked by Red aircraft. The major then separately allocated enough gun and automatic weapons units to properly defend the first objective. He continued allocating priority by priority until all available units were committed. Finally, he organized the defenses for command and control and summarized the principles for employing antiaircraft artillery. In an efficient manner, Major Carrington presented both the doctrine for employing antiaircraft artillery and a clear, concise application of that doctrine.²

In spite of the excellent job of describing how to employ antiaircraft artillery to protect assets of the theater commander, the major did not demonstrate how to communicate the theater commander's decision to subordinate commanders. His lecture would have been more complete if he had stated the

antiaircraft tasks each unit was to accomplish, but it probably was not necessary. Doctrine spelled it out for the students. The Coast Artillery Field Manual prescribed forms for antiaircraft artillery unit orders from regiment through battery level which suggested task wording.³ The statements in regimental through battery orders were almost the same, only the level of the commander was different:

"Decision of the regimental commander to provide antiaircraft artillery gun and machine-gun protection for certain units, areas, or establishments."⁴

The preliminary command course students attending the lecture only had to insert the name of the units and the objectives selected during the planning exercise to specify the tasks to any of the antiaircraft units. Instructions for a corps order indicated the wording of task statements for antiaircraft units.⁵ This example and the Staff Officers' Field Manual framed antiaircraft artillery instructions for combined arms unit operations.⁶ The staff manual contained forms for various types of operations: attack, defense of a riverline, etc. These forms specified when and where to include antiaircraft artillery instructions. Subparagraph 3c of the form of an order for a defense of a coast line was typical:

"Instructions for any attached antiaircraft artillery including protection for general reserve in movement to counterattack."⁷

With all this guidance, it was simple for the students to prepare a task for each unit,

901st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade provides antiaircraft artillery gun and machine-gun protection for the Harrisburg-Middletown bridges,

and insert them into the prescribed paragraph.

Unfortunately, the period between 1932 and 1940 was the high water mark for simplicity in orders preparation. The August, 1940, edition of the Staff Officers' Field Manual substituted the general form for a field order and a set of checklists for the previous order forms.⁸ Every checklist contained an antiaircraft reminder similar to the one in the attack checklist:

"Antiaircraft Artillery: Gun and automatic weapon defense."⁹

The comfort of a tailored format with a specific antiaircraft artillery subparagraph for recurring tactical situations was abandoned; only the general form remained. The 1943 Antiaircraft Artillery Field Manual followed suit by providing a commander's checklist and by referring the reader to the staff manual.¹⁰ Freedom from the tyranny of prescribed forms and statements may have been great for knowledgeable commanders, but World War II students trying to quickly learn to conduct antiaircraft operations lost the benefit of seeing at least one way to state tasks and missions. Today, the Army still has not replaced the abandoned guidance for students of air defense operations seeking the skill of stating tasks and missions clearly and precisely.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the guidance applicable to stating specified air defense tasks and missions. Both guidance applicable generally and guidance directed at air defense tasks and missions will be discussed.

GENERAL DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE

Task Statements

Army doctrine does not substantially address the stating of operational tasks. Indirectly, such discussion is subsumed in the presentation of the characteristics of good combat orders. The explanations which amplify each characteristic provides basic directions for stating tasks, Figure 1. While all of the directions except that of timeliness apply to tasks, the directions of the five asterisked characteristics primarily shape task statements.¹¹ This paper will adopt all but the last of the directions of Figure 1 as the criteria for judging task statements.

<u>CHARACTERISTIC</u>	<u>DIRECTION</u>
*Clarity	Use accepted doctrinally-established military terms.
*Completeness	Ensure that subordinates conform to the purpose or intent of the force commander.
Brevity	Avoid unnecessary detail.
Recognition of the subordinate commander's perogatives	Infringe on the initiative of subordinates only under unusual circumstances.
*Use of affirmative form	Indicate desired action
*Avoidance of qualified directives	Eliminate meaningless expressions. Eliminate expressions that lessen responsibilities.
*Authoritative expression	Direct subordinates in unmistakable terms.
Timeliness	Provide subordinates sufficient time.

Figure 1. The Characteristics of a Good Combat Order.

Mission Statements

The general composition of mission statements for combat estimates, plans, and orders is well defined in joint and Army doctrine: the restated mission consists of a clear, concise statement of essential tasks and the purpose to be achieved. Army doctrine specifically eliminates routine and standing operating procedure (SOP) tasks from the mission and directs that tasks be listed in execution sequence. It also prescribes that the purpose should indicate criteria for determining the feasibility and attainability of the course of action.¹² Operationally, Army doctrine states that missions will usually specify who, what, when, where, and why the action is to be taken.¹³ Figure 2 summarizes doctrinal requirements for stating operational missions.




Figure 2. Specified Doctrinal Requirements for Mission Statements.

The current staff officers' manual provides illustrations containing air defense mission statements. In a discussion of tasks for combat support elements, the general format for operation plans and orders directs that the air defense subparagraph contain an organization for combat, assigned tactical missions to include priorities of fire, and reference to an annex, if any.¹⁴ Examples of plans and orders for tactical echelons from corps to battalion contain Air Defense Artillery tasks.¹⁵ A corps defensive operations plan demonstrates two such tasks:

"e. Air Defense.

"(1) Protect in priority passage of lines, COSCOM and corps HQ."

"(2) 401st ADA Gp: (GS). Position one HAWK battalion in the 25th Armd Div sector and one in the 52d Mech Div sector."¹⁶

The first task is typical of tasks in the other example plans and orders. The detail of the stated priorities do vary from vague to precise although vaguely stated priorities are most frequent. The second task is an unusual example of a narrative task. Nowhere in the examples is there an example of an air defense tasking to units other than Air Defense Artillery units.

AIR DEFENSE GUIDANCE

An entire family of publications has evolved from volume II, Antiaircraft Artillery, of the Coast Artillery Field Manual used by Major Carrington in 1937. This family is still evolving. Currently, there are two capstone doctrinal manuals for air defense operations. The newest focuses on air defense as a battlefield operating system.¹⁷ The other publication prescribes

doctrine for Air Defense Artillery.¹⁸ Together these two manuals greatly improved upon previous doctrine but they still have not reestablished the doctrinal support for preparing task statements that Major Carrington enjoyed.

Combined arms air defense operations is the focus of Field Manual 44-100. Its purpose is to provide operational guidance for commanders, trainers, and leaders at all echelons of the Army. The manual explains the integration of air defense into the operational and tactical levels of war in broad, general terms. It prescribes two primary operational objectives: "gain control of the air environment and protect the force," and four tactical objectives:

- retain the freedom to maneuver,
- protect command and control,
- sustain the battle, and
- destroy enemy aircraft.¹⁹

Appendix C, Air Defense Staff Planning, provides a form for an air defense annex of a supported unit's operation order.

Unfortunately, the manual's author confuses the reader by wording paragraph two as if it were for an air defense unit only:

"2. MISSION. A short paragraph stating the mission for the air defense unit. The mission statement should be a clear, concise statement of the air defense task. (Must answer the questions who, what, when, where, and why.)"²⁰

while the remainder of the annex is organized to inform all applicable arms and services of their air defense tasks in the prescribed operation.²¹ Overall, the manual provides students clear doctrine for the air defense system but leaves them without

help in preparing air defense orders.

The capstone Air Defense Artillery manual confuses air defense students seeking help with the problem at hand. It discusses air defense specified tasks but used the term "mission" instead of the term "task." It redefined support terms as standard tactical missions. Finally, the manual limits its discussion to the tactical level of war. There is no substantive mention of the operational or strategic levels.²² Although the manual recognizes the importance of a "well-defined, comprehensive mission statement properly articulated by the commander" that identifies the goals of the commander, it obscured rather than clarified the issue of stating tasks and missions.²³

The terminology of the manual must confuse students. By reading the section addressing Air Defense Artillery tactical missions carefully, it becomes apparent the manual is discussing the assignment of tactical tasks to subordinate commanders even though the term "mission" is repeatedly used.²⁴ Requiring students to recognize and translate terms in order to understand doctrine does not help teach them to state anything clearly and concisely.

Air Defense Artillery standard tactical missions assigned relationships between supported and supporting Air Defense Artillery units but did not clarify air defense tasks. This detour began in 1970, evolved somewhat in 1976, then continued unchanged into today's doctrine.²⁵ Before this, Air Defense Artillery missions were described in terms of tasks.²⁶ The four

standard tactical missions, general support, general support reinforcing, reinforcing, and direct support, address important issues but do not state specifically what was to be accomplished or why. Fortunately, the detour that defined support relationships as missions has been recognized and should be corrected in the future.²⁷

With the doctrinal recognition of three levels of war, it is also likely that a future capstone manual will discuss operational and strategic tasks.²⁸ The current manual only briefly touches on these levels in its discussion of the Air Defense Artillery role in AirLand Battle doctrine.²⁹

The other Air Defense Artillery manuals generally repeat the "standard tactical mission" doctrine described above without significant additional guidance. Several manuals illustrate mission statements in example annexes. These statements generally follow one of the following forms:

"3-441 ADA (C/V) provides air defense protection for brigade trains, DISCOM, division main, division artillery in priority and provides short-range AD for 201st ACR during covering force operation and movement through division sector."³⁰

"The 3-441 ADA (C/V) is in Direct Support of 54th Mech, providing low altitude air defense not later than (DATE TIME GROUP) within the division sector."³¹

"1-440 ADA Bn (Y/S) with attachments provides SHORAD protection to maneuver brigades 1, 2, and 3 and 54th CAB located initially at NA6780, NA6085, NA8042, NA9536 respectively, DISCOM vic NA6020, DTOC vic NB015201 NLT 010530."³²

Air defense task statements are either similar to example essential tasks or implied. The specified task of each of the above mission statements is a form of the same task, provide air

defense protection to some set of assets. Included in the same examples are tasks to subordinate Air Defense Artillery units that are variations of the following:

"C/3-441 ADA: DS to 2d Brigade. Priority of protection to brigade trains and supporting artillery in that order."

Two other examples were slightly different:

"O/O protect TF Armor (2-76)"

"On order move to air ambush site vic EH303048."³³

The former example is an authoritative version of the essential task. The latter example implies that the subordinate unit is to ambush enemy aircraft. The review of all example tasks contained in current Air Defense Artillery publications indicates that air defense tasks to subordinates either are similar to example essential tasks or are not specified but implied by prioritized lists of assets to be protected.

SUMMARY

This chapter reviewed current Army manuals to locate doctrine that addresses the stating of air defense tasks and missions. General doctrine applicable to task and mission statements of any type unit was reviewed as well as specific doctrine applicable to air defense tasks and missions. There is no direct general doctrine for stating tasks at any level of war, tactical, operational, or strategic.³⁴ Indirect direction may be deduced from broader guidance and applied to task statements. That direction is summarized in Figure 1. Doctrine applicable to mission statements exists. Those prescriptions are summarized in

Figure 2. The doctrinal review of specific guidance for stating air defense tasks and missions revealed the following:

- o Some current air defense manuals define support relationships as standard tactical missions. The doctrine indicates that these "missions" are actually tasks to subordinates.

- o The only specific guidance for stating air defense artillery tasks and missions other than the prescriptions defining the standard tactical missions are tactical examples contained in illustrative operation plans, orders, and annexes.

- o Illustrative air defense mission statements are similar in form and content.

- o The essential tasks of all of the illustrative tactical mission statements are some form of the expression: to provide air defense protection to some specified assets.

- o Almost all illustrations of air defense tasks to subordinates either are similar to the mission-statement task above, are an authoritative variant: protect some specified asset, or are implied.

- o There are no illustrative air defense tasks for units other than Air Defense Artillery units.

- o There are no illustrative examples of air defense operational or strategic tasks.

ENDNOTES

1. G. deL. Carrington, Antiaircraft Artillery in a Theater of Operations. Lecture. Fort Humphreys, D.C.: U.S. Army War College, 15 September 1937.

2. Carrington, pp. 1-12
3. U.S. Department of War, Coast Artillery Field Manual, 3 January 1933, Vol. II, p. 125 - 132.
4. Ibid., p. 125.
5. Ibid.
6. U.S. Department of War, Staff Officers' Field Manual (26 September 1932), pp. 45 - 100.
7. Ibid., p. 70.
8. U.S. Department of War, Field Manual 101-5 (19 August 1940), pp. 96 - 97; pp. 53 - 88.
9. Ibid., p. 54.
10. U.S. Department of War, Field Manual 101-5 (28 June 1943), p. 79.
11. FM 101-5, pp. 7-1 - 7-2.
12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1-02 (Test), p. 235; FM 101-5 p. 5-8.
13. Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5-1, pp. 3-1 - 5-6.
14. FM 101-5, p. G-67.
15. Ibid., pp. G-54 - G-82.
16. Ibid., p. G-57.
17. FM 44-100, p. 3-1 - 5-6.
18. FM 44-1, p. ii.
19. FM 44-100, pp. 3-1 - 5-6; the term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I; the objectives are on pp. 4-3 and 5-1.
20. Ibid., p. C-6.
21. Ibid., pp. C-5 - C-7.
22. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.
23. FM 44-1, p. 2-18.
24. Ibid., pp. 4-2 - 4-4.

25. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-1 (6 February 1970), pp. 8-2 - 8-4; Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-1 (25 March 1976), pp. 4-1 - 4-2.
26. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-1 (31 July 1967), pp 10 - 11.
27. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-16, pp. 2-5 - 2-8; Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-90, pp. 5-2 - 5-4.
28. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-0, p. I-8; the term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.
29. FM 44-1, pp. 2-1 - 2-9.
30. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-3, p. B-3.
31. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-1-2, pp. 8 - 11. (hereafter referred to as "FM 44-1-2")
32. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-11, p. B-3.
33. FM 44-1-2, pp. 8-12, 8-18, and 8-24.
34. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.
35. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.

CHAPTER III

THE STATE OF ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

Major Carrington's students could achieve doctrinal standards with task preparation easily in 1937. Given the planned defenses, they only had to insert the name of the defending antiaircraft unit and the objective it was to defend into the task format provided in the Coast Artillery manual. That simplicity disappeared in 1940. If today's students were given a planned defense and were to insert the name of an Air Defense Artillery unit and an objective into the current illustrative air defense examples, would they satisfy current standards for stating tasks and missions? This paper has adopted the direction and guidance summarized in Figures 1 and 2 as task and mission statement standards. This chapter will analyze a doctrinal example mission using these standards. It will also review that mission's essential task as well as other tasks contained in doctrinal publications. Finally, it will review the air defense contents of a sample operation plan presented to students in the 1990 Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

AN AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY MISSION STATEMENT ANALYSIS

Illustrative air defense mission statements comply only marginally with general doctrinal prescriptions. They meet the standards of the operational definition but not of the broader

general guidance. Consider the best of the published examples, the first example presented on page 14, Chapter II:

"3-441 ADA (C/V) provides air defense protection for brigade trains, DISCOM, division main, division artillery in priority and provides short-range AD for 201st ACR during covering force operation and movement through division sector."

As operationally defined by the Army the mission is complete if implications are acceptable. It specifically states who: 3-441 ADA, and what: provide air defense protection to a variety of assets. It implies when: throughout the duration of the operation, and the reason therefore: permit the defended assets to conduct their operations unburdened by enemy air attacks. It may imply where: in the vicinity of the prescribed asset. The operational definition is complete if the last implication is acceptable. If it is not, the adverb, "usually," of the definition permits deletion of the "where" element thereby making the definition complete. Such a deletion is consistent with Air Defense Artillery unit operations because their commanders usually have the freedom to locate defenses anywhere within supported unit boundaries.

The mission statement is not in accordance with the Army's doctrinal definition and its related constraints. Figure 2 of the previous chapter summarizes the standards. It states the task, provide air defense protection to a set of assets, that does not meet general doctrinal task standards. The next section will discuss the specific shortcomings. The mission statement further fails to meet standards by not stating the purpose of the task. Of course, the reader may consider the purpose implied

just as it was above because air defense operations are functional and functional operations are conducted for specific purposes. The inherent purpose of air defense operations is to provide an area secure from air attack. Even so, the mission statement remains unsatisfactory. Implied purposes inherently lack clarity. And, implied purposes fail to reveal the criteria that determine the feasibility and attainability of a course of action.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY TASK STATEMENTS

The essential tasks of the analyzed mission statement fail to meet the adopted doctrinal standards. The tasks are the following:

- o To provide air defense protection for brigade trains, DISCOM, division main, division artillery in priority, and
- o To provide short-range air defense for 201st Armored Cavalry Regiment.

In both cases the stated action verb is "provide." The object of each verb is "air defense protection." As stated the expression, provide air defense protection, is meaningless without the additional prepositional phrases which explain what is to be protected. Both tasks ignore the direction to eliminate meaningless expressions, avoid unnecessary detail, and direct subordinates in unmistakable terms. Two questions immediately arise: how much protection, and from what? The answers to both questions influence the design of air defenses. The former affects the number of fire units required and their engagement methodology. The latter affects fire unit siting. Both answers

affect fire unit distance from the protected assets. Another weakness with the first task is the qualifier, in priority, of the action verb. This expression violates the direction to eliminate expressions that lessen responsibility. The implication is that the battalion should protect the stated assets as well as it can. In Major Carrington's day this would not happen. During defense planning he committed antiaircraft units to the first priority until it was protected in accordance with doctrinal standards.¹ Then, succeeding priorities were allocated resources until all antiaircraft units were committed. Doctrine of that time did not support designating priorities of protection. Theoretically, a similar allocation occurs today but the expression, in priority, infers otherwise.²

The practice of designating protection in priority has existed from World War II until today. The expression appeared in field orders during World War II, but it did not appear in illustrative examples published in the Staff Officers' Field Manual until 1954.³ Since that time, all editions of the staff manual have contained examples directing protection of assets in priority. In 1959 the series of Air Defense Artillery capstone manuals first introduced the expression but prescribed a different usage.⁴ It directed that air defense priorities be designated in the concept-of-operations subparagraph. It directed that missions be assigned to each subordinate unit.⁵ This prescription was ignored in subsequent staff officers' manuals.⁶ Although the current edition of Field Manual 44-1 does not prescribe the phrase, most illustrative air defense tasks and

missions contain the expression.

A finding of the review in the previous chapter is that the only illustrated mission-statement form of an air defense essential task is "to provide air defense protection in priority to some set of assets." Tasks to subordinates offer no wider range of expression than do the essential tasks. Many illustrations either imply the task or present identical or shortened versions of the above mission-statement task. The best examples are those stated authoritatively: protect some set of assets. An advantage to this statement is that the assets-to-be-protected are essential to the task expression as objects of the verb. Unnecessary detail has been eliminated. A disadvantage is that the expression is not unmistakable. The question is, protect them from what? Aircraft? Missiles? Ground attack? Everything? What? A logical assumption is to protect the defended asset from air attack within the capabilities of the supporting units. Often, the question still remains. Jets? Helicopters? Both? Example tasks to subordinate units do not illustrate task statements that meet the adopted standards.

A U.S. COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE ILLUSTRATION

Two sample operation plans distributed to students in the 1990 U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer's Course illustrate the consequences of doctrine which affect air defense mission and task statements. These plans are clearly labeled as samples for instructional purposes only but they surely represent

an application of doctrine by the lesson authors. These plans are reviewed here because, as previously stated, a premise of this paper is that illustrations influence the future actions of students. The distribution of these example plans during instruction presents the opportunity for the air defense contents to influence Command and General Staff College students. The two plans are related; one is a corps defensive order and the second is the defensive order of a division in that corps.⁷ Because the treatment of air defense operations in both orders is identical, only the contents of the Corps order will be reviewed.

Other than the assignment of Air Defense Artillery units in the task organization annex, the corps order addresses air defense operations in only two places. The commander's concept of operation establishes counterair priorities:

"(3) Counterair Operations. Priority to protection of Lance, NASPs, ASPs, helicopter staging areas, POL points, and main CPs. Air defense warning status is YELLOW. Weapons status is TIGHT."⁸

The subparagraphs for tasking subordinate units contains a cryptic statement:

"d. Tasks to Combat Support Units.

(1) Fire Support. * * * * *

(2) Air Defense: Organization for combat. Annex A (Task Organization).

(3) Chemical (NBC Defense) * * * * *

(4) Engineer Support: * * * * *"⁹

The order is a slight improvement on doctrinal illustrations. Stating counterair priorities in the concept-of-operations paragraph conveys air defense guidance to

all types of units. This change actually broadens air defense responsibility of previous examples from the Air Defense Artillery commander to all commanders. The technique also supports the battlefield operating system philosophy. Communications to the Air Defense Artillery commander is better. He has as clear a statement of priorities as he previously had; it is just in a different location. His responsibility is not lessened by the expression, "in priority."

The order is not perfect from an air defense operations standpoint. Subparagraph 3d(2) conveys no meaningful information and should be eliminated. There are no specified air defense tasks for any units regardless of type. Significant to the Air Defense Artillery commander is the general nature of the assets-to-be-protected. A questionable assumption is that there are enough air defense resources to protect all of the assets. The Air Defense Artillery commander has the responsibility; he may not have adequate resources.

The sample order fails to support this paper's assumed standards for stating air defense tasks. There are no specified air defense tasks. The Air Defense Artillery commander has the implied task of protecting all of the priority assets but the broad description of the assets could lead him to identify and protect specific assets other than those the force commander had in mind. In this regard the force commander failed to direct the Air Defense Artillery commander in unmistakable terms, a violation of two of the adopted standards. The meaningless tasks of "providing air defense protection" or of "protecting" may have

been wisely deleted in accordance with the standards, but specified tasks identifying particular assets located at particular locations should have replaced them.

CONCLUSIONS

Illustrative air defense mission statements do not comply with the Army's doctrinal standards. Essential tasks do not meet task criteria. The purposes for performing the tasks are not included in the statements.

Neither form of illustrated air defense tasks meet adopted task standards. Task verbs do not authoritatively direct precisely what the subordinate is to accomplish. The most commonly illustrated task objective, air defense protection, is almost meaningless and requires prepositional phrases to identify the objects-to-be-defended. Finally, the qualifier, in priority, lessens the responsibility of executing commander.

ENDNOTES

1. Carrington, pp. 9 - 11.
2. FM 44-1, pp. 4-11 - 4-14.
3. Headquarters, First United States Army, "Field Order #1;" U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5 (18 May 1954), p. 246.
4. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-1 (1 May 1959), p. 86.
5. The term "mission" in this manual equates to the term "task" in this paper.
6. Department of the Army, Field Manuals 101-5 dated 19 July 1960, 14 June 1968, 19 July 1972, and 25 May 1984.
7. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Course P118,

Lesson 9, "Corps OPLAN 2--RED FOX" (hereafter referred to as "Corps OPLAN 2"); and Lesson 10, "Division OPLAN 3--52d Mech Div".

8. Corps OPLAN 2, p. L9/4-I-4; although not the subject of this paper, the stating of the warning and weapon status in the plan is questionable.

9. Corps OPLAN 2, p. L9/4-I-6 - L9/4-I-7.

CHAPTER IV

DOCTRINAL CHANGES

The review in Chapter II indicated that the Army's doctrine regarding the stating of air defense tasks and missions was both generally and specifically incomplete. Chapter III concluded that illustrative air defense tasks and missions do not meet general doctrinal standards. This chapter will present possible changes to illustrative tasks and missions. These changes could serve as a foundation for adding direction and illustrations to doctrinal publications in order to guide military students in the preparation of clear, precise air defense tasks and missions.

General Doctrine

The Army should add discussion of the considerations for stating tasks to the Staff Officers' Field Manual. Currently, there is no direct discussion of the subject. Although standards can be derived from the broader discussion of the characteristics of good combat orders as this paper has done, a section specifying general standards would serve as a clear reference for military students. After a broad treatment of the subject, separate paragraphs should address tactical, operational, and strategic tasks. A well written section would reinforce both the doctrinal discussion of mission statements and the characteristics of good combat orders.

Air Defense Guidance

Both the doctrinal review in Chapter II and the analysis of illustrative examples in Chapter III indicate serious faults in stating air defense tasks and missions. This chapter will suggest doctrinal changes by offering techniques for improving both mission and task statements. The next section will present a mission statement that meets the adopted standards. The following sections will discuss improvements using the rewritten mission statement as an example. Using the presented techniques the last three sections prior to the summary will discuss considerations for stating air defense tasks for non Air Defense Artillery units, for stating strategic air defense tasks, and for stating operational air defense tasks.²

This chapter will not campaign for the deletion of the standard tactical missions of Air Defense Artillery. The evidence indicates that the Army had made the doctrinal decision to redefine these terms. The elimination of the doctrine of standard tactical missions should continue as manuals are revised.

AN IMPROVED MISSION ILLUSTRATION

The primary deficiencies of the mission analyzed in the previous chapter were that the tasks were almost meaningless and that there was no purpose to convey feasibility and attainability criteria. Here is a revision of the analyzed mission with precisely defined tasks and purposes:

3-441 ADA (C/V) ambushes enemy helicopters 130430 April
to screen operations of brigade trains and artillery

units operating forward of phase line DOG, guards the division main command post to prevent disruption of command and control operations by fixed wing aircraft, and covers the division's reserves of aviation fuel and MLRS rockets to preclude losses from enemy fixed wing aircraft.

This statement meets all of the requirements of the operational and doctrinal definitions and prescriptions, Figure 2, except one. The omission provides the air defense commander freedom of action to establish defenses anywhere within the supported commander's area of operations.

WHO: 3-441 ADA (C/V)
WHAT: ambush enemy helicopters,
guard the division main command post, and
cover the division's reserves of aviation
fuel and MLRS rockets
WHEN: beginning 0430 hours, 13 April 1990
WHERE: not stated
WHY: to screen operations,
to prevent disruption, and
to preclude loss

The tasks - ambush enemy helicopters, guard the division main command post, and cover the division's reserves of aviation fuel and MLRS rockets - are authoritative and unmistakable. The mission statement includes purposes that are also clear - screen operations, prevent disruption, and preclude losses.

USE FIELD LANGUAGE

A careful choice of words can produce air defense tasks and mission statements that effectively and efficiently communicate between commanders. The use of field language of combined arms commanders is not only an effective and efficient choice of words but also supports four of the task standards:

- o Use accepted doctrinally-established military terms.

- o Ensure that subordinates conform to the purpose or intent of the force commander.
- o Indicate desired action.
- o Direct subordinates in unmistakable terms.

The definitions of some established terms may need to be stretched a bit to meet the first of these directions. The term "perimeter" is used throughout the military. Its meaning is clearly understood: an all-around defense that will deny the enemy any approach to the protected asset.³ On the other hand, the term, "static point defense," is an accepted term used primarily by the Air Defense Artillery community.⁴ It may mean little to a supported commander. Use of the more broadly used term in an air defense task statement increases the chance of effective communication. The acceptable use of "perimeter" just needs to be broadened to include air defense usage. With the use of nontraditional terms in air defense task and mission statements becomes accepted, field language becomes a powerful aid for stating air defense tasks and missions.

Select Unmistakable Verbs

The previous section used Army operational terms to precisely communicate tasks. Some words were used out of their traditional context, but if such use improves communication, clarity warrents the indiscretion. Consider the term, "ambush." Its use to specify an air defense task exactly fits the operational definition:

"A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy."⁵

More important than the purity of its use are the wider operational connotations:

- o An intent to establish positions along carefully selected routes of ingress.

- o An intent to destroy or repulse the enemy before he reaches his target.

- o The risk that the enemy could approach along other routes and still attack friendly forces.

Military leaders fully accept both the definition and connotation of the word, "ambush." Its use to describe an air defense task effectively and efficiently communicates as it directs subordinates in unmistakable terms.

The words, "screen," "guard," and "cover," are out-of-context uses of operational terms. The Army defines them indirectly as adjectives in its definition of security operations.

"A screening force maintains surveillance, provides early warning to the main body, impedes and harasses the enemy with supporting indirect fires, and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements within its capability."

"A guard force accomplishes all the tasks of a screening force. Additionally, a guard force prevents enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. A guard force reconnoiters, attacks, defends, and delays as necessary to accomplish its mission. A guard force normally operates within range of the main body indirect fire weapons."

"A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. Additionally, a covering force operates apart from the main body to develop the situation early and deceives, disorganizes, and destroys enemy forces. Unlike screening or guard forces, a covering force is a tactically self-contained force (that is, it is organized with sufficient combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces to

operate independently of the main body)." ⁶

To maneuver commanders, the connotation for these terms comes from the core of each definition:

- o screen: impede and harass,
- o guard: prevent direct observation and fire, and
- o cover: deceive, disorganize, and destroy.

The definitions clearly establish a hierarchy of action that maneuver commanders appreciate but conventionally limit to tasks for maneuver units. The intent in stating air defense tasks with such terms is to convey the relative degree of protection the commander intends to commit to each of the designated objectives. Such use may change the norm but combined arms commanders will understand the task to be accomplished.

Upon acceptance of terms not traditionally used to state air defense tasks a wide choice of words becomes available to commanders. Figure 3 contains a list of terms taken from the Army's manual of operational terms and symbols as well as common definitions that are used to describe military action. ⁷ Any of these terms could serve as the action verb of an air defense task or as an infinitive describing the purpose of the action.

Army Operational Terms

Common Terms

ambush	delay	control
attack	deny	defeat
attrit	guard	destroy
canalize	neutralize	establish
contain	raid	maintain
cover	screen	
defend	suppress	

* Do not assign "attrit" tasks to short range air defense units. ⁸

Figure 3. Doctrinally Accepted Terms That May Be Used To Describe Air Defense Tasks.

Select Precise Objects

The object and modifying prepositional phrase of a tasking verb are elements of a task statement that can enforce the second, third, and fourth task standards listed above. They can identify the specific enemy threat to focus on. They can identify the friendly asset to be defended. They can identify a feature or condition to be attained.

The object of air defense action is usually aircraft. Knowing the category aircraft the commander wants engaged focuses subordinate commanders. Because the flying characteristics of various categories of aircraft differ, supporting commanders site air defense weapons to meet the expected or predominant threat. Weapons on high ground can engage fast fixed-wing aircraft that cannot hug every fold of the earth. Slow airplanes and

helicopters which fly under the coverage of hilltop units force commanders to relocate weapons onto lower ground. Different threats dictate different defenses. Fortunately, aircraft tend to be utilized over different parts of the combat zone because of their various operating characteristics.⁹ Helicopters operate relatively close to the front lines while jets fly deeper into enemy territory. By specifying the threat commanders improve the effectiveness of subordinate air defenses. In situations where more than one category of aircraft may be the primary threat, stating a specific object in task statements provides at least part of the commander's intent and ensures that the subordinate conforms to the force commander's plan.

The object of the action verb can identify specific friendly assets to be protected. The objects of the guard and the cover tasks in the rewritten mission at the beginning of this chapter are the division main command post and the division's reserves of aviation fuel and MLRS rockets respectively.

A neutral term can also be the object of the action verb and convey intent. Air superiority, air parity, and air control are all conditions that a commander may direct attained. Airspace of some depicted boundaries can also be the object of the action verb. For example, a task could be to maintain air superiority over the 3d Armored Division.

AVOID THE EXPRESSION "IN PRIORITY"

Use of the expression "in priority" in an air defense task or mission statement implies that doctrine has been ignored. If

defense planning guidance had been followed the expression would be unnecessary. If task standards were upheld, the expression would have been omitted.

The rewritten mission statement does not include the expression, in priority. There should be no question about what action is to be taken and the relative amount of resources to devote to each asset. Unlike the original mission, the number of assets to be protected is now a specified few instead of a large, ambiguous set. It is now feasible to establish and maintain air defenses for all the assets throughout the duration of the operation. A sufficient number of resources are available to protect each asset. The overall list of ambiguous priorities has been omitted, but clear, precise tasks have replaced them.

A commander lessens the responsibility of the subordinate commander when he directs protection in priority. If the assets-to-be-protected are general rather than specific, the commander violates three other task standards. He does not ensure that subordinates conform to his intent. He has not specifically indicated desired action. He does not direct subordinates in unmistakable terms. Each of these points was discussed in Chapter III. Avoid the expression, "in priority" and the chances of meeting the standards for stating air defense tasks are greatly improved.

ADD DEFINITIVE PURPOSES

The purposes of the rewritten example demonstrates an application of the principle of war, objective.¹⁰ The purpose for

performing the task is the reason, or objective, for the military action. The criteria for selecting objectives should be the criteria for stating purposes: clearly defined, decisive, and attainable. A purpose is clearly defined if the intent of the issuing commander cannot be mistaken. The purposes of the example tasks are stated in unmistakable combined arms terms. For air defense operations, the second criterion applies to the selection of the friendly asset to defend. It must be critical to the success of the supported commander's operation. Doctrine already applies the third criterion to the purpose of mission statements. This paper has already discussed its affect: commanders must allocate sufficient resources to subordinate commands to enable them to accomplish the assigned task. The allocation of resources may be as precise as the intent of a task is expressed. These criteria, together with the doctrinal prescription of feasibility, form a solid set of guidelines to use when stating the purpose of any operational task.

ILLUSTRATE NON AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY TASKS

The capstone manual for the air defense battlefield operating system has set the stage for frequent assignment of active air defense tasks to units other than Air Defense Artillery units. The manual widened the scope of air defense by expanding the concept of air defense operations from a purely defensive orientation to include both defensive and offensive actions. ¹¹ Its description of Army participation in air defense operations identified the contribution various types of units

were capable of making.¹² Finally, it prescribed a new format for air defense operations that focuses on all types of units.¹³

Unfortunately, the manual did not illustrate any air defense tasks. Of course, commanders can direct any unit to perform defensive tasks usually assigned to Air Defense Artillery. Now they may also assign offensive air defense tasks that capitalize on the inherent capabilities of units. Here are possible tactical tasks for units based on their inherent air defense capabilities:

Field Artillery tasks:

Suppress staging fields 210430 March located vicinity NA162839, and NA596455, to impede enemy helicopters maneuvering against 1st Brigade attack of Objective Rat.

Destroy FAARPs of helicopters supporting enemy main attack.

Armor, Aviation, Cavalry, and Infantry tasks:

Guard the left flank of 1st Armored Division attack to repel enemy helicopter counterattacks.

Raid the assembly area vicinity NA444689 to destroy enemy helicopters.

ILLUSTRATE STRATEGIC TASKS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff formulate strategic tasks while developing national military strategy.¹⁴ Strategic objectives are much broader than operational or tactical tasks.¹⁵ For example, during World War II, the Combined Chiefs of Staff tasked General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Expeditionary Commander, to enter the continent of Europe and to undertake operations aimed at the destruction of German armed forces.¹⁶ Ordinarily,

air defense tasks are too narrow to be strategic objectives. An exception to this is the strategic direction given to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the U.S. Space Command. There is also a remote possibility that a theater CINC could receive or recommend a strategic air defense objective based on conditions in his theater.

The CINC, United States Space Command is assigned strategic air defense tasks for the defense of the United States. As the CINC, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNOAD), he leads a combined command consisting of military forces of the United States and Canada.¹⁷ His area of responsibility consists of three regions, Canada, the continental United States, and Alaska.¹⁸ The CINC receives strategic direction for the air defense of North America based on national and military strategies. A permanent joint board on defense coordinates national strategies between the Canadian government and the National Command Authority (NCA) of the United States. A military cooperation committee coordinates national military strategies between the Chief of the Canadian Defense Staff and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. From this coordinated direction the CINC formulates the equivalent of theater strategy for North America.¹⁹ The same factors that affect theater estimates influence CINCNOAD's estimate except that his concern is air, not land, attack. Primary concerns must be the vulnerability of strategic retaliatory weapon bases and launch sites and the air defense functions directed by joint doctrine:

"Early detection of potential threats or attack."
"Timely assessment of detected potential threats

or attacks."

"Timely notification of potential or actual attack to NCA and appropriate United States and Allied military commanders."

"Interception of enemy forces."

"Disruption or destruction of hostile weapon systems." ²⁰

Illustrative strategic tasks could be stated to accomplish the above functions or to protect strategic retaliatory assets:

- o Defend missile launch sites to maintain retaliatory options for the President of the United States in case of strategic attack on North America.

Theater CINCs translate national and alliance strategic direction into theater strategies. ²¹ They devise strategic concepts to achieve higher objectives within provided resources. ²²

Since the United States often fights wars as part of a coalition, air defense objectives could become strategic due to the concerns of allied national leaders, the fears of an allied population, or the importance of allied resources to the war effort. ²³

Either national or allied leaders could direct strategic air defense tasks or the theater CINC could recommend them based on his theater estimate. ²⁴ Here are two possible strategic air defense objectives which are stated in broader terms than tactical tasks:

- o Destroy hostile aircraft attempting to attack an ally's capital. The strategic intent would be to demonstrate allied resolve and strength, improve fragile coalition relationships, or improve the spirits and morale of combatants and noncombatants.

- o Protect an ally's oil refineries from air attack. The strategic intent behind this task is to insure continuous

production of strategic resources vital to the war effort of the United States or its allies.

ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONAL TASKS²⁵

Theater CINCs conduct theater campaigns to achieve strategic objectives.²⁶ In today's terminology, the air defense objectives Major Carrington developed for his students in 1937 were operational objectives of the theater CINC. Force commanders and component commanders immediately subordinate to a CINC may conduct subordinate campaigns which achieve operational objectives.²⁷ For OPERATION OVERLORD the joint operations plan of the First United States Army Group assigned to the Ninth Air Force and supporting units an operational objective of maintaining air superiority.²⁸

Possible operational tasks include variations of the Ninth Air Force instructions:

- o Repel enemy aircraft east of the Rhine River.
- o Establish air parity above territory occupied by allied forces.
- o Gain air superiority throughout the theater.
- o Control the airspace above VII Corps to provide attacking forces freedom of movement unimpeded by hostile aircraft.

CONCLUSIONS

Doctrine can prescribe standards for stating air defense tasks and missions. Only an additional section needs to be added to the general doctrine prescribed in the Staff Officers' Field Manual. Air defense doctrine requires more of a treatment but

the changes are not difficult to accomplish.

Additions to general doctrine that would improve the basis for preparing air defense tasks and missions are not great. The treatment of mission statements is sufficient. A set of standards needs to be specified for task statements. The discussion should address all three levels of war.

Air defense doctrine requires guidance for stating both air defense tasks and missions. The Chapter II summary of adopted task standards, Figure 1, could serve as a start point. Addition of the considerations presented in this chapter to that basis, Figure 4, forms an outline for a doctrinal treatment.

Illustrative air defense tasks for various types of units could be developed from the doctrinal discussion and the military terms listed in Figure 3. Similarly, Figure 5 outlines a doctrinal treatment for air defense mission statements. Illustrative examples should meet these expanded doctrinal standards.

Suggestions throughout the chapter presented tactical tasks applicable to Air Defense Artillery and other units, and for operational and strategic tasks for applicable to combined arms units.

29

Use accepted doctrinally-established military terms of the combined arms commander.

Ensure that subordinates conform to the purpose or intent of the force commander.

Avoid unnecessary detail.

Infringe on the initiative of subordinates only under unusual circumstances.

Indicate desired action

Eliminate meaningless expressions.

- o Avoid the expression "provide air defense protection"

Eliminate expressions that lessen responsibilities.

- o Avoid the expression "in priority"

Direct subordinates in unmistakable terms.

- o Select unmistakable verbs
- o Select precise objects and prepositional phrases

Figure 4. Standards for Stating Air Defense Tasks. (This chapter recommends the underlined standards.)

CLEAR, CONCISE STATEMENTS

usually include WHO
WHAT
WHEN
WHERE (optional), and
WHY

present tasks in execution
sequence

use field language

ESSENTIAL TASKS

adhere to task standards

do not include routine or
SOP actions

PURPOSE

establish criteria that is
feasible,
attainable,
clearly defined, and
decisive (for the supported unit's
mission)

Figure 5. Standards for Stating Air Defense Missions. (This chapter recommends the underlined standards.)

ENDNOTES

1. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.
2. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.
3. FM 101-5-1, pp. 1-55.
4. Department of the Army, Field Manual 44-3, p. 6-9.
5. Ibid., p. 1-5.
6. Ibid., pp. 1-64 - 1-65.
7. Ibid., pp. 1-1 - 1-75.
8. FM44-1, p. 4-4.

9. FM 44-100, p. 5-7.
10. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1, pp. 2-14.
11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1-02 (Test), p. 14; FM 44-100, pp. 1-2 and Glossary-4.
12. Ibid., p. 3-8 - 3-9.
13. Ibid., pp. C-5 - C-7.
14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 0-1, pp. III-41 - III-46.
15. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-0, p. III-2. (hereafter referred to as "JCS Pub 3-0"); the term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.
16. Combined Chiefs of Staff, "Directive to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force," p. 1.
17. Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1988, p. 66.
18. Ibid., p. 56.
19. Ibid.
20. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-01.1, p. 5.
21. JCS Pub 3-0, p. I-3.
22. Ibid., p. I-4.
23. The White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States," p. 15.
24. JCS Pub 3-0, p. III-9.
25. Throughout this section the term "operational" refers to the operational level of war.
26. Ibid., p. III-7.
27. Ibid., pp. III-9 - III-10.
28. Headquarters, First U.S. Army Group, Joint Operations Plan, U.S. Forces for Operation Overlord, p 11.
29. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.

CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this paper is to improve doctrinal guidance regarding the stating of air defense tasks and missions at all levels of war. To accomplish this goal Chapter II presented applicable doctrine and examples which illustrated that guidance. A number of omissions were noted. Chapter III analyzed published illustrations as well as two Command and General Staff College Course sample operation plans which contained air defense instructions. The unsatisfactory state of all the illustrations is the primary argument for improving both guidance and illustrations that influence the performance of military students. Chapter IV contained a secondary argument by demonstrating that improvements of tasks and missions to doctrinal standards are possible.

Action to improve guidance should focus on air defense doctrine. However, this paper recommends some changes to general doctrine and to the doctrine of other battlefield operating systems. As discussed in Chapter IV, the Staff Officers' Field Manual requires a section that directly addresses task statements. It should include a set of standards and discussion about differences in formulating tasks at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.¹ The staff field manual as well as all other doctrinal publications which illustrate air defense tasks require replacement tasks that adhere to the standards prescribed by the capstone doctrine. Improvements to

air defense doctrine requires much more extensive treatment. The doctrinal review revealed that there is no specific air defense guidance addressing the subject. This paper recommends the adoption of the task and mission standards presented in Figures 4 and 5 of the previous chapter. These standards should be incorporated in the capstone air defense battlefield system manual, Field Manual 44-100, and the capstone Air Defense Artillery manual, Field Manual 44-1. They should also be included in the entire series of Air Defense Artillery emplacement manuals. A final recommendation is that illustrative air defense tasks and missions in all air defense manuals be improved to doctrinal standards. The previous chapter contains a number of candidate replacements.

Although Major Carrington's lecture served as a base from which doctrine for stating air defense tasks changed, the paper does not argue for a return to formatted statements that must simply be completed. In effect, that practice exists today. Either a standard expression is stated, a slight variant of that expression is stated, or the air defense tasks are implied by a prioritized set of standards. This paper argues for doctrine and illustrations that will prompt commanders to convey incisive air defense intent. Task and mission statements are visible products of a commander's decision making. Illustrative examples reflect an unsatisfactory situation concerning air defense operations. Without doctrinal guidance to encourage commanders, air defense tasks and missions will continue to be stated in the same vague, meaningless manner they are today. Stating tasks and missions as

this paper proposes requires an air defense concept, defense planning, and a clear decision. The results will not merely be statements that are well prepared, but the focused conduct of decisive operations that accomplish exactly what the commander intended.

ENDNOTES

1. The term "operational" refers to the operational level of war; see endnote 3, Chapter I.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington: March 1990.
2. Carrington, G. deL. Antiaircraft Artillery in a Theater of Operations. Lecture. Fort Humphreys, Washington, 15 September 1937. (public document of Institute of Military History, Carlisle, Pa.)
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 0-1: Basic National Defense Doctrine (Initial Draft). Washington: 17 November 1989.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Washington: 1 December 1986.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 1-01: Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program). Washington: 15 April 1988.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Draft). Washington: 1 December 1989.
7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (Test Pub). Washington: 10 January 1990.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 3-01.1: Joint Doctrine for the Defense of the United States Against Air Attack. Washington: 11 February 1982.
9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 3-01.2: Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations. Washington: 1 April 1986.
10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub 3-01.3: Doctrine for Air Defense from Oversea Land Areas. Washington: 23 May 1964.
11. U.S. War Department. Coast Artillery Field Manual (Provisional). United States Army, Vol 2. Fort Monroe, Va.: 15 June 1930.
12. U.S. War Department. Coast Artillery Field Manual. Vol. II, Antiaircraft Artillery, Part One. Washington: 3 January 1933.
13. U.S. War Department. Coast Artillery Field Manual. Vol. II, Antiaircraft Artillery, Parts Two and Three. Washington: 1 February 1933.

14. U.S. War Department. Coast Artillery Field Manual, Vol. II, Part One. Washington: 1 June 1938.
15. U.S. War Department. Staff Manual: United States Army. Washington: 1 August 1917.
16. U.S. War Department. Staff Officers' Field Manual. Washington: 26 September 1932.
17. U.S. War Department. Field Manual 101-5: Staff Officers' Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders. Washington: 19 August 1940.
18. U.S. Department of the Army. Coast Artillery Field Manual 4-105: Antiaircraft Artillery Organization and Tactics. Washington: 2 August 1940.
19. U.S. Department of the Army. Antiaircraft Artillery Field Manual 4-105: Organization and Tactics of Antiaircraft Artillery. Washington: 28 June 1943.
20. U.S. Department of the Army. Antiaircraft Artillery Field Manual 4-100: Antiaircraft Artillery Employment. Washington: 16 April 1952.
21. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1: Air Defense Artillery Employment. Washington: 1 May 1959.
22. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1: U.S. Army Air Defense Employment. Washington: 26 July 1962.
23. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1: U.S. Army Air Defense Employment. Washington: 25 February 1964.
24. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1: U.S. Army Air Defense Employment. Washington: 11 October 1965.
25. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1: U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Employment. Washington: 31 July 1967.
26. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1: U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Employment. Washington: 6 February 1970.
27. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1: U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Employment. Washington: 25 March 1976.
28. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1: U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Employment. Washington: 9 May 1983.
29. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-1-2: Air Defense Artillery Reference Handbook. Washington: 15 June 1984.
30. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-2: Air

Defense Artillery Employment Automatic Weapons M42/M55.
Washington: 1 November 1968.

31. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-3: Air
Defense Artillery Employment, Chaparral/Vulcan/Stinger.
Washington: 15 June 1984.

32. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-4: Operations
and Training, Chaparral. Washington: 2 November 1984.

33. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-5: Operations
and Training, Vulcan. Washington: 29 September 1978.

34. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-6: Operations
and Training, Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR). Washington: 8
October 1987.

35. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-10: U.S.
Roland Air Defense Artillery Employment. Washington: 30 April
1985.

36. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-11: Air
Defense Artillery Employment, Sgt York/Stinger. Washington: 13
March 1985.

37. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-15: Patriot
Battalion Operations. Washington: 4 April 1984.

38. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-15-1:
Operations and Training, Patriot. Washington: 17 February 1987.

39. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-16: Platoon
Combat Operations—Chaparral, Vulcan, and Stinger. Washington:
29 May 1987.

40. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-18: Air
Defense Artillery Employment, Stinger. Washington: 30 September
1981.

41. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-18-1: Stinger
Team Operations. Washington: 31 December 1984.

42. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-90: Hawk
Battalion Operations. Washington: 8 September 1987.

43. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-90-1: Hawk
Firing Platoon Operations. Washington: 30 December 1981.

44. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 44-100: U.S.
Army Air Defense Operations. Washington: 22 November 1988.

45. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-1: The Army.
Washington: 29 August 1986

46. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 101-5: Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure. Washington: 13 July 1950.
47. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 101-5: Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure. Washington: 18 November 1954.
48. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 101-5: Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure. Washington: 19 July 1960.
49. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 101-5: Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure. Washington: 14 June 1968.
50. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 101-5: Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure. Washington: 19 July 1972.
51. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 101-5: Staff Organization and Operations. Washington: 25 May 1984.
52. U.S. Command and General Staff College. Field Manual 101-5-1: Operational Terms and Graphics. Washington: 21 October 1985.
53. U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School. Field Circular 44-32: Echelons above Corps Air Defense Artillery Operations. Washington: 31 March 1986.
54. National Defense University. AFSC Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1988. Washington: 1 July 1988.
55. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Corps Defensive Operations, Course P118, Lesson 9. Fort Leavenworth, Ks: April 1989.
56. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Division Defensive Operations, Course P118, Lesson 9. Fort Leavenworth, Ks: April 1989.
57. Combined Chiefs of Staff, directive to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 12 February 1944.
58. First United States Army Group. Joint Operations Plan: U.S. Forces for Operation Overlord. European Theater of Operations: 8 May 1944.
59. First United States Army. Field Order #1: European Theater of Operations: 1 July 1944.