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Tactical Implications of the U.S. Army's Insurgent
War Theory and Counterinsurgent Doctrine

A Monograph
by
Major Francis X. Kinney
Infantry

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE US ARMY'S INSURGENT WAR THEORY AND COUNTERINSURGENT DOCTRINE.

By Major Francis X. Kinney, USA. 47 Pages.

This monograph departs from the premise that the US Army's counterinsurgent doctrine is radically different than its conventional doctrine. The monograph suggests that the doctrines and tactics used by an army to prosecute war must be congruent with its theoretical understanding of war. Furthermore, it suggests that success in applying doctrine is limited by what can be accomplished at the tactical level. Consequently, it seeks to establish the capabilities of US conventional forces to execute this alternate doctrine.

The monograph compares the unconventional and the conventional theories of war and describes the US Army's counterinsurgent doctrine. The purpose is to identify what tactical missions the security forces of a country must accomplish to effectively prosecute a counterinsurgency. The capabilities and limitations of US conventional forces are then assessed to see which of these missions they could realistically be expected to accomplish if committed in a direct combat role in a counterinsurgency.

The monograph concludes that US conventional forces are limited in what they can accomplish in a counterinsurgency. These limitations are a function of their focus on conventional operations, their inability to acquire intelligence on covert organizations, and of the advantages that accrue to an unconventional force acting on familiar terrain. It also concludes that US forces can be profitably committed against a Phase III insurgency - particularly when the insurgents are using conventional tactics. In these circumstances, US forces can be successful in preventing insurgent victory - that is the armed overthrow of a government. Furthermore, the monograph suggests that prior to commitment of US forces, US decision makers must conclude that the foreign government fighting the insurgency has the potential of prosecuting an effective counterinsurgency following the stabilization of the situation. They must also decide how to treat guerrilla sanctuaries in adjacent countries.

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I - INTRODUCTION

It is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy....this way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them.

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature.¹

The implications of this quote from Clausewitz's On War are that the theories and doctrine that dictate how a nation conducts a war must be appropriate to the type of conflict it participates in. The point is that just because we have a theory of war, a given doctrine, and supporting tactics that have been proven in past conflict or for the next one based on simulations and exercises, doesn't mean that they will be effective in other circumstances. This is my concern about insurgent warfare. It appears that the purpose of this type of war and the circumstances under which it is conducted are so different from the conventional wars we prepare for, that perhaps our general purpose forces with their conventional focus and current organization may not be effective as a counterinsurgent force.

It can also be inferred from this quote that an army must not only identify the unique threats posed by each type of war, but also prepare itself to address those threats.

At present, the U.S. Army recognizes that it faces diverse threats that are spread across a spectrum of intensity.² At the high end of that spectrum is the threat posed by the mechanized forces of the Soviet Union. At the low end, the threat is posed by less sophisticated adversaries in immature theaters. Another way that these threats are categorized by the Army is by likelihood of occurrence. The Soviet threat is considered a 'low probability' one. "High probability conflict,"³ (a term that was popular with General Woerner, the former SOUTHCOM Commander) describes the more common types of conflict, to include insurgency and terrorism. Thus, a problem that faces the US Army is how to prepare for a multiplicity of threats, where the least likely one is ostensibly the most dangerous, and the most likely is arguably the least threatening.

Insurgent conflict represents a threat to the United States, and hence is one that the US Army must be prepared to deal with. The seriousness of this threat is demonstrated by its prevalence since World War II. Insurgencies have toppled U.S. Allies in China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua. In this same period, insurgencies have also threatened regimes friendly to the United States in the Philippines, Brazil, Guatemala, Greece, and El Salvador.

Perhaps a non traditional dimension of this threat is our inability as a nation and as an armed force to come to

grips with it. It may not be that insurgencies per se are threatening, it may be instead that the inability to deal with them decisively and effectively is what makes them dangerous. This inability to cope with insurgency is illustrated by Vietnam, where the South Vietnamese government was unable to stand up to the North Vietnam backed insurgency, and by the ongoing civil war in El Salvador, where despite the influx of American aid and advisers, the Government has been unable to break the stalemate.⁴

It may seem odd to suggest that the US Army has failed to come to grips with the nature of the threat posed by insurgencies. After all, it has participated directly in counterinsurgencies in the Philippines at the turn of the century and in Vietnam during the 60s and 70s. It has also taken on advisory roles in countries fighting insurgencies. Greece and El Salvador serve as examples. Nevertheless, the question that remains to be answered is: Is the US Army prepared to adequately address the threat posed by insurgency?

In order to answer this question, I will examine the Army's theoretical understanding of insurgent conflict and its counterinsurgency doctrine. I will identify from this examination the tactical missions that the security forces of a country must accomplish to successfully prosecute a counterinsurgency. Finally, I will assess the capabilities

and limitations of our conventional forces to see which of these missions they can accomplish if assigned a direct combat role in an insurgency. This question is relevant because our forces have been committed in the past in counterinsurgencies and the possibility of their future commitment exists. 5

II - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY, DOCTRINE & TACTICS

There is a hierarchical linkage between theory, doctrine, and tactics. Theory provides an understanding of war, defines its purpose, and describes how victory is to be attained; in Clausewitz's words, theory studies "the nature of ends and means."⁶ Doctrine is derived from this theoretical understanding and provides principles and guidelines for the conduct of operations, battles, and engagements.⁷ Finally, tactics are the actual putting into application of the values and beliefs that are held about warfare.⁸

Despite this hierarchical relationship in which theory occupies the dominant position and tactics the subordinate one, there must also be an ascending reverse relationship among the three. A doctrine is of little use if it is not executable. Doctrine is not executable when there are faulty tactics or procedures, inappropriate forces, or poorly trained forces.⁹

III - CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

There are four basic schools of strategic thought: the continental, the maritime, the aerospace, and the revolutionary.¹⁰ The first three schools borrow from the theories proposed by Clausewitz. I will classify them as conventional schools. I will consider the last of the four, the revolutionary school to be unconventional. The conventional theories share similar concepts. They hold that the centers of gravity of the combatants are their respective armed forces.¹¹ They advocate both direct and indirect strategies. In the former, the objective is the enemy force. In the latter, the objective is to paralyze the force by undermining its ability to fight effectively.¹² They also normally consider warfare as being interstate conflict.¹³ One other salient feature of these schools of strategic thought is their characterization of the relationship between political goals and the actions of the armed forces. At the strategic level of conventional war, political considerations are dominant. Yet at the operational and tactical levels of war, military considerations are normally predominant. There are exceptions, especially when the use of nuclear or chemical weapons is contemplated.

The unconventional school differs from the other three in that its focus is on the socio-political arena instead of the military.¹⁴ Furthermore, it recognizes that the conflict

is predominantly intrastate, even though it doesn't exclude the influence of external actors or of the international situation.¹⁵ It also defines the term center of gravity in a different way. Here, the struggle is characterized as a zero sum game in which both sides are competing for a shared center of gravity.¹⁶ Different terms are used to describe this center of gravity, including legitimacy, popular support, and political power.¹⁷

Another significant difference between the conventional and unconventional schools of thought is that in the former the primacy of political considerations extends from the strategic level to both the operational and the tactical levels of war. Thus, whereas in conventional conflict the tactical decisions of a platoon leader are probably politically insignificant, in insurgent war a single act of commission (such as the acts of atrocities committed by Lt Calley's platoon in My Lai) can be a turning point because of its political significance. In a similar way, an act of omission (such as the failure of the Israeli Defense Forces to secure the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in 1982) can also have operational or strategic ramifications.

The conventional and unconventional schools of strategic thought also differ in their characterization of success. Conventional theory holds that victory in war comes about by defeating the armed forces of the adversary.¹⁸

Unconventional theory holds that victory comes about by depriving the other side of its legitimacy. The insurgents seek victory through other ways because they are not capable of defeating the armed forces of the government they are seeking to overthrow. While Clausewitz suggested that such alternate strategies existed:

It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy's forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.¹⁹

Clearly, he expected that these alternate strategies would be the exception, not the norm.

IV - THE US ARMY'S THEORY OF INSURGENCY AND DOCTRINE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

The US Army has interpreted the theory of insurgent war as follows: It holds that insurgent success is dependent on the ability to exploit systemic weaknesses within a particular country.²⁰ It suggests that the most dangerous and most difficult insurgency to defeat is the mass-oriented, which was described by Chairman Mao's three phase paradigm.²¹

During Phase I of this model, the focus of activities is on organization.²² The insurgents are establishing their infrastructure, developing their themes, and cementing their ties with the population. During Phase II, the emphasis is

on guerrilla actions.²³ The insurgency's armed element conducts more frequent guerrilla operations against the government to sway popular support and to undermine the government cause. Finally in phase III, the emphasis is on conventional operations by regularly constituted forces.²⁴ In this phase, the insurgent cause has gained so much strength that it is able to field forces that can capture and retain terrain and who seek to militarily defeat the armed forces of the government. Their purpose is to overthrow the government and install the insurgent leadership.

The following description of a Maoist insurgency by General Galvin summarizes how the US Army perceives these insurgencies:

The insurgent movement - at the outset too weak militarily to seize political control of the country - focuses first on destroying civic responsiveness to the state, and then on eroding the effectiveness of the military and the administrative establishments. Meanwhile, the insurgents seek to develop their military arm to the point where it can effectively challenge the regular forces in conventional battles supported by guerrilla operations and terrorism.²⁵

Thus, each phase of a Maoist insurgency is characterized by a focus on different types of activities. Furthermore, it is held that an insurgency can move back and forth between stages, or even be in different stages simultaneously.²⁶ What this means is that if an insurgent is defeated in Phase III, he has not lost. He can revert to Phase II and prepare for Phase III again.

The U.S. Army has developed a counterinsurgent doctrine that derives from these theoretical conclusions about the nature of insurgent conflict. Two key components of this doctrine are the acronyms IDAD and FID. The former refers to Internal Defense and Development,²⁷ the actions taken by a government to prevent an insurgency from occurring in its own country (proactive measures),²⁸ or to defeat an ongoing insurgency and to eliminate the conditions that allowed the insurgency to make headway in the first place. The latter refers to Foreign Internal Defense - the actions taken by a foreign government to assist another government in its IDAD efforts.²⁹

The Army's doctrine suggests that the most effective counterinsurgency strategy is that which prevents an insurgency from occurring by alleviating the socio-political conditions that provide the fertile environment in which an insurgency can grow.³⁰ If however an insurgency is already underway, the Army's doctrine suggests that the chosen strategies to combat the insurgency should correspond to the particular phase of the insurgency.³¹ Thus, counterinsurgency is essentially a defensive proposition. It is defensive because it is not only a response to societal flaws that have been exposed and taken advantage of by an insurgency, but also because the strategies and measures chosen depend on the insurgents' capabilities.

A second influence on the development of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine has been its own experience. A body of institutional knowledge developed as the result of participation in the Greek Civil War and the Vietnam War, and more recently as a result of our experience as advisers in El Salvador. Experience unfortunately is not always a salutary influence. It can, for instance, be misinterpreted and lead to the development of erroneous doctrine.³² At other times, methods that were useful or successful in one insurgent situation are transplanted to another one, neglecting the basic principle that insurgent warfare, unlike its conventional counterpart, is characterized by the uniqueness of each occurrence and not by the presence of universal truths and principles.³³

A third influence on the Army's counterinsurgent doctrine has been the presence of political constraints. The protracted nature of these conflicts, the difficulty of making consistent and visible progress, together with the often unsavory aspects of the violence perpetrated by both sides make it politically difficult for the US to maintain a consistent and supportable stance in such a struggle.³⁴ Consequently, the Army's doctrine has incorporated stated policy (such as the Guam Doctrine)³⁵, and anticipates similar constraints in the future. Thus, our doctrine states that the use of US forces in a combat role is an "exceptional event."³⁶ Instead, a counterinsurgent effort is assisted by

US forces that provide "...military training, technical training, and intelligence and logistical support."³⁷

The current Army doctrine on insurgent conflict can be summarized as follows: The most important step is for the threatened government to develop a coherent counterinsurgent strategy that addresses the socio-political ills that allowed the insurgency to prosper in its country. This strategy must include necessary social, political and economic reforms to legitimize the government and undermine the insurgent's effort. Simultaneously, the government must conduct military operations to protect its population and infrastructure from attack by the insurgents. But this military effort must be subordinated to the overall national strategy. The role of the US Army is to provide technical and tactical assistance and advise as necessary and in extreme circumstances only, to commit conventional forces to conduct combat operations against the insurgent force. What is readily evident is that the Army's counterinsurgent doctrine is primarily intended for other countries. It does not really describe how the US Army conducts counterinsurgencies; instead, it suggests how foreign governments should do so. Only a small portion of it applies to US combat forces.

V - THE TACTICS, STRENGTHS, AND WEAKNESSES OF THE INSURGENT

During Phase I, the insurgent is faced with the task of developing a theme that capitalizes on real or perceived grievances within the society.³⁸ Thus, the insurgent must use psychological techniques and propaganda to gain converts to his cause.³⁹ Furthermore, the insurgent must recruit adherents and organize his infrastructure. In order to intimidate opponents, the insurgent is also likely to use tactics such as murder, bombings, and 'peoples trials.' To gather resources such as money and weapons, the insurgent is likely to commit bank robberies and raids on such facilities as police stations or isolated garrisons.⁴⁰ All these tactics and techniques share the purpose of strengthening the insurgent infrastructure.

In Phase II, the insurgent relies principally on guerrilla operations by its armed elements. He conducts the following types of activities: ambushes of government security forces; sabotage of critical fixed installations; temporary occupations of towns; traffic blockades; and any other actions that can demonstrate insurgent strength and governmental weakness. The purpose of these activities is to create a perception of government ineptness and insurgent strength, in order to convince the population that it is the insurgent cause that merits support. The insurgents will normally avoid being fixed in decisive engagements by the

government security forces, and will not attempt to hold terrain.⁴¹

In Phase III, the insurgents field an armed force that seeks conventional battle in order to destroy the armed forces of the government. According to Mao Tsetung, the role of the guerrilla force becomes secondary. Its purpose is to "support regular warfare and to transform itself into regular warfare."⁴² The insurgent armed force uses conventional offensive tactics to "capture key geographical and political objectives in order to defeat the enemy."⁴³ It also uses conventional defensive tactics to retain terrain it captures or to deny the enemy access to 'liberated areas.'

This three-phased strategy is a protracted one. Its intent is to effect "a continual change in the difference in comparative strength and hence in the relative position of the two sides."⁴⁴ It must be protracted because at the outset the insurgents are materially inferior to the government forces. But time isn't always on the side of the insurgent. The counterinsurgent can also use it to his advantage.⁴⁵

The weaknesses of the insurgent vary in each phase. In Phase I, the insurgent is at his weakest as he tries to establish a viable organization. He is particularly vulnerable to penetration as he expands his membership. Another weakness is that the themes he is attempting to

develop are vulnerable to counterpropaganda and psychological operations by the government. The insurgency's center of gravity in this phase is its covert infrastructure. In particular, its cadre of leaders who are the organizational glue.

In Phase II, the insurgent does not have sufficient armed might to face the regular forces of the government. Hence, he must rely on secrecy and surprise. Another problem that he has is that his caches and bases of operation must be undetectable or unreachable. This means that he must locate them outside the country, in isolated areas, or keep them small. Because he cannot defend a location, he is dependent on continuous access to his source of supply and support. If these can be identified, they can be interdicted. His key weaknesses in this phase are thus his inability to stand up to regular forces, and the fragility of his sustainment base. The center of gravity of the insurgency in this phase lies in its sources of supply and support. In many insurgencies, that source of strength is its domestic popular support. It is in this stage that the struggle over the shared center of gravity is most important. In Phase III, the insurgent force shares the same weaknesses of a regular force; it can be seen, it has fixed facilities it must defend, and it can't abandon the battlefield as a guerrilla force can. Its center of gravity is now its armed forces.

During Phases I and II, the strength of the insurgency is derived from its ability to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Its advantages accrue primarily from its ability to avoid detection and to achieve surprise. The guerrilla must capitalize on these advantages to be able to muster superior force at the times and places it chooses to act. In Mao's words: "Fight when you can win, move away when you can't win."⁴⁶ Another advantage is its ability to prevent government forces from surprising it. In Phase III, the insurgent cedes these advantages in order to accelerate the revolution and to further legitimize his cause. His only advantages will derive from superior strength, tactics, and the ability to seize and maintain the initiative. However, none of these advantages accrue automatically to him.

Initiative, the one advantage that normally belongs to the guerrilla, is not the result of superior mobility or agility. It is instead the result of his ability to camouflage his intentions and dispositions by relying on tacit and overt cooperation from the population in the area of operations.⁴⁷ If the guerrilla loses this advantage, he has lost his edge. This guerrilla superiority stems from the fact that the intelligence cycle of the counter guerrilla force is too long. By the time the counterinsurgent force has picked up the indicators and analyzed them, the guerrilla force has already conducted its strike against the selected target. The guerrilla advantage is maintained by preventing

the conterinsurgent forces from discovering its aims or preparations in time to react to them.⁴⁸

One final advantage of insurgent forces is that they are not susceptible to the efforts of forces that focus on conventional centers of gravity until the insurgent forces resort to conventional operations in Phase III:

Without the well-defined military unit structure and with a set of tactics and operational principles dependent upon small actions and the erosion of confidence in the efficiency and fairness of the government in power, the insurgent forces are not as susceptible to destruction in the field or demoralization at the command level as the conventional armies considered by Clausewitz Destruction, annihilation, and demoralization are almost irrelevant to the task of eroding the insurgents' base of support among the civilian population or the isolation of the fighters from the politically oriented segment of the insurgent movement.⁴⁹

VI - THE TACTICS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

The security forces of the counterinsurgent have three basic operations that they must perform. The first of these is penetration of the insurgent organization.⁵⁰ This requirement is a continuous one that spans all phases of an insurgency. The other two tasks are offensive operations to destroy insurgent forces and defensive operations to prevent the insurgent forces from either attacking fixed targets or gaining access to the population or to resources.⁵¹ The offensive operations are often classified as Search and Clear or Search and Destroy operations.⁵² Offensive and defensive military operations will gain in

importance as the insurgents increase their ability to use force. If the insurgents eventually resort to conventional operations, offensive and defensive operations will become paramount.

In Phase I, while the insurgent organization is most vulnerable and has not yet developed an ability to conduct extensive armed actions, the security forces should concentrate on penetrating the covert infrastructure as it attempts to establish itself.⁵³ The tactics available to the security force include the infiltration of agents, the paying of informers, and the detainment and interrogation of suspicious persons. The skills required of the force are primarily police related.⁵⁴ Obviously, the force must be extremely familiar with the region; be able to assimilate itself into the population; be able to distinguish between insurgent, insurgent sympathiser, and government supporter; and be able to attract and retain the support of the local populace.

During Phase II, when the insurgents resort to guerrilla activities, the security forces must conduct offensive operations in order to find and destroy insurgent combat units which have the capability of interfering with government activities.⁵⁵ These military operations, whose intent is to eliminate local guerrilla forces and to disrupt the insurgent infrastructure, must be accompanied by political operations

that will contribute to the process of regaining control of the population.⁵⁶ The security forces will also be required to conduct defensive operations. These are conducted not as an economy of force measure, but because the security forces are unable to determine where and when the insurgents will strike. Defensive operations are also conducted to deny the guerrillas access to resources and to the population. ⁵⁷

The tactics which can be used effectively for the offensive operations include patrols, ambushes, raids, and attacks. The security forces must be familiar with the terrain, be able to identify and locate guerrilla forces, and finally must be able to seize the initiative from the insurgents. Tactics appropriate for the conduct of defensive operations include: the defense of fixed installations, escorting of convoys, conducting of perimeter and area patrols, establishing of curfews and other restrictions on movement, imposing of inspections and other techniques designed to control the flow of goods, and forming paramilitary self defense units.⁵⁸ The political tasks essential to the process of regaining governmental control need not be performed by the security forces, although they are often the only organization capable of performing them.

In Phase III, when the insurgent forces rely on conventional operations, the security forces must conduct normal military operations against the insurgent armed

forces. Conventional tactics and techniques for both offensive and defensive operations are appropriate. The security force must consider the enemy forces as the center of gravity and focus its efforts on destroying them.⁵⁹ To be successful, it must collect accurate and timely intelligence on the insurgents, take the initiative away from them, and defeat them in battle.

VII - COMMITMENT OF US FORCES IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY

Current doctrine states that US forces will only be committed to a counterinsurgent conflict as a matter of last resort;⁶⁰ that such a commitment to combat operations will be made only in exceptional circumstances when US national interests cannot be secured by other means.⁶¹ Such a situation could occur when it becomes apparent that a guerrilla force possesses the strength and capability to defeat an embattled government's armed forces in the field and the US desires to prevent that outcome.

The use of US conventional forces in direct combat is thus most likely in Phase III of an insurgency when the government's survivability is at stake. Perhaps the commitment of US forces during phase II of an insurgency is also possible if it appears that regime collapse could be precipitated by the guerrillas without them resorting to Phase III type activities. The commitment of US forces in non-combat roles in countries facing insurgencies is however considered routine by our existing doctrine.⁶²

These non-combat roles may include training and advising the armed forces of a government facing an insurgency, assessing the security needs of a country, and managing the US Security Assistance program to the country, providing humanitarian assistance and conducting civic action missions. These roles are normally accomplished by Special Forces units, by soldiers and officers assigned on an individual basis to Military Assistance and Advisory Groups, and by selected units from both the active and reserve components who rotate to the country temporarily to accomplish a particular task. However, these non-combat roles are not what I am addressing in this monograph.

It seems evident that the primary reason the US should intervene with combat forces is to prevent an insurgency from accomplishing one of its major objectives - the overthrow of the government in power. One of the principal indicators that regime collapse is imminent is the inability of the government to use force effectively.⁶³ Once this inability becomes apparent, as it did in Nicaragua in 1979 when the Sandinistas were leading an insurgency against the Somoza dynasty,⁶⁴ the US must decide whether to intervene directly with forces or to accept probable insurgent triumph.

Prior to making this decision, the US must also determine whether the commitment of US forces is sufficient

to prevent regime downfall. In the case of Nicaragua in 1979 for example, it was very unlikely that the dictator, Somoza, could have easily been kept in power. He faced not only an insurgency that was preparing to begin conventional military operations, but also a societal insurrection. He had already lost the support of just about every significant sector and group in the country.⁶⁵ The result of intervention by US forces on his behalf may have been war with the people of Nicaragua.

When the commitment of US forces is being considered, the subject of interdiction of resources and sanctuaries provided by foreign sponsors to the insurgents must also be addressed. If US forces are prevented from taking direct actions against a sponsoring country or from attacking out-of-country sanctuaries, then the cost of intervention goes up.⁶⁶ Obviously, attacking sanctuaries or foreign sponsors also drives up the cost of intervention. The policy maker must decide whether intervention can be successful or is worthwhile while sanctuaries remain inviolate, and whether he can afford to interdict them.

There is no rule that states that sanctuaries are inviolate. Only superior power guarantees their safety. During the Greek Civil War for example, the implicit threat of Soviet reaction to any direct attack on guerrilla sanctuaries in Albania and Yugoslavia was sufficient to

guarantee their viability.⁶⁷ More recent examples of insurgent sanctuaries deriving their protection from a strong patron include the CONTRAs whose sanctuaries in Honduras are guaranteed by the USA, and the UNITA and FRELIMO insurgents whose sanctuaries in South Africa were protected by that country. A sanctuary may also derive its safety from the unwillingness of the counterinsurgent to risk the international political consequences of striking out against them. An example of this situation is provided by the MUJAHEDIN sanctuaries in Pakistan and the Soviet reticence to attack them overtly.

VIII - TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMITTED US FORCES

Once a decision is made to commit US forces against an insurgency, it should become evident to both the strategic and the operational planner that the task at hand is primarily a military one; political imperatives should restrain the tactical commander as little as possible. After all, if the guerrilla forces are not at the very least contained, then the political agenda to resolve the reasons for the insurgency will never have a chance to be implemented. Thus, the purpose of committing US forces "in a counter guerrilla role is primarily to provide enough internal security to enable the host country to initiate counterinsurgency programs and pursue national objectives."⁶⁸

Current doctrine identifies the tactical tasks that US

forces may have to perform if committed in an insurgent situation. These missions include:

Interdicting of support from out of country sources, conducting security screens (so host nation forces can regain the initiative), or securing key facilities and installations, thus freeing host nation forces to reassume complete responsibility for combat operations. 69

These three tasks share the characteristic that they are not offensive, force-oriented operations. The intent is not to seek out and destroy insurgent forces, but instead to restrict their freedom of action to such an extent that the supported country's security forces can once again regain the initiative. The purpose is not to defeat the insurgents militarily, but to prevent them from defeating the government.

To successfully accomplish these missions the US forces must be capable of operating against both conventional and unconventional forces. This means that the intervening force must either be able to collect adequate intelligence on the enemy it faces, or be provided such information. Furthermore, the US forces must be able to identify and segregate guerrillas. If these basic tasks cannot be performed, the insurgent forces will be able to operate almost at will against the US forces.

Committed US forces will have the greatest difficulty in operating against an unconventional force. The guerrilla forces of mass-oriented insurgencies avoid defeat by

integrating themselves into the society in both urban and rural areas, eventually becoming capable of conducting coordinated, nation-wide offensives such as the one launched in El Salvador on 11 November 1989. Our current divisions, with their lack of language skills and their limited knowledge of the countries facing insurgency, will more than likely be ineffective against a sophisticated guerrilla organization of the type currently found in the Philippines, El Salvador, Peru, and Colombia - Even the security forces of those countries have been unable to seize the initiative from those organizations.

In addition to dealing with the inherent problems of acting in an alien culture against an elusive enemy, the US tactical commander has different planning considerations than he does in conventional conflict. For example, in addition to the standard considerations of METT-T (mission, enemy, troops available, terrain & time) the commander must also consider population - that is, how the local population will be affected by the planned operations. These considerations cause US forces to "function under restrictions not normally encountered in other types of warfare."⁷⁰ They may not be able to use all available means in the execution of assigned missions. For example:

The unrestricted use of firepower in the vicinity of civilians or their property will result in turning their anger towards the government and may turn them to the insurgent cause.⁷¹

This consideration will create problems for units that train to conventional standards where the collateral effects of weapons systems are not normally considered. An example of such a situation is provided by the use by American forces in Lebanon in 1982 of sixteen inch naval guns to engage insurgent positions in urban areas. It is not a transition that is easily made. It should always be remembered that all military operations conducted must be shaped by the "political, economic, or psychological objectives" that form part of the national counterinsurgent strategy.⁷²

The conditions of insurgent conflict also differ from conventional conflict in that there are ethical dilemmas which the conventional commander normally does not encounter:

Revolution has a morality and ethics of its own, subordinating everything to revolutionary success. Any means that are effective are morally acceptable ...The counterrevolutionary system may also manifest 'unusual' moral and ethical values of its own.⁷³

Examples of the ethical problems encountered in past counterinsurgencies are instructive. From the Moro insurgency in the Philippines, we have the example of General Franklin J. Bell, the US commander, ordering the execution of a prisoner for every assassination committed by the insurgents.⁷⁴ In Algeria, the French resorted to torture to extract time-sensitive intelligence from their prisoners.⁷⁵ In both Argentina and Uruguay, the security forces relied on 'disappearances' to get rid of captured

insurgents. They also used torture to pry information from prisoners on the clandestine and hard to penetrate cellular organizations that were conducting urban guerrilla warfare.⁷⁶

The ethical dilemma arises when the counterinsurgent commander considers more expedient (but normally illegal) ways of dealing with the insurgents. The temptation to rationalize the use of such tactics and techniques is apparently great. It is particularly difficult to fight an insurgent when his code of conduct doesn't correspond to that of the counterinsurgent. US conventional forces require specific training to operate in this ethically unconstrained environment. This is especially true because of the decentralized nature of operations in a counterinsurgency. Another My Lai cannot be allowed to happen.

Another difference in the conditions results from the nature of the enemy. A tactical commander is normally concerned with finding his conventional enemy, fixing him by fire, maneuver, or a combination thereof, and then either destroying him or capturing him. However, when the enemy presents no detectable troop formations, has no fixed installations to defend, and has no lines of communications subject to interdiction, then the conventional forces must operate in a different manner. The enemy force can no longer be the focus of operations and will likely hold the initiative. The conventional force may have to concentrate

on minimizing the exposure of valuable targets to the insurgent force - ie perform security missions instead of on more conventional force-oriented operations.

The US force will also be facing a force that has superior mobility. This insurgent mobility advantage is not a function of equipment. It is a result of guerrilla familiarity with the terrain, of his ability to merge in with the populace, and of his ability to gather information about the counterinsurgent force activities.⁷⁷ Perhaps the very organization of an intervening conventional force and its affinity to predictable operations contribute to this guerrilla advantage.⁷⁸

One additional consideration for US forces committed to a counterinsurgency is that they will have non traditional missions to perform. FM 90-8 states that they must also:

support the overall COIN (Counterinsurgency) program by conducting noncombat operations to provide an environment where the host country government can win the trust and support of its people and ultimately become self-sustaining.⁷⁹

These additional missions will detract from a unit's ability to prosecute combat operations and will require not only special skills, but also additional materials and supplies. Despite the fundamental differences between insurgent conflict and conventional war, US forces that are organized and trained to conduct combat operations under the conditions of the latter, can still be successful under those of the

former. They can be successful if those who commit them never lose sight of their limitations - in particular their difficulty in conducting counter guerrilla operations against a sophisticated insurgent organization. US forces will be most effective if the insurgents are utilizing conventional tactics in Phase III, and against fixed and identifiable guerrilla bases and sanctuaries. Such a conventional insurgent strategy plays to the strength of US forces - their ability to operate against conventional centers of gravity.

IX - ADEQUACY OF EXISTING DOCTRINE

The US Army's existing doctrine has correctly identified the supporting role that US forces must take in a counterinsurgency:

The principal function of US forces must be to assist the host nation, but it is the host nation which must ultimately defeat the insurgency and eliminate the internal conditions which bred it. 80

However, it has not explicitly limited the ways in which US forces can provide this assistance. The tactical limitations of US forces in a counterinsurgency must determine the doctrinal combat roles that are prescribed for US forces in such an environment.

At present, the US Army's implementing doctrine, FM 90-8, Counter guerrilla Operations, does not recognize the limited capabilities of US forces in a counterinsurgency. Instead, it prescribes tactics and techniques for the

accomplishment of missions appropriate in all phases of an insurgency - missions that are beyond the capabilities of our conventional forces. This manual should just describe those missions that we can reasonably expect our conventional forces to successfully execute.

One of the reasons that FM 90-8 includes missions appropriate to all phases of an insurgency is that it addresses counter guerrilla operations in the context of both an insurgent and a conventional environment. Yet counter guerrilla operations in an insurgency are so different from those in the context of a conventional conflict that they should be addressed in separate manuals. In a counterinsurgency, all counter guerrilla operations must be tempered by the need to win the struggle for legitimacy. However, in a conventional war, the force that is brunt of the guerrilla operations may not be capable of gaining this popular support. This was the case of the Turkish forces that were being attacked by T.E. Lawrence's guerrilla forces in Palestine during World War I, and of Napoleon's forces during the campaigns in Spain and Portugal.⁸¹ Consequently, non-military considerations are more prominent for counter guerrilla operations in the context of an insurgency.

It is however appropriate for the Army's doctrine to prescribe tactics and techniques for the performance of military operations in all phases of an insurgency as it currently does. After all, the US Army does have the

non-combat role of training and advising the security forces of other nations as they conduct counterinsurgencies. Consequently, it must have both a theory of insurgent warfare and a comprehensive doctrine for the conduct of counterinsurgencies. Both the theory of insurgent warfare and the counterinsurgency doctrine presented in FM 100-20 are comprehensive in their understanding of this kind of conflict and thorough in their analysis of what is required to defeat an insurgency.

It is not appropriate though for a single doctrinal manual to prescribe procedures for both US forces and foreign ones. This is what FM 100-20 does currently. What the Army needs instead is a doctrinal manual prepared specifically for US Army personnel that will act as trainers and advisers under the auspices of our Security Assistance program to another country. This manual should describe our theory of insurgent conflict, our thoughts about the operations, tactics, and procedures appropriate for the conduct of a counterinsurgency, and the manner in which the US Army conducts non-combat missions in the context of the Foreign Internal Defense mission .

The Army also needs a manual that provides guidance to its conventional forces on the conduct of combat operations in the context of a counterinsurgency. This is a viable mission with unique requirements. The conditions of insurgent

conflict are so different than those of conventional war, that our conventional units cannot be expected to successfully execute assigned tasks without specific doctrine and adequate preparation. The existing doctrinal guidance for our conventional forces is thus not only insufficient, but is also difficult to decipher given the many purposes that the existing manuals must serve.

X - CONCLUSIONS

If you wish for peace, understand war - particularly the guerrilla and subversive forms of war. 82

As previously cited, the nature and the purpose of insurgent war are so different from those of conventional war, that conventional doctrines that identify the enemy force as the center of gravity are inadequate. The US Army understands these differences and has developed a comprehensive theory of insurgent warfare and a separate doctrine for counterinsurgency.

The Army's characterization of mass-oriented insurgencies using Mao's three-phased model is useful for the analyst. However, the assumption that an insurgent organization will elect to conduct conventional operations in Phase III is not necessarily accurate. Unconventional tactics are generally chosen by the insurgent to offset his weaknesses. But there is no reason why the advantages they offer to a weak force can't be used by a force strong enough

to conduct conventional operations. Other than this caveat, I find the Army's theoretical understanding of unconventional war satisfactory.

The Army's counterinsurgency doctrine has shortcomings. First, most of the doctrinal recommendations contained in FM 100-20 for the conduct of counterinsurgency describe how the government of a country affected by an insurgency should address it - not how the US Army is involved. Second, insufficient attention is paid to the development of specific doctrine to guide the operations of US forces assigned combat roles in a counterinsurgency. Attention is given instead to the non-combat roles of the US Army. However, I am most concerned with the doctrine's failure to clearly recognize the tactical limitations of US forces and to define the tasks that they should be assigned when committed to a counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgent success in Phase I of an insurgency is dependent on the collection of detailed human intelligence and the ability to infiltrate the insurgent organization. These two tasks cannot be accomplished by our general purpose forces. Success in Phase II depends on the security force being able to elicit the support of the populace in the affected areas and on their ability to distinguish readily between guerrillas, their active and passive supporters, and uninvolved civilians - US forces also lack this capability.

What US forces can do in Phase II of an insurgency is restrict the ability of guerrilla units to act. Finally in phase III - if the insurgent forces act in a conventional manner - success depends on the security forces being able to defeat the guerrilla forces in conventional battle. US forces can be successful in this mission.

What does this tell us? First, that US forces will probably be successful if committed against an insurgent force that is operating in a conventional manner. Second, that there are some tasks essential for victory in a counterinsurgency that are beyond the tactical capabilities of US conventional forces. Consequently, US forces should not be committed with the expectation that they will defeat an insurgency - they are unlikely to defeat one in either Phase I or Phase II. They are also unlikely to defeat guerrilla forces that refuse to utilize conventional tactics. What US forces can do is prevent the insurgents from attaining military success using conventional tactics. This is a tactic that has been attempted by insurgent organizations in the past - examples are provided by the TET Offensive in Vietnam in 1968 and the final offensive of the guerrillas in El Salvador in 1981. US forces may also be able to limit the successes that unconventional guerrilla forces can accomplish during Phase II of an insurgency.

Thus, US conventional forces should only be committed to

combat operations in a counterinsurgency with the express purpose of preventing the insurgents from overthrowing a sitting government. However, prior to their commitment it should be determined whether the government facing the insurgency has the capability of reassuming the responsibility for the counterinsurgency. If it cannot regain this capability, US forces will become the guarantor of its survival and their extrication will be problematic. US forces should not be committed under these circumstances to a combat role in a counterinsurgency. It is important to remember that the conduct of a counterinsurgency is not an American responsibility. It is a task to be accomplished by the threatened government. Our task is to help them in the development and prosecution of an effective counterinsurgent strategy and to avoid making it our primary responsibility.

Finally, guerrilla warfare should not be looked on as an inferior strategy forced on its practitioner by insufficient means. This disdain for guerrilla tactics was demonstrated even by Mao-Tsetung, who receives much credit for his theoretical writings on the subject:

...we should not repudiate guerrilla-ism in general terms but should honestly admit the guerrilla character of the Red Army. It is no use being ashamed of this. On the contrary, this guerrilla character is precisely our strong point, and our means of defeating the enemy. We should be prepared to discard it, but we cannot do so today. In the future this guerrilla character will be definitely something to be ashamed of and discarded, but today it is invaluable and we must stick to it.⁸³

ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 88.
2. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May, 1986), p. 1.
3. Fred F. Woerner, " The Strategic Imperatives for the United States in Latin America." Military Review, (February 1989), p. 21.
4. A.J. Bacevich, American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, (Washington DC.: Pergammon-Brassey's, 1988), p. 43.
5. Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, FINAL DRAFT, 7 March 1989), p. 1-3, and FM 100-5, p. 3. The most recent commitment of US forces in a combat role in a counterinsurgency was during the Vietnam War. At present US Army personnel are assisting foreign governments fighting insurgencies in advisory capacities in the Philippines and in El Salvador.
6. Clausewitz, p. 142.
7. FM 100-5, p. 6. The Operations manual has this to say about doctrine: "An army's fundamental doctrine is the condensed expression of its approach to fighting campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. Tactics, techniques, procedures, organizations, support structure, equipment and training must all derive from it. It must be rooted in time-tested theories and principles, yet (be) forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions. It must be definitive enough to guide operations, yet versatile enough to accomodate a wide variety of worldwide situations. Finally, to be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known and understood." Thus we see how the Army holds that doctrine must evolve from theory and tactics in turn must be derived from doctrine.
8. Ibid, p. 10. Though the FM 100-5 definition of tactics is in terms that apply only to combat: "Tactics is the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements." It can be deduced that the use of any potential inherent to an organization to accomplish a given mission is also in the tactical realm - for example the use of the assets of an engineer company to build a bridge for civilian use.

9. Joseph J. Collins, "The Soviet-Afghan War" in Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman ed. The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I. (Washington DC: Heath and Company, 1985), p. 203. According to the author, the Soviets in Afghanistan "were put in the awkward position of having a force structure and tactics that did not match the military situation." He argues in his essay that the Soviets were unable to attain their objectives because of these tactical and organizational shortcomings.

10. The major exponents of these strategic schools of thought are: Of the continental - Claus von Clausewitz, whose theories appear in On War; Of the maritime - Julian S. Corbett, author of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and Alfred Thayer Mahan, author of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783; Of the aerospace - Giulio Douhet, author of The Command of the Air; And of the revolutionary, Mao Tsetung, author of Selected Writings of Mao Tsetung.

11. Clausewitz, p. 595-596. The center of gravity is defined as "The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."

12. The principal advocate of indirect strategies was B.H. Liddell Hart who suggested that "In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home." (p. 5) and that "The soundest strategy in any campaign is to postpone battle and the soundest tactics to postpone attack, until the moral dislocation of the enemy renders the delivery of a decisive blow practicable." (p. 147), B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, (New York, Signet, 1974).

13. Clausewitz never states outright that warfare is an interstate affair exclusively, but the theories developed in On War evidently are based on this assumption. The many references to the enemy as being another country lead me to this conclusion. See for example the references to other countries on pages 79, 81, 90, and 91 in chapter one, "What is War?" Also, in the chapter on "The People in Arms" Clausewitz again sees the object of popular uprisings as another country's forces - see p. 479.

14. Douglas Pike, PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam, (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1986). The reduced importance of military operations in an insurgency is revealed by the slogan attributed to Ho Chi Minh by the author. "Political action is more important than military action; propaganda is more important than fighting." (p. 31).

15. FM 100-20, p. 2-9.

16. Major Melvin Richmond, "Communist Insurgencies and the Relevance of the Concepts of Center of Gravity and Decisive Points." SAMS Monograph, 19 April 1989, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas, pp. 31-32.
17. FM 100-20, pp. 2-3 & 2-4.
18. Clausewitz, p. 97. For example, the idea that "the destruction of the enemy's force underlies all military actions; all plans are ultimately based on it, resting like an arch on its abutment."
19. Ibid, pp. 92-93.
20. FM 100-20, p. D-1. These systemic weaknesses are either the result of existing "social dysfunctions" or can be the result of a perception created by skillful insurgent manipulation of issues and use of ideology. The idea of 'perceived deprivation' is developed by Ted Robert Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel.
21. Ibid, p. 2-14, see also p. D-1.
22. Field Manual (FM) 90-8, Counter guerrilla Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1986), p. 1-3. Further details about insurgent activities in each of the three phases is presented in pages D-3 through D-6 of FM 100-20.
23. Ibid, p. 1-4. This emphasis on guerrilla activities in Phase II is corroborated in the Selected Writings of Mao Tsetung, (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1972), p. 212.
24. Ibid. Chairman Mao in his Selected Writings also advocates what he calls positional and mobile warfare by conventional forces as the primary mode of operations - presuming that the insurgent forces now have the capability to confront the regular forces of the opponent. (p. 214.)
25. General John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm", (Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College, Vol XVI, No. 4, pp. 2-8), p. 6.
26. FM 90-8, p. 1-3.
27. For a detailed discussion of Internal Defense and Development see FM 100-20, pages 2-16 through 2-28.

28. The ideally proactive nature of IDAD is revealed by the following excerpt from FM 100-20: "Its fundamental goal is to prevent insurgency by forestalling and defeating the threat insurgent organizations pose and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence." p. 2-16.

29. FM 100-20, p. 2-35. The manual states that "FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies (of the United States) in any of the action programs another government takes to free and protect its society from subversion."

30. Ibid, p. 2-16.

31. Ibid, pages D-10 through D-12.

32. Robert Allan Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939, (Hamden, CN, Archon Books, 1985). The author argues that France entered WWII with an inappropriate doctrine that had been developed as the result of its experiences in WWI and of the conclusions it drew from that conflict about the nature of future conflict.

33. Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War, (New York, NY, New York University Press, 1986). p. 281.

34. Examples of these political constraints are provided by the restrictions that the Congress has placed on US aid to El Salvador. For example the number of US advisers in that country cannot exceed 55 and each year the President must certify that the Government of El Salvador is making progress on Human Rights issues among other areas. Similar constraints have been placed on US efforts to help insurgents, ie. limitations on assistance to the CONTRAS.

35. Franz Schurmann, The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon: The Grand Design, (Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, 1987). pp. 115-116. The Guam Doctrine (also known as the Nixon Doctrine) was announced in July 1970. The doctrine declared that in the future US ground forces would not be used in counterinsurgencies. The US would provide instead security assistance, and in some cases air support to governments fighting insurgencies. The Vietnamization process was a result of this doctrine. This declared reticence to commit US ground forces against an insurgency has not been modified since.

36. FM 100-20, p. 2-30.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid, p. 2-6. In addition to using ideology to explain perceived social problems, the insurgents use it to justify the violent means they employ to attain their end and to provide an alternate vision of the society they will lead.

39. Pike, p. 217. The author suggests that Political Dau Tranh is what the North Vietnamese called these tactics. Political Dau Tranh "means systematic....mobilization of support.

40. Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil, (Baltimore, MD, Penguin Books, 1971). p. 80. This Brazilian urban terrorist, author of the famous Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare, provides a listing of different tactics available to a guerrilla force in its formative stages. See also FM 90-8, p. 3-16.

41. These types of activities have characterized the activities of the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. Their insurgency has been in Phase II ever since the defeat of their 'final offensive' in 1981. Their recent offensive (initiated on 11 November 1989) may indicate an attempt to move the insurgency to Phase III.

42. Mao, Selected Writings, p. 246.

43. FM 100-20, p. D-6.

44. Mao, Selected Writings, p. 209.

45. FM 100-20, p. 2-10. The adage that "time is on the side of the insurgent" is disputed by the manual. It suggests instead that time favors he who most profitably uses it.

46. Mao, Selected Writings, p. 139.

47. William Buchanan & Robert Hyatt, "Capitalizing on Guerrilla Vulnerabilities." Military Review, August 1969), p. 13.

48. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, (London, Pall Mall Press, 1964), p. 55.

49. Cable, Conflict of Myths, p. 283.

50. Buchanan & Hyatt, "Capitalizing on Guerrilla Vulnerabilities", p. 16.

51. Robert Thompson, "Regular Armies and Insurgency," (Ronald Haycock Ed. Regular Armies and Insurgency, London, Croom Helm Ltd, 1979, pp. 9-20) p. 12.

52. Buchanan & Hyatt, p. 19.

53. Thompson, "Regular Armies and Insurgency," pp. 14-15. The author suggests that a government has two key tasks during this phase: securing its own assets in order to make the guerrilla task more difficult; and then concentrating its efforts on the penetration of the insurgent infrastructure.

54. FM 100-20, p. D-11.

55. Sam Holliday, "Warfare of the Future", (Military Review, August 1969, pp. 12-17), p. 17.

56. Regaining control of the population is the first step in the process of mobilization of the population in order to gain its support. Mao Tsetung (Selected Writings, p. 213) viewed this as the key activity in Phase II. FM 100-20 suggests that civil affairs is a means to accomplish these political tasks, (p. E-31).

57. These defensive operations are known as Populace and Resource Control Operations, (FM 100-20, p. E-41). An example of the successful conduct of these operations occurred during the Malayan insurgency where food denial operations were used.

58. Caesar D. Sereseres, "Lessons from Central America's Revolutionary Wars, 1972-1984," (Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman Ed. The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I, Lexington MA, Lexington Books, 1985, pp. 161 - 188) p. 173. The Guatemalan Armed Forces have used self defense forces with some degree of success as they fight the different insurgent groups acting in the country. They trained and armed the inhabitants of villages, (forming the so-called Civil Defence Forces) anticipating that it would serve as an economy of force effort and that villagers charged with their own well being would be less receptive to guerrilla entreaties. These organizations didn't just serve a military function, they also were used in a countermobilization effort to compete with the guerrilla covert infrastructure. There is of course a risk in such a program - the government could end up arming the guerrillas if they are not careful. When forming such forces, the government security forces must be able to respond quickly to any major guerrilla presence to avoid guerrilla reprisals against villages that have openly sided with the government.

59. FMFM 8-2, Counterinsurgency Operations, (Washington DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, January 1980), p. 20. According to the manual, the enemy force must be the focus of security force operations because "the imminence of military defeat must be averted if the government is to

survive." The combat requirements of the military must take priority and other activities can continue only after the military defense has been assured.

60. FM 90-8, p. 1-6.

61. FM 100-20, p. 1-3.

62. FM 100-5, p. 4. See also FM 100-20, p. 2-30.

63. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, (New York, Random House, 1965), p. 89.

64. Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, New York, Vintage Books, 1986), p. 110.

65. Ibid, pp. 34-37.

66. William Staudenmaier, "A Strategy of Counterrevolutionary War," (Military Review, February 1985, pp. 2-15), p. 13.

67. Cable, Conflict of Myths, P. 10.

68. FM 90-8, P. 1-8.

69. FM 100-20, p. 2-45.

70. FM 90-8, p. 3-5.

71. Ibid, p. 3-9.

72. FM 100-20, p. vii.

73. Sam Sarkesian, "Low Intensity Conflict: Concepts, principles, and policy guidelines." (Air University Review, Jan/Feb 1985, pp. 4-23), p. 15.

74. Franklin J. Bell, Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, (Batanga, P.I.: Headquarters, Third Separate Brigade, 1902), Circular No. 5, p. 8. The order read: "...The Brigade Commander therefore announces for the information of all concerned, that wherever prisoners or unarmed or defenseless Americans or natives friendly to the United States government are murdered or assassinated for political reasons...it is his purpose to execute a prisoner of war...This prisoner of war will be selected by lot from among the officers or prominent citizens held as prisoners of war, and will be chosen when practicable from those who belong to the town where the murder or assassination occurred." Bell Hall at Fort Leavenworth is named after General Franklin J. Bell.

75. Constantin Melnik, "The French Campaign Against the FLN", (Rand Corp, September 1967), pp. 61-62. See also Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962, (New York Penguin, 1979), p. 79.
76. Arturo Porzecanski, Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla, (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 70.
77. Buchanan & Hyatt, p. 13.
78. Cable, Conflict of Myths, p. 124.
79. FM 90-8, p. 3-2.
80. FM 100-20, p. 1-19.
81. David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York, Macmillan, 1966), pp. 608-611.
82. Liddell Hart, Strategy, P. 361.
83. Mao Tsetung, Selected Writings, P. 139.

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