A Model of Social Selection and Successful Altruism
Abstract
Within the framework of neo-Darwinism, with its focus upon fitness, it has been hard to account for altruism, behavior that reduces the fitness of the altruist but increases average fitness in the society. Many population biologists believe that, except for altruism to close relatives, human behavior that appears to be altruistic really amounts to reciprocal altruism, behavior undertaken with an expectation of reciprocation, hence incurring no net cost to fitness. This paper proposes a simple and robust mechanism, based upon human docility and bounded rationality, that can account for the evolutionary success of genuinely altruistic behavior. Because docility -- receptivity to social influence -- contributes greatly to fitness in the human species, it will be positively selected. As a consequence, society can impose a tax on the gross benefits gained by individuals from docility by inducing docile individuals to engage in altruistic behaviors. Limits on rationally in the face of environmental complexity prevent the individual from avoiding this tax. An upper bound is imposed on altruism by the condition that there must remain a net fitness advantage for docile behavior after the cost to the individual of altruism has been deducted. (Author) (KR)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 07, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA225614
Entities
People
- Herbert Simon
Organizations
- Carnegie Mellon University