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THE BATLLE ERA AND LABOR IN URUGUAY
AND
U.S. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT POLICY
IN
LATIN AMERICA

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THE BATLLE ERA AND LABOR IN URUGUAY
AND
U.S. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT POLICY
IN
LATIN AMERICA

BY
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REPORTS

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*International relations;
Labor unions history;
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THE BATLLE ERA AND LABOR IN URUGUAY

INTRODUCTION

In surveying the history of labor in Latin America during the early twentieth century there is no more appropriate place to begin than Uruguay. While there is a tendency for many observers to concentrate their efforts on labor issues affecting the more familiar countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, it is worth noting that much of the advanced labor legislation adopted by these and other countries in the region had as their basis the innovative and bold social, economic and political reforms established during the first three decades of the twentieth century (the Batlle era) in Uruguay. In a continent whose institutions were typically authoritarian and unstable, Uruguay's unique reformist experience exhibited an early development of progressive social and labor legislation, the growth of the public sector of the economy, the prominence of the middle classes, and an adherence to (and innovation in) constitutional and liberal forms of government. The Batlle era set the stage for the effective transformation of Uruguay from a country notorious for its revolutions to Latin America's most stable democracy and open society (that is, until the military coup in 1973). With José Batlle y Ordóñez furnishing the directive impulse, Uruguay's program of

advanced labor and welfare legislation made it the chief laboratory of social experimentation in the Americas. Indeed, Uruguay's progressive labor and welfare agenda, as Rock has observed, served as a model for the establishment of similar reforms in Argentina under Yrigoyen later in the century.¹

Throughout the period 1903-1929, Uruguay's political, economic, and social development was profoundly affected by the idealistic philosophy and pragmatic political acumen of Batlle, president from 1903 to 1907 and again from 1911 to 1915. Even after the completion of his second presidential term, Batlle's influence remained strong as he dominated the Colorado party and Uruguayan politics until his death in 1929. When Batlle became president in 1903, however, the salient features of his reformist philosophy were not as yet generally known publicly, nor was there necessarily any overwhelming support for his taking office. Less than a year after assuming the presidency, Batlle's administration faced a national crisis. Factional opposition from elements within the Colorado party as well as the Blancos, or nationalists, eventually resulted in the Civil War of 1904.² After nine months of fighting, Batlle's Colorado's emerged

¹David Rock, *Politics in Argentina: 1890-1930* (Cambridge, 1975), 119.

²For a discussion of the roots of this war, see R.B. Giudici, *Batlle y Batllismo* (Montevideo, 1928), 318-335, and Milton Vanger, *Jose Batlle y Ordonez of Uruguay* (Cambridge, MA., 1963), 117-129.

victorious and through the peace terms announced at Acequa, Batlle unified the country and opened the way for social and economic changes.³ However, internal strife and reconstruction problems hindered Batlle's efforts at reform and he left office in 1907 without a well-articulated or successful reform program. Nevertheless, from his writings and recommendations to the legislature the public began to gain some insight as to the reforms Batlle desired, particularly in the areas of religious liberalism and the establishment of government-owned enterprises. On the other hand, he remained cautious about alarming the rural-based nationalists regarding a progressive tax on land values.⁴

After a mandatory four-year hiatus from the presidency, Batlle resumed office in 1911 and launched the most progressive administration in Uruguayan history. Within a year he recommended legislation providing state monopolies of insurance and electricity, the reorganization of the State bank, the eight-hour day, a compulsory full day of rest for every five days of work, regulations to improve working conditions, university education for women, secondary education for the rural districts, and the creation of institutes and experiment stations to aid basic industries. Later, other measures were adopted such as the

³Thomas Weil, *Area Handbook for Uruguay* (Washington, D.C., 1971), 29.

⁴*El Dia*, November 16, 1904.

establishment of a State mortgage bank, a scheme for construction of State railways, the establishment of a chemical institute, increased protection for domestic industry, laws to protect animals, old-age pensions, workmen's compensation, indemnification of discharged employees, full freedom of the press, universal suffrage, and the abolition of capital punishment.⁵

Not all of Batlle's innovations met with immediate success or universal popularity, however. Some, such as the measures to establish the State Insurance Bank or involve the government in the railroads and the light and power industries met with strong resistance from economic elites and foreign interests. In addition, due to the novelty of these reforms many members of his own party, as well as the Blanco opposition, became disturbed. Nevertheless, political persecutions eventually ceased, freedom of the press was respected, and the recommended reforms ultimately became law.

Given the significance of *Batllista* Uruguay's advanced agenda of social and economic legislation a number of questions immediately come to mind, the first of which is: Why Uruguay? To the extent of Uruguay's progressiveness, why did a small and relatively isolated country elect to embark on such a far-reaching and fundamentally divergent pattern of development? What

⁵Simon G. Hanson, *Utopia in Uruguay* (Oxford, 1938), 21.

factors or combinations of factors contributed to this alteration of the *status quo ante*? What was the extent of Batlle's influence and personal ideology (*Batllismo*) in effecting Uruguay's pro-labor legislation? How did he utilize the political process to fulfill his reformist goals? And finally, how did organized labor influence Batlle and the political system and to what extent were labor's demands incorporated into the legislation which evolved during Batlle's second presidency?

To the student of Latin American labor history the answers to these questions are basic to an understanding of Uruguay's development in the twentieth century. While a number of factors contributed to the success of *Batllismo*, there is evidence that Batlle and the Colorado party enacted pro-labor reforms not simply out of a benign sense of altruism, but rather as a more measured response to a number of social, economic, and political forces ongoing during the period. Of these, one of the most important was the increased militancy of organized labor, the demands of which became manifest in a series of strikes at the turn of the century. These strikes sought, as their basic aim, to ameliorate the poor working conditions in Montevideo at the time, which included a work day of between 15 and 19 hours daily in 1895 in certain manufacturing industries and commercial

establishments.⁶

Because of the importance of organized labor as a social force during the Batlle era, this report will address the relationship between labor and the government, in this case Batlle and the Colorado party, during this period. Specifically, it is posited that through the instrument of the Colorado party and Batlle's libertarian, populist, and pro-labor ideological orientation, *Batllismo* successfully undermined the militant, but relatively weak, Uruguayan labor movement by converting their demands and aspirations into legislative achievement. By incorporating the demands of the working class into the political program of the Colorado party, Batlle expanded the functions of the State to a position of "neutrality above classes" and sought to maintain an equilibrium between an antagonistic organized labor movement and the increasingly more vulnerable urban industrialists by concessions to each, while conserving and strengthening the independence of the political system through its capacity to mediate.

To accomplish the goal of outlining labor's relationship to *Batllismo* and how Batlle undermined the militant labor movement by integrating labor's demands into the Colorado party's program, it is first necessary to examine the various

⁶Carlos M. Rama, *Batlle, su obra y su vida* (Montevideo, 1959), 41-42.

factors which contributed to the increased influence of the working class movement and to the ascendancy of Batlle himself into Uruguay's political environment. As such, the following section will address the political, social, and economic factors relevant to the *Batllista* period which set the stage for Batlle's reform legislation. Next, Batlle's ideological roots will be examined to establish the basis for his pro-labor policies. After Batlle's ideology is outlined, Uruguay's working class movement will be examined to determine its overall influence during the Batlle era. Finally, a more in-depth discussion of Batlle's two presidential terms will be presented to determine how he incorporated labor's demands and aspirations into the Colorado party's legislative program thereby neutralizing the growing tension between the working class and other classes within Uruguayan society.

SETTING THE STAGE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MODERNIZATION

In considering the unorthodox nature of the *Batllista* mode of government, it is essential to understand the myriad of political, economic and social factors that existed during the Batlle era. By examining these factors it is possible to determine the conditions that contributed to Batlle's success at establishing his unique package of social and pro-labor legislation. These factors, many of which mirrored those in other countries in the hemisphere at the time, set the stage for Batlle's ascendancy to power and allowed him to formulate a pro-labor emphasis based on both pragmatic and idealistic roots (see next section). Essentially Batlle, in concert with his progressive ideological perspectives, embarked on his reformist agenda in response to the various economic, political, and social processes already underway in the country.¹

Despite the abundance of in-depth analyses of Uruguay's social, economic, and political transformation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is a tendency by a number of authors of Uruguayan history to view the presidencies

¹M.H.J. Finch, *A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870* (New York, 1981), 10.

of Batlle, and his extensive influence until his death in 1929, as discontinuities or aberrations in the life of the nation.⁸ Some of these authors tend to view Batlle's achievements as exclusively the result of his personality and vision with little or no appreciation for the important internal and external processes underway in the country at the time. For example, Fitzgibbon indicates that "some of the discussions of Batlle which one hears today in Uruguay are altogether too likely to take on lyrical overtones and be suffused with an air of discipleship which presumes the infallibility of the master."⁹ So too, some North American authors also fail to acknowledge these developmental processes, but for different reasons. Most notable is Milton Vanger who believes that Batlle gained and consolidated power primarily through his ability to manipulate political events. "Batlle's success lay in his use of the Colorado political organization and tradition, not in his response to class needs and demands."¹⁰ While Vanger is correct in viewing Batlle as a preeminent and practical politician with the skill to assess and mold public opinion, it is also evident that Batlle alone was not the singular instrument of change at the time. Again, according to Fitzgibbon,

⁸*Ibid.*, 9.

⁹Russell H. Fitzgibbon, *Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy* (London, 1956), 123.

¹⁰Vanger, *Batlle of Uruguay*, viii.

"Batlle was no saint. . nor was his final legacy solely the work of Batlle himself. Capable lieutenants [such as] Brum, Arena, and others re-enforced Batlle's work. . It must be admitted, too, that deep-rooted economic and other currents beyond the control of any single individual would inevitably have brought Uruguay in time a considerable measure of advancement."¹¹ Without detracting from the significance of Batlle as the "spiritual fountainhead" of Uruguay's reforms, it is therefore more appropriate to view him as more "the creation of his times, rather than their creator."¹²

If Batlle was only one (albeit, the most important) participant in Uruguay's changing economic, political, and social environment, what specific processes produced a country susceptible to Batlle's ascendancy to power and pro-labor reforms? Two major processes, antedating Batlle's rise to power, are at the foundation of his success. The first was economic modernization, principally in the rural areas of the country. The second was the evolution of an autonomous political system which allowed the rise of a political sector with interests separate from those of the dominant economic elites. Batlle exploited the conditions brought on by these processes to build a political base

¹¹Fitzgibbon, *Portrait*, 123.

¹²Finch, *Political Economy*, 10.

strong enough to expand the social welfare functions of the State while enhancing the Colorado party and the other existing political institutions of the country.

Economic Modernization

During the last three decades of the nineteenth century Uruguay embarked on a process of modernization of its economic and political systems which laid the basis for further reforms under Batlle. Over the thirty years from 1870-1900, Uruguay went from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist state.¹³ But, unlike some countries in the hemisphere, Uruguay retained domestic control over its rural productive system which was based primarily on wool, hide, and meat export. While foreign capital played an important role in the development of Uruguay's export-based economic structure, it was generally subsidiary in nature as it most often only provided infrastructure and processing capacity to Uruguayan concerns.¹⁴ As an example, foreign--principally British--influence in establishing the Uruguayan railroad system was a key factor in facilitating the growth and expansion of the

¹³Jose Pedro Barran and Benjamin Nahum, *Batlle, Los Estancieros y El Imperio Britanico*, Tomo 2 (Montevideo, 1981), 13-21.

¹⁴Finch, *Political Economy*, 3.

Uruguayan rural economy. British involvement in establishing Uruguay's railroads began in 1866 and by 1877, the British Central Uruguay Railway Company was founded. Later, as several more English companies entered the market, Uruguay's railroad system grew to some 1,432 miles by 1909.¹⁵ In addition to the railroads, English, as well as other foreign countries (France, U.S., Spain, Argentina, Brazil, etc.) influenced the establishment of mining, meat-packing, banking and farming enterprises. Britain was also influential in establishing and operating much of Uruguay's tramway system. But, as Koebel illustrates, English (and other foreign) influence was less in Uruguay than in some other countries on the continent which allowed Uruguay to retain greater domestic control over its rural export economy: "It is true that in many branches of industry the ratio of British increase [in Uruguay] has not been in proportion with that of other countries."¹⁶

The existence in Uruguay of a progressive domestic (landowning) bourgeoisie in control of the export sector also led to the important process of capital accumulation. This relatively new sector of the landowning class, made up principally of Spanish and Italian immigrants who established small-to medium-sized

¹⁵W.H. Koebel, *Uruguay*, (London, 1911), 296-301.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 297.

estancias or acquired land for the growth of cereal products, eventually began to exert increasingly more influence and domination over the export economy (and hence, the traditional rural elite consisting of cattlemen and ranchers with *estancias* in excess of 2,500 hectares), particularly through alliances with and investments in commercial and financial interests in which foreign capital was dominant. The resultant dynamism of the export economy and the diffusion, even though only partial, of its benefits to the rest of society stimulated the diversification of the economy and gave rise to other urban and rural groups producing mainly for the domestic market. Their interests ultimately diverged from and competed with those of the export sector. Thus, conflicts of interest arose within the economically elite landowning class leading to increased rural strife, especially in the northern and central regions where traditional caudillos resisted outside incursions to limit their control of the land.¹⁷

Of the distinctive features of Uruguay's progressive economic development by 1900, the modernization of the all-important livestock sector of the rural economy was the most significant.¹⁸ Through the auspices of the Asociacion Rural, livestock production practices improved and, for the first time,

¹⁷Barran and Nahum, *Battle, Los Estancieros y El Imperio Britanico*, 77-91.

¹⁸Hanson, *Utopia*, 8-10.

landowners adopted wire fencing to cordon off their lands. This is important because prior to the introduction of fencing, claims to property were legitimized simply by possession. Property rights depended on the physical ability of landowners to defend them. Consequently, a large rural labor force was necessary on the *estancias* not only for production purposes, but also to defend a particular landowners' right to property and the product of the land.

With the modernization of the livestock sector came changes in the role of labor in the rural economy. As livestock production methods improved and investment in wire fencing increased, a massive displacement of the rural labor force from participation in the livestock economy occurred. By fencing off pastures and improving production practices, the amount of labor required directly in production and indirectly to safeguard the stock decreased. It also eliminated the population which lived by grazing a few animals on marginal land.¹⁹ Thus, the lack of opportunity for profitable employment and the concomitant inability of the rural economy to absorb the natural increase in rural population (approximately 16,000 persons annually)²⁰

¹⁹Finch, *Political Economy*, 9.

²⁰Departamento de Ganaderia y Agricultura, *Censo Ganadero de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay, 1900*, (Montevideo, 1901), 33.

forced many laborers to migrate elsewhere, particularly to Argentina or Brazil, or to Montevideo. As Weinstein indicates, "the important point is that they (laborers) have not left because of the increased mechanization of livestock raising, but because the methods employed and the increasing stagnation of the sector have reduced employment possibilities."²¹ By the end of the century, then, the drift to Montevideo was underway in that 30 per cent of the country's population of 915, 647 lived in the city,²² a result of both internal rural-to-urban migration and, more importantly, the influx of foreign immigrants to Montevideo.

The status of rural labor was thus significantly altered due to the overall changes within the livestock sector. These changes did not just impact the rural areas, however. Montevideo also underwent vast economic and social change as the displaced rural laborers migrated to the city. Montevideo grew in size as well as influence, a situation which worked to the advantage of Batlle and the urban-based Colorado party as they began efforts to attract middle and working class support.

Urbanization and Immigration

²¹Martin Weinstein, *Uruguay: The Politics of Failure* (Westport, 1975), 92.

²²Dirección General de Estadística, *Anuario Estadística de la República Oriental del Uruguay* (Montevideo, 1901-1915), 49-50.

Within the rubric of economic modernization fall two key and interrelated elements in the social formation of Uruguay: immigration and urbanization. Neither element is a new phenomenon in the course of Uruguay's social and economic development. Rather, these two phenomena are of the utmost importance toward understanding why Batlle and his urban-based Colorado party succeeded at the turn of the century in that Batlle recognized that the increase in the population of Montevideo could be incorporated into the Colorado party to enhance its overall strength vis-a-vis the Blancos.

Uruguay's progress in the twentieth century is largely the result of the growth of Montevideo. Statistical data reveal a striking contrast between the economic activity of Montevideo and the interior of the country.²³ From the mid-nineteenth century on, Montevideo enjoyed growth, prosperity, and increased opportunities for labor and capital. However, due to various interpretations of nineteenth and twentieth century population estimates, as well as the questionable validity of the data overall, some contemporary researchers believe that immigration as a factor in Montevideo's growth was overestimated. For example,

²³See Hanson, *Utopia*, 215-228, for a comparison of the economic activity of these two areas.

Rothman's interpretation of migration data indicates the net contribution of immigration to the city's population relative to natural increase during the period 1895-1919 was lower than previous estimates.²⁴ The effect of this reassessment indicates that Uruguay, contrary to studies done by Naranco and Calamet, could not compete with Brazil or Argentina as an ultimate destination for immigrants; in the decade 1905-1914, the ratio of new immigrants to total population for Uruguay was only one-tenth of that for Argentina.²⁵ For many migrants, Montevideo was simply a staging-post on the way to Buenos Aires or to Rio Grande do Sul.²⁶

This is not to say, however, that immigration was not of critical importance to Uruguay's development. Despite modifications to previous estimates to data after 1895, contemporary analyses of census data on the number of foreign-born inhabitants testify to the importance of immigration to Uruguay during the second half of the nineteenth century. For example, Finch indicates that "while a revision similar to Rothman's for pre-1895 migration statistics has not been made, it is most unlikely that it would relegate immigration to such a

²⁴Ana Rothman, *Evolution of Fertility in Argentina and Uruguay* (London, 1971), 716.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶Finch, *Political Economy*, 25.

marginal position as a determinant of [Montevideo's] population growth. Contemporary estimates and census data. . . testify to the importance of immigration during the second half of the nineteenth century."²⁷ And as just discussed, the inadequate supply of land available for colonization and the expulsion of labor from the *estancias* meant that Montevideo retained a disproportionately large number of new arrivals, many from the interior of the country. As such, beginning in the 1860s lower- and lower-middle-class immigration began from southern Europe. According to Taylor, as early as 1852 the census reported 28 per cent of the country's population was foreign born. By 1860 the figure was about 33 percent, and in 1880 it was reported at 40 percent. The majority settled in the capital and in neighboring Canelones Department.²⁸ Meanwhile, the Censo Municipal in 1889 indicated that 46.8 per cent of Montevideo was foreign-born.²⁹ Of these immigrants, most came from Italy (47 per cent) and Spain (32 per cent. Uruguay's first national census, taken in 1908, showed a similar trend. In this case, the census indicated 42 per cent of the population of Montevideo was foreign-born; for

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸Philip B. Taylor, "Uruguay: The Costs of Inept Political Corporatism," in Howard Wiarda and Harvey Kline, eds., *Latin American Politics and Development* (Boulder, 1985), 322.

²⁹Departamento de la Ciudad de Montevideo, *Censo Municipal* (Montevideo, 1889-1890), 259-260.

the country as a whole the proportion was much less at 17.4 per cent.³⁰ And further, during the period 1900-1930, Hanson reports net annual immigration at 15,000, and the increase in population at 145 per cent in Montevideo and 115 per cent in the interior.³¹

Despite certain ambiguities in the migration data, as well as different interpretations of the data, the importance of pre-1900 immigration to Montevideo was significant. Although not explicitly stated in the data, it is possible that the lower level of importance placed on migration relative to natural increase between 1900-1919 derived from increased births within the already large immigrant population. Overall, though, the impact of immigration on Uruguay's social and economic development was substantial. As indicated earlier, some immigrants entered the rural export economy as small and medium-sized landowners and soon rivaled the influence of the traditional landowner through increased ties to foreign capital and the urban sectors. Eventually, the urban bourgeoisie, like its rural counterpart with which it overlapped, became dominated by immigrants engaged mainly in commerce and financial activities.³² Most immigrants, however,

³⁰Direccion General de Estadistica, *Censo General de la Republica en 1908* (Montevideo, 1908), 14.

³¹Hanson, *Utopia*, 209.

³²Finch, *Political Economy*, 6.

settled in the city because their skills as artisans and industrial workers could be best utilized in the factories and industries which dominated Montevideo. The Census of 1889 reveals how the immigrants were absorbed into the labor force. Evidence indicates that immigrants introduced enterprise, skills and labor, while nationals contributed capital and occupied the "dependent middle class" stratum.³³ Male working-class occupations were heavily comprised of immigrants: 83 per cent of laborers, 87 per cent of shoemakers, 88 per cent of bricklayers, 85 per cent of metal workers, 93 per cent of seamen, 80 per cent of waiters, and 81 per cent of carpenters, were all foreign-born. In addition, in a wide range of other trades, such as millers, bakers and tailors, the relative number of foreign-born immigrants was overwhelming. The only large occupational groups with a disproportionate representation of nationals were the army (85 per cent), government employees (68 per cent), and clerks (45 per cent). The professions also contained a preponderance of nationals.³⁴

These new immigrant workers also arrived with certain ideological perspectives. Based on the above data, it is not surprising that the ideology of Uruguayan trade unionism should bear close European connections. Coming from regions heavily

³³*Ibid.*, 36.

³⁴*Censo Municipal, 1889-1890*, 247-256.

influenced by anarchist or Marxist thinking, these new immigrants were prepared for class struggle, for the rights of labor, and for access to the political process.³⁵ Thus, Montevideo's social situation underwent massive change during the last three decades of the nineteenth century through both internal migration and immigration from abroad. It was this situation which Batlle inherited and eventually exploited politically to achieve his reformist goals.

The other key element in Uruguay's social formation prior to and during the Batlle era was its extreme degree of urbanization. Like immigration, the urbanization process in Uruguay was not new. Similarly, Montevideo's overall importance to the rest of the country was not a new phenomenon. Solari indicates that since Independence, "it is likely that the capital has always accounted for at least one-quarter of the country's total population."³⁶ And, according to the censuses of 1889 and 1908, the proportion increased to over 30 per cent.³⁷ As to why Montevideo remained a magnet for Uruguay's population, a number of reasons are evident. The original function of the city was to defend the Banda Oriental during the early to mid-

³⁵Taylor, *Political Corporatism*, 322.

³⁶Aldo Solari, *El Desarrollo Social del Uruguay en la Postguerra* (Montevideo, 1967), 32.

³⁷*Censo Municipal*, 1889, 226-227 and 279-318, and *Censo General*, 1908, 14 .

nineteenth century. Later, as the necessity for this function declined, the growth of the city increased due to its extensive natural advantage as a port. While the rural economy continued to be based on livestock production requiring a limited settled population, Montevideo grew on the basis of its commerce and as the formal administrative capital of the country. The arrival of European immigrants in the late nineteenth century confirmed Montevideo's preeminence. However, not all immigrants who stayed in Uruguay settled in Montevideo. Indeed, the growth of agricultural production for the urban market was due to the participation of immigrants.³⁸

As noted previously, the overwhelming cause of the rapid growth of Montevideo at the turn of the century and beyond was internal migration brought on by the economic modernization of the rural economy and foreign immigration. The failure to employ the natural increase in the rural labor supply is central to the social history of Uruguay since 1870. As such, the capital with its superior employment opportunities and concentration of social and economic facilities served to absorb the vast social tensions generated by primitive and relatively unproductive land

³⁸Nestor Campiglia, *Migracion Interna en el Uruguay* (Montevideo, 1968), 15-16.

utilization policies favored by the traditional landowning class.³⁹ Montevideo thus became the proving ground for Batlle's efforts to fulfill his reformist goals and to incorporate labor and the middle class into the fold of the Colorado party. To accomplish this, a unique political system existed in which Batlle adroitly participated in and manipulated.

The Autonomous Political Structure

The political configuration of Uruguay in the final decades of the nineteenth century did not fit the simple model of political domination by economic elites in alliance with foreign capital. Rather, one of the more unique characteristics of Uruguayan political development was the substantial degree to which the State and the political system remained autonomous from these elites, in this case the rural landowners.⁴⁰ While not absolute, such autonomy on the part of the political process meant that the function of political parties in articulating the interests of, and fabricating alliances with, the dominant economic class was not fully developed. As such, the political process was not fully responsive to the requirements of the dominant class and, at

³⁹Finch, *Political Economy*, 30.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 2-3.

times, even acted contrary to the interests of this class on behalf of subordinate class interests or other class fractions. To explain the autonomous nature of the political system, it is important to understand two key elements. The first is to identify the urban political elite which formed the basis of the Colorado party. The second is the concept of Uruguayan political behavior known as coparticipation.

The New Urban Political Elite

The urban political elite evolved out of the civil wars of the 1870s. During this period, the state apparatus and central government was relatively weak compared with the landowners of the interior. Displaced from power in 1876 by the military, the urban political group (mainly from the Colorado party) declined in status to that of a professional, intellectual, and above all, political, elite group. Ideologically, its roots came from Europe, combining anti-state liberalism with aristocratic tendencies derived from its forefathers, and was unrelated to the rural and urban economic elites.⁴¹ This group, known as the urban bourgeoisie, was dominated by immigrants engaged mainly in commercial and financial activities. Seeing the political system as

⁴¹Finch, *Political Economy*, 5-6.

preoccupied by the rivalry between the urban and rural elites and thus unresponsive to their needs, this new urban middle class bypassed the institutionalized political structure and instead concentrated its efforts toward taking control of the state apparatus.⁴²

By the mid-1880s, though, the new urban bourgeoisie began to revitalize the Colorado party as the vehicle to express the growth of its economic and social interests, many of which remained antagonistic to those of the rural and urban economic elites.⁴³ This movement toward a more significant expression of one-party government (as opposed to coparticipation, to be discussed in the next section) was evident in the Colorado presidency of Julio Herrera y Obes. By restricting Blanco electoral control within some rural departments, Herrera y Obes threatened "the imminent breakdown of formal Blanco participation in national politics."⁴⁴ The new urban political elite thus came to dominate the Colorado party and with it, the electoral process.

Although some representatives of the landowning class held public office, the new political elite was a distinct group sustained

⁴²*Ibid.*, 6.

⁴³Juan E. Pivel Devoto and Alcira Ranieri de Pivel Devoto, *Historia de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay* (Montevideo, 1966), 351-352.

⁴⁴Weinstein, *Failure*, 52.

by its use of the press, by clientalism, and by the elevation of *caudillo* modes of leadership. Through these means, and helped by the substantial conflicts of interest ongoing within the economic elite itself (as discussed earlier), the new urban political elites were able to pursue policies at times contrary to the interests of the economically powerful. The practice of politics as a full-time profession subsequently developed and according to Solari, "to an increasing degree the political system was manipulated in the interests of its own practitioners such that there emerged in Uruguay the presence of a strong and coordinated political class."⁴⁵ Consequently, the two-party system, which had its origins in the siege of Montevideo and the Guerra Grande (1838-1851) with the establishment of Blanco-dominated government outside of Montevideo and a separate Colorado government in the capital, became more sophisticated and developed into one of the most salient features of twentieth century Uruguayan political life. An important outgrowth of this more defined two-party system was the concept of coparticipation which legitimized and assured the continued influence of the minority party (Blancos) within Colorado-dominated governments.

Coparticipation

⁴⁵Solari, *Desarrollo Social*, 3.

Coparticipation has a long history in Uruguay. Begun in 1872, coparticipation developed as a political mechanism to contain political conflicts (civil wars) during the last quarter of the nineteenth century between the rural-based Blanco (nationalist) party and the urban-based Colorado party. Described as the peaceful sharing of formal political and informal bureaucratic power, coparticipation as more narrowly interpreted referred to the presence of members of the opposition party in government posts, particularly at the ministerial level, or as directors of state corporations. More widely defined, the term refers to the legitimation of the notion that the two traditional parties and their adherents had an inherent right to divide and share the process and product of government and governmental activities.⁴⁶ In practice, this meant the Blanco party eventually gained control of four key rural departments (Canelones, San José, Florida, and Cerro Largo), while the Colorado party represented the other departments of the country, to include the all-important Department of Montevideo. Thus, the geographic control extended to the Blancos institutionalized and guaranteed the participation of the minority party in government.

⁴⁶Martin Weinstein, *Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads* (Boulder, 1988), 20.

Through the 1890s, the country remained divided into the *feudo partidos* established in 1872, but Blanco power had eroded during the interim due to the creation of eight new departments, all coming under the control of the Colorados. Blanco discontent continued to build under the Colorado presidencies of Herrera y Obes and Juan I. Borda. In 1896, it abstained from the general elections and in 1897, civil war broke out between the two parties. Despite the general peace secured by the Truce of 1897, minor disturbances continued until 1903. However, the election of Batlle that year created severe consternation among the Blanco leadership. Batlle, through editorials in *El Dia* prior to his election, indicated that the 1897 agreement granting the Blancos political control of two more departments was not a permanent arrangement. Further, Batlle fundamentally rejected the coparticipatory form of government: "The politics of coparticipation of parties in the government is always the result of extraordinary occurrences . . . for the next electoral struggle there will not be compromises since it is not logical for the normal functioning of institutions to have anything but party government. . ."⁴⁷ Inevitably, in 1903 civil war again erupted culminating nine months later in the complete victory of the

⁴⁷*El Dia*, September 4, 1897 as cited by Efrain Gonzalez Conzi and Roberto Giudici, *Batlle y el Batllismo* (Montevideo, 1928), 98.

urban Colorado party over the Blancos.

The end of the 1903-1904 civil war is generally accepted as the triumph of the city over the country. But, differences between the two remained. As outlined previously, Spanish and Italian immigration streamed into Montevideo allowing political and economic power to gradually shift to the city. Thus, "the conflicts of 1897 and 1903-1904 were attempts by rural interests to delay or protect themselves from this shift."⁴⁸ Coparticipation did not disappear, though. Blanco leaders, particularly Luis Alberto de Herrera, immediately called for constitutional reforms designed to strengthen the legislature, more carefully outline the power of the president, and allow for a more decentralized administration. These proposals attempted to soften the Blanco defeat and sought a new way to insure the continued political viability of the party. Herrera specifically called for "the coparticipation of all Uruguayans in the management of public affairs."⁴⁹ Herrera's proposals were ultimately rejected, but coparticipation remained a salient element within Uruguayan politics throughout the Batlle era and beyond.

Through the evolution of a significant political elite with interests separate from the economically dominant class, and a

⁴⁸Weinstein, *Failure*, 55.

⁴⁹Devoto and Devoto, *Historia*, 473.

national political behavior based on coparticipation to contain conflict and ensure the limited political representation of these economic elites, Uruguay's political system offered Batlle the mechanism through which to secure and manipulate power. The inheritance of a comparatively autonomous political system was employed by Batlle and the Colorados to secure the political isolation of the dominant but divided landowners. Concurrently, Uruguay's process of economic modernization allowed for the creation of an urban base which Batlle recognized as essential to the long-term success of the already urban-oriented Colorado party. By harnessing this base of middle- and working-class support brought on by internal migration and foreign immigration, Batlle enhanced the role of the political system and his party and achieved a liberal and humanitarian settlement of the tensions which resulted from these political and economic processes. Batlle's success, therefore, was the result of the conditions which obtained at the time. However, while it is a truism that great men are the products of their times, it is also true that great men can influence those times. Thus, in addition to the economic and political factors which influenced Uruguay's twentieth century development, Batlle's personal dreams and convictions-his ideology-also played a significant role. The next section outlines the roots of Batlle's ideological perspective.

THE ROOTS OF BATLLISMO

Early in his career, José Batlle y Ordóñez acquired an ideology and developed a program that combined are known as *Batllismo*. Based on the premise that extensive state intervention in the economic and social affairs of the country could control societal conflict, Batllismo's task was to bring about social justice and lessen economic inequality through the redistribution of resources. "The real source of inequality is in the difficulty in arriving at a just distribution."¹ At the same time, *Batllismo* sought to enhance the role of the political system, particularly the Colorado party, by incorporating labor and expanding state control over certain economic and social aspects of society. Using his newspaper, *El Dia*, Batlle propagated these liberal, democratic ideals such that by 1896 he became the most influential and well-known journalist in Uruguay.² This influence eventually contributed to his election to the presidency in 1903 at which time he began to put his idealistic program into practice.

Before discussing the roots of Batlle's ideology, it is important to establish a working definition of *Batllismo*. Because

¹*El Dia*, June 3, 1917.

²Hanson, *Utopia*, 19.

the literature pertaining to the Batlle era is somewhat broad, a number of definitions and interpretations of *Batllismo* exist. However, Finch's definition is probably the most comprehensive. According to his definition, *Batllismo* is essentially the highly distinctive social and political achievement of President Batlle during the early years of this century. In a wider sense, *Batllismo* was the ideology of the faction of the Colorado political party which Batlle led until his death in 1929 and which subsequently based its identity on his memory. But in the most general meaning *Batllismo* refers to the national style or ideology of development within which Uruguayan public life was conducted from early this century until the end of the 1960s, with a brief interruption in the 1930s.⁵² The hallmark of this national style was above all the use of political, social, and economic techniques to redistribute income in the interests of securing a high level of social consensus, and, related to this a marked preference for political compromise rather than confrontation.⁵³

Batlle's pro-labor emphasis had both pragmatic and idealistic roots. Pragmatically, Batlle's labor reforms responded to the various economic, political, and social factors already underway in the country, as detailed in the previous section. For

⁵²Finch, *Political Economy*, 2.

⁵³*Ibid.*

Batlle and his colleagues within the Colorado party, the challenge was how to take advantage of these social and economic trends and integrate the new and overwhelming urban mass into society at large, and the Colorado party in particular. As Weinstein states, "Batlle's political genius rested on his recognition of the importance of the new immigrants as an urban mass that could be made the backbone of the electoral strength of the Colorado party."⁵⁴

Batlle's pragmatism also reflected his appreciation that foreign-principally British-involvement in the Uruguayan economy was a necessity for Uruguay's growth and modernization.⁵⁵ Although his nationalistic sense was offended, he understood that his political goal of improved working and wage conditions for his clients could not be achieved while large earnings were transmitted abroad. Giudici cites Batlle as writing in 1907, "We can make great progress during the next twenty years if we have honest government and especially if we are less generous in handing out money to foreign corporations."⁵⁶ Thus, Batlle accelerated the process of organizing autonomous state enterprises for essential services, and in so doing, sought to

⁵⁴Weinstein, *Democracy*, 23.

⁵⁵Taylor, *Political Corporatism*, 322.

⁵⁶Giudici, *Batlle y el Batllismo*, 383

exempt them from partisan influence and required they earn a profit. "From the point of view of the national economy, a wasteful administration by the State is always preferable to the efficient management of an industry by foreign enterprise."⁵⁷

Batlle's commitment to private investment was also instrumental in securing increased economic modernization and growth. Private capital, largely foreign, allowed the creation of such entities as banks, export-import houses, shipping and agricultural processing firms, and railroads. The State was therefore freed to direct its budget surpluses to modernizing such social functions as education, health, and communications. "State socialism makes it possible to use for the general good that portion of the results of labor which is not paid to labor."⁵⁸

Ideologically, Batlle's pronouncements on labor preceded by a number of years his ascension to the presidency. Batlle subscribed to the belief that the "cure for economic, political, and social ills lay in making laws and more laws, a firm faith that the mere enactment of progressive labor laws would effect a general uplifting of the standard of living by increasing the total welfare of the community. . ."⁵⁹ By pursuing progressive, pro-labor

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 769.

⁵⁸*El Dia*, September 3, 1919.

⁵⁹Hanson, *Utopia*, vii.

legislation, Batlle accepted the idea that the individual worker could attain upward mobility based on merit and that labor should seek autonomous political action rather than "be captured by a directive political party or class-determinant ideology".⁶⁰ As early as 1896, editorials in *El Dia* recognized that the small, but militant labor movement could form the basis of a new urban base for the Colorado party. As such, strong editorial support for labor became the norm: "Among us the labor movement should be considered as the arrival of working people into public life, and seen in this light, the movement acquires national importance."⁶¹

In addition to supporting labor's right to organize, Batlle adamantly encouraged labor's right to strike. "We sympathize with the strikers. A strike means that the weak have made themselves strong and having first implored justice now demand it."⁶² Similarly, after the railroad strike of 1908 failed, Batlle declared: "Every strike is justified and it would be ideal if all could be successful. Since the all-important matter is that the time be opportune, let the State help by keeping the workers informed. . .⁶³ Batlle, however, did not believe that the strike alone could provide enough incentive for employers to submit to worker's

⁶⁰Taylor, *Political Corporatism*, 323

⁶¹*El Dia*, January, 4, 1916.

⁶²*El Dia*, January 3, 1896.

⁶³*El Dia*, April 3, 1908

demands. Because the power of capital and labor was so unequal, Batlle believed that "modern industry must not be allowed to destroy human beings. The State must regulate it to make more happy the life of the masses."⁶⁴

Thus, pragmatism and idealism together represented the *Batllismo* philosophy and illustrated Batlle's dual approach to governing. Throughout his lifetime, Batlle remained faithful to the high ideals of democratic government, state intervention, and the cause of labor and worker's rights. At the same time, though, he emerged as a skillful and pragmatic politician capable of shrewd political maneuverings. In 1938, Hanson capsulized Batlle's philosophical creed which bears repeating:

Steadfast faith in the ballot-with a consequent solicitude for such major voting elements as labor and the bureaucracy. Unrestrained nationalism-involving among other things unconcealed antagonism to foreign capital and willingness to aid domestic enterprise except when its interests conflicted with that of labor. Confidence in the ability of the State to participate directly and successfully in industry and trade. Inflexible belief that the primary obligation of the State is to secure for labor a larger share of the national wealth and income-with the stipulation, however, that it shall not involve a redistribution of the landowner's property.⁶⁵

⁶⁴Giudici, *Batlle y el Batllismo*, 549.

⁶⁵Hanson, *Utopia*, 23.

Batlle and Populism

Although Batlle's legacy and achievements are well-documented, few authors refer to he or his program as populist in nature. Whether this is an oversight or simply a lack of understanding as to what populism as a phenomenon meant to twentieth century Latin American history, it is evident little mention of Batlle as a populist exists in the literature. Some authors such as Conniff and Taylor allude to Batlle as being a populist, but no one has, as yet, devoted a study specifically to this end. Conniff places Batlle at the periphery of the populist movements in Latin America. By dating the beginnings of Latin America's populist movements between 1920 and 1965, Conniff does indicate that both Batlle's Colorado party and Yrigoyen's Argentine Radicals contained elements of populism prior to the formal start of the populist period.⁶⁶ And Taylor labels Batlle's social legacy as a "libertarian and populist blueprint based on state involvement in the economy."⁶⁷ Despite the paucity of references linking Batlle and populism, it is evident that through his achievements he not only qualifies as such, but also was Latin

⁶⁶Michael Conniff, *Latin American Populist*, 6.

⁶⁷Taylor, *Political Corporatism*, 323.

America's first populist leader in the twentieth century.

Many elements of populism require definition and clarification. According to Conniff, the most important characteristics of populism are that it be urban, multiclass, electoral, expansive, "popular", and led by charismatic figures.⁶⁸ Populism was generally urban in Latin America because it reacted against the authoritarian nature of nineteenth century wealthy elites, most of whom controlled the rural economic and political sectors. The multiclass nature of populism indicates that the movement drew support and adherents from all levels of society, to include the urban workers, petit bourgeoisie, the economically inactive, rural migrants, and even such nonaligned groups as students, intellectuals, and soldiers. In general, the largest and most favored groups were urban labor and the middle classes. The former group received union recognition, electoral power, welfare benefits, and a recognized place in society. The latter received more public jobs, better educational facilities, decision-making authority in the bureaucracy, and a higher social standing.⁶⁹

Twentieth century populism was usually electoral and incorporated citizen participation in politics. The earliest populist

⁶⁸Conniff, *Populism*, 13.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 15.

parties arose to demand restitution of electoral rights or their extension to disenfranchised groups. Populist movements also expanded to embrace new groups and new causes. These movements attempted to establish new contacts, register new voters, organize local committees and rallies, and essentially become popular by bringing the political system to new elements within society.⁷⁰ And finally, charismatic leadership characterized Latin American populism. This type of leadership covered two types of behavior. The first type was antiauthoritarian and democratic, while the second type was authoritarian and relatively unstable. The former emphasized the populist movement itself as the political phenomenon while the latter leaned more heavily on the leader himself as the phenomenon in question.

In examining these characteristics of populism, it is notable that most, if not all, apply to the Batlle era in Uruguay. Batlle's Colorado party was urban-based, as was Batlle himself. Batlle's Colorados inherited a social and economic situation in which both rural migration and foreign immigration contributed to the rise of a large working class and substantial middle class, both in need of political representation and desiring to participate in the political process. Batlle's programs were expansive and popular in that he

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 17.

campaigns for, and achieved legislatively, expanded voting rights (to include women) and competitive elections. And finally, Batlle fit the mold of a nonauthoritarian leader even though he preferred behind-the-scenes political maneuverings and generally maintained an introverted personal manner.⁷¹ Batlle and his adherents, then, represent the essence of a populist movement, one that preceded by more than a decade the official beginnings of the populist era in Latin America.

As Batlle was the forerunner to later populist efforts in Latin America, it is instructive to briefly outline a similar populist movement beginning in 1916 in neighboring Argentina involving Yrigoyen and his Radical party. Although the circumstances and motivations of Yrigoyen's movement differed substantially from Batlle's, a comparison between the two is possible due to the many similarities encountered.

Prior to 1916, the Radicals paid little attention to the working class. Particularly lacking in their program was the belief that the workers could become a full base of support to the party. Of the few references to labor's right to participate in the political process most were more a complaint against the oligarchy in power than any attempt to institute broad labor reforms.⁷² In

⁷¹Vanger, *Batlle of Uruguay*, 23.

⁷²Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, 117-118.

addition, the Radical party viewed the working class as generally disruptive. One of the salient features of the party's ideological orientation was an antipathy toward the notion of class conflict. So too, the party rejected any measures likened to socialism, an ideology the Radicals associated with organized labor.⁷³ Thus, Yrigoyen and the Radical party, contrary to Batlle, carried no ideological desire to see the urban worker gain socially or politically as a class.

After 1916, though, the Radical party determined to go beyond its middle class support base and include the integration of the working class into the party program. At first this seems contradictory to its previous ambivalent position vis-a-vis the working class. Certainly there was no reason the Radicals, in spite of their cross-class aggregative character, should have displayed interest in the working class especially in light of its previous lack of support for labor. However, according to Tamarin, the Radicals courted labor for electoral considerations, particularly to bolster its chances for congressional supremacy.⁷⁴ And Rock indicates that "the vote of the native-born workers, who had been enfranchised by the Saenz Pena Law, was, despite their being a

⁷³*Ibid.*

⁷⁴David Tamarin, "Yrigoyen and Peron: The Limits of Argentine Populism," in Michael Conniff, *Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective* (Albuquerque, 1982), 35-38.

minority in terms of the working class as a whole, one of the major keys to the political control of the city of Buenos Aires."⁷⁵ Thus, the search for political control over the working class was one of the most significant effects of the widening franchise in Argentina in 1912 and became a primary tenet in the Radical party's attempts to gain and retain power after 1916.

To accomplish bringing labor into its fold, Yrigoyen and the Radical party formulated an "even-handed" labor policy sympathetic (like Batlle's) to worker's "just demands."⁷⁶ This labor policy, known as "obrerismo", included plans for protective and regulatory social legislation reinforced by acts of charity and patronage. In part, *obrerismo* contained the real conviction that labor should be integrated into Argentine society and share more equitably in the nation's wealth. As such, between 1916 and 1919, Yrigoyen lent support to a number of strikes, particularly those in the maritime transport and railway sectors dominated by foreign capital. This support emanated primarily in the form of government nonintervention, that is, police power was not utilized to break strike activity. Occasionally, Yrigoyen used the power of the presidency to persuade recalcitrant employers to arbitrate

⁷⁵David Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, 119.

⁷⁶David Tamarin, "Yrigoyen and Peron", 36.

their conflict with strikers.⁷⁷ These policies directly paralleled those of Batlle in Uruguay a decade earlier. Beyond these efforts, however, little doubt exists that *obrerismo* was principally a calculated form of electoral strategy designed to woo the native and naturalized worker into the Radical party's orbit.⁷⁸

In comparing the reform movements of Batlle and Yrigoyen the question of why reformism was more successful in Uruguay than Argentina can be raised. Without elaborating into a full discussion of the various social, political, and economic factors which impacted Yrigoyen's presidencies it is evident that Batlle "may have been the model for Yrigoyen."⁷⁹ Batlle, though, always held a much stronger political position than Yrigoyen, especially after the Colorado defeat of the Blancos in the 1904 civil war. Yrigoyen's own revolt in 1905 failed and although he eventually gained power, the strong influence of the conservatives remained intact. Also, a number of authors believe Uruguay's successful welfare legislation compared more favorably than Argentina's due to Uruguay's need to compete with Argentina for immigrants due to labor shortages.⁸⁰ Despite the differences, the parallels between

⁷⁷*Ibid.*

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 35.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*

⁸⁰David Tamarin, "Yrigoyen and Peron," 37-38; David Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, 120; and Finch, *Political Economy*, 25.

Batlle and Yrigoyen were significant in that both aimed to eliminate the threat of Anarchism by integrating labor into the established political system. Both desired to strengthen their respective political parties through this process. Thus, as a populist movement, Batlle's achievements transcended not only obstacles in his own country, but also served to influence other populist movements as well. This remains an important aspect of Batlle's legacy in Latin America.

Batllismo : Variations on a Theme

Despite the importance of Batlle's advanced agenda of social and pro-labor legislation on the subsequent development of Uruguay various interpretations exist which attempt to explain the *Batllista* philosophy and its results. In examining some of these interpretations of *Batllismo*, two observations can be made. First, it is apparent from a review of the literature that some Uruguayan and other authors view Batlle and his philosophy in an overly idealistic and idolistic manner. Roberto Ares Pons, for example, recognizes the basic flavor of the *Batllista* style as "bourgeois humanism, rationalism, and faith in lineal and indefinite progress."⁸¹ Interpretations of Batlle's legacy thus

⁸¹Roberto Ares Pons, *Uruguay: Provincia o Nacion?* (Montevideo, 1967), 78.

become, in one way or another, campaign biographies which make him larger than life.⁸²

A second observation is the abundance of interpretations of Batlle's ideology. Although the interpreters of *Batllismo* cover the spectrum from right to left, few disagree with Solari that a definite Batlle ideology did exist:

Whatever the opinion one might have of Batlle's ideology, it seems impossible to deny that he had one. It seems impossible to deny that the idea of nationalizing public services, of struggling against foreign capital, of creating autonomous administrative units. . . formed an ideological whole of a certain coherence, and for which Batlle and his faction constantly struggled.⁸³

Interpretations of *Batllismo* tend to reflect the particular ideological leanings of the interpreter. Thus, for German Rama, *Batllismo* represents the rise to national power of the petty bourgeoisie through a political movement of the middle class. Hence, it is limited by the very nature of all such middle class movements.⁸⁴ For Julio Louis, *Batllismo* is also a bourgeois ideology, but it did not go far enough in resolving Uruguay's

⁸²Vanger, *Batlle of Uruguay*, vii.

⁸³Aldo Solari, "Pensamiento y Comparamiento Politico del Ciudadano" in *Uruguay: Una Politica del Desarrollo*, Cuadernos, #17, (Montevideo), 117-118.

⁸⁴Weinstein, *Failure*, 32.

dependence on foreign capital, its domination by the *latifundio*, or its reliance on monoproduction. In sum, it does not resolve any of the infrastructural problems.⁸⁵ Meanwhile, Ricardo Martinez Ces condemns *Batllismo* for its inability to deal effectively with society's underlying structural problems. Rather, *Batllismo* left Uruguay as underdeveloped as it was prior to Batlle's ascendancy because it remained economically dependent on the English market.⁸⁶ And for Carlos Real de Azua, *Batllismo's* weakness was its lack of promoting and sustaining a national ethic or sacrifice despite the sense of economic nationalism *Batllismo* generated.⁸⁷

All of these interpretations of *Batllismo* have a certain degree of merit. Underlying them all, however, is an appreciation that *Batllismo* was a unique attempt at state-building and nation-building. *Batllismo* as a phenomenon was a liberal, humanitarian, middle-class settlement of the political and social tensions ongoing at the time. Though at times it may have taken a radical form, particularly in the protection by the State of the economically and socially weak, the basic design of *Batllismo* was fundamentally conservative--it expanded the functions of the State in order to secure an equilibrium of class forces, while enhancing the role of

⁸⁵Julio A. Louis, *Batlle y Ordonez* (Montevideo, 1969), 196.

⁸⁶Ricardo Martinez Ces, *El Uruguay Batllista* (Montevideo, 1962), 196-197.

⁸⁷Carlos Real de Azua, *El Impulso y Su Freno: Tres Decadas de Batllismo y Los Raices de la Crisis Uruguayana* (Montevideo, 1964), Chapter iv.

the political system.⁸⁸

Now that the economic, political and social factors that existed up to and during the Batlle era have been identified, and Batlle's ideological perspective examined, it is possible to outline the characteristics of Uruguay's militant labor movement. Of interest is the historical development of organized labor in Uruguay, its demands, and how those demands were incorporated by Batlle and the Colorado party into legislative achievement. To accomplish these goals and to determine the overall relationship between labor and government, three significant strikes will be examined. Batlle's response to labor's demands, as well as his efforts to offer pro-labor social legislation reinforce the point that Batlle undermined the militant labor movement by incorporating their demands into law.

⁸⁸Finch, *Political Economy*, 10.

THE WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT AND LABOR LEGISLATION

As demonstrated in previous sections, certain economic, political, and social conditions provided an environment conducive to significant labor reforms in Uruguay at the turn of the century. So too, Batlle's widely published idealistic and progressive views in support of the welfare of the worker served to set the Colorado party on the course toward advanced social reform. Indeed Batlle's reforms, many of them implemented before the First World War, were not only advanced among Latin American countries, but also frequently preceded their adoption by other societies with much longer histories of liberal humanitarianism. Nonetheless, the inspiration for Uruguay's advanced labor legislation found root neither in misguided altruism nor misplaced modernity, but rather in an attempt to integrate the urban working class, particularly organized labor, into the ranks of the Colorado party. Because the urban population, especially the economically active part, was composed predominantly of immigrants, it lacked the traditional bonds of loyalty to the existing political parties. The aspirations of the working class for higher standards of living and greater economic security were

directed towards the militant anarcho-syndicalist working class movement, which threatened to undermine the mass urban support on which Batlle's Colorado party depended. Thus, labor legislation had Bismarkian objectives in seeking to integrate the new urban population and the demands of labor into the traditional institutional structure, while at the same time strengthening the role of the masses. "The party which he [Batlle] determined to organize was frankly for the workers, not for any idealistic reason but because he realized it would contribute to national goals, and also on which the future of the party and himself could be built."⁸⁹ To explain how Batlle accomplished his goal of integrating labor into the Colorado party, it is first necessary to outline the roots of Uruguay's labor movement.

Origins and Development of the Labor Movement

Although the formative years of the trade union movement in Uruguay were the two decades preceding the First World War, its forerunner was the various mutual aid societies established in the 1850s which catered to the sick and disabled and provided assistance to worker's survivors.⁹⁰ The earliest recorded attempt

⁸⁹ Rama, *Obra y Vida*, 47-48.

⁹⁰ Weil, *Area Handbook*, 320.

to form a worker's association occurred in 1865; however, the first formal union, that of the printing workers, was established in 1870. A year later in 1871, a branch of the International Association of Workers was established in Montevideo under the guidance of immigrant labor leaders who were "veterans of the great social and economic struggles ongoing in Europe at the time and in many cases, oriented toward anarchism."⁹¹ Other occupational groups also formed unions during the 1870s and 1880s both for economic and political purposes. This included the founding of the anarchistic Federation of Uruguayan Workers in 1885.

As the number of unions increased, strikes also became more prevalent. Strikes took place at the Cunapiru gold mine in 1884, in Montevideo's hospitals in 1889, and in the printer, transportation, and meat packing sectors that year as well.⁹² By 1895, most skilled trades, to include carpenters, masons, bricklayers, hair-cutters, and shoemakers were unionized. Most of these unions existed in Montevideo, however, a few located outside the city such as the stone and marble quarryment, and the

⁹¹Lucia S. de Touron and Jorge E. Landinelli, "El Movimiento Obrero Uruguayana", in Pablo Casanova (ed), *Historia del Movimiento Obrero en America Latina*, Tomo 4 (Mexico City, 1984), 252-253.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 253.

port construction workers at Paysandu.⁹³ In 1905, a total of thirty-eight labor associations existed, almost all in the occupations or skilled crafts. Also in that year two new institutions formed which reflected the growth of Uruguay's organized labor movement: a union of workers of various crafts in Montevideo, and the first modern federation of unions, the Federacion Obrera Regional Uruguayana (FORU).

Before discussing the objectives, activities, and demands of labor (FORU), it is essential to understand some of its ideological underpinnings. As indicated earlier, the Uruguayan labor movement and most, if not all of its leadership was anarchist or syndicalist in nature. Inspired by the social doctrines of Proudhon and Bakunin, anarchism essentially rejected the more moderate aims of socialism which called for the gradual social, economic, and political reform of society. Instead, anarchists advocated the direct action of the working classes to liberate society from the oligarchy. Through class revolution, anarchists sought the breakdown of the institutional structures of society to be replaced by the workers to achieve immediate benefits and improvements within the society.⁹⁴ The main significance of the

⁹³Carlos M. Rama, "La Cuestion Social", in *Montevideo Entre Dos Siglos, 1890-1914*, Cuadernos de Marcha, #22 (Montevideo, 1969), 64.

⁹⁴ Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, 77-78.

anarchists lay in their influence within unions. This influence was initially manifested more readily in the small industrial and service occupations than among large-scale concerns. "An anarchist tendency in the early labor movement resulted in the proclivity for independent unions and a shifting of membership from one union to another. Later, in federated groups, there was a tendency toward decentralization with pronounced local union autonomy and toward movement of affiliation from one central group to another."⁹⁵

Syndicalists differed from anarchists in that they were less prone to extremism. Syndicalists relied on the belief that political change was unnecessary and instead believed in achieving tangible economic and social improvements among the working class. Linked more closely to the Socialist party than the anarchists, syndicalists opted for greater use of the strike as a weapon to achieve economic gains from employers and the government. However, syndicalists sided with the anarchists in their acceptance of the class basis of the modern state and therefore regarded socialist efforts to reform it as destined to failure.⁹⁶ Syndicalists, like their European counterparts, regarded the trade union as the basic instrument to achieve redemption of

⁹⁵Weil, *Area Handbook*, 321.

⁹⁶Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, 84.

the working class. Not only was it a means of self-defense, but it also was the unit for the establishment of a new society led by the working class linked by common economic interests. Syndicalists recognized that violent action on the part of the anarchists was doomed to failure such that they endeavored to direct the working class toward greater organization and self-discipline through the organization of the trade union.

In Uruguay, organized labor (FORU) combined the anarchist and syndicalist perspectives. Uruguay's labor movement, always considered extreme, grew even more radical during the early years of the Batlle era due to the president's policy of unrestricted admission of extremists into the country from Buenos Aires.⁹⁷ Also contributing to labor's militancy during Batlle's first years in office was his policy recognizing labor's right to strike and his promulgation of regulations restricting police repression of strikes. Previously, the police assisted employers in strike-breaking; now they were required to remain neutral. As such, on May Day, 1903, one labor leader exulted that Uruguay now led South America in modern ideas because of its President's liberalism.⁹⁸ As FORU's influence grew, so did its membership. By 1912 estimates indicated that it contained approximately 7,000

⁹⁷Finch, *Political Economy*, 55.

⁹⁸*El Dia*, May 2, 1903.

members.⁹⁹ Although the ratio of union members to working-class population was low, members were extremely active and militant. Recruitment was selective and membership required a high degree of ideological commitment. Union leaders served as the vanguard of the movement, and in spite of their limited numbers the size of some strikes and demonstrations supported contentions that FORU controlled as many as 90,000 industrial workers.¹⁰⁰ This level of support for union positions by the rank-and-file would indicate that the leadership correctly interpreted labor's demands against employers.

Tactically, FORU manifested the approaches of both the syndicalists and the anarchists. Regarding the former, FORU relied on strikes, sometimes made more effective by boycotting enterprises showing a lack of sympathy to the movement. As to the latter, some strikers resorted to sabotage and other forms of violence. Regardless of the tactics, the labor movement's ultimate goal was revolution and the liberation of the proletariat. The unions acted not merely to defend their own class interests but also attacked the concept of private ownership of the means of production and the system of state authority.¹⁰¹ Labor unions

⁹⁹Rama, "La Cuestion Social," 25-26.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁰¹Touron and Landinelli, "El Movimiento Obrero Uruguayana," 252-254.

relied on direct industrial action as participation in the political process was limited. The admission of non-proletarian elements into the labor movement was restricted so as to maintain its radical nature (even though many labor leaders were not members of the rank-and-file). Thus, the route to emancipation of the working class was through the working class itself, not legislation.¹⁰² The challenge for Batlle, then, was to disarm the militant labor movement which threatened the Colorados of their urban base. The next section will examine Batlle's actions in response to labor agitation during his presidencies.

Batlle and the Demands of Labor

During the Batlle era, the level of strike activity fluctuated considerably. According to the 1911-1912 annual statistics, one hundred strikes occurred with over 500,000 working days lost between 1908 and 1911.¹⁰³ While the international trade cycle served as one of the primary causes of these strikes, it is evident that the eight-hour day was labor's primary goal, followed by demands for higher wages and reinstatement of dismissed

¹⁰²Finch, *Political Economy*, 56.

¹⁰³*Anuario Estadístico*, 1911-1912, 717-718.

workers.¹⁰⁴ To better determine the aspirations of labor and Batlle's responses to them, three significant strikes will be examined: The Port Workers Strike of 1905; the Railroad Strike of 1908; and the General Strike of 1911.

The Port Workers Strike of 1905

Beginning in late 1904 and early 1905, labor union activity increased due to the end of the 1904 Civil War and Batlle's firm commitment to the betterment of labor's economic and social situation. In December, 1904, the railroad workers formed a union, and within a month, went on strike. The union demanded an eight-hour day for part of the year, increased wages to 80 pesos monthly for locomotive engineers, two days off with pay per month, and dismissal payments to any worker over the age of fifty.¹⁰⁵ The railroad initially rejected these demands forcing Batlle to intervene and threaten to cutoff the railroad's government subsidy. Eventually, the railroad accepted labor's demands, to include the taking back of the strike leaders (management continued to reject the establishment of the union, though). Labor rejoiced as they finally realized they had a friend

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵Vanger, *Batlle of Uruguay*, 206.

(Batlle) at the top.¹⁰⁶

On May 23, 1905, the port workers of Montevideo, having seen the success of the railroad union earlier, also went on strike demanding more money, an eight-hour day, fixed numbers on work gangs, and union recognition. Management balked at these demands and blamed the strike on the anarchist leadership of the union as they were considered "elements foreign to daily labor, who came with deceitful words to perturb the worker's tranquility."¹⁰⁷ The harbor came to a standstill as more than 11,000 workers joined the strike, considered the largest in Uruguayan history.

Batlle's response to the strike was fundamentally pro-labor, but generally neutral. Instructed to protect the right to strike , as well as the right to work, the police did not interfere with efforts by the stevedore companies to bring in outside workers. Due to the seriousness of the strike, Batlle appointed an official government fact-finder, thus elevating the strike from strictly a private matter to a public one. The subsequent report indicated that the strikers deserved better conditions and advised the Executive to arbitrate the strike. While the Executive had no legal power to arbitrate strikes or compel employers to deal with

¹⁰⁶*El Siglo*, January 17, 1905.

¹⁰⁷*El Siglo*, May 24, 1905.

unions, Batlle could order the army to unload ships and act as a strikebreaker. Batlle refused; however, he did meet with the Lussich Company and requested they settle the strike based on a limited increase in worker's wages. Further, to encourage the strikers, as well as to counter the hostile Montevideo press and to educate the public, Batlle authorized *El Dia* to publish editorials in support of the strike. One editorial defended the professional labor leaders: "These so-called agitators were to workers what attorneys were to employers. The fact that labor leaders were foreigners should not be held against them, for it gave them experience with labor conditions elsewhere. . it was unjust not to rehire strike leaders."¹⁰⁸ Also, "to limit, in general, the action of agitators is not only to limit liberty, it is also to limit progress. ."¹⁰⁹

Batlle's public and private efforts to end the strike favorably for labor failed to bring positive results. While negotiations continued, a group of strikers were killed by the police during an attempt to intercept a band of strikebreakers. Later, Batlle's request to Lussich met intense opposition among management. The employers insisted on their original position: the men must return as individuals and ask to be rehired, no strike leaders

¹⁰⁸*El Dia*, June 16, 1905.

¹⁰⁹*El Dia*, June 19, 1905.

would be rehired, and the employers would not accept a union. Batlle did all he could within the law to help the strikers. He refused to permit launches to work on holidays and tried to prevent strikebreakers from entering the port. But the companies kept the port operating and the strike ultimately failed. The men won only a few cents per day increase but lost over a month's pay.¹¹⁰

The strike demonstrated that the Montevideo unions, despite their rhetoric and the justice of their case, were not strong enough to stand up to employers. Batlle's policy of benevolent neutrality was ineffective at helping the strikers achieve their demands. Vanger states, "Only in exceptional situations-situations like that of the railroad, when employers needed some special concession from the government-would the government's pro-labor sympathies make an employer willing to treat with a union."¹¹¹ Thus, Batlle needed to find a way to increase the government's ability to help labor if a change in the employer-worker relationship was to occur. Batlle believed the solution, as always, lay in promulgating progressive legislation in support of labor. "The president is occupying himself with the making of an

¹¹⁰Milton Vanger, *The Model Country-Batlle of Uruguay* (Hanover, 1980), 210.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*

extensive labor law designed to resolve many of the questions which today cause conflicts between employers and workers."¹¹² Due to congressional and employer opposition, though, Batlle was forced to wait until his second term to see his proposals enacted. "To educate the Uruguayan people to his reform ideals, to give the Colorado party an ideological program, to organize the party in such a way that elected Colorado officials would be required to put the party program into effect-these Batlle conceived of as the work of the rest of his life."¹¹³

The Railroad Strike of 1908

In 1908, the railroads were Uruguay's largest employer and railroad workers participated in the country's most effective union. During the first Batlle administration, the railroads, anxious to continue receiving government subsidies and approval of railroad extension contracts, quietly settled the strike of 1905 on terms somewhat favorable to labor. Although employers failed to recognize the union, they allowed the strike settlement terms to continue until 1909. Now, however, with Williman in power as president, the continuation of Batlle's pro-labor policies was in

¹¹²*El Dia*, September 8, 1905.

¹¹³Vanger, *The Model Country*, 213.

jeopardy.

In February, 1908, workers on the Midland line struck in response to the dismissal of four militant labor agitators. Eventually, workers along the lines leading to Montevideo also struck. At the request of the railroads, the army dispatched 2,500 troops to guard the railroad and move the trains. Sabotage activities by strikers forced Williman to close down union halls, prohibit strike meetings, and forbid strikers from venturing near the railroads.¹¹⁴ The strike lasted forty-one days before collapsing. The railroads took back only those workers not considered union activists and previous concessions were revoked. From that point, working conditions were set exclusively by management.

The contrast between Batlle's pro-labor efforts to negotiate the port workers strike in 1905 and Williman's hard-line, pro-management stance in the 1908 railroad strike is illustrative. At the end of the 1908 strike, railroad officials visited Williman to thank him for his efforts on their behalf: "They visited not only to advise him of the end of the strike, but also to express the company's gratitude for the measures adopted by the government during the emergency."¹¹⁵ Also, despite pushing through a

¹¹⁴*El Siglo*, February 14 and 15, 1908.

¹¹⁵*El Dia*, April 5, 1908.

number of progressive reforms such as the divorce law and the abolition of the death penalty, most observers considered Williman a conservative. Williman himself declared: "In the area of economic, social, and labor reforms, my government differed so fundamentally from that of señor Batlle that it was considered, not entirely justly, conservative."¹¹⁶ Because of Williman's conservative approach to labor the government's previous pro-labor policy was held in abeyance until Batlle's second term.

The General Strike of 1911

The return of Batlle in 1911 removed the last vestiges of Williman's anti-labor policies and, along with improved economic conditions, resulted in an upsurge of labor activity. Forty-one strikes occurred in 1911 in which over 19,000 men participated.¹¹⁷ Only three weeks after Batlle's inauguration, 10,000 workers protested the high cost of living and cheered Batlle upon passing his residence. In April, Batlle mediated a hospital worker's strike in Montevideo and in May, the Federacion Obrera met and endorsed "anarcho-communism" as its final goal. This increased labor activity led directly to the circumstances

¹¹⁶Vanger, *The Model Country*, 214.

¹¹⁷Hanson, *Utopia*, 128.

surrounding the 1911 General Strike.

The General Strike of 1911 began in response to the firing of nine activist labor organizers from the trolley union by two foreign-owned trolley companies. After the companies refused to rehire the workers, the trolley union went on strike. The principal aims of the union were a pay increase, a shorter work day, a revision of work rules, the rehiring of the nine, and a requirement that all trolley workers be union members.¹¹⁸ In response, Batlle's government announced it would respect the right to strike, but would protect any operating trolley from striker's violence. The trolley companies, meanwhile, were told to continue operating or the municipality would fine them 3,000 pesos daily. Failure to pay resulted in a criminal act subjecting the managers to imprisonment.¹¹⁹ Batlle thus indicated to both the strikers and the employers his desire to work within the law, but he also decided to provide as much help to labor as legally possible.

Within days, though, violence ensued and attempts to settle the strike became futile. After striking ten days the trolley union requested the Federacion Obrera enter the strike on their behalf. Delegates of thirty-five unions unanimously voted to close down

¹¹⁸*El Dia*, May 12, 1911.

¹¹⁹Vanger, *The Model Country*, 123.

Montevideo with a general strike as a protest "against the falsification of the terms by the managers."¹²⁰ Remarkably, marchers then descended on Batlle's residence and held a rally, at which time Batlle told them "the government will never be your enemy so long as you respect law and order."¹²¹ Batlle thus blessed the crowd at the beginning of the first general strike in Uruguayan history and pledged the state's benevolent neutrality during the strike's duration. The strike lasted twenty-four hours and ended with substantial material gains for the trolley workers.

Batlle's handling of the 1911 General Strike served as a turning point in his bid to garner political support for his pro-labor policies. At first glance, though, this conclusion may not be evident. Both Anarchists and Marxists complained that Batlle exposed his fundamentally bourgeois outlook by forbidding public demonstrations and arresting 85 men during the strike. The Marxists blamed Batlle for the general strike and indicated he tried to win "cheap popularity" with impossible promises to strikers, then fomented the general strike with his speech.¹²² On the other hand, the Blancos portrayed Batlle as the strike leader and some members of the Colorado party also believed he went

¹²⁰*El Dia*, May 23, 1911.

¹²¹*El Siglo*, May 23, 1911.

¹²²*La Democracia*, May 27, 1911.

too far in backing a "revolutionary" strike. The short-term political loss, though, was not serious as he had just taken office and the legislature was virtually all-Colorado. For the long term, Batlle set the stage for eventual worker support of the Colorado party. "When the worker organizes politically, goes to elections, makes up a considerable part of the legislature, he will vote Colorado."¹²³ Through his active support for labor, Batlle endeared himself to the rank-and-file and concomitantly increased his personal and political prestige within both the Colorado party and the more progressive factions of the Blancos. This allowed him to build on the Colorado party's legislative majority within the Congress and set up voting blocs favorable to his reformist agenda. His political power and influence thus counteracted the potential for political defections later in his term as his progressive ideas finally took root.

In analyzing Batlle's attitude of benevolent neutrality it is important to realize he believed in the legitimacy of labor's demands. He also recognized that these demands were channelled through the revolutionary trade union movement and not through the electoral process. Indeed, workers failed to massively support Batlle in 1910 at the polls because many were not citizens, were not motivated to vote, feared employer reprisals for voting

¹²³Vanger, *The Model Country*, 129-130.

Colorado, or followed the advice of the anarchist-led Federacion Obrera that "the workers will not vote."¹²⁴ Accordingly, Batlle pragmatically realized that to gain labor support required demonstrable acts from the government on their behalf.

Batlle benefitted from his benevolent neutrality policy in another way. By allowing strike activity, Batlle gained at least the tacit support of anarchist leaders and undermined their ability to affect revolutionary political activity. Anarchists and Socialists alike considered Batlle an exceptional figure within the bourgeois system even though they continued to view pro-labor reforms as temporary measures in their overall revolutionary struggle. Nonetheless, Batlle's pro-labor efforts eventually won the allegiance of the working class and in so doing preempted the reformism of the Socialists and restricted the influence of anarcho-syndicalism such that unions--or at least their growing membership--became more concerned with conditions of employment than with social revolution. By guaranteeing the right to strike peacefully, the strike ceased to be in itself an act of political opposition or confrontation.¹²⁵

Labor Legislation

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 100

¹²⁵Finch, *Political Economy*, 57-58.

Social and labor legislation formed the foundation of Batlle's progressive pro-labor programs. While strikes provided Batlle the opportunity to display his sympathies toward labor and improve his chances to garner rank-and-file support, Batlle recognized that fundamental social changes required the enactment of laws through the established political process. In addition, to ensure the continued viability of the traditional political system, Batlle's pro-labor legislation anticipated working class demands such that organized labor's efforts to undermine the institutional structures of society failed. A strong element of pragmatic politics characterized Batlle's efforts as he used his massive influence to convince legislators of the need for social reform and advanced labor legislation.

It is worth noting that despite the abundance of social legislation enacted during the Batlle era, neither Batlle nor the Colorado party ever sponsored union legislation. Because unions were foreign-led and considered revolutionary, those who proposed to legalize unions intended to restrict union activities by setting up obligations for leaders and members.¹²⁶ Batlle gave no support to such legislation, and none passed. Nor did Batlle attempt to set up Colorado-sponsored unions as hostility to unions

¹²⁶Vanger, *The Model Country*, 350-351

was too great. Instead, Batlle's legislation was directed at the whole of the working class, only a small part of which was unionized. He pushed such measures as the eight-hour day and old-age pensions so that all workers benefitted, not just the unionized minority. The enactment of social legislation, the provision for rest days and workmen's compensation for industrial accidents, and minimum wage legislation, all consolidated the loyalty and support of wage earners to the state apparatus which protected them.¹²⁷ But Batlle, for all of his altruistic tendencies, never emphasized the appeal to workers over the appeal to the Colorado party and the political system, in general.¹²⁸ Rather, much of Batlle's motivation for reform was linked to the potential for future worker's votes. For example, in the 1913 congressional elections, Batlle deemphasized his political appeals to the working class because workers were a future rather than a present source of support.¹²⁹

Progressive labor legislation in Uruguay did not originate with Batlle or the Colorado party. The Nationalist party, fresh from its defeat in the 1904 Civil War and anticipating Batlle's intention to introduce legislation to aid workers, preempted Batlle

¹²⁷Finch, *Political Economy*, 13.

¹²⁸Vanger, *The Model Country*, 351.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*

in February, 1905 and initiated a bill to regulate the hours and conditions of labor.¹³⁰ This bill met with much opposition and it was almost two years later when Batlle introduced his version of the solution to the "labor problem." In the bill, Batlle's principal objective mirrored that of labor, the eight-hour day. Since the eight-hour day was the main demand of almost every strike since 1900, Batlle urged that legislation on the matter would be the easiest way to allay organized labor's militant activity. While some industries and professions, such as the Compañía General de Fósforos and the masons adopted an eight-hour day in 1901, these practices were the exception.¹³¹ Batlle, then, realized that by integrating labor's primary demand into the program of the Colorado party through a formal law organized labor's influence could be diminished. Despite the attractions of the bill, and although he had a workable majority in Congress, Batlle failed to persuade his party to accept this radical innovation. It took a decade for the eight-hour day to become law. As Hanson indicates, "had Batlle been more moderate in his demands he might have obtained an hours law during his first administration, but his proposal involved too drastic a change to satisfy the more

¹³⁰For a capitulation of the genesis of this legislation see Comision Departamental del Partido Nacional, *Al Autor de la Primera Legislacion Obrera en el Uruguay* (Montevideo, 1928) 3-15.

¹³¹Hanson, *Utopia*, 124.

conservative members of his own party."¹³²

The bill establishing the eight-hour day finally became law on November 17, 1915 but it was not without problems. While all work establishments were covered by the law, enforcement was difficult especially among the port workers. A staff of only twenty-five inspectors with low salaries was authorized to enforce compliance.¹³³ Further, provisions requiring weekly rest and limits protecting women and children in the work force lagged in Congress even though data showed 10 per cent of the females in industry and commerce were under the age of fifteen.¹³⁴ By the time the eight-hour bill became law, many of Montevideo's all-male industries already had an eight-hour day. This is notable because the law was largely an official recognition of a status which labor was fast creating for itself.¹³⁵ Thus, despite the significance of the eight-hour-day law, it took time and effort to make it effective. Above all, according to one senator, "it was characteristically Uruguayan--idealistic, impracticable, difficult to enforce, and definitely designed to win political support."¹³⁶

¹³²*Ibid.*, 126.

¹³³*Ibid.*, 130.

¹³⁴*Diario de Sesiones*, CCXXVIII (1913-1914), 142-145.

¹³⁵Hanson, *Utopia*, 131.

¹³⁶*Diario de Sesiones*, CCXLVII (1916), 160.

Batlle's other pro-labor legislative proposals faced similar enactment delays and implementation problems. Congressional debate and the requisite committee adjustments to the bills' provisions took time-so much, in fact, that except for the eight-hour bill and some later modifications to it, the rest of Batlle's pro-labor legislative proposals became law only after he finished his term in office in 1915. From 1916-1929, Batlle remained the cornerstone of the Colorado party and personally pushed the passage of his legislative proposals. For example, night labor was prohibited in a bill passed on March 19, 1918 and a bill mandating a compulsory twenty-four hour rest period after six days of labor passed on December 20, 1920. Minimum wage legislation, always one of Batlle's key efforts to lessen the economic and social conflicts between labor and management finally passed on February, 15, 1923. Amendments to the bill extending its provisions passed on November 18, 1930. Regarding the implementation process, problems such as funding and enforcement occurred. In a report to the Congress concerning the history of Uruguayan social legislation during the Batlle era, evidence indicated that the laws were generally imperfect when enacted and that Congress had not taken the proper interest in revising them. By failing to provide adequate funds and means to enforce the laws and disregarding the practicability of the

measures, the report noted that the Congress "had doomed many acts to certain failure, especially those which industry and commerce had indicated they would oppose."¹³⁷ Thus, in spite of Batlle's forward-looking agenda, a quarter of a century had not sufficed for the full enactment of his initial labor program.¹³⁸

Regardless of these problems, the Batlle era's reputation as a center of progressive legislation is a singular achievement in the realm of Latin American labor history. By incorporating many of the social programs and laws initiated by Batlle into the Constitution of 1934, the population was finally guaranteed the legal means to achieve social improvement. Batlle's pragmatic political efforts to incorporate labor's demands into the Colorado party not only resulted in the social and economic betterment of the labor force in general, but they also solidified and strengthened the political system (and the Colorados). At the same time, Batlle successfully undermined Uruguay's militant labor organizations and lessened the conflict between labor and management in the process.

¹³⁷*Diario de Sesiones*, CCCLXII (1930), 474-497.

¹³⁸Hanson, *Utopia*, 145.

CONCLUSION

The Batlle era in Uruguay remains one of the most significant periods in Latin American labor history. From 1903-1929, Batlle's progressive labor reforms served as models for similar reforms throughout the hemisphere. Batlle's combined political acumen for pragmatic politics and his socially advanced ideological perspectives made him the most renowned innovator of his time. While many of his proposals met with opposition, even within his own party, Batlle persevered and by the time of his death Uruguay led Latin America in social and political reform.

Throughout this report the relationship between labor and the government during the Batlle era was addressed. Specifically, it showed that Batlle undermined the militant Uruguayan labor movement by converting their demands and aspirations into legislative achievement. It also indicated that economic modernization, particularly in the livestock sector, and urbanization and immigration played important roles in providing Batlle his political base of support. Uruguay's autonomous political system also affected Batlle's ascendancy to power as the Colorados secured a large degree of autonomy from

the economic elites of the minority Blanco party. Linked to these economic, political, and social factors was Batlle's pro-labor ideology--an ideology that contained liberal, humanitarian, and populist elements all forming a philosophical foundation oriented toward the betterment of Uruguayan society. And, by describing the underlying basis of Uruguay's militant labor movement and Batlle's response to their demands, this report indicated that Batlle indeed fulfilled his legislative agenda, thereby lessening the antagonisms and tensions between the working class and other classes within Uruguayan society.

Given the above accomplishments the question can continue to be posed: Why Uruguay? Why did such a small country consisting of a vast number of immigrants, wrought by a series of nineteenth-century civil wars, and limited by an economy based primarily on wool and meat export become the model of advanced social legislation in the hemisphere? While these questions remain contentious today, it is certain the answers are not simple. What is certain is that Batlle was a social and political force of the first magnitude and his overall significance to Uruguay's development was paramount. As the foremost political and spiritual leader of the country for three decades, he held himself and his subordinates to the highest of standards. His vision of society was benevolent, fair, and compared with other leaders of

the time, far-reaching. He took a genuine interest in the welfare of the rank-and-file worker and his policies, particularly during strikes, reflected this philosophy. His ability to influence people and use the political system was unparalleled in Uruguayan history. And as a nonauthoritarian populist, he appealed both to the common man as well as to elites.

Even if Batlle was a man ahead of his times, is it accurate to consider Uruguay's social development solely as the result of his personality and vision? The answer is probably, no. Rather, Batlle's behavior, policies and eventual accomplishments were affected not only by his ideological perspectives, but also the unique political, economic and social forces prevalent in Uruguay at the time. Thus, while idealism pervaded his long-term thinking pragmatism was the essential ingredient which forced the political system to acknowledge the need and desirability for social reform, if for no other reason than to ensure the system itself remained intact. The fact that many of Batlle's reform initiatives met resistance not only from the Blancos, but also from some members of his own party indicates that his policies were not universally attractive. Through compromise and shrewd political maneuvering, however, Batlle overwhelmed his opponents and garnered enough political support to eventually achieve his legislative package. Because of Batlle's massive popular support

legislators sympathetic to his agenda assured themselves of reelection. Thus, as more of his reform package became law Batlle's political support grew accordingly.

Batlle, then, was not only a man ahead of his times, but a man of his times. His realization that the new social and economic dynamics of the times, particularly the increased militancy of labor, could either benefit or damage the political viability of the Colorados offered him the chance to initiate reforms so as to harness these potentially damaging forces for the benefit of the Colorado party. By incorporating the demands of the working class into the political program of the Colorados, Batlle expanded the functions of the State to a position of "neutrality above classes" and maintained an equilibrium between organized labor and other societal elements. In a sense, then, a combination of pragmatic, personalistic and idealistic elements all contributed to the success of Batlle and the Colorados in affecting Uruguay's progressive social and labor reforms.

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U.S. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT POLICY
IN
LATIN AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

Much thought and work have gone into the development of a viable LIC [Low-intensity conflict] capability for the U.S. military. Regrettably, the present political and economic environment [within the U.S.] leads one to question the relevance of this effort. The U.S. Congress and people have shown little or no inclination to support the long-term requirements, whether they are economic aid, security assistance, U.S. military involvement or combinations thereof, that U.S. strategy stipulates are necessary for success in LIC situations. Nowhere is this situation more true than in Latin America, where low-level insurgencies and underlying problems drag on because of circumstances beyond military control. And our present efforts, lacking widespread political support and sufficient funding, appear destined to do little more than maintain stalemates that eventually favor our enemies.¹

Lieutenant Commander Mott's frustration regarding the apparent ineffectiveness of U.S. LIC policies in Latin America is neither new nor confined to military officers. Senior policy makers, strategists and analysts concerned with national security issues also acknowledge that despite a massive increase in the U.S. military's budget over the past decade, extensive reorganizations within the Department of Defense (DOD) aimed at increasing the

¹Charles P. Mott, "A Realistic LIC Strategy in Latin America." *Military Review*, Vol. LXIX, No. 5, May 1989: 16.

military's LIC capabilities, and in-depth debates over strategic and tactical issues relating to these types of conflicts, the U.S. political-military posture and ability to deal with LICs are inadequate and, in the main, ineffective.² Many observers point to a lack of strategic direction within the U.S. government in planning for, and aligning force structures applicable to, LIC operations. Others view the military as inherently incapable of a sustained fight in a LIC environment and, therefore, should stay out of these situations altogether.³

Coupled with these concerns over the military's inability to conduct operations in a low-intensity situation is the lack of a national consensus as to whether the U.S. should become involved in wars not directly affecting the territorial integrity of the United States. Many of the domestic political considerations that had such a profound impact on U.S. participation in the Vietnam conflict, such as the fear of becoming bogged down in a war of attrition with no end in sight, now apply in Central and South America. Polls in the early- to mid-1980s revealed that

²Discussions of the U.S. military's capability to conduct low-intensity warfare abound, however, Sam Sarkesian, in his book entitled, *The New Battlefield* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1986) is one of the most outspoken critics of the U.S. military's ability to undertake effective operations in a LIC environment.

³Michael W. Symanski, "Hoist with the LIC Petard." *Military Review*, Vol. LXVIII, No. 9, September 1988: 19-26.

Americans were essentially ignorant about Central America, but more importantly, "this vast uninformed majority is generally predisposed against U.S. involvement in other countries' affairs, unless a clear and compelling issue of national interest or national security is at stake."⁴ On the other hand, U.S. Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), indicates that critics of U.S. policies in Latin America, and specifically Central America, have misapplied the lessons of Vietnam when arguing against U.S. involvement in the area: "Because Vietnam is not Central America, the use of U.S. power, especially military power, will not inevitably lead to the quagmire in which we found ourselves in Vietnam."⁵

While both perspectives have merit, reality, unfortunately, dictates that the U.S. as a nation, as well as its military, be prepared to encounter situations based not only on nuclear or conventional warfighting strategies and tactics, but also those of an unconventional nature. The world in which the United States must coexist is one marked by civil disturbances, terrorist violence, subversive activities, surrogate wars, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare and other forms of low-level violence. It is a world embroiled in forms of warfare unsettling to the U.S.

⁴Mott, *Military Review*, 18.

⁵Ike Skelton, "What Next for U.S. Policy in Central America?" *ARMY*, Vol. 39, No. 1, January 1989: 20.

perception and approach to war, but the kind of war that the U.S. may be called upon to fight in the foreseeable future. The character of such conflicts is far removed from those of nuclear wars, major conventional conflicts, limited conflicts of the Korean War variety, or even those of the Israeli-Arab wars of the past two decades. Indeed, Former Secretary of the Army, John Marsh, indicated in 1988 that:

Since World War II and the development of our nuclear deterrent, we have been successful in averting major war. Yet, while our deterrent has worked at the upper end of the conflict spectrum, war and the resort to force at the lower end of the spectrum has not been deterred. Indeed, resorting to violence by states and groups has been an inherent feature of the postwar environment despite U.S. attempts to support a peaceful, stable, democratic world. Low-intensity conflict has remained and is likely to be the most prevalent threat to our security and to the peace that is so essential to our world.⁶

In view of this concern, the purpose of this paper is to analyze current U.S.-Latin American military relations, particularly in the context of the effectiveness of U.S. LIC doctrine as applied in the region. Central to this analysis is the premise that the U.S. capability as a nation to operate effectively in a low-

⁶John O. Marsh, "Comments on Low-intensity Conflict." *Military Review*, Vol. LXIX, No. 2, February 1989: 3.

intensity environment for a sustained period remains questionable. While the U.S. military has devoted considerable resources and thought to the conduct of low-intensity operations, and is without doubt more capable tactically to conduct these operations than at any time during the post-Vietnam era, weaknesses continue to exist at the strategic level in developing appropriate force structures, training, budgeting and the necessary integration of national-level agencies to achieve a fully successful LIC capability. Applied to Latin America, it is essential that U.S. policy makers involved in LIC planning understand that U.S. military, economic and political influence in the region has waned over the past decade, making it difficult to achieve U.S. objectives through bilateral LIC operations alone. Rather, it is now important that the United States approach hemispheric security issues not just on a case-by-case basis, such as in El Salvador or Nicaragua, but also on a multilateral basis with the intent to address more comprehensively the outstanding security issues in the hemisphere.

Problems and Challenges

Although many policy makers admit there is the need to prepare for and become adept at fighting low-intensity wars, the

majority of participants within the national security community continue to stress policies, doctrine, and strategy oriented toward nuclear weapons and conventional forces. Concomitantly, as the issues of war and peace have become more complex, ambiguous and multidimensional, a confusing array of views and interpretations exist which inhibit any concise articulation of U.S. strategic goals relating to low-intensity conflicts. Given the nature of the U.S. political system and prevailing institutional bias within the DOD, policy makers are likely to continue to adopt conventional thinking and Western-based perceptions in establishing policy and strategy toward Third World low-intensity situations rather than appreciate and analyze each conflict on its own merits and unique circumstances. This lack of understanding of low-intensity conflicts--particularly revolution and counterrevolution--can easily lead to policy misjudgments, and misguided political partisanship, thereby exposing the U.S. military to conflicts and contingencies that are difficult, if not impossible, for it to undertake effectively.⁷

Much of the lack of understanding as to the nature of low-intensity conflict is manifest in our policies, and reactions thereto, toward Latin America. Foremost topics of debate include U.S. support to El Salvador, the U.S. creation of the *Contra* forces in

⁷Sarkesian, *The New Battlefield*, xiv.

Nicaragua, and the ramifications of U.S. military involvement in combatting illicit drugs in the Andean countries. Of the multitude of opinions and positions regarding whether a U.S. involvement (military or otherwise) in these situations is warranted, two perspectives generally dominate. The first perspective is the non-interventionist approach, which basically believes revolutionary and violent conflicts in Latin America are internal in nature and can be resolved through negotiation, economic aid, and increased development. The other perspective insists that these conflicts cannot always be resolved through peaceful means; rather, many revolutionaries seek the violent overthrow of established governments, thus necessitating the use of military force to protect friendly governments in order to allow them time to administer needed reforms. Despite the arguments put forth by these two schools of thought, experience indicates that the key determinants that the U.S. public uses to decide whether or not to favor U.S. intervention in low-intensity conflicts, particularly in Latin America, tend to be based not only on the overall merits of the situation in terms of security or human rights, but also on "the duration of the involvement and the monetary costs of such involvement."⁸

⁸Mark Falcoff, "The Apple of Discord: Central America in U.S. Domestic Politics." *Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglio*, ed., Howard J. Wiarda (Washington, D.C., 1984), 364.

The fickleness of the U.S. public aside, any realistic appraisal of Latin America's political, social, economic and military problems, coupled with continued U.S. budgetary limitations aimed at helping resolve some of these difficulties, leads to the conclusion that there are serious constraints on what the United States, and particularly the U.S. military, can accomplish in the region. Fred F. Woerner, former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command (the U.S. military command responsible for conducting all U.S. military relations in the hemisphere) indicates that uncontrolled population growth, un-and-under-employment rates of 40-50 per cent, enormous debt burdens, declining foreign trade, illicit drug traffic and the presence of many subversive groups are placing severe strains on the newly-formed democratic governments throughout the region. Woerner further notes that U.S. Southern Command, in attempting to conduct its military mission and further U.S. foreign policy goals in the hemisphere, receives only four per cent of the worldwide security assistance budget, has only 0.6 per cent of the DOD manpower, and only 0.1 per cent of the fiscal 1988 budget.⁹ Against this background, Howard J. Wiarda argues that the United States is now in a generally weaker position vis-a-vis the region than it

⁹Fred F. Woerner, "U.S. Southern Command: Shield of Democracy in Latin America."

Defense '87, November/December 1987: 23.

was fifteen or twenty years ago. U.S. foreign assistance has declined and no major new foreign aid programs are likely. Outside actors, particularly Japan, West Germany and the Soviet Union, are now considerable influences. Also, Latin American countries have become increasingly assertive and independent, and there is considerable apprehension over whether the U.S. "can carry out a coherent, sustained, bipartisan, long-term foreign policy in the hemisphere."¹⁰

Based on these realities, U.S. policy makers face an enormous challenge in formulating appropriate policies in response to needs within individual countries, as well as the region as a whole. Implicit in this challenge is how best to promote U.S.-Latin American military relations in order to achieve the security and stability needed to affect democracy, socioeconomic development, and the betterment of the human condition in the hemisphere. Furthermore, the U.S. must rid itself of the narrow and ethnocentric attitude that only massive U.S. military and economic aid can solve the hemisphere's security and socioeconomic problems. Contrary to Lieutenant Commander Mott's belief, the U.S. military cannot and should not unilaterally take the lead in resolving regional conflict. Instead, U.S. LIC

¹⁰Howard J. Wiarda, *In Search of Policy: The United States and Latin America* (Washington, D.C., 1984), 131-133.

policies must be based on a broad and realistic appraisal of our overall strategic interests in the region. Past U.S. LIC policies have not produced an environment conducive to strengthening democratic institutions and practices in the hemisphere. Despite the major U.S. military role in the region, the U.S. style of civilian-military relations has failed to take hold.

To help ameliorate this situation and to promote a more secure and stable environment in Latin America, the U.S. must improve the process of understanding the systemic problems inherent in the region so as to build toward a more cooperative and less dominant U.S. military role in resolving the area's security issues. This process involves understanding the roles that civilian and military actors play in Latin American societies and the effects of previous U.S. attempts to influence civil-military relations in the hemisphere. By examining these factors it may be possible to suggest a reorientation of U.S.-Latin American military relations away from the current emphasis on bilateral U.S. involvement in regional low-intensity conflicts and instead toward a renewed hemispheric security system that stresses multilateral U.S.-Latin American participation in resolving hemispheric security issues.

In order to outline the parameters of this revised, multilateral approach to regional security in the hemisphere, it is

first necessary to identify and analyze the U.S. military doctrine of low-intensity conflict. Particularly important is how this doctrine fit into the foreign policy strategy of the U.S. during the Reagan years. Second, it is necessary to discuss U.S. policy in Latin America through an analysis of U.S. strategic interests in the region, thereby setting the stage toward identifying obstacles to those interests, especially in the form of the internal machinations of Latin American political-military relations. And finally, the concept of a revised hemispheric security system will be addressed through which U.S.-Latin American military relations can be strengthened and conflict reduced throughout the hemisphere.

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

With the initiation of the Reagan administration, senior policy makers rediscovered the important potential role low-intensity conflict (LIC) can have as an instrument in achieving U.S. national security objectives. While the U.S. has a long history of confronting the challenge of low intensity warfare, both American political leaders and military professionals have had to relearn the lessons of the past with each involvement in unconventional conflict. After falling in disrepute as a result of the Vietnam experience, low-intensity warfare is again high on the agenda of defense policymaking. But, what exactly is LIC? And what elements relevant to warfighting are included under the LIC concept? Also, what caused this revitalization of LIC as a major doctrinal component of defense planning? A short look at the historical roots of modern U.S. low-intensity warfare strategy and doctrine can help in understanding why the use of LIC as a major foreign policy tool has again become so popular.

Historical Roots of Modern LIC Doctrine

Since World War II, U.S. foreign policy has consisted of two major goals: To prevent the development of new socialist or

radical nationalist nations in the world (containment), and to force existing socialist or nationalist regimes back into the pro-U.S. camp (rollback). Containment involves a defense of the *status quo* and is compatible with the mutual existence of capitalism and socialism (communism) as two distinct social systems. Rollback, in contrast, undertakes the more aggressive agenda of eliminating socialist or socialist-leaning regimes altogether. Bodenheimer and Gould indicate that neither containment nor rollback are mutually exclusive; rather, postwar U.S. foreign policy is best characterized as selective rollback--containment of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe combined with rollback of Third World regimes seen by the U.S. government as unfriendly to U.S. interests.¹¹ Under the Reagan administration, U.S. foreign policy shifted toward the rollback extreme of the foreign policy spectrum. As a consequence, the reliance on LIC warfighting capabilities became a necessary adjunct toward achieving the various objectives envisioned under this rollback foreign policy posture. Modern LIC doctrine, though, traces its roots to the late 1950s and early 1960s, with its fullest expression becoming manifest in the counterinsurgency policy of the Kennedy administration.

¹¹Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert Gould, "U.S. Military Doctrines and Their Relation to Foreign Policy." *Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America*, ed., Augusto Varas (Boulder, CO., 1989), 29.

Kennedy's dynamic strategy of counterinsurgency was designed to meet the challenge of the many national liberation wars (insurgencies) ongoing at the time throughout the world. This new strategy contained three basic assumptions:

- 1) That a global threat existed in the form of a unified Communist strategy to advance its cause without risking nuclear or conventional war, exploiting the modernization process throughout the world, and using the proven techniques of guerrilla warfare;
- 2) That the United States had the duty and power to confront and defeat this challenge, ideally without the necessity of intervening directly with military forces;
- 3) That to accomplish this task, the United States had to adopt both a military strategy (counterinsurgency) and a political and economic strategy involving all avenues of the U.S. government overseas; and that the central objective of the U.S. was to improve the ability of a threatened regime to govern effectively and

to help it generate sufficient popular support to thwart communist incursions.¹²

Although the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine of the 1960s achieved success in Latin America, particularly in Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia, it foundered in Vietnam, leading to its temporary decline and a return by the U.S. military to conventional warfighting doctrines. It was during this period that the euphemism of low-intensity conflict arose.

The term known as "low-intensity conflict" came into use as a replacement for the traditional terms used in Vietnam, such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla warfare, which reminded the military of its failure in that war. Because the United States returned from Vietnam with an aversion to entering extended military interventions in foreign internal conflicts deeply embedded in its political and moral conscience, the government realized the necessity for a complete reassessment of U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the Third World. As a result, the U.S. failure in Vietnam was reflected during the mid-to late-1970s in an almost total rejection of warfighting strategies and capabilities to address revolutionary conflicts and insurgencies,

¹²Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (New York, 1977), 25.

including those in our own hemisphere. Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla warfare were too closely identified with unpopular, protracted struggles of psychological attrition; during the post-Vietnam era, even the terms themselves were eliminated from official use. Today, the terminology of revolutionary warfare is subsumed under the broad generic classification low-intensity conflict, where it presently resides with other definitional elements in a confusing array of terms, meanings, and relationships.¹³

The decline in the acceptance of counterinsurgency doctrine in the 1970s was reflected in the rapid drop of funding for Special Operations Forces (SOF), which fell from its Vietnam War peak of over \$1 billion per year to under \$100 million in 1975.¹⁴ However, following the establishment of Marxist-Leninist regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Central America, as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis, the Carter administration renewed efforts to improve U.S. military capabilities. Thus, in the late 1970s a more aggressive U.S. foreign policy developed which was later extended under President Reagan and became known as the Reagan Doctrine.

¹³Jerome W. Klingaman, "U.S. Policy and Strategic Planning for Low-intensity Conflict." *Low-intensity Conflict in the Third World*, ed., Lewis Ware (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL., 1988), 165.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

The Reagan Doctrine

Under the Reagan administration, low-intensity conflict expanded as a tool in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in order to support the U.S. contention that the Soviet Union's expansionist tendencies threatened U.S. global interests. This expansion of LIC capabilities supported what is known as the Reagan Doctrine, a posture which held that rather than relying only on counterinsurgency as a strategy to support established governments, the U.S. should also assist or foment insurgencies against non-friendly governments and thereby undercut socialist or radical nationalist nations through military, political or economic means. The Reagan Doctrine was, in its most direct form, a policy of rollback in the Third World.¹⁵ The most visible example of this more aggressive foreign policy was the creation and support by the U.S. of the *Contras* in Nicaragua. Other examples included U.S.-financed resistance movements in Afghanistan and Angola.

To accommodate the needs of this rollback foreign policy the need to increase LIC capabilities became a priority. The military services, taking their cue from the administration, expanded their

¹⁵Bodenheimer and Gould, *Hemispheric Security*, 23.

strategic and tactical view to include a wide range of contingencies from nuclear to limited war. As a result, since 1981, budgeting for SOF more than tripled, reaching \$1.5 billion by 1986. Beginning in 1988, the Pentagon planned to spend over \$ 7.5 billion on SOF through 1992.¹⁶ By 1990, SOF active duty manpower had increased 80 per cent since 1981 and approximately 35 per cent of all U.S. military mobile training teams (MTTs) consisted of SOF personnel. From 1980, MTT weeks abroad increased five-fold.¹⁷ SOF personnel assigned in Latin America include fifty-five military advisers in El Salvador; as many as one hundred-fifty trainers in Honduras to train El Salvadoran and Honduran personnel; and a number of personnel in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia to help local officials conduct counterdrug activities.¹⁸ The use of SOF MTTs, as well as the extensive number of U.S. Southern Command non-SOF military personnel who interface with their military counterparts in Latin America, is consistent with the Pentagon's desire to increase its LIC capability at the regional level. Meanwhile, recent attempts to increase the military's LIC capability at the national level included the creation of the position of Director for Low-intensity Conflict

¹⁶*New York Times*, July 19, 1986.

¹⁷Bodenheimer and Gould, *Hemispheric Security*, 24.

¹⁸*Defense Monitor*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 1985: 14.

at the Pentagon; a new joint Special Operations Command; new policies and doctrines associated with the tactical and strategic implications of LIC as expressed in the 1987 *National Security Strategy*; and a new intelligence directorate within the Defense Intelligence Agency to deal with LIC situations.¹⁹ All of these measures respond to recommendations by a number of commissions, the military services, and the Congress on ways to improve the ability of the U.S. to operate in a LIC environment. In its fullest expression, therefore, low-intensity conflict involves a mix of U.S. and foreign, public and private, covert and overt resources to carry out U.S. objectives overseas.²⁰

¹⁹William J. Olson, "Organizational Requirements for LIC." *Military Review*, Vol. LXVIII, No. 1, January 1988: 9-10.

²⁰Bodenheimer and Gould, *Hemispheric Security*, 24.

Components of LIC

Because LIC is a broad concept that spans the spectrum of conflict²¹ from relative peace to conventional war, it is appropriate to outline the operational definitions of LIC now current within the U.S. military. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) defines LIC as:

A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic and psychological pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.²²

In addition, the President's *National Security Strategy of the United States* offers this definition:

Low-intensity conflicts. . .take place at levels below conventional war but above the routine peaceful competition among states. . .They often

²¹See Sam C. Sarkesian's, *The New Battlefield*, for an in-depth discussion of his concept of a spectrum of conflict and U.S. military capabilities at each of the levels within the spectrum. Sarkesian's claim is that the U.S. military is well qualified to engage in mid-to-high intensity warfare, but is incapable of adequate responses at the lower end of the spectrum.

²²"Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms." *The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication #1* (Washington, D.C., 1987), 214-215.

involve a protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies. [LICs] may be waged by a combination of means, including the use of political, economic, informational and military instruments.²³

From these definitions it is clear that LIC refers to a condition that does not involve a traditional scenario of opposing armed forces; it is also clear that the U.S. must develop a long term interagency approach to craft policies to address LIC problems. While DOD is a principal actor in LIC activities, as in all matters concerning the conduct of foreign policy, the President and the Department of State comprise the primary operators in LIC.²⁴ Fundamental to this reality is that in low-intensity conflict, nonmilitary factors play a far greater role at all planning levels from strategic to tactical. Dealing effectively with LIC requires an understanding of the other instruments of national power and persuasion and their relationship to the military aspects of the conflict. Actions taken in the military arena cannot be separated from--and will have an effect on--the political, economic, psychological and social environments as well.²⁵

²³*National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C, January 1987), 32-33.

²⁴William Thornton, "The Army Medical Department in Low-intensity Conflict." *CLIC Papers*, August 1987: 2.

²⁵Donald Morelli and Michael Ferguson, "Low-intensity Conflict: An Operational Perspective." *Military Review*, Vol. LXIV, No. 11, November 1984: 9.

Conversely, not every LIC condition requires a military effort. Each situation is evaluated in a multidisciplinary fashion to ensure that military initiatives in one area do not interfere with or inhibit efforts in another. As such, to contribute effectively to a LIC effort the military, according to Morelli and Ferguson, "must advise on the nature of the peace; the character of potential threats and their underlying causes; the political, economic, psychological and military objectives of our military activities; and the likelihood of success." Further, "diplomats and other U.S. government representatives must have an understanding and awareness of the military aspects of the [particular] situation. . .they must have an appreciation for military capabilities--beyond the application of force." And finally, "they must be sensitive to the relevance of military capabilities in support of national development, the economic and political elements of power, and the capacity of the U.S. military to influence local forces and governments."²⁶

In analyzing LIC from a national security perspective, it is important to note that conflicts of this type in and of themselves rarely, if ever, directly threaten the security of the U.S. Consequently, some observers believe that U.S. involvement in a conflict short of directly threatening U.S. territorial integrity is

²⁶*Ibid.*

anathema. Others, such as Francis Glynn, point to the potentially adverse effects on U.S. national security caused by multiple LIC situations occurring simultaneously.

In the worst-case, risk assessment game, one LIC in itself may have relatively low impact on the vital national interests of the U.S.; but because of the high likelihood of its occurrence on several fronts, it can. . . multiply itself into a significant threat to national well-being. In geopolitical terms, isolated instances of LIC present little threat to either superpower; but occurring simultaneously in numbers, they can have a great impact on the interests of both.²⁷

One other observation is relevant regarding the nature of LIC. LIC is a "superpower" term of only relative utility to its users. What for the U.S. or the Soviet Union is a conflict of low-intensity--that is, the limited commitment of troops, the remoteness of the conflict from national territory, or the reliance on advice-oriented support to a Third World counterinsurgency campaign--is for the assisted country very much high intensity, since the struggle is usually for the survival of the government

²⁷Francis Glynn, "Security Assistance and Low-intensity Conflict." *CLIC Papers*, July 1987: 3.

and the national way of life. "It is almost an insult to speak with a supported nation in terms of 'low-intensity.'"²⁸

Since the scope of LIC is extremely broad and encompasses military and non-military components, the military services have identified four specific types of missions which fall under the umbrella of LIC. These are: Foreign Internal Defense (FID) which includes insurgency and counterinsurgency operations; Terrorism Counteraction; Peacekeeping Operations; and Peacetime Contingency Operations. While all of these operational areas have relevance regarding potential U.S. involvement in Latin America, the principal focus of U.S. military attention in the region usually falls under FID and peacetime contingency operations.

Foreign internal defense missions are defined by the JCS as "the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."²⁹ FID programs can be either proactive, designed to protect the society before an insurgency develops, or they can be reactive once an insurgency is underway. In either case, the U.S. ambassador is the lead element in any U.S.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹Peter Bond, "In Search of LIC." *Military Review*, Vol. LXVI, No. 8, August 1986: 81.

support programs initiated in the country. Because insurgencies and revolutionary wars are designed to achieve moral legitimacy, that is, the popular perception of the relative moral rightness of the competing forces, proactive U.S. support to a host nation prior to the manifestation of an insurgency is grounded in a high degree of advice-oriented developmental and security assistance programs. As such, the U.S. military's security assistance program is a major instrument of U.S. foreign policy.³⁰ Its purpose is to ensure that the local military posture is credible and adequate to meet potential threats and to minimize the possibility of calling upon U.S. combat forces.

Four types of assistance funding are contained under the rubric of security assistance: Foreign military sales; economic support funds; military aid grants; and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. These four assistance programs provide for mobile training teams, equipment procurement, foreign military sales contracts, and education and exchange visits by international students to various U.S. military schools such as the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy in Panama. To

³⁰Ernest Graves and Steven Hildreth, *U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process* (Lexington, MA., 1985), 163.

coordinate these objectives, the military maintains 68 security assistance offices worldwide.³¹

Another fundamental element within the U.S. military's FID mission is the area of civil-military operations (CMOs). CMOs seek to achieve the economic, political, psychological and social objectives of revolution on the part of the host nation.³² In essence, CMOs are civic action programs initiated prior to and during insurgency situations, and are designed to provide for the needs of the population and build confidence among civilians toward the host nation's armed forces and government. Also encompassed within CMOs are civic assistance activities, population and resource control, civil defense, and public information and psychological operations (PSYOPS). Civic assistance activities provide governmental management skills to host nation local and mid-level leaders. Population and resource control are those measures designed to isolate the population and resources from insurgents and mobilize them for the counterinsurgency effort. Civic defense projects provide local security by training and arming villagers to protect their towns

³¹*Congressional Presentation Document for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1986* (Washington, D.C., 1985), 55.

³²John Fishel and Edmund Cowan, "Civil-Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America." *Military Review*, Vol. LXVIII, No. 1, January 1988: 38.

and provide valuable intelligence to the military regarding insurgent activities. Finally, public information and PSYOPS provide information to the populace to mobilize support for the counterinsurgency effort.³³

CMOs are conducted under the auspices of combined host nation and U.S. combat support units. These units include engineers, transportation specialists, medical personnel, supply and logistics managers, intelligence experts, and communications technicians. Together, these specialists provide needed infrastructural support to a host nation both before and, if necessary, during a counterinsurgency situation. However, as Morelli and Ferguson point out, the effectiveness of these U.S. advisers is a function of their overall training and preparation for employment in a low-intensity operation, as well as in the appropriateness of the force structure employed by the U.S. in each case.³⁴ In addition, in coordinating CMOs, especially for long term actions, the planning process ensures that indigenous personnel are trained concurrently so that the civic action effort is lasting and pervasive after the U.S. and host nation military efforts are terminated. And finally, plans to conduct civil-military

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Morelli and Ferguson, *Military Review*, 13.

operations are integrated with concurrent programs or projects such as those involving the Peace Corps.

Psychological operations are probably the least understood area of civil-military operations. Formally used by the U.S. military since World War II, the primary role of PSYOPS today is basically the same as it was in the 1940s, that is, to win support for the established system from a largely uncommitted or only marginally supportive civil population, to reinforce the loyalty of friendly forces, and to turn enemy forces' loyalties.³⁵ PSYOPS consists of directing information at target audiences stressing themes that will enhance the established government's legitimacy. To be effective, these themes must be built on the truth and based on programs the government has delivered. Combined with the other elements of CMO and security assistance, PSYOPS can provide a viable means of helping secure the legitimacy of the government in a crisis situation.

The previous discussion of the military's foreign internal defense mission dealt with a proactive stance. However, at times an insurgency becomes manifest too late to conduct some of the more long term activities envisioned above. Thus, in the reactive mode of FID, U.S. security assistance will continue, but in support of the host country's national counterinsurgency program. This

³⁵Fishel and Cowan, *Military Review*, 46.

support can include advisory assistance and, if requested by the host nation and approved by the national command authority (NCA), U.S. combat forces.³⁶ As the LIC operational concept makes clear: "U.S. combat forces are used only when and where they have a high probability of decisively altering the situation. They must not be committed where the effort would be irrelevant or counterproductive to U.S. interests and national prestige."³⁷ While SOF elements play the lead roles in this scenario of U.S. military support to host nation counterinsurgency forces, U.S. conventional forces--such as the light division forces of the 7th Infantry Division--may be employed to conduct specific counter guerrilla operations in support of a particular mission. However, to provide responsive, appropriate support, both the SOF and the light conventional forces must understand not only the national counterinsurgency strategy of the host country, but also the nature of that particular society and the causes of the insurgency.

Peacetime contingency operations is the other LIC component most likely to be employed by the U.S. in Latin America. Unlike the other components of LIC, peacetime contingency operations are not easily visualized due to the many

³⁶Bond, *Military Review*, 86.

³⁷"U.S. Army Operational Concept for Low-intensity Conflict." *U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-44* (Fort Monroe, VA., 1986), Foreword.

divergent operations and missions associated with this LIC category. The current definition recognizes this problem: "Politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of conventional war, e.g., strike, raid, rescue, recovery, demonstration, show of force, unconventional warfare and intelligence operations."³⁸ Examples of operations included under this definition are Operation *Urgent Fury* in Grenada and Operation *Just Cause* in Panama. Both operations were of short duration, politically sensitive, rapidly projected and involved a mix of conventional and unconventional forces. Operation *Just Cause* has been labeled a LIC operation; however, this remains debatable considering the extent to which conventional forces were utilized against conventional targets. However, the light infantry concept, designed primarily for peacetime contingencies, performed as planned thus giving the operation the aura of a LIC involvement.

By far, the most politically sensitive of peacetime operations is unconventional warfare (UW). When authorized by the NCA, the military can conduct UW in enemy-held or politically-sensitive territory: "[UW operations are designed] to exploit military, political, economic or psychological vulnerabilities of an

³⁸TRADOC, 12.

enemy. UW operations. . .may be overt, covert or clandestine."³⁹ UW operations are not short term and to be successful, it must be well-planned and supported at the highest official level over a protracted period.

Although these various LIC missions seem as separate entities, in reality they frequently overlap. For example, Operation *Urgent Fury* in Grenada began as a classic strike operation, however, once initial resistance was quelled, the military became a peacekeeping force charged with law and order maintenance and funded under provisions of security assistance legislation.⁴⁰ Later, as combat forces departed the island, a number of combat support units remained to conduct FID missions such as civil affairs, transportation and communications upgrades and economic support. The Panama invasion (December, 1989) also illustrates the multifaceted mission requirements of LIC. A mix of conventional and unconventional warfighting techniques were employed; once hostilities ceased U.S. forces reverted to FID and peacekeeping missions commensurate with the provisions of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty.

³⁹"Command, Control and Support of Special Forces Operations." *Field Manual 31-22* (Washington, D.C., 1981), 2-2, 2-3.

⁴⁰Bond, *Military Review*, 85.

Limitations and Weaknesses of Current LIC Doctrine

Despite the tactical effectiveness of the Grenada and Panama operations, as well as the arguable success of U.S. support to the *Contras* in bringing the Sandinistas to the bargaining table in Nicaragua or the contentious support to El Salvador, weaknesses continue to exist in the promulgation of LIC as a realistic means for achieving national security goals. While there has been growth in U.S. doctrine and capabilities to engage in low-intensity warfare at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the military establishment, it remains to be seen whether the efforts of the past decade will result in a foundation for a long-term commitment on the part of the future political leadership and the public to support, or engage in, LIC in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. This reality is not lost on strategic planners within the military.

In a democracy, public support is a priceless commodity that must not be squandered. Since the strategist can initially count on public support, his challenge is to devise strategies that will retain this support, and, at the same time, achieve the political objectives which is his *raison d' être* for the use of force. In any case, . . . it is clear that [U.S.] counterinsurgency [LIC] strategies must be implemented quickly and ended successfully even

faster. The U.S. public has little patience for strategies that take decades to unfold.⁴¹

Unfortunately, the Reagan administration failed to convey to many sectors of the political leadership and the general public that LICs are often of long duration and not amenable to a decisive outcome in a short period of time--U.S. support of the Afghan insurgency being a notable exception. In fact, over the past decade, the necessity to make long-term commitments became obscured by the multiple use of "quick strikes and withdrawal operations" in areas such as Grenada, Libya and Panama. The conduct of such operations, while definitionally included under the tenets of LIC doctrine, and although popularly received, acted as a barrier to the development of an understanding by the general public that most LICs are not to be resolved in either days or years. The administration never fully conveyed to the American people that protracted conflict can extend through decades and the ultimate outcome determined by long-term political considerations rather than short-term military objectives.⁴²

⁴¹William Staudenmaier and Alan Sabrosky, "The Problem of Counterinsurgency War." *Military Review*, Vol. LXV, No. 2, February 1985: 13.

⁴²Stephen Sloan, "U.S. Strategy for LIC: An Enduring Legacy or Passing Fad?" *Military Review*, Vol. LXX, No. 1, January 1990: 11.

Just as important as the Reagan administration's failure to convince many policy makers and the public of the protracted nature of LIC and build a consensus between Congress and the executive branch, was its emphasis on ideology as the driving element of conflict in the Third World. By seeking to emphasize the Soviet hand in destabilization in developing countries, the Reagan administration stirred national and international opposition to many of its foreign policy initiatives. Rather than approach U.S. involvement in Third World areas in the context of containing or responding to Soviet involvement in those areas, lessons of the past decade indicate that for LIC to achieve future success, policy makers must direct the public's attention more to the internal factors responsible for conflict, such as social and economic tensions in modernizing societies. As Steven Metz points out, defeat of an insurgency by the U.S. and its allies may not be as important as reconciling the protagonists so as to address the root causes of a conflict.

As the United States slowly transcends its high Cold War, Manichaeic view of the world and recognizes that any victory in insurgency that leaves the root causes of conflict unchanged is a chimera, reconciliation may become the primary objective of counterinsurgency. To seek the full defeat of the insurgents was a natural goal when strategy was based on the

experience of World War II, but in a constrained conflict where the United States is unwilling or unable to pay the costs of massive involvement, American power should be used to bring settlement on favorable terms. In any case, the decision to seek full defeat of the insurgents or reconciliation should be guided by the analysis of the root causes of conflict, the American interests at stake, and, most important, the goals of the insurgents.⁴³

So too, instead of attempting to identify "outside agitators" in the intervention arena to blame for instability, more emphasis should be placed on the results of that instability. Less reliance on finding ideological enemies and more emphasis on the possible loss of crucial resources necessary to our national security "may have more meaning to [the] public. . . especially if it results in an economic impact such as high oil prices or long gas lines."⁴⁴

Another weakness of LIC as a strategic tool linked to the Reagan administration's rollback foreign policy was the inability of LIC proponents to formulate policies or convince Congress that the U.S. should support noncommunist revolutionary movements. Prior to the 1980s, the U.S. essentially supported any and all friendly governments threatened by insurgencies. Under the

⁴³Steven Metz, "Counterinsurgency Campaign Planning." *Parameters*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, September 1989: 63.

⁴⁴Sloan, *Military Review*, 13.

Reagan Doctrine, though, the U.S. became involved in supporting revolutionary movements directed against countries adhering to Marxist-Leninist ideology. This policy was manifest in Afghanistan, Angola, and most notably, Nicaragua. The Reagan Doctrine, however, came under heavy attack from those who believed that U.S. support for revolutionary movements against established regimes was immoral and violated international law. "The doctrine of low-intensity warfare and its application relegate to a backrow seat even the most elementary norms of international law."⁴⁵ Indeed, according to John Hunt, "rollback policy recognizes the right of peoples to determine their own form of government and refuses to surrender them forever to the yoke of tyranny. [It] requires more than a simple view of the opposite side of counterinsurgency. It has legal, moral and operational implications that must be considered by the U.S. Armed Forces. . ."⁴⁶

Because an insurgency (pro-U.S. or not) is considered an outlaw organization in its own country and in the world at-large by the nature of international law, Hunt indicates that "the status

⁴⁵Lilia Bermúdez and Raúl Benítez, "Freedom Fighters and Low-Intensity Warfare." *Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America*, ed., Augusto Varas (Boulder, CO., 1989), 137.

⁴⁶John Hunt, "Low-intensity Conflict and the Law." *Military Review*, Vol. LXVIII, No. 6, June 1988: 17.

of an insurgency is precarious. The insurgents and the United States, if it supports them, must convince their people and the world community of the justice of their cause and appropriateness of their methods."⁴⁷ Thus, the United States, or another country supporting a domestic challenge to the legitimacy of an incumbent regime, shares the insurgent's requirement to meet the burden of persuasion. This task is difficult because, according to von Glahn, if a regime satisfies certain objective and subjective conditions, such as the control over the administrative machinery of the country or appears to have the backing of a substantial segment of the population, then "it can be said that [these conditions] of its competence to act as the representative of the state have been met."⁴⁸ Thus, incumbency is generally *prima facie* evidence of legitimacy and hence, legality.⁴⁹ In addition, the legitimacy of a regime is not necessarily affected by the means used to acquire power. As von Glahn states: "No rule of the law has ever ascribed anything like a sacred character to the constitution of any country. No rule of the law can be held to deprive a people of its right to change its form of government, whether by ballot or by bullet, nor does any existing rule maintain that such a change must be

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

⁴⁸Gerhard von Glahn, *Law Among Nations* (New York, 1981), 98.

⁴⁹Hunt, *Military Review*, 18.

the handiwork of a majority in any nation."⁵⁰ Consequently, the incumbent government starts from a position of strength in both domestic and international law. The challenger has the burden of persuasion. International law assumes that, in general, the established government is legitimate and legal, and that the use of violence by insurgents is a criminal act. As the violent acts of the insurgents are widely perceived to be illegal, so may be support to the insurgents by a third power. Therefore, the supporting government must persuade its own citizens and the world of the propriety of its actions, as well as the legitimacy of the insurgents.

To acquire legitimacy, an insurgent organization must demonstrate it can perform the functions of government in a superior manner to that of the incumbent. Insurgents must provide a legitimate legal system, distinctive executive and judicial agencies, and a commitment to due process of law. In essence, "it must look like a government, speak like a government and act like a government."⁵¹ In this setting, the incumbents are then made the wrongdoers who exercise governmental powers without legal authority. In all, however, whichever side prevails will most likely be aided by the extent to which its morality,

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 99

⁵¹*Ibid.*

legality, purpose, and methods are accepted by the domestic and world communities.

In the case of Nicaragua, the U.S. fell short of convincing many of the propriety of both the actions of the *Contras* and the United State's support to them. Representative Skelton, a proponent of *Contra* support, admitted that the administration's problems in developing a policy toward Nicaragua were deficient due to "an emphasis on covert, rather than overt action; tardiness in trying to build public support for the legitimacy of the *Contra* cause; and the fiasco of the Iran-Contra affair."⁵² Through its emphasis on covert assistance to the *Contras*, the Reagan administration gave the effort an aura of illegitimacy. As such, it became difficult for many in Congress and within the public to understand the nature of the problem in Nicaragua and the rationale for U.S. assistance to the insurgency. Because the fight in Nicaragua contained no dramatic event capable of extensive media coverage, the case for aiding the *Contras* was not clear to those who had not paid close attention to developments since the 1970s.

In addition, the realization that covert assistance to the *Contras* was ongoing for almost two years without a clear-cut

⁵²Skelton, *Army*, 20.

rationale also contributed to the perception of illegitimacy.⁵³ So too, the inability of the *Contras* to offer a formal agenda for opposing the Sandinistas and instituting an alternative government contributed to their failure. All of this was in contrast to the overt Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of an unpopular government there. This invasion was an easily grasped international event which the administration clearly defined and articulated. As a result, covert support to the Afghan rebels received consistent bipartisan support due to its perceived legitimacy.

The failure of the government to communicate that the U.S. can and should support selective revolutionary movements will probably continue to have serious implications for U.S. foreign policy regarding future confrontations with oppressive regimes (right- or left-oriented). To ameliorate potential misjudgments concerning intervention in future LICs, particularly in support of revolutionary movements, the term 'capturing the revolution' is relevant. This not-so-new concept stipulates that "where U.S. national interests are clearly at stake, we must consider intervention. If we are to succeed, however, we must also capture

⁵³*Ibid.*, 21.

the revolution. That is, we [U.S.] must champion the just expectations of the people and make their causes ours."⁵⁴

Predicated on the realization that communist states tend to infiltrate legitimate rebellions against oppressive regimes and mold them to serve wider foreign policy considerations, the U.S. frequently finds itself, even with the best of motives, shoring up repressive and venal systems simply because they are ostensibly anticommunist. By 'capturing the revolution', the U.S. can react to LICs based less on an ideological perspective and more on supporting groups and movements based on legitimate grievances and values we endorse. Thus, according to Hunter, "the core problem of counterinsurgency (or support for an insurgency) is redirecting the attitudes and activities of the government and in-group elites, not the extermination of a popular movement with legitimate grievances. This is one clear lesson emerging from Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Philippines."⁵⁵

Faced with these flaws in LIC policy at the national level, it is not surprising that the services individually and jointly have had difficulties in developing a consistent doctrine and strategy to conduct LIC activities. One of these problems is the lack of

⁵⁴Horace Hunter, "Capturing the Revolution." *Military Review*, Vol LXX, No. 1, January 1990: 89.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

definitional boundaries associated with the all-encompassing term 'low-intensity conflict.' Since the term possesses no referential framework of its own, aside from a stipulated content made up of conflict elements such as insurgency, counterinsurgency, etc., there is no consensus on either its upper or lower limits.⁵⁶ As a result, the strategy development process invariably finds itself subject to semantic relativism and endless debate over the number and types of conflict elements to be included within the term. Because of the term's highly relative meaning and many possible connotations, it lacks utility in precisely those instances where an unequivocal understanding is crucial to national security--in pinning down the types of low-intensity conflict that must be addressed through policy, strategy, doctrine and force structure initiatives. Thus, the lack of conceptual clarity inherent in such a highly relative term as LIC continually frustrates the best attempts at definition, and it complicates the strategy development process.⁵⁷

Definitional problems aside, it is also important to look at certain organizational constraints inhibiting the U.S. from improving its LIC capabilities. According to Glenn Harned, these constraints include:

⁵⁶Klingaman, *LIC in the Third World*, 163.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 164

- 1) The lack of interagency consensus within the executive branch, and in particular the State Department's abrogation of its LIC responsibilities under the lead agency concept;
- 2) Congressional restraints on presidential authority to implement a coherent LIC strategy. Chief among these restraints are the implications of the War Powers Act when designing a long-term sustained LIC effort, the earmarking of ever-decreasing amounts of security assistance funds, unrealistic personnel ceilings in U.S. security assistance organizations worldwide, and the prohibition against DOD training of host nation police forces;
- 3) The reluctance of the U.S. military to allocate greater resources to LIC at the expense of the general purpose forces' capability to deter or wage war.⁵⁸

These arguments necessarily open the door to further debate as to the role of the U.S. military in LIC operations. For example, do all U.S. forces personnel need LIC training? Is it necessary to increase the amount of time and instruction in U.S. military schools on the subject? Are LIC advocates' expectations too high as to the ability of the military to respond to LICs? Are resources adequate to support mission requirements? Do we need to revamp U.S. national-level strategic planning away from

⁵⁸Glenn Harned, "Narrow Definitions, Misunderstood Concepts." *Military Review*, Vol. LIX, No. 2, February 1989: 93.

conventional and nuclear war potentialities toward LIC? And finally, should this be reflected in the DOD budget, assuming events in Eastern Europe and the USSR continue to improve and stabilize? It is evident from these questions that the LIC strategic planning process is still evolving and more time is needed to fully appreciate the complexities of this type of warfare.

A final weakness of the current U.S. LIC strategy development process is that it is virtually impossible to account for every variant of LIC in a way that avoids either a possible misapplication of the general guidance or a misinterpretation of the threat itself. This dilemma has its roots in attempts to determine the cause of societal problems leading to a LIC. Some analysts indicate that the Soviet objective of controlling global basing, critical maritime chokepoints and strategic resources is a primary cause of Third World instability. Others argue that such instability is the direct result of high population densities, poverty or lack of political self-determination, and that the answers lie in socioeconomic development and a democratic political system. Meanwhile, Sarkesian indicates that "in the long run, the battle over ideologies may be the most critical in shaping political systems and determining the outcome of unconventional conflicts."⁵⁹ Regardless of the causes, in some cases there may be

⁵⁹Sarkesian, *The New Battlefield*, 296.

no ready solution to the problem, or at least no solution that can be carried out through American involvement.

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND LIC IN LATIN AMERICA

The previous section outlined the conceptual basis, operational elements and doctrinal weaknesses of the U.S. military doctrine known as low-intensity conflict. Doctrinal weaknesses were outlined with a major emphasis on the lack of consensus within the U.S. government or academic circles as to what LIC is and how and when it should be conducted. The purpose of this section is to outline how U.S. LIC policies in Latin America respond (or not) to U.S. strategic interests in the region. In Latin America, U.S. policies, including the conduct of LICs, are implemented through the U.S. embassies in each of the respective countries, as well as the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) located in Panama. As such, this section will first articulate a broad definition of the U.S. strategic interest in Latin America and then include a brief commentary as to its component parts. Following this, LIC policies as implemented by USSOUTHCOM will be examined to determine if they indeed support U.S. interests in the region.

U.S. Strategic Interests: A Definition

Since the end of World War II, the security interests of the U.S. have focused principally on the strategic balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In this context, Latin America has traditionally been only marginally important. Furthermore, U.S. security interests assumed that a stable and friendly Latin America was dependent on the exclusion of foreign influence and the maintenance of hemispheric solidarity behind U.S. leadership. However, while U.S. definitions of strategic and security interests in the region have remained constant over time, Latin American perceptions of their security needs have undergone dramatic changes in recent years.⁶⁰ As the various countries have developed politically and economically, and as international roles have become more complex, U.S. and Latin American national interests have begun to diverge. Differences over specific U.S. policies including arms transfers, trade questions, human rights, recognition of Cuba, support for the *Contras*, and other economic and political issues suggest to Latin Americans that U.S. policy is not responsive to their needs. Consequently, North American options for implementing a

⁶⁰Margaret Daly Hayes, "Security to the South: U.S. Interests in Latin America." *International Security Review*, Vol 5, No. 1, Summer 1980: 131.

narrowly defined, U.S.-oriented interpretation of collective hemispheric security are becoming increasingly limited.⁶¹

With these factors in mind, it is important for U.S. policy makers and defense planners to note that while a politico-military alliance with the United States is not contrary to Latin American interests, it is not at the top of the Latin American agenda.⁶² Rather, there is an increased tendency for Latin Americans to seek a stronger commitment to equality and cooperation in their security, economic and political relationships with the United States. Security considerations, particularly concern over external threats to the hemisphere, are now of less concern to Latin Americans than are the twin pillars of economic development and economic integration into the global economy. Thus, it is increasingly evident that the inter-American security system as conceived in the 1950s and 1960s no longer provides a satisfactory basis for regional collective security.⁶³ However, as Latin Americans become more highly developed (despite setbacks due to heavy debt and inflation) the potential exists for these countries to acquire new military capabilities, making possible the incorporation of more broadly conceived defense policies than

⁶¹*Ibid.*

⁶²*Ibid.*, 132.

⁶³Augusto Varas, *Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO., 1989), 2-3.

merely internal security considerations. These changes offer the United States an opportunity to share with the Latin Americans the various regional security responsibilities on a more equitable and mature basis. To achieve this, the U.S. must undertake a substantial shift in its security policies toward the region, including an improvement in the level and quality of its military relations, arms transfer policies, and U.S. nuclear policy.

As part of this need to review its security policy toward the region, a review of U.S. strategic interests in the hemisphere is also needed. In particular, it is pertinent that the U.S. adopt a more broadly conceived notion of its hemispheric interests away from the narrower concept of military security to one incorporating a more goal-oriented perspective of 'What is it in our interest to prevent?' and 'What would we seek to accomplish?' in the region. U.S. strategic interests must also fully appreciate the distinct differences between regions within Latin America and their different socioeconomic and security requirements. The current rationale for continuing America's military and political involvement in the region centers around permanent U.S. national interests: Defending the homeland; maintaining access to strategic raw materials; increasing markets for U.S. exports and investment opportunities; strengthening the international order;

and fortifying democratic values.⁶⁴ While these interests are basically accepted by most North Americans, it is the means used to accomplish them that causes consensual rifts between Latin Americans and outsiders.⁶⁵ In concert with these fundamental concerns, Hayes presents a more broadly-based definition of U.S. strategic interests in Latin America which she believes is representative of U.S. values and goals for the region.

It is in the United States' national interest that there exist in the Western Hemisphere, friendly, prosperous states with stable responsible governments that permit the free movement of goods and services throughout the region; that respect the political integrity of their neighbors; and that offer no support to the United States' global political rivals.⁶⁶

Central to this definition is the need for Latin American countries to be able to conduct their own affairs and to cope with and to accomodate to change so that the United States is not compelled to deal with regional events on a crisis basis. Countries

⁶⁴Martin Andersen, "The Military Obstacle to Latin Democracy." *Foreign Policy*, No. 73, Winter 1988-89: 95.

⁶⁵See Tom Barry and Deb Preusch, *Central America Fact Book* (New York: Grove Press, 1986) for an articulation of the various perspectives at achieving U.S. policy goals in Latin America.

⁶⁶Margaret Daly Hayes, "Understanding U.S. Policy Toward Latin America." *Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America*, ed., Augusto Varas (Boulder, CO., 1989), 76.

exhibiting these characteristics are more likely to be politically stable and responsible in their dealings with their domestic political, economic and security problems. Governments must also be responsible and responsive to their societies by respecting human rights, the political and economic well-being of the population, allowing the articulation and incorporation of demands from a variety of interest groups. It is in the United State's best interests, then, to support governments that demonstrate effective, efficient and responsible actions in response to the demands of their populations. It also means the U.S. should recognize and support countries that conduct elections and absorb changes of political leadership through constitutional means and not through coups or revolutionary movements.

Friendly relations and regional economic prosperity are also major tenets of U.S. strategic interests derived from Hayes' definition. Too often it is assumed that the United States demands that Latin America acquiesce to U.S. desires. This is not the case, nor should it be. Rather, friendly relations can continue even though important differences in objectives or policies may exist between countries. Inflammatory rhetoric from either the U.S. or Latin America serves little purpose and should be minimized, whereas appropriate diplomatic channels need to be more fully utilized to conduct regional foreign policy.

Regional economic prosperity is a key interest of the United States and goes hand in glove with political stability. While economic growth is desired, the distribution of the benefits of this growth toward the development of each country must be the overall goal. Economic prosperity requires that Latin America not only access external markets and sources of hard currency, but also promote broad-based domestic consumption. To accomplish these needs, Latin Americans, along with the Japan, Europe and the United States must come to grips with the massive regional debt burden and simultaneously press for economic reforms away from import substituting industrialization and more to the development of export markets and the encouragement of foreign capital investment.

It is also in the U.S. interest that countries in the region respect each other's sovereignty and the political integrity of their respective borders. For the most part, Latin American countries have managed classic international border disputes peacefully; however, the record for managing subversion is less clear. From the U.S. perspective, Latin Americans tolerate cross-border subversive elements excessively.⁶⁷ U.S. concerns are justified in that regional instability affects U.S. domestic and foreign affairs, particularly if the U.S. is called upon to take sides. El Salvador is a

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 81.

prime example. As the U.S. public was drawn into and made part of El Salvador's domestic conflict, the country's domestic political problems became intertwined with U.S. foreign policy. Activists on all sides of the political spectrum failed to comprehend that very real limits to U.S. policy existed--both in what the U.S. would support and what it could tolerate. In essence, El Salvador illustrates that there is very little the U.S. as a nation can do to resolve the domestic political problems of others. Henry Kissinger indicates that "the United States is no longer in a position to operate programs globally; it has to encourage them. It can no longer impose its preferred solution, it must seek to evoke it. . . [the U.S. must] contribute to a structure that will foster the initiative of others. . . to encourage and not stifle a sense of local responsibility."⁶⁸ The U.S., then, must recognize that the political problems of a country need to be resolved by the people themselves. Nevertheless, the United States is drawn into the political instability of the region when the governmental institutions of those countries are threatened. To minimize U.S. involvement in response to regional instability it is in the interest of the U.S. and others that those institutions be strengthened.

⁶⁸Henry Kissinger, "On the National Interest." In *American Foreign Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1973)

Finally, it is in the national interests of the U.S. that the countries of the region not provide support for or align themselves with U.S. global rivals. This is the key to current problems with Cuba, and until recently, Nicaragua. Of crucial importance is the need for critics, as well as supporters of U.S. policy in the region, to understand the principles established in the early 1960s that guide this policy. These principles, resulting from President Kennedy's pronouncements in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, included the U.S. acceptance of a Marxist Cuba in return for Cuban nonintervention outside its borders. Most critics of recent policy in Central America fail to appreciate the consistency with which those principles have persisted and how they have guided the formulation of attitudes within the U.S. government and public at large.⁶⁹ Thus, in the broadest of terms, U.S. foreign policy is based fundamentally on alignment, with the internal political dynamics of a country as a secondary (but important) consideration--foreign policy is the element on which a country is judged most strictly.⁷⁰ This philosophy is at the root of U.S. security policies throughout the hemisphere.

These concerns reflect the need of the U.S. to strive for a more broadly-based interpretation of its strategic and security

⁶⁹Hayes, *Hemispheric Security*, 83.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

interests in the region. U.S. hemispheric interests include economic and political stability, respect for human rights, good government and freedom from physical and ideological aggression. These goals are not inconsistent with the interests of Latin Americans. Rather, the key to the quality of the future relationship depends on how effectively the United States and Latin America can work to achieve these goals.

U.S. Strategic Interests and Low-intensity Conflict Doctrine

Based on this broad definition of U.S. strategic interests in the hemisphere, how well does LIC doctrine serve to further these interests as a foreign policy tool? While some may argue that LIC doctrine is an unsuccessful military device used to rollback socialist or radical nationalist regimes, thereby resulting in only more violence and repression in the region, there are indications that LIC, at least at the tactical and regional level (USSOUTHCOM), does indeed further broader U.S. interests in Latin America. However, it is also evident that LIC doctrine cannot satisfy all U.S. strategic and security requirements in the hemisphere.

As the LIC debate has developed and become more sophisticated over the past decade, there is a growing realization

that neither military activities alone nor the singular emphasis on human rights can satisfy U.S. and Latin American interests. Nowhere is this realization taken to heart more readily than at the U.S. Southern Command in Panama where LIC doctrine is applied in Latin America. Taking its cue from certain policy makers in Washington, D.C., and such former Commanders-in-Chief as Generals John Galvin and Fred Woerner, USSOUTHCOM's strategy to further U.S. foreign policy goals underwent a conceptual reorientation in the mid-1980's. This reorientation consisted of reducing the military's more narrowly-based, conflict-oriented stance toward managing the region's instability to one involving a more cooperative and less conflictive orientation. The result is that in many ways, USSOUTHCOM's approach to regional security reflects Hayes' broader, goal-oriented approach discussed above.

This more sophisticated position became manifest in subsequent statements by former USSOUTHCOM commanders. For example, General Galvin indicated early in his tenure at USSOUTHCOM (1985-1987) that "the essential problem here is not military, and the answer to the problem is not military."⁷¹ General Woerner, who succeeded Galvin in 1987, indicated:

⁷¹John Galvin, interviewed by Deborah Gallagher Meyer in *The Armed Forces Journal*, Vol. 123, No. 6, December 1985: 34.

The salient points in the application of our strategy [in Latin America] are democracy, economic development and security. . .the consolidation of democracy [is a] key objective of U.S. policy; another round of dictatorships of the right or left would not advance our national interests. We no longer see an incompatibility between our ideals and our strategic interests.⁷²

Going further, Woerner indicated that:

- 1) Democratization in Latin America secures our southern flank and is the best defense against totalitarian inroads.
- 2) Societies that fully engage the creative capacity of their citizens and that hold their governors accountable to the governed contribute more to their and to our national security than do authoritarian governments whose previous claim to legitimacy was their promise of security or their anti-communist stance.
- 3) Democratic governments threaten neither their people nor their neighbors.
- 4) Dictatorships, civilian or military, provide fertile ground for Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries by weakening civilian leadership and, in many cases, corrupting the very guardian of security--a nation's armed forces.⁷³

⁷²Fred Woerner, "The Strategic Imperative for the United States in Latin America." *Military Review*, Vol. LXVIII, No. 2, February 1988: 24.

⁷³*Ibid.*

In response to this conceptual reorientation, USSOUTHCOM developed a policy framework based on what is now known as the four "D's"--democracy, defense, development and dialogue. Of these, the primary goal is the spread and sustainment of democracy in the region. This means that the closeness of U.S. relations and the level of U.S. assistance are conditioned by the absence or presence of participative democratic pluralism in any nation. Defense means the United States will support the self-defense efforts of these governments, and will recognize the responsibility to provide a "security shield" from outside intervention and interference.

Development indicates the U.S. recognizes that fundamental contradictions exist that must be eased by economic, social and political growth designed to improve the population of a country. And dialogue means the U.S. will always discuss differences and options with political and military actors who seek nonviolent solutions to internal and external problems. Dialogue also means the United States encourages discussions where and when the possibilities of progress and compromise are real. "Our nation believes that, to the degree these objectives are accomplished, U.S.

interests will be served because stability will return and the ideals of democracy will triumph."⁷⁴

USSOUTHCOM's strategic, operational and tactical activities are designed to implement the goals professed in the four "D's." Strategically, USSOUTHCOM is charged with providing a stable and secure southern flank for the United States. This is best accomplished through extensive military-to-military coordination, as directed and approved by the U.S. ambassador, and communications between U.S. and host-nation military institutions to achieve a number of mutual goals. These goals include the support for democratic development, subordination of the military to civilian control, commitment to high standards of military professionalism and ethics, and dedication to national stability. Further, USSOUTHCOM's strategy also encompasses collective cooperation in the defense of the hemisphere under the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty.⁷⁵

At the operational and tactical level, USSOUTHCOM implements its strategy through the various activities associated with the LIC components previously outlined. Principal among these is foreign internal defense and its related elements such as

⁷⁴John Galvin, "Challenge and Response on the Southern Flank: Three Decades Later." *Military Review*, Vol. LXVI, No. 8, August 1986: 10.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*

security assistance, civil-military operations, personnel exchange programs, combined exercises, small-unit exchanges, mobile training teams, conferences and visits. USSOUTHCOM also is capable in planning for and executing peacetime contingency and peacekeeping missions; however, General Woerner indicated that "my most effective force capabilities. . .are not related to the direct application of military power, but rather more subtle politico-military methods that demonstrate and reinforce the armed forces' legitimate role in a democracy."⁷⁶

These activities indicate that USSOUTHCOM's role in promoting U.S. interests in the region is considerable. They also indicate a convergence toward a goal-oriented perspective involving the ideas of "what is it in our interest to prevent?" and "what would we seek to accomplish?" in the hemisphere. USSOUTHCOM's broader, more comprehensive emphasis on nation-building and peaceful change based on democracy and democratic principles, rather than simplistic military-only solutions, are rooted solidly in U.S. strategic interests.

While USSOUTHCOM's overall strategy is appropriate, its overall effectiveness remains questionable. A number of factors inhibit USSOUTHCOM's ability to fully achieve its goal:

⁷⁶Woerner, *Military Review*, 24.

- 1) The continued lack of a long-term and consistent commitment to Latin America at the U.S. national level as evidenced by the paucity of security assistance and economic support funds available to the region.
- 2) An imbalance in U.S. assistance to Central America relative to South America. While the security problems of Central America have justifiably focused U.S. attention on that subregion, South American countries receive only \$10.7 million of the more than \$205 million of security assistance allocated to Latin America.⁷⁷
- 3) The realization that traditional military operations are less effective in the low-intensity environment than are ideas and values. The moral legitimacy of governments is the key objective of LIC rather than military objectives. Sustaining an intellectually sophisticated "war of information" is the key to communicating democratic values through public diplomacy.

⁷⁷Woerner, *Defense* '87, 6.

These efforts take time, perhaps over a number of generations.

- 4) The lack of requisite growth or development in the economic sector due to high inflation and heavy debt burdens.
- 5) The continued extensive military involvement in governmental affairs in many Latin American states which impede the effectiveness and legitimacy of civilian institutions (to be discussed in the next section).
- 6) The existence of insurgencies in nine countries which continue to threaten the stability of established governments; and the increased instability associated with the illicit drug trade.

These factors should not be construed to mean that U.S. efforts have failed completely. On the contrary, despite the ever-present socioeconomic and political problems in the hemisphere, democratic institutions and principles are gaining in acceptance. Democratic elections in Panama, Brazil, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Chile attest to these democratic currents. These factors do suggest, though, that LIC doctrine is not itself a solution to the

strategic and security problems in the region. Concurrently, they also underscore the premise that the U.S. alone is not willing or capable of providing the economic and military resources needed to ensure the region's democratic systems remain viable.

This being the case, what options are available to strategic and security planners regarding U.S. LIC policies in the region? Four options come to mind. The first entails the perpetuation of the *status quo*, which essentially means the continuation of bilateral U.S. efforts to improve hemispheric security through various LIC components available for use by USSOUTHCOM. However, the existence of manpower and funding shortfalls and the lack of national-level integration of LIC policies and doctrine will continue to hamper efforts to implement this strategy. On the other hand, if LIC and its socioeconomic and security objectives are not politically or economically feasible, or if the U.S. government and public cannot make the long-term commitment to prevail in LIC situations, then the military should recommend a change in emphasis. Thus, a second option is a strategy oriented away from LIC and toward mid-intensity operations entailing the use of U.S. combat troops. These operations could be conducted against insurgencies deemed threatening to friendly regimes or against unfriendly governments already established in the region.

A third option is a strategy involving a set of LIC objectives that are reduced in scope. This strategy would require an admission by U.S. political leaders that the United States does not have the political will to commit resources and men to a particular LIC in sufficient quantity to win. The strategy would recognize that the conflict is internal and not of vital interest to the U.S. Finally, a fourth option is to increase hemispheric security cooperation based on the realities outlined earlier which suggest that Latin Americans desire less U.S. and more regionally-oriented solutions to the hemisphere's security problems. This option would require the U.S. to rethink its military commitments to the region under the Rio Treaty.

Regardless of which strategy is eventually realized the scope of the region's problems, the U.S. resource shortfall to assist in dealing with those problems, and the weaknesses regarding LIC as a strategic policy tool suggest that new and more innovative ways to resolve security issues are necessary. However, before examining one potential means by which the U.S. and Latin America can better resolve security problems in the hemisphere, it is first necessary to analyze one of the major impediments toward achieving the U.S. goals of peaceful resolution of conflict and the building of democratic institutions in the region. That impediment is the problematic issue of Latin

American civil-military relations. By understanding the dynamics of how civilian and military institutions interact in the region, and how the U.S. has influenced this relationship in the past, it is possible to suggest a framework for a revised hemispheric security order based on a more cooperative and multilateral approach to conflict resolution.

THE MILITARY OBSTACLE TO REGIONAL SECURITY

As outlined in the last section, a number of factors serve to inhibit the effectiveness of the U.S. (and hence, USSOUTHCOM's) strategy of helping countries in the region to affect peaceful change through nation-building and adherence to democratic principles. One of the most notable is the continued extensive involvement of the military as an institution in the governmental affairs of many Latin American states. This section examines this factor from a systemic perspective to determine whether or not this obstacle to regional security can be adequately addressed through the application of U.S. LIC policies as currently practiced in the region. Included in this discussion is an examination of why the militaries dominate civilian institutions, the origins and concepts associated with the National Security Doctrine, and ways in which the imbalance between the civilian and military spheres can be mitigated.

Military Intervention in Domestic Politics

Since independence, the military has been a key variable in the political processes of the Latin American republics. Arguably the oldest and most enduring issue in post-Independence Latin

America, the political role of the military has of course varied for each of the countries in the hemisphere. The issue of the military in domestic politics has implications not merely for the political order, but also for the economic system and the network of international alliances adopted by these countries.

Over the past decade, Latin America, in narrow political terms, entered a cycle of demilitarization. Since 1979, the trend away from military rule and toward civilian government was witnessed in Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Panama, and (to a certain extent) Paraguay. Despite these changes, democracies and democrats continue to battle authoritarian ideologies. In some countries, such as Guatemala and El Salvador, the advance of democratization is hampered by officer corps that are willing to relinquish government offices, but not the functions of civil power. Fledgling democracies struggle under the threat of military coups or find that unelected uniformed tutors set conditions on their authority.⁷⁸

In retrospect, the transitions to democratic rule in Latin America that began in the late 1970s have almost always been the result of complex negotiations between civilians and the military organizations. Political or economic failure, or military

⁷⁸ Andersen, *Foreign Policy*, 94.

defeat, are generally the elements responsible for the military's decision to relinquish rule to civilians. Yet the terms of withdrawal tend to be drawn to protect the military's institutional interests. The amount of power gained by civilians varies according to the strength and cohesion of military institutions relative to their civilian antagonists. In many cases, the transition from military to civilian regimes owed far less to the strength of civilian institutions than to wounds self-inflicted by the armed forces themselves during periods of de facto rule.⁷⁹ Optimally, the power retained by the military is limited to its specific domain; in practice, though, it often ranges over a wide array of decisions that the armed forces consider national security concerns, even reaching the point of continued dominance over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

To define an ideal pattern of civil-military relations has, so far, eluded politicians, military leaders, and academicians. However, based on an analysis of the nature and context of military involvement in politics over the years, a common theme does appear. That theme, according to Ronald McDonald, is systemic in nature and involves a crisis of institutionalization in the region within the context of modernization, specifically the

⁷⁹ Mark Falcoff, "Military and Strategic Issues in Latin America." *Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America*, ed., Augusto Varas (Boulder, CO., 1989), 68.

imbalances which have evolved between civil and military institutions.⁸⁰ Within this thematic context, three general patterns of change can be identified for the military organizations which help to explain both the evolution of civil-military relations and the divergencies which currently exist in the region. These patterns, outlined principally by John Johnson, include modernization, professionalization, and institutionalization of military organizations.⁸¹

Modernization includes the adoption of more sophisticated weaponry, tactics, and resources by military organizations, largely through the importation of technologies and materials developed for military purposes elsewhere. Modernization increases the potential effectiveness of military organizations in the technical sense and makes it easier and more efficient for them to complete their assigned missions. New weapons, new communications systems, new tactics such as counterinsurgency, even new branches or divisions, such as air forces, fall into the general category of modernization.⁸²

⁸⁰Ronald McDonald, "Civil-Military Relations in Central America: The Dilemmas of Political Institutionalization." *Rift and Revolution: The Central American Imbroglia*, ed., Howard J. Wiarda (Washington, D.C., 1984), 129.

⁸¹John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, CA., 1964), 244-52.

⁸²McDonald, *Rift and Revolution*, 131.

Professionalization encompasses the training of personnel for their respective roles in the military, either as officers or as recruits. Professionalization presumes formal education, specifically the use of both national military academies and foreign military training assistance. The efficiency and skills of individuals is increased through professionalization, but it also inevitably changes their orientation to their roles, inculcating officers and (to a lesser extent) recruits with new values and commitments that both change and standardize their perceptions of themselves, again by changing and standardizing the processes through which they are recruited and rewarded within the organization.⁸³ Professionalization produces more bureaucratic and, potentially at least, more stable processes than traditional relationships in which bonds are familial, patrimonial, or associational.⁸⁴

Institutionalization is the process whereby the military organizations develop highly ingrained procedures for renewal and regeneration that transcend specific military leaders. Militaries that are considered highly institutionalized exhibit well-defined loyalties and allegiances to the institution itself, and reflect a common bond of values, identifications, expectations, and

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴Johnson, *Military and Society*, 252.

interests with the organization. Many patterns for institutionalizing military organizations can exist, particularly regarding relationships between military personnel, their organizations, and their civilian counterparts. Military institutions may evolve so as to be subservient to civil sectors of society, equal to or competitive with them, or dominant over them. All of these patterns have emerged at various times in Latin America.

These three processes, though dynamic and closely related, tend to be sequential in their effect. Military modernization, particularly in certain South American states, proceeded early on in the nineteenth century, followed by professionalization, and to a varying degree, institutionalization. In Central America, the institutionalization process has proceeded less rapidly than in South America.⁸⁵ Despite differences in the degree of the institutionalization of the militaries within the sub-regions of Latin America, military organizations have, on the whole, been more adaptive than civilian ones, especially within the context of the extensive social and economic changes in the region. Thus, the central problem of civil-military relations is one of institutionalization, or rather, the imbalance created by that process between civilian and military organizations; an imbalance

⁸⁵McDonald, *Rift and Revolution*, 161.

that, according to McDonald, can contribute to revolution and political upheaval.⁸⁶

Over the past half-century, the relationship between civil and military elites in Latin America has been one in which the military overwhelmed the civilians in their organizational effectiveness, their resources, their specialized skills, and their growing individual and institutional incentives to prevail. The product of this unbalanced competition has been military intervention and military dominance of governmental and political processes. However, military intervention in the political workings of a nation is generally misunderstood in the U.S., particularly due to the premise that military involvement in civilian affairs is anathema. Military intervention is also generally misunderstood due to the assumption that political processes in Latin America have broken down or failed to function and that military intervention is either, at best, a symptom of that failure, or, at worst, the cause of it. As a result, some analysts believe military intervention is synonymous with political instability and is the reason why civilian institutions fail to take root in the region. Others who apologize for military regimes believe the military is the only organization capable of providing political,

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 133.

economic, and social stability, particularly in the containment of revolutionary movements.

A more realistic approach toward analyzing military intervention is to view the military as just one of several politically active interests in a country, functioning as a class of upwardly mobile individuals who share many common ambitions, aspirations, and values with other societal elites. Thus, according to Charles Anderson, military elites are only one set of power contenders in a society who "attempt to demonstrate a power capability sufficient to be recognized by other power contenders, and that the political process consists of manipulation and negotiation among power contenders reciprocally recognizing each other's power capability."⁸⁷ Military influence and intervention are thereby conceived as a continuous, normal part of the political contest, distinguished by degree and kind of intervention rather than by their presence or absence from national politics.⁸⁸

Although military influence in the political processes of countries occurs everywhere, including the U.S., the ongoing contest between civilian and military elites in Latin America is frequently overt and hostile. Also, just as military elites

⁸⁷Charles Anderson, "Toward a Theory of Latin American Politics." *Vanderbilt University Occasional Paper No. 2*, February 1964: 5.

⁸⁸McDonald, *Rift and Revolution*, 147.

intervene in civilian groups, civilian elites intervene in military organizations as well. This two-way contest, which includes virtually all politically influential civilians and military leaders, is conditioned not only by differing objectives, but also by the political skills and economic resources that can be mobilized. Additionally, this two-directional political process depends on the creation of alliances forged not only by institutions, but also by individuals. It is this process of political alliance building that is critical to understanding military intervention in the region.⁸⁹

Military intervention in civilian politics is essentially political in nature and tends to ebb and flow in degree. Intervention by the military specifically requires the officer class to make alliances with other classes in the society, as well as to form coalitions within their own forces such as between the branches of the military (army, navy, air force, national police). One of the major consequences of professionalization within the military has been to encourage these bureaucratic and political skills among its elite, resulting in military leaders building personal and institutional alliances with other significant elements in their societies. As such, the officer class pursues its interests both as a group and individually through alliances with the upper classes that are most immediately able to improve its position.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 148.

Likewise, the upper classes pursue their vested interests by building alliances--again between both individuals and groups--with the military. This powerful alliance has dominated most of the time in Latin American society, particularly in Central America.⁹⁰

The motivations for political intervention by the military are found in both group and individual interests. From an institutional perspective, the maintenance of political and military stability appears as the overriding preoccupation of military officers. According to Alfred Stepan, "this attitude is encouraged, in part, by the emphasis on counterinsurgency as advocated by U.S. military assistance and training."⁹¹ Thus, the perception of a threat to national security, whether real or not, is a primary factor increasing the chances for military intervention by facilitating the conditions necessary within the military to pursue it.

Other motivations for military intervention include the desire for national economic development and modernization, which to some officers are ends in themselves and to others a means of securing the primary goal of national stability.

⁹⁰McDonald, *Rift and Revolution*, 149.

⁹¹Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J., 1971), 126-33.

Promoting and managing economic development are roles that have been performed by military elites in many Latin American countries, including Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, and Needler believes it is clearly a motivating force at the group level for officers in Central America.⁹² In addition, military intervention can occur when the military believes certain of its institutional prerogatives are threatened by civilian elites. For example, civilian attempts to determine promotions, salaries, and equipment purchases, as well as efforts to undermine the integrity of the military as an institution (such as Goulart attempted in Brazil when he supported a sailor's strike against the naval hierarchy) may give cause for the military to defend itself through increased intervention in civilian affairs or (as a last resort) a coup.

Regardless of these motivations, in no country, particularly in Latin America, can the military be considered nonpolitical. Because it is often the only really well-organized institution that exhibits a clear-cut sense of mission, an unambiguous pattern of authority, and in some areas, a near monopoly on skills essential for development such as civil engineering, atomic power, and communications, it is imperative to realize that the military has

⁹²Martin Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60, September 1964: 616-626.

always been, and will remain, a major political force in Latin America. The viability of the armed forces, their political influence, and continued weaknesses in civilian organizations and institutions indicate that the relationship between the military and its civilian counterparts (the crisis of institutionalization) will retain its unbalanced character for the foreseeable future. With this in mind, can U.S., and particularly USSOUTHCOM, efforts be successful in promoting strong, civilian-led, democratic regimes in the region and concomitantly, more balanced civil-military relations in the hemisphere? Is it feasible, under the circumstances, to meet USSOUTHCOM's objectives of a more apolitical military in Latin America? And does current U.S. LIC doctrine contribute to the promotion of a more balanced civil-military relationship? To address these questions, a brief look at foreign attempts to influence Latin American militaries is in order, especially the U.S. role in promoting the doctrine of national security which today continues to be an accepted military concept throughout the hemisphere. Following this, specific recommendations at improving Latin American civil-military relations will be examined.

Foreign Influence and the National Security Doctrine

Civilian authorities in Latin America face a difficult task in changing military attitudes concerning the role of the military in society and ameliorating the unbalanced civil-military relationship that currently exists. This task remains difficult because many Latin American officers still adhere, albeit less visibly than during the 1960s and 1970s, to the belief that the armed forces are the ultimate guardians of not only the national borders, but more importantly, the essence of their societies. This belief is embodied within the conceptual framework of the National Security Doctrine (NSD), a concept that focuses the military's efforts on internal rather than external enemies and portrays the military as society's vanguard in pursuit of the twin pillars of security and development. Weinstein indicates that the doctrine of national security is "garbed in a pseudoscientific analysis of society grounded in geopolitics. Sovereignty no longer resides in the people, but derives from the requirements of state survival. NSD thus becomes an updated version of the theological justification for rule."⁹³

According to this doctrine, the military plays an active role in the political and economic affairs of the country and seeks to ensure its intervention through law and the institutions of the

⁹³Martin Weinstein, *Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads* (Boulder, CO., 1989), 51.

state. NSD contains components likened to both secular and religious concerns. The religious takes the form of an almost holy war against "communist subversion," whereas the secular involves a reordering of economic policies and priorities so as to ensure development, without which the instability that originally provoked the military's intervention would return. By pursuing both elements the military acknowledges that society must sacrifice certain freedoms in order to protect and preserve the state.⁹⁴

National Security Doctrine had its genesis in Latin America primarily in the writings of certain French military authors, particularly André Beaufre. In his book *Introduction to Strategy* (1963), Beaufre maintained that mankind was obsessed by the senseless destruction of the two world wars and that global conventional conflict, accentuated by the advent of nuclear weapons, was futile. But just as true was the futility of finding real peace. Rather, the future would be marked by low-intensity warfare in which East-West ideological concerns were paramount. Beaufre insisted that the Soviet Union was winning this worldwide low-intensity war, in part, because the U.S. continued

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

to naively view the world in the outmoded terms of war and peace.⁹⁵

In support of this thesis, by the late 1950s and early 1960s communist or communist-inspired revolutionary movements gained success against conventional armies in a number of areas, including China, Indochina, Algeria, and Cuba. This led military and political leaders in both the developed and under-developed world to pay more attention to devising military strategies to combat or prevent domestic revolutionary warfare. By 1961, the U.S. under the Kennedy administration became preoccupied with the concepts of counterinsurgency as the means to quell the potential threat of armed revolution in Latin America emanating from Cuba. Accordingly, U.S. military assistance programs to Latin America devoted considerable emphasis on doctrines concerned with the military's role in counterinsurgency techniques, civic action, and nation-building.⁹⁶

Latin American officers, particularly in the southern cone, borrowed heavily from Beaufre and other French and U.S. counterinsurgency strategists to form the basis for the development of their own counterinsurgency strategies. The most notable proponents of these new ideas were the highly

⁹⁵Andersen, *Foreign Policy*, 96.

⁹⁶Stepan, *The Military In Politics*, 136.

professional and institutionalized militaries of Brazil and Peru. Taking their cue from Castro's defeat of Cuba's conventional army, these militaries believed that internal security matters, as well as the existence of the military institution itself, were linked to the need for a new, more professional approach regarding the conduct of national security policies. This new approach, labeled by Stepan as the "new professionalism" of internal security and national development, differed conceptually from the "old professionalism" model of military behavior. Under the old model, the military concentrated primarily on external security threats, specialized in military-oriented tasks and occupations, and acknowledged the distinct role that civilians played in the governing process.⁹⁷ In essence, the old professionalism assumed armies developed skills to fight conventional wars against foreign enemies and that the military restrict its political influence.

By adopting the new professional model, some Latin American militaries built on their already high level of professionalism and institutionalization and conceived a new role for themselves in society. Militaries in Peru, Brazil, Argentina,

⁹⁷Numerous works exist outlining the components of military professionalism. One of the most notable authorities on the subject is Samuel Huntington, who in his work, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964) gives extensive detail as to the components of the "old professional" behavioral model.

and Uruguay studied such questions as the social and political conditions facilitating the growth of revolutionary protest and developed doctrines and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgent movements. Military organizations throughout the region came to believe that professional military expertise was required in a broad range of fields. Thus, instead of increasing only their functional specialization, that is, the development of more sophisticated, military-oriented warfighting techniques, the militaries expanded the training of their officers in order to acquire expertise in internal security matters that embraced all aspects of the social, economic, and political life of the country. The military and political spheres became more interrelated as the military played an ever increasing role in interpreting and dealing with domestic political problems: the "new professional" military man became highly politicized.

Eventually, the new professionalism of internal security and national development led to a considerable degree of military role expansion. While this expansion of the military's influence varied from one country to another, it appeared that the weaker the civilian government's own legitimacy and ability to manage the domestic political and economic aspects of the nation, the greater the tendency for the military's new professionals to assume control of the government and impose their views of development

on the state.⁹⁸ The technical and professional specialization of the military, in conjunction with doctrines and ideologies of internal security led to military "managerialism" in the political sphere. Consequently, the imbalance between civilian and military institutions widened, resulting in the imposition of extensive military rule during the 1960s and 1970s.

The importance of foreign, and especially U.S. training to Latin American military organizations was, and still is, a critical factor in the professionalization process leading to the adoption by these institutions of the National Security Doctrine. As indicated earlier, since 1961 United States military policy toward Latin America has encouraged the region's militaries to assume as their primary role counterinsurgency, civic-action, and nation-building tasks. This policy has often been defended in the name of helping to create a professional army and by implication, an apolitical force in the nation. As Woerner states, "promoting professional military institutions that support democratic development, respect human rights, are subordinate to civilian control, and are committed to high standards of military excellence and ethics,"⁹⁹ are key objectives of U.S. strategy in the region. These objectives are addressed through LIC policies

⁹⁸Stepan, *The Military In Politics*, 136.

⁹⁹Woerner, *Defense '87*, 5.

established by USSOUTHCOM (identified earlier), U.S. military missions within the countries, and the U.S. School of the Americas (among others).

According to McDonald, however, U.S. influence has been more than a technical one. The training experience socializes Latin American officers to accept the values which have motivated U.S. involvement in the first place: Maintenance of internal security, vigilance toward possible "communist" subversion, and a strongly pro-American international stand. In addition to instruction, U.S. equipment, strategies, and standardization "[have made] them dependent on the United States for military resources, their future modernization, and perhaps their survival."¹⁰⁰ The military organizations, through their exposure to foreign training and advisers, have increasingly specialized in counterinsurgency activities and planning, an area clearly encouraged by U.S. mentors and in general by U.S. military assistance to the region.

Martin Andersen, a critic of past and present U.S. military policy stresses that the Reagan administration, while emphasizing the need for military subordination to civilian leaders and respect for the rule of law, tended to contradict these ideals through increased aid packages to, and recognition of, repressive regimes.

¹⁰⁰McDonald, *Rift and Revolution*, 145.

"Latin officers cannot be faulted if they believe that that message is for U.S. domestic consumption, while a harder-line, less restrictive signal is also sent."¹⁰¹ Andersen cites the Reagan administration's policies toward Argentina, which included public admonishments of Argentina's military excesses in the "dirty war" of the 1970s on the one hand, and the desire to renew cordial relations through increased military aid and instruction on the other, as evidence of its confusing and contradictory approach to security issues in the hemisphere. Thus, U.S. security interests and policies have evolved from essentially military considerations to more political ones, the result of which is that Latin American militaries have become detached from U.S. institutions, the inter-American military system has become bankrupt, and the Latin American armed forces have been deprofessionalized.¹⁰²

Criticisms of foreign (particularly U.S.) influences on Latin American militaries notwithstanding, many observers question whether these influences have been properly analyzed and understood. For example, Louis Goodman indicates that questions remain as to the impact of foreign influence on the development and implementation of the NSD. "While there is no doubt that such a doctrine has been debated by Latin American militaries, it

¹⁰¹Andersen, *Foreign Policy*, 109.

¹⁰²Varas, *Hemispheric Security*, 2.

is unclear whether its influence has been properly understood."¹⁰³ Goodman is also skeptical of the overall impact of external influences on Latin American military organizations in that "it is unlikely that such highly nationalistic institutions would simply absorb foreign doctrine."¹⁰⁴ Rather, other aspects of the issue which deserve particular attention are the matter of how its [NSD] introduction may have created splits among the officers corps, how these splits may have affected civil-military relations, and how its impact compares with that of the substantial flows of technical assistance and military equipment introduced into the region by external powers.

Meanwhile, despite Martin Andersen's criticisms of U.S. policies in general, he disagrees with those who would reduce or curtail U.S. funding to Latin American militaries. . . "strategic considerations--including the region's geographic proximity and access to raw materials--suggest that [reduced U.S. funding] would be unwise. . . the United States should be involved in providing military assistance that is based on realistic, rather than ideologically skewed, assessments of security threats."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³Louis Goodman, "Civil-Military Relations." *International Review*, No. 3, May/June 1986: 16.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵Andersen, *Foreign Policy*, 110-111.

Institution-Building and Repudiation of NSD

The need to consolidate the region's new democracies and break the cycle of military intervention in the hemisphere indicates that U.S. military policy be consistent with its stated goals of democratization. Just as important, it also means that institution-building and knowledge creation are the primary keys to a successful reorientation of the region's civil-military relations. Based on the problems posed by these relations, it is increasingly apparent that any solution must emphasize the strengthening of civilian institutions , while at the same time, allowing for an appropriate level of military influence to be retained in the political process.

To accomplish these goals, changes in civilian and military attitudes are necessary. Civilians must increase the capacities of political parties and groups within society to aggregate interests and effectively represent the populace in the political system, thereby reducing military anxieties about social chaos. Since such elements as divisiveness, infighting, rigid polarization, and an inability to negotiate or compromise weakens civilian capacities to govern and build strong civil-military relationships, overcoming these systemic obstacles to effective governance are imperative. Civilians, along with the military, must also develop means to

increase civilian awareness of professional military goals and concerns. Strong democratic civil-military relations require more than a few individual citizens highly informed about military issues. Rather, the creation of informal, as well as formal, academic and professional organizations is necessary to allow for a more meaningful public discussion of national security and military matters.

Other elements concerning state institution-building include the strengthening of civil-military communications within the executive and legislative branches of governments and the creation of national security councils under the auspices of civilian directors. By improving communications, an environment can be created in which civilian and military leaders can together rectify society's needs and problems. National security councils serve to subject the military to the checks and balances of democratic politics and allow civilians to enter into oversight roles vis-a-vis the armed forces. In addition, the strengthening of specialized legislative committees designed to assess military and national security issues will contribute to civilian oversight of the military.

The military must also contribute to a state's institution-building process. Military command structures must be unified, disciplined, and must adhere to established procedures for

promotions, salaries, and assignments. Those that do not are much less predictable and more vulnerable to coup attempts and other acts of insubordination. The military also must ensure it does not become isolated from society. Isolation breeds suspicion, thus it is important to create fora so that better assessments of civil society can be made by the military. On the other hand, military organizations must come to a consensus with their civilian counterparts as to the appropriate level of their involvement and interaction within society, to include the desirability of the military's operation of state enterprises.

In all of these solutions the basic assumption is that a political system is healthy if its armed forces and its civilian political organizations work together. As such, the goals of civilian institution-building and increased civilian knowledge regarding military issues dictate that military organizations repudiate the doctrine of national security. Militaries must accept that even though civilian efforts at political consensus-building and promoting national economic growth and development often produce mixed results, military support of national security doctrines based on repression only exacerbate societal tensions and polarize a nation's institutions. Thus, the creation of reliable public information about military behavior and concerns, the creation of institutionalized fora where civilian

and military leaders can discuss divergent national concerns, and an openness to building more comprehensive understandings of the nature of civil-military relations are essential elements for creating societies oriented toward democratic rule.

Given all of this, it is evident that the United States is not in a position, particularly with its emphasis on selective bilateral LIC policies, to help affect the changes necessary to achieve more balanced civil-military relations in the hemisphere. While there is universal recognition that a more apolitical military is desirable, U.S. nation-building and security assistance programs are generally designed to improve the capabilities of military organizations and tend to neglect offering similar programs to improve the capabilities of civilian institutions. Thus, in addition to U.S. efforts to inculcate democratic values to Latin American military personnel, it is equally important (or more so) to support the region's civilian institutions.

In an era of budgetary constraints and pressures, U.S. assistance to help improve civil-military relations remains questionable. However, a number of opportunities exist for the U.S. to continue to promote its goals of democracy through peaceful change by relatively inexpensive means. U.S. assistance to both military and civilian entities should encourage greater scholarship and training opportunities for Latin Americans in the

United States. Civilians could augment their skills through meetings with representatives of congressional oversight committees, watchdog agencies, and the press. Also, increased training of Latin American civilians regarding military affairs comparable to that offered to Latin American military officers would give those civilians greater ability to work with the military and break down perceptions of the "special relations" which exist between military organizations. And finally, the U.S. can exercise greater influence over Latin American militaries by emphasizing that decisions on military training and assistance for a particular force be shaped by its adherence to basic principles of human rights, as well as by strategic concerns. Overall, it is important that the U.S. recognize that many of the problems associated with the region's civil-military relations are systemic in nature and that bilateral U.S. LIC policies cannot be effective in producing an environment conducive to peaceful conflict resolution.

CONCLUSION: A REVISED HEMISPHERIC SECURITY ORDER

In analyzing U.S. security policies in Latin America, particularly in the context of the effectiveness of low-intensity conflict doctrine as applied in the region, it is evident that the U.S. must reexamine its approach to conflict resolution in the hemisphere. The current U.S. emphasis on bilateral LIC operations in selected countries based on U.S. political-ideological perspectives, coupled with the general decline in U.S. influence and the diversity of conflicts within the region, suggests that a conceptual reorientation of the hemisphere's security order is necessary. Fragmentation of security interests, changes in local defense structures over the past two decades, and increasingly diverse and independent security positions of Latin American countries in the international military arena indicate that the current inter-American security order is becoming irrelevant.¹ So too, the reemergence of traditional interstate rivalries also contribute to regional conflict. These conflictive elements thus inhibit the emergence of a security system able to contain the myriad of tensions and rivalries as well as integrate the states in the region.

¹Varas, *Hemispheric Security*, 57.

The current breakdown of the inter-American security system is the product of unequal expectations between Latin American states and the U.S. Shared security interests, as well as incentives for military cooperation, have been blocked due to the different nature of power projection by the United States and the Latin American countries. This diversity has impeded the organization of military linkages and has led to a wide variety of international and regional military postures within the hemisphere.

At its inception, the inter-American security system was based on strategic and professional military interests among all parties. However, over the past two decades political and ideological concerns have supplanted military ones.¹⁰⁷ From a military perspective, the strategic implications of an inter-American security system entailed cooperative ventures and basing rights on the part of the Latin American countries; it also implied obligations on the part of the United States to support a coordinated program of military modernization and economic development. However, the level of modernization expected by the Latin American militaries was never achieved. As indicated earlier, by the early 1960s, pan-American military relations

¹⁰⁷Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America* (Princeton, N.J., 1987), 310.

acquired a clear political orientation centered on the ideological indoctrination of military personnel leading to the incorporation by certain countries of national security doctrines. Accordingly, the character of inter-American security relations was progressively reoriented away from concern with hemispheric military security and toward internal political security. Thus, the shift in U.S.-Latin American military relations from an emphasis on the military aspects per se to an almost exclusively political interest frustrated the expectations of modernization held by the Latin Americans.¹⁰⁸ This led to each country's armed forces taking the responsibility to define and pursue their own individual military agendas, thus subverting attempts to unify the region's militaries into a single security order.

In retrospect, the inter-American security system has failed because it is used primarily as an instrument to achieve the security interests of the United States. The system has been increasingly separated from regional security interests and instead has generally been replaced by bilateral approaches to security issues based on political-ideological concerns. U.S. policy, especially in Central America, has been to use the conflicts there for demonstration purposes vis-a-vis the USSR.¹⁰⁹ As U.S. concern

¹⁰⁸Varas, *Hemispheric Security*, 51.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 52.

about regional instability became linked to political rather than strategic terms, the United States began to view Latin American military organizations as proxy forces responsible for containing undesirable social and political change in the area. The net effect of this policy has been not the alignment of Latin American armed forces with the United States, but an increase in the autonomous positioning of these forces in the international military arena. As a result, internationalization of local conflicts and the wider presence of extraregional military actors in the hemisphere have increased--precisely the opposite effect desired by the United States.¹¹⁰

As previously indicated, over the past few years the U.S. (and primarily USSOUTHCOM) reoriented its response to the region's security issues from military-oriented ones to those involving a more cooperative and less conflictive orientation. Nevertheless, the continued emphasis by the U.S. on bilateral approaches to conflict resolution, as well as the extension of such nonmilitary issues as the illicit drug trade and illegal migration into the strategic realm of military security policymaking, have caused further confusion among Latin American and U.S. military professionals, particularly regarding the extent to which military personnel may become further politicized. Consequently, the

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*

pursuit of bilateral military relations will not produce a stable hemispheric security order. Rather, it is necessary to develop common security interests and integrate these interests into a single, revised hemispheric security order based on professional military and strategic imperatives.

Because the U.S. presence in the region cannot be ignored, any regional security order must entail U.S. participation. In addition, any security order that attempts to incorporate every conceivable security issue is cumbersome and tends toward ineffectiveness. To overcome this obstacle, a number of specific security arrangements or regimes could be developed in the hemisphere based on the particular dimensions of security, such as aerial, naval, and territorial.¹¹¹ For example, under the territorial security regime, the various countries could produce a conflict control mechanism that would protect the continent from internal military confrontations and the hemisphere from the internationalization of these confrontations. The U.S. influence under this multilateral arrangement would be to emphasize a new professionalization process concentrating training as well as arms transfers around defensive doctrines and weapons. Similar regimes could be established for naval and air force elements. The advantage of these specific security regimes is that they

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 59-61.

engage the diversity of regional conflict on a more manageable level, thus allowing experts from a particular dimension of national defense to resolve service-specific issues on a more efficient and effective basis.

As in any reorientation process, difficulties will arise in formulating the procedures and conceptual basis for each of these security regimes. The need for regional cooperation, an area made more difficult due to the current trend toward nonalignment among Latin American states, will necessitate that each country renounce offensive military postures, increase the effectiveness of civilian political and economic institutions (institution-building), and ensure that force is not permitted to resolve political differences between states. Regarding bilateral U.S. LIC policies, a new hemispheric security system based on specific military regimes would make these policies less palatable. By subscribing to a revised hemispheric order, U.S. military influence in the region would be strengthened as the professionalization process went forward. Therefore, the United States must not withdraw from the area, but instead attempt to lead the region's military organizations back to their more traditional roles of external security and the maintenance of cross-border peace and stability. This increased level of U.S.-Latin American cooperation will contribute to a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous region.

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