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**The Light Infantry Division
And Counterguerrilla Operations:
Organizational Fit or Mismatch?**

**A Monograph
by
Major Dennis C. Dimengo
Infantry**

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**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
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The monograph concludes that the current light infantry division division-base organization does support current counter guerrilla doctrine. Further, it finds that the organizational principles in the US Army's counter guerrilla doctrine accurately address the likely complexion of guerrilla warfare on the modern conventional or counterinsurgency battlefield. The monograph also concludes that the division-base organization is fully capable of adapting to emerging US Army doctrine for contingency operations or reinforcement of forward deployed forces.

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Major Dennis C. Dimengo


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Approved by:



Lieutenant Colonel Gerald R. Thiessen, MS

Monograph Director


Colonel William H. Janes, MA, MMAS

Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies


Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate
Degree Program

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ABSTRACT

**THE LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION AND COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS:
ORGANIZATIONAL FIT OR MISMATCH?** by MAJ Dennis C. Dimengo, USA, 55 pages.

This monograph examines the suitability of the US Army Light Infantry Division's division-base structure to execute counter guerrilla doctrine. Since the adoption of AirLand Battle doctrine by the US Army in 1982, there has been an increasing call to move the US Army division base to the brigade and, in essence, fix the brigade structure with its own organic combat, combat support and combat service support structure. While there has been considerable study of this proposal with regards to heavy brigades and divisions in mid- to high-intensity conflict, there has been little examination of the light infantry division and virtually none of low-intensity conflict. In light of this apparent void, this monograph analyzes brigade- vs. division-base organization for the light infantry division in one type of operation that appears to be applicable to light infantry employment across the conflict spectrum--counter guerrilla operations.

The monograph first explores the nature of guerrilla operations on the modern battlefield in both conventional and insurgency warfare. It then reviews US Army counter guerrilla doctrine in both instances. Next, the organization and capabilities of the light infantry division are examined. Finally, the congruence between counter guerrilla doctrine and light infantry division organization is analyzed. Additionally, the ability of the division-base organization to adapt to emerging doctrine is examined.

The monograph concludes that the current light infantry division division-base organization does support current counter guerrilla doctrine. Further, it finds that the organizational principles in the US Army's counter guerrilla doctrine accurately address the likely complexion of guerrilla warfare on the modern conventional or counterinsurgency battlefield. The monograph also concludes that the division-base organization is fully capable of adapting to emerging US Army doctrine for contingency operations or reinforcement of forward deployed forces.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction.....	1
II. The Threat.....	4
III. US Army Counterguerrilla Doctrine.....	7
IV. Light Infantry Division Organization and Capabilities	23
V. Analysis.....	27
VI. The Future.....	36
VII. Conclusion.....	39
Figures.....	42
Endnotes.....	45
Bibliography.....	51

SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

Since the adoption of a more maneuver-based doctrine by the US Army, there has been a continuing controversy over the suitability of the division-base structure to support that doctrine. A survey of recently published material reveals four major studies, seven monographs and four Journal articles covering the subject.¹ Almost all these studies and articles argue for the reorganization of US Army divisions from a division-base structure to a brigade-base structure.²

Most of these arguments, however, are made in the context of mid- to high-intensity conflict only.³ When considering the complexity, speed and nonlinear character of mid- to high-intensity conflict, the drive to a smaller, easier to handle organization is understandable and warrants the considerable thought now being done in this area. Additionally, the modernization of the US Army's heavy forces and the Army's continuing focus on possible war with the Soviet Union further fuel the concentration on organizational change in the mid- to high-intensity conflict arena. Unfortunately, the considerable emphasis on organizational change for the high end of the conflict spectrum may result in a collateral change in structure at the low end of the conflict spectrum.

It is almost universally recognized that the the most likely employment for the US Army in the foreseeable future is in low intensity conflict (LIC).⁴ Due to this recognition, there has also been a resurgence in doctrine, organization and conceptual thinking in the US Army about LIC. As a result of this resurgence, as well as a

substantial shortfall in strategic deployment assets, the Army in the mid-1980's fielded five new light infantry divisions as well as a number of additional special operations organizations.⁵

The light infantry division has its primary application in low-intensity conflict but is intended for use in mid- to high-intensity conflict as well. Although many of the missions that the light infantry division could expect to receive are comparable (if not the same) as a heavy division, the environment that the light infantry division is expected to fight in and the methods it uses are materially different. The light infantry division is expected to operate in the full range of LIC missions-insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations.⁶ Additionally, the division is capable of operations in mid- to high-intensity conflict against opposing light forces in any terrain, against any opposing force in restrictive terrain or, if augmented, against opposing heavy forces in "more open, hilly, and partially forested or urbanized terrain."⁷

There has been, however, a lack of scrutiny of the appropriateness of a brigade-base structure versus a division-base for the light infantry division. Of the studies and articles on the subject cited above, only three deal wholly with the light division. Of these, all tackle the question in the realm of mid- to high-intensity conflict. Only one of the many studies done on this subject addresses LIC.⁸

Adopting a brigade-base organization without an analysis of its impact on the light infantry division could prove an error. This is especially true if the Army goes into its most likely conflict arena

(LIC) with an improper organizational structure. It is as critical, however, at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. Light infantry divisions have a significant role in reinforcing forward deployed Army forces as well as operating as part of contingency forces that would likely be employed in mid- to high-intensity conflict.⁹

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the appropriateness of the light infantry division division-base structure. In order to fit the analysis as closely as possible to the full range of light infantry division missions, counter guerrilla operations will be the basis for examination. "The most common combat role in which the division will conduct operations will be executing counter guerrilla missions."¹⁰ As an integral part of counterinsurgency warfare, counter guerrilla operations are one of the most complex, difficult and risky of the possible light infantry division missions in LIC. Additionally, one of the most likely missions for the light infantry division in mid- to high-intensity conflict is rear area combat operations (RACO).¹¹ Many aspects of RACO will involve counter guerrilla operations. Counter guerrilla operations, then, appear to transverse the conflict spectrum and consequently should provide a sound vehicle for rigorous analysis of the issue at hand.

The method I will use to conduct this analysis is to first describe the guerrilla threat facing the light infantry division. Then, the US Army doctrine to counter the threat will be presented. This will be followed with a presentation of the organization and capabilities of the light infantry division. The capability of the light infantry division structure to execute the doctrine will then be analyzed. Finally, a

short discussion of the Army's future concepts for LIC will be presented along with an analysis of the capability of the current light infantry division structure to adapt to this vision.

SECTION II: THE THREAT

Modern warfare is characterized by nonlinear operations. Regardless of the intensity, location, duration, or belligerents, modern war will have a discontinuous appearance. Operations across a wide front and throughout the entire depth of the operational area will be the norm whether the war be revolutionary or nuclear. The reasons for this are many.

The speed with which today's forces can concentrate and the high volumes of supporting fires they can bring to bear will make the intermingling of opposing forces inevitable. Similarly, from the first hours of battle, deep reconnaissance, air mobility, long range fires, and special operating forces (SOF) will blur the distinction between front and rear.¹²

Soviet doctrine calls for a wide variety of forces to operate in the enemy rear area, each employing guerrilla tactics. Among the many types of forces employing these tactics are enemy controlled agents, enemy sympathizers, terrorists, and unconventional warfare units. Airborne and airmobile units will often conduct special or unconventional warfare missions in the enemy rear area and will use guerrilla tactics as well. Additionally, regular combat units may conduct raids, ambushes and reconnaissance missions in the enemy rear area and may also employ guerrilla tactics.¹³ "Guerrillas, SOF and

terrorists will seek to avoid set-piece battles and to strike at scattered points of vulnerability."¹⁴

Guerrilla warfare in the enemy rear area will be executed to support the primary air-land operations in the close battle area and conventional deep operations by regular ground forces.

Absence of a continuous front, considerable dispersal of the troops and presence of exposed flanks and large gaps all promote mobile operations, bold envelopments, deep flanking movements, swift attainment of the enemy's flanks and rear, and sudden and decisive strikes from different directions.¹⁵

To achieve these results, the Soviets plan to employ deep attacks by heliborne, airborne, and amphibious units as well as deliberate operations by armored forces.¹⁶

The result of this view of modern battle is that US forces will simultaneously encounter conventional forces employing both conventional and guerrilla tactics, unconventional forces employing guerrilla tactics and guerrillas proper all in close proximity on the modern mid- to high-intensity battlefield. Remarkably, this view of the mid- to high-intensity battlefield is not unlike that of an insurgency.

Insurgencies are each unique. Nevertheless, four general patterns appear. Insurgencies can be classified as subversive, critical-cell, traditional or mass oriented.¹⁷ Of these, the most sophisticated and prevalent (at least in terms of possible US involvement) is the mass-oriented insurgency.¹⁸ This type of insurgency generally follows a Maoist form and is described in three phases each presenting a different type of threat to the counterinsurgent.

Phase I, the latent and incipient phase, is the organizational phase. It involves a great deal of political action and organization. Activity is normally covert and is designed to discredit the government and gain influence over the population. Major violence is avoided. The second phase, guerrilla warfare, is dominated by armed conflict. The insurgents step up their attacks on the government. They seek to control large areas of territory and install their own government. The objective is to cause the government to overextend itself by having to protect areas it controls while attempting to recover areas lost to the insurgents. The final phase is the war of movement. In this phase, organized insurgent units fight a generally conventional war against the government's armed forces.¹⁹

Normally, elements of all three phases blend and often occur simultaneously in different parts of the nation experiencing the insurgency. At the least, phases I and II activities continue even while the war of movement is ongoing. Occasionally, an insurgency may be defeated in one of the phases and may then revert to an earlier phase. Regardless, the overall effect is that within the same LIC operational area "conventional" warfare may coexist with pure guerrilla warfare as well as with terrorism.²⁰

The final result, whether in conventional or counterinsurgency wars, is in Mao Tsetung's terms a "jig-saw pattern" war. Forces engaged in conventional operations will find themselves engaged with guerrillas in their rear areas. Forces fighting guerrillas in a counterinsurgency campaign will find themselves fighting "conventional" forces at the same time. As Mao accurately described, modern warfare in any of its forms

will result in forces fighting simultaneously on interior and exterior lines, in possession and non-possession of their rear areas, and continuously in encirclement and counterencirclement.²¹

SECTION III: US ARMY COUNTERGUERRILLA DOCTRINE

US Army counter guerrilla doctrine is the result of extensive American experience in counter guerrilla operations. This experience is primarily in counterinsurgency operations but also includes, to a lesser degree, experience in counter guerrilla operations in conventional warfare. The basic doctrine is contained in four manuals. FM 100-5, Operations, provides the basic operating doctrine for US Army forces in the field regardless of level of intensity while FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, provides the basis for counter guerrilla operations in LIC. FM 90-8, Counter guerrilla Operations, provides the basic doctrine for the actual conduct of counter guerrilla operations across the conflict spectrum. FM 90-14, Rear Battle, contains the doctrine for tactical operations in the friendly rear area primarily for conventional warfare.

The basic operational and tactical concepts of the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine apply to counter guerrilla operations. The AirLand Battle tenets, in particular, provide the guiding ideas for the Army's counter guerrilla doctrine. In terms of depth, counter guerrilla operations are to be conducted over large areas and with minimal logistical support. The counter guerrilla battle is to be fought in depth to delay, disrupt and destroy the guerrilla's uncommitted forces .

A minimum of reserves are kept so as to allow the maximum use of forces while retaining the ability to react to unexpected attacks.²²

In addition to depth, the tenets of agility and synchronization are also stressed. Counter guerrilla operations require flexible organizations that are adaptive to different situations. Counter guerrilla organizations must have mobility equal to or greater than that of the guerrillas. Successful counter guerrilla operations also require the effective and coordinated use of all available combat power. Additionally, there must be an effective integration of non-combat operations.²³

In terms of techniques, US Army counter guerrilla doctrine is virtually the same for LIC as well as conventional warfare. Nevertheless, the differing environment between LIC and conventional warfare gives rise to some fundamental differences between the doctrine for LIC and conventional warfare. Therefore, this section will be presented in three parts. First, the doctrine for counterinsurgency operations will be presented. Second, the doctrine for conventional warfare will be presented. Finally, US Army organizational principles for counter guerrilla operations will be discussed. As will be seen from this discussion, the doctrine inherently recognizes the jigsaw pattern of modern insurgency and conventional warfare.

PART 1: COUNTERGUERRILLA DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCIES

United States support to a counterinsurgency effort follows an integrative strategy. This strategy is known as Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). IDAD strategy is essentially preemptive and employs

and incorporates a full range of military and civil programs to promote growth in and protection of the affected nation. IDAD strategy has four functions. They are balanced development, security, neutralization and mobilization.²⁴

Balanced development refers to the cultivation of political, economic and social programs that will address the root causes of the insurgency. This function recognizes the long term aspect of the counterinsurgency effort. Security encompasses all activities that protect the population and resources from the insurgents to allow balanced development to take place. Neutralization involves separating the insurgents from the population. Mobilization provides manpower and resources to the affected nation while denying the same to the insurgents. Significant military activity occurs in the security and neutralization functions.²⁵

The IDAD functions are achieved through the application of four guiding counterinsurgency principles. The four principles are unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence and responsive government. As guides to military action, these principles accentuate the requirement for "coordinated action and centralized control at all levels."²⁶ Additionally, they underscore the elusiveness of the principle of minimum use of violence. "At times, the best way to minimize violence is to use overwhelming force. At other times, it is necessary to proceed with caution, extending the duration but limiting the intensity or scope of violence."²⁷

As a consequence of these functions and principles, US military action in support of a counterinsurgency "should be part of a

coordinated blend of available instruments of national power, designed to achieve clearly defined political objectives."²⁸ Although the normal role of US forces is to augment US security assistance programs, direct use of US military resources to support a counterinsurgency effort is not ruled out. If required, "[t]he United States will use its military resources to provide support to a host nation's counterinsurgency operations in the context of foreign internal defense."²⁹

Foreign internal defense, or FID, "is the participation by civilian and military agencies in any of the action programs another government takes to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency."³⁰ In conducting FID, the United States follows the IDAD concept.³¹ Operations by US forces in FID "cover the entire spectrum of the use of force."³² Among the possible operations are intelligence operations, joint-combined exercises, civil-military operations, humanitarian or civic assistance, logistics support operations, populace and resources control operations, drug interdiction operations and tactical operations.³³

Tactical operations focus on four broad missions. US forces conduct operations to disrupt and destroy combat formations. They also interdict external support to the insurgents. Additionally, US forces may establish security screens to prevent insurgent combat formations from interfering with other FID operations. Finally, they may secure key facilities and installations. The introduction of US combat forces into a nation to perform these types of tactical operations indicate a transition from LIC to war and may permanently alter the conflict. As a result these operations must be limited in either scope or duration.³⁴

"Generally, the purpose of military operations is to defeat the opposing force. The use of armed forces in a counter guerrilla role is primarily to provide enough internal security to enable the host country to initiate COIN [counterinsurgency] programs and pursue national objectives."³⁵ It is within this rather indistinct atmosphere that US Army counter guerrilla doctrine is articulated.

US Army counter guerrilla doctrine seeks to achieve an appropriate balance between conventional, unconventional, and foreign internal defense operations. In this regard, US forces have a dual mission. "First, they must defeat or neutralize the guerrilla militarily....Second they must support the overall COIN program by conducting noncombat operations....Both aspects of the COIN mission are of equal importance and are usually conducted simultaneously."³⁶ Additionally, regardless of the emphasis of the particular operation (military or civil), its effect on the populace is the primary consideration for US forces involved.³⁷ Consequently, minimum force is applied although it is recognized that "the principle of minimum force does not always imply minimum necessary troops. A large number of men deployed at the right time may enable a commander to use less force than he might otherwise have done...."³⁸ "Counter guerrilla operations are geared to the active military element of the insurgent movement only. To this end, counter guerrilla operations are viewed as a supporting component of the counterinsurgency effort."³⁹

"Organization for and conduct of counter guerrilla operations is dependent on the tactical situation. Units are organized and employed to counter the current guerrilla threat."⁴⁰ Consequently, the inherent

differences between "pure" guerrilla warfare (Phase II Insurgency) and war of movement (Phase III Insurgency) are also recognized. "Small units operating in dispersed areas are the norm in counter guerrilla operations....A mobile warfare threat by insurgents demands modified tactics," which will be more conventional in nature.⁴¹ The probability that these different type operations will occur simultaneously is also understood. "The activities of the insurgent force will fluctuate between the use of organized forces and ambushes by small forces to acts of terrorism. Commanders must be adaptable enough to recognize these changes in operations."⁴²

As a result of this general philosophy, US Army forces will conduct major counter guerrilla operations within an overall IDAD and FID framework. There are two principal types of counter guerrilla operations that are designed for this purpose: strike and consolidation operations. These operations are conducted at the brigade level as separate campaigns under the control of division headquarters.⁴³

Strike campaigns consist of a series of major tactical operations targeted against insurgent tactical forces or bases. Strike campaigns are of relatively short duration. They use self-sufficient task forces tailored around "normal" brigade slices. They are specifically organized to operate in areas remote from logistics bases. Additionally, brigades are usually augmented with psychological operations (PSYOPS) and intelligence assets for strike campaigns.⁴⁴

Brigades are normally assigned a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) for a strike campaign. The brigade normally then assigns an area of operations (AO) for its subordinate maneuver battalions. The brigade

usually maintains its support base in a secure area while committed battalions establish small operational support bases within their AOs. Brigade elements may be rotated through the brigade support area for rest and training. Strike campaigns are normally conducted outside areas that are under government control or are undergoing consolidation.⁴⁵

Consolidation campaigns are civil-military operations undertaken to restore government control of an area and its people. Consolidation campaigns use brigades task organized to include tactical, intelligence, PSYOPS, civil affairs, populace and resource control and advisory assistance assets. Consolidation campaigns are conducted in four phases. The preparatory phase involves planning and training by the brigade for the operations. The brigade also engages in intelligence and other FID operations that will increase its understanding of the consolidation area and the current situation there. The preparatory phase is followed by the offensive phase.⁴⁶

The offensive phase consists of moving a civil-military task force into the consolidation area and gaining control of it. Tactical operations are undertaken to eliminate the guerrillas and their sympathizers from the consolidation area. Once the guerrillas have been cleared from the area, operations are conducted to ensure that the guerrilla threat does not return. This leads into the development and completion phases.⁴⁷

During these phases, brigade operations center on keeping the area free from the guerrillas so that IDAD and FID programs can be executed. This involves extensive defensive operations by the brigade to preclude

the reentry of guerrilla forces into the consolidation area and to protect the infrastructure and population centers. The brigade will also train local forces for their own defense. These phases end with the brigade turning over its responsibilities to the host nation's security forces.⁴⁸

Regardless of the type campaign, the brigade's operations may be either offensive or defensive. The type of offensive operation undertaken by the brigade will depend on the phase of the insurgency. In Phase I (latent and incipient insurgency), offensive operations are primarily search and control operations. They include police-type operations such as searches of individuals, built-up areas and vehicles, establishment of checkpoints and roadblocks, and civil disturbance and riot control. As the level of insurgent activity increases, so does the size and character of the counterinsurgency effort.⁴⁹

In Phase II (guerrilla warfare), small-unit tactical operations are used. These operations include raids, ambushes, reconnaissance patrols and small deliberate attacks. As the guerrilla operations increase to Phase III (war of movement) activity, counterinsurgency operations become large-unit operations and employ conventional tactics. These tactics include movements to contact, reconnaissance in force, hasty attacks, deliberate attacks, exploitation, and pursuit.⁵⁰

While offensive operations are geared to the phase of the insurgency, defensive operations are somewhat more universal regardless of phase. Some defensive activity, such as patrolling, is the same as for the offensive. The difference is the purpose for the activity. Defensive operations normally involve the defense of bases, lines of

communications or critical facilities. Defensive operations will commence once the US Army force arrives in the host nation and will continue in all operations.⁵¹

Several operations are common to both offensive and defensive counter guerrilla operations. These include movement security, border operations and urban operations. They may be found in each phase of an insurgency. Their existence and importance will depend on the tactical, environmental and social situation.⁵²

In summary, US Army doctrine for counter guerrilla operations in counterinsurgency is supportive of the overall IDAD/FID strategy. It incorporates significant non-combat operations into the conduct of counter guerrilla campaigns. Counter guerrilla campaigns are conducted to disrupt or destroy insurgent formations, interdict support from another country, screen host nation forces so that they can conduct FID operations without interference, or protect key facilities and installations. The campaigns themselves are of two types. Strike campaigns seek to destroy guerrilla units and bases so as to allow the IDAD strategy to take place. Consolidation campaigns return areas to government control while implementing the IDAD plan. The doctrine emphasizes task organizing counter guerrilla units to accommodate the differing levels of guerrilla activity associated with the three phases of an insurgency as well as the differing needs within the three phases for combat versus non-combat operations. This rather elaborate doctrine for counter guerrilla operations in counterinsurgencies is in stark contrast to the somewhat vague approach for counter guerrilla operations in conventional warfare.

PART 2: COUNTERGUERRILLA DOCTRINE FOR CONVENTIONAL WARS

The counter guerrilla mission in conventional warfare is to preserve freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. Successful completion of the mission, consequently, revolves around three goals. These are the protection of the physical sustainment, and command, control and communications facilities located in the rear area; protection of reserves positioned in the rear area; and protection of the routes used for these functions.⁵³ In conventional warfare, the guerrilla's objective is to support the main enemy force by disrupting and harassing the enemy rear area.⁵⁴ Counter guerrilla operations in conventional warfare are, therefore, governed by US Army rear battle doctrine.⁵⁵ The rear battle effort is guided by three principles: unity of effort, economy of forces and responsiveness. These goals are further defined by four rear battle tasks. They are secure forward support for forward combat units, detect the enemy in the rear area, delay the enemy's progress after detection and destroy the enemy in the rear area.⁵⁶

In order to accomplish these goals and tasks, the Army's doctrine divides the possible threat to the rear area into three levels. The doctrine in turn designates an escalating system of response for eliminating the threat.

A Level I threat consists of enemy agents, sympathizers or terrorists conducting individual acts of sabotage. This threat is met with self-protection by the units occupying the rear area, employing small reaction forces if necessary. A Level II threat consists of attacks, sabotage and special operations conducted by enemy

unconventional warfare units, and raids, ambushes and reconnaissances conducted by regular enemy units. This threat is normally countered by military police units operating in the rear area. A Level III threat consists of battalion-sized or larger operations often as the result of heliborne, airborne, or amphibious insertion or ground infiltration. This threat is normally met by a combined arms combat force, known as a Tactical Combat Force (TCF), that is assigned to the rear area. Although these levels would seem to represent graduated enemy activity in the rear area, the threats they represent may not occur in a specific order nor are they necessarily interrelated. In fact, all three may occur simultaneously. Additionally, any of the threats may be supported by enemy air force, helicopter, long range artillery, missiles and rockets, mines or radio electronic combat assets.⁵⁷

As a result of this wide variety of possible guerrilla threats and the large numbers of varying units occupying the rear area, the counter guerrilla effort can be either offensive or defensive or, most likely, both. The tactical techniques employed in counter guerrilla operations in conventional warfare are the same as in counter insurgency warfare.⁵⁸ They generally can be equated between the phases of an insurgency and the level of threat. For example, a Level I threat corresponds in activity to a Phase I insurgency. Thus, the counter guerrilla techniques employed, in this case searches and police-type actions, generally apply. The environment of the rear area also demands that special attention be paid to command and control of counter guerrilla forces.

The commander of the counter guerrilla force may not have control over all forces in the rear area. Therefore, establishing the commander's authority within the counter guerrilla area of operations is critical. The command and support relationship must be clearly delineated. The counter guerrilla force commander effects liaison with all friendly elements in the rear area. He fixes specific responsibilities for each unit, base or installation. He also exercises control over defensive operations in response to a guerrilla threat.⁵⁹ Two additional aspects of the environment in conventional warfare also alter the approach from counterinsurgency.

"The ability of the guerrilla force to operate successfully does not rely on the attainment of popular support. Rather, the guerrilla force relies more on its ability to cause confusion in rear areas."⁶⁰ Consequently, the social and political factors that governed US Army doctrine in counterinsurgency are reduced. Nevertheless, the support of the population is still desired so as to ensure the minimum commitment of combat force to the rear battle.⁶¹

However, among the various types of forces that present a threat in the rear area, not all may be classified as guerrillas. "Only if this force uses guerrilla warfare tactics is it considered a guerrilla force. If it continues to operate within the area that can be influenced by the main enemy forces, or if it utilizes conventional tactics, then it is not considered a guerrilla force."⁶²

In summary, US Army counter guerrilla doctrine in conventional warfare is governed by rear battle doctrine. In it, the counter guerrilla effort fits into a graduated response system based on

the level of threat in the rear area. Within this system, the actions taken by the counter guerrilla force are virtually the same in terms of techniques as for counterinsurgency campaigns. Significant differences, however, include the deemphasis of political and social factors and the additional importance of clearly delineated command and control. Added to this is the specter of regular enemy units using conventional tactics operating in the rear area in conjunction with guerrillas.

PART 3: ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES

Counter guerrilla operations at division level are normally conducted under a higher formation. In a counterinsurgency the division normally operates under a joint task force (JTF) or a corps. In conventional warfare, a division conducting counter guerrilla operations will normally be under the command of a corps although assignment directly under a field army or army group is possible.⁶³ The various combat, combat support and combat service support organizations of the division conducting counter guerrilla operations are both task organized and often given non-standard missions to fit the specific requirements of the situation. This holds true for counterinsurgency and conventional counter guerrilla operations although special force composition and task organization, rapid deployment and restraint in the execution of military operations are required for LIC.⁶⁴ A number of principles guide this flexible organization.

First, forces in counter guerrilla operations must be organizationally flexible. They must be inherently capable of adapting to rapidly changing situations. The situations they encounter may

change tactically. The nature of counter guerrilla warfare may require transition from small-unit operations to large-unit operations and back again. US Army organizational doctrine requires that units organize to counter the current guerrilla threat and match the size of the guerrilla force. The counter guerrilla force must be capable of operating on either the offensive or defensive or both simultaneously. The situation may change, as well, from an emphasis on combat to non-combat operations.⁶⁵

Second, counter guerrilla forces must be organized to operate over large areas with minimal logistics support. This requires units that can be made self-sufficient for semi-independent or independent operations. Consequently, the organization should be able to provide sufficient combat support and combat service support assets for the type of counter guerrilla operation anticipated and for varying durations.⁶⁶

Third, counter guerrilla forces must retain the capability to react to unexpected situations. This principle is in direct conflict with the need to maximize the numbers of counter guerrilla units in the field. Therefore, while reserves are kept to a minimum, they are, however, highly mobile. Air transportation is the preferred method of moving the reserve.⁶⁷

Fourth, the rest of the counter guerrilla organization is organized with a mobility equal to or greater than that of the guerrillas. Consequently, the counter guerrilla organization must be capable moving forces by foot, vehicle or aircraft.⁶⁸

Finally, the counter guerrilla force must be able to integrate varying types and amounts of combat, combat support and combat service

support units into the organization so as to properly align capability with the situation.⁶⁹ In some cases, units may be assigned nonstandard missions in order to accomplish the counter guerrilla task. Several examples will help illustrate this process.

Due to the size of the area that counter guerrilla forces operate in, operations cannot be tied to fire support. Consequently, field artillery must be flexible, responsive, and provide maximum coverage but still be able to be massed. This will result in decentralization of firing batteries along with an increased demand for centralized control to allow any field artillery in range to fire regardless of command or support relationship. Available artillery needs the capability to respond to calls for fire from not only the tactical force but self-defense forces, police, base security elements and support units as well.⁷⁰ What is implied here is that artillery will be positioned to achieve coverage of the area in which counter guerrilla forces operate rather than allocated permanently or semi-permanently to a specific maneuver force. It is, in other words, the fire base concept.

A similar situation occurs with intelligence assets. "Because of the decentralized nature of counter guerrilla operations, portions of the divisional assets are usually attached to brigades...."⁷¹ The brigade may use long range surveillance detachments or communications and electronic warfare intelligence assets from division or corps.⁷² Even though these assets may be attached to a brigade for a specific mission due to the nature of the operation, their collection and destruction plans support the overall mission. "A unified, centralized all-source intelligence system is especially important to the effective conduct of

counterinsurgency operations."⁷³ Again, the implication is that though decentralized in execution, intelligence assets, even at the lowest level, must respond to the collection requirements of higher levels.

In many counter guerrilla operations, especially in LIC, there will be no air threat. Consequently, air defense artillery (ADA) units may be better employed as additional security for support bases. They may be equally well employed in support of civic action programs. However, if an air threat develops, ADA units must "maintain the capability to immediately react to the air threat."⁷⁴

Engineer and military police (MP) units may be attached to brigades to perform their normal tactical functions. They may also be concentrated for specific missions in support of an overall FID approach. In such cases, normal support to a brigade may be reduced.⁷⁵ In contrast, "[t]he composition of the signal element committed in support of the counter guerrilla force is modified to meet mission and situation requirements. The signal support element may be either in direct support or attached. A direct support role is desirable as it affords the signal officer wider latitude and greater flexibility to meet changing support requirements."⁷⁶

Additional combat service support (CSS) units may also be attached to brigades as the situation demands. "Most of the combat service support assets are found at division or higher level and are attached to brigades as needed. In some cases, the brigade may receive a larger portion of the division assets than normal if the situation requires it."⁷⁷ Some CSS assets, particularly medical units, may provide limited support to the local population.⁷⁸

Finally, the brigade commander is primarily concerned with tactical operations in strike campaigns. Nevertheless, five other operations exist and support the whole range of FID programs. They are intelligence, PSYOPS, civil affairs, population and resources control and advisory assistance. These operations normally take precedence in consolidation campaigns. The shifting of precedence between tactical operations and supporting operations in strike and consolidation campaigns necessitates a corresponding change in organization of the brigade for each mission.⁷⁹

In summary, the organizational principles that support US Army counter guerrilla doctrine are based on flexibility, self-sufficiency, ability to react to unforeseen situations, mobility equal to or greater than the guerrillas and the ability to integrate additional assets as the situation demands. Due to these requirements, organizations engaged in counter guerrilla operations need to adapt their structure to the specific requirements of varied situations. This means that US Army units in counter guerrilla operations must be task organized and, if necessary, assigned non-standard missions.

SECTION IV: Light Infantry Division Organization and Capabilities

The light infantry division is organized in a standard US Army division-base structure (Figure 1). This structure is a refinement of the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) concept begun in 1959 which was itself a throw-back to the armored division combat command

structure in World War II.⁸⁰ In this structure, a fixed group of company and battalion level units are assigned to the division. These units provide the division with command and control capability and a standard amount of combat, combat support and combat service support capability. The division base for a light infantry division consists of a division headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), three brigade HHCs, an aviation brigade HHC, a division artillery (DIVARTY), a division support command, an engineer battalion, an air defense artillery battalion, a cavalry squadron, a signal battalion, a military intelligence battalion, a military police company and a division band.⁸¹

"Maneuver battalions and additional units are placed in a command relationship to this base to provide the division with the ability to accomplish its mission in an anticipated operational environment."⁸² This permits the numbers and types of units and equipment assigned to the division to vary according to the mission and operational environment. The division support command is then modified as needed to support whatever number and type of maneuver battalions and other units are assigned.

Although using the same division base as other US Army divisions, the light infantry division is specifically designed for employment in LIC. The current mix of maneuver battalions and other units assigned to a light infantry division are nine light infantry battalions, three light field artillery battalions, one medium field artillery battery, one attack helicopter battalion, and one assault helicopter battalion.⁸³ This organization allows the light infantry division to operate independently in LIC.⁸⁴ Augmentation in this case may be limited to

finance, personnel and maintenance detachments for the division's own internal support.⁸⁵ "If augmented with civil affairs and psychological operations units, the division is capable of participating in foreign internal defense operations."⁸⁶ Augmentation for mid- to high-intensity conflict is as appropriate for the mission but characteristically includes antitank, artillery, engineer, chemical and transportation assets.

The division's three brigades are task organized to perform major maneuver missions. The brigade headquarters provide

the command and control facilities necessary to employ attached and supporting units....The necessary combat, CS and CSS units to accomplish the brigade mission are attached, OPCON [operational control], or placed in support of the brigade.⁸⁷

The maneuver elements of the division are organized so that they can operate on a semi-independent basis. Additionally, they are capable of operating at considerable distances from the division headquarters and support area.⁸⁸

Other combat, combat support and combat service support elements are designed for employment under division control so that they can be massed as required for specific missions. There is only one organic battery of general support artillery for the division. Consequently, the close support artillery is usually retained in a support relationship so that it can be massed against critical division targets.⁸⁹ ADA is concentrated to protect high-priority assets, not areas.⁹⁰ The military intelligence battalion is normally placed in general support of the division but has the capability, with task

organizing, to provide direct support to maneuver brigades.⁹¹ The division's engineer battalion is organized to provide sapper companies in a support relationship to maneuver brigades. The engineer battalion's equipment, however, is in a single assault and barrier platoon for use in general support of the division.⁹² Direct support MP platoons are not provided to the maneuver brigades. MP platoons are kept in general support and provided areas of operation in the division rear.⁹³ Tactical transportation assets (trucks and helicopters) permit movement of only two light infantry battalions simultaneously.⁹⁴

The entire organization is structured to operate without depending on bases or extensive logistics support. The division contains limited organic heavy equipment. The division's light and easily maintained equipment needs considerably less support than a heavy division. As a result, once in an operational area, the division needs less logistical support than other units. Additionally, the division's CSS structure, while austere, is designed to readily accept augmentation.⁹⁵

The division's command and control structure is also specially prepared to receive and incorporate augmentation. The command and control organization contains a large number of liaison officers at all command levels. The liaison officers coordinate the reception of augmentation assets and ensure their rapid integration into the division's plans. The division's command and control structure is also organized with a number of "integrating cells." These cells are used, instead of fully manned staff sections, to perform planning for functions that are not permanently assigned to the division. The

existence of these cells permits the rapid incorporation of augmentation into the division's operations.⁹⁶

SECTION V: ANALYSIS

A review of the counter guerrilla operational environment and US Army counter guerrilla doctrine reveals a considerable congruence between the light infantry division division-base structure and current US Army doctrine for counter guerrilla operations. This congruence between structure, doctrine and environment seems to revolve around three factors. First, the capability of the division-base structure to allow rapid integration of nondivisional assets appears to provide the division the ability to be task organized for either conventional or insurgency counter guerrilla warfare without permanently assigning units required for one but not both environments to the division. Second, the capability of the division-base structure to task organize brigades for specific missions seems to give the light infantry division the flexibility needed to address several different counter guerrilla tasks simultaneously, such as concurrent strike and consolidation campaigns. Third, the capability of the division-base structure to mass selected functions by retention of combat, combat support and combat service support assets at the division level appears to allow more effective use of fewer assets while enhancing the deployability profile of the light infantry division, improving the agility of its brigades and keeping US involvement in an insurgency to a minimum.

In order to analyze each of these factors to determine if the congruence apparent on the surface is true, the salient points of each will be presented in two cases. First, each factor will be examined in light of the current division-base structure. Second, each factor will be examined in the context of a hypothetical light infantry division organized with a brigade-base structure. The hypothetical division's maneuver brigades will contain a fixed amount of combat, combat support, and combat service support capability. Divisional assets that can be attached, placed under operational control or placed in direct support of the maneuver brigade will be assumed to be organic to each maneuver brigade as part of its base.

In reviewing the environment of guerrilla warfare and the subsequent doctrinal requirements for US forces, one is struck by the varied organizational requirements. In a conventional campaign, for example, the guerrilla threat may require an increased antitank and anti-air capability for the light infantry division. Civil affairs and PSYOPS needs, on the other hand, may be reduced. The reverse is often true in a counterinsurgency. In this situation, civil affairs and PSYOPS capability become an absolute necessity while in most cases the threat from armor and aircraft is at least minimized if not nonexistent. As these few examples illustrate counter guerrilla operations will require rapid and effective incorporation of augmentation that will vary with the specific counter guerrilla mission but will not be needed on a habitual basis for all operations.

The light infantry division's "integrating cells" on the division staff and the plethora of liaison officers (LNOs) throughout the

division appear to be tailor-made for this situation. The "Integrating cells" and LNOs within the division-base structure allow organization of the division to be rapidly and effectively modified to fit the counter guerrilla situation without burdening it with a number of permanently assigned but situationally dependent units. Augmentation can be retained under division control or allocated to the brigades as necessary. Nevertheless, is there any intrinsic value in having "Integrating cells" and liaison officers solely at division level? Could not these cells be as effective if assigned instead to the brigade headquarters within the context of a brigade-base organization and accomplish the same function? Three aspects of this solution argue against it.

First, if the "Integrating cells" and LNOs are assigned to brigade headquarters to assume this task, the number of personnel assigned to this function will likely grow at least three-fold. Although this may not be a significant increase in the size of the division it will have a cumulative effect as will be seen later in this analysis. Second, if the cells are not retained also at division level, the division's role in applying augmentation becomes one solely of responding to subordinate brigade requests and merely allocating arriving assets to the brigades. If the division even with a brigade-base organization is to have any role beyond simply assigning missions to its brigades, it must have the capability to plan and execute operations independent of the brigade missions. This requires a planning staff (cells and LNOs) and a support structure external to the brigades. This, in turn, identifies the third aspect against this solution-the role of the division.

As identified earlier in the discussion of US Army doctrine, the division is anticipated as having major non-maneuver missions in counter guerrilla operations. In counterinsurgencies, these non-maneuver missions could include the full range of FID activities such as conducting civic action programs, training host nation personnel or units and providing logistical support to other US or host nation agencies. In conventional warfare, non-maneuver missions could include such functions as providing fire or engineer support to bases in the rear area. Completion of this aspect of US Army counter guerrilla doctrine requires that the division have the capability to conduct its own operations beyond those conducted by its brigades. This will, in turn, require that the division have its own assets outside the brigade-base and be able to employ them and non-divisional augmentation independently. Both these conditions argue for retention of the division base.

Although it can be thus established that the division needs a capability to conduct independent operations outside those executed by its brigades and that the light infantry division division-base structure fits this need, would it not be prudent to give the division headquarters this capability and still organize the brigade with its own base of combat, combat support and combat service support assets? In this case, the arguments for the base to remain at the division are similar to those used to justify keeping assets not habitually needed by the division at corps level. As the environment and threat in counter guerrilla operations showed, the light infantry division will face a variety of threats simultaneously. As a result, the division is

likely to be required to assign its brigades to significantly different missions simultaneously. Each mission in turn will need a unique task organization. Several examples will illustrate this point.

In a conventional war, the division with a rear area combat mission is likely to be conducting at least three operations simultaneously. The division may be conducting offensive counter guerrilla operations against unconventional warfare (UW) or regular enemy units using guerrilla tactics in the friendly rear area. Concurrently, it may be fighting regular enemy units that are conducting a deep ground or air transported attack into the rear area or have simply broken through forward defenses. Finally, the division may be conducting offensive or defensive counter guerrilla operations against enemy partisans or locally recruited guerrillas.

When conducting counter guerrilla operations in a counterinsurgency the light infantry division faces a similar environment. The division is likely to find itself conducting offensive counter guerrilla operations in the form of a strike campaign in an area of the host nation controlled by the insurgents. At the same time, the division is likely to be conducting defensive counter guerrilla operations in another area undergoing consolidation. It is also conceivable that the division may be required to conduct counter guerrilla operations along a border to stem external support to the insurgency. At times, this may involve conventional operations as might a strike campaign against an insurgency in Phase III (mobile warfare).

The division base structure allows the division commander to task organize brigades so that these varied yet simultaneously occurring

threats can be met. During counter guerrilla operations in conventional wars, the division-base structure permits the division to fight the full range of possible enemy forces. For example, a brigade can be organized with heavy emphasis on truck- and helicopter-borne infantry along with light artillery and air and ground cavalry to conduct offensive counter guerrilla operations against UW forces in the rear area. Additional infantry along with extensive human intelligence (HUMINT), PSYOPS, military police and civil affairs assets can be task organized with the brigade to conduct defensive counter guerrilla operations against a partisan or locally recruited guerrilla threat. Another brigade can be organized with infantry, attack helicopters, medium artillery, engineers, and antitank assets to address the deep or breakthrough threat from conventional units.

Similarly, in a counterinsurgency the division base structure allows the light infantry division to conduct strike and consolidation campaigns simultaneously under division control. The division can task organize an infantry heavy brigade with light artillery and cavalry for a strike campaign. Another brigade can be organized with less infantry but with engineers, medical, military police, civil affairs and PSYOPS assets to conduct a consolidation campaign. Additional assets from division control can be allocated to the consolidation effort to conduct training activities for host nation national and local forces. A brigade-sized reserve of infantry, attack helicopters and medium artillery can be maintained to react to unexpected attacks.

Any attempt to create a brigade-base in this environment will likely be faced with the impossible task of determining how much of each

combat, combat support, and combat service support asset will be required for each of the possible counter guerrilla situations. Providing enough assets to handle all possible situations will inevitably result in huge brigades that might begin to rival even the division in size. It can, of course, be argued that as with the division-base, a brigade-base could be designed that would contain only those assets needed on a habitual basis for all missions. After all, if this approach can be made to work for the division it must certainly be able to be made to work for a brigade. Again though, US Army doctrine for counter guerrilla operations and the basic premises for the light infantry division organization seem to argue against such a solution. US Army doctrine recognizes a need for the division to be able to mass selected functions for counter guerrilla operations. This is achieved by retention of combat, combat support and combat service support assets at the division level and their provision to the brigades in an OPCON or support basis. This appears to allow more effective use of fewer assets while enhancing the deployability profile of the light infantry division, improving the agility of its brigades and keeping US involvement in an insurgency to a minimum.

Two distinct types of massing are called for in the doctrine. First, there must be the flexibility to mass the entire division for either strike or consolidation operations in a counterinsurgency or against either a partisan, UW or conventional threat in a conventional rear area battle. This provides the organizational flexibility required to meet an unusually strong threat in one area. Second, there must be

the flexibility to mass individual assets where their quantity can create favorable circumstances. Several examples are appropriate.

The retention of transportation assets in general support at the division level allows the massing of assets to obtain a movement differential over the guerrillas without encumbering the division with significant amounts of helicopters or rolling stock. Standard supporting missions for the division's artillery allows a small number of well positioned howitzers to be massed as the situation requires. Since counter guerrilla operations are expected to be conducted over a large area, the provision of enough organic artillery to a brigade to provide adequate fire support is virtually impossible. The current artillery supporting system, however, allows the fires of multiple sources to be shifted to committed units. This is accomplished through a force artillery headquarters (in this case DIVARTY) that can coordinate and direct any fire within the division.⁹⁷

In the case of intelligence, the need for centralization is even more pronounced. The entire counter guerrilla effort revolves around intelligence. Tactical intelligence activities are in the position of supporting not only their own unit's operations but higher headquarters up to the strategic level, a variety of other US agencies such as country-team activities, and the host nation as well. As a result of the environment, intelligence assets are dispersed to the lowest level possible for execution but respond to a centrally directed plan that fills the needs of the various users. Intelligence assets are concentrated in those areas that will yield the best results for the

overall counterguerrilla effort and not diluted across the entire division.⁹⁸

Centralized combat support and combat service support assets allow the division to undertake large scale and long duration FID operations. This includes establishing training activities for the host nation up to national level, providing medical support to local people, and conducting civic action training and support. The ability of light infantry brigades to operate at considerable distances from the division base without extensive logistics support allows the division to undertake these missions that are vital to the overall counterguerrilla effort without an undue burden on the brigades. Shifting these assets to the brigade base seriously hampers this capability.

On the other hand, inappropriate assets, such as ADA in most LIC scenarios, can be redirected to other missions. Three benefits are achieved from this. First, units of battalion size with their organic staffs and added experience can be assigned non-standard missions thus increasing the chance of success. Second, use of existing battalions for non-standard missions reduces the need for additional units in the Army. Third, if not needed for the specific mission, some units can be simply left at home station thus reducing the signature of US involvement.

This last benefit is reflected in the overall light infantry division division base structure. Keeping assets at division level reduces the amount of personnel and equipment needed. Consequently, the division is able to move faster strategically than all other US Army divisions. This enhances the psychological impact-so important in

counterguerrilla operations-of the commitment of the light infantry division. At the same time, the small physical signature of the division due to this structure helps reduce the negative impact of "Americanization" of counterinsurgency operations.

In summary, it would appear that the light infantry division division-base structure presents some advantages over a brigade-base organization. First, it allows the effective integration of augmentation into the division structure in sufficient quantities to meet all contingencies. More importantly it also permits the division to conduct major non-maneuver operations independent of its brigades' operations. Second, it allows the division to task organize to meet the variety of threats likely to be encountered simultaneously in modern counterguerrilla operations. Third, it allows the division to mass its assets thus enabling it to meet a particularly strong threat in one area and to accomplish more missions than its size would normally allow. Additionally all these advantages work synergistically to allow the division to achieve the psychological advantages of moving quickly while limiting American presence. It remains only to be seen if the division base organization is viable for the future.

SECTION VI: THE FUTURE

Ongoing international military and political changes are refocusing the Army on contingency operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The ongoing lessening of tensions in Europe as well as unilateral Soviet troop cuts are part of the reason for this refocusing.

But a recognition that American interests abroad are becoming less Eurocentric is the real catalyst for the US Army's growing interest in improving its capability at the low end of the conflict spectrum. This needs-based approach is accompanied by a growing interest within the Army in adjusting its paradigm of war to more accurately reflect the continual movement of international violence to the lower end of the spectrum.⁹⁹

In addition, the Army is expecting to see further reductions in manpower and equipment. Recent estimates of the possible impacts of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act project as much as a 62,000 man reduction in Army strength as well as a commensurate cut in operating and procurement funds to be possible over the next year.¹⁰⁰ Depending on the outcome of the ongoing Conventional Forces-Europe negotiations, these cuts could not only continue, but go deeper over the next several years.¹⁰¹ As the Army surveys the time ahead, it appears to be opting for a contingency response that will accommodate both decreased budgets and increased employment of American forces in LIC situations.

Emerging concepts of US Army commitment to a low-intensity conflict center around a notional security assistance force (SAF). This force was presented conceptually in the new draft of FM 100-20. Its genesis, however, appears to be in US Army counterinsurgency doctrine from the early 1960s. As originally proposed in 1962, counterinsurgency efforts by the US Army would be executed by "free world liaison and assistance groups" or FLAGs. A FLAG was based on a Special Forces Group reinforced with a PSYOPS battalion, and civil affairs, engineer, signal, military intelligence and medical detachments. Later in 1962, an airborne

brigade supported with artillery and aviation was proposed as a counter guerrilla force and dubbed a "strategic attack force" or STAF. The FLAG and STAF concepts were eventually united in an operational concept that called for a FLAG response to Phase I and II insurgencies while a STAF (although not necessarily airborne but any ROAD brigade) would be introduced in a Phase III insurgency. In the event, the war in Vietnam put an end to this experiment although several tests of the ROAD brigade in counterinsurgency were conducted and initial deployments to Vietnam were in rough approximation of the FLAG and STAF concepts.¹⁰²

The new draft FM 100-20 updates this concept with the security assistance force or SAF. The SAF augments the security assistance organizations that consist of all US Armed Forces organizations that are permanently assigned to a US diplomatic mission and have security assistance responsibilities. The SAF's mission is to assist US security assistance personnel in a host nation with training and operational advice and to advise and assist host nation forces. It is a composite organization and when constituted, operates under a unified command or JTF. This SAF concept has been further developed in the US Army's AirLand Battle-Future study.

This study, which projects the requirements for the US Army in terms of environment, doctrine and structure in the year 2004, postulates "tailorable" brigades that can be rapidly structured for specific missions. Brigades will be required to absorb augmentation peculiar to the mission which is likely to include significant combat support and combat service support assets. Depending on the situation, these brigades are organized "on demand" with either a preponderance of

combat units and small national development (ND) units consisting of civil affairs, medical, engineer, special forces and PSYOPS elements or a preponderance of national development units and a small combat element (Figures 2 and 3).¹⁰³

Divisions will be expected to task organize brigades to meet specific mission requirements. The division headquarters deploys with the mission specific brigade to provide command and control. The division, in turn, coordinates the application of fires, airlift, intelligence, local forces and local government. A corps headquarters provides the link to the national command authorities through the unified command's commander-in-chief and ambassador.¹⁰⁴

It would appear from the preceding discussion in Section V, Analysis, that the light infantry division with its current division base structure provides a ready-made organization for implementation of both the SAF and AirLand Battle-Future concepts. The division-base structure has the capability to task organize its assigned combat, combat support, and combat service support assets under brigade headquarters for specific missions. Additionally, it has the capability to rapidly receive and incorporate non-divisional support.

SECTION VII: CONCLUSION

The division-base structure of the light infantry division appears to provide a significant congruence with the Army's doctrine for counter guerrilla warfare. This is due primarily to the structure's capability for responding to a wide variety of counter guerrilla warfare

requirements not only discretely but simultaneously as well. The Army's doctrine correctly recognizes that the modern battlefield, whether it is a conventional or insurgent one, will present the American commander an exceptional number of different situations. The division-base structure seems to currently provide the right mixture of unity of command at the planning and allocation level (division) and "tailorability" at the executing level (brigade) to satisfy the diverse requirements of modern counter guerrilla warfare. It also appears that although there are some advantage to it, a brigade-base structure fails to provide the necessary depth for executing current counter guerrilla doctrine.

The division-base structure also appears to have greater utility in meeting future counter guerrilla requirements. As forecasted, both the reinforcement of forward deployed forces and contingency missions will require brigades task organized "on the fly" for specific missions. These task organized brigades are then proposed to operate under division control. The current light infantry division division-base organization provides an "off the shelf" structure capable of executing the emerging doctrine.

Although adoption of a brigade-base structure is not totally without merit, it will require some significant shifts in US Army doctrine for counter guerrilla warfare. Provision will undoubtedly have to be made for an increase in the size of the light infantry division to accommodate the inefficiency that accompanies a move from the pooling concept used by the division base. A variety of brigades each designed for a specific mission will have to be examined, or the flexibility to meet varying situations will have to be built into the organization in

another fashion or at another level (such as at battalion level).

Finally, a reexamination of the broad spectrum of missions now assigned maneuver brigades in counter guerrilla operations may have to be undertaken with an eye to reducing their scope perhaps by shifting some to combat support or combat service support responsibility.




Figure 1

TAILORABLE UNITS:




Figure 2

TAILORABLE UNITS:




Figure 3

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2. Of them only Starry, op. cit., does not.
3. Bahnsen, op. cit., and Starry, op. cit., mention low-intensity conflict in passing.
4. John O. Marsh Jr, "Comments on Low-Intensity Conflict," Military Review, February, 1989, p. 3.
5. In addition to the light infantry divisions, the Army has activated two additional Special Forces Groups as well as Special Forces Team Delta, a Special Operations Aviation Group, an additional psychological operations battalion, a third Ranger Battalion and the Ranger Regimental Headquarters. Also, the US Army Special Operations Command was activated to command the special operations forces. Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 178.

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