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THESIS

A STUDY OF REASONS FOR NOT REENLISTING:
FIRST-TERM MARINES IN CRITICAL OCCUPATIONS

by

Timothy J. Beaty

December 1989

Thesis Advisor:

Mark J. Eitelberg

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A Study of Reasons for Not Reenlisting:
First-Term Marines in Critical Occupations

by

Timothy Joel Beaty
Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.A., Miami University, 1980


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
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
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
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

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ABSTRACT

This thesis determines the primary reasons why first-term enlistees assigned to critical occupations decide against reenlisting in the Marine Corps. The reasons given for not reenlisting are determined by analyzing responses to the Marine Corps Enlisted Separation Questionnaire over the period of fiscal 1985 through fiscal 1989 (third quarter). Questionnaire responses are analyzed using cross-tabulations and frequency distributions according to demographic characteristics (marital status, gender, race, and pay grade) and occupational skill requirements. The results suggest that, for most Marines, lack of promotion opportunity is the main reason for not reenlisting. Other reasons vary by demographic and occupational skill groups. Family separation influences the decisions of women and E-5s, while Marines in more technical specialties are more concerned with compensation. Reenlistment incentives are evaluated using the results of this study. Recommendations are offered to improve current incentives and the criteria for reenlistment.



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I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A. GENERAL

In a prepared statement submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 24 March 1988, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel, Grant S. Green, clearly outlined the importance of retaining military personnel. He stated that:

The penalties associated with insufficient retention are severe. Most notable is reduced mission capability, but there are longer term effects that are no less serious. Lower retention leads to less selectivity in choosing the future leaders of the officer and enlisted force and fewer experienced people in the middle grades. Because lower retention drives higher accessions, it means greater training costs and higher trainee-to-supervisor ratios. It means placing substantially greater demands on the remaining Service members. Most serious of all, it means that all of these conditions will continue for many years, because significant losses of trained and experienced officers and enlisted members cannot be recouped in the short term. [Ref 1: p. 113]

Mr. Green later pointed out that there is a need to be concerned about the future, especially considering that in fiscal 1987 the Marine Corps achieved only 93 percent of its first-term reenlistment goal.

Balanced against the need to retain enlisted personnel is the issue of their "quality". All Military Services emphasize the recruitment of high-quality individuals. For initial

enlistment, measures of quality are usually based on aptitude test scores and educational attainment (high school graduation). The Marine Corps has been particularly successful in bringing highly qualified members into its ranks, as recently noted by LtGen J. I. Hudson, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower at Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC). He stated that the Marine Corps has increased the percentage of high school graduates recruited from 77.8 in fiscal 1980 to 98.1 in fiscal 1987, while the percentage of new recruits with above-average scores (50th percentile or higher) on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) has increased from 59.0 in fiscal 1980 to 67.6 in fiscal 1987. [Ref. 2:p. 211]

The Services emphasize the recruitment of high quality enlistees because they learn relatively quickly and experience generally fewer disciplinary problems. In addition, high quality recruits are more likely than their counterparts to complete the first term of enlistment. However, the Services have also found that high quality personnel are less likely to reenlist at the completion of the first term.

The Marine Corps (like the other Services) offers various reenlistment incentives. However, while the quality of the first-term population has dramatically improved over the past ten years, the reenlistment incentives being offered over the same period have remained relatively unchanged. This

situation may help to explain the recent difficulties experienced by the Marine Corps in meeting first-term reenlistment goals.

B. SCOPE OF THESIS

This thesis focuses on military occupational specialties (MOSs) in the Marine Corps that have been critically short since fiscal 1985. It also seeks to determine the role of available reenlistment incentives in influencing the reenlistment behavior of first-term personnel assigned to critically short specialties. To fully develop the connection between the critical specialties and available reenlistment incentives, background information is examined on the criteria for first-term reenlistment. The reenlistment criteria are evaluated as to whether they guarantee the continued service of highly qualified Marines beyond the first term. The study further examines the current reenlistment incentives offered to first-term Marines, and compares these incentives to those offered by the Army. The final elements of background information discuss general Marine Corps policy for providing balance to the enlisted force and the criteria for designating an MOS as "critical".

C. METHODOLOGY

The bulk of background information for this thesis was provided by the Enlisted Plans Section of the Manpower Policy and Plans Division at HQMC. Additional information was obtained from various Marine Corps directives. The first area of analysis determines which Marine Corps' MOSs are considered critical. To determine these specialties, first-term Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) multiples are analyzed from fiscal 1985 to the present. (SRB multiples are explained in Chapter II under current reenlistment incentives.) In this study, it is assumed that the presence of a multiple indicates a potential future shortage in the respective occupational specialty. In addition, it is assumed that the higher the multiple, the more critical the specialty is to the Marine Corps.

In the second area of analysis, data compiled by the Manpower Analysis section at HQMC using Enlisted Separation Questionnaires are examined. Questionnaire data on first-term Marines in critical occupations are analyzed using cross-tabulation and frequency distributions. These techniques are used to characterize differences among the respondents based on the background factors of marital status, gender, race and pay grade. Furthermore, the data are divided by Department of Defense (DoD) occupational area and analyzed using

frequency distributions to detect trends according to occupational skill similarity. Finally, a relationship is established between the factors influencing the separation of Marines from critical specialties with available reenlistment incentives.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Overview

The literature review begins with an examination of the factors affecting personnel to remain in or separate from an organization, both from civilian and military perspectives. Next, studies that focus on the purpose and effectiveness of reenlistment incentives are discussed. Finally, the literature review addresses the importance of quality in retaining enlisted personnel.

2. Retention and Turnover Behavior

a. Civilian Studies

The parallel between civilian employment and military service centers around the individual's voluntary choice to leave or remain in an organization. Stolzenberg and Winkler [Ref. 2] analyzed the causes and consequences of voluntary separation by developing an analytical framework based on previous civilian research. The basis of their study comes from research conducted by J. W. Thibaut and H. H. Kelly

in 1959 in *The Social Psychology of Groups*. Thibaut and Kelley propose "...that people evaluate their experience in groups according to the costs and benefits involved in maintaining membership in the group" [Ref. 2:p. 4]. Their proposition is formed around the concepts of comparison level (within the organization) and comparison level for alternatives (outside the organization). The comparison level requires an individual to evaluate his or her satisfaction in a group relative to the other group members. The comparison level for alternatives requires a group member to evaluate his or her satisfaction in a group relative to membership in another group. As the authors state:

The key point about the comparison level is that it determines whether workers are happy with their jobs, but it does not determine whether they leave them. The key feature of the comparison level for alternatives is that it determines whether workers leave their jobs, but not whether they are happy with them. Accordingly, workers sometimes leave jobs they like, or stay in jobs they do not like. [Ref. 2:p. 5]

In addition to Thibaut and Kelley, Stolzenberg and Winkler borrow from the work of Herbert Simon to add two more aspects to their framework of voluntary separation. First, Simon treats low satisfaction as a precipitator to search for a more satisfying job, thus establishing job search as a behavioral link between job satisfaction and the decision to quit. Second, Simon allows the result that a search for

an alternate job may be unsuccessful, which causes the formerly unsatisfying job to become more satisfying.

Within the above framework, Stolzenberg and Winkler employ the following six characteristics as factors that contribute to job comparison and the eventual decision to voluntarily stay or separate:

1. expected earnings
2. job security
3. advancement opportunities
4. dispute resolving mechanisms
5. fringe benefits
6. amenities, conveniences, psychological rewards and working conditions

Stolzenberg and Winkler conclude their review of civilian separation literature by emphasizing that job comparison and the search for alternatives must account for the above range of characteristics. By not doing so, one may incorrectly attribute the decision to separate to a narrow range of factors, and possibly achieve misleading results.

In addition to the work of Stolzenberg and Winkler, Farkus [Ref. 3] applies civilian-oriented concepts to determine how unmet expectations, changes in satisfaction, and changes in organizational commitment relate to changes in the intention to reenlist. Farkus relies heavily on research

conducted by L. W. Porter and R. M. Steers in 1973, published under the title *Organizational , Work, and Personal Factors in Employee Turnover and Absenteeism*. Porter and Steers found a consistent relationship between job satisfaction and employee turnover, and they explained this relationship in terms of "met expectations". Simply, they found that if an employee's expectations are met, he or she will experience job satisfaction and tend to remain in the organization. The opposite is true if expectations are unmet.

In addition to the application of met expectations, Farkus uses the notion of organizational commitment as a predictor of employee turnover. His use of organizational commitment includes the acceptance of values and goals of the organization, a willingness to exert high effort on behalf of the organization, and a desire to remain in the organization.

With the above concepts in mind, Farkus administered questionnaires to a cohort of Navy enlisted personnel over different points in their first term. His analysis found that changes in job satisfaction and organizational commitment resulted from a steady decline over time in met expectations. His analysis also suggested that changes in organizational commitment were a stronger

determinant of changes in the reenlistment intention than were changes in job satisfaction.

Another area of civilian research is Herzberg's two-factor theory, which focuses on the aspects of job satisfaction [Ref. 4]. Herzberg found that certain factors were associated with high satisfaction and others with dissatisfaction. He referred to job content factors as "satisfiers", which included such things as achievement, recognition, advancement, and responsibility. He called the job context factors "dissatisfiers", and these included company policy, supervision, salary, and working conditions.

Herzberg proposed that jobs containing content factors (satisfiers) will lead to job satisfaction; but their absence will lead to neutrality or indifference. Conversely, he suggested that a job containing many context factors will lead to indifference; but their absence will lead to dissatisfaction. Herzberg concluded that jobs should be designed to include both context factors (to avoid dissatisfaction) and content factors (to ensure satisfaction).

While the intention to reenlist is not exactly comparable to the intention to remain in a civilian organization, the studies discussed above are relevant to the reenlistment decision. It is apparent from these works that a wide range of factors influence one's decision to remain or

separate, as do the strength of organizational commitment and changes in job satisfaction and met expectations.

b. Military Studies

Doering and Grissmer [Ref. 5] give a general review of the methodologies employed by researchers who have studied reenlistment behavior through 1984. With regard to retention, they note that several studies have concluded that retention rates are sensitive to both the present and expected future value of compensation. They write:

The focus on pay research is partly understandable. The cost of military compensation is quite visible; therefore measurements as to its effectiveness are constantly in demand. Pay is also easily observed and frequently adjusted to meet short term manpower goals. Data to track these pay changes and associated retention decisions are very good and easily accessible. No special data collection is required. It, thus, presents an excellent opportunity for measurement of effects. [Ref. 5:p. 16]

Doering and Grissmer expand their review of retention research by acknowledging that the effects of compensation must be combined with other explanations of retention. Using both administrative personnel data and survey results, various studies have found a wide range of variables that influence retention decisions among military personnel. Additionally, most studies are longitudinal in approach, linking an individual's reenlistment intention with eventual reenlistment behavior. Doering and Grissmer suggest

that statements of enlistment and reenlistment intentions provide good predictions of both actions, and can lead to policy-relevant analysis.

Mobley, Hand and Griffith [Ref. 6] reviewed 76 military studies that dealt with enlistment, reenlistment, and/or the withdrawal process. The studies employed diverse methodologies and data. Mobley et al. were able to classify the studies according to the dominant independent variable (e.g., economic, organization climate and practices, etc.) and the resulting decision (e.g., reenlistment, separation). The authors evaluated 11 categories of independent variables, including: economic/incentives, organization practices, organization climate, job content, satisfaction, intentions, expectations, demographic/biographic, psychological, aptitude, and performance [Ref. 6:p. 119].

A common theme discovered by Mobley et al. is that the economic/incentive category accounted for the most variance among the independent variables. However, the authors conclude that the reenlistment process is multivariate in nature, and research must therefore include the broadest possible spectrum of variables.

In their review, Mobley et al. mention a study conducted by Carlisle [Ref. 6:p. 14], who examined 1,070 enlisted Marines in the telecommunications field. Carlisle

used a difference in means test to compare those intending to reenlist to those not intending to reenlist. Each Marine rated several categories of intrinsic and extrinsic job factors. The intrinsic factors include the work itself, achievement, recognition, responsibility, and growth. The extrinsic factors included working conditions, supervisors, peers, policies, family and social life, and pay. Carlisle found those intending to reenlist had positive perceptions of the intrinsic factors, and no extrinsic factor affected their intention to reenlist. Alternatively, those deciding not to reenlist were primarily concerned with their dissatisfaction with extrinsic factors.

Chow and Polich [Ref. 7] used a 1976 DoD survey of 4,000 Army, Navy and Air Force personnel to determine the factors influencing first-term reenlistment. Their study focused on individuals in pay grades E-4 or higher who had one year or less remaining on active duty.

Chow and Polich constructed a multivariate logit model to predict reenlistment probability using such explanatory variables as regular military compensation, reenlistment bonuses, allowances, aspects of the military environment, and demographic variables (such as education, race, sex, AFQT category and occupational specialty). Some of their findings include the following:

1. The survey respondents consistently overvalued their compensation.
2. Those who perceived larger values of compensation were more likely to reenlist.
3. There were higher reenlistment rates among females, non-whites, those receiving higher bonus multiples, and those with dependents living in government quarters.
4. There were lower reenlistment rates for personnel with high school diplomas, with some college, and for those who underestimated the value of their compensation.

The study by Chow and Polich emphasized that reenlistment intention accurately predict reenlistment behavior. By comparing a respondent's survey intention with his or her personnel record one year later, the authors found that for those who said there was a greater than 90 percent chance of reenlisting, 89 percent actually did.

Finn [Ref. 8] used data from the 1985 DoD survey of officer and enlisted personnel to predict the reenlistment intentions of Marines in their first or second term. Finn used a multivariate logit model with the following explanatory variables: pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, predictive ability to find civilian employment, attitude toward the military in meeting one's expectations, and satisfaction with family environment.

Finn found that job satisfaction was the most significant variable affecting reenlistment behavior. He also found that several factors were directly related to the

likelihood of reenlistment. These included higher pay, higher promotion, minority status, and being married. In addition, he found that a person's gender could not be used to predict reenlistment intention.

Fletcher and Giesler [Ref. 9] used data from the Navy Occupational Task Analysis Program (NOTAP) survey to relate the respondent's attitudes toward Navy working and living conditions to reenlistment decisions. The authors further identified the effects of these attitudes in providing guidelines for allocation of quality of life program funds. The respondents' occupations covered a range of technical and non-technical jobs. The authors used factor analysis to reduce the survey data from 67 NOTAP job satisfaction items to the three factors of pay, quality of job, and quality of military life. The quality of job factor included autonomy, physical work environment, skill utilization, team effort and relationships with peers, supervisors, and subordinates. The quality of military life factor included deployment time, housing, duty station, medical services, and ship habitability.

Fletcher and Giesler used the three factors along with demographic variables in a trinomial logit model to estimate the probability of separating, extending, or reenlisting. Their results show that pay is consistently

important in retaining first-term personnel, and the quality of job factor affected the decisions for both first-termers and careerists. The authors also found that the quality of military life factor was identifiable with quality of life programs, and related most directly with the retention of career personnel.

Cavin [Ref. 10] used data from the 1985 DoD survey of officer and enlisted personnel to determine the number of dimensions of Marine satisfaction with military life. By using factor analysis, the author was able to form three factors from 18 survey questions that gauged the satisfaction of respondents with different aspects of military life (e.g., personal freedom, assignment stability, pay and allowances, medical and dental care, etc.). Cavin identified the three factors as personal fulfillment in the military, military family stability, and military compensation and benefits.

Cavin noted two important implications from his study. First, because satisfaction can be related to three factors, he suggested that different elements of human behavior explain different aspects of individual dedication to the service. Therefore, different models of behavior may be appropriate. Second, the presence of three factors has policy implications in terms of how best to allocate resources to retain dedicated personnel. In addition, as Cavin writes,

the results "suggest that economic factors are only part of the retention story and that military personnel policies bearing on family stability may be important as well" [Ref. 10:p. 8].

The study by Vernez and Zellman [Ref. 11] provides a review of the factors influencing reenlistment and separation decisions for military members with families. The authors point out that the proportion of married military members increases with years of service. The authors present statistics showing that just five percent of enlisted Marines are married at the time of entry. By comparison, 34 percent are married between their third and fourth years of service. Therefore, the authors write, family considerations might become increasingly important as personnel reach the first-term reenlistment decision. In addition, the authors state that it is not enough to know whether military members and their families are satisfied with military life. One must also consider how their level of satisfaction compares to the perceived level of satisfaction available to them in the civilian sector.

Vernez and Zellman point out that service members with spouses or with children are more likely to leave during their first-term. Additionally, the authors highlight that frequent relocation, lack of choice in duty station, and

frequent separations impact negatively on one's choice to remain in the military.

This thesis relies heavily upon past research to determine the factors influencing reenlistment or separation. The studies presented in this portion of the literature review provide a broad view of those factors. A continuing theme throughout is that the choice to stay in or separate is a combination of many factors, including compensation, job satisfaction, and location stability. The final decision obviously rests with the individual service member, based upon the level of satisfaction, fulfillment of goals, and perceived availability of options. The next section of the literature review covers the role of reenlistment incentives in influencing a service member's decision to remain in the military. It also discusses research dealing with the effectiveness of retention incentives.

3. Reenlistment Incentives

Weybrew [Ref. 12] discusses the effectiveness of several Navy incentive programs in 1966. Although the programs are outdated, the background information he develops is still relevant. Weybrew writes that the objective of military incentive programs "is to maintain or improve the manpower 'posture' both quantitatively and qualitatively" [Ref. 12:p. 2]. In relation to this study, the objective of

reenlistment incentives is to get the right number of quality personnel to reenlist in the right skill groups as a way of balancing the force.

A primary theoretical issue discussed by Weybrew is the concept of incentives as they relate to personal motivation. The effectiveness of a given incentive depends upon the perception or meaning the incentive has to the person making the decision. He states that "the effectiveness of an incentive program will be affected by the degree to which each member of the population toward which the system is directed perceives the incentives as meaningful, tangible and relevant" [Ref. 12:p. 3].

Weybrew also relates the concept of incentive effectiveness to the fulfillment of a hierarchy of primary and secondary needs. He assumes that monetary incentives are directed toward primary needs (food, clothes, housing), and these needs must be met first before secondary needs (security, self-esteem, status affiliation and need achievement) can be met. Therefore, an incentive (e.g., educational opportunity) aimed at achieving a secondary need will be ineffective unless the individual is relatively sure that primary needs will also be met.

Weybrew ends his discussion of motivational theory by emphasizing "that a recruit, a reenlistee or a career officer

is a person with needs, motives, and perceptions and not simply a retention statistic" [Ref. 12:p. 7]. Therefore, incentives must be adaptable enough to meet the needs of the broadest range of personnel. Weybrew suggests that incentive programs with the most potential for maximizing first-term reenlistments should address the areas of advancement and educational opportunities, pay and allowances, and satisfaction with duty.

Studies focusing on the effectiveness of reenlistment incentives have invariably looked at the impact of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program. Hosek, Fernandez, and Grissmer [Ref. 13] offer a general outline of the utility of the SRB Program. Five of their major points are listed below: [Ref. 13:pp. 28-29]

1. Bonuses are probably more cost effective than across-the-board pay increases because they can be targeted toward particular skills.
2. Bonuses offer greater flexibility because they can be adjusted among skill groups, and can help control transitory shortages.
3. Bonuses counter long term imbalances because of their continued payment to many skill groups over time.
4. Bonuses counter the effect of declining military pay and civilian unemployment on retention in critical skills.
5. Bonuses lengthen the average term of commitment since they are paid to personnel who reenlist for more than three years. This, in turn, improves the military's return in its training investment and reduces accession requirements.

Hosek and Peterson [ref. 14] follow-up on the above points by analyzing continuation rate data from fiscal 1976 through fiscal 1981. Their purpose in studying this period is to determine the impact of two methods of bonus payment, installment and lump sum. They found that lump sum bonuses are more cost-effective, at least at the first-term retention point. This is true because a smaller lump sum payment has the same impact on retention as a larger bonus paid out over the term of reenlistment. The authors conclude by suggesting a continuation and possible expansion of the SRB program. They base this recommendation on the ability of bonuses "to respond quickly to changes both in labor supply, such as those created by economic and demographic cycles, and in labor demand, such as those created by changes in weapons systems or force deployment" [Ref. 14:p. 3].

Another study centering on the impact of SRBs on retention is that of Cymrot [Ref. 15]. Cymrot looks specifically at the Marine Corps, and begins by grouping over 350 Marine occupational specialties into 22 skill families, assuming individuals in similar occupations have similar responses to bonuses. He further divides the skill families into three experience zones based on years of service.

Cymrot uses the Annualized Cost of Living (ACOL) approach to establish a relationship between bonuses and

reenlistments. Cymrot states that the ACOL approach assumes Marines make reenlistment decisions based on the comparison between military and civilian monetary and psychic rewards. The ACOL approach also allows Cymrot to introduce other factors (i.e., civilian unemployment rate, net pay and military rank) that have an indirect effect on the relationship between bonuses and reenlistments.

The results of Cymrot's study show there is a strong statistical association between bonuses and reenlistments in nearly all combinations of skill families and experience zones. With his results, Cymrot is able to calculate reenlistment rates under different bonus multiple levels and economic conditions. He finds that increases in the unemployment rate increased expected reenlistments, and that higher-ranked personnel are more likely to reenlist than lower-ranked personnel. Additionally, Cymrot's study indicates that suspensions of the SRB program due to fund depletion resulted in decreased reenlistments.

Aside from studies dealing with bonuses, no research was found that quantitatively addresses the impact of other incentives on retention. However, the study by Doering and Grissmer (discussed above) highlights the need to determine the effectiveness of additional reenlistment incentives. They note that enlistment experiments have been conducted to

measure the effects of educational benefits and terms of service. The authors propose that several different incentives could be tested with relatively small sample sizes (500 to 1,000 individuals) and yield statistically significant results. They recommend the testing of incentives that include pay, guaranteed location, tour length, and job retraining. Additionally, the authors recommend testing specific incentives at different reenlistment points.

The final study mentioning the use of reenlistment incentives is by Jacobson and Thomason [Ref. 16]. The purpose of their study is to determine the impact of permanent change of station (PCS) orders on the earnings of a military wife and the resulting effect on a husband's retention. The authors' research of first-term Navy personnel estimates that overall retention is reduced by nine percent because of relocation lessening the earnings of wives. Based on these results, the authors recommend as a reenlistment incentive the guarantee to service members that no relocation will occur. They indicate the incentive would be valuable to approximately 18 percent of the potential first-term reenlistees, but that savings would occur from reduced accession, training, and PCS moves.

Reenlistment incentives may be effective in retaining the proper number of personnel with the right skills, but

simple numbers should not be the only concern. The military also wants the best quality personnel to stay. The next section of the literature review discusses the issue of quality, and its importance in a technically-oriented, highly specialized military.

4. Retention and Quality

The issue of quality was addressed above as it pertains to standards of enlistment (measured by AFQT category and high school graduation). Marcus [Ref. 17] uses AFQT categories as standards of quality while addressing the effect of SRB levels, unemployment, and pay on the quality of the career force. He proposes that responsiveness to pay is different for individuals with differing characteristics, and that changes in pay or the national economy may have a significant impact on the quality of personnel retained.

The research by Marcus shows that there are substantial differences in the impact of pay and unemployment across mental groups. He suggests that changes in pay and unemployment have the most impact on the best people who are more valuable to civilian employers. Therefore, the higher quality people are less likely to reenlist at the end of their first-term when faced with widening gaps between military and civilian pay or reduced unemployment levels.

An additional funding by Marcus that is relevant to this study concerns the importance of advancement to the reenlistment decision. He points out that promotion is a targeted policy since those promoted are the best performers and therefore more valuable. Marcus proposes that increasing the advancement rate in undermanned skill groups would have a substantial impact on retention and is targeted on the best people.

Ward and Tan [Ref. 18] differ from previous research in their measure of quality. Although AFQT score and high school graduation indicate the quality of personnel at the time of enlistment, the authors question whether these factors are meaningful predictors of job performance. Ward and Tan introduce into their analysis the factors of promotion speed and rank attained (along with AFQT scores and education level) to get a broader picture of quality at the first-term reenlistment point.

Their research shows that the military retains much better personnel in the career force than it loses. In comparing the performance of those who reenlisted with those who did not, the authors note those who reenlisted had the highest performance and higher absolute military ability. Ward and Tan also state that AFQT category and education level

matter very little in predicting the "success" (as measured by rank and speed of promotion) of the first-term enlistee.

Ward and Tan apply their findings to reenlistment policy. According to the authors, guidelines on eligibility to reenlist should not be heavily weighted toward AFQT category or education achievement, and should allow waivers of standards that vary by military occupation. Additionally, they propose that rank attained at the end of the first term, and perhaps the speed of promotion should be included in reenlistment policy guidelines.

Binkin [Ref. 19] addresses the relationship between military technology and manpower requirements. Binkin balances two concepts against each other. First, with regard to technology, technical jobs have grown to represent a larger share of all jobs in the military, while the technical complexity of specific jobs has also expanded. Second, with regard to manpower, the shrinking youth population combined with anticipated economic recovery may make it increasingly more difficult for the military to enlist and retain the proper amount of qualified personnel.

Binkin addresses quality from the normal standards of AFQT category and education level. He notes that because of their declining abilities, a smaller proportion of the youth population will be qualified for service if advances in

technology bring a heavier concentration of technical jobs to the military.

Binkin discusses whether advances in technology increase or decrease the need for higher quality personnel. He approaches this subject from the perspective of system complexity, reliability, and maintainability. By presenting recent examples of the introduction of technically-advanced equipment, Binkin concludes that high technology increases the need for smarter, more technically proficient personnel.

Binkin balances the issues of technology and manpower by offering several policy options. With regard to equipment technology he proposes that the military services procure less complex, more reliable, and more easily maintained equipment. At the same time, he discusses the possibilities of expanding the roles of women and civilians. He also discusses the retention of highly skilled personnel by diverting resources used to retain semi- or unskilled personnel. Binkin suggests using these resources for incentives to retain highly skilled individuals. As a further hedge against technology and manpower trends, Binkin advises the military to alter training concepts by focusing more on on-the-job training and applying new technologies to the training base.

Eitelberg [Ref. 20] echoes some of the above thoughts in his study of aptitude trends in the military's C³I

(command, control, communication, intelligence) specialties, including electronics and computers. He points out that these specialties have grown in technological complexity, and have also grown as a portion of the overall force.

Eitelberg examines the aptitude test scores (as measured by the AFQT) of three cohorts of enlisted personnel assigned to C³I jobs. The cohorts include persons enlisting in the military in 1972, 1977, and 1982. The results reveal a consistently downward trend over time in the aptitude test scores of those who remain in the military. From these trends, he concludes that the military is losing many of its smartest people from some of the most technical jobs. Eitelberg states that although the mean percentile scores have fallen, they are still well above the national average. Yet, a substantial loss of talent is evident, and it could be countered through more effective reenlistment programs.

In addition to the downward trends in aptitude, Eitelberg identifies future considerations concerning manpower and technology. Specifically, he states that:

The competition for bright people in technological fields is intensifying as the available supply of employees continues to shrink. Moreover, as the military experiences technological growth, its demand for highly-qualified members will likely expand. The net result (assuming relatively stable force size) is that proportionately fewer people from an already-declining population will be qualified for a growing number of military jobs. This suggests that any deterioration in

the quality of military manpower will be proportionately greater in places where quality is needed most. [Ref. 20:p. 25]

5. Conclusion

The literature review has built a foundation of topics relevant to the study of reenlistment incentives. It began by addressing the wide range of factors that influence military and civilian personnel to leave or remain in an organization. This was followed by a discussion of the role of incentives, and a brief summary of several incentive-specific studies. Finally, the literature review looked at the relationship between retention and quality within an increasingly technical and specialized military.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter II provides background information in three general areas. First, the criteria for reenlistment are examined to determine their ability to ensure the retention of quality Marines. Second, the reenlistment incentives currently offered by the Marine Corps are presented. Lastly, the concepts of enlisted force balance and occupational skill criticality are addressed.

In Chapter III, critical MOSs are identified by examining the assignment of SRB multiples from fiscal 1985 to the present. Additionally, a methodology is presented for the

examination of data obtained through the USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire.

In Chapter IV, data from the separation questionnaires are analyzed using cross-tabulation and frequency distributions. The data are examined according to demographic characteristics and DoD occupational areas to determine the primary reasons for first-term Marines (in critical MOSs) not reenlisting.

The results of the analyses conducted in this study are summarized in Chapter V. Additionally, conclusions are presented that focus on the enlisted separation questionnaire and current reenlistment incentives. Finally, recommendations are made that address reenlistment criteria and incentives.

II. BACKGROUND

A. OVERVIEW

In the Marine Corps, the process of retaining highly qualified enlisted personnel falls under the guidance of the career planning program. Marine Corps Order P1040.31E [Ref. 21], the Career Planning and Development Guide, states that the "retention of quality Marines will ensure the maintenance of a career force which is composed of Marines who are capable of making significant contributions to the overall effectiveness of the Marine Corps." [Ref. 21:p. 1-3] This study draws on two phrases of this quote to present retention background information.

The "retention of quality Marines" invokes the notion that the Marine Corps is selective in keeping the best personnel. The issue of quality, although never defined in the reference, is addressed in this chapter by referring to the criteria for reenlistment eligibility. These criteria should ensure that only quality Marines (those who meet the criteria) will be permitted to reenlist.

The same phrase, "retention of quality Marines," could be viewed from the perspective that there are quality Marines approaching the end of their enlistment and facing a

reenlistment decision. By being "quality" Marines, they meet the criteria, yet they are not all inclined towards reenlistment. Some are undecided, while the others feel strongly for or against reenlisting. This study views reenlistment incentives as mechanisms for influencing those who are undecided. It also views incentives as added benefits to those who would reenlist even without the presence of the incentives. For those who are strongly inclined to separate, reenlistment incentives are viewed as being non-pertinent to their decision process. In this chapter, the study presents the first-term reenlistment incentives offered by the Marine Corps. These incentives are also compared to those offered by the U.S. Army, as outlined in Army Regulation 601-280. [Ref. 22]

Another portion of the above quote (from the Career Planning and Development Guide) concerns "the maintenance of a career force". This study assumes that the phrase refers to the enlisted ranks, beyond the first-term, as being balanced by rank, experience, and skill. However, quality first-term Marines are those the Marine Corps wants to transfer into the career force. Therefore, maintaining balance in the career force begins with retaining those in their first-term who possess the skills deemed critical by enlisted manpower planners. The concepts of enlisted force

balance and occupational skill criticality are the final background issues discussed in this chapter.

B. REENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

As previously noted, the criteria for reenlistment should provide a guarantee for maintaining a high quality enlisted force beyond the first-term. The majority of criteria apply to all enlisted Marines, whether first-term or beyond. Additional criteria apply only to first-term reenlistment. Moreover, all unmet criteria may be waived at different levels in the chain of command. This study examines the reenlistment criteria by categorizing them into one of three groups.

The first reenlistment criteria group involves individual character and other personal traits. This group includes the following five prerequisites: [Ref. 21:pp. 3-5 to 3-6]

1. Possess high standards of leadership, professional competence, and personal behavior required to maintain the prestige and quality standards of the Marine Corps.
2. Possess the moral character and personal integrity expected of all Marines.
3. Not be a conscientious objector.
4. Not be a sole surviving son or daughter.
5. Be recommended by the commanding officer.

The first two of these criteria appear so grandiose in wording that they refer more to the collective character of the Marine Corps than they do to the individual Marine. As

such, these criteria have little impact in determining whether a Marine is qualified to reenlist. The third prerequisite has less impact since a conscientious objector is not likely to voluntarily join an organization renowned for its warfighting capacity and probable early commitment in any size scale of conflict. Likewise, restricting enlistment or reenlistment from a sole-surviving son or daughter can be easily waived, and seems more appropriate under draft conditions during a large-scale conflict than under volunteer conditions of a peacetime force. The final character criterion is the most basic in that it introduces the element of judgment by the chain of command. However, a commander must base his judgment concerning the worthiness of a prospective reenlistee on some tangible evidence. This evidence can be found in the second and third categories of reenlistment criteria.

The second category of reenlistment criteria can be described as performance-related. Included in this category are the following six prerequisites:

1. Pass the physical fitness test and meet military appearance and height/weight standards.
2. Have a minimum conduct and proficiency average of 4.0/4.0 (explained below).
3. Have successfully completed a twelfth grade education or its equivalent.

4. Have a general technical (GT) aptitude area score of 80 for a high school graduate or 95 for a non-high school graduate.
5. Pass a physical examination to be fully qualified for all duties at sea and in the field.
6. Meet the necessary time-in-service requirements. Most often, this means that a Marine has less than one year remaining on his or her current reenlistment contract.

Three of the above prerequisites may be waived at the Commanding General's level for first-term Marines. These include education level, general aptitude, and performance rating. These three prerequisites are the most directly related to standards of quality discussed in Chapter I. As previously noted, in recent years virtually all Marine recruits have been high school graduates. Furthermore, the few new recruits who do not possess a high school diploma at enlistment are strongly encouraged to obtain an equivalency diploma during their first term. The criterion for educational level is therefore meaningless by today's standards. Concerning aptitude, the requirement for a GT score of 80 for high school graduates is not particularly restrictive. In fact, studies have suggested that this score can be achieved by at least 72 percent of the general population.¹ Additionally, a Marine who scored poorly on the

¹Eitelberg, M. J., *Manpower for Military Occupations*, p. 235, April 1988.

entrance examination may retake any portion to improve his or her scores to qualify for reenlistment or other selective training programs. The final performance-related criterion that can be waived by a commanding general pertains to proficiency and conduct ratings. Without going into the specific rating guidelines, a mark below the 4.0 level for either area normally identifies a Marine needing too much job supervision (proficiency) or having disciplinary problems (conduct). Considering that over a typical four-year enlistment, a Marine will receive many marks from different supervisors, average marks of below 4.0/4.0 signal a marginal-to-poor performer. In all, the performance-related criteria are not particularly restrictive, and are less so when allowing the three that are most related to standards of quality to be waived.

The final category of reenlistment criteria is punitive-related, and includes the following six prerequisites:

1. Not have a record of military involvement in the wrongful use, possession, distribution, or introduction for the purpose of distribution on a military installation of any narcotic substance or dangerous drug (including marijuana).
2. Have no conviction by a court-martial.
3. Have no known convictions by civil authorities, or action taken which is tantamount to a finding of guilty of an offense for which the maximum penalty under the Uniform Code of Military Justice is confinement for six months or more and/or a fine of \$500 or more.

4. Have no more than two nonjudicial punishments.
5. Not have completed formal alcohol treatment during the past year. (Marines may be extended for up to one year. This restriction does not apply to Marines who volunteer for treatment and have had no performance or conduct problems.)
6. Have completed an unscheduled urinalysis within 90 days prior to reenlistment.

As previously observed, the Services have learned that higher-quality enlistees generally experience fewer disciplinary problems. Additionally, the urinalysis testing program, currently used by all Services, has resulted in a steady decline through the 1980s in the number of drug-related incidents. As such, these criteria set forth minimally-accepted standards of conduct. A Marine who breaches one of these criteria will receive reduced marks for conduct and possibly even proficiency. Moreover, as with most reenlistment criteria, a commanding general may waive the prerequisites for first-term Marines that deal with illegal drugs, civilian convictions, court-martials, and nonjudicial punishments.

The majority of all enlistment criteria, particularly those related to performance and punitive standards, establish minimally accepted standards. As such, the criteria seem to allow the reenlistment of Marines who can meet only the minimum standards. Additionally, by permitting many of the

criteria to be waived, the Marine Corps provides reenlistment opportunities to Marines who do not meet all minimum standards. The overriding presence of the waiver process appears to give the Marine Corps the flexibility to reenlist marginal personnel, likely during difficult periods of recruiting or retention. As noted by Doering and Grissmer, the flexibility in the reenlistment criteria may allow the retention of marginal personnel if the alternatives are vacant billets and unmet retention goals. [Ref. 5:p. 2]

C. FIRST-TERM REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES

Chapter Four of the Marine Corps Career Planning and Development Guide outlines the incentives available to first-term Marines who are eligible to reenlist. The chapter begins by stating that "incentives are offered to afford qualified Marines who are sincerely oriented towards a Marine Corps career an opportunity to influence their future". [Ref. 21:p. 4-3] With regard to first-term Marines, those decided to reenlist after having served approximately four years have likely not made the reenlistment decision with a long-term, 20-year career in mind. More likely, they have considered the ability of the Marine Corps to meet their expectations, their opportunity to pursue perceived alternatives, and their overall satisfaction with a wide range of factors.

This study consequently considers the first-term reenlistment decision to be of shorter term, lasting for the length of the reenlistment contract. Also, the quote in the above paragraph focuses on the ability of incentives to allow reenlisting Marines to shape and influence their future. This concept relates more to the Marine who is certain of reenlisting. However, for those who are undecided, the incentives should influence their reenlistment decisions in that incentives must be meaningful and pertinent to the individual contemplating reenlistment. It is unlikely that the incentive with the most quantifiable impact on reenlistment, the Selective Reenlistment Bonus, or SRB, could be categorized as allowing a Marine to shape his or her Marine Corps career. Receiving an SRB may influence one's lifestyle, and it may shape one's career only to the extent that by receiving a bonus, a Marine will stay in.

The SRB has been the most widely studied incentive, and guidance for its use is the most detailed of all the incentives. The guidance begins in Title 37 of the United States Code, paragraph 308. [Ref. 23:pp. 214-216] Six major points to be drawn from Title 37 are as follows:

1. It requires an individual to be qualified in a military skill designated as critical.

2. It establishes the method of bonus formulation; (SRB multiple) * (one month's basic pay) * (number of years reenlisted). (The SRB multiple is explained below.)
3. It sets the maximum multiple of six, the maximum number of years of reenlistment as six, and the maximum bonus at \$30,000.
4. It states that, of the total new bonuses paid during a fiscal year, not more than ten percent may exceed \$20,000.
5. It requires an individual to reenlist for more than three years.
6. It allows the payment of bonuses either in a lump sum or installments.

The SRB multiple is a number between zero and six. Its value is assigned to every enlisted military occupation by manpower planners for each of the Services. A higher multiple indicates a more critical occupation and thus a higher bonus. In addition to varying by occupation, multiples also vary by three experience zones: Zone A for first-term reenlistees, Zone B for second-term reenlistees, and Zone C for careerists with no more than 14 years of service. Finally, multiples are changed frequently by manpower planners to manage the size and experience levels of their respective Services. As noted by Cymrot, the Marine Corps changed the SRB multiples 21 times between October 1979 and December 1985 [Ref. 15:pp. 4-5].

The above guidelines are further refined in Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 1304.22, dated 7 August 1985 [Ref.

24]. The major refinements from this instruction include the following four points:

1. It established three zones of SRB eligibility depending on total years of service. Zone A generally pertains to first-termers, Zone B to intermediates or second-termers, and Zone C to careerists.
2. It stipulates the criteria for designating an occupational specialty as critical. (These criteria are outlined below along with the concept of force balance.)
3. It further defines criteria for individual member eligibility, such as being in pay grade E-3 or above.
4. It states that the purpose of the SRB is to induce individuals serving in a critical skill to reenlist and serve in the skill for the full period for which the bonus is paid.

The maintenance of the SRB program is further refined at the level of the Secretary of the Navy and Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps incorporates three additional points to the program. First, the Marine Corps requires an individual to reenlist for a minimum of four years, not three. Next, the method of payment is required to be 50 percent of the total bonus at the time of reenlistment, with the remaining portion paid in equal amounts on the reenlistment anniversary dates. Finally, the Marine Corps sets the maximum multiple at five, not six.

As can be seen above, although Title 37 of the U.S. Code establishes basic guidelines, the SRB program faces many refinements before arriving at the individual service level.

Additionally, each Service may administer the program differently from the others. For example, the Army has recently added two refinements. [Ref. 25] First, the Army allows multiples to increase by half values between one half and six (0.5, 1, 1.5, etc.). This may provide the Army with more accuracy in targeting the necessary number of reenlistments in each critical specialty, given a change in the SRB multiple. Second, the Army now links the SRB multiple to not only occupational specialty and zone, but also to grade. For example, an E-5 may receive a larger multiple than an E-4 even though they are both first-termers with the same occupational specialty. This may help to retain personnel of higher quality if quality is gauged by rank attained and speed of promotion, as suggested by Ward and Tan [Ref. 18]. In 1985, the Marine Corps similarly tied an SRB multiple of one to occupational specialty and rank. In that year, first-term Marines in several combat arms specialties (rifleman, machinegunner, mortarman, assaultman, and field artillery cannoneer) qualified for a bonus only if they were in pay grades E-4 or E-5.

In addition to the SRB, the Marine Corps offers reenlistees a choice of assignment preference to a duty station, a type of duty, or a location where a requirement and billet vacancy exist for their grade and occupational

specialty. With regard to a particular duty station, Marines may request three preferences for assignment. The preferences may be in the continental United States (CONUS) or overseas (normally Okinawa, Japan), or the Marine may request to remain at his or her present location for up to 12 months. In general, the individual's assignment preferences must match the Marine Corps' requirements for grade and skill vacancies.

The request for a specific type of duty involves training for an assignment to a duty that is outside of a Marine's primary occupational specialty. Examples of these duty assignments are Marine security guard (barracks), recruiting, and drill instructor duties. These assignments require the Marine to meet strict screening criteria. Additionally, reenlistment is not the only occasion when these special duties may be requested. If a Marine meets the screening criteria, he or she may request special duty at any time. It is beyond the scope of this study to address the likelihood of a Marine requesting and eventually being assigned to special duty. However, special duty billets are extremely competitive, not only for initial assignment to training, but also to complete training.

The Army offers reenlistment incentives for choice of duty station or type of duty based upon the same general theme as the Marine Corps--that is, the individual's qualifications and

the needs of the Army. Some of the Army's options are basically identical to those of the Marine Corps, such as remaining at one's present location for up to 12 months, or requesting an assignment either in CONUS or overseas. Type of duty incentives are also similar to the Marine Corps in that they are extremely competitive. These include assignment to the Berlin Brigade or to the Army's ceremonial "Old Guard" (the Third Infantry in Washington, D. C.). Other options offered by the Army appear broader in scope. For example, a reenlisting soldier may request assignment to a particular unit down to the regimental level. Also, some of the incentives involving type of duty seem to expand the soldier's opportunities within his or her primary occupational specialty. These include the possibility of airborne or ranger training, with the subsequent assignment to a unit requiring those skills.

The Marine Corps offers career progression training as the third type of reenlistment incentive. This type of training is normally within a Marine's primary occupational specialty, and it exposes the Marine to advanced level courses based on the needs of the Marine Corps and the availability of formal school quotas. Reenlistment is not the sole occasion for assignment to career progression training. However, this type of training is set aside for Marines who

have a solid record of performance and will remain on active duty for a specific amount of time(at least 12 months, normally) following completion of the training. The Army offers similar advanced training to reenlistees. Additionally, the Army offers foreign language training at the Defense Language Institute. As with airborne and ranger training, language training expands the soldier's opportunities within his or her primary specialty.

The final type of reenlistment incentive offered by the Marine Corps is lateral movement to another occupational specialty. Lateral movement may occur if an individual is in a specialty that is overstrength and qualifies for training in an understrength specialty. As with other reenlistment incentives, lateral movement does not have to occur at the point of reenlistment. Moreover, lateral movement is a method used more by manpower planners to balance the force than it is as a reenlistment incentive [Ref. 26]. The issue of a balanced force and the designating of an occupation as "critical" are addressed below.

D. FORCE BALANCE AND OCCUPATION CRITICALITY

The issue of balancing the Marine Corps' enlisted force involves several factors. Among these factors are overall end-strength, occupational specialties, years of service,

rank, attrition, recruitment, and retention. Because this study focuses on reenlistment incentives and their impact on first-term retention, this section initially addresses the process of setting reenlistment goals. It then examines how these goals are adjusted when balanced against end-strength and occupational specialty requirements. The information for this section was provided by the Enlisted Plans Section of the Manpower Policy and Plans Division at HQMC.

The setting of reenlistment goals begins with an estimate of what the career planning force can expect to achieve. The estimate comes from the Enlisted Force Management System, which applies forecasted losses to the current personnel inventory. The system then compares the forecasted inventory by occupational specialty and zone (based upon years of service) to the overall target inventory for the enlisted force. The system calculates retention rates for each specialty and zone based on recent historical behavior from the past year. It then applies the rates against the population of Marines who will reach the end of their service contracts in the targeted fiscal year. This produces an estimate of how reenlistments can contribute towards balancing the enlisted force. After review by the enlisted assignment monitors and the Enlisted Retention Section, the estimate becomes the reenlistment plan for a given fiscal year.

The execution of the reenlistment plan is monitored by the Enlisted Retention Section. This section determines on a monthly basis whether the reenlistment goals are achievable. If not, the entire enlisted manpower plan must be changed to reflect more realistic goals. Every change to the manpower plan requires the approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs at HQMC. For example, two changes to the plan in fiscal 1989 reduced the overall reenlistment goal by over 1,400 reenlistments.

Changes to the reenlistment goals may occur when goals are not being met for specific occupational specialties. This can affect the skill balance within the force. However, achieving an end-strength figure is more critical than balancing the force by skills. Thus, not achieving a retention goal in one specialty may result in retaining more personnel than required in other specialties. Exceeding a specialty's retention goal is limited by the policy that prohibits first-term reenlistment into an overmanned specialty.

Similarly, as with occupational specialties, personnel experience (years of service) also contributes towards balancing the force. If balance and end-strength cannot both be met, balance will be sacrificed to achieve end-strength. Therefore, the inability to meet first-term reenlistment goals

can lead to an increase in intermediate and career goals. For example, during fiscal 1988 and fiscal 1989, shortfalls in first-term reenlistments were counteracted by over-execution of intermediate and career goals.

The achievement of a balanced enlisted force by skill and experience is secondary in importance to meeting end-strength requirements. However, other factors besides reenlistment plans affect the attainment of an end-strength. For instance, recruitment plans and separation policies can contribute to short-term achievement of an end-strength. To address the long-term effectiveness of a force, one must consider balance by skill and experience. The dependence of the Services on the SRB to encourage retention of personnel having critical skills confirms the need for this type of balance.

As mentioned earlier, the SRB is offered to individuals in specialties that meet specific criteria for being designated as "critical". DoD Instruction 1340.22 [Ref. 24] outlines the requirements for designating these occupational specialties. The criteria include the following:

1. Serious undermanning in a number of adjacent year groups.
2. Chronic and persistent shortages in total career manning in past years or projected for future years.
3. High replacement cost, including training costs.

4. Skill is relatively arduous or otherwise unattractive compared to other military skills or civilian occupations.
5. Skill is essential to the accomplishment of the Service missions.

The selection of "critical" occupations requires a balanced evaluation of the above criteria. Although the DoD Instruction outlines the criteria, each Service must apply the guidelines to their respective force to determine the critical specialties. The Marine Corps, for example, considers a skill critical when it is manned by less than 95 percent of the billet requirement. Additionally, each service must equally consider the amount of money allocated for expenditures on SRBs. Based on the above DoD guidelines, most specialties would likely be considered "critical".

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter began by presenting the first-term reenlistment criteria currently used by the Marine Corps. These criteria are fairly unrestrictive in allowing the possible reenlistment of marginal personnel. Current reenlistment incentives were covered next. In addition to the SRB, the incentives offered by the Marine Corps are choice of duty and duty station, career progression training, and lateral movement into an understrength MOS. The SRB is strictly controlled at many different administrative levels

within the Department of Defense. The other incentives are specific to the Marine Corps, and available at other times besides the point of reenlistment. The final areas covered in this chapter were enlisted force balance and skill criticality. Total force end-strength overrides force balance based on skills and experience, while skill criticality appears equally controlled by allocated SRB funds, and by DoD and Service guidelines.

III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter consists of two sections. In the first section, critical military occupational specialties (MOSs) in the Marine Corps are identified. These MOSs were selected by examining the SRB multiples assigned by HQMC from fiscal 1985 to the present. The second section focuses on data obtained through the USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL SPECIALTIES

The focus of this study is on Marine occupational specialties that have been critically short from fiscal 1985 to the present. The initial step is to obtain data and develop a methodology for identifying the critical skills. Identification of critical skills was originally requested from the Enlisted Plans Section of the Manpower Policy and Plans Division at HQMC. Specifically, the author requested that critical specialties be identified according to annual retention goals for each specialty, with the corresponding success rate in meeting each goal. As it turned out, this information was not retained by HQMC during the time period studied here, and was therefore unavailable. As an


alternative, it was recommended that this study examine the assignment of SRB multiples from fiscal 1985 to present. As noted in the previous chapter, an MOS must first be designated as critical before it can be assigned an SRB multiple. Therefore, it is assumed that an examination of SRB multiples can reveal which MOSs are considered critical. As a result, seven messages were examined that assigned SRB multiples to Marine Corps MOSs. The seven messages with their corresponding message designation and fiscal year appear below.

1. ALMAR 268/84 for fiscal 1985 [Ref. 27]
2. ALMAR 260/85 for fiscal 1986 [Ref. 28]
3. ALMAR 264/86 for fiscal 1987 [Ref. 29]
4. ALMAR 329/87 for fiscal 1988 [Ref. 30]
5. ALMAR 260/88 for fiscal 1989 [Ref. 31]
6. ALMAR 101/89 to update fiscal 1989 [Ref. 32]
7. ALMAR 165/89 for fiscal 1990 [Ref. 33]

The messages identify the occupational specialties by their four digit codes, with corresponding multiples for each of the three zones (A, B, or C). This study deals only with the zone A multiples for first-term Marines. Additionally, this study examines only those specialties that existed from 1985 to the present. For instance, several specialties that rated multiples on the first three messages were deleted and

reassigned between 1985 and 1987 due to enlisted skills reorganization. As a result, 23 specialties were eliminated from further study. Also excluded from further study are specialties designated for Marines not yet occupationally qualified (that is, trainees) and those designated for Marines of pay grade E-6 and above. In all, 291 enlisted occupational specialties existed over the entire period and rated at least one SRB multiple.


Two interesting trends appear in the assignment of SRB multiples. First, the number of specialties rating an SRB has declined by more than half from fiscal 1985 to present; 235 in fiscal 1985, down to 116 for fiscal 1990 (see Figure 1). Second, the average multiple has been increasing, from 3.27 in fiscal 1985 to 4.10 for fiscal 1990 (see Figure 2). From these trends it appears that the Marine Corps has become more selective in using the SRB as a reenlistment incentive. This selectivity may be partly due to generally less money being appropriated to the Marine Corps for new SRB payments during the same period. According to the Enlisted Plans Section, the Marine Corps received \$51.8 million in fiscal 1985, and has been appropriated \$38.3 million for fiscal 1990.



Note: The above values were obtained by summing the number of MOSSs awarded an SRB for each fiscal year. 1989-1 indicates the initial SRB program for fiscal 1989 (ALMAR 260/88). 1989-2 reflects an update of the fiscal 1989 SRB program (ALMAR 101/89)

Source: ALMAR 268/84, ALMAR 260/85, ALMAR 264/86, ALMAR 329/87, ALMAR 260/88, ALMAR 101/89, and ALMAR 165/89.

Figure 1. No. of MOSSs Awarded an SRB by Fiscal Year



Note: The average multiple was found by summing all multiples and dividing by the number of eligible MOSs for each fiscal year. 1989-1 indicates the initial SRB program for fiscal 1989 (ALMAR 260/88). 1989-2 reflects an update of the fiscal 1989 SRB program (ALMAR 101/89).

Source: ALMAR 268/84, ALMAR 260/85, ALMAR 264/86, ALMAR 329/87, ALMAR 260/88, ALMAR 101/89, and ALMAR 165/89.

Figure 2. Average SRB Multiple by Fiscal Year

As mentioned earlier, the assignment of an SRB denotes a specialty as critical. However, this study sought to distinguish those specialties that have received the highest multiples over the entire time frame. Therefore, a methodology, based on specific criteria, was needed to identify the critical specialties by using SRB multiples.

The following two criteria were consequently applied in selecting "critical" MOSs for this study:

1. The average SRB multiple for the critical MOS over the entire period was two or greater; and
2. The critical MOS was awarded a multiple on the seven selected messages at least four times.

In addition to the two above criteria, if a specialty were in a Marine occupational field in which the majority of specialties met the first two criteria, it was considered critical. (Note: An occupational field is a general classification, such as intelligence or logistics. There are 36 Marine occupational fields, each of which is subdivided into individual military occupational specialties.) This last criterion was added to ensure the inclusion of specialties that require skills similar to those of the entire occupational field.

By following the above criteria, this study identified 177 specialties out of 415 as "critical". Many of the critical specialties fall within occupational fields where all the specialties in the field are critical. Examples of these fields are intelligence, signal intelligence/ground electronic warfare, and electronics maintenance.

Appendix A lists the critical specialties arranged by the Department of Defense (DoD) Occupational Conversion Manual [Ref. 34]. By using this system, the data base is divided

into the following eight occupational areas (instead of the 36 Marine occupational fields):

1. 0 - Infantry, Gun Crews and Seamanship Specialists
2. 1 - Electronic Equipment Repairers
3. 2 - Communications and Intelligence Specialists
4. 4 - Other Technical and Allied Specialists
5. 5 - Functional Support and Administration
6. 6 - Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers
7. 7 - Craftsman
8. 8 - Service and Supply Handlers

Occupational areas three (Medical and Dental Specialists) and nine (Nonoccupational) were not relevant to this study. The DoD classification system is used because it groups specialties together that are similar in their occupational requirements. Furthermore, this study uses the DoD system as a basis for analysis of the separation questionnaires.

C. USMC ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE

The separation questionnaire data for this study were provided by the Manpower Analysis Branch of the Manpower Policy and Plans Division. The data base contains enlisted personnel only, and includes not only survey responses but also information about the demographic background of the respondents (e.g., pay grade, MOS, education level, etc.).

Additionally, the data were collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989. The questionnaire data base initially contained 38,904 observations and 76 variables for each observation.

The data base was condensed to 19,485 observations to eliminate data based on term of service and reenlistment code. Survey data were retained on individuals completing their first term of service and on those who had been assigned a reenlistment code indicating they were eligible and recommended for reenlistment. Additionally, survey data were deleted for individuals of grade E-1 or E-2. This was done as an added guarantee that observations would be retained on Marines who were completing their first term of service and had not experienced any disciplinary problems.

The final step in condensing the data base required the extraction of observations from Marines assigned to critical specialties. This step reduced the data base from 19,485 to 4,857 observations. The resulting data base did not include questionnaire observations from Marines representing 29 critical specialties. As a result, 148 critical specialties, not 177, are represented by the survey data.

In addition to being arranged by DoD occupational area, the 4,857 observations were arranged by demographic variables accounting for marital status, race, gender, and pay grade.

The marital status variable had seven possible markings: married, divorced, widowed, separated, single, annulled, and pending final divorce. This study combined married, separated, and pending final divorce into the "married" category. The remaining observations comprised the "single" category. This grouping produced 32.7 percent "married" and 67.3 percent "single". These percentages are in line with statistics mentioned in the literature review (stating that approximately 35 percent of Marines near the end of their first-term are married). The race variable had six possible markings: white, black, yellow, red, other, or unknown. The white respondents were placed into one group, and all others into a "minority" category. This grouping produced 86.4 percent white, and 13.6 percent minority. The pay grade variable had four possible categories: E-3, E-4, E-5, and E-6. There were five observations from Marines in grade E-6. These were combined with the E-5 observations, and the E-3 and E-4 categories remained unchanged. As a result, the data base contained 19.1 percent E-3s, 67.2 percent E-4s, and 13.7 percent E-5s.

Tables 1 and 2 display the above demographic variables for all observations, arranged by DoD occupational areas. Information in Table 1 includes number and percentage of observations represented by each occupational area, average

TABLE 1. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY DOD
OCCUPATIONAL AREA, GENERAL TECHNICAL SCORE, AND
PAY GRADE

OCCUPATIONAL AREAS	NO. OF OBS	% OF SAMPLE	AVG GT SCORE	PAY GRADE		
				E-3	E-4	E-5
0 Infantry & Gun Crews	91	1.9	107.9	33.0	56.0	11.0
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers	1,097	22.6	116.7	13.9	60.9	25.2
2 Comm & Intelligence Specialists	230	4.7	119.6	14.3	59.1	26.6
4 Technical & Allied Specialists	72	1.5	111.8	6.9	68.1	25.0
5 Functional Support & Administration	505	10.4	106.4	21.8	68.1	10.1
6 a. Elec/Mech Equip Rprs (Aircraft related)	1,213	25.0	108.2	18.8	71.6	9.6
b. Elec/Mech Equip Rprs (Non-Aircraft rel)	1,143	23.5	104.2	22.0	68.7	9.4
7 Craftsmen	314	6.5	101.5	20.4	71.0	8.6
8 Service & Supply Handlers	192	3.9	102.8	26.6	71.8	1.6
ALL	4,857	100.0	108.9	19.1	67.2	13.7

Note: The above values reflect only the composition of the data used in this study. They are not meant to represent the Marine Corps as a whole. The sample population consists of first-term Marines in critical MOSSs.

Source: USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan 1989.

TABLE 2. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY DOD
OCCUPATIONAL AREA, MARITAL STATUS, GENDER, AND
RACE

OCCUPATIONAL AREAS	<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>		<u>GENDER</u>		<u>RACE</u>	
	Married	Single	Male	Female	White	Minority
0 Infantry & Gun Crews	39.6	60.4	100.0	-	75.8	24.2
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers	30.1	69.9	95.9	4.1	92.0	8.0
2 Comm & Intelligence Specialists	38.7	61.3	92.2	7.8	93.5	6.5
4 Technical & Allied Specialists	41.7	58.3	100.0	-	91.7	8.3
5 Functional Support & Administration	34.1	65.9	82.0	18.0	72.9	27.1
6 a. Elec/Mech Equip Rprs (Aircraft related)	33.5	66.5	98.7	1.3	89.3	10.7
b. Elec/Mech Equip Rprs (Non-Aircraft rel)	33.4	66.6	96.2	3.8	83.7	16.3
7 Craftsmen	33.8	66.2	94.3	5.7	84.1	15.9
8 Service & Supply Handlers	28.1	71.9	99.0	1.0	85.9	14.1
ALL	32.7	67.3	95.2	4.8	86.4	13.6

Note: The above values reflect only the composition of the data used in this study. They are not meant to represent the Marine Corps as a whole. The sample population consists of first-term Marines in critical MOSs.

Source: USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan 1989.

GT score, and pay grade distribution. While not a measure of intelligence, GT score is a measure of aptitude and trainability, and is included to show variation between the different occupational areas. Table 2 displays the distribution of the remaining demographic variables (marital status, gender, and race).

There is wide variation in the representativeness between occupational areas. For instance, the electronic/mechanical equipment repairers comprise almost half of the observations, while the technical and allied specialists make up less than two percent. As a result, the electronic/mechanical equipment repairers were further divided into aircraft and non-aircraft related groups. This caused a more equal distribution of occupational area six. The remaining percentages simply describe the data base, and are not meant to be representative of the Marine Corps on the whole.

Three assumptions were made in analyzing the separation questionnaires. Doering and Grissmer state that exit surveys have been plagued with poor response rates, and that low response is subject to problems of bias [Ref. 5:p. 48]. The Marine Corps enlisted separation questionnaire has a response rate of approximately 35 percent. Therefore, it is assumed that the data are biased to the extent that they reflect only the opinion of those Marines in critical specialties who chose

to respond; and no broad generalizations should be drawn for all Marines who separated during the period studied here.

The second assumption is that the Marines who responded to the questionnaire are voluntarily separating at the end of their first enlistment contract. This is in contrast to involuntary separation in which a service member is processed for discharge by his or her command for reasons of unsuitability (such as medical or punitive reasons). The steps mentioned above to condense the data based on favorable reenlistment code ensure that the observations to be analyzed are from Marines voluntarily separating.

The final assumption concerns the ability of the questionnaire to accurately portray an individual's reasons for not reenlisting. Doering and Grissmer state that most exit surveys tend to focus on the "push" factors (the military-related factors that push an individual out of the military), as opposed to "pull" factors (the civilian-related factors that pull an individual into the civilian sector). [Ref. 5:p. 32] The Marine Corps Enlisted Separation Questionnaire : milarly focuses on "push" factors. Therefore, this study assumes that the questionnaire enables the respondents to indicate only the military-related factors for not reenlisting.

The questionnaire is displayed in Appendix B. The sixth section of the questionnaire, which lists the 34 military-related reasons for not reenlisting, provides the data for analysis. The questionnaire responses were initially analyzed based upon their mean average values and associated standard deviations for the entire sample. Within the data base, each questionnaire response is assigned a value between one and five in Part A of Section 6. The values correspond to the five degrees of importance that a respondent may assign to each response. The values are coded in the data base in the following manner:

1. 1 "Extremely Important"
2. 2 "Very Important"
3. 3 "Important"
4. 4 "Of Some Importance"
5. 5 "Not Very Important or of No Importance"

For this study, the values were recoded in reverse order (i.e., a value of "5" was assigned to "extremely important", a value of "4" to "very important", and so on). The questionnaire responses, with their respective mean average values and standard deviations, are displayed in Table 3 in the order that they appear on the questionnaire.

TABLE 3. MEAN VALUES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF USMC
ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE			
No.	Reason for Not Reenlisting	Mean	Std Dev
1	Dislike physical fitness standards	1.52	* 1.01
2	Too many petty regulations	2.96	1.36
3	Assigned work doesn't use educational skills	2.09	1.37
4	Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor	2.51	1.49
5	Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want	2.57	1.49
6	Pay and allowances are too low	2.96	1.44
7	Lack of recognition for doing a good job	2.90	1.44
8	Fear of losing retirement benefits	1.47	* 0.98
9	Too many permanent change of station moves	1.83	* 1.25
10	Too much family separation	2.58	1.59
11	Can't get the education or skill training I want	2.57	1.53
12	Poor quality of Commissary/Exchange	1.53	* 0.97
13	Can't get into the MOS I want	1.85	* 1.37
14	Poor quality of medical care	2.31	1.42
15	Dislike field duty	1.66	* 1.13
16	Housing not available or of poor quality	1.99	1.40
17	Can't get the duty/duty stations I want	2.13	1.43
18	Dislike the kind of people I must work with	2.24	1.36
19	Not enough promotional opportunity	3.12	1.53
20	Not enough reenlistment bonus money	2.51	1.57
21	Dislike deployments aboard ship	1.82	* 1.33
22	My spouse does not want me to stay in....	1.76	1.36
23	Not enough chance to do more interesting work	2.53	1.46
24	I want to live near my parents or relatives	1.86	* 1.28
25	I feel that my current job is not worthwhile	2.13	1.43
26	Lack of help/information from my career planner	1.66	* 1.17
27	Working hours are too long	1.98	1.32
28	Fear of losing more fringe benefits	1.14	* 1.03
29	Not being treated with respect	2.81	1.51
30	Poor quality of dental care	1.81	* 1.23
31	Dislike personal appearance standards	1.78	* 1.19
32	Too much racial prejudice	1.91	1.32
33	Too much sexual harassment	1.28	* 0.77
34	Too much sexual discrimination	1.62	* 1.20

Note: * - denotes responses excluded from further analysis. Responses are numbered in the order they appear on the questionnaire.

Source: Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989.

Fourteen questionnaire responses were excluded from further study based on low mean values with corresponding low standard deviations (in comparison to the other responses). A low mean value indicates that the response was of little importance in general to the sample respondents in influencing their decisions to separate. A corresponding low standard deviation indicates that survey respondents uniformly assigned a low value to the response. Furthermore, the responses dealing with sexual harassment and discrimination were recently added to the questionnaire and had few responses during the period studied here. They were consequently excluded from further analysis. Additionally, response 22 ("My spouse does not want me to stay in the Marine Corps") was retained for cross-tabulation based on marital status (despite its low mean and low standard deviation) to determine its importance to the sample's married respondents.

Following the exclusions, 20 responses remained in section six of the survey for further analysis. Part A of the sixth section directs the respondent to indicate how important each response has been in influencing the Marine's decision not to reenlist. As described above, the respondent is able to indicate one of five different degrees of importance, ranging from "extremely important" to "not true or of no importance". Since all of the responses (except the last) allow for some

degree of importance, responses were combined to create a clearer picture of which ones had the most influence on separating. Responses "extremely important" and "very important" were combined, as were "important" and "of some importance". The final response, "not true or of not importance", remained unchanged. As a result, in Part A, the 20 responses had three possible markings, not five.

The combining of responses in Part A provides one method for conducting frequency analysis. This study examines the percentage of Marines who marked each response with the combined response of "extremely important" and "very important". Simply, the response with the highest percentage had the most influence on the respondents' decisions not to reenlist. In the data analysis section, the responses with their corresponding percentages are presented for the entire data base and by occupational area. Furthermore, the 20 responses are cross-tabulated against the demographic variables mentioned above.

Another method of frequency analysis utilizes Part B of the questionnaire's sixth section. Part B contains three columns, and instructs the respondent to mark "the most important reason," "second most important reason," and "third most important reason," in deciding not to reenlist. The respondent is instructed to mark only one response in each

column. In this study, the three choices are combined to formulate an average percentage of Marines who marked each response as either the first, second, or third most important reasons. For instance, if a response was marked by 12 percent of the respondents as the most important reason, and it was also marked by ten percent as second most important and by eight percent as third most important, then the response would have an average rating of ten percent. (In this example, the combination of response frequencies add up to 30 percent, which is then divided by three, the total number of possible markings.) The responses with the three highest percentages are presented for the entire data base and by occupational area. The results of Part B analysis are also cross-tabulated against the demographic variables. It is expected that the analyses of Parts A and B will yield similar results concerning questionnaire responses that have the most impact on the decisions not to reenlist.

The final portion of the data analysis section evaluates current reenlistment incentives in light of the reasons given by first-term Marines for leaving active duty. Several responses are directly related to existing incentives, such as type of duty, duty station location, availability of skill training, and the amount of SRB money. The response dealing with SRB money (number 20 in Table 3) is not expected to be

of much importance, since the observations are from Marines who possessed skills that likely rated bonus money at the time of separation.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS

A. OVERVIEW

Data from the enlisted separation questionnaires are analyzed using cross-tabulations and frequency distributions. The analysis is divided into three sections. In the first section, the data are examined by the demographic variables of marital status, gender, race, and pay grade. The second section focuses on the possible relationships between reasons for separation and an individual's occupational skill. The final section addresses the ability of current reenlistment incentives to counter the dominant factors influencing the separation of Marines in critical skill groups.

B. DATA ANALYSIS BASED ON DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

1. Marital Status

Table 4 compares the responses of married and single personnel concerning their reasons for not reenlisting on the Enlisted Separation Questionnaire (Part A, Section 6). Both groups were similar in the percentage of those marking "not enough promotional opportunity" (42.1 percent for married, 40.6 percent for single) and "pay and allowances

TABLE 4. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICAL MOSS) GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING, BY MARITAL STATUS


QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE		<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>	
No.	Reason for Not Reenlisting	Married	Single
2	Too many petty regulations	28.7	36.02(2)
3	Assigned work doesn't use educational skills	17.1	17.6
4	Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor	26.3	27.2
5	Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want	22.9	29.4
6	Pay and allowances are too low	34.5(3)	34.8(3)
7	Lack of recognition for doing a good job	34.2	33.4
10	Too much family separation	49.9(1)	20.0
11	Can't get the education or skill training I want	26.5	29.2
14	Poor quality of medical care	28.3	17.5
16	Housing not available or of poor quality	19.1	16.1
17	Can't get the duty/duty stations I want	18.5	18.9
18	Dislike the kind of people I must work with	15.9	19.5
19	Not enough promotional opportunity	42.1(2)	40.6(1)
20	Not enough reenlistment bonus money	29.2	27.2
22	My spouse does not want me to stay in....	29.3	5.9
23	Not enough chance to do more interesting work	25.8	25.6
25	I feel that my current job is not worthwhile	17.7	19.6
27	Working hours are too long	14.7	15.0
29	Not being treated with respect	31.0	33.5
32	Too much racial prejudice	12.5	14.5

Note: The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicating each reason was "extremely important" or "very important" in influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in parentheses show the first, second and third highest percentage within each category.

Source: Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989.

are too low" (34.6 percent married, 34.8 percent single). However, for nearly half of the married personnel (49.9 percent), "too much family separation" was the most important reason for not reenlisting. Additionally, 36 percent of the single respondents indicated that "too many petty regulations" was the second most important reason. The largest differences in the two groups occur in responses dealing with the family. In addition to family separation, the quality of medical care and, quite expectedly, the concerns of the spouse were important reasons to married personnel for separating. The lack of freedom to use non-working hours was noticeably more important to single Marines than to those who were married (29.4 percent for single, 22.9 percent for married).

Analysis of Part B yield virtually the same results as described above. As shown in Figure 3, "too much family separation" was marked by 12.8 percent of married personnel as one the of three most important reasons, followed by the responses involving promotion (8.9 percent) and pay (8.5 percent). For single personnel, the three most important reasons remained the same. However, "too many petty regulations" received the most marks (10.2 percent), followed by the responses of promotion (9.6 percent) and pay (9.0 percent).



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989.

Figure 3. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, by Marital Status

2. Gender

Table 5 displays the differences between men and women in their stated reasons for not reenlisting (Part A). The most noticeable difference between how men and women

TABLE 5. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICAL MOSs)
GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING, BY GENDER

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE		GENDER	
No.	Reason for Not Reenlisting	Female	Male
2	Too many petty regulations	24.3	34.1 (3)
3	Assigned work doesn't use educational skills	12.3	17.7
4	Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor	25.9	26.9
5	Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want	16.2	27.8
6	Pay and allowances are too low	24.7	35.3 (2)
7	Lack of recognition for doing a good job	29.4	34.0
10	Too much family separation	39.6 (1)	29.3
11	Can't get the education or skill training I want	23.0	28.7
14	Poor quality of medical care	24.7	20.8
16	Housing not available or of poor quality	14.5	17.2
17	Can't get the duty/duty stations I want	14.0	19.0
18	Dislike the kind of people I must work with	20.4	18.2
19	Not enough promotional opportunity	38.3 (2)	41.2 (1)
20	Not enough reenlistment bonus money	21.7	28.1
22	My spouse does not want me to stay in....	24.3	13.1
23	Not enough chance to do more interesting work	32.3 (3)	25.3
25	I feel that my current job is not worthwhile	19.6	18.9
27	Working hours are too long	11.1	15.1
28	Not being treated with respect	26.0	33.0
32	Too much racial prejudice	22.1	13.4


Note: The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicating each reason was "extremely important" or "very important" in influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in parentheses show the first, second and third highest percentage within each category.

Source: Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989.

marked the questionnaire is that men placed comparatively more importance on 13 of the 20 reasons for not reenlisting. Women indicate that family separation is the most important reason for not reenlisting. Also of importance to women is their apparent desire to do more interesting or challenging work (32.3 percent). However, this result is not duplicated by similar responses that address skill training or type of duty/duty station to which men ascribed more importance (skill training - 28.7 percent men, 23 percent women; duty/duty station - 19 percent men, 14 percent women). Additionally, both sexes indicate that the lack of promotional opportunity is an important reason for separating (41.2 percent men, 38.3 percent women), while men marked the responses concerning low pay and petty regulations the second and third most frequently (35.3 and 34.1 percent respectively).

The results shown in Figure 4 (Part B) confirm the above finding for men, where promotions, regulations, and pay are the most important reasons for not reenlisting. For women, family separation remains the most important reason; but Part B introduces two different reasons for separating that rank second and third. "Too many petty regulations" becomes the second most important reason for women, and the concerns of the spouse becomes the third most important reason for women not reenlisting. Further research showed that 139

of the 243 women (59.4 percent) were married. This result suggests that married women attributed family concerns as a dominating factor for not reenlisting, and their concerns influenced the results of the female group as a whole.



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989.

Figure 4. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, by Gender

3. Race

Minority respondents (those in the sample population other than whites) placed a greater level of importance on 15 of the 19 responses in Table 6. Not surprisingly, the largest difference between the two groups concerns the marking of the response addressing the presence of racial prejudice (25 percent for minorities, 12.1 percent for whites). Other noticeable differences occur in responses dealing with job skills and money to which minorities placed much more importance. With regard to job skills, 35.1 percent of minorities (27.2 percent whites) pointed out the desire for more education or skill training, and 25.7 percent (17.6 percent of whites) indicated they were unable to obtain the duty or duty station they wanted. With regard to money, 39.5 percent of minorities (34 percent of whites) indicated dissatisfaction with the pay and allowances, and 32.1 percent (27.2 percent of whites) showed displeasure with the amount of SRB money.

Referring back to Table 2, one can see that minorities are over-represented in the sample in the occupational areas of Infantry/Gun Crews and Functional Support Administration. Of the eight occupational areas, these two are not the most technical. The results suggest that many minorities in the

TABLE 6. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICAL MOSS) GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING, BY RACE

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE		
No.	Reason for Not Reenlisting	RACE
		White Minority
2	Too many petty regulations	34.2(2) 30.1
3	Assigned work doesn't use educational skills	16.8 21.8
4	Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor	26.7 28.3
5	Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want	26.9 29.7
6	Pay and allowances are too low	34.0(3) 39.5(2)
7	Lack of recognition for doing a good job	33.5 35.7(3)
10	Too much family separation	29.7 30.4
11	Can't get the education or skill training I want	27.2 35.1
14	Poor quality of medical care	21.3 19.5
16	Housing not available or of poor quality	17.1 16.9
17	Can't get the duty/duty stations I want	17.6 25.7
18	Dislike the kind of people I must work with	18.2 19.4
19	Not enough promotional opportunity	41.2(1) 40.5(1)
20	Not enough reenlistment bonus money	27.2 32.1
23	Not enough chance to do more interesting work	25.3 28.0
25	I feel that my current job is not worthwhile	18.6 21.2
27	Working hours are too long	14.5 17.1
29	Not being treated with respect	32.2 35.4
32	Too much racial prejudice	12.1 25.0

Note: The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicating each reason was "extremely important" or "very important" in influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in parentheses show the first, second and third highest percentage within each category.

Source: Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989.


data set may have desired different skill training or duties. Furthermore, the minority group's added emphasis on low pay and inadequate bonus money suggests that these Marines considered their critical skills, whether technical or not, more marketable outside the military.

Responses to Part B (Figure 5) yield identical results for the majority group, showing that promotion, regulations, and pay are the three most important reasons for not reenlisting. For the minority group, low pay becomes the most important reason, followed by the responses dealing with promotions and regulations.

4. Pay Grade

Table 7 compares the responses of Marines in different pay grades in the marking of Part A. The most notable difference is that E-3s placed much higher importance on 15 of the 19 responses. Besides the expected high proportion who marked the response addressing promotional opportunity (58.7 percent), E-3s show greater dissatisfaction with the amount of recognition and respect they receive. Almost half (46.8 percent) of the E-3s (32.4 percent of E-4s, and 22.4 percent of E-5s) marked "lack of recognition" as being an important reason for not reenlisting. In addition, 41.8 percent of E-3s (31.9 percent of E-4s, and 23.6 percent of E-5s) felt they were not treated with respect. In actuality, these three

areas (promotion, recognition, and respect) are intertwined in that promotion is a form of recognition, and respect is normally associated with higher pay grade.



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989.

Figure 5. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, by Race

TABLE 7. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARIN'S (IN CRITICAL MOSs)
GIVING REASON FOR NOT REENLISTING, BY PAY GRADE


QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE		PAY GRADE		
No.	Reason for Not Reenlisting	E-3	E-4	E-5
2	Too many petty regulations	34.9	34.2 (3)	29.3 (2)
3	Assigned work doesn't use educational skills	20.5	16.9	15.8
4	Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor	30.2	26.7	23.5
5	Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want	31.3	27.5	20.7
6	Pay and allowances are too low	40.5	34.3 (2)	29.1 (3)
7	Lack of recognition for doing a good job	46.8 (2)	32.4	22.4
10	Too much family separation	25.8	30.4	32.7 (1)
11	Can't get the education or skill training I want	26.4	28.9	28.1
14	Poor quality of medical care	17.9	21.3	24.0
16	Housing not available or of poor quality	19.8	16.8	14.6
17	Can't get the duty/duty stations I want	20.8	18.2	18.3
18	Dislike the kind of people I must work with	20.5	18.5	14.1
19	Not enough promotional opportunity	58.7 (1)	40.5 (1)	19.5
20	Not enough reenlistment bonus money	31.9	27.2	24.9
23	Not enough chance to do more interesting work	26.6	24.9	27.5
25	I feel that my current job is not worthwhile	21.8	18.7	15.9
27	Working hours are too long	18.8	14.7	10.5
29	Not being treated with respect	41.8 (3)	31.9	23.6
32	Too much racial prejudice	18.2	13.5	9.9

Note: The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicating each reason was "extremely important" or "very important" in influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in parentheses show the first, second and third highest percentage within each category.

Source: Part A, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989.

Marines in higher pay grades assigned slightly more importance to the response involving education/skill training (28.9 percent E-4s, 28.1 percent E-5s, and 26.4 percent E-3s). In addition, responses dealing with the family (family separation and medical care) were chosen by a larger proportion of Marines in the higher pay grades. Family separation was the most important reason for E-5s not reenlisting (32.7 percent, compared to 30.4 percent of E-4s and 25.8 percent of E-3s). In addition, Marines in the higher pay grades indicated more concern with the quality of medical care (24 percent E-5s, 21.3 percent E-3s, and 17.9 percent E-3s). Further research showed that pay grade is related to marital status. For E-5s, 39.2 percent are married, as compared to 32.2 percent of E-4s, and 29.8 percent of E-3s. This result partially explains the importance of family-related matters with the respondents of higher pay grade. Moreover, the married E-5s influenced the results of the E-5 group as a whole.

Figure 6 shows similar results to those described above for E-4s and E-5s. Although the order is inconsistent, regulations, promotions, and pay are the most important reasons for E-4s, while pay, family separation, and regulations are the most important for E-5s. Lack of promotional opportunity is overwhelmingly the most important reason for not reenlisting among E-3s. However, low pay and petty regulations rank as the second and third most important reasons for E-3s in Part B.



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989.

Figure 6. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, by Pay Grade

5. Concluding Remarks Based on Demographic Variables

Analysis of the separation questionnaires based on demographic variables yielded important differences between the groups. Married and women Marines showed relatively higher concern for family-oriented responses, as did E-5s. A larger percentage of minorities and E-3s chose reasons involving recognition and respect. (Further research showed that lower pay grade is associated with minority status in the sample population. Specifically, 16 percent of E-3s were minority, as compared to 14.2 percent of E-4s, and 7.7 percent of E-5s.) Lack of promotion opportunities dominated all groups, except E-5s. Based upon the above results and the information in Tables 1 and 2, the typical respondent in the data set would be a single, white male in pay grade E-4. As such, the dominance of these demographic characteristics suggests that for all observations combined, the most important reason for not reenlisting would be lack of promotional opportunity, followed by low pay and petty regulations. In the next section, the data are analyzed as a whole and examined by DoD occupational areas.

C. DATA ANALYSIS BASED ON DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA

1. All First-Term Marines in Critical MOSs

Table 8 displays the entire data set with corresponding percentages of respondents who marked each response as either "extremely important" or "very important" in influencing their decision not to reenlist. The responses are listed in order from highest to lowest percentage. Additionally, response 27 ("working hours are too long") was excluded, because analysis from the preceding section showed that it was relatively unimportant among the various reasons for not reenlisting. Responses addressing promotion opportunities (41.2 percent), low pay (34.8 percent), and lack of recognition (33.9 percent) were selected by a larger proportion of respondents. Part B results, shown in Figure 7, replicate the respondents' attitudes toward promotion and pay, while the respondents' distaste for petty regulations becomes the second most important reason.

Table 9 presents a matrix of percentages based on Part A of the questionnaire. The rows are formed by the 16 questionnaire responses, and the nine columns represent the DoD occupational areas. (Note: Occupational area six is subdivided into two groups, aircraft and non-aircraft specialties.) The matrix provides the basis for analysis by


TABLE 8. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES GIVING RESPONSES
FOR NOT REENLISTING, FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST
IMPORTANCE, ALL CRITICAL MOSs

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE		
No.	Reason for Not Reenlisting	PERCENTAGE
19	Not enough promotional opportunity	41.2
6	Pay and allowances are too low	34.8
7	Lack of recognition for doing a good job	33.9
2	Too many petty regulations	33.7
29	Not being treated with respect	32.7
10	Too much family separation	29.8
11	Can't get the education or skill training I want	28.3
20	Not enough reenlistment bonus money	27.9
5	Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want	27.3
4	Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor	26.9
23	Not enough chance to do more interesting work	25.7
14	Poor quality of medical care	21.1
25	I feel that my current job is not worthwhile	19.0
17	Can't get the duty/duty stations I want	18.8
18	Dislike the kind of people I must work with	18.3
3	Assigned work doesn't use educational skills	17.5
16	Housing not available or of poor quality	17.1
32	Too much racial prejudice	13.9

Note: The above values reflect the percentage of respondents indicating each reason was "extremely important" or "very important" in influencing their decisions to not reenlist.

Source: Part A, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1987.

occupational area. The matrix in Table 9 is examined both by column (by occupational area), and by row (by questionnaire response).



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989.

Figure 7. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines (Critical MOSs)

TABLE 9. PERCENT OF FIRST-TERM MARINES (IN CRITICAL MOSS) GIVING REASONS FOR NOT REENLISTING, BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE	OCCUPATIONAL AREA							
	0	1	2	4	5	6a.	6b.	8
(2) Petty Regulations	35.2(3)	35.7(2)	28.7(3)	36.1(3)	28.1	34.7	33.6(3)	31.5
(3) Educational Skills	33.0	18.4	11.7	27.8	16.8	12.0	21.0	22.0
(4) Poor Leadership	20.9	27.0	27.0	29.2	25.7	25.1	27.7	35.0
(5) Lack of Freedom	22.0	26.1	20.4	18.1	22.4	29.3	29.6	26.1
(6) Low Pay	33.0	32.7	27.8	23.6	34.3(2)	40.0(2)	33.3	34.7
(7) No Recognition	23.1	31.0	24.8	33.3	33.5(3)	35.4(3)	36.6(2)	37.3(2)
(10) Family Separation	24.2	27.1	27.0	27.8	29.3	31.7	31.9	29.6
(11) Ed. Skill Training	48.4(1)	24.0	28.7	40.3(2)	26.3	26.9	30.8	33.1
(14) Medical Care	17.6	21.6	15.7	16.7	20.4	22.1	21.3	20.1
(16) Housing/Quarters	6.6	17.9	12.6	8.3	14.5	17.2	18.4	20.7
(17) Duty/Duty Stations	23.1	15.3	13.5	20.8	23.4	14.7	23.3	22.6
(18) Kind of People	12.1	17.9	13.5	29.2	17.4	16.4	19.4	23.9
(19) Promotion	36.3(2)	37.5(1)	45.2(1)	29.2	36.0(1)	47.6(1)	40.6(1)	36.9
(20) Bonus Money	13.2	29.2	22.2	23.6	29.5	32.3	26.1	24.2
(23) Challenging Work	34.1	24.2	27.0	45.8(1)	24.6	20.0	28.0	36.9(3)
(25) Job Worthwhile	28.6	17.2	16.5	33.3	20.4	14.6	22.0	20.1
(29) Treated w/Respect	30.8	33.6(3)	32.2(2)	29.2	30.3	30.8	33.1	38.2(1)
(32) Racial Prejudice	9.9	11.1	6.1	13.9	17.6	10.5	17.8	19.4
								20.8

Note: The above values represent the combined percentage of respondents in each occupational area who marked the questionnaire response as either "extremely important" or "very important" in influencing their decisions to not reenlist. Numbers in parentheses () reflect the three highest percentages by occupational area. Underlined numbers reflect the three highest percentages by questionnaire response.

Source: USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989, and Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan 1989.

2. Infantry and Gun Crews


For Marines in occupational area 0, one can see that the most important response (as measured by highest percentage) concerns the lack of skill training or desired education. Not only was this response the most important, Marines from no other occupational placed more importance (48.4 percent) on this reason for not reenlisting. Furthermore, this trend is reflected in other responses involving the respondents' satisfaction with their work. In comparison to the other occupational areas, Marines in occupational area 0 ascribed the most importance (33 percent) to the response that concerns their assigned work not using their educational skills. In addition, they placed the second highest percentage of marks (28.6 percent) on the response addressing their current job being worthwhile, and the third highest percentage of marks (34.1 percent) on response 23 ("Not enough chance to do more interesting/challenging work"). As a result, although concerns with promotion and regulations rank second and third, respectively, by column, the results show that dissatisfaction with work and the desire for more education or skill training are the overriding reasons why Marines in this occupational area chose to separate.

Analysis of Part B confirms that the desire for more education or skill training is the primary reason for Marines

in critical infantry or gun crew MOSs to not reenlist (see Figure 8). The second and third most important reasons concern low pay and petty regulations. The dominance of the response concerning more education or skill training brings into question its wording. The results are unable to distinguish whether the respondents actually desired more "education" or more "skill training". (The wording of this response is discussed in Chapter V.)

3. Electronic Equipment Repairers

Lack of promotional opportunity is the most important reason for not reenlisting among Marines in this occupational area. In comparison to Marines in the other areas, this reason was chosen by a relatively low percentage (37.5 percent) of respondents in occupational area one. This can be partly explained by referring back to Table 1, which shows that this occupational area has the second-highest percentage of E-5s (25.2 percent), and the second-lowest percentage of E-3s (13.9 percent). The second most important reason concerns petty regulations, to which these Marines assigned the third-highest percentage of marks (35.7 percent) among respondents in all occupational areas. Lack of respect is the third most important reason, and as above, these Marines ascribed the third-highest percentage of marks (33.6 percent) across all occupational areas. Results from Part B do not




Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and *DoD Occupational Conversion Manual*, Jan 1989.

Figure 8. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 0

duplicate the respondents' concern with not being treated with respect. Figure 9 shows that concern with regulations, promotions, and pay are the three top reasons for not reenlisting for Marines in this occupational area.



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and *DoD Occupational Conversion Manual*, Jan 1989.

Figure 9. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 1

Other marking trends worth noting for Marines in occupational area one address the quality of medical care and amount of reenlistment bonus money. These Marines assigned the third-highest percentages (21.6 percent and 29.2 percent,


respectively) to these responses as compared to the remaining sample. No trends or conclusions can be drawn from these findings based on the demographic variables mentioned earlier.

4. Communications and Intelligence Specialists

The respondents from occupational area two indicate that lack of promotional opportunity is the most important reason for not reenlisting. This reason received the third-highest proportion of responses (45.2 percent) from Marines assigned to this occupational area. Moreover, analysis of Part B reveals the same results (see Figure 10). This result is somewhat unexpected, since this occupational area has the highest percentage of E-5s (26.6 percent) and the third-lowest percentage of E-3s (14.3 percent) among respondents in all occupational areas.

The second and third most important reasons for not reenlisting for Marines in occupational area two concern lack of respect (32.2 percent) and petty regulations (28.7 percent). The concern with petty regulations is in line with the demographic trend noted earlier for whites, and this group has a relatively high percentage of white respondents (93.5 percent). However, their concern with lack of respect cannot be attributed to previously discussed demographic factors. Nor is it duplicated in the analysis of Part B, which shows

low pay and petty regulations as the second and third most important reasons for not reenlisting, respectively.



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and *DoD Occupational Conversion Manual*, Jan 1989.

Figure 10. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 2

A final trend worth noting for Marines in occupational area two involves the generally low levels of importance that they placed on each of the questionnaire responses. Except for the response concerning promotion opportunity, the resulting percentages in Part A were relatively low in relation to other occupational areas. This trend is in line with the responses of personnel in higher pay grades. A final distinguishing feature of this group is its high average GT score of 119.6 (not shown here). This is by far the highest average among occupational areas, compared to the data set average of 108.9.


5. Technical and Allied Specialists

Two trends can be identified from the observations of Marines assigned to occupational area four. The first trend concerns the lack of job satisfaction among these Marines. In comparison to the other occupational areas, these Marines ascribed the highest percentage of marks to the reasons concerning their opportunity to do more interesting or challenging work (45.8 percent) and their current jobs being worthwhile (33.3 percent). Additionally, response three ("Work I am assigned doesn't use educational skills") and response 11 ("Can't get the education or skill training I want") received the second-highest proportion of marks (27.8 and 40.3 percent, respectively) from these Marines.

Analysis of Part B confirms this group's overall job dissatisfaction (see Figure 11). Although distaste for petty regulations ranks as the most important reason for not reenlisting, this group's desire for more interesting work and the inability to receive more education (or skill training) rank as the second and third most important reasons, respectively.

The second trend involves this group's personal relationships at work. Compared to the remaining occupational areas, these Marines ascribed the highest percentage of marks (29.2 percent) to response 18 ("Dislike the kind of people I must work with"), and the second-highest percentage (29.2 percent) to response four ("Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor").

It should be noted that the Technical and Allied Specialists represent the smallest occupational area in the data set. (As shown in Table 1, this area comprises only 1.5 percent of the total sample.) Moreover, of this group's 72 observations, 66 are from one MOS, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense Specialist (MOS 5711). Therefore, the trends mentioned above may apply more to NBC Defense Specialists than to the occupational area as a whole.



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and *DoD Occupational Conversion Manual*, Jan 1989.

Figure 11. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 4

6. Functional Support and Administration


Among the eight occupational areas, area five contains the largest percentages of respondents who are women (18 percent) or minorities (27.1 percent). The three most important reasons from analysis of Part A are lack of

promotional opportunity (36 percent), low pay (34.3 percent), and lack of recognition (33.5 percent). The importance of pay-related responses was noted in the previous discussion of minorities and partly explains the high ranking of low pay. It may also explain the importance of the response that addresses the amount of reenlistment bonus money, which received the second-highest percentage of marks (29.5 percent) in comparison to all occupational areas.

Despite relatively large representation of women, this group as a whole, does not reveal the concern with family-related matters and the desire to do more interesting work that was noted earlier for women as a group. However, a high percentage of Marines in functional support and administrative billets marked response 17 ("Can't get the duty/duty station I want"), which received the second-highest percentage (23.4 percent) among all occupational areas. Analysis of Part B (see Figure 12) shows low pay as the most important reason for these Marines not reenlisting, followed by petty regulations and lack of promotional opportunity.

7. Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers (Aircraft)

As noted earlier, occupational area six was divided into subgroups for aircraft and non-aircraft specialties. For Marines in aircraft-related specialties, lack of



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSS) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and *DoD Occupational Conversion Manual*, Jan 1989.

Figure 12. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 5

promotional opportunity (47.6 percent) is the most important reason for separating, followed by low pay (40 percent) and lack of recognition (35.4 percent). In relation to all occupational areas, these Marines assigned the highest


percentage of marks to low pay (40 percent) and "not enough reenlistment bonus money" (32.3 percent). The concern expressed by these Marines with pay and bonus money may be due to their generally high level of technical training and their opportunity to pursue higher paying civilian jobs.

Analysis of Part B confirms the concern these Marines have with promotion and pay, and also reveals petty regulations as the third most important reason for separating (see Figure 13). The lack of promotional opportunity is evident from this group's pay grade distribution, which shows this group as having a relatively low percentage of E-5s (9.6 percent), as compared with 13.7 percent for the entire sample.

The final item to note for Marines in the aircraft subgroup is the importance they attributed to family-related matters. Although this group ranks sixth in its percentage of married personnel (33.5 percent), the responses concerning family separation and quality of medical care received the second-highest percentage of marks (31.7 and 22.1 percent, respectively) from these Marines.

8. Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers (non-aircraft)

Marines in the non-aircraft subgroup of occupational area six indicated that the three major reasons for not



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and *DoD Occupational Conversion Manual*, Jan 1989.

Figure 13. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 6.a


reenlisting concerned promotion (40.6 percent), recognition (36.6 percent), and regulations (33.6 percent). The first two reasons may be partly explained by the comparatively high percentage of E-3s (22 percent) and low percentage of E-5s

(9.4 percent) in this subgroup. Analysis of Part B shows petty regulations as the most important reasons, followed by lack of promotional opportunity and low pay (see Figure 14).

Other questionnaire responses to note for this subgroup involve its comparison to the remaining occupational areas. Response 10 ("Too much family separation") received the highest percentage of marks (31.9 percent) from Marines in this group despite having the seventh-lowest percentage of married personnel (33.4 percent) among the eight occupational areas. Additionally, these Marines ascribed the second-highest percentage of marks (29.6 percent) to response five ("Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want").

9. Craftsmen

Compared to all areas, Marines in occupational area seven placed comparatively higher levels of importance on all of the questionnaire responses. This group's general dissatisfaction can be described as either personnel-related or work-related. For personnel-related matters, the reasons addressing poor leadership and lack of recognition received the highest proportion of marks (35 and 37.3 percent, respectively) from these Marines. They also placed the second-highest percentage of marks (38.2 percent) on response



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan 1989.

Figure 14. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 6.b


29 ("Not being treated with respect") and the third-highest percentage (23.9 percent) to response 18 ("Dislike the kind of people....").

For work-related matters, Marines in occupational area seven gave the second highest percentage (36.9 percent) to response 23 ("...do more interesting/challenging work"). They also ascribed the third-highest proportion of marks (22 and 33.1 percent, respectively) to responses three ("...assigned work doesn't use educational skills") and 11 ("Can't get the education or skill training I want").

The results in Figure 15 only support the previous finding concerning this group's emphasis on low pay. The other responses identified through analysis of Part B are petty regulations and promotion opportunities. The concern with the promotion is interesting, since this group is only one of two (the other being occupational area four) where lack of promotion did not rank in the top three reasons from Part A statistics.

10. Service and Supply Handlers

The final occupational area is similar to the preceding group in that its respondents place great importance across a broad range of questionnaire responses when compared to the other areas. Almost half of these Marines (47.9 percent) chose response 19 ("Not enough promotional opportunity") as being an important reason for not reenlisting. This result is in line with the grade structure, since this group has the lowest E-5 representation (1.6



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSSs) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan 1989.

Figure 15. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 7


percent) and the second-highest percentage of E-3s (26.6 percent) among all occupational areas. Responses addressing the following concerns received the highest percentage of marks from Marines in this group: petty regulations (38

percent), freedom to use non-working hours (37 percent), poor quality of medical care (24 percent), inability to get the duty/duty stations wanted (24 percent), and not being treated with respect (38.5 percent). Additionally, despite having the fifth-lowest representation of minority respondents (14.1 percent), Marines in this group gave the highest proportion of marks (20.8 percent) to the response concerning racial prejudice.

Analysis of Part B duplicates two of the most frequently marked responses from Part A, promotion opportunities and low pay (see Figure 16). Additionally, the findings from Part B show that distaste for petty regulations was marked most frequently by these Marines as one of the three most important reasons for not reenlisting. Considering both Parts A and B, Marines in occupational area eight, on average, placed more importance across a broader range of responses than did Marines in any of the other occupational areas.

11. Concluding Remarks Based on DoD Occupational Areas

Analysis of the separation questionnaires reveals marked variation in the reasons for not reenlisting across DoD occupational areas. Lack of promotion opportunity is unquestionably the most important reason among all



Note: The values represent the combined percentage of first-term Marines (in Critical MOSS) who marked the above responses as the first, second, or third most important reasons for not reenlisting.

Source: Part B, Section 6, *USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire*, collected between fiscal 1985 and third quarter fiscal 1989, and *DoD Occupational Conversion Manual*, Jan 1989.

Figure 16. Top Three Reasons for Not Reenlisting, First-Term Marines, DoD Occupational Area 8

respondents. Other questionnaire responses that were frequently noted as having generally high levels of importance concerned the following: petty regulations, low pay, lack of recognition, desire for education or skill training, the desire for more challenging work, and not being treated with

respect. In addition, many trends were noted as pertaining to Marines in particular occupational areas. For instance, Marines in aircraft specialties of occupational area six (Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers) attributed the greatest importance to factors dealing with compensation (pay and bonuses). Additionally, Marines in occupational areas seven (Craftsmen) and eight (Service and Supply Handlers) generally ascribed more importance across all responses. Conversely, Marines in occupational areas two (Communication and Intelligence Specialists) and five (Functional Support and Administration) assigned relatively low importance to the responses. In all, first-term Marines (in critical MOSs) appear to base their decisions to separate on reasons that are generally linked to the occupational skills they possess.

D. CURRENT REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES

There were few instances in the previous analysis sections where Marines in critical MOSs mentioned current reenlistment incentives as an important reason for not reenlisting. The one questionnaire response that was cited as an important reason dealt with the education or skill training desired by the respondents. This was the most important reason for Marines in occupational area zero (Infantry and Gun Crews) and the second most important reason for Marines in occupational

area four (Technical and Allied Specialists). However, only the part of this response regarding "skill training" -- namely, career progression training -- is related to a reenlistment incentive. There is ambiguity as to whether the respondent's desire for "education" or "skill training" influenced the selection of this response. Further, it's not clear whether the desire for skill training is related to a respondent's current MOS, or to a different one. Since response 13 ("Can't get into the MOS I want") was excluded because of relatively low importance, the desire for skill training is assumed to be within one's MOS. As a result, Marines in critical MOSs that fall into the above two occupational areas seem to be influenced in their decision to separate by the unavailability of skill training.

Considering the incentive of lateral movement into another MOS, the desire for Marines in critical occupations to pursue a different specialty is not evident in this study. This situation is assumed to occur for two reasons. First, the critical specialties involved in this study are generally more technical than other occupations in terms of training and application. Therefore, Marines in critical occupations tend to receive skills that are not only more valuable to the Marine Corps, but also more valuable in the civilian job market. Second, one would expect that a primary reason for

the MOSs in this study to be defined as "critical" is that the Marine Corps has a difficult time keeping the required number of positions filled. Therefore, Marines in a critical skill would not be offered lateral movement into another critical skill.

Response 17 from the questionnaire relates directly to the reenlistment incentive involving choice of duty and duty station. In comparison to all questionnaire responses, it was relatively unimportant. However, this response received higher percentages from Marines in the least technical occupational areas. Specifically, three of the four highest percentage of marks received by this response were assigned by Marines in the following areas: Service and Supply Handlers (24.0 percent), Functional Support and Administration (23.4 percent), and Infantry and Gun Crews (23.1 percent). Additionally, among the demographic groups examined here, minorities placed the highest percentage of marks (25.7 percent) on response 17.

Response 20 addresses the adequacy of reenlistment bonus money. As mentioned in Chapter III, this response was not expected to be of much importance among the reasons for not reenlisting. Generally, it was not mentioned by many respondents, but there are several trends worth noting. First, Marines in the more technical occupational areas tended

to place more importance on reenlistment bonus money. Specifically, this response received two of the three highest percentage of marks from the aircraft-related Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers (32.3 percent) and the Electronic Equipment Repairers (29.2 percent). Conversely, the lowest percentage among the eight occupational areas came from the Marines assigned to Infantry and Gun Crews (13.2 percent). The remaining trends focus on demographic characteristics. Specifically, the amount of bonus money was more important to men, minorities, and personnel in lower grades. Virtually no difference existed between married and single personnel.

In general, the respondents in this study placed low levels of importance on questionnaire responses that addressed current reenlistment incentives. This result suggests that the respondents were aware of the incentives, yet were not attracted to reenlist because of dissatisfaction with other aspects of their work. From the analysis presented in this chapter, the other aspects include lack of promotion opportunity, low pay and allowances, petty regulations, and lack of recognition and respect. In the following chapter, the results of the study are summarized, and conclusions are presented that focus on the Enlisted Separation Questionnaire and current reenlistment incentives. Finally, recommendations

are offered for possible improvements in current reenlistment criteria and incentives.

V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS

1. Identification of Critical Skills

The emphasis of this study is on first-term enlisted Marines in MOSs that have been critically short from fiscal 1985 to the present, and the dominant reasons why those Marines decided not to reenlist. The first area of analysis concerned the identification of critical MOSs in the Marine Corps. Information that specifically identified the critical MOSs during the required time frame was unavailable from HQMC. As an alternative, critical MOSs were identified using Marine Corps messages that assigned first-term SRB multiples for each of the fiscal years between 1985 and 1990. Using criteria based on average SRB multiple and frequency of multiple assignment during the stipulated time frame, 177 enlisted MOSs were identified as "critical" (see Appendix A).

2. USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaires

The second area of analysis focused on the examination of USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaires to determine the main reasons why Marines in critical MOSs decided to separate. Data were provided by HQMC containing over 38,000 separation questionnaires from enlisted Marines who separated from active

duty between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989. Only questionnaires completed by first-term Marines (who were recommended and eligible for reenlistment) in critical MOSs were analyzed. As noted in Chapter III, the questionnaires retained for analysis reflect only the opinions of Marines who chose to respond; and these opinions may not be representative of all persons who separated from the Marine Corps over the indicated time period.

The demographic characteristics of the survey respondents were first examined with respect to not reenlisting. The following characteristics were included in the analysis: marital status, gender, race, and pay grade. The results showed that both married and single respondents ascribed high levels of importance to lack of promotion opportunity and low pay as reasons for not reenlisting. However, for married personnel, the most important reason to separate was the amount of family separation. For single Marines, a distaste for petty regulations strongly influenced the decision to separate.

Male respondents stated that the most important reason for not reenlisting involved a lack of promotion opportunity. Men also indicated they were influenced by low pay and petty regulations. Women similarly placed high importance on lack of promotion opportunity and petty regulations. However, for

women, the most important reason for not reenlisting was overwhelmingly their concern with family separation. This result was influenced by the fact that a large proportion (59.4 percent) of female respondents were married.

White respondents indicated that they did not reenlist for the following reason (in order of importance): lack of promotion opportunity, petty regulations, and low pay. Minority respondents similarly assigned high levels of importance to lack of promotion opportunity and low pay, along with lack of recognition. Furthermore, minority respondents placed comparatively higher levels of importance than did whites on the desire for education and skill training as well as different duties. This result likely occurred because the minority respondents were generally overrepresented in the least technical MOSs.

As expected, respondents in pay grade E-3 (the lowest grade for the sample population) indicated that the most important reason for not reenlisting was lack of promotion opportunity. Additionally, in comparison to Marines in pay grades E-4 and E-5, E-3s placed much higher levels of importance on all but four of the questionnaire responses. The results suggested that lower pay grade is intertwined with other reasons for separating, such as lack of recognition and respect and low pay, and also caused E-3 respondents to have

comparatively more negative feelings toward their military experiences.

Respondents in pay grade E-4 stated that the most important reasons for not reenlisting were petty regulations, lack of promotion opportunity, and low pay. E-5s placed the greatest importance on low pay, family separation, and petty regulations. In comparison to E-3s, Marines in the higher pay grades placed greater emphasis on questionnaire responses involving education and skill training, and the family.

The second basis for analyzing the separation questionnaires involved the differences between personnel in the several DoD occupational areas. To perform this analysis, the respondents were placed into one of the following DoD occupational areas:

1. 0 - Infantry and Gun Crews
2. 1 - Electronic Equipment Repairers
3. 2 - Communications and Intelligence Specialists
4. 4 - Technical and Allied Specialists
5. 5 - Functional Support and Administration
6. 6 - Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers
 - a. Aircraft-related
 - b. Non-Aircraft-related
7. 7 - Craftsmen
8. 8 - Service and Supply Handlers

Table 10 summarizes the most important reasons that Marines in critical MOSs did not reenlist, based upon DoD occupational area. In all but three of the areas, respondents identified lack of promotion opportunity as the most important reason for not reenlisting (according to analysis of Part A of the questionnaire). Respondents in two occupational areas (Communications and Intelligence Specialists, and Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers (aircraft-related)) also attributed greatest importance to this reason on Part B of the questionnaire. Respondents from only one other occupational area (Infantry and Gun Crews) chose the same reason in both Parts A and B of the questionnaire as being the most important. These Marines indicated that the inability to "get the education or skill training" they wanted was the most important reason for separating.

As shown in Table 10, the most prominent reason for not reenlisting from Part B of the questionnaire was distaste for petty regulations. In all but four of the occupational areas, respondents identified this factor as the most important reason for separating. Marines from occupational area five (Functional Support and Administration) indicated that low pay was the primary reason for not reenlisting.

TABLE 10. SUMMARY OF MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR FIRST-TERM MARINES IN CRITICAL MOSS NOT REENLISTING BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA

ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES			
DOD OCC AREA	Part A(a)	Part B(b)	Duplication of Responses (c)
0	Can't get education or skill training	Can't get education or skill training	Can't get education or skill training Too many petty regs
1	Not enough promotion opportunity	Too many petty regs	Not enough promotion opportunity Too many petty regs
2	Not enough promotion opportunity	Not enough promotion opportunity	Not enough promotion opportunity Too many petty regs
4	Want more interesting or challenging work	Too many petty regs	Want more interesting or challenging work Too many petty regs Can't get education or skill training
5	Not enough promotion opportunity	Pay and allowances are too low	Not enough promotion opportunity Pay and allowances are too low
6a.	Not enough promotion opportunity	Not enough promotion opportunity	Not enough promotion opportunity Pay and allowances are too low
6b.	Not enough promotion opportunity	Too many petty regs	Not enough promotion opportunity Too many petty regs
7	Not treated with respect	Too many petty regs	-
8	Not enough promotion opportunity	Not enough promotion opportunity	Not enough promotion opportunity Pay and allowances are too low

NOTES: a - Response from analysis of Part A, Section 6 that received the highest combined percentage of marks as being "extremely important" or very "important" in influencing Marines' decisions to not reenlist.
b - Response from analysis of Part B, Section 6 that received the most marks as being the first, second, or third most important reason for not reenlisting.
c - Responses that were duplicated as being one of the three most important reasons for not reenlisting in analyses of Parts A and B.

Source: USMC Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, collected between fiscal 1985 and the third quarter of fiscal 1989, and DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, Jan 1989.

The final column of Table 10 lists the items that were marked by respondents (within each occupational area) on both Parts A and B of the questionnaire as the top three reasons for not reenlisting. The most frequently duplicated reasons for separating, in order, were lack of promotion opportunity, petty regulations, and low pay. In all but two of the occupational areas (Technical and Allied Specialists and Craftsmen), respondents duplicated two reasons for not reenlisting.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of this research deal with three areas. The first area involves the results of the data analysis. The second area concerns the construction of the enlistedseparation questionnaire and wording of the questionnaire responses. The final area focuses on the apparent inability of current Marine Corps reenlistment incentives to influence the behavior of certain Marines in critical MOSs.

1. Results of Analysis

The results of this study suggest that there are diverse reasons why Marines in critical MOSs do not reenlist. This study attempted to show variation in the responses based on demographic factors and between DoD occupational areas.

With regard to demographic factors (marital status, gender, race, and pay grade), several reasons for not reenlisting were generally important to all respondents regardless of background characteristics. Among these reasons were lack of promotion opportunity, low pay, and petty regulations. Conversely, other reasons for separating were tied directly to particular demographic factors. For instance, women, E-5s, and married respondents placed much greater emphasis on questionnaire items that addressed family concerns. Additionally, minority respondents showed a much greater desire (in comparison to all demographic groups) for education and skill training, and for a specific duty or duty station.

The primary reasons for not reenlisting also varied by occupational group. As previously noted, the questionnaire responses addressing promotion opportunities, petty regulations, and low pay were consistently found to be of more importance in explaining separation. However, other questionnaire responses stand out among particular occupational areas. For example, Marines in occupational area zero (Infantry and Gun Crews) overwhelmingly placed more importance on the desire for education or skill training.

The final conclusion involving the results deals with the diversity found between analyses of Parts A and B of the separation questionnaire. In general, analysis of Part A

allowed much more variation to be displayed between demographic groups as well as groups with similar occupational skills. Conversely, analysis of Part B showed much less variation. The attempt to compare reasons for separating between groups based on Part B provided inconclusive results. Marines in seven of the nine subgroups (based on DoD occupational area) marked the same three items (petty regulations, lack of promotion opportunity, and low pay) as being the top three reasons for separating. Moreover, in four of those seven subgroups, the top three reasons fell into the identical order of importance as listed above.

Because results from Part B of the questionnaire revealed very little variation across demographic factors or occupational areas, they were used basically as a supplement to results found in Part A. Therefore, analysis of Part B served more as a check of reliability for Part A findings than as a tool for showing diversity between different groups.

2. Enlisted Separation Questionnaire

Two problems were found concerning the construction and wording of the questionnaire. First, there are probably too many reasons for separating listed on the questionnaire. Fifteen of the 34 questionnaire responses were removed from this study because of their relatively low importance to the sample of first-term Marines. Moreover, several of the listed

reasons may be of little importance to any Marine deciding to separate.

Another concern involves the duplicity of reasons listed on the questionnaire. For example, a Marine who wants to serve in a different MOS (conveyed in questionnaire response 13) may also feel that his or her current job is not worthwhile (response 25) and would probably like to do more interesting or challenging work (response 23). At the same time, that Marine probably cannot get the duty he or she wants (response 17) and may feel that his or her educational skills are not being used on the job (response 3).

The problems with duplicity are further compounded in that the questionnaire sometimes uses two separate responses to express almost identical topics. For instance, too much sexual harassment (response 33) is probably indistinguishable from too much sexual discrimination (response 34) for most respondents (though the reasons are technically different).

Duplication of questionnaire responses may cause several problems. First of all, because the number of reasons for separating is unnecessarily increased, the respondent may be overwhelmed by the size of the questionnaire and the time needed to fill it out. In addition, similar but separate responses do not allow the respondent to truly distinguish between the most important reasons for not reenlisting. As

a result, respondents may be unable or unwilling to respond to the questionnaire in a manner that would provide the most beneficial data for analysis.

There is also some ambiguity in the wording used to describe two of the reasons for not reenlisting. First, as noted in Chapter IV, it is not clear whether the desire for more "education or skill training" (response 11) influenced the Marines in occupational area zero (Infantry and Gun Crews) to attribute such a high level of importance to that response. "Education" seems to pertain more to civilian-type education (perhaps college-level classes). Conversely, "skill training" implied advanced training in one's primary MOS (perhaps SCUBA, parachute, or Ranger training for infantrymen) or even training in a different MOS.

There is a similar problem in the wording of the questionnaire response regarding availability of a particular duty or duty station (response 17). A specific duty may imply assignment to a normal tour outside of one's primary MOS. Such assignments, as noted in Chapter II, include drill instructor, recruiter, or Marine Security Guard. Receiving one of the above duties would not change a Marine's primary MOS.

The above questionnaire response is even more confusing because it includes the phrase "duty stations".

The inability to be assigned to a duty station conveys the unmet desire to live and work in a specific geographic region. Obviously, this interpretation of response 17 is quite different than that explained in the above paragraph.

Another problem with the questionnaire responses is that they mainly address the military-related factors that "push" Marines out of the military. (This topic is discussed in Chapter I.) The absence of civilian-related factors that may "pull" Marines out of the military forces respondents to attribute their reasons for separating to "negative" aspects of service life. For example, the response that military "pay and allowances are too low" (response six) begs the question: too low compared to what? For a separating first-term Marine who has received technical skill training, has served a minimum of four years on active duty, and is still relatively young, the comparison is unquestionably on what can be earned in the civilian sector. An alternative response could be "I can receive higher pay and benefits in a civilian job".

Another poorly-worded questionnaire response that allows the respondent to attribute his or her reason for separating solely to the "negative" aspects of the military is "too many petty regulations" (response two). Again, one wonders what basis for comparison is used when the individual marks this response. (Perhaps home life, school, a civilian

job, or other branches of Service?) Prior to joining the Marine Corps, all persons should know that they will have to adhere to a strict set of rules and regulations. It's a well-known aspect of life in the military. Therefore, a respondent who marks this response as being the most important reason for not reenlisting is simply one who was dissatisfied at having to personally adjust to the regulations that govern military life. An alternative response could be "I can't accept all the rules and regulations".

3. Current Reenlistment Incentives

As discussed in Chapter IV, the unavailability of current reenlistment incentives was not found to be particularly important in influencing the separation of Marines in critical MOSs. The other side to this study is how Marines in critical MOSs who did reenlist were influenced in their decisions by the incentives. This could likely be answered by a study involving not only the Marines who reenlisted, but also the unit career planners who have first-hand responsibility for monitoring reenlistment trends.

There are two reasons that current reenlistment incentives are believed to be of little importance to the Marines in this study. First, the available incentives, for the most part, did not address the primary concerns of the respondents. "Not enough promotional opportunity" was

undoubtedly a very important reason why Marines in this sample did not reenlist. In addition, since higher pay is directly associated with higher pay grade, the importance of promotion becomes magnified.

No reenlistment incentive is directly tied to promotion opportunity. The only indirect associations to be made are that an individual may regard promotion opportunity as being better by receiving a specific duty assignment, career progression training, or lateral movement to another MOS.

The second reason that current reenlistment incentives are believed to be of little importance is that they are not tied to the specific act of reenlisting. The only exception is the SRB. However, in a Service that offers incentives to its career-oriented members as a way for them to influence their future (paraphrased from a quote in Chapter II), the payment of bonus money does not seem to give enlisted Marines that stated ability.

The other reenlistment incentives may be requested and granted at other times while on active duty, not just at reenlistment. Additionally, requests for a change of duty or for career progression training are tied less to reenlisting than to meeting a time-remaining-in-service requirement. For instance, the initial type of career progression training

(normally offered to E-4s and E-5s in their primary MOS) usually requires a Marine to remain on active duty for at least 12 months after completion of training. If an eligible candidate does not meet this requirement because of limited time remaining on an enlistment contract, he or she may still attend the training without reenlisting. The Marine could simply extend his or her current enlistment contract to meet the requirement.

Perhaps, a Marine in the above situation would be more apt to reenlist as a result of the training (or duty) received. If not, then the training (or duty) was of less benefit to the Marine Corps than if it were given to someone more likely to make the Marine Corps a career.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Current Reenlistment Criteria

As noted in Chapter II, the reenlistment criteria currently used by the Marine Corps establish certain minimum standards. In addition, by allowing many of the criteria to be waived, the Marine Corps provides reenlistment opportunities to Marines unable to meet the minimum standards. It is suggested that the criteria for reenlistment be modified in a manner that would afford reenlistment opportunities to the most-qualified Marines. The criteria should not present

reenlistment opportunities to marginal personnel on an equal basis with those who are highly qualified. Below are suggested modifications to the criteria.

a. Reduce the number of criteria that can be waived by the chain of command.

b. Eliminate the criteria that address education level and minimum GT score. These criteria appear more relevant as standards of enlistment.

c. Establish an annual ceiling (by percentage or number) of reenlistments awarded to E-3s. Just as annual reenlistment quotas are established at different unit levels, the same "quotas" or ceilings could be established for reenlistments of E-3s.

d. Reduce the number of punitive-related criteria or eliminate them altogether. A Marine's conduct is already part of the criterion that requires him or her to have a minimum average conduct mark of 4.0. Additionally, concern with punitive-related infractions seems more appropriate when a Marine is being administratively discharged from active duty than when being considered for reenlistment.

e. Remove the criteria regarding one's status as a conscientious objector or as a sole-surviving son or daughter. These criteria seem more appropriate under draft

conditions during a large-scale conflict than under volunteer conditions of a peacetime force.

f. Remove the criteria that require an individual's professional competence and moral character to reflect the prestige and quality standards expected of all Marines. These criteria pertain more to the collective character of the Marine Corps than to the abilities of the individual.

By adopting the above recommendations, the following criteria would remain.

- a. Be recommended by the commanding officer.
- b. Be an E-4 or above. E-3s would be permitted to reenlist within the command's annual ceiling. (Can be waived at the Commanding General's level.)
- c. Be physically qualified.
- d. Pass the physical fitness test and meet military appearance and height/weight standards.
- e. Have a minimum conduct and proficiency average of 4.0/4.0. (Can be waived at the Commanding General's level.)
- f. Meet the necessary time-in-service requirements.

The above recommendations may be viewed as overly restrictive, and as not giving a command the flexibility it

needs to meet first-term reenlistment quotas. However, if the Marine Corps were to consider adopting additional (or modifying current) reenlistment incentives, the current pressure on commands to meet first-term quotas may in turn be partially relieved. (Note: The Marine Corps achieved almost 98 percent of its first-term reenlistment goal for fiscal 1989, securing 3,529 reenlistments out of a goal of 3,611 [Ref. 35].)

2. Reenlistment Incentives

As observed above, the current incentives offered by the Marine Corps can probably be improved. The most apparent need is to tie the incentive directly to the reenlistment process. In addition, the results of this study suggest that lack of promotion opportunity is the most important reason cited by Marines for not reenlisting.

Early in the 1980s, the Marine Corps tied promotion to first-term reenlistment. In fact, many Marines were promoted to the next higher pay grade primarily because they did reenlist. This promotion policy is not recommended as a result of this study. However, reenlistment is recommended as a way for first-term Marines to earn bonus points toward their composite score for promotion. (The composite score is used to determine Marine Corps promotion to E-4 and E-5.) Depending on the amount of bonus points (no specific amount

is suggested), a Marine may be able to boost his or her composite score enough to gain promotion. In addition, the greater likelihood of being promoted following reenlistment may help to indirectly counter some of the other prominent reasons why Marines may decide not to reenlist (for example, concerns with lack of recognition and respect, and low pay).

In addition to linking promotion opportunity to reenlistment, it is suggested that the Marine Corps adopt an initiative involving the SRB--specifically, award Marines in higher pay grades a higher bonus in critical MOSs. For example, an E-5 would rate a higher bonus than an E-4 (who would rate a higher bonus than an E-3), even if they are in the same MOS. In addition, and related to the recommendation of reenlistment and composite score for promotion, a Marine who acquires the composite score needed for promotion following reenlistment would receive the higher bonus. (A time frame for promotion could be established within which the Marine could earn the higher bonus (e.g., within six months after reenlistment.)

Finally, it is recommended that the Marine Corps test different incentives or combinations of incentives to determine their impact on reenlistment. As noted in Chapter I, Doering and Grissmer [Ref. 5] propose testing different reenlistment incentives with sample sizes ranging from 500 to

1,000 individuals. These recommended sample sizes are comparable to many Marine Corps units (battalions, Marine Expeditionary Units, squadrons, etc.). In addition, there are career planners within units of that size who understand why Marines in the unit are separating. The career planner may also have ideas concerning the types of incentives that would influence these Marines to reenlist. As a result, separate units could tailor reenlistment incentive programs to meet the needs and concerns of their own enlisted personnel. In turn, enlisted Marines may be more prone to reenlist, and transfer their skills and experience to the enlisted career force.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF CRITICAL MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, BY DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA

For this study, the Marine military occupational specialties (MOSs) listed below are critical for first-term Marines. The MOSs are classified by general occupational areas assigned by the DoD Occupational Conversion Manual (Jan 1989). The MOSs are listed by their four digit code: the first two digits indicate the specific Marine Corps occupational fields; the last two digits indicate the MOSs within the separate occupational fields. (The occupational fields pertinent to this study are listed at the end of the appendix.)

- 0 INFANTRY AND GUN CREWS
 - 0313 LAV Crewman
 - 0861 Fire Support Man

- 1 ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT REPAIRERS
 - 2800 Data/Communications Maintenance (All MOSs) a,b
 - 5900 Electronics Maintenance (All MOSs) a
 - 6314 Aircraft Communications/Navigation Systems Technician RF4/F-4
 - 6316 Aircraft Communications/Navigation Systems Technician KC-130/OV-10
 - 6323 Aircraft Communications/Navigation Systems Technician CH-53
 - 6324 Aircraft Communications/Navigation Systems Technician U/AH-1

6352 Aircraft Weapons Systems Specialist A-4/TA-4/OA-4
 6364 Aircraft Weapons Specialist Helicopter/A-6/OV-10/F/A-18
 6365 Aircraft Communications/Navigation/Radar Systems Technician EA-6B
 6423 Aviation Electronic Micro-Miniature/Instrument & Cable Repair Technician, IMA
 6462 Avionics Test Set Technician, IMA
 6463 Radar Test Section/Radar Systems Test Station Technician, IMA
 6464 Aircraft Internal Navigation System Technician, IMA
 6465 Hybrid Test Set Technician, IMA
 6468 A/C Electrical Equipment Test Set/Mobile Electronics Test Set Technician, IMA
 6475 Aircraft Radar/IR Reconnaissance Systems Technician, IMA
 6483 Aircraft Electronics Countermeasures Systems Technician, Helicopter, IMA
 6492 Aviation PME/ATE Calibration and Repair Technician
 7212 Low Altitude Air Defense Gunner

2 COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS

0200 Intelligence (All MOSs) a
 2600 Signal Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare (All MOSs) a
 7236 Tactical Air Defense Controller
 7312 Air Traffic Controller-Tower
 7322 Air Traffic Controller-Radar
 7372 First Navigator
 7382 Airborne Radio Operator/Loadmaster

4 TECHNICAL AND ALLIED SPECIALISTS

1422 Geodetic Surveyor
 2336 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician
 5711 Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Specialist

5 FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATION

3043 Supply Administration and Operations Clerk
 3441 NAFI Audit Technician
 3451 Accounting Technician
 4069 Systems Programmer

4313 Broadcast Journalist
 4321 Print Journalist
 6046 Aircraft Maintenance Administration Clerk
 6047 Aircraft Maintenance Data Analysis Technician
 7041 Aviation Operations Specialist

6 ELECTRICAL/MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT REPAIRERS

a. (Aircraft Specialists)

6015 Aircraft Mechanic AV-8/TAV-8
 6016 Aircraft Mechanic KC-130
 6018 Aircraft Mechanic OV-10
 6025 Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, Rolls Royce
 Pegasus
 6027 Aircraft Power Plants Mechanic, F-404
 6035 Aircraft Power Plants Test Cell Operator, Fixed
 Wing
 6055 Aircraft Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, AV-8/TAV-
 8
 6056 Aircraft Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, KC-130
 6057 Aircraft Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, F/A-18
 6058 Aircraft Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, OV-10
 6072 Aircraft Maintenance GSE Mechanic
 6087 Aircraft Safety Equipment Mechanic, F/A-18
 6092 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, A-4/TA-4/OA-4
 6093 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, A-6/EA-6
 6095 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, AV-8/TAV-8
 6096 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, KC-130
 6097 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, F/A-18
 6098 Aircraft Structures Mechanic, OV-10
 6113 Helicopter Mechanic, CH-53
 6114 Helicopter Mechanic, U/AH-1
 6122 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-58
 6125 Helicopter Power Plants Mechanic, T-400
 6135 Aircraft Power Plants Test Cell Operator, Rotary
 Wing
 6142 Helicopter Structures Mechanic, CH-46
 6143 Helicopter Structures Mechanic, CH-53
 6144 Helicopter Structures Mechanic, U/AH-1
 6152 Helicopter Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, CH-46
 6154 Helicopter Hydraulic/Pneumatic Mechanic, U/AH-1
 6333 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, A-6/EA-
 6/TC-4C
 6335 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, AV-8
 6336 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, KC-
 130/OV-10

6344 Aircraft Electrical Systems Technician, U/AH-1
 6374 Imagery Interpretation Equipment Repair
 Technician
 6476 Aerial Camera/ADAS Systems Technician, IMA
 7011 Aircraft Recovery Specialist

b. (Non-Aircraft Specialists)

1341 Engineer Equipment Mechanic
 2100 Ordnance (All MOSs)
 2311 Ammunition Technician
 2513 Constructive Wireman
 2519 Wire Chief
 2811 Telephone Technician
 2813 Cable Systems Technician
 3522 Intermediate Automotive Mechanic
 3523 Vehicle Recovery Mechanic
 3524 Fuel and Electrical Systems Mechanic
 6521 Aviation Ordnance Munitions Technician
 6531 Aircraft Ordnance Technician
 6541 Aviation Ordnance Equipment Repair Technician

7 CRAFTSMEN

1100 Utilities (All MOSs) a
 1316 Metal Worker
 3513 Body Repair Mechanic
 6075 Cryogenics Equipment Operator

8 SERVICE AND SUPPLY HANDLERS

0451 Air Delivery Specialist
 3533 Tractor-Trailer Operator
 6060 Flight Equipment Marine

Sources: DoD Occupational Conversion Manual, January 1989
 Numerical Index of Military Occupational
 Specialties

Notes: a - Indicates the entire occupational field. No MOSs
 are included that are designated for trainees or
 for only Staff Sergeants (pay grade E-6) and
 above.
 b - Does not include MOSs 2811 and 2813, which are
 classified with Electrical/Mechanical Equipment
 Repairers (non-aircraft specialists).

MARINE OCCUPATIONAL FIELDS (related to this study)

- 02 Intelligence
- 03 Infantry
- 04 Logistics
- 08 Field Artillery
- 11 Utilities
- 13 Engineer, Construction, and Equipment
- 14 Drafting, Surveying, and Mapping
- 21 Ordnance
- 23 Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- 25 Operational Communications
- 26 Signal Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare
- 28 Data/Communications Maintenance
- 30 Supply Administration and Operations
- 34 Auditing, Financing, and Accounting
- 35 Motor Transport
- 40 Data Systems
- 43 Public Affairs
- 57 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
- 59 Electronics Maintenance
- 60/61 Aircraft Maintenance
- 63/64 Avionics
- 65 Aviation Ordnance
- 70 Airfield Services
- 72 Air Control/Air Support/Antiair Warfare
- 73 Air Traffic Control and Enlisted Fight Crews

APPENDIX B

USMC ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE

SN 0000 00 006 9581 U/1PG OF 60

USMC ENLISTED SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Civilian Job Opportunity

Have you investigated appropriate jobs in the civilian sector?

() Yes

() No

() ?

Are there appropriate jobs available for you?

() Yes

() No

() ?

3. Last Name (or first 9 letters)

First Initial	Middle Initial
()	()
(A)	(A)
(B)	(B)
(C)	(C)
(D)	(D)
(E)	(E)
(F)	(F)
(G)	(G)
(H)	(H)
(I)	(I)
(J)	(J)
(K)	(K)
(L)	(L)
(M)	(M)
(N)	(N)
(O)	(O)
(P)	(P)
(Q)	(Q)
(R)	(R)
(S)	(S)
(T)	(T)
(U)	(U)
(V)	(V)
(W)	(W)
(X)	(X)
(Y)	(Y)
(Z)	(Z)

2. Marine Corps Experience

The questions on the back of this form are worded to allow you to express your reasons for separating. Please indicate how satisfied you have been with your overall Marine Corps experience.

() Exceptionally Satisfied

() Very Satisfied

() Satisfied

() Indifferent

() Unsatisfied

() Very Unsatisfied

() Extremely Unsatisfied

4. Social Security Account Number

()	()	()	()	()	()	()	()
(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(4)
(5)	(5)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)
(9)	(9)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)
(3)	(3)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(5)	(6)	(6)
(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)	(9)	(9)	(0)	(0)
(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(4)
(5)	(5)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)
(9)	(9)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)
(3)	(3)	(4)	(4)	(5)	(5)	(6)	(6)
(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)	(9)	(9)	(0)	(0)

YOUR SINCERE RESPONSES ARE NEEDED TO HELP IMPROVE DECISIONS AFFECTING MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL.

MARKING INSTRUCTIONS

- Use only No. 2 pencils
- Make heavy black marks that fill the circle **COMPLETELY**
- Erase clearly any answer you wish to change.
- Make no stray marks on the answer sheet
- Complete the front and back of the form
- Complete Block # 5 "Special Answer Section" in the lower right-hand corner only if you have been given special instructions to do so

THIS SECTION SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE COMMAND'S ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. Every separating enlisted marine shall be requested to complete this questionnaire for the benefit of future Marines. If an enlisted marine refuses to complete this questionnaire, mark "decline" in "Completion Check" (Box #5) and complete boxes "Name" (3) and "Social Security No." (4). If the enlisted marine completes the form, check to make sure there are no extraneous marks and obvious failures to follow directions. Then mark "verified" in the "Completion Check" box (5). A form must be submitted for every enlisted marine separating.

2. These forms may be accumulated up to one week. Mail completed original forms in the standard fashion for optically scannable forms (DO NOT FOLD, STAPLE OR PUNCH HOLE) to THE FORMS to:

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
(CODE MPM 20)
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-0001

3. At times, special instructions for completing the "Special Answer Section" will be distributed. The special instructions should accompany this questionnaire when it is presented to the separating marine.

4. Request additional forms through the Marine Corps Supply System.

5. Completion Check

() Decline () Verified

UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED COMPLETE BLOCKS 1 THROUGH 4, THEN GO DIRECTLY TO THE BACK OF THE FORM.

5. Special Answer Section (Use only if instructed)

1 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	11 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	21 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
2 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	12 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	22 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
3 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	13 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	23 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
4 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	14 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	24 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
5 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	15 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	25 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
6 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	16 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	26 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
7 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	17 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	27 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
8 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	18 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	28 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
9 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	19 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	29 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
10 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	20 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)	30 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E)

A If you are VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING How important has each of the following been in your decision to not reenlist?
If you are INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATING or RETIRING How important has each of the following been in its influence on you?

L **Extremely Important**
Very Important
Important
Of Some Importance
Not True or of No Importance

B After completing A, indicate here the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd most important reasons

L **Mark Only One in Each Column**
Of the 34 possible reasons
1 **2** **3**
...What is the most important reason? ...What is the second most important reason? ...What is the third most important reason?

- | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Dislike physical fitness test standards | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 2 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Too many petty regulations | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 3 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Work I am assigned doesn't use educational skills | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 4 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Poor leadership of my immediate supervisor (NCO/SNCO) | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 5 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 6 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Pay and allowances are too low | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 7 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Lack of recognition for doing a good job | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 8 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Fear of losing retirement benefits | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 9 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Too many permanent change of station moves | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 10 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Too much family separation | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 11 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Can't get the education or skill training I want | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 12 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Poor quality of Commissary/Exchange | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 13 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Can't get into the MOS I want | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 14 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Poor quality of medical care | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 15 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Dislike field duty | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 16 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Housing not available or of poor quality | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 17 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Can't get the duty/duty stations I want | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 18 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Dislike the kind of people I must work with | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 19 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Not enough promotional opportunity | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 20 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Not enough reenlistment bonus money | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 21 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Dislike deployments aboard ship | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 22 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | My spouse does not want me to stay in the Marine Corps | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 23 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Not enough chance to do more interesting/challenging work | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 24 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | I want to live near my parents or relatives | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 25 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | I feel that my current job is not worthwhile | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 26 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Lack of help or information from my career planners | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 27 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Working hours are too long | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 28 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Fear of losing more fringe benefits | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 29 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Not being treated with respect | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 30 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Poor quality of dental care | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 31 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Dislike personal appearance standards | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 32 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Too much racial prejudice | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 33 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Too much sexual harassment | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| 34 | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | Too much sexual discrimination | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |

Please check to be sure you have answered every item on the front and back of this form. If the items (above) do not adequately reflect your reasons for separating, please state your reason within the box provided on the right. →

DO NOT WRITE OUTSIDE THIS BOX

DO NOT WRITE
IN
SHADED AREA

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