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STUDY PROJECT

ARMY INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT: RECONSIDERING OUR OPTIONS

BY

GRACE M. PARKER, DAC

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ARMY INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT:
RECONSIDERING OUR OPTIONS .

An Individual Study Project

by

Grace M. Parker, DAC

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
15 March 1990

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty years, the U.S. Army has invested significant resources in internal and external studies and reviews to determine how to more efficiently and effectively manage its installations in the Continental United States (CONUS) and overseas. Evaluated below, these studies tended to reach a series of closely related conclusions, reflecting remarkable consistency in their perception of the source of problems in Army installation management and equal consistency in how best to cure those ills. These studies have been requested, in most cases, by installation management proponents, and have been presented to Army and DoD senior leadership. However, despite the fact that the Army itself repeatedly asked the question of how it might better manage its installations, and has heard familiar answers an equal number of times, it has generally not embraced the solutions offered, implementing only peripheral recommendations after long periods of reflection. Clearly, this pattern is inconsistent with the Army's predilection for action and demands an overall analysis

of these studies in the context of Army's corporate culture. The purpose of this paper, then, is to conduct that analysis, offer some possible explanations of the cultural incompatibility of past studies, and to present some ideas which may be more acceptable to the Army while achieving desired improvements in installation management.

WHAT IS INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT?

Tellingly enough, a review of the traditional sources--Army regulations, the Army Dictionary, the Army War College Text on Command and Management, previous studies and proponents' organization and functions manuals -- yield no definition of installation management. For the purposes of this analysis, the common delineation of activities considered to encompass base operations (BASOPs) includes: real property maintenance and repair; family and bachelor housing construction, maintenance and operations; general military construction; food service; transportation; supply operations; installation level contracting; non-tactical information management; resource management; physical security and law enforcement; publications; records management; utilities; fire protection; personnel management; and morale and welfare activities. Funding for base operations is found in

appropriations across the Army. For example, the May 1989 Program Budget Guidance (PBG) reflects base operations activities in Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA), Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Army Industrial Fund (AIF), Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) and Army Family Housing (AFH). In the Continental United States (CONUS) only, EASOPs activities employed 20,607 military personnel, 71,521 civilians, and cost over \$5.4 billion.¹ The magnitude of our personnel investment in base operations in CONUS and overseas is significant; the Army estimates that it employs approximately 143,000 military and civilian personnel in OMA-funded installation management activities alone.² While the accounting structure impedes construction of a true picture of the Army's cost for managing its installations it is evident that this area consumes a significant enough portion of the Army budget to warrant managerial attention. In fact, the size and expense of installation management has been the catalyst for virtually all of the formal and informal studies conducted by the Army over the past two decades.

ENDNOTES

1. Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment) Army Management Review: Base Operations, IPR 3, p. 14.

2. Ibid., p. 12.

CHAPTER II

WHAT HAVE THE STUDIES RECOMMENDED?

The entire body of studies conducted by the Army on how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of installation management has not been reconstructed here. Most quick-reaction studies, as well as those conducted by Major Army Commands (MACOM) are not collected centrally. However, the Office of the Comptroller of the Army (COA) and later, of the Director of Management (DM) have served as repositories of notable efforts to identify problems and solutions for base operations. These, plus past reviews performed by students at the Army Comptrollership Course at Syracuse University and at the Army War College are presented here for the purpose of comparing findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Readers familiar with these study efforts and with base operations issues in general are encouraged to only scan Chapter II and III. These chapters provide the foundation for conclusions and recommendations found in Chapters IV and V and will primarily be of interest to those less acquainted with Army garrison operations issues.

CONUS Installation Management Study, July 1969; conducted by Office, Comptroller of the Army.

The stated purpose of this study was "to develop guidance which will enable CONUS Class I Installation Commanders to accomplish effectively their primary mission, and still give proper attention and direction to the efficient and economical management of their industrial (post support) and community activities."¹ Certainly the most comprehensive of the early studies, this review provided a wide range of findings and recommendations in the areas of management doctrine and philosophy, organizational structure, and management procedures and control. Specifically, the study recommended installation management doctrine and philosophy be published as an Army regulation. Section III of the study provides a proposed statement of doctrine and philosophy roughly defining the scope of installation management as a two-part operation of industrial and community activities. Further definition states: ". . . industrial operations include the maintenance of real property, supply, maintenance and other logistic services. The management of community functions includes . . . dependent schools, service clubs, open messes and recreational activities."² The doctrinal statement is relatively limited in scope to an assertion that the installation commander must be

provided "usable resources" to include trained senior subordinates experienced in installation management. It further prescribes that he should have an organizational structure which enables him to devote appropriate time and attention to each assigned mission, efficient management of quotidian operations by "capable senior subordinates." Finally, this study concludes that the Army needs different standard structures for three types of installations depending on the support mission assigned. The primary differences related to the degree of integration of the tactical and garrison staffs.³

This study was the harbinger of recommendations on the need for doctrine, standardization of organizational structure, and training in installation management. The primary result of this study was the establishment, via AR5-3, of three distinct organizational structures for Class I installations.⁴ Standardization was directed down to and including principal staff level; below that, standardization was only by function.⁵ Firm implementation of this standardization plan was only accomplished 15 years later with the Standard Installation Organization (SIO) directed by a revised AR 5-3. Ironically, SIO is now being reviewed for rollback to the higher level of standardization (directorate) proposed in this 20 year-old study.

This study raised central questions which have recurred in later studies:

- 1) Should key positions be civilian or military?
- 2) Are installation management positions being filled by military personnel in terminal assignments? If so, has this resulted in degradation of efficiency?
- 3) Are civilian personnel grade structures adequate to obtain the quality and expertise desired?
- 4) What training opportunities exist in installation management for civilians and military?
- 5) Should there be a military installation management career field?⁶

Among the improvements toward which the study was directed was elimination of layering of higher headquarters' regulations, elimination of non-essential reports, and greater use of automatic data processing (ADP). It recommended that commanders place emphasis on economy of operations, installation master planning, work measurement and quantitative analysis, and watching over locally controllable costs such as transportation, temporary duty (TDY), and supplies.⁷ One cannot help but observe that many of these recommendations have only within the past five years been acted upon effectively through the Model Installation Program (MIP) and Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE).

Installation Management Alternatives, April, 1979,
conducted by Office, Director of Management, OCSA.

This study examined six alternatives for performing installation management. The alternatives reflect degrees of centralization ranging from consolidation of total installation control under one organization (HQDA, Corps of Engineers, Forces Command (FORSCOM) or Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)) to centralization under existing parent MACOM.

Specifically, the six alternatives evaluated were:

- 1) Total installation control under the Corps of Engineers.
- 2) Real Property Maintenance centralized under Corps of Engineers Districts and Divisions.
- 3) Installation Management Command as a MACOM under HQDA.
- 4) Installation Management under FORSCOM through the Continental U.S. Armies (CONUSA).
- 5) Installation Management under TRADOC.
- 6) Installation Management centralized under existing MACOM.

Given the rather exhaustive listing of advantages and disadvantages provided for each alternative, they are not discussed in detail here. However, there were salient pros and cons to centralization common to most alternatives which merit

inclusion in this overview for they illustrate a facet of the Army's dilemma over how to best manage its installations. In corporate fashion, they are:

Advantages:

1) Relieves local commanders of BASOPs responsibilities, permitting concentration on primary missions.

2) Standardizes BASOPs systems and procedures.

3) Facilitates regionalized contracting of BASOPs.

4) Provides installation stability during peace and mobilization.

5) Relieves other MACOM/agencies of BASOPs duties.

6) Allows greater specialization and career opportunities in the field of installation management.

Disadvantages:

1) Reduces local commander's flexibility and control.

2) Potentially less responsive to local commander's needs.

3) Requires restructuring of PPBES.

4) Establishes another stovepipe command.⁸

Alternatives were designed to be applied initially only to TRADOC and FORSCOM installations; AMC was generally excluded from consideration due to its "unique" mission. Smaller MACOM (HSC, MDW, etc.) were to be studied separately to determine the feasibility of their inclusion under any new organization.

None of the alternatives were adopted.

Army Command and Control Study, - 82 September 1979,
conducted by the Office, Chief of Staff, Army.

In a very similar effort to the Installation Management Alternatives Study, this study compared four alternative means of command and control of CONUS installations. Primary emphasis in this review, however, was to ensure ease of mobilization and wartime effectiveness while providing maximum peacetime efficiency. The four options reviewed were:

- 1) Installation Management Command (IMCOM) established as a separate MACOM.
- 2) Corps of Engineers assume command and control of TRADOC, FORSCOM, ACC (now ISC) and INSCOM installations.
- 3) HQ FORSCOM establish a separate staff section to provide command and control of TRADOC, INSCOM, ACC (ISC) and its own installations.
- 4) Status quo with minor modification to enhance mobilization capability.

Essentially, the description of advantages and disadvantages mirrored those described six months earlier in the Installation Management Alternatives study. This study did, however, begin to put a price tag on the concept of an IMCOM - approximately 250 personnel in addition to those

realigned from affected MACOM, plus one Lieutenant General, two Major Generals, and one Brigadier General. These alternatives also required new facilities adequate to house a new MACOM. So, as in previous studies, the most attractive advantage - that of eliminating competition for a commander's attention between day-to-day installation operations and his primary mission of training, readiness, and war planning - was outweighed by the reduction in his flexibility to balance resources between mission and support. At this time, this concern for resource balancing usually translated to a perception that commanders routinely stripped BASOPs resources to fund mission requirements.

Even the third option, that of giving command and control (C²) to FORSCOM, thus providing a peacetime structure requiring the least change during mobilization, had such significant disadvantages that it was not ultimately recommended. Concern over excessive span of control and that greater emphasis on mobilization could detract from combat readiness and deployment missions contributed to non-acceptance of this alternative.

The final, least turbulent option was accepted for implementation. It protected the key element of unity of command at the installation. Mobilization was enhanced by designation of key positions at each installation which could

be filled by mobilization designees (MOBDES) or retired military personnel.⁹ It is interesting to note that many of the studies conducted during this time also cite increased BASOPs contracting as a source of greater flexibility for commanders; this point of view would quite likely be debated by current installation commanders.

Base Operating Support Consolidation at DoD Level Study, August 1983, conducted by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics). Requested by the DEPSECDEF in a memo dated 1 Dec 82, the purpose of this study was simply to find ways to provide base operating services more efficiently. It compared only two alternatives: 1) the creation of a single Defense agency which would own and operate all installations or 2) retention of Service BASOPs responsibilities, but with greater efficiency.¹⁰

Although some of the advantages and disadvantages are the same as those now familiar from earlier studies, the OSD perspective provides a broader view of BASOPs as a business. Key advantages of centralized installation management by a single Defense agency were:

- 1) Provides trained, experienced professionals to manage installation support.

2) Facilitates inter-and intra-service support at closely located installations.

3) Permits a standardized and integrated management information system.

4) Provides stable management of installations during mobilization and war.

5) Allows commanders to focus on their primary mission. Predictably, the military Services expressed strong objections to giving up control of their installations to OSD. Responses asserted that:

1) Linkage between mission and BASOPs support is inseparable; cleavage of the two would degrade mission accomplishment.

2) Commander's flexibility to move people and money between mission and base operations would be lost.

3) Difficulty in identifying personnel in Service headquarters staff who are exclusively dedicated to installation management would yield small manpower savings.

4) Employees sense of loyalty/belonging to the primary mission of the installation would be lost.

5) Civilianization would be likely and would damage the rotation base and military personnel career development.

6) Excessive numbers of military personnel would be working for other than their parent Service.

7) Level and quality of support, and funding priorities would be a constant source of friction between the agency and supported mission commanders.

8) Service-unique requirements might not be met satisfactorily during mobilization and wartime.

In the face of such overwhelming objections, the study authors recommended against the creation of a single Defense agency to manage installations. Cited reasons were: 1) efficiency benefits of a Defense agency were uncertain; 2) transition to a Defense agency would cause turbulence for a decade; and, 3) a Defense agency might not be as effective as the current system during mobilization and wartime.¹¹ The study ultimately made very modest recommendations that the Services emphasize use of existing efficiency programs such as Defense Regional Interservice Support (DRIS), Commercial Activities, and Efficiency Reviews (Management studies of non-contractible functions).¹²

US Army Installation Management Study, Mar 88, conducted by the American Management System, Inc.

By far its most far reaching effort to discover solutions to persistent perceived installation management shortcomings was a study done for the Army under contract by American Management Systems, Inc. (AMS) Unlike most previous studies,

the AMS study extended to OCONUS installations and to all major Army commands. Its charter was to develop specific recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Army installation management. The contractor interviewed 250 installation managers and garrison commanders at 54 Army installations worldwide. Findings from the AMS study highlighted a wide range of deficiencies in management of our installations; for the sake of synopsis, they are grouped here into general categories of personnel and training; systems; doctrine and resources; and proponentcy.

Personnel and Training:

- a. There is insufficient professional preparation for installation managers (training or career development).
- b. Garrison commanders are trained to be operational (mission) commanders rather than "city managers."
- c. A City Manager is needed to run Army installations, but there is no equivalent position in the structure.
- d. Garrison commanders are not OPMS Command Board selectees.

Systems:

- a. Information systems are not well distributed among or within Garrisons.
- b. Acquisition process is over regulated.

c. Acquisition requirements are ill-defined.

d. The Army does not yet have a Standard Installation Organization.

e. Installation force development does not follow any comprehensive methodology.

f. Services provided by installations are not well integrated.

Doctrine and Resources

a. There is no common doctrine to guide resource distribution.

b. Installation management receives little attention in HQDA resource decision making.

c. Managers do not have sufficient flexibility in executing their budget.

d. Capital assets are not accounted for properly.

Proponency

a. There is no single proponent for installation management at HQDA, MACOM, or installations.¹³

A summary of the most notable recommendations follows:

a. Select Garrison Commanders by DA Command Selection Board or centralized selection board. This recommendation was designed to correct the perception that garrison commanders are "retirement-bound" colonels selected based on availability

rather than qualifications. It was also directed toward providing the prestige of true command designation to a position of great complexity. To date, no action has been taken on this recommendation; however, one MACOM, USAREUR, has initiated certain actions which will have a similar effect. USAREUR is in the process of identifying key military positions in its communities and transferring them from Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) to a Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) structure.¹⁴ Communities would become Base Support Groups (BSG) reflecting their wartime roles; BSG commanders would be selected by HQDA Command Boards.

b. Develop a prototype for a civilian garrison city manager and improve training and attendance at installation management courses. Derived from study findings that 39% of garrison commanders overall (49% in USAREUR) found installation management an unappealing assignment, the study proposed that installation management would be improved if it were performed by professionally trained civilians for whom these assignments became sought-after career objectives. Training at the three-week Army Installation Management Course (AIMC) at Ft. Lee, VA, the core course in this area, did not compare favorably with the emphasis the Army places on training tactical commanders both through formal command courses and by successive

assignments as company, battalion and brigade commanders. Civilianization of most military positions at the installation level has left few opportunities for on-the-job training (OJT), the sine qua non of successful performance at all levels.¹⁵

The civilian garrison manager concept is receiving continuing attention by HQDA DCSPER which has done extensive work to create a viable position description and classification standards. During its fact finding visits to installations which had created civilian garrison manager positions, DCSPER found that these personnel were seldom "true deputies" to the Installation Commanders, largely because of their ineligibility to perform Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) duties, and because they were seldom allowed to rate military staff directors. Another finding was that retired military personnel were frequently selected for these positions;¹⁶ this seems inconsistent given that military personnel's lack of training and experience was a main catalyst for civilianization. This concept will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter V of this paper.

Expansion of formal training opportunities for military personnel has met with resistance due to cost. DCSPER

analysis indicates that if all newly-assigned installation directors and special staff (providing the trained, competent subordinate senior staff objective stated in the earliest studies) were to attend the three week AIMC, costs would increase over \$4.6M per year. Further, DCSPER advises that Ft. Lee could only accommodate approximately 27% of the student load generated by such a policy.¹⁷ It should be noted here that lack of preparation for garrison command was a major complaint voiced by those who assumed these positions - an issue that pervades all studies. Partly to fill this void, and to teach OCONUS - unique subjects such as local national personnel policy, USAREUR supplements AIMC training with a one-week deputy community commander (DCC) course, mandatory for incoming DCC. The course is also open to sub-community commanders, community staff officers, and community sergeants major.¹⁸

3. Develop clear installation management policies and philosophy incorporating maximum authority and flexibility. Further, develop doctrine for peace-war-peace installation roles.

This recommendation recognizes that AR 5-3, Installation Management and Organization, does not provide policy, doctrine, or wartime roles for installations. TRADOC was tasked to

develop installation management doctrine; however, funding constraints prevented this from being accomplished. Notwithstanding the lack of doctrine, the Army has promoted programs which support the principles of flexibility and authority for commanders. Army Ideas for Excellence Program (formerly Model Installation Program and Army Suggestion Program) approved over 10,000 individual initiatives to improve Army management. Not all of these related solely to improving installations; however, this program does provide a viable means of challenging regulations and practices which commanders and their workforce find impediments to efficient and effective management throughout the Army.

d. Designate HQDA and MACOM proponents for installation management.

The complexity of community management and the competition for resources make an integrator and a "champion" necessary. An important role of this proponent would be to articulate needs and to defend resources for base operations. Under the traditional panel system associated with the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development, nine panels were assigned vertical slices of the Army program (e.g. equipping, manning, training). Seven of these nine panels had part of the base

operations resources. As resources became constrained, the loyalty of these panels tended to migrate away from installation support to their primary mission areas, resulting often in all panels cutting base operations with a cumulative effect that installations lost much of even their core resources. Garrison commanders then were forced to reverse the process, transferring resources from mission to BASOPs accounts, reprogrammings which ultimately became so massive that they required reprogramming authority from Congress. In FY87, the Army reprogrammed (from mission to BASOPs) \$256M and in FY88 \$204 million reflecting a serious disconnect between planning and reality. For the FY90 POM, the panels have been realigned along appropriation lines providing for the first time a BASOPs panel (now called Program Evaluation Groups (PEGS)) with the Director of Management as BASOPs proponent.¹⁹

Association of this large number of initiatives with the recommendations of the AMS study cannot properly lead to the conclusion that these actions were taken solely as a result of this study. Many of the initiatives were already underway at the time of the study and were incorporated due to their compatibility with the study objectives. It is indeed difficult to discern exactly how much influence this study had on the eventual changes; it may fairly be said, however, that

the comprehensiveness of the AMS study and the levels of personnel who participated elevated Army awareness of shortcomings in installation management.

Another FY88 study also received the very highest levels of attention in the Army:

DoD Review of Unified and Specified Command Headquarters
(commonly known as the Vander Schaaf Report), Feb 88.

By direction of Congress, this study was conducted by OSD, specifically by the DoD Inspector General. With a decidedly different orientation from previous studies, the Vander Schaaf study examined layering and duplication in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified command headquarters, their support activities and component commands.

Vander Schaaf relied heavily on the principles of Installation Management as published in DoD Directive 4001.1, which states in part:

"The Commanding Officer of an installation is responsible for accomplishing the mission . . . and should be delegated broad authority . . . Regulations that limit installation commanders' freedom to do their jobs are contrary to the basic DoD installation management policy, and shall be cancelled or revised. Exceptions should be rare."²⁰

Vander Schaaf found excessive involvement in base operations policy and oversight at the Unified and Service component command headquarters. For example, in USAREUR, it found little justification for the BASOPs staff at Corps level. Service attempts to justify retention of these staffs were not successful and these manpower spaces were withdrawn from base operations activities (1,123 for the Army).²¹ Generally, however, the proposed elimination of duplication and layering did not occur; given the latitude to take the reductions however they chose, spaces were generated by either "salami slices" or functional cuts.

Army academia expressed interest in installation management at about the same time the rest of the Army was engaging in this exhaustive introspection. With relatively fewer constraints on their reviews, students at both the Army Comptrollership Course (ACC) (a 14 month advanced program) at Syracuse University and a team of students at the Army War College observed not only what was happening but were able to hypothesize as to the causes.

A Primer on Installation Management, was published in August 1988 by the Syracuse ACC Class XXXVI. This study states as its intent to "provide the reader with a general knowledge of installation management within CONUS."²² Although it does

remain largely faithful to that plan during its review of ten Army installations and the associated installation management philosophy of their four MACOM HQ (FORSCOM, TRADOC, AMC and HSC), the primer does make a number of observations which illustrate findings documented in previous studies. For example, regarding the need for training in how to manage Army "cities", the Primer found that:

"The Army does little to attract well-qualified officers to the position of garrison commanders. The Army's "best" officers are groomed for command positions with maneuver units, not garrisons. City managers follow a career development path of increasing responsibility as they progress from smaller towns to larger cities. City management is a profession; garrison management is not."²³

Clearly the Primer as well as other Army studies envision that should a civilian be placed in a leadership position at Army installations, that individual must possess specific professional qualifications. Continuity provided by civilians is only one of the desired improvements; professional preparation would be a prerequisite:

"The use of a positive education requirement, such as an MPA (Masters of Public Administration), coupled with the requirement to pursue professional certification, will enhance the Army's development of installation management as a professional career."²⁴

Other observations of this Syracuse class also support previous study findings regarding BASOPs funding difficulties:

"In the BASOPs area, the biggest problem appears to be the perception that there is a lack of understanding at the MACOM and DA level of the readiness implications of cutting BASOPs. Since it is difficult to quantify or explain the relationship between BASOPs and readiness, BASOPs has taken disproportionate cuts in funding."²⁵

Garrison Commanders - In Search of Excellence

Finally, a study conducted by four students in the class of 1987 at the Army War College yields a number of perceptions regarding how well the Army manages its installations. Structured along the same organization as the best selling book In Search of Excellence, this study evaluated high and low performing Army installations - albeit without identifying how these distinctions were derived. The now-common theme of training for garrison command received early attention in this study:

". . . [the] fundamental issue is the selection and training of senior military personnel to assume positions of leadership at the directorate or garrison level. Every garrison commander interviewed stated he did not feel adequately prepared to assume his duties . . . [O]ther than the Installation Management Course at Ft. Lee . . . the Battalion and Brigade pre-Command Course (PCC) at Ft. Leavenworth has recently

added some instruction on the subject . . .
[T]here are not, however, very many garrison
commanders, especially in CONUS, who have
commanded at the Brigade level."²⁶

The authors observe that the lack of formal training is exacerbated by the fact that there are few military positions remaining in BASOPs TDAS. These positions previously served as training ground for junior officers so that they could gain experience prior to assuming larger responsibilities for directorates or entire garrisons:

"The most successful officers were those who had prior experience working in the BASOPs arena. The Army does a great job of preparing officers to command divisions through successive assignments as company battalion and brigade commanders. Unfortunately, a parallel structure does not exist in the installation management business. Interviewees felt that 'growing our own' was the best way to develop competent leaders and managers in installation management."²⁷

Beyond the lack of formal training or OJT afforded our garrison commanders, the study found that the very quality of the officers assigned was often questioned. They were characterized as "retirement-bound Colonels" at the end of their careers- "second-class citizens." The people interviewed (120 Army personnel of all ranks and from all levels from OSD to installation) did "not believe . . . that an installation staff job background is conducive to promotion or command selection."²⁸

Stovepipe organizations outside a garrison commander's control (e.g. Army-Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), DoD Dependent Schools (DODDS), and Information Systems Command (ISC)) were cited as major sources of frustration and complexity for garrison commanders. These organizations have substantial impact on how well the installation functions and how well the garrison customers are served, yet there is little effective means to set their priorities or enhance service. Stovepipes are one more limitation to commanders' flexibility.²⁹ The AWC study recommends elimination of stovepipes where possible, and that those not eliminated be required to report to the Garrison Commander.

To improve the quality and the prestige of installation management assignments, the study recommends retention of positions for junior officers at sub-directorate level to permit gaining of experience for later assignments. They further recommended that garrison commanders positions be designated as command positions and be filled through the current OPMS command selection board process.³⁰ As in the Vander Schaaf study, this review found the layers of base operations staff in USAREUR to be particularly unproductive. This study consistently applauded the Model Installation Program for its effect of reducing over-regulation and

providing a way of delegating authority to the operating level.

ENDNOTES

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4. JoAnn Vogel, Army Installation Management, p. 2.

5. CONUS Installation Management Study, p. 15.

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24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 20.

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CHAPTER III

WHAT CHANGES HAS THE ARMY MADE?

This substantial body of investigation and introspection has given the Army a relatively consistent picture of its principal weaknesses in installation management and a set of solutions for use in correcting these weaknesses. What has the Army done to institute needed improvements and why has it chosen not to act on other recommendations? The remainder of this chapter addresses both areas of progress and possible reasons for inaction.

Standard Installation Organization

One of the earliest, most concrete, but least popular improvements to Army installation management was the imposition of the Standard Installation Organization (SIO) on our garrison structure. Prior to SIO, the Army had adopted a number of possible templates, depending on the installation's primary missions; these structures, however, were largely advisory. No installation commander felt compelled to design his organization to match any of the published models. The SIO, however, was decided upon at the highest levels of Army leadership; MACOM commanders were consulted and their support

for the concept was believed to be firm. Therefore, the SIO was ultimately presented for mandatory implementation Army-wide. The shock of being forced to organize the TDA garrison along a single, relatively inflexible model was compounded by the initial disinclination of the DA staff to grant exceptions. As the field began to accept the inevitability of SIO, or to ignore it where it was intolerable, the concept gained support. Now, approximately five years after the early throes of implementation, there is a more measured view which questions whether the level of installation standardization needs to be imposed as low as it is (staff division level) or whether directorate level standardization would not achieve the intended benefits without involving an entire bureaucratic process of requesting, considering and granting exceptions. Granting a commander this flexibility, as well as that of deciding when he needs to place special emphasis on programs by having them report directly to the command group, has been and continues to be a central dichotomy for the SIO. As one past CINCUSAREUR put it "How can I support SIO and the OSD Principles of Excellent Installations which challenge me to "discourage conformity, uniformity, and centralization for they stifle innovation?"' This philosophical divergence between

the Army's purported policy of decentralization and flexibility and this denial of flexibility in the firm imposition of a structure which could only be altered with HQDA approval (except for some standard options) has kept this issue contentious since SIO's inception.

Support for SIO has come from general acceptance of the idea that it made moving among installations easier for our soldiers and their families as they could anticipate certain services being offered by the same organization no matter to which installation they were assigned. This predictability is also accepted as a significant improvement to our mobilization capability. Greater efficiency and effectiveness were to be achieved also through SIO for it was created under those guiding principles rather than by adapting a structure already in place with its inherent inefficiencies. The SIO became, then, an important, firm step toward improving installation management.

Model Installation Program

At about the same time as it embarked on SIO implementation, the Army selected several Model Installations to serve as test beds for how installations could operate when relieved of most constraining regulations. Commanders of these Model Installations were given much greater flexibility to try

radically new ways of managing. Higher headquarters were very cooperative in delegating authority due to the revolutionary system governing MIP which would not allow denials without the express consent of the highest authorities at that level (installation, sub-MACOM, or MACOM). Proponents of restraining regulations virtually had to "fall on their sword" to deny an installation commander the relief or authority he requested. Even when headquarters staff could make a plausible argument that the new procedure had serious drawbacks, they could seldom prove that it was too risky to allow a test of the concept, thus proving or disproving their predictions of disaster.

Besides the actual regulatory changes it caused, the MIP did something far more fundamental to the Army. It changed the mindset at installations from one of resignation with over-regulation to one where people with a good idea would step forward and challenge the status quo - for they now had a real chance of winning. It exposed those who had grown complacent and accustomed to excusing poor management with "the regulation requires. . ." Regulations were challenged daily, uncovering the amount of control which had been imposed on our installations over the years. Higher headquarters became much more cautious about publishing new restraining policies for they knew they would be immediately challenged.

Army Suggestion Program

The similarities between the intent of the MIP and the Army Suggestion Program (ASP) prompted their merger in FY87 with ASP proponency transferred from civilian personnel to resource management channels at all levels throughout the Army (although implementation of the DoD Reorganization Act caused the programs to be managed at HQDA by the Director of Management, OCSA rather than by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management)). The Army then went through a difficult, good faith effort to properly and fairly consider a tremendous backlog of ideas which had been given little attention under the pre-MIP mindset. Pushing this backlog through the system, while also expanding the MIP to all Army installations put a severe strain on the process; however, the worst of that is over now and the Army has emerged with a continuing commitment to "power down."

The impact of the Model Installation Program cannot be overstated; it altered the very fabric of the decision making and managerial process. One of the reasons the MIP/ASP (now called Army Ideas for Excellence) is so important and so successful is because it brought our actual practices into harmony with our declaratory policies, i.e. commander's prerogatives for maximum flexibility and decentralization of

authority. Commanders could and did embrace this at all levels for it embodied the way things were supposed to be.

Civilian personnel administration and resource management were high among the areas that commanders felt most constraining and least responsive. Both, therefore, received focused attention under MIP; this may have been a catalyst to the decision of senior officials in both areas to look at some radical structural changes in the way these functions could be managed at installation level.

Unified Budget Test

Far-reaching initiatives providing greater installation-level flexibility in resource management are in progress. Primary among these are the Unified Budget Test and the Managing Civilian Workforce to Budget Test. The Unified Budget, which removes many of the preset compartments from the installation budget, gives commanders much greater latitude to move money to satisfy true priorities rather than being forced to spend it within its own category regardless of relative priority. The OSD report on results of the Unified Budget Test stated that merely having greater flexibility in how to spend their allocated resources gave installation commanders the equivalent of an extra 3% buying power.²

Managing the Civilian Workforce to Budget

Another initiative, Managing the Civilian Workforce to Budget (MCB) is being tested in FY90 at 60 CONUS Army installations, including all TRADOC installations. According to a joint DCSPER-ASA (FM) memorandum, 19 Sep 89,

"MCB involves delegation of authority, responsibility, and accountability for civilian budget execution and position classification to the lowest practical level of management...[it] is part of a broad effort by the Army leadership to provide commanders greater flexibility to manage their financial resources. This is particularly critical in light of declining dollar resources. In addition, MCB provides the foundation of fiscal responsibility essential to the success of initiatives to make the civilian personnel system more responsive to commanders, managers, supervisors and employees. . . MCB represents a pioneering effort to decentralize authority and control within the Department of the Army. This is in direct response to requests by commanders for greater management flexibility. . ."

If this FY90 test proves successful, MCB will be permanently implemented at all CONUS locations beginning FY91.

These initiatives represent real improvements in granting commanders the flexibility and authority found to be so lacking by past studies. The Army leadership will have to place continuing emphasis on ensuring that the intended beneficiaries actually reap the rewards of these efforts and that

natural bureaucracy does not shortstop delegation of authority at intermediate (MACOM or sub-MACOM) levels. As important as resource management and civilian personnel management are, they only represent a portion of an installation commander's broad responsibilities; logistics, safety, law enforcement, procurement, information management, and community activities also require aggressive deregulation.

Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs)

In recognition of the impact that mission panels were having on base operations, HQDA queried the MACOMs regarding their support for a single proponent for BASOPs. The support was there. "Although DM is the DA proponent for BASOPs, the resourcing is fragmented across several ARSTAF activities and as many panels. The result is imbalanced BASOPs resourcing and multiple decision authorities. A senior integrator with BASOPs oversight and funding responsibility will ensure a strong voice and a means to swift resolution of major issues."⁴

The FY90 PPBES process will see the BASOPs PEG for the first time. Consolidation of BASOPs issues into a single group should largely eliminate the damaging effect of the mission area panels each cutting BASOPs to protect their primary functions. New rules governing the PEGs are also designed to give field commanders resources where they say they need them

rather than where powerful HQDA proponents place them. The PEGs this year may only rule on whether MACOM Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) follow programming guidance; their ability to change priorities is very limited. The need for this new system was clearly indicated by the extensive reprogramming done by installation commanders in the budget execution year, further validating of the widespread perception that "BASOPs is broken." Although the BASOPs PEG certainly does not have responsibility for all BASOPs resources as described at the beginning of this paper, this restructuring is an important first step toward recognizing the need for active support of BASOPs resources.

Civilian Personnel Modernization Project

Even more than the resource management area, civilian personnel management has frustrated local commanders' attempts to make it responsive by cloaking itself in a seemingly impregnable mantle of Federal Statutes, union agreements and volumes of regulations. Even the most determined and strong willed commanders often threw up their hands when dealing with the Civilian Personnel Office (CPO). In 1985, the Army Inspector General (IG) confirmed that the Civilian Personnel system needed to be revamped to better support the Army mission; this ultimately launched the Civilian Personnel

Modernization Project. A multi-faceted project, two key provisions are well underway now: delegation of classification authority to installation commanders; and, creation of a professional development plan to guide formal training and assignments for civilian personnel in a fashion similar to that employed for military personnel. Transfer of classification authority out of the civilian personnel stovepipe over to commanders was an enormous psychological transfer of power. Although it is still too early to evaluate trends resulting from this increased flexibility, it is unlikely that the worst fears of personnelists - massive, unjustified higher grades - will materialize. This new authority, coupled with the MCB, approximates the latitude that department heads of corporations have always found essential to responsive management. The alignment of authority and responsibility is more likely to result in judicious decisions as the incentive to "beat the system" is removed.

Creation of the Army Civilian Training and Education Development System (ACTEDS) provides an orderly plan for progressive and sequential growth throughout a civilian's career. In terms of improved installation management, it clearly supports a commander's need for a well-trained, competent senior staff. Replacing a rather ad-hoc training system under which employees attempted to identify what

training or assignments they needed or wanted - and then worked to persuade their supervisors to approve - ACTEDS should lend some structure, predictability and relevance to the professional development of civilians (who now constitute the vast majority of the installation level workforce).

Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE)

An outgrowth of the Model Installation Program, its Graduate Program, and OSD's constant celebration of the excellence of Air Force bases, the Army Chief of Staff directed the creation and implementation of a program to substantially change the Army's mindset about the quality of facilities and services on Army installations. It pushed out to Army posts world-wide a concept piloted at TRADOC several years before which called for the setting of standards for customer service and for interior and exterior design of facilities. As in any effort of this scope, ACOE has taken several years to become a real part of the Army's operating ethos. Moving from the Army's mindset to that of the Air Force would prove to be a real journey. An on-going TRADOC study comparing Army and Air Force means of providing base operations support finds this difference:

"Air Force Leaders -- Accomplish the air command mission with aircraft that must be properly maintained by airmen. . . installations and facilities are our fighting platform and form the foundation of our warfighting readiness. . . therefore... we demand excellence... we fight any hint of satisfaction with imperfection. . . our people deserve to live and work in places that are as excellent as the work we expect from them."

"Army Leaders -- Accomplish the ground combat mission 'in the mud' under the toughest circumstances. . . we are proud of our heritage of toughness, austerity, endurance and courage. . . in spartan-like conditions. . . installations and facilities are temporary places at which we train, and are not directly linked to our warfighting readiness. . . Therefore. . . the minimum essential will do . . . we don't need fancy barracks or well-equipped maintenance facilities. . . we care for our people by ensuring they are properly trained to accomplish the warfighting mission and stay alive on the battlefield."⁵

Under ACOE, standards for facilities and overall installation design guides were quickly adopted as they were familiar concepts in the engineering community. Unfortunately, the extent of investment needed to bring the corporate Army physical plant up to standards which could be characterized as "excellent" met immediately with the reality of dramatically declining budgets, particularly in the base operations area. Declining budgets have decidedly slowed the pace of renovation of our installations; however, we still are spending over three

billion dollars per year in real property maintenance and repair which, now that we have design guides, is likely to lead more steadily to an overall notable improvement in our facilities.

Improvement of services has taken a longer time to get underway as the development of good standards was found a difficult task at all levels of the Army. Inspired, however, by the fact that services could be improved with very little cost, and would also have a dramatic impact on satisfaction of Army workers and families, the Army has recently placed much greater emphasis on providing excellent services. ACOE, like MIP, attacked long standing, deeply imbedded problems in installation management. It certainly must be celebrated for promoting change in corporate culture to advance the idea that a desire for excellence in base support was not somehow "un-Army."

These programs and projects are a few of the most visible and systematic improvements the Army has made in installation management in the last five years. They are important changes and reflect a willingness on the part of the Army to become more efficient, to give local commanders greater authority and flexibility, and to take better care of their soldiers, civilians and families.

BUT MUCH IS LEFT UNDONE

Why then, has the Army not implemented more of the long list of recommendations presented in the studies it requested? Why has it not, for example,

- Provided more & better training for garrison commanders?
- Recognized garrison command as true command position and centrally selected garrison commanders?
- Protected base operations resources as it does major weapon systems?
- Embraced the concept of the civilian city manager?
- Published comprehensive installation management doctrine?
- Instituted a military installation management career field?
- Centralized installation management under a single agency or MACOM?

ENDNOTES

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3. Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management), Army-wide Implementation of Managing the Civilian Workforce to Budget (MCB), pp. 1-2.

4. HQ US Army Training and Doctrine Command, BASOPs Alternatives - Defense Management Review (NSR-11), p. 1.

5. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Installation Management Review and Redesign, pp. 12-13.

CHAPTER IV

WHAT IS HOLDING THE ARMY BACK?

Not Mission Essential

I submit that the reasons why the Army has not implemented these recurring recommendations is that they are contrary to Army culture. First, they divert resources from the principal Army mission of warfighting; garrison command (or management) is not combat, combat support, or combat service support. A garrison is not deployable and therefore is not central to our mission. Because installations are not part of the Army go-to-war force (unlike those of the Air Force) they are not seen as a unit to be "commanded" nor for which significant training should be necessary. Under this general principle, neither should we protect BASOPs resources with the same ardor as we do our weapons. Doctrine development, too, has been reserved for our mission side; there is continuing controversy over whether we need doctrine for an activity we have been conducting for 200 years without it. In my conclusions and recommendations I will further address installation doctrine.

Civilian/Military Distinctions

The civilian/military issue needs to be recognized. There is an unspoken, but pervasive mistrust of the responsiveness of civilians to the needs of mission commanders. For this reason, there is great reluctance to introduce a civilian layer in the garrison chain of responsibility. Even in those places where civilian garrison managers have been employed, their authority has been undermined by circumventing them in the military rating chain. The validity of these perceptions is not the issue; one can find defenders of civilian responsiveness and dedication in most areas of the Army. However, the widespread frustration that exists with 1) the inability to "command" civilians, 2) the comparatively narrow scope of expertise characteristic of civilian personnel development, and 3) the general lack of leadership training are prime impediments to the introduction of the civilian "city manager" concept. Solutions to this issue are explored below.

Stovepipes Counterproductive

Finally, the idea of a centralized installation management agency defies the principle of unity of command. Many of the studies outlined in Chapter 1 described commanders' frustration with formal and informal 'stovepipes' which are more responsive to their vertical functional chain than to the horizontal

requirements of the installation supported. An installation management command represents the supreme stovepipe, multiplying exponentially the worst attributes of our current functional commands. Resistance to this concept is not surprising.

These are, I believe, the real reasons why carefully developed, consistent recommendations for improvement have not been implemented. Other technical, "acceptable" reasons have been offered for each of these; however, Army cultural incompatibility may well be the more accurate answer.

Whatever the reasons for past non-adoption of studies' recommendations, there is now a window of opportunity to achieve the objective of improved installation management while conforming more closely with traditional Army values. During any period of great change, the status quo is temporarily open to critical review and, therefore, new initiatives have an improved chance for favorable consideration. Offered here are some new ideas and approaches to some long-standing installation management problems.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS

Increase Military in Base Operations.

The Army has led the way in DoD in civilianizing its base operations to the point where we now have approximately an 80% civilian workforce. In contrast, the Air Force (whose base operations are praised from Congress to airmen) employ only one-half that percentage; the Prime Beef concept has kept base operations a predominantly 'blue suit' profession. Would the Army have anything to gain by reversing the trend of civilianization at our installations? The answer to that, I believe, is "yes", and more so now than any point in the past ten years. The advantages are many, particularly in the areas of mobilization, training and preservation of force strength.

Mobilization

If the Army places more military personnel in base operations, especially in supply, maintenance, transportation, communications, and food service, it will simultaneously improve its mobilization capability by placing in the active component a level of CS and CSS which could enhance support to limited/contingency military operations (e.g. Panama, Grenada).

The personnel shift would not be so dramatic as to undermine the need for the reserve component support for major operations, but it would provide the Army greater flexibility in quickly deploying and sustaining all the forces needed for the likely scenarios of limited objective operations.

Training

Further, in peacetime, a "greening" of base operations provides training and experience for future garrison commanders. Our trend of continual reduction of military personnel in BASOPs has denied our junior officers this training, a deficiency which later results in garrison commanders unprepared for their complex missions. An ancillary benefit is that this training and experience are not derived from exercises which provide only training, but that they concurrently contribute real benefit to the Army in peacetime. Training which simultaneously provides needed services benefits all parties and must become one of our training strategies as resources decline.

Force Strength

As we build a smaller Army, there is concern that it remain balanced, robust, and capable of rapid growth if the threat warrants. Movement to a more military BASOPs structure supports these objectives. It provides more spaces for

a "warm base" of cadre personnel who would otherwise have to be eliminated from the force. This concept contributes to reversibility (growth) and more rapid deployability should we need to increase our force structure quickly. Thus, we would improve our warfighting capability and our base operations simultaneously while containing costs. This solution also responds to customers' and commanders' desire for greater responsiveness in that the garrison staff could be "commanded" to meet changing priorities.

Objections to Military BASOPs

What are the objections to reversing the Army's trend to greater civilianization of BASOPs? First, remilitarization is contrary to Defense Guidance which directs ever-greater civilianization. Over time, this guidance has unfortunately acquired the power of the status quo and has not been critically examined in the light of vastly changing Army needs. When the Army was growing, civilianization made sense as a means of freeing scarce military spaces for new warfighting units. We had the resources to keep the military in the units and backfill their vacancies at installations with civilian personnel. If we continue unquestioningly on this path while we draw down, the result will be a relatively small military

component and a disproportionately large civilian component, which brings into question how that structure is designed to perform the Army's mission.

The second objection is that military personnel are more expensive on a per capita basis than are civilians. How can we justify using a larger percentage of more expensive personnel when our budgets are being cut? Justification must come from the recognition that we must preserve our ability to perform our warfighting mission - a mission performed by military personnel. Preservation of that ability, therefore, demands protection of a disproportionately large element of military personnel who can in peacetime train through base operations and deploy in wartime. We can no longer afford the luxury of a single use force which only trains in peacetime, not contributing to the Army's daily support. Much in the same fashion that industry and the civilian component of the Army have recognized the need for multi-skilled employees, the Army should adapt the concept toward building a more flexible, military force which simultaneously trains and provides services. This concept vitiates the comparative costs of military and civilian personnel by converting some training costs (including the availability factor) into production. If we cannot afford to both have civilians providing installation services and military training in schools and exercises to

provide similar services, we must opt in favor of the more operationally and economically advantageous integration of military into BASOPs.

The third primary objection would come from both the reserve and civilian components which would perceive the importance of their roles being diminished while that of the active military component grows. This objection, too, must be managed as the reserve and civilian components build down their strength and structure. In the case of the reserves, the concept which placed the majority of the CS and CSS in the RC was basically designed to support a large scale war in Europe--a scenario which most of the Army now believes not to be our most likely operation. While we must continue to rely on the RC for support in full scale wars, there is a growing recognition that the active component needs the flexibility of "wholeness" for successful execution of limited operations without need to activate the mobilization mechanism with its attendant political ramifications. Given that these AC personnel would only be sufficient to satisfy the limited operations scenario, their actual impact on the RC mission would also be limited.

By far the greatest impact of this change of direction would be felt by the civilian component. Not only would their

overall numbers decline along with the AC and RC, but the shrinking would be exacerbated by conversion of many key positions to military incumbency. There is no easy answer to this objection, for these positions are coveted at the installation level and in many cases have been civilianized only recently. In this case, the Army may only be able to offer retraining and relocation to assuage the negative effects on civilians and will simply have to be willing to withstand the opposition for the sake of greater mission capability. Army force developers should conduct a full assessment of which positions should be reserved for civilians (for example, those which require predominantly business skills, or those for which there is no corresponding military role) and which are needed for military training and readiness. The process of retraining and relocating, taking full advantage of vacancies caused by attrition and the many hire freezes to be experienced over the next few years can then begin. The final mix may vary based on the installation's mission, but there should be overall consistency across the Army in the philosophy and techniques for restructuring the BASOPs force.

Military Training and Education in Base Operations

The studies reviewed in this monograph decried the lack of training provided to our garrison commanders. The Army

Installation Management Course (AIMC), even for those fortunate enough to attend it, is not able (in just three weeks) to prepare officers for duties comparable in complexity to brigade command. What are some possible solutions? One which has been offered most frequently is to employ civilians as city managers; this concept will be discussed below in greater detail. The other alternative is to better train military for garrison command. My earlier discussion of the training benefits of "greening" the BASOPs force also apply here. Not only would military be training for possible deployment, they would also be obtaining valuable experience needed for future assignments as garrison commanders. A possible and, I believe, logical extension of this would be the development of an installation management career path for military personnel. This would acknowledge the changing nature of Army installations as places which should provide high quality services at a competitive cost. In the same fashion in which the Army has recognized that the acquisition field is both complex and important to the Army - important enough to create sophisticated military business managers - there is cause to consider installation management in a similar light. There are certain military specialties now which employ many of the

critical skills and require the appropriate type of education that would directly contribute to well prepared garrison commanders. Although there almost certainly others, engineer and finance officers already possess excellent foundations for duty as garrison commanders. These officers could be developed in a secondary specialty of garrison operations, with alternating assignments preparing them for command in either (or both) fields. Why would an officer elect such a path? Again citing the newly developed acquisition career field as an example, this career field offers a broad range of responsibilities, complexity, challenge, and, not insignificantly, a highly marketable private sector skill. Just as many young officers with business backgrounds are attracted to acquisition, they may well find city management a viable career. This career, must, however offer good advancement potential if it is to attract quality officers. By extension, this means that either the requirement to have successive command assignments for promotion must be altered, or garrison assignments must be viewed in the same light as commands at company and field grade level. Undoubtedly this requires some "new thinking" in what command is and does. However, if the complexity of garrison positions is fairly evaluated, and if more military personnel are in BASOPs, this new perspective is feasible.

Recognizing garrison management positions as command assignments has many benefits. First, it will attract motivated officers who previously have eschewed garrison positions for they provided none of the needed gates for advancement. Secondly, it will ameliorate the loss of command positions which the shrinking Army is experiencing. Thirdly, it properly recognizes that the technological revolution has affected not just our tactical systems, but that our posts also need top quality leaders to manage accelerating change. We cannot continue to treat garrison officers as second-class citizens if we want excellence in community facilities and services; they must be better integrated into the mainstream of the Army.

Civilian Garrison Managers

Most of the studies conducted by and for the Army have recommended the creation of a new civilian position to become Army city managers. ODCSPER has done much toward this end; in fact, several of these positions have already been created and filled. My analysis and recommendations regarding a move toward a greater proportion of military personnel in BASOPs again leads one to find this concept inappropriate for our current situation. There are several fundamental flaws in the concept which the Army should recognize as it restructures.

First, the city or garrison manager position is designed to solve the problem of the ill-prepared military garrison commander by giving him/her a professional city manager to take care of garrison operations. This position was most often a deputy to the colonel who is dual-hatted as chief of staff/garrison commander. Ironically, however, nearly all the positions filled to date are occupied by retired military personnel - the very people deemed ill-prepared while they were on active duty. Apparently the need for the garrison manager to understand Army systems, functions, and missions has been determined by selecting officials to be more critical than professional preparation in city management. Therefore, the primary objective of the positions is not being realized.

A second objection to this position is that the civilian incumbent is frequently not providing the full range of managerial roles. ODCSPER has found that he/she is often not in the rating chain for subordinate military directors. This is a long standing, contentious issue throughout much of the Army. Military personnel frequently object to being rated by civilians for fear that their chances of advancement will be harmed by those not attuned to the imperatives of the military rating system. One of those imperatives, beyond the issue of proper wording, is that officers hope to be rated by other

officers as high ranking as possible. Introduction of a new lower layer in the rating chain (deputy to the garrison commander) is not welcome and will invariably be met with hostility - most often resolved by circumventing the deputy in the chain. A supervisor who does not have rating authority over subordinates is effectively not in charge.

As it has developed so far, then, the civilian garrison manager is neither the trained, professional city manager nor empowered to execute his/her full responsibilities. The issue of empowerment, however, contains the seeds to the solution. We have long espoused the Army value of decentralization of authority - powering down. The experience of the Model Installation Program proved again that more could be accomplished and people would find greater professional satisfaction if they were granted more authority to accompany their responsibility. Yet in installation management we propose to add another headquarters layer to help the Chief of Staff/Garrison Commander direct base operations. When one considers that installation directors are quite senior, usually colonels or GM 14/15, it would seem that they could be expected to operate professionally with a great deal of independence, and not require close supervision. In fact, each of them could well be considered deputies to the garrison commander, charged

with the responsibility to not only execute their functional roles, but to ensure that a balanced program is achieved which best serves the needs of the entire installation. This approach is consistent with Army values, provides greater satisfaction to senior managers and eliminates an unnecessary and structurally ineffective headquarters layer. For the reasons stated, I recommend elimination of this fourth layer in the command group. This is one of the rare instances in which a more economical solution also improves effectiveness.

Installation Management Doctrine

Does the Army need doctrine for more effective base operations? Development of this doctrine has been consistently recommended although the exact purpose it would serve has often remained vague. My analysis of Army installation management leads me to conclude that development of this doctrine would, in fact, be of significant value to the Army. Many of the issues which have been discussed herein are controversial largely because the Army as an entity has not systematically gone about deciding how it wants to manage installations, how their systems should be integrated, what the force structure should be (ie. civilian/military/contract) and, exactly how mobilization and transition to war will be accomplished. Some parts of the above are found in documents developed by

functional proponents, but no broad review or debate has been conducted to ensure compatibility of functional plans nor to provide long-term guidance for areas not covered. For example, our sporadic support for contracting of base operations services may be traced more to the lack of clear principles or vision to which the Army subscribes at all levels than to all the other difficulties of the program. Similarly, we lack a concept (e.g. Prime Beef) which clarifies our end state civilian/military mix in base operations. Further, we haven't dealt effectively with garrison commanders' proper command and control of stovepipe organizations which support (or fail to support) the installation. Equipment distribution, particularly automation, is similarly left to chance resulting in massive incompatibility which further weakens horizontal installation command and control. Systematic resolution of these issues and others would be facilitated through the doctrine development process and would serve the Army well. It is unclear at this point how extensive this effort would be as we must avoid the temptation to impose restrictive rules which reverse recent gains in powering down. However, if power down is one of the overarching principles guiding doctrine development and remains clearly in focus throughout the process, this pitfall can be avoided.

Summary

This review of the issues affecting Army base operations is by no means exhaustive. Many challenges and successes have completely escaped mention while others are covered in only the briefest fashion. It is the author's hope, however, that the consideration of possible reasons for our Army's consistent non-adoption of equally consistent recommendations will lead to contemplation of other options. Some of those options are presented in this paper - options which the author believes are deserving of discussion and further analysis. The window of opportunity will not remain open indefinitely; we can and should find new solutions now.

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