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**The Mission: The Dilemma of Specified Task
and Implied Commander's Intent**

**A Monograph
by**

**Major William F. Crain
Infantry**

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
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ABSTRACT

THE MISSION: THE DILEMMA OF SPECIFIED TASK AND IMPLIED COMMANDER'S INTENT by MAJ William F. Crain, USA, 59 pages.

This monograph examines the limited success achieved by the U.S. Army in implementing mission oriented command and control. Evidence from the National Training Center (NTC) suggests that there is a problem with intent communication and effective execution. The study specifically addresses whether or not alterations to the five paragraph field order may help rectify these apparent discrepancies.

Mission oriented command and control is analyzed from the theoretical, historical and contemporary aspects. Theory supports the mission oriented concept by providing the principle of unity of purpose. Historically, the German Army's development of a mission oriented doctrine is consistent, while the American experience has swung back and forth between a mission versus a task orientation. Currently, U.S. Army has a mixture of mission and task oriented doctrine. This dichotomy manifests itself in practice by units training at the NTC and reflects the dilemma of specified task and implied intent.

Confusing doctrine appears to be part of the problem, but one that can be rectified. Several suggestions are presented which may help eliminate doctrinal inconsistencies and clarify terms. Finally, the study recommends that the five paragraph field order be modified to provide missions, not just tasks, for the higher headquarters and subordinate elements.

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Part I - Introduction

With the adoption of Airland Battle doctrine, the U.S. Army renewed its emphasis on mission oriented command and control. Recognizing that clear communication of orders has always been a problem, this new doctrine placed greater reliance on effective communication to enhance unity of effort and promote initiative. Despite these efforts, the problem still exists.

The U.S. Army appears to have achieved only limited success in implementing mission oriented command and control. Originating as a theoretical concept designed to accommodate the friction of war, mission oriented doctrine emphasizes subordinates' exercise of initiative within the framework of the commander's intent. In practice, effective execution is sought through adequate communication of intent using mission type orders. Key terms associated with the mission oriented concept are mission, task, purpose and intent. For common understanding, these terms will initially be defined as follows:

Mission = Task + Purpose¹
Task = A measurable activity [what]²
Purpose = The result desired [why]³
Intent = Purpose⁴

Using this common basis, evidence exists which suggests

that both the doctrine and its application fall short of the Army's desire to exercise mission oriented command and control.

Observations from the National Training Center (NTC) indicate there is a problem with intent communication and effective execution. An examination of tactical operations orders produced by units training at the NTC reveals that the restated mission statements in these orders often appear to exclude the purpose of the task or provide a purpose which is not within the intent of the higher commander. Furthermore, it appears that even if the purpose of the task is adequately expressed, subsequent execution may accomplish the assigned task but not always the intent. The central issue is the relationship between the higher commander's intent and the assigned subunit tasks with the subordinate's restated mission statement. The subordinate must discern a purpose for the specified task. In essence, it is the dilemma of specified task and implied commander's intent.

The purpose of this paper is to determine how, if at all, the five paragraph field order should be altered to enhance communication of the commander's intent. To achieve this end, a threefold analysis is used. First, theoretical propositions are examined regarding the relationship between adequate

communication of intent and effective execution. Second, a historical comparison traces the development of the intent communication process with particular emphasis given to the evolution of the German and American methods. Finally, a contemporary analysis of intent communication in the U.S. Army is conducted within the context of mission oriented orders. Both the doctrine and its application are examined. Evidence consists of unit orders, taped after action reviews (AARs) and unit Take Home Packets (THPs) produced at the NTC. The orders are examined to identify the presence or absence and appropriateness of the commander's intent, mission statement and subunit tasks. Review of the AARs and THPs will determine if the intent and or the assigned tasks were accomplished. Observations from this examination are used to identify alternative modifications to the five paragraph field order which will more effectively express intent. Conclusions from this analysis are then used to develop several suggestions which may enhance the Army's mission oriented doctrine.

Part II - Theoretical Background - The Intent

An insight to propositions regarding the relationship between adequate communication of intent

and effective execution maybe gained by examining the writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and J. F. C. Fuller.

Sun Tzu's fundamental factors for appraising war and his five circumstances for predicting victory emphasize the importance of a common intent or purpose. In assessing the first fundamental factor of war, moral influence, Sun Tzu focuses on "... that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders...."⁵ This harmony between the people and their leaders describes a unity of purpose which is again highlighted as a circumstance for predicting victory. Specifically, "he whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious."⁶ Without unity of purpose, confusion reigns and leads to victory for the enemy. Simply stated, victory stems from unity of purpose.

Clausewitz establishes a strong link between intent and execution, and reinforces the primacy of purpose established by Sun Tzu. Two passages serve to illustrate this point. First, in addressing the relationship between politics and war, Clausewitz states that "the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."⁷ The second comes from his discussion on war plans:

No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to

conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.⁸

While emphasizing the relationship between intent and execution at the strategic and operational level, Clausewitz maintains this thread down to the tactical level and points out that " ... every engagement, large or small, has its own particular purpose which is subordinate to the general one."⁹ The message is clear. Effective execution requires an understanding of the purpose - the means must be linked to the intent.

J.F.C. Fuller places certainty of purpose as the foundation for all plans and a prerequisite to exercising initiative. According to Fuller, the first step in planning is to make certain of the purpose and constantly keep it in mind.¹⁰ With unity of purpose, Fuller reasons that a commander is able to achieve a centralization of will which permits true initiative to be exercised.¹¹ He further states that a subordinate who understands the purpose is expected to use his initiative when:

If, in the opinion of the leader, the plan has, through change in conditions, become inoperative, then he ceases to be a leader and becomes, for the time being, an independent commander and he must act as if he were a general-in-chief. That is to say, he must replace the inoperative plan by an operative one ...¹²

In summary, the heart of planning is unity of purpose which provides the lifeblood to initiative and effective execution.

Several major themes emerge from a synthesis of these theoretical propositions. First victory is the result of unity of purpose. Second, unity of purpose is achieved through a clear understanding of intent. Third, initiative and effective execution require unity of purpose. Taken together, one basic principle can be identified. The principle is unity of purpose; and its rule is that clear communication of intent is necessary for effective execution.

Part III - Development of the Mission Oriented Order

The concept of mission oriented orders has been present for decades; what has changed is its doctrinal definition and emphasis. The significance of these changes can be recognized by tracing the development of the mission oriented order in both the German and American Armies.

The German Experience

The German Army's doctrine of mission oriented orders has been an evolutionary process marked by consistency. This progressive approach is illustrated by comparing the 1933 German Field Service

Regulation, Troop Leading with the current 1972 German Army Regulation, Army Command and Control System.

Three areas are of particular interest to this study: mission and task, intent and intentions, and subunit missions.

The Germans distinguish between task and mission. Task refers to the performance required while mission includes both the task and its purpose. In both the 1933 and 1972 publications, the mission determines the tasks.¹³ However, two important points must be made. First, only mission essential tasks associated with the main objective are included in the mission statement¹⁴; and second, "the will of the superior must be expressed unequivocally in the mission [statement]."¹⁵ In effect, the mission was and still is an expression of task and purpose.

The commander's intent and intentions have also remained essential to effective execution. Here the Germans make several important distinctions which can be easily overlooked. One is that intent equals purpose - in that it expresses "the end to be achieved" (1933)¹⁶ or more currently, "the will of the superior" (1977).¹⁷ Second, intention does not equal intentions. Intention relates to the purpose of the command as a whole while intentions express the purposes of the tasks for the subordinate commands. This difference in

meaning is consistent in both documents. The 1933 version states:

As troops enter battle there must be no doubt in any commander's mind as to the intention of the high command.¹⁸

...it is often best for the commander to clarify his intentions to his subordinates...¹⁹

The 1977 edition parallels this difference in:

The major commander should ... inform his subordinate commanders personally and explain to them his intention.²⁰

The decision reflects the major commander's intentions...it contains the basic outline of the operation plan.²¹

These subtle differences between intention and intentions are not only significant, but essential to effective execution.

German doctrine emphasizes assigning missions to subordinate units. In line with the concept of providing intentions, the subordinates' missions, not just the tasks, are specified. Here again consistency is maintained between the 1933 and 1977 versions. The earlier document states that the operation order should contain "missions for the elements of the whole command."²² The 1977 edition continues this practice indicating that operation orders usually contain the missions of the subordinate forces.²³ To carry the point further, mission analysis focuses on understanding the assigned mission (task and purpose),

not on developing a restated mission statement
(discerning a purpose for a specified task).
Simply stated, THE MISSION IS ANALYZED - NOT CREATED!

The American Quest

In comparison to the Germans, the U.S. Army's doctrine of mission oriented orders has been marked by inconsistency. This trend becomes apparent by examining the development of FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, from 1932 to the current edition, fielded in 1984. Table 1 - Evolution of FM 101-5, is provided on the following page and traces the changes in those items related to mission oriented orders. Using this table, specific focus is given to three areas to illustrate the vacillation in U.S. Army doctrine - the definition of the mission, the relationship between task and purpose, and the content of sub-unit instructions.

The American definition of mission has undergone radical changes since 1932. In fact, three distinct definitions have been used. Originally defined as "assigned or deduced"²⁴ in 1932, this definition was slightly modified in 1940 to "assigned mission from higher."²⁵ This definition was significantly changed in 1950 to "a statement of the task and purpose"²⁶ and maintained in the 1954

Table 1 - Evolution of FM 101-5

Item	1984	1977	1968	1954	1950	1940	1932
Mission Defined	Task & Purpose (5-8)	Who, What, Why & Where as Appropriate (C-4)	Who, What, Why & Where as Appropriate (H-4)	Task & Purpose (91)	Task & Purpose (61)	Assigned Mission From Higher (90)	Assigned or Deduced Mission (45)
Commander's Decision	Who, What, When, Where, How & Why (E-8)	Who, What, When, Where, How & Why as Appropriate (B-21)	Who, What, When, Where, How & Why as Appropriate (C-7)	What, As Appropriate Who, When, Where, How & Why (94)	What, As Appropriate When, Where, How & Why (60)	What, When, How & Where (43)	Overall Intent. What, When, Where, How & Why (46)
Contents of Paragraph 2	Task(s) & Purpose (G-14)	Who, What, Why & Where as Appropriate (C-5)	Who, What, Why & Where as Appropriate (H-4)	Mission & Its Purpose NO SUB-PARAGRAPHS (118)	2 Parts: a. Mission b. What, When & Where (80)	2 Parts: a. Cdr's Decision - What & Where, How & Details of General Application (43) b. Details of General Application (43)	Multi-Part: a. Assigned Mission b. Cdr's Decision c. Details of General Application What, When, Where, How & Why (31)
Sub Unit Instructions	Tasks Specified (G-14)	Tasks Specified (C-6)	Tasks Specified	Tasks or Missions IAW Para 2 (118)	Tasks or Missions IAW Para 2 (80)	Missions IAW Higher Cdr's Decision or Assigned Mission (43)	Tasks IAW Para 2 (31)
Concept of Operation & Scheme of Maneuver	Cdr's Intent (G-14) includes Cdr's Decision (E-8); Clarifies Purpose	Should Clarify Purpose; Derived from Cdr's Decision (C-6)	May Clarify Purpose; Derived from Cdr's Decision (H-4)	Decision is Amplified to Concept of Operation (94)	Tasks or Missions IAW Para 2	Included in Paragraph 2 (43)	Included in Paragraph 2 (31)

edition.²⁷ However, the 1968 FM 101-5 redefined the mission to be "a clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished by the command ... normally contains the who, what, when, and, as appropriate, the why and where..."²⁸ Inclusion of the purpose, or why, was no longer required. The 1977 FM 101-5 (Final Approved Draft), which was never fielded, remained consistent with the 1968 definition.²⁹ With the publication of the current FM 101-5 in 1984, the definition of the mission returned to one that was very similar with the 1950 and 1954 editions: "... a clear, concise statement of the task (or tasks) to be accomplished by the command and the purpose to be achieved."³⁰ In brief, the U.S. Army's definition of the mission has undergone several significant changes. Depending on which time period is referenced, it has been defined as either that which is assigned, the task to be accomplished, or both the task and the purpose. Charitably one might conclude that the U.S. Army has always been mission oriented, it simply depends on how one defines mission.

Purpose has always described the 'why' of the task; however, emphasis linking the two has vacillated. The previous discussion of the definition of the mission provides some insight to this linkage; however, a clearer understanding can be gained by focusing on the content of the commander's decision. Both the 1932

and 1984 editions of FM 101-5 specifically state that the commander's decision includes both the 'what' (task) and the 'why' (purpose).³¹ On the other hand, from the 1940 through the 1977 versions, the commander's decision either did not include the purpose (1940), or included it "as appropriate" (1950, 1954, 1968 and 1977). Basically, the American army has swung back and forth between two schools of thought. One position is that the purpose is intrinsically related to the task - it provides the 'why' of the 'what'. The other position maintains that the relationship is situational - the 'why' is only provided as appropriate. This vacillating linkage between task and purpose is also reflected in the content of sub-unit instructions.

Since 1932, sub-unit instructions provided either the task, the mission, or the task or mission. Originally only tasks were provided (1932). By 1940, the doctrinal guidance was to provide sub-unit missions in accordance with the commander's decision. A middle position was taken in the 1950 and 1954 manuals which assigned tasks or missions to subordinate units. From 1968 on, the doctrine returned to the 1932 guidance of providing specified tasks. The doctrinal treatment of sub-unit instructions had come full circle.

In retrospect, the difference between mission

oriented orders and task oriented orders is a matter of definition. In the current vernacular, a mission oriented order provides the task and purpose while the task oriented order gives only the task. By the German definition we have wavered from mission to task and back to mission oriented orders. By our own account, we have always been mission oriented. Transcending the U.S. Army's definition of mission from 1932 to date, the issue is one of task and purpose versus task alone. In essence, we have been either purpose or task oriented. Whether the American Army's doctrinal definition of mission continues to vacillate or not, theory tells us that clear communication of intent is necessary for effective execution - success is achieved through unity of purpose.

Part IV - Intent Communication in the U.S. Army Today

The U.S. Army has achieved marginal success in practicing mission oriented command and control. The problem stems from two sources - confusing doctrine and inadequate communication of intent. Reflecting the doctrine, its application is also a mixture of mission oriented and task oriented orders.

The Disease

Confusing doctrine hinders the practice of

mission oriented orders. Both inadequate or confusing definition of terms and a mix of mission and task oriented doctrine contribute to this problem.

The lexicon associated with mission oriented orders lacks sufficient definition. Several areas in doctrine were found to be conflicting, unclear or insufficient. Specifically:

1. FM 101-5 and FM 101-5-1 differ in their definition of the term 'mission'.
2. The distinction between 'operation', 'task' and 'purpose' is unclear.
3. Terms used to describe a type of operation are not clearly distinguished.
4. The definition of terms used to describe a task often lack utility.
5. Words frequently used to describe the purpose are not identified nor defined.

Each of these areas are addressed separately, below.

FM 101-5 and FM 101-5-1 differ in their definition of the term 'mission'. FM 101-5 defines mission as "the task (or tasks) to accomplished by the command and the purpose to be achieved."³² FM 101-5-1 defines mission as "the primary task assigned to an individual, unit, or force. It usually contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and the reason therefore, but seldom specifies how."³³ These two definitions conflict because the FM 101-5-1 definition of mission describes the FM 101-5 definition of the

commander's decision.³⁴ FM 101-5-1 tends to be task oriented by stating that the mission is the primary task assigned with no reference its a purpose. Current usage favors the FM 101-5 definition.

The distinction between 'operation', 'task' and 'purpose' or 'intent' is unclear. JCS Publication 1 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and FM 101-5-1 are in agreement in their definition of operation, defining it as:

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical ... mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.³⁵

FM 101-5-1 maintains continuity with this definition in its description of defensive,³⁶ offensive,³⁷ retrograde,³⁸ deception³⁹ and security⁴⁰ operations. Yet in defining specific types of defensive operations such as defense in sector, defense of a battle position and defense of a strongpoint, the manual incorrectly refers to these as missions. The manual does clarify its definition for the remaining operations and clearly identifies the various types associated with them.

FM 101-5-1's treatment of task is unclear. The term 'task' is not defined, and the definitions of those tasks which are used in mission statements often lack utility. Without a clear definition, how is a

task distinguished from an operation or the purpose or intent? Practice at the NTC indicates that this is a problem. FM 25-100, Training the Force, is the only doctrinal publication found which gives an adequate definition. Task is defined as:

A clear defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities which contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions to other requirements.

This definition appears appropriate, but needs further refinement when referring to combat activities. Specifically, since the task contributes to the accomplishment of the mission, it should be associated with the remaining factors of METT-T; ie. the enemy, friendly force, terrain and or time. Using this definition of task, specific words used to describe tasks were examined to determine if they were described in measurable terms. Words selected for examination were taken two sources: first, from those frequently used in operation orders by units training at the NTC (a sample of these terms is provided as Appendix A - Order Evaluation); and second, those defined in FM 101-5-1. The list of tasks and purposes, and their frequency of use, were identified. This information is provided in Table 2 - Task and Purpose List, below.

Table 2 - Task and Purpose List

Task	# Used	%	Purpose	# Used	%
Seize	62	54	Prevent*	30	57
Destroy	22	19	Protect	7	13
Contain	10	9	Deny	4	8
Occupy	9	8	Support	4	8
Contact	2	2	Cause	3	6
Cover	2	2	Provide	3	6
Overwatch	2	2	Restore	1	2
Attrite	1	1	Portray	1	2
Block	1	1	TOTAL	53	102 **
Breach	1	1			
Clear	1	1			
Retain	1	1			
Fix	1	1			
TOTAL	115	102 **			

* Includes purpose of "no penetration" as prevent enemy from crossing a specific phase line or boundary.

** % rounded off to nearest whole number.

Of the terms used as tasks, three were not defined in FM 101-5-1: destroy, occupy and retain. The remainder were defined in varying degrees of utility, with few being in measurable terms. Block, contain and fix were found to be fairly well defined in useful terms as a task. Taken as a whole, both the term task and the words frequently used as a task need to be clarified in FM 101-5-1.

Purpose lacks doctrinal definition and intent lacks clarity. Consequently the two are considered either equal or separate and distinct. FM 100-5 supports the contention that purpose = intent. In describing the basic tenet initiative, FM 100-5 states

that if subordinates are to exercise initiative..., they must thoroughly understand the commander's intent."⁴² The manual further paraphrases this line under command and control by stating,

If an unanticipated situation arises, committed maneuver unit commanders should understand the purpose of the operation well enough to act decisively, ... doing what their superior commander would order done were he present.⁴³

However, FM 101-5-1 defines commander's intent as the "commander's vision of the battle - how he expects to fight and what he expects to accomplish."⁴⁴ This definition is void of any expression of purpose - there is no 'why'. In fact, it more accurately describes the concept of operation discussed in FM 101-5-1 and in FM 101-5. Additionally, it gives the impression that the commander's intent is a cloak that veils a commander telling his subordinates how to accomplish their task. When considered with the inadequate doctrinal treatment of operation and task, there is little wonder that the practice of using these terms shows a lack of understanding.

Current U.S. Army doctrine is a mixture of mission oriented and task oriented orders. The doctrine is mission oriented in that the operation order provides the task and its purpose in the issuing command's mission statement. FM 101-5 provides

specific guidance in this regard. Paragraph 2 (Mission) contains "a clear and concise statement of the task to be accomplished by the command and its purpose."⁴⁵ However, we are task oriented on several accounts.

First, FM 100-5 tends to be task oriented in its discussion on command and control. The manual reads "mission orders that specify **what** must be done without prescribing **how**..."⁴⁶ There is a notable absence of **why** in this description. The manual's focus is to state the task without providing its purpose.

Second, FM 101-5 fails to specify inclusion of the higher commander's mission or intent. In providing information about the issuing command's higher headquarters (paragraph 1b), the manual states that it "includes information concerning higher ... units, as applicable. Information should be limited to that which subordinate commanders need to know to accomplish their assigned mission."⁴⁷ The guidance is not clear as to whether the mission, the purpose or intent, or just the task of the higher headquarters is provided. If it is essential that a commander "must know the intention of the commander two levels above him",⁴⁸ then the guidance should be specific as to the content of the friendly higher unit information.

Third, our doctrine calls for providing only

tasks to subordinate units. Specifically, paragraph 3b (sub-unit instructions) provides "... the specific tasks to be accomplished by each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical missions ..."⁴⁹ Normally the mission essential task(s) can be found in this section, but the purpose associated with them is not called for. While it may be argued that paragraph 3a (Concept of Operation) provides the purpose for the subordinates' sub-unit instructions, the guidance in FM 101-5 focuses on providing the intent and clarifying the purpose of the operation for the unit at the issuing commander's level, not for the subordinate commands. To carry the point further, in describing mission analysis, FM 101-5 states that "the mission [task and purpose by the current definition] is assigned by the higher headquarters or is developed or deduced by the commander."⁵⁰ Yet nowhere in the manual does a single discussion, description or example of an operation order support this statement. In effect, these doctrinal examples illustrate the subordinate's dilemma of specified task and implied intent.

Thus, it is clear that the leaders in our Army are guided by a confusing mixture of mission and task oriented doctrine. With this dichotomy, attention now turns to how the doctrine is practiced.

The Symptom

Unit performance at the NTC reveals that there is a problem between adequate intent communication and effective execution. This problem was identified after examining 22 operation orders issued by units training at the NTC. These orders included 22 higher headquarters information sub paragraphs (paragraph 1b), 64 mission statements (paragraph 2), and 73 sub-unit instructions (paragraph 3b - only that statement which was mission essential). This information is summarized in Table 3 - Operation Order & Mission or Task Statements.

Table 3 - Operation Orders & Mission or Task Statements

Level of Order	# of Orders	# of Mission or Task Statements		
		Higher Para 1b(1)	Issuing Para 2	Subordinate Para 3b
Division @	3	3	3	12
Brigade	4	4	4	1
Battalion	15	15	15	60
Company	*	*	42	*
=====				
TOTAL	22	22	64	73

@ Division level order issued by NTC Operations Group.

* Company level mission statements were extracted from unit Take Home Packets. Missions and tasks for higher and subordinate units were not included in the packets.

These orders were evaluated to determine if they included a task and or a purpose. This data is provided in Appendix A - Order Evaluation.

From this data several problems were

identified. These problems are:

1. Frequent use of incomplete mission statements
2. Lack of clarity in expressing commander's intent
3. A predominant focus on task accomplishment
4. Intent expression diminishes at lower levels
5. Confusion with the terms operation, task and purpose

Mission statements are often incomplete at the battalion and company level. The data in appendix A - Order Evaluation was examined to determine if the statement included both a task and its purpose. The results of this comparison are provided below in Table 4 - Complete Mission Statements.

Table 4 - Complete Mission Statements

Level of Order	Higher Para 1b(1)	Issuing Para 2	Subordinate Para 3b
Division	3	3	9
Brigade	4	2	1
Battalion	6	4	0
Company	NA	3	NA
=====			
TOTAL	13	12	10

By comparing the number of complete mission statements with the number of mission or task statements provided in table 3 - Operation Order & Mission or Task Statements, several observations were made. First, only 19% of the statements in paragraph 2 of the operation orders included both a task and a purpose. Second, the percentage of complete mission statements decreased from the higher levels to the lower levels.

Third, the percentage of complete mission statements decreased from the higher unit information (paragraph 1b(1)) to the issuing units' mission (paragraph 2) to the subordinate unit instructions (paragraph 3b). This data is provided in Table 5 - Percentage of Complete Mission Statements, below.

Table 5 - Percentage of Complete Mission Statements

Level of Order	Higher Para 1b(1)	Issuing Para 2	Subordinate Para 3b	MEAN %
Division	100	100	75	83
Brigade	100	50	100	78
Battalion	40	27	0	11
Company	NA	7	NA	7
=====	=====	=====	=====	=====
MEAN %	59	19	14	

From this data, it is alarmingly apparent that mission statements at the battalion and company level are frequently incomplete.

Commanders at battalion and company level lack clarity in expressing their intent. This point can be demonstrated from two positions. The first addresses the school of thought that intent equals purpose and is, therefore, included in the mission statement as an expression of the desired result of the action. The second position is that the intent may be expressed in other parts of the order or could be

provided orally and not recorded in the written order. These positions are addressed separately.

When the commander's intent is expressed as the purpose of the mission statement, it is often excluded in the operation order. Using the data provided in appendix A - Order Evaluation, the mission statements were examined to determine the presence of a purpose or a task. This information is provided in Table 6 - Statements With Task or Purpose, below.

Table 6 - Statements With Task or Purpose

Level of Order	Higher Para 1b(1)		Issuing Para 2		Subordinate Para 3b	
	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose
Division	3	3	3	3	12	9
Brigade	4	4	3	3	1	1
Battalion	12	8	11	8	34	1
Company	NA	NA	32	6	NA	NA
=====						
TOTAL	19	15	49	20	47	11

By comparing this information with the number of statements provided in table 3 - Operation Order & Mission and Task Statements, several observations are made. First, only 31% of the mission statements in paragraph 2 of the operation orders included a purpose. Second, the percentage of mission statements which included a purpose decreased from the higher levels to the lower levels. This information is shown in Table 7 - Percentage of Statements With Task or Purpose, below.

Table 7 - Percentage of Statements With Task or Purpose

Level of Order	Higher Para 1b(1)		Issuing Para 2		Subordinate Para 3b		MEAN %	
	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose
Division	100	100	100	100	100	75	100	83
Brigade	100	100	75	75	100	100	89	89
Battalion	80	53	73	53	57	2	63	19
Company	NA	NA	76	14	NA	NA	76	14
=====								
MEAN %	86	68	76	31	64	15		

From this data, it is obvious that the commander's intent, if it is expressed as the purpose in the mission statement, is often excluded at the battalion and even more so at the company level.

When the commander's intent is expressed in portions of the order other than the paragraph 2 or is provided orally, evidence suggests that there is still a predominant lack of clarity. To examine this aspect, the THPs of over 30 rotations from 86-1 to 88-11 were reviewed. A sample of comments which were frequently made follows.

1. The Task Force actions and the intent for the Company/Teams on contact were inadequate.⁵¹
2. The staff planning process was characterized by a weak commander's guidance ... and communication of intent.⁵²
3. The commander generally reiterated the concept at the end of the order, but never clearly communicated his intent.⁵³
4. He [the task force commander] never enunciated the results each subordinate and each operating system must achieve and how these results combined to achieve the commander's intent and successfully complete the mission.⁵⁴

5. The commander must communicate his intent so that subordinates can use their initiative to achieve the required results. As the situation changes, they can adapt their plan to fit the situation and still achieve success.⁵⁵

Collectively, these documents highlight the problem. In brief, intent communication is inadequate at the battalion and company level.

There is a predominant focus on task accomplishment rather than meeting the commander's intent. This problem results from the intent not being clearly expressed, as discussed above. A review of tables 6 and 7 illustrates this point. Overall, the mission statements of the issuing unit provide the mission essential task 76% of the time, but the purpose is provided in only 31% of the statements.

Additionally, sub-unit instructions provided the task 64% of the time and the purpose only 15%. Of particular note in the battalion orders are the sub-unit instructions. 57% of the statements provided the task, but only 2% provided the purpose. In effect, the tendency is to specify the task and ignore its purpose.

The clarity of expressing intent diminishes at the lower levels. This problem is evident from the data previously presented, but deserves specific mention. Table 7 shows a general trend in this regard. Specifically, the percentage of statements including a

purpose rarely exceeds that of the next higher level. This trend is consistent within each level of order and between levels of orders. Stated another way, when the battalion order includes a purpose in its mission statement 53% of the time, then the company level mission statement includes it even less, as do the sub-unit instructions in the battalion order itself. Consequently, adequate communication of intent is significantly less at the lower levels. This failure to adequately communicate intent is compounded by a lack of clarity concerning tactical terminology.

The content of the mission statements indicates confusion of the terms 'operation', 'task', and 'purpose'. The most common form of confusion is to substitute an operation for the task and replace the purpose with the task. This leads to mission statements which sound like "attack to seize" or "defend to retain" which specify the task of the operation but fail to express the purpose for the task. Using the data in appendix A, the frequency of statements which expressed an operation in place of the task was determined. This information is provided in Table 8 - Operation Versus Task on the following page.

Table 8 - Operation Versus Task
(Number - # and Percent - %)

Level of Order	Higher Para 1b(1)		Issuing Para 2		Subordinate Para 3b		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Division	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brigade	0	0	1	25	0	0	1	11
Battalion	2	13	3	20	20	33	25	28
Company	NA	NA	10	24	NA	NA	10	24
=====								
TOTAL	2	9	14	22	20	27	31	19

From this data, it is apparent that a term for an operation is substituted for the task in approximately 20 - 30% of the mission or task statements in the operation orders. Additionally, this practice partially accounts for the absence of a purpose in these same statements.

Part V - Specified Intent - The Cure

The evidence suggests that mission oriented command and control can be enhanced through improvements in doctrine. This can be achieved by deconflicting and refining FM 101-5-1 and FM 101-5 to reflect a mission orientation.

Updating FM 101-5-1 can enhance intent communication by providing clear, concise definitions of terms normally associated with mission oriented command and control. Several areas warrant improvement.

Mission should be defined in accordance with FM 101-5. This definition highlights the importance of including the purpose of the mission essential task(s). Without this emphasis, the mission statement is task oriented; it constrains the subordinate's initiative to accomplishing the task rather than achieving the desired result should the task become inappropriate.

Task should be defined using FM 25-100 as a basis. In the absence of any definition in FM 101-5-1, this would certainly be an improvement. Here the focus should be on a measurable activity in terms of the enemy, friendly force, terrain and or time. A recommended definition would be:

Task: A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations which contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions. In operations, a task defines the specific result(s) a unit must achieve in terms of the enemy, the terrain, friendly force and or time. The task provides the 'what' of the mission.

With this definition, the task is a measure of effectiveness. It can be accomplished in varying degrees of effectiveness. As an example, the task 'destroy' the enemy can be accomplished from 0 to 100% - no losses to total annihilation. In effect, the degree to which a task is accomplished is a measure of quality. It is a means to achieve a purpose.

Purpose, intent - intention and intentions

should be defined to emphasize their relationship and utility. Purpose should be defined as the desired result of the task. In effect, it is a measure of performance of the end result which is either achieved or not. Intent should be the purpose associated with the mission essential task(s) of the command. In this vein, purpose would equal intent.⁵⁶ Consequently, the purpose of a non-mission essential task would not be considered as the commander's intent. Intentions then would refer to the purposes of the mission essential tasks assigned to subordinates. A commander who expresses his intent and intentions would be providing both the desired result of his command's mission essential task(s) [intent], and the desired results of his subordinates' mission essential task(s) [intentions], as they both relate to the whole operation. This linkage would imply that the mission essential purpose of a subordinate command designated as the main effort would be much the same as that of its higher command. The relationship between these terms is critical to understanding and implementing mission oriented orders.

The elements of the commander's decision should be specified and defined. Being a logical result of the commander's estimate, the commander's decision should reflect the commander's intentions and

contain the basic outline of the concept of operation. A refined version of the German model provides a good guide to the specific content as follows.⁵⁷

1. WHO: One's own unit to be named in its entirety.
2. WHY: The commander's intent is unequivocally stated to provide the mission essential purpose of the command and establish the connection with the intentions of the subordinate elements.
3. WHAT: The mission essential task(s) of the command which will result in accomplishing the commander's intent is clearly identified.
4. HOW: The commander's intentions for the subordinate elements are clearly stated by providing their mission essential purpose and task(s), the main point of effort and the integrated commitment of forces for the operation.
5. WHEN: The time of execution is to be stated.
6. WHERE: Area, direction or local objective are to be clearly designated.

The definition of operation should be refined to specify the different types of operations. FM 101-5-1 is close to the mark on this point. However, clarification is needed in the area of defensive operations. Specifically, the manual's description of defensive operations should be brought in line with that of the other operations. Additionally, a chart which identifies the various operations, tasks and purposes would be helpful to delineate between these

terms. An recommended chart is provided in Appendix B - Combat Operations, Tasks and Purposes.

Words normally used to describe tasks should be identified and defined as measures of effectiveness. As discussed previously, these terms must have utility as they relate to the purpose they are attempting to achieve. A list of recommended definitions is provided as Appendix C - Task Definitions.

Terms frequently used to describe the purpose should be identified and defined as measures of performance. The purpose is a "Go - No Go" proposition, you either achieve the purpose or you don't. It is the 'why' of the operation as it relates to the whole. Based on the experience at the NTC, it appears that there is a specific set of terms which is usually used to describe the purpose of a mission. However, because this area has yet to be explored in any great depth, it is recommended that additional study be conducted before these terms are completely identified and defined in our doctrine.

FM 101-5 can enhance intent communication when realigned with an updated FM 101-5-1 and by describing orders which are completely mission oriented. This would promote consistency and common understanding.

Several alternatives exist for improving the

mission oriented order. Recognizing that the current order is both mission and task oriented, attention turns to modification of the format and or content. Several possibilities exist. These alternatives are described below.

Alternative 1: (Modify content) -

- a. Provide the higher commander's intent as the purpose of his mission statement [Paragraph 1b].
- b. Provide the issuing commander's intent as the purpose of his mission statement [Paragraph 2 - Mission].
- c. Provide the issuing commander's intentions as the purpose for the mission essential task(s) assigned to subordinate units [these subordinate mission statements would be included in Paragraph 3a - Concept].
- d. Provide the purpose for non-mission essential tasks specified to subordinate units [Paragraph 3b - Sub-Unit Instructions].

Alternative 2: (Modify content) - Includes only a, b and c of alternative 1.

Alternative 3: (Change format and modify content) - Same content as alternatives 1 and 2 only the higher and issuing commander's intent would be provided as a separate subparagraph.

Each of these alternatives offers improved intent communication. The issue now becomes which is the most effective.

Three of the characteristics of a good combat order identified in FM 101-5 are clarity, completeness and brevity.⁵⁸ Using these criteria the varying merits of the alternatives can be identified. Clarity is improved in all the alternatives when using clearly defined terms from an updated FM 101-5-1. Completeness

is enhanced in all alternatives by providing missions, rather than just tasks, to subordinates. Brevity is better achieved by the first two alternatives which modify the content of existing format to express intent and intentions rather than the addition of more paragraphs. Whether or not the purpose for all tasks assigned to subordinates should be included may well be a matter of the time available. However, to communicate the commander's intent and intentions more effectively, the purpose of all mission essential tasks should at least be specified as in alternative 2. A recommended example of a mission oriented order is provided as Appendix D - Mission Oriented Order.⁵⁹

Two other doctrinal issues should be considered for added emphasis and inclusion in the doctrine - providing assumptions and levels of decision making.

Commanders should practice providing the assumptions on which the plan or order were based. Every plan and order is a projection of events which are to occur sometime in the future. Consequently, certain critical assumptions are always made with regard to the enemy, terrain, friendly force and time. Based on these assumptions, a commander analyzes and selects his course of action - the basis for his concept of operation. This concept is then expanded

with missions being assigned to subordinate units. As the battle unfolds, these basic assumptions prove themselves either right or wrong. Correct assumptions tend to indicate the operation is developing according to the original concept. Incorrect assumptions indicate that the situation is different from that envisioned. Without a knowledge of these assumptions, it is difficult for the subordinate to recognize that his superior commander's concept needs to be modified to meet the changing situation. With this knowledge, the subordinate is able to assess the concept against the situational realities and then consider and initiate appropriate action - action which may call for a modification or change of the assigned mission. FM 100-5 briefly mentions and supports this practice by stating,

If subordinates are to exercise initiative without endangering the overall success of the force, they must understand the commander's intent and the situational assumptions on which it was based [emphasis added].⁶⁸

These assumptions would be included in the operation order under paragraph 1d (Assumptions) just as they are for the operation plan. The benefits of providing the situational assumptions to subordinates are also to identify when a decision needs to be made and why. Knowing when and why to make a decision leads to the

question of what decision should be made.

Three levels of situational decision making exist which describe the dynamic relationship between the situational assumptions and the mission. A level I decision occurs when the situational assumptions are basically correct; the result is that the task and purpose remain unchanged. A level II decision occurs when the effect of the incorrect assumptions requires a change in the task, but not the purpose. The level III decision refers to situations where the magnitude of the assumptions' incorrectness forces a change in the purpose of the mission. A commander who changes his mission in a level III decision could replace it with the mission of the main effort of the parent unit, assume the mission of his immediate superior, or in extreme cases assume the mission of the command two levels up. In each case, a commander may or may not change the mission of some or all of his subordinate units. Conversely, subordinates are guided by the commander's intent throughout each level. These decision levels are summarized in Table 9 - Levels of Decision Making, below.

Table 9 - Levels of Decision Making

Level	Assumptions	Mission	
		Task	Purpose
I	Assumptions prove generally correct.	SAME	SAME
II	Effect of assumptions incorrect but friendly intent remains constant.	NEW	SAME
III	Assumptions are significantly incorrect, and original friendly intent is inappropriate.	SAME or NEW	NEW

It is in this light that mission oriented command and control takes on real meaning. Recognizing that combat is unpredictable, that effective execution requires initiative, and unity of purpose is essential to success; the ability to conduct this type of decision making is exactly what mission oriented command and control seeks to foster.

Part VI - Conclusions

Mission oriented command and control in the U.S. Army can be examined in the context of theory, doctrine and practice. Theory provides the foundation, doctrine the guide, and practice the experience. From the experience we are able to evaluate the effectiveness of application, and consider the appropriateness of the doctrine and the validity of the theory.

The U.S. Army's experience at the NTC indicates there is a problem with intent communication and effective execution. This problem appears to be the result of several factors. First, units frequently use incomplete mission statements. The statements exclude either the mission essential task or the purpose for this task. Second, commander's generally lack clarity in expressing their intent. Third, there is a predominant focus on task accomplishment at the expense of the purpose. Fourth, adequate intent communication significantly diminishes at the battalion and lower levels. Finally, there is a general confusion in terms which refer to an operation, task and purpose. The symptom is ineffective execution due to a misunderstanding of what is expected.

Confusing doctrine appears to be at least a partial cause of the problem. Inadequate definition of terms and a mix of mission and task oriented doctrine are the major contributors. Specifically, FM 101-5 and FM 101-5-1 define mission differently; the doctrinal distinctions between an operation, task and purpose are not clear; the terms used to describe types of operations are not clearly distinguished; terms used to define tasks often lack utility; and words frequently used to describe the purpose of a mission are neither identified nor defined. Additionally, the doctrinal

guidance for operation orders reinforces the practice of providing specified tasks with implied intent, particularly in the case of higher headquarters information and subordinate instructions. Confusing doctrine is, in part, the disease of inadequate intent communication and ineffective execution.

The deficiencies in our mission oriented doctrine warrant several remedies. Generally, inconsistencies between FM 100-5, FM 101-5 and FM 101-5-1 must be eliminated. Specifically, FM 100-5 should describe mission orders as an expression of what and why - both the task and purpose. FM 101-5's guidance for operation orders should be completely mission oriented. The manual should specify that the operation order provides the mission of the higher headquarters and assigns missions to subordinate elements.

FM 101-5-1 needs modification in several areas. First, mission should be defined in accordance with FM 101-5. Second, using the definition in FM 25-100 as the basis, task should be defined in terms of a measurable activity related to the enemy, friendly force, terrain and or time. Third, purpose, intent - intention and intentions should be defined to emphasize their relationship and utility. The purpose is a measure of performance - it is a "Go - No Go" proposition. This distinction is critical to any

mission oriented doctrine. Fourth, the elements of the commander's decision should be specified and defined. A review of the development of FM 101-5 reveals that there is a generation of soldiers in our army who were raised on a doctrine that professed that the elements of the commander's decision are the same as the mission statement. This cancer must be checked. Finally, terms used to describe operations, tasks and purposes must be identified and defined. The difference between them is critical for understanding and essential for effective execution. In sum, the cure is available, how long it will be before it takes effect is the question.

The U.S. Army's attempt to implement mission oriented command and control is well-founded, yet incomplete. Theory supports this concept, but observations from the NTC indicate we have a problem with its execution. The problem is not terminal. The symptoms to and disease of inadequate intent communication and ineffective execution have been diagnosed and can be cured.

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30. FM 101-5, (25 May 1984), p. 5-8.
31. FM 101-5, (26 September 1932), p. 46 and FM 101-5, (25 May 1984), p. 5-8.

32. FM 101-5 (25 May 1984), p. 5-8.

33. U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols. (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 21 October 1985), p. 1-47.

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37. Ibid., p. 1-52.

38. Ibid., p. 1-62.

39. Ibid., p. 1-22.

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55. Ibid.

56. U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Field Manual 1, Warfighting, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 6 March 1989), p. 71. This manual provides a concise description of the relationship between the mission, task, purpose and intent under the sub-title of 'commander's intent.' Specifically, "We achieve this harmonious initiative in large part through the use of the commander's intent. There are two parts to a mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason, or intent. The task describes the action to be taken while the intent describes the desired result of the action. Of the two, the intent is predominant."

57. HDv 100/200, Army Command and Control System, p. 3-17.

58. FM 101-5, (25 May 1984), p. 7-1.

59. Robert J. Tezza, "Teaching Mission Orders in Officer Advance Course Instruction: Reality or Myth?," (Master of Military Arts and Science thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1989), pp. 21 - 22. The example mission oriented order is an extract from Major Tezza's thesis. The original mission order example used by Major Tezza is taken from a Director, Combined Arms and Tactics Department, U.S. Army Infantry School, "Comments on Skills, Knowledge and Attitudes for Officers - DECISION PAPER, (Fort Benning, GA: Tactics Division CATD, U.S. Army Infantry School, 6 May 1988), Tab B, pp. 9 - 10.

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Appendix A - Order Evaluation

1. Division.

Order	Higher		Issuing		Subordinate	
	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose
1	Contain	Provide	Contain	Provide	Contain	Protect
2	Clear	Restore	Seize	Prevent	Seize	Prevent
3	Contain	Protect	Contain	Protect	Destroy	Support
					Attrit	Portray

2. Brigade.

Order	Higher		Issuing		Subordinate	
	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose
4	Destroy	Provide	Destroy	--	NA	NA
5	Seize	Protect	Contain	Prevent	NA	NA
6	Seize	Prevent	Seize	Prevent	NA	NA
7	Contain	Protect	*	Prevent	NA	NA

3. Battalion.

Order	Higher		Issuing		Subordinate	
	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose
8	Seize	--	Seize	--	Seize	--
9	Seize	--	Seize	--	Seize	--
10	*	--	*	--	*	--
11	Seize	Protect	Seize	Cause	Seize	--
12	Destroy	Protect	*	Deny	*	--
13	Destroy	Deny	--	Seize	--	--
14	Destroy	--	Destroy	--	--	--
15	Seize	--	Seize	--	Seize	--
16	Destroy	--	Destroy	No Pen	Occupy	--
17	Contact	--	Contact	--	Seize	Destroy
18	--	No Pen	--	No Pen	*	--
19	Seize	Cause	Seize	Cause	Seize	--
20	Destroy	No Pen	Destroy	No Pen	*	--
21	Block	Prevent	Destroy	--	Support	Breach
22	*	Prevent	*	Deny	*	--

NOTES: -- Item not clearly stated. Usually occurred when item was absent from the order.
 NA Information not available. This occurred when portions of the order were missing.
 * A type of operation was provided rather than a task (ie., defend in sector, attack, etc.).

Appendix A - Order Evaluation (Continued)

4. Company.

Order	Issuing					
	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose	Task	Purpose
23	Seize	--	Seize	--	Seize	--
24	Seize	--	Seize	--	Seize	--
25	*	No Pen	*	No Pen	*	--
26	Seize	--	Seize	--	Destroy	--
27	Destroy	--	*	--	*	No Pen
28	Seize	--	Seize	--	Seize	--
29	Destroy	--	NA	NA	Destroy	--
30	Seize	Support	Seize	--	Seize	Support
31	Occupy	--	Occupy	--	Occupy	--
32	Seize	--	Overwch	--	Destroy	Deny
33	Destroy	--	*	--	*	--

NOTES: -- Item not clearly stated. Usually occurred when item was absent from the order.
 NA Information not available. This occurred when portions of the order were missing.
 * A type of operation was provided rather than a task (ie., defend in sector, attack, etc.).

Appendix B - Combat Operations, Tasks and Purposes¹

OPERATION ²		TASKS ³	PURPOSES ⁴
Action	Type		
Offense	Deliberate Attack	Attrite	Cause the force or enemy
	Exploitation	Block	Deny the enemy
	Hasty Attack	Breach	Portray to the enemy
	Movement to Contact	Clear	Prevent the enemy
	Pursuit	Contact	Protect the force or object
Defense	Raid	Contain	Provide resources, space or time
	Defend a Battle Position	Delay	
	Defend in Sector	Destroy	Restore the force, object or terrain
	Defend a Strongpoint	Fix	
		Guard	Support the force
Retrograde	Delay	Occupy	
	Retirement	Retain	
	Withdrawal	Screen	
Security	Area Security	Secure	
	Cover	Seize	
	Guard	Suppress	
	Screen		
	Area Reconnaissance		
Deception	Route Reconnaissance		
	Zone Reconnaissance		
	Demonstration		
	Display		
	Feint		
	Ruse		

- NOTE: 1 - This list is not intended to be all inclusive, but attempts to include terms which are more frequently used.
- 2 - The Operations (actions and types) were taken from FM 101-5-1.
- 3 - Tasks were taken from FM 101-5-1 and those used in operation orders at the NTC.
- 4 - Purposes were taken from unit operation orders used at the NTC.

Appendix C - Task Definitions

1. ATTRITE: A task to incrementally destroy enemy personnel and or equipment.
2. BLOCK: A task to prevent enemy forces from going or moving to a particular location or in a particular direction.
3. BREACH: A task to create a gap or lane in an obstacle, enemy position or fortification.
4. CLEAR: A task to remove all enemy forces and obstacles from a piece of terrain.
5. CONTACT: A task to establish the presence of a force or object by physical, visual, thermal, electronic or other means.
6. CONTAIN: A task to confine enemy forces to a particular geographical area; less restrictive than fix by not requiring elimination of enemy freedom to maneuver.
7. DELAY: A task to prevent the enemy from conducting an action prior to a particular time or event.
8. DESTROY: A task to render a force or object useless through the killing of enemy personnel and or the destruction of equipment or vehicles.
9. FIX: A task to eliminate an enemy force's freedom of maneuver; any attempt to move or reposition will expose the fixed force to accurate and effective direct fires.
10. GUARD: A task to protect a force or object by preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire on the force or object.
11. OCCUPY: A task to physically place a force on a piece of terrain.
12. RETAIN: A task to maintain possession and prevent enemy occupation of a specified piece of terrain.
13. SCREEN: A task to protect a friendly force or object through surveillance, providing early warning to the friendly force, impeding and harassing the enemy with indirect fires and destroying enemy reconnaissance elements within its capability. A screening force is not to become decisively engaged unless specifically

ordered to do so.

14. SECURE: A task to prevent enemy observation, direct fires and use of a piece of terrain; does not require physical occupation by friendly force.

15. SEIZE: A task to occupy and secure a piece of terrain.

16. SUPPRESS: A task to prevent effective enemy direct fires from a specific force or piece of terrain.

Appendix D - Mission Oriented Order

1. Situation.

a. Enemy. The enemy situation must reflect the commander's significant deductions on the enemy and terrain as they apply to his unit.

b. Friendly. The mission (task and purpose) of higher and adjacent units.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

d. Assumptions. The commander's key assumptions about the enemy, terrain and or friendly force which form the basis for his decision.

2. Mission. A clear, concise statement of the task(s) (mission essential) and its purpose (commander's intent).

3. Execution.

a. The concept of operation reflects the commander's decision. It describes "how" the unit is going to generate the effects of combat power. At a minimum, it will:

- provide the commander's intentions by specifying the missions (mission essential tasks(s) and purposes) of the subordinate elements.

- identify the subordinate unit that is the main effort. Successful accomplishment of the main effort's mission should result in successful accomplishment of the mission of the commander issuing the order. Supporting efforts should create conditions favorable for the success of the main effort.

b. Sub unit instructions should provide missions (specified non-mission essential tasks and purposes) to subordinate elements. Missions to combat support assets should be in harmony with the results to be achieved by the main and supporting efforts.

4. Service Support. Provided distribution plan and allocation of combat service support resources consistent with the results to be achieved by the main and supporting efforts.

5. Command and Signal. Identifies the methods (position of commander) and means (signal information) to ensure subordinate actions are consistent with the commander's mission and identification and correction of subordinate behavior inconsistent with the commander's intent.