The Mission: The Dilemma of Specified Task and Implied Commander's Intent
Abstract
This monograph examines the limited success achieved by the U.S. Army in implementing mission oriented command and control. Evidence from the National Training Center (NTC) suggests that there is a problem with intent communication and effective execution. The study specifically addresses whether or not alterations to the five paragraph field order may help rectify these apparent discrepancies. Mission oriented command and control is analyzed from the theoretical, historical and contemporary aspects. Theory supports the mission oriented concept by providing the principle of unity of purpose. Historically, the German Army's development of a mission oriented doctrine is consistent, while the American experience has swung back and forth between a mission versus a task orientation. Currently, U.S. Army has a mixture of mission and task oriented doctrine. This dichotomy manifests itself in practice by units training at the NTC and reflects the dilemma of specified task and implied intent. Confusing doctrine appears to be part of the problem, but one that can be rectified. Several suggestions are presented which may help to eliminate doctrinal inconsistencies and clarify terms. Finally, the study recommends that the five paragraph field order be modified to provide missions, not just tasks, for the higher headquarters and subordinate elements. Keywords: Profiles; Task forces; Military doctrine; Decision making; Command and control systems; Infantry.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 03, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA225436
Entities
People
- William F. Crain
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College