The Tactical Center of Gravity: How Useful is the Concept?
Abstract
The 1986 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, 'Operations', introduced a theoretical basis to AirLand Battle, the U.S. Army's basic fighting doctrine. One of the concepts introduced was 'center of gravity.' The manual indicated the concept had little utility at the tactical level. This study examined the origin, definition (original and current), and tactical applicability of the theoretical concept center of gravity and the related concepts of 'schwerpunkt,' and 'main effort.' The study examined the Battles of Schmidt (1944) and East Falkland (1982) to determine the utility of the concept of a tactical center of gravity. The study concludes that the concept is of use to the tactical commander only if the classical definition of center of gravity as a concentration of force or source of power is used. The concept is already embodied in the doctrine in the term 'main effort.' That term is not universally understood or applied in the doctrine. The study recommends that FM 100-5 be changed to reflect a narrower interpretation of the term 'center of gravity,' and that the tactical utility of the concept be recognized. It also recommends that a standard definition for the term 'main effort' be developed and included in all derivative tactical and operational level doctrine manuals. Keywords: Clausewitz/theory; Decisive points; Synchronization/Vulnerabilities; Airland battle; West Germany.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 06, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA225485
Entities
People
- Michael T. Inman
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College