Legal Aspects of Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention Under Domestic Laws

Abstract

The notion that domestic law must be considered as part of the planning to implement an arms control treaty shows how far the nations of the world have come in their negotiation of wuch agreements. Increasingly, arms control agreements are more than simply mutual declarations of self interest. Verification provisions have made them instruments that create enforceable law which , as such, must be integrated into the existing legal structure of each State Party. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the development of internal controls over chemical weapons. If the global chemical weapons convention being negotiated is supposed to be different because it has teeth, the American body politic may have to rearrange some of its other organs to accommodate them. In our system, this requires a legal analysis. This subject will be covered in the remaining four sections. Section 2 offers a brief comment concerning the requirements of United States Senate approval of any treaty. Section 3 considers the constitutional problems that may be created by on-site inspections and monitoring. Several means are suggested in Section 4 for mitigating the constitutional problems that are uncovered. Section 5 presents the conclusions.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1989
Accession Number
ADA225492

Entities

People

  • Edward A. Tanzman

Organizations

  • Argonne National Laboratory

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Arms Control
  • Arms Control Treaties
  • Chemical Industry
  • Chemical Weapons
  • Congress
  • Governments
  • International Organizations
  • Law
  • Motivation
  • National Governments
  • National Security
  • Supreme Court
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • United States Government
  • Weapons

Readers

  • Government and Public Administration Law.
  • Strategic Security Studies