Soviet Breakout Implications under START

Abstract

The agreed provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty are expected to place well defined limits on the accountable warheads, missile launchers, and bombers that can be deployed by the superpowers. This paper discusses typical U.S. force structure options that would be permissible within the proposed treaty limits. It shows the likely effects on force totals of the complex counting rules permitted for penetration bombers, and uses each side's total expected inventory of warheads as a basis for assessing the possibility and implications of a Soviet breakout. The results indicate that while the Soviet breakout with 'nondeployed' missiles remains a present concern, that action may be counterproductive because such a move would not necessarily enhance their counterforce capability. Keywords: USSR/treaties; Jet bombers; United states; Guided missiles; Military counterforces.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Aug 01, 1990
Accession Number
ADA226519

Entities

People

  • C. Henderson

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Cyber
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Arms Control
  • Arms Control Treaties
  • Ballistic Missiles
  • Boats
  • Congress
  • Force Structure
  • Guided Missiles
  • Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
  • Nuclear Warheads
  • Security
  • Strategic Warning
  • Strategic Weapons
  • Tactical Warning
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • Ussr

Readers

  • Explosive Engineering.
  • Strategic Security Studies