Rear Operations during the Offense: How Capable is the Corps of Conducting Rear Security Operations during the Attack?
Abstract
This study examines current U.S. Army rear operations doctrine as it applies to the tactical level of war. Specifically, it analyzes the ability of a heavy U.S. Corps conducting offensive operations to conduct successful rear operations against a Level III Soviet threat. This paper briefly reviews two cases of rear operations. First, the German army on the Eastern Front in World War II is examined. Next, the experiences of the US Army in Korea are examined. These case studies provide significant lessons learned which may apply to the modern battlefield. Soviet doctrine for attacking an enemy rear area is studied next. Our current doctrine for conducting rear operations is reviewed in the next chapter. The analysis compares our current capabilities against the probable threat. Using the lessons learned from the two historical examples, this paper then analyzes the ability of the Corps to protect its rear area. This study concludes that our current doctrine does not adequately identify the size and nature of the threat. Keywords: Army operations, Attack, Battles, Rear area security, Tactical warfare.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 27, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA225418
Entities
People
- Timmy D. Moore
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College