Anticipation and Improvisation: The Firebase Concept in Counterinsurgency Operations
Abstract
Trends in international relations indicate that the United States must prepare to support friendly nations in repelling internal and external threats by assisting them in undertaking essential political, social, and economic reform. At the same time, the U.S. must deter third world conflict by preparing to confront aggressors decisively, swiftly, and with discrimination. Consequently, the U.S. Army must prepare to wage counterinsurgency warfare and counterguerrilla operations. FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations defines current Army counterguerrilla doctrine. It describes the characteristics of of insurgencies, the fundamentals of counterguerrilla operations, and the utility of the operational support base (fire base) in facilitating command and control fire support, and logistics. This monograph examines the effectiveness of the fire base concept in generating and projecting combat power in counterinsurgency operations. It focuses on the value of the fire base in three counterguerrilla operations: strike campaigns, consolidation campaigns, and fire base defense. Using Huba Wass de Czege's combat power model as criterion for analysis and the Vietnam War as an example of counterinsurgency, it is possible to assess the beneficial and detrimental effects of the fire base concept on combat power. Keywords: Low intensity conflict; Counterinsurgency; Vietnam; Infantry tactics.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 12, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA225455
Entities
People
- Randy J. Kolton
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College