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IMPLEMENTING A CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE (CFE) TREATY:
WILL NATO BE READY?

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AUG 30 1990

BY

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15 June 1990



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE ^		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Implementing a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty: Will NATO be Ready?		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Study Project
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Lieutenant Colonel(P) Bruce F. Bach		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		12. REPORT DATE 15 June 1990
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 58
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Keywords: Military Forces Europe, Treaty, Arms Control, CFE		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The ongoing CFE negotiations that may lead to the most significant conventional arms control agreement in European history are receiving the totality of attention and world focus. The ability of NATO to effectively verify this treaty has not been addressed. This study will examine NATO's practical perspective and that of its member nations. It will first present relevant portions of the draft treaty currently being negotiated. Then, the		

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IMPLEMENTING A CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE (CFE) TREATY:
WILL NATO BE READY?

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15 June 1990

Accession For	
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DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
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Availability Codes	
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A-1	



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AUTHOR: Bruce F. Bach, LTC(P), IN

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IMPLEMENTING A CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE (CFE) TREATY:
WILL NATO BE READY?

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The onward rush of political events, euphoric reporting, and expectant plans to spend an already assured peace dividend have quite simply overlooked a significant stumbling block to the desired stable and secure Europe of the future. As the discussions in Vienna progress in fits and starts towards a conventional arms treaty among the twenty-three nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, little note has been taken of the ability of these nations to effectively verify what will most probably be the most complex and far ranging arms control agreement ever reached.

To begin this study, it is first necessary to survey the draft treaty and protocols that have been tabled among the parties. Although there are still several contested points, there is sufficient agreement to begin a review of the proposals. An analysis of recent inspection experience in the West will be presented, prior to the examination of the preparations of NATO members as they assess what will be needed to implement a conventional forces treaty. Recognizing that there are many dimensions to verification, the human element will receive the principal focus.

This study will cover only NATO and its member nations.

BACKGROUND

Conventional arms control is not really a new subject, but for many of the areas to be covered in the CFE Treaty it is breaking new ground and going where few have ventured before either in words or deeds. The immense task of monitoring the destruction and removal of tens of thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, aircraft and helicopters from the central European area poses challenges not seen before in the arms control arena. The daunting problem of exchanging and then verifying baseline data on perhaps 2,000-3,000 separate locations in the Eastern bloc in a limited time period will also keep many planning officers busy in the coming months. 1

Yet for the volumes written on arms control, the focus in the past has been almost exclusively nuclear, for the obvious reason that it was the greatest threat to world peace. It also was the only area where the United States and Soviet Union could sometimes come close to agreeing.

Relations among the Western nations, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union have changed radically in recent years. Looking at arms control and beginning with the Stockholm Accord in 1986 followed by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement in 1987, many changes have taken place involving observation as well as on-site inspection. These human techniques of monitoring have been some of the first efforts at intrusive, non-technical means of verification in arms control between the super-powers.

To really comprehend the magnitude and extent of what the pending CFE agreement could mean, it is first necessary to look at the draft treaty to date, its protocols relevant to verification, inspection and destruction, and the scope of these tentative proposals. It is also important to clarify some definitions involved in the arms control process.

The term "verification" is not always interpreted in the same manner among those occupied with arms control matters. In reports to the U.S. Congress, "verification" is defined as a decision made by a policy making branch (in this case, the Executive) whether observed behaviour is allowed by a given treaty. "Monitoring" is then described as a report on the observed behaviour as obtained from on-site inspectors, National Technical Means (NTM), and other sources. 2 What has been most common, however, is the use of verification as a description of means and activities used to determine if specified treaty requirements are being executed.

Another extremely important concept is that of "effective" verification. One American arms control adviser defined it before Congress as "if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any significant way, we should be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation." 3 Although this statement was made in reference to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, it still has great relevance to current conventional issues.

ENDNOTES

1. Various figures are discussed among NATO planners. For reasons that may concern both security and final treaty technical aspects, no official would commit to a single figure. For this reason I have stated numbers in the range of what was mentioned.

2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, The INF Treaty Monitoring and Verification Capabilities, S. Rept. 100-318, 100th Congress, 2d sess., 21 March 1988, pp.4-5.

3. James E. Nolan, "The Politics of On-Site Verification," The Brookings Review, Fall 1988, p.20.

CHAPTER II
THE DRAFT TREATY TO DATE

There are two major provisions of the proposed CFE Treaty which have received almost all of the attention. The first concerns Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) such as tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat helicopters, artillery, and combat aircraft. The other is that of troop ceilings, which may not only restrict total strengths of each group of states (an Eastern proposal), but also limit the superpowers to set numbers of troops in the Atlantic to Urals (ATTU) region. At this point in time what is significant to know is that there are still differences at the negotiating table in equipment definitions as well as amounts of equipment to be limited on each side. The figures that follow have been agreed to in some categories but remain unsettled in others (as indicated). The key, however, is to attempt to grasp the staggering quantities of what will need to be counted and verified by inspecting parties.

- PROPOSED NATO AND WARSAW PACT LIMITS IN THE ATTU-

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NATO PROPOSAL</u>	<u>WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL</u>
TANKS	20,000	20,000
ARTILLERY	16,500	20,000
ARM. VEHICLES	30,000	28,000
COMBAT AIRCRAFT	4,700*	4,700
ATTACK HELICOPTERS	1,900**	1,900

* Problems remain in determining counting rules for aircraft and where purely air defense interceptors fit into the equation (if a distinction can be made). The West has proposed an additional category for air defense aircraft with a limit of 1,000 to allay Soviet concerns in this area. This category is proving to be one of the most difficult, if not the most difficult, equipment definition to resolve.

** The critical aspect here is that the East desires to convert attack helicopters to other uses. The West would then require a very specific process of verifying that the conversion is complete, total, and not easily reversible.

Additionally, personnel limitations have been agreed to whereby the United States and the Soviet Union will be held to a ceiling of 195,000 troops in the central region. The United States will be permitted an additional 30,000 outside the central zone to account for the reinforcement distances involved.

Two other areas dealing specifically with equipment and personnel are those of sufficiency-no one country to retain more than a specified percent of the overall limits and regional limitations-ceilings on items within defined sub-zones of the overall Atlantic-to-Urals (ATTU) area. The concept of stationed forces is also presented as limiting troops and equipment from exceeding certain levels when stationed outside of their national boundaries.

As can be seen from even a cursory review of these figures, the amount of equipment involved in this treaty is in the tens of thousands of end items. The enormity of the tasks involved in counting, removing, converting or destroying such sums of war materiel has been lost on too many of the key people involved in arms control.

METHODS OF CEILING ATTAINMENT

What has been agreed to by both sides is that from the time the treaty enters into force there will be a three year time frame to attain the ceilings on TLE and personnel. Generally, these limits will be reached by a mixture of destruction, conversion/recategorization (Eastern proposal for attack helicopters), and demobilization. Specific destruction sites will be declared, and these will be subject to on-site inspection as well as any conversion sites where helicopters are modified into a category other than "attack". There will be no quotas limiting inspection of these sites or any right to refuse a nation the right to observe.

Several points under the protocols dealing with destruction clearly show the difficulties in reaching agreement. Initial thoughts centered on such means as using explosive charges to destroy equipment, filling equipment with cement, sinking items at sea, and cutting equipment into sections. As the process of negotiating has continued, the East has focussed more on conversion of equipment to non-threatening uses. Some examples are converting tanks to fire fighting vehicles or farming tractors, and attack helicopters to combat support aircraft. What

may eventually evolve is treaty language allowing destruction or conversion by a choice of means with technical parameters for clear and verifiable certification.

Although contractors and government experts are involved with the technical approaches to destruction, the scope of the problem exceeds the problem of numbers. There is no standard figure that can be found in determining the cost to destroy one tank. What is a part of the process, however, is the man-hours to first strip the equipment of usable parts (allowable by the treaty) and then the time to physically destroy the item to meet treaty requirements. Estimates have ranged from 100-300 man-hours for this process. 1 Clearly, the cost will be significant, to first, accomplish the destruction and, second, to send teams to witness your counterpart's destruction or conversion.

There is, however, one other factor that may eventually yield a far smaller number of TLE that must be destroyed. As treaty negotiations continue, there are quite naturally no restrictions on nations removing or replacing equipment that is currently in the region as an element of modernization. News reports have noted regiments of Soviet tanks being transported by rail back to the motherland as new equipment arrives. On the other hand, the United States has sold European based M-60 tanks to Egypt as the newer M-1 reaches all units in West Germany.

Tied to these activities is the NATO concept of cascading. It involves replacing one nation's equipment with the more modern

item from another. This could come about due to treaty ceilings of TLE as a country seeks ways to reach its mandated ceiling. These actions to modernize equipment in the region will influence the final totals that exist when the treaty enters into force. The totals may well be smaller in each alliance. Additionally, stockpiles of equipment stored in the months before a treaty is signed in areas outside of the ATTU region will not be subject to any measures of the present CFE negotiations. This may well present a lucrative method for the Soviets and Warsaw Pact to avoid wholesale destruction of in the vicinity of 40,000 tanks. 2

STABILIZING MEASURES

A series of measures have been proposed for the ATTU region to restrict offensive actions which could threaten other states. One of these is permanent storage sites. They would be clearly defined, contain limited numbers of equipment, require notification to remove items, and be subject to inspection. This provision is supported by the East, whereas, the West would prefer destruction of excess equipment to further ensure against rapid buildup and mobilization. In addition, Armored Launched Bridges which are necessary for offensive operations would be restricted in quantity so that those exceeding the ceiling would be placed in storage and subject to withdrawal only with written notification.

Size limitations on exercises and quotas as to the number that may be held have also been proposed. The details are similiar to agreements reached in the Stockholm Accords in 1986. 3

What can be said of any final stabilizing measures that are likely to be approved is that they will all require significant human and technical resources. Inspections and observations will be the major elements in these important efforts to make offensive activities more transparent and less of a threat to all states in the treaty area.

NOTIFICATION, DATA EXCHANGE, AND VERIFICATION

Under the title of "Notification" may well be a treaty article that will demand the most intense human and technical efforts in the entire CFE process. It concerns the exchange of data on all of the units, their equipment, personnel, and locations throughout the treaty area. There will probably be a separate protocol dealing with the establishment and maintenance of this data base. What this means is that each group of nations must assemble the required data and then exchange it with the other group of signatories to the treaty.

It is almost certain that there will be a baseline period during which the data will be exchanged, and then nations will have the right to go into each other's territory and physically verify the information. If this period is similiar to the INF experience, it could mean only 90-120 days to accomplish this

monumental task. 4 In considering that there could be several thousand sites to check, it will likely require a combination of on-site inspection, sampling of like sites, and the use of National Technical Means (NTM) to sufficiently verify the data presented by the other side. This time frame will require a surge effort with nations using the maximum number of personnel available with closely coordinated priorities to ensure that the baseline figures are as accurate as possible and achieved in the required period. Once the baseline period ends, there will be no second chance to get it right since the treaty will be in effect and the reduction/destruction effort to attain the mandated ceilings will be in full swing.

The focus of any arms control treaty must be its measures of verification which are established to ensure compliance with the agreement. What appears probable for CFE is that each nation will have a quota of "active" inspections per year to inspect members of the other alliance (quotas in the West will perhaps be based on a combination of factors like treaty holdings of equipment in the area as well as geographic size). Treaty signatories will also be required to receive a set number of "passive" inspections executed by members of the opposing states. Tied to these inspections will be the right to monitor equipment destruction/conversion, storage sites, troop reductions and aspects previously discussed under

stabilizing measures. Some form of aerial inspections may also be approved separate from any agreements reached under the "Open Skies" negotiations.

Much detailed work has gone into the specific protocols concerning on-site inspections. Lessons learned by both the Soviet Union and the United States in the INF Treaty are being incorporated into the CFE proposals and have provided a good frame of reference. Some of the key areas involve inspection teams, equipment, and on-site procedures.

Inspection teams will be limited in size (six members appears to be the middle ground with most delegations) and rosters of inspectors must not exceed a set number. Teams will be able to divide into smaller elements if desired. There will be designated points of entry and exit into each nation's territory. Inspecting teams will be limited to a set number of hours at any site (forty-eight is likely) and be held to a maximum number of consecutive days in the country (ten is being considered). Teams will be allowed to bring equipment to aid in verification (examples are binoculars, video cameras, lap-top computers, dictaphones and maps), although the East has yet to agree on specific items to be permitted. Finally, sequential inspections from one site to another will be allowed within a limited time frame of notification at an ongoing inspection site.

Some additional aspects of these protocols require inspecting teams to have their own interpreters, and there is also

the likelihood that there will be six official languages for the treaty to facilitate its execution. Although not finalized, these may be English, Russian, French, Spanish, German and Italian. Inspecting states will provide their own transportation to a country's point of entry, and the inspected state will then be responsible for transport within the region to the inspection site. There will also be definitive rules for inspecting non-declared sites and procedures to handle sensitive points once identified by the inspected party.

FINAL POINTS

There are two final treaty elements that must be discussed. The first is the agreement of all parties to permit the use of National Technical Means (NTM) in assisting verification and compliance, and not to interfere with its use. Concealment measures to hinder NTM will not be permitted and there is resolve among signatories to cooperate on this point. This article evolved from similar language in the INF accord signed in 1987.

The second important element is the formation of a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) which will handle the daily functioning of the treaty in regard to resolving questions of procedure, disputes and implementation. This is similar to the Special Verification Commission established in the INF Treaty. In both cases, good treaty language and effective practical experience in INF have assisted in the formation of the proposed CFE Treaty.

ENDNOTES

1. Interview with Joseph Schaeffer, LTC(P), U.S. Delegation to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 7 May 1990.

2. James Woolsey, "The CFE Talks Are Vital," Newsweek, 19 March 1990, p. S2. Interview conducted by Margaret Warner.

3. The Stockholm Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, 19 September 1986.

4. The Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Article XI, 8 December 1987, (hereafter referred to as "The INF Treaty"). Although this treaty allowed 90 days for its baseline period, the quantity of equipment and numbers of locations to check in verifying the data for a Conventional Forces Treaty will require at least as long if not a longer time frame.

CHAPTER III

INSPECTION AND ARMS CONTROL - LESSONS FROM THE RECENT PAST

There has been astonishing progress made in the last five years concerning arms control agreements and the inclusion of verification provisions which until recently were totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union and its allies. We have now seen both the Stockholm Document in 1986 and the INF Treaty in 1987 provide for a level of intrusiveness which has never occurred before in the East or West. The requirement for on-site inspectors and observers was something long talked about but never successfully included in treaties until these recent breakthroughs. A look at the practical effect of these two agreements and what has been learned by the people on the ground responsible for their implementation will provide a solid reference point for the verification of some very similar provisions now appearing probable under CFE. (The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe from which the Stockholm Document emerged is also known as CDE. The provisions and activities that occur due to this accord are commonly referred to either as the Stockholm Accord or as CDE.)

NEW GROUND AT STOCKHOLM

What clearly distinguishes the Stockholm Document from the earlier measures under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is that it has mandatory verification provisions. 1 The new requirements involving notification of troop exercises exceeding certain levels are more stringent and now include both the invitation of observers to these activities as well as the right to conduct on-site inspections when an agreed confidence-and security-building measure is in doubt. Signatories to the document are required to accept up to three inspections per year with not more than one from the same state. There are two other key provisions of the accord with relevance to this study. The first is the recognition of the use of NTM to monitor military activities. The second is a provision allowing short-notice inspections (ground, air, or both).

In the almost four years since the Stockholm Document has been in force, forty-two inspections and observations have been made by the East, while NATO nations have conducted thirty-nine. 2 Valuable inspection experience has been gained by numerous NATO members while participating in these activities. This core of experience should prove significant in preparations for CFE.

PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE UNDER THE STOCKHOLM ACCORD

Almost one-half of the members of the NATO Alliance have conducted an inspection or observation under the provisions of this document. What lessons have they learned that will guide them as they plan for the implementation of the CFE Treaty? There are no "lessons learned" files from which to extract key points gained from trial and error among each of the participating nations. This is perhaps a major disadvantage to the negotiating format which ended up with 35 signatories and no standing secretariat to maintain historical data. As well, the omission of any sort of commission or consultative group to coordinate among parties to the accord in its execution caused some difficulties which fortunately were able to be overcome. The INF Treaty and the draft of the CFE Treaty both have provisions for consultation during treaty implementation. Under CFE, however, there is no mechanism to cause coordination among the Western Allies other than arrangements that may be worked out in the NATO context.

In both interviews with officers who have participated in these inspections/observations, and the published experiences of COL. (Retired) Don Stovall, there are important points to study and consider.

To begin with, it must be recognized that the conduct of observation or inspection procedures will be primarily a human effort. Therefore, maximum focus should be on preparing the selected individuals to successfully perform their task. There

should be a training period during which several things must take place. Inspectors should receive intensive instruction in the verification provisions of the agreement they will be implementing. Detailed knowledge of a treaty can translate directly into fewer incidents and smoother execution when actually on the ground conducting an inspection. Those personnel with a language responsibility should undergo a refresher course not only in speaking and reading, but also in any technical terms that may be relevant due to the nature of the treaty. All personnel selected to actively participate as an inspector must have a high degree of maturity and be able to work together with other team members. This particular point was repeatedly stressed by all officers who had practical experience in inspections.

Although the individual inspector should be the focal point, knowledge of the equipment that may be necessary to accompany him is also important. Short instruction on the operation of cameras, recording equipment, or lap top computers may be valuable and preclude embarrassing mistakes. Likewise, the assembly and maintenance of all of the components of the items prior to the time they must be used is essential. It is too late when the aircraft is enroute to Kiev for someone to realise that no one procured film for the cameras. 3

A valuable technique used in preparing teams for inspections is that of a "mock inspection". This involves teams going to one of their own installations/exercises or that of an ally, and conducting an inspection just as if they were in a Warsaw Pact

country. If done properly with the use of interpreters, escorts, equipment, etc., it is a valuable experience not only for the inspectors in their preparation, but also useful for the inspected unit. The unit and its leaders will gain an insight into how they may be inspected one day by officers from the East and also be made aware that conventional arms control can directly affect them. An additional byproduct of a mock inspection is that all of the necessary agencies involved in treaty implementation are brought together in a trial run. This serves as an excellent shakeout of the planning that will be required later.

There are several other important points that were learned from the experiences of observations and inspections under CDE. Once on a site, communications are important not only as far as being able to talk with your embassy or a controlling element, but also between teams or members of a team if it splits into smaller sections. When conducting a count of equipment items, some type of recording instrument whether a camera or dictaphone is critical to preclude double counting large numbers of materiel.

A final lesson from CDE inspection experiences is that the lack of coordination among Western signatories in the implementation of the verification provisions was observed. What occurred was that any deviation in procedure among inspecting teams was noticed and in some cases taken advantage of by the Soviet Union. Although no one can predict how they will conduct

themselves under any CFE regime, their past behaviour clearly demonstrates that some level of coordination in inspection procedures should be seriously considered within the alliance. 4

What can be said of the experiences gained by many NATO members who participate in verifying aspects of the Stockholm Accord is that it is an extremely valuable training ground for the future, as well as a step forward in mutual understanding, cooperation, and the lessening of tensions.

THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY - A MODEL FOR SUCCESS

The INF Treaty signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987 was another leap ahead in intrusive verification and on-site inspection in the East. Although this treaty concerns nuclear weapons destruction, there are still many relevant points which can greatly assist allied nations in their preparation for CFE. What will be examined here is the preparation, organization, operations, and lessons learned by the United States in the implementation of this treaty.

When it became apparent that the treaty would be signed much more rapidly than anyone had expected, the Department of Defense began initial planning in the fall of 1987. After some inter-agency battles between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of Defense, a National Security Directive ordered the establishment of the On-Site Inspection

Agency (OSIA) to be responsible for monitoring the treaty. 5 The agency operates under the Department of Defense, but major policy decisions come from an interagency group that is under the National Security Council. This arrangement, although appearing somewhat unwieldy, has the executive side of government determining policy (their central responsibility), and the operational element of the Defense Department executing the practical aspects of the Treaty.

In forming any new agency, the initial work is not related to its reason for existence, but to the practical aspects of establishing an infrastructure. The first months for the OSIA were filled with the mundane details of finding facilities, equipment and the people to become members of this new organization. Once the basic tasks of creating the agency were progressing satisfactorily, attention was turned to four areas that were deemed essential. The Director of OSIA, Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, requested that he be allowed to select the officers who would serve as team chiefs in the conduct of the inspections. He required experienced field grade officers who had demonstrated sound judgement and maturity. A second priority was to conduct a series of informal technical talks to clarify practical working matters with the Soviet Union before actual inspections began. Thirdly, it was decided to task the Military Airlift Command to support transportation requirements of inspection teams to and from points of entry. This would give great flexibility and responsiveness to the system. Lastly, a

series of mock inspections was planned to prepare every inspection team, escort team, U.S. missile site, and airlift element for the actual missions they were to conduct. 6

The agency had roughly six months to build its infrastructure, develop its plans, and prepare to implement the treaty. When the articles of ratification were exchanged on June 1, 1988, baseline inspections were to begin in thirty days.

ORGANIZATION

The agency has three functional subordinate elements: operations, portal monitoring, and support. The Operations Directorate has approximately two-hundred inspectors limited by treaty, of which a percentage are permanent staff and the rest are assigned on a temporary duty basis when needed for inspections. These inspectors are grouped into ten-person teams with a designated senior officer as the team chief. Teams are comprised of Soviet specialists, linguists, and missile technicians. There is also an escort division and a management division within this directorate. It is important to note that the escort division is given the special task to accompany Soviet inspection teams both in the United States and in Europe. This section has two field operating offices (one at Frankfurt, West Germany and the other at San Francisco), as well as the people at agency headquarters at Dulles Airport, Washington, D.C. 7

The second element of two-hundred personnel has the responsibility for portal monitoring (these are the missile

production facilities at Magna, Utah and Votkinsk, U.S.S.R.) which is a unique feature of this arms control treaty. This group is largely comprised of contract civilians from Hughes Aircraft Corporation. The third element is the Support Directorate which provides necessary administrative and logistics support to the entire agency.

TRAINING

To adequately prepare the members of the agency for the tasks ahead, training in several areas was essential. Instruction in the treaty and its inspection protocols was critical not only for the inspectors, but also the escorts. Linguists had to attend refresher training and constantly work on maintaining their proficiency at a professional working level. Through experience, it was later determined that additional instruction was needed in technical terms necessary for the complexities of nuclear missiles. Counterintelligence training was also determined to be important to the development of all team members. Knowledge of the equipment to be used during the conduct of inspections as well as basic familiarity with the missiles being destroyed by both sides was also included. In rounding out their preparation, procedures for escort and inspection were developed and taught to appropriate personnel. As the agency matured, the Defense Intelligence College was tasked to put together the instruction course deemed necessary for OSIA inspectors and escorts. 8

KEY LESSONS LEARNED

In the over two years since the On-Site Inspection Agency has been functional, valuable experience has been gained among hundreds of personnel. In collecting and reviewing as much information as possible, the most constant common thread is a statement by Brigadier General Lajoie that "highly qualified people are crucial". 9 The requirement for experienced, capable and willing individuals cannot be shortchanged, for if it is, the ramifications could well be at an international level. In some instances, too much focus has been on the inspectors and little on the role of escorts. In reality, both duties are equally important. Escorts need precise knowledge of the treaty, excellent administrative and logistical skills to coordinate all aspects of the inspection by the arriving party, and an ability to gain the confidence of the unit being inspected. The work of linguists is no less important, and not only do they need constant practice, but, in particular, an emphasis on technical language that may be peculiar to a given arms control situation.

The aspect of forming core inspection teams is also significant. Several benefits are derived by organizing the permanently assigned people into standing teams and bringing in temporary inspectors when needed to fill out the group. A team leader can establish his standard way of operating, people can

become familiar with each other's capabilities, and the organizations providing the temporary inspectors would lose these specialized personnel for only a limited time. 10

Another focus of the team concept is the timely sharing of information. What works extremely well under INF is a system where returning inspection teams share their recent experience with teams preparing to depart. This keeps everyone up to date on the current situation and atmosphere within the country undergoing the inspections.

The use of mock inspections was invaluable not only for team members, but all agencies involved. It has been the single best method to validate the planning and proposed concept of operations for treaty execution. A major lesson learned from these inspections was that American units should also be well prepared to receive Soviet inspectors. 11 Local commanders need to have a working knowledge of the treaty. A common policy of how incoming inspectors are to be treated is essential to preclude embarrassing situations.

The baseline inspection period was the most demanding in the treaty to date. It required a surge effort for twenty inspection teams to accomplish 117 inspections at 127 sites in a sixty-day window. The escorts likewise accompanied Soviets on thirty inspections at twenty-one American sites. 12 The impact of this was one of extreme fatigue among escorts and inspectors. The air

travel, difficult ground movement in some parts of the Soviet Union, time zone changes, and rapid pace of inspections made recovery from one inspection to the next very difficult.

The costs entailed in OSIA's treaty monitoring are an interesting point to conclude with the lessons learned. A breakdown of the budget shows facilities, temporary duty pay, and airlift as the three most expensive parts. What is significant is that when the costs to operate the portal detachment at Votkinsk are excluded, airlift by military aircraft takes up the majority of inspection and escort expenses. 13

SUMMARY

It is clear that by combining the experience gained under CDE inspections and observations with the extensive American work within INF, concrete and invaluable sources of reference are available to prepare effectively for CFE. Only through the sharing of information among allies and cooperative efforts in planning can we be sure that each nation enters the CFE verification process as well prepared as possible.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER IV

PREPARING TO MONITOR A CFE TREATY

The pace of planning among NATO nations concerning the requirements in verifying the anticipated conventional arms treaty has been erratic. This has coincided with the expectations of when a treaty would likely be signed and with internal national debates as to what exactly will be required. There have also been extensive discussions within NATO Headquarters concerning what its role may be in supporting the verification and monitoring process. A close analysis of what each member country is doing to prepare for treaty implementation and what the alliance is considering at the organizational level will clarify the current status of planning.

NATO LOOKS AT THE PROBLEM

The most difficult problem for the alliance is the proper balance between what is necessary for an effective implementation of the eventual CFE agreement and the stated legal point that verification is a national responsibility. This one issue has hampered planning and in some ways increased friction between the headquarters in Brussels and the military command element at Mons. The arms control planners at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) approached the verification issue from an operational aspect and developed an excellent draft organization

for NATO. This plan unfortunately proved to be too ambitious due to political considerations. In addition, the French position that the negotiations are among twenty-three nations and not bloc to bloc has further complicated attempts at devising the best arrangement for a cooperative alliance role in verification.

Over the past several months, various proposals have been considered as to the form of NATO's role in verification. These have come from the International Military Staff (IMS) and SHAPE, as well as from member nations. From these ideas a framework of what the organization hopes to have in place to assist the process has been developed. However, as late as March 1990 there were pressures building to begin looking at a follow-on to CFE before NATO had settled on concrete ideas for resolving its own level of involvement in verification. 1

Planning for the alliance role has finally focussed on three criteria that must be met if there is to be effective verification. The first is that coordination of inspections is an absolute necessity. Both in the baseline phase as well as residual phases of withdrawal and destruction, a staff element at NATO must work with each nation to deconflict their individual inspection plans and ensure adequate coverage of the Eastern bloc. Second, the entire issue of baseline data exchange and management will require an automatic data processing capability. This is necessary not only to ensure that one central repository exists to place all baseline data exchanged among the treaty signatories, but also to assist those NATO members that lack the required

computer assets nationally. Lastly, is the necessity of forming a verification committee or coordinating body with political representation from each country.

The Defense Planning and Policy Directorate in the International Staff at NATO has been tasked to implement any alliance involvement with verification. Its framework for the alliance role is as indicated in the preceding paragraph. The inspection coordination element and data management section would be designated as the verification support staff and would directly assist the verification coordinating body. The central issue still unresolved is to whom this group will report. There are some nations who desire it to report to the North Atlantic Council and thereby strengthen the alliance. Another group of nations thinks it should report back to national capitals in the same manner as the High Level Task Force operates. The hope is that by the summer of 1990 a decision at the level of permanent representatives will resolve the NATO structure that will support verification. 2

NATIONAL PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS

The efforts within each member country of NATO are as varied as the languages represented. Some nations are well prepared to begin any required verification tasks within a few months, if necessary, while others may need six months to one year. What has been a major help to many countries is the information exchanged

at the annual NATO CDE/CSBM Implementation Seminars. The third annual session was held in Brussels in March 1990 and allowed those nations that were prepared to present their ideas on CFE monitoring. A review of each nation's preparations to monitor the CFE treaty as of the spring of 1990 will provide insight into the overall alliance status.

BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, PORTUGAL

Belgium has developed a verification organization that will eventually be comprised of approximately thirty people. The unit is under the direction of its Defense Staff and has officers already in training. It has a coordination and command cell, as well as inspection teams that are split between air and ground responsibilities. Planners see the need for a maximum of four teams (three army and one air force) in the baseline surge period. Teams will contain six people of which four will be officers and two non-commissioned officers. Their concept for passive inspections dictates that two inspectors (not currently engaged in inspections) will escort arriving teams on Belgian territory and will be assisted by two representatives from the site/unit being inspected. All requirements for baseline data exchange and computer support will be the responsibility of their intelligence service working closely with the verification organization.

Training for verification will encompass three elements: language training, instruction on the treaty, and technical

aspects of the Warsaw Pact order of battle. Those not already proficient will take Russian language training, while some additional officers will learn German and Polish. Five officers began Russian instruction in February, and five more will follow in September. The goal is to have one or two members of each team capable of speaking Russian. The plan is to have all teams selected and available for training by mid-June. A series of mock inspections in September will conclude the initial preparations.

Belgium views collaboration as very important to the success of CFE verification. It is seen as the most effective and efficient method for the country to fulfill its responsibilities. In this vein, then, the Defense Ministers of the BENELUX countries hope to sign an accord which will incorporate joint training of inspectors as well as possible joint inspection missions and sharing of inspection quotas.

Although Luxembourg has no extensive holdings of equipment to be reduced or eliminated, there are large amounts of American materiel in the country which will be inspected. Luxembourg has expressed the desire to be an active participant in inspections and is preparing one team of officer volunteers just for this duty. Part of the team began Russian language training in February and will follow on with technical training at a course in Belgium this summer. Luxembourg hopes to see the BENELUX memorandum of understanding incorporate both CFE verification and "Open Skies" cooperation. 3

The Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands established its organization for verification in January 1990. It will have a Supervisory Group for Verification to deal with oversight, verification policy issues, and also to coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its verification division will come under the Chief of Defense Staff and receive resource support from the Army and Air Force. This division will be comprised of three sections: one for active inspections, one for passive inspections, and a third for data processing. A group of four officers has begun initial planning and this element will eventually evolve into a Joint Arms Control Branch. It will be tasked with the coordination and execution of all arms control verification activities.

The goal is to have fifteen full-time and sixty part-time inspectors ready by September 1990. The first group began their training in March. Officers selected for this duty will be majors or lieutenant colonels with a high level of English language ability and preferably some German. Full-time inspectors will have a basic knowledge of Russian. Personnel in the verification division will be split among inspectors, escorts, and interpreters.

The Dutch have tasked their School for Military Intelligence to teach a course for verification personnel. The following six subjects will comprise the instruction: treaty knowledge, Warsaw Pact equipment, order of battle, language instruction, inspection techniques, and mock inspections. Inspectors will receive all six

elements of instruction, while escorts will receive all but language and inspection techniques. Interpreters will only attend treaty knowledge, language training and the mock inspection. Plans call for trial inspections between Poland and the Netherlands in September 1990. Although well developed in their training program, it is one area in which they particularly hope for international cooperation.

Portugal has no defined organization as yet, but is still in the planning stages. A study has been presented to the Chief of Defense Staff and a decision is pending. The Portuguese want to see cooperation within the alliance to accomplish the verification task. Assistance is required to prepare Portuguese teams in the areas of language and technical training. With no active experience in CDE inspections and having received none on Portuguese soil, Portugal is at a distinct disadvantage. Additionally, Portugal traditionally has limited experiences with Slavic languages which will compound the problem in preparation of inspectors. The idea of mixed inspection teams is appealing as the best method of accomplishing the Portuguese active quota of inspections.

Preliminary plans show a need for three inspection teams which would also be used on passive inspection duty. There is no intent to have a special verification agency, but in all likelihood the personnel will be under the Plans and Policy Branch of the Defense Staff.

The Portuguese recognize their limited assets and would like to be used by NATO in covering gaps in any inspection planning. This would also allow more time to prepare their personnel. The Portuguese position is one of support for NATO as a central body for verification coordination. 4

DENMARK, ICELAND, AND NORWAY

Denmark will approach its preparation for CFE by building upon a staff section that already handles all CSBM/CDE inspections and observations. The Ministry of Defense will handle the operational aspects of CFE verification, while matters of policy will be determined by a national working group. Although undecided as to the total number of personnel necessary for the various arms control and security building regimes, Denmark has trained twelve officers in a two-week course that was completed in March. These will form a nucleus for future CDE and CFE requirements.

Estimated quotas for active inspections, as well as predictions of the number of passive inspections that may be received, dictate a relatively small organization. No major problems are foreseen in any aspect of preparation. Of particular note is a pool of trained Russian linguists in the Army Reserve which will be an important asset.

The Danish Senior Staff Course has been progressive in the area of arms control and teaches a series of twenty-eight lectures on this subject. It not only keeps officers up to date on current

negotiations and national policy, but also ensures common understanding throughout the services on their possible role.

Iceland will not receive any active inspection quotas due to its lack of an armed force. There are, however, significant American military assets in Iceland and these will be subject to inspection. Iceland has the right to accompany any inspections conducted on its territory. To date, Iceland has not been an active participant in any meetings or preparatory sessions held in Brussels concerning the CFE treaty.

The Norwegian Ministry of Defense has the responsibility for all CSBM and CFE planning. Seven officers form the core of an arms control planning cell. Although no decisions have been made on the ultimate size and organization to implement CFE, some selected officers began Russian language instruction in January. An already established Russian language program teaches ten officers every year, and this will provide a solid nucleus for all inspection and escort tasks.

Norway supports the concept of mixed inspection teams and also views cooperation within the alliance as a must. Norway is presently seeking cooperative training with France and the Netherlands. Regarding NATO's role, a small element for coordination is all that Norway sees as essential. 5

ITALY, GREECE, SPAIN, AND TURKEY

Italian plans for future verification requirements are progressing rapidly. Although no decisions have been made, the

general staff has proposed that an agency or center for verification be established to handle all arms control initiatives that are active or pending.

The structure for this element would have a section for external coordination, an inspector group, a section for data management, a planning division, a section to analyze inspection reports, and a secrevariat for support. Approximately fifty to sixty people of all ranks will make up the agency. Estimates for the baseline phase, however, point to the need for an expansion of up to one-hundred people. In November 1990 the agency should be up to full strength. A pending decision is to determine a suitable site in the Rome area to accomodate the new organization.

A training course for verification personnel is being prepared and should be ready for its first students by late summer or early fall. Officers initially selected for duty with the agency will have some previous Slavic language background (attaches will be prime candidates). Limits in the availability of language qualified personnel will cause Italy to hire civilian interpreters, when necessary, to ensure that at least two linguists accompany each inspection team. Training for verification duties will conclude with a mock inspection exercise. An interesting approach that Italy has taken is in the form of an exchange program with Hungary. This could provide a means of performing mock inspections on each other, at some point prior to treaty implementation.

As the alliance's role in verification takes shape, Italy hopes for maximum cooperation and coordination at the NATO level. In particular in the area of aerial inspections, it is hoped that a pool of air assets will be established at NATO for this task. 6

The Greek situation regarding preparations for CFE is difficult to ascertain. It appears that the lengthy political difficulties over the past year have hindered planning efforts. In addition, their concerns about regional definitions and strength accounting in regards to Turkey were distractions from an analysis of their own needs for CFE monitoring.

Spain is also waiting for final approval from the Ministry of Defense on a verification plan. Initial concepts provide for existing arms control planning cells (within the Defense Ministry, Joint Staff, and Service Staffs) to be held responsible for performing the CFE mission. An inspector/escort group will be formed by the end of 1990 utilizing both full-time and temporary personnel. Estimates show the need for a minimum of six teams, totaling forty personnel, to begin the base organization. A data management system will be established and maintained at the joint staff level within the arms control cell.

The inspector/escort group will be under the Plans and Policy Division within the joint staff. The selection of verification personnel occurred in April/May, and will be followed by language training that will continue into the summer and fall of 1990.

Turkish authorities have developed plans for a national verification organization which they hope to have ready by the end of 1990. The initial core organization will be formed under the Plans and Policy Directorate of the Turkish General Staff. This agency will have a data management division, plans and evaluation division, implementation division (comprised of inspectors and escorts) and a support unit. Plans call for an eventual total of two-hundred officers and civilians in the organization.

A phased approach is underway to bring the organization into being. Selection of the first sixty personnel was scheduled for the end of May of which the majority will immediately start language training. Members of the staff will commence follow-on planning for the next phases. It is hoped that fifty percent of the agency will be manned by September 1990. The final phase is to be completed by early 1991 when full operational capability is expected.

At this stage in Turkish preparations, major problems confront Turkey covering all aspects of establishing their verification group. The most significant difficulty is the cost involved in putting together an organization with the scope envisioned. It already recognizes that some reductions in scale may be necessary. In order to comply with Turkish verification responsibilities, a high level of cooperation within the alliance is strongly endorsed.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND FRANCE

West Germany and France are perhaps the most advanced, NATO members in terms of their preparation to verify the CFE accord. West Germany's planning began in July 1989 and a draft concept was ready in the fall. The current plan will have an organization of five-hundred personnel responsible for work in CDE, CFE, Chemical, and INF matters. No decision has been made as yet whether the organization will report to the Defense Ministry or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The organization will have five divisions and a support company. The various divisions are central affairs (planning), operations center, data exchange (computer support), analysis, and insertion (escort and inspections). Officers have already been selected for the unit, with many being volunteers. Qualifications for those selected were, first, language ability, and second, operational experience. The grade structure is from lieutenant to colonel with most being lieutenant colonels and two-thirds general staff qualified.

Training for officers began in January 1990. This program is a combination of language and functional instruction. Approximately sixty people began Russian instruction in January with a small element taking Polish and Czech. An additional twenty officers who already have some training in Russian joined

the course in progress in April. After a break from training in the summer, three more months of language instruction will follow and then the officers will attend a six week function course.

The function course will have six modules in its program. These are: fundamentals of security and armament policy, the treaty and its protocols, order of battle/pact equipment, inspection equipment training (cameras, radios, recorders), conversation psychology, and mock inspection exercises. The entire training program is expected to last until the end of 1990, at which time the organization will be ready for all tasks.

Verification is viewed by West Germany as a sovereign responsibility, yet it is recognized that cooperation among nations and coordination within the alliance will necessitate some compromise of priorities. 7

French preparations are as advanced as those in West Germany. Since the fall of 1989, extensive planning has taken place in order to have a verification capability ready by the summer of 1990. The Minister of Defense signed the official order creating a verification unit on March 9, 1990. With his signature, a unit of 150 people from all the armed services was authorized. The unit will be based at Creil, a former air force base north of Paris. The verification agency will serve under the Ministry of Defense.

The members of the unit are broken down into a support staff of approximately fifty people and an operational group of one-hundred. Officers will make up roughly sixty percent of the

operational teams and non-commissioned officers the remainder. Initial French plans are for eight-person inspection teams and four people on escort teams. Based on estimates of active and passive inspections, five teams in each category will be required initially. The unit will have the capability to expand to monitor other arms control accords as required.

The first sixty inspectors have been selected and should complete their training by the end of June. Forty additional people will be acquired at a later date. The French approach in selection was different from other nations in that fifty percent of those chosen for the unit were required to already have the necessary language skills and the rest had to have operational experience. This significantly reduced the lead time in preparing inspector/escort personnel. The core training program will be a three-week technical course that will include instruction on techniques of inspection, protocols of the treaty, photography, and mock inspections. Units selected for the end of course inspection exercise will be elements of a pilot program intended to check the effects of the treaty on portions of each service.

The French support a minimal role for NATO that involves data base management and coordination, but no analysis of inspection information. The two biggest problems foreseen are in obtaining quality officers as team leaders and in preparing their own armed forces for inspection and destruction activities. 8

CANADA, UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES

Canadian efforts to prepare for CFE began in the summer of 1989, although they have studied arms control issues in the Department of External Affairs since 1982. A small planning team worked on their concept into the fall of 1989 and ministerial approval was received in January 1990. The Directorate of Arms Control and Verification Operations in Ottawa will be responsible for Canadian efforts under CFE.

Inspection and escort teams will be formed at the Canadian Forces Base in Lahr, West Germany. Personnel selected will already have proficiency in a Slavic language and their training will focus on treaty knowledge and inspection methods. Training will begin in July and they hope to have two teams ready in Europe by mid-September. Planners foresee a need for a maximum of five, six-person teams. The inspecting and escort elements in Lahr will receive all of their support from the existing infrastructure of the base. This concept will eliminate the need to form an agency or group, solely, to support their monitoring effort. Air transportation resources will be provided by the Canadian Air Force as needed.

The Canadians are very interested in the aerial inspection provisions of CFE. In this context, they have ordered four maritime patrol aircraft (P-3 variants) for arctic patrol, which can be easily modified for possible arms control uses.

Canada's role in peacekeeping operations and arms control theory and research, naturally, causes it to have extreme interest in being an active participant in all aspects of CFE. With limited resources, however, cooperation is deemed essential although on a quid pro quo basis. A prime concern for Canada is to receive enough active inspection quotas to justify the scope of its effort. 9

Arms control verification within the United Kingdom will be the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff. A Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG) will conduct all active inspection and escort commitments in addition to any destruction requirements. Support for transportation and administrative needs will come from Home Commands and units being inspected.

Plans show the need for up to 270 inspectors, but current authorization documents will only provide for 123 positions to be established by March 1991. The goal is to have a core group of officers with the new unit by the summer of 1990. Training for the teams is planned so that six teams will be ready by January 1991 and sixteen by March 1991. These will be split into ten for ground unit inspections and six for air force units.

A training course for the implementation group will include instruction on the treaty and its protocols, inspection techniques, equipment recognition and photography. Two Russian language speakers will be assigned to each team. Mock inspections are planned for the summer and, perhaps, some bilateral practices in the fall of 1990.

The United Kingdom sees the education process of its own units in receiving inspections as a task equal to the preparation of their inspection teams. They have tackled this problem with a three-step approach. First, a video cassette will be produced explaining what to expect in an inspection. Second, within each unit a unit arms control officer will be appointed. Lastly, some form of required annual training for ground units in arms control matters is under consideration.

The United States has conducted resource planning in preparation for CFE, but a decision on who will receive the responsibility to implement verification has not been made. There has been little sense of urgency within the government, and the interagency process has further complicated matters. The obvious solution to most knowledgeable people is for the On-Site Inspection Agency to receive the mission, although the Commander-in-Chief of European Command will necessarily have a fairly permanent role in all CFE issues. 10

In assessing the personnel requirement needed for CFE, only linguistic requirements have been determined, with initial preparations made at the Defense Language Institute. The Defense Intelligence College has also done some work in determining course requirements for future CFE inspectors and escorts, similar to their work for INF. It is fairly clear that the American experience with INF and the nearly flawless performance of OSIA has made the necessity of preparing for CFE seem easier or less important to some decision makers. However, what appears to be a

ready pool of experienced inspectors under an established infrastructure at OSIA will be insufficient to handle CFE, INF, and the likely Chemical and START agreements that now appear imminent. Sufficient lead time is critical for OSIA'S capability to expand to accomodate CFE needs.

The United States supports a NATO role in verification which does not involve intelligence analysis but, does involve data base management and inspection coordination. An automatic data processing support system has been offered (with the necessary software) to assist NATO in baseline data management. A conflict exists in NATO, however, in that many key people do not want intelligence activities to be visible in any form. What may not be clearly understood is that the information to be exchanged is order of battle intelligence and not an analysis of the capabilities of the twenty-three nations that will sign the CFE treaty. If this issue is not resolved, it may cause many nations with limited resources to have to deal bilaterally or off-line to acquire needed information before conducting inspections. In effect, multinational cooperation within the alliance in the monitoring effort may be severely hindered. 11

SUMMARY

As each alliance member has approached the problem of how best to monitor the future CFE treaty, their plans have directly reflected several factors. Generally, those with direct prior experience in inspecting the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact countries have produced detailed plans that will have them ready to implement the accord when necessary. Smaller nations with limited assets have put their hopes on extensive cooperation and coordination so they can fulfill their responsibilities. Yet, other countries seem to be still making slow progress in verification preparations. If effective verification is to occur, the sharing of information in all areas related to treaty monitoring must take place in the NATO context.

ENDNOTES

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3. Interview with Jean-Paul Heck, Lieutenant Colonel, Luxembourg Army, Military Representative to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 7 May 1990.
4. Interview with P.L.C. Gomes Lopes, Captain, Portuguese Navy, Deputy Military Representative to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 8 May 1990.
5. Interview with B.A. Hansen, Colonel, Norwegian Air Force, Deputy Military Representative to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 8 May 1990.
6. Interview with Pietro Bonabello, Brigadier General, Italian Army, Director Designate of Italian Verification Organization, Rome, Italy, 16 May, 1990.
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8. Interview with J. Masuy, Captain, French Navy, Chief of the Verification Office, Paris, France, 2 April 1990.
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10. Interview with Mike Miggins, Colonel, Director of CFE Branch, J-5, Washington, D.C., 23 April 1990.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The question: "Will NATO will be ready to effectively implement the CFE treaty?" can now be responded to in a positive mannner. Despite serious misgivings in the winter and early spring of 1990, when the rapid pace of negotiations in Vienna seemed to be going faster than negotiators could manage, the Soviet slowdown in compromise and accomodation has been a saviour for the alliance. It enabled the staff in Brussels to work through several concepts and emerge with some common agreement as to what the alliance's role should be. Likewise, all members have benefited from the slowed pace which has allowed them to better prepare all aspects of their verification plans. It is apparent that if the treaty had been concluded in June as President Bush had sought, NATO would not have been prepared to effectively monitor the agreement in the fall of 1990. Even f all nations continue with their current training plans, there will be some who will be only marginally prepared by January 1991.

The inspection and observation experiences of CDE and INF have provided a wealth of valuable lessons for those nations that have been active participants. By conducting a sound analysis of national experience in those activities, countries like the Federal Republic of Germany, tne United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States have been able to build on those experiences and

approach CFE preparation with a clear idea of what will be necessary.

As NATO looks to the future and strives to find a new strategy that will encompass the changed nature of European security, the aspect of arms control is prevalent in every document the alliance produces. In particular, The Alliance's Comprehensive Concept released in May 1989, refers to the principles of security, stability, and verifiability concerning arms control. If NATO is serious about its future, and arms control is to be an integral part of its strategy, then it must devote adequate resources and effort into a central role in monitoring the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty. Only through the NATO mechanism of collective cooperation and coordination can many nations effectively fulfill their treaty responsibilities.

CHAPTER VI

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are numerous areas in which shared information can benefit NATO members as well as the Alliance planning staff. The recommendations that follow may provide some ideas that could prove of value in implementing the CFE Treaty.

The verification support staff at NATO must have adequate resources if it is to be effective. It has two roles to fulfill: one in actual support of the verification committee, and the other in providing every measure of assistance to those alliance members that request it. If only a handful of personnel are devoted to this section, as is currently planned, they will have a limited capability to do the kinds of coordination and training cooperation that many members of the alliance need. Six staff members will be very hard pressed to handle data base management, inspection deconfliction, and responses to the requests of the committee. By providing assistance in such areas as lessons learned files/seminars, minimum inspection standards, cooperative training, joint inspection requests, possible equipment pooling, and quota oversight, NATO will be actively assisting members that need help, and at the same time be directly contributing to the

quality of the monitoring effort. The security strategy of the alliance will thereby be directly enhanced by more effective verification.

An immediate step that could be taken to help improve preparation across the organization would be to conduct several seminars similiar to the annual CSBM/CDE sessions that are held. These could be focussed on details such as curriculum for inspector training courses, reciprocal mock inspection scheduling, inspection techniques, etc.. The exchange of information in all areas related to arms control monitoring experience would allow participants to benefit from the preparations of the more advanced nations.

The education of the armed forces in every NATO country as to how this treaty may impact on them is of paramount importance. The average infantry colonel sitting in his command post on an exercise in Germany is far removed from such things as inspection quotas and telling Soviet officers detailed information about his unit. The United Kingdom has very appropriately singled out this issue. Nations would do well to study the British approach and focus on what may be relevant to their situation. The concept of video taping what inspectors are allowed to do on an installation is an excellent method of informing soldiers what is in store for the future. The formal education process is also important, and can provide information on current arms control issues and the corresponding national positions to the officers that will be

entrusted with carrying out those policies. The Danish system of arms control instruction in their staff college is a good example of how to include even their negotiators from Vienna into the process.

A final recommendation concerns the most important area regarding the effective monitoring of the CFE treaty. The subject is people. From all of the interviews with officers who have conducted up to thirty inspections in the Soviet Union and who have led teams on numerous CDE and INF missions, the one message that is common is the absolute necessity for quality personnel. Francois Gere, writing in a 1989 issue of Strategique, described the personnel aspect of verification as follows: "A body of genuine inspectors should not be improvised, but requires time and money.... it needs high quality people with a sense of diplomacy, technical competence, language skills, a spirit of finesse, common sense, and quick decision making." The complexity and importance of CFE to all nations dictates that only the best people available should be concentrated on this most significant arms control agreement for Western security.

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