

DIG FILE COPY

(2)

AD-A226 612

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California

DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 24 1990
D CS D



THESIS

FROM FORWARD DEPLOYMENT TO FORWARD PRESENCE:
A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC

by

MICHAEL EDWARD SMITH

March, 1990

Thesis Advisor:
Co-Advisor:

Claude A. Buss
Frank M. Teti

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

90 09 20 030

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No 0704-0188	
1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3 DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School		6b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) 56	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School		
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000			7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000		
8a NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO	PROJECT NO	TASK NO
					WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO
11 TITLE (Include Security Classification) FROM FORWARD DEPLOYMENT TO FORWARD PRESENCE: A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PACIFIC (U)					
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Smith, Michael Edward					
13a TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis		13b TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) March, 1990	
15 PAGE COUNT 106					
16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.					
17 COSATI CODES			18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	U.S. Navy, Maritime Strategy, National Strategy, Asia, Pacific, Soviet Union, Burdensharing		
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This thesis analyzes the changing strategic environment in East Asia and the Pacific. Despite sweeping foreign policy initiatives, the Soviets maintain a significant military capability. Even as the likelihood of the Soviet threat diminishes, low-intensity type conflicts threaten U.S. regional interests. Additionally, changing regional perceptions are undermining traditional U.S. security arrangements. Rising Asian nationalism questions the need for forward deployment of U.S. forces within regional states. A policy of forward presence via maritime assets is the solution. U.S. naval assets would allow for a reasonable power projection capability in time of crisis, yet would meet fiscal constraints during peacetime through a scaling down of deployed assets. Other U.S. forces will maintain their ability to meet regional responsibilities through training exercises with regional forces and a build-up of the U.S. sealift capability. (OVER)					
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☐ DTIC USERS			21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Claude A. Buss, Frank M. Teti			22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 646-2228		22c OFFICE SYMBOL 56

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

From Forward Deployment to Forward Presence;
A New National Strategy for the Pacific

by

Michael Edward Smith
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1983

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


from the


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March, 1990


Author:


Michael Edward Smith

Approved By:


Claude A. Buss, Thesis Advisor


Frank M. Teti, Co-Advisor


Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman, Department of
National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the changing strategic environment in East Asia and the Pacific. Despite sweeping foreign policy initiatives, the Soviets maintain a significant military capability. Even as the likelihood of the Soviet threat diminishes, low-intensity type conflicts threaten U.S. regional interests. Additionally, changing regional perceptions are undermining traditional U.S. security arrangements. Rising Asian nationalism questions the need for forward deployment of U.S. forces within regional states.

A policy of forward presence via maritime assets is the solution. U.S. naval assets would allow for a reasonable power projection capability in time of crisis, yet would meet fiscal constraints during peacetime through a scaling down of deployed assets. Other U.S. forces will maintain their ability to meet regional responsibilities through training exercises with regional forces and a build-up of the U.S. sealift capability.

Now is the time to encourage regional states to assume greater responsibilities for their own defense. A regional maritime organization must be developed to maintain open trade routes. With a focused mandate, such an organization would not threaten individual national sovereignties and would promote regional cooperation and stability.

An expansion of the U.S. Navy's peacetime mission will certainly serve the national interest. Increased port visits to economically less developed regions should be coordinated to support on-going or planned U.S. assistance programs.



ACCESSION FOR	
NTIS	CH-11
DTIC	7A3
Unannounced	1
Justified	
By	
Distribution	
Approved for release	
Dist	Section
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.....	3
A. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.....	3
B. CHANGING U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARDS EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.....	6
C. THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.....	8
1. Soviet Military Threat.....	9
2. Low-Intensity Conflicts.....	10
D. ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.....	11
1. Maritime Strategy: Peacetime Missions.....	11
2. Maritime Strategy: Crisis Response.....	12
3. Maritime Strategy: Warfighting.....	13
E. THE NAVY'S FUTURE UTILITY IN THE ASIA--PACIFIC REGION.....	14
III. CHANGING SOVIET PERSPECTIVES.....	16
A. HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF EAST ASIA TO THE SOVIETS.....	16
B. ECONOMIC VALUE OF EAST ASIA TO THE SOVIETS.....	19
1. Fishing Industry.....	21
2. Other Natural Resources.....	22
3. Need For Western Technology.....	23
4. Trade.....	25
C. CHANGING SOVIET ATTITUDES.....	26
D. CHANGING SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH NATIONS IN EAST ASIA.....	28
E. CHANGING SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE.....	31
F. SOVIET NAVY'S RESPONSE TO "NEW THINKING".....	35

G. TRENDS IN THE SIZE AND APPLICATION OF THE SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET.....	37
IV. CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....	40
A. ONGOING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.....	41
B. FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.....	43
1. Numerical Limitations.....	44
2. Confidence--Building Measures.....	45
3. Operational Restrictions.....	47
V. CHANGING REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS.....	50
A. CHANGING REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.....	50
1. Northeast Asia.....	50
2. The People's Republic of China.....	56
3. The Republic of China.....	61
4. ASEAN.....	68
5. Australasia.....	73
B. THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS.....	79
1. Asia-Pacific Cooperation.....	79
2. India.....	81
3. Common Interests in Regional Security.....	82
VI. CONCLUSION.....	83
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	86
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	96

I. INTRODUCTION

As the United States enters the 1990s it must evaluate what its true interests are in East Asia and the Pacific. Since the end of World War II the United States and its friends and allies have derived mutual benefits from their security relationships. However, dynamic events are reshaping the international environment. Lowering perceptions of international threats, combined with regional political and economic developments are undermining traditional U.S. relationships and commitments.

In light of these changes in the strategic environment, does a Soviet threat to U.S. interests still exist? If so, what is the effect of that continuing threat on U.S. policy and policymakers?

Even if the Soviet threat is eliminated or reduced, are there other low-intensity type conflicts which linger in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how do they impact upon U.S. policy?

Specifically, this thesis will examine how these policy considerations affect the status and operations of the U.S. Navy. After reviewing the traditional U.S. relationship towards the Asia-Pacific region, changes in Soviet and regional perceptions will be analyzed together with changes in the international environment. It is recognized that the Navy is an integral part of the overall national policy not only in the Pacific area but all over the globe.

As changes in the strategic environment take place, how will they affect the current national strategy of forward deployment? Will a continued naval presence be necessary for the protection of U.S. national interests?

How will changes in U.S. national policy impact the defense responsibilities assigned to other U.S. services?

Finally, what levels of efficiency and deployment must be maintained in the new environment in order to effectively continue ordinary peacetime activities (for example port visits) normally assigned to the U.S. Navy?

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the changing world dynamics and determine how the U.S. Navy can best be used to support future U.S. and regional interests.

II. THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The United States must recognize the changing geo-political situation in East Asia and the Pacific and develop policies that reflect the political, economic and military dynamics of the region. Unfortunately, East Asia has long eluded clear strategic definition by U.S. policymakers. From the Korean War through Vietnam, ambiguous perceptions of national interests or unclear goals often characterized American policy towards the region. Nonetheless, the United States could always rely upon the growing 'Soviet threat' to perpetuate its bilateral security arrangements. With the advent of Gorbachev, regional perceptions of the Soviet threat waned. American policies were treated with growing skepticism. Originally, this criticism was limited to a vocal minority. However, New Zealand's anti-nuclear movement demonstrated the ominous dangers to U.S. interests from spreading criticism of American policies. The United States was tasked to find common bonds linking its interests with those of the regional states.

A. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The ultimate goal of the United States' national security policy is "to seek an international order that encourages self-determination, democratic institutions, economic development, and human rights." (Reagan, 1988, p.3) U.S. national security strategies are formulated to support this ultimate goal.¹ While Europe remains the central theater of U.S.--Soviet rivalry, official U.S. policy specifies the prevention of domination of the entire Eurasian landmass as a principle national security objective (Reagan, 1988, p.3).

¹In addition to this ultimate goal, other national interests that U.S. strategy intends to "assure and protect" include:

1. The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for our national endeavors.
3. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests.
4. The growth of human freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system.
5. Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships." (Reagan, 1988, p.3)

Thus, a Eurocentric analysis of American foreign policy underemphasises a significantly larger and equally important area of the world. Indeed, the United States' national interests in Asia and the Pacific continue to expand and may soon eclipse American interests in a "United Europe". As then-Secretary of the Navy James Webb said:

"We must remind ourselves from time to time that we are more than a European nation... The United States is becoming more intertwined with Asia, and the issues involving Asia are moving to the forefront in the world community... Nor should we forget that it provides the only point in the world where the direct military interests of the Soviet Union, The People's Republic of China, The United States, and Japan converge." (Webb, 1988, pp. 3-4)

U.S. national security goals in East Asia and the Pacific are "aimed at helping [its] allies and friends in the region to develop economically and politically as they defend themselves from encroachment." (Reagan, 1988, p.30) However, as the Soviets continue to reduce perceptions of a 'Soviet threat', regional concerns over external encroachment may wane. Indeed, their common interests may center on internal political stability and individual economic development. As these states develop economically, they may question the need for continued U.S. presence.

Economic development in the region is impressive. During the past twenty-five years East Asian economies have grown an average of 6 percent a year, with the regional share of gross world product growing from 8 to 20 percent from 1967 to 1987 ("America, Asia....", 1988, p.29). Perhaps the greatest individual change has involved the economic relationship between the United States and Japan. Today Japan is America's second largest trading partner, with Japanese-American trade reaching \$112 billion in 1988. American companies are the largest foreign direct investors in Japan while Japanese companies are the fourth largest in the United States ("Japan and America....", 1989, p.32). This strong economic interdependence is effecting the way each state views the other. While nationalist movements question continued reliance on American presence, some in the United States are reevaluating the scope of military involvement in the Far East.

Given the political dynamics of the Asia-Pacific Region, it is important to clarify who the United States considers a "friend" or "ally". U.S. allies are easier to identify and the list is generally more stable. However, the term "friend" is much more difficult to quantify and highly dependent on current U.S. interests.

The United States and Japan maintain bilateral defense and economic ties through a Treaty of Cooperation and Security. Given the significant trade relationship between the two countries and forward basing arrangements, Japan is vital to the economic and security interests of the United States. Indeed, it is easy to understand why former President Reagan wrote that "Cooperation with Japan remains basic to U.S. relations in the region." (Reagan, 1988, p.30)

The U.S. also maintains a bilateral defense agreement with the Republic of Korea. Reagan termed this alliance "vital to regional stability," (Reagan, 1988, p.31) and former Defense Secretary Carlucci wrote that the balance between North and South Korea was "a key factor in U.S. military planning for the East Asia-Pacific region." (Carlucci, 1989, p.23)

In the Oceania region, Guam and The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are both protected unconditionally as territories of the United States. The Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau are members of the Compact of Free Association and are therefore entitled to defense by the United States.

Other bilateral security obligations cover the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. New Zealand is no-longer covered under the ANZUS Treaty due to its political decision not to allow port visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships. However, the U.S. is hopeful that they will one day change their policies and, therefore, still considers New Zealand a "friend".²

²During his statements before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. J. Stapleton Roy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, remarked that: "The United States seeks a relationship with New Zealand based on reciprocity and treatment of New Zealand as a nonallied friend... As clearly stated in the past, the Administration does not support any form of economic sanctions or reprisals against New Zealand." (Dept. of State Bulletin, 1987, p.46)

B. CHANGING U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARDS EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Because of its global responsibilities, the United States' regional interests must not be viewed in isolation. Former Secretary of Defense Carlucci articulated this global perspective when he wrote that:

"With the growing interdependence of nations, America no longer has the luxury of political, economic, or military isolationism. The entire world is our ecological home, our marketplace, and so our security posture must remain global as well." (Carlucci, 1989, p.5)

East Asia must be viewed as one part of a 'strategic mobile'; the region's importance always balanced against relative interests elsewhere. Throughout the period of the Cold War, U.S. security policy centered on Europe, an area the United States long considered the most likely theater for a U.S.--Soviet confrontation. Indeed, it was estimated that between \$140 to \$150 billion of the U.S. defense budget was dedicated to maintaining the approximately 200,000 American troops stationed in Europe. This compared to about \$20 billion spent on the 130,000 troops in the East Asia ("America, Asia...., 1988, p.30).

However, rapidly changing political events within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are resulting in a reassessment of the economic and political utility of continued support for large numbers of American troops in Europe. As the emphasis shifts from the "worst case" U.S.--Soviet conflict, increased consideration must be given to maintaining the stability of economically vital regions in East Asia. In 1987 American exports to East Asia (\$62 billion) were greater than exports to the 12 countries of the EEC (\$61 billion) and Canada (\$57 billion) ("America, Asia...., 1988, p.30). Indeed, growing economic interdependence justifies continued interest in maintaining the economic and political stability of the region and developing a security system that supports these interests.

As the international environment in East Asia and the Western Pacific changes, so too must U.S. policies towards regional states. How will the United States view an emergent

China? President Reagan wrote that "a strong, secure, and modernized China is in our interest," and that "we expect to cooperate when our interests and China's are parallel." (Reagan, 1988, p.31) How have recent events changed U.S. perceptions of Chinese relations? American leaders must understand their long term goals and constantly decipher the dynamic environment to ensure U.S. interests and those of its friends are supported.

America's "friends" are those nations with common national interests. As Secretary Carlucci wrote,

"As a moral and security imperative, America seeks an international order that encourages self-determination, democratic institutions, economic development, and human rights. We oppose the expansion of influence or territorial control by nations hostile to freedom and other fundamental values shared by democratic nations."(Carlucci, 1989, p.5)

However, just as the United States' economic relationship with the Asian nations is changing, so too, is its attitude towards maintaining this "moral and security imperative." During a time of increased fiscal constraints, a vocal minority in the U.S. Congress is again questioning the extent of America's overseas commitment. Senator Dale Bumpers recently introduced a bill that would have required reducing the 43,000 U.S. troops in Korea by 10,000 over three years. His colleague, Senator Carl Levin, reportedly supported the removal of all but 3000 troops (Halloran, 1989, p.A12).

Although the Bumpers amendment was defeated, it nonetheless reflects a growing concern over the economic costs of maintaining forward deployed U.S. forces. Such sentiment is reflected in continuing calls for increased allied fiscal support, or "burdensharing." U.S. military leaders are therefore critically reviewing force structure requirements and their available options for meeting overseas missions. In a recent example, Pentagon officials reported beginning a one year evaluation of U.S. requirements in Korea (Halloran, 1989, p.A12). Commenting on the U.S. presence in Korea, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William Crowe, remarked that:

"It has kept, at least contributed, to the stability of that region. On the other hand, I must tell you, as a military man, that with the kind of fiscal constraints that we are having put on us, then everything in our inventory is open to looking at and certainly being re-examined every year." (Halloran, 1989, p.A12)

It appears that these fiscal constraints have begun to effect U.S. forces stationed overseas. Indeed, during his February 1990 visit to South Korea, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced an agreement in principle to reduce the U.S. presence in Korea by 5000 non-combatants ("Seoul Agrees on....," 1990, p.A8).

A recent article by the Chief of Naval Operations called for "the United States, its friends, and allies to review their common responsibilities for regional and global defense." He wrote that, through such a review,

"nations whose interests are most directly affected would develop the purely defensive and counteroffensive military capabilities for protecting those interests, while the responsibility of the United States and of the larger alliances would be for strategic deterrence and for reasonable power projection." (Trost, 1989, p.8)

Given the changing international environment, the role of the U.S. Navy in the Far East must be re-evaluated. The Navy must not only fulfill its traditional roles of deterring war and defending U.S. interests and the common interests of regional states, it must play its part in enhancing goodwill and maintaining regional stability in increasingly-difficult times. U.S. naval assets are uniquely valuable in participating in a regional maritime patrol and extending humanitarian assistance to peoples in need.

C. THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Many factors work against defining a specific mission for the U.S. Navy. Not least among these factors are growing Asian nationalism and an ongoing Soviet "peace offensive." The U.S. must respond to conflicting perceptions of threats to existing interests.

Maintaining free access to the open oceans is the most constant mission of the U.S. Navy. Most of the United States' vital strategic materials are transported over the sea-lanes of the Pacific.³ Therefore, it is important to identify possible threats that might hamper free

³Just considering oil imports alone, Indonesia is the United States' largest overseas producer and more oil is imported from the Port of Valdez Alaska than from the Persian Gulf. See (Hansen, Nov. 1987, p.26) and (Lyons, July 1987, p.68).

communication throughout the Pacific Basin. The Secretary of Defense summarized these threats in his most recent Annual Report to Congress. He wrote:

"Direct Soviet aggression against the United States and its allies is the "worst case" threat to U.S. and allied security. Low-intensity conflict, however, has been the most common form of conflict for the United States in the post-World War II era. Such conflict-- in the form of insurgency, terrorism, and subversion-- threatens U.S. interests around the globe (Carlucci, 1989, p.7).

1. Soviet Military Threat

Certainly the most apparent threat to U.S. interests in Asia since World War II has been the Soviet military. Although the initial Soviet build-up in Asia appears to have been in response to the threat from China, after 1969, even as Sino-Soviet tensions decreased, Soviet military strength continued to increase. According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, between 1984 and 1988 the Soviets added four additional divisions to their Far East TVD and increased the size of their Pacific Fleet by 40 vessels (Armitage, 1988, p.4). Logistical support for these forces was significantly enhanced by the completion of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway in 1984.⁴

In 1987 the Soviet Pacific Fleet controlled over forty-percent of the heavy surface ships in the entire Soviet Navy, including two VSTOL carriers and a Kirov-class cruiser. Additionally, approximately 40% of the combat aircraft of the Soviet Naval forces were deployed in the Far East.⁵

Despite the removal of their SS-20 missiles, the Soviets remained a strategic threat to the region. Over 40% of their SSBN fleet was deployed in the Far East, and Siberian ICBM fields threatened East Asia and the Western United States. Additionally, according to Secretary Armitage, "since 1985 the Soviets have deployed about 100 road-mobile,

⁴ Soviet Far East forces now total over 500,000 soldiers in 57 divisions. Of these forces, approximately 90% are stationed along the Sino-Soviet border, four divisions are assigned to Mongolia, and one division with MiG-23 fighter support is stationed on two islands in the Northern Territories. Sources include: (U. S. Defense Posture...., 1987, p.11).

⁵This includes 80 Backfire bombers with an un-refueled combat radius covering most of East Asia. See: (Hansen, Oct. 87, p.55).

single warhead SS-25 missiles, which, with a range of 10,500 kilometers, can reach Asian targets from the Western Soviet Union." (Armitage, 1988, p.5)

While the Soviet military presence in Asia can not be disregarded, it also can not be isolated from political events. Just as the U.S. military supports U.S. national interests, so too, the Soviet military was conceived to support Soviet interests. The central threat to those interests was of course perceived to be the United States. Where the Soviet Union was economically weak, the United States was foremost in maintaining a strong and free global market. Where the Soviet Union was experiencing political unrest within its own country and throughout its Warsaw Pact allies, the United States enjoyed a dynamic and independent military alliance in Europe.

Soviet policies towards East Asia must therefore be seen as part of a global strategy to improve the Soviet position as a world power. In consequence, with the advent of the Gorbachev era, Soviet leaders appear to be turning to diplomatic and economic solutions rather than relying upon their military power alone. This significantly increases the challenges to U.S. policymakers. They must view the soviet military threat as one piece in the strategic puzzle and develop solutions for the entire picture.

2. Low-Intensity Conflicts

The final threat Secretary Carlucci addressed was low-intensity conflict. This threat might present itself in the form of insurgencies within various countries, terrorism against U.S. citizens or property, the subversion of friendly governments, or even the expanding drug trade. These threats place new responsibilities on the U.S. Navy.

Recent events clearly demonstrate that the Navy is ideally suited to counter low-intensity conflicts. Libya demonstrated the advantages of carrier operations in politically sensitive, low-intensity actions. Whether these actions involve a sealift function, as in the Iran hostage attempt, or a protective function, as in the Persian Gulf, the Navy is able to

respond to wide spectrums of crises in politically sensitive and unstable regions of the world.

However, current (1990) fiscal constraints are impacting upon the U.S. Navy's force structure and may eventually impact upon its ability to meet overseas missions. Hard choices must be made between the size of deployed forces, their force mix or their time on station. In a statement before Congress on the proposed force cuts, Adm. Trost commented that:

"Let me state at the outset that the United States Navy remains, even after these cuts, a most capable force. But, these changes are not insignificant and will require substantial adjustments to deployed force levels and a number of commitments that can be routinely met." (Trost, 1989a, p.5)

Along with the decreasing defense budget, U.S. Navy leaders must also deal with the changing international environment. In his most recent Policy Guidance on military planning for 1992-1997, Secretary Cheney is reported to have instructed the services "to plan for the possibility that the United States might have to give up its bases in the Philippines... and to plan for forces of greater range to compensate for the loss of bases (there)." (Gordon, 1990b, p.A9) A solution to these possible changes might include increased coordination with allied and friendly navies.

D. ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

"The U.S. Navy today brings traditional naval strengths to bear against both Soviet and Third World adversaries where they are the weakest by exercising sea control; executing power projection with tactical air strikes, cruise missiles, and expeditionary forces; and providing the necessary sealift to project the appropriate force mix at the right time." (Trost, 1989a, pp.22-23)

[Adm. C.A.H. Trost]

1. Maritime Strategy: Peacetime Missions

The general concepts for employing the Navy as a component of the national military strategy are outlined in the Maritime Strategy (Watkins, 1986, pp.2-17). During peacetime, forward deployments maintain access to world markets, protect critical air and

sea lines of communication, maintain stability and physically demonstrate U.S. interest in a region.

Adm. Lyons, the former Commander of the U.S. Pacific fleet, wrote that:

"Our peacetime strategy must address the important issues which could weaken deterrence and destabilize the Pacific rim. It must address regional problems and issues which heretofore have been largely subsumed." (Lyons, 1987b, p.47)

The U.S. must recognize the reluctance of many regional nations to become involved in entangling alliances. Instead, discussions could be used to demonstrate the political stability and economic benefits accorded from a continued U.S. naval peacetime presence.

2. Maritime Strategy: Crisis Response

"The heart of (the) Maritime Strategy is crisis response. If war with the Soviets ever comes, it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out of control. Our ability to contain and control crises is an important factor in our ability to prevent global conflict." (Watkins, 1986, p.8)
[Adm. Watkins]

The Maritime Strategy (as defined at the beginning of 1990) demonstrates why the Navy is ideally suited for crisis control. These reasons include: its forward deployment and rapid mobility; the high state of readiness of naval forces; the Navy's logistical longevity; its operational flexibility; and its demonstrated effectiveness. A crucial element to a successful crisis strategy will be its force structure. Capable of responding to regional objectives, these units must be highly mobile, well trained and well equipped. Secretary Webb identified just such forces when he commented,

"The overriding guidepost for the future is that our conventional force structure must provide us the most utility and the most capability in the global arena... An example of this type of unit is the Third Marine Division on Okinawa, forward deployed not for the local defense of Okinawa, but as a maneuver force available for immediate commitment throughout Asia." (Webb, 1988, p.7)

Due to potentially unlimited scenarios, the Maritime Strategy does not explain the Navy's response to every possible crises-- it is an overview of general concepts, not a war plan. Nonetheless, the difficulty with the present strategy is its reliance upon the American decision process during times of crisis. The United States would be well advised to sit

down with its allies and friends and determine their range of support for U.S. actions. How receptive will regional states be to joint actions against terrorists? Can Japanese naval units be used to counter the drug trade in Southeast Asia or Latin America? If Vietnam threatens Thailand, will the U.S. Navy be allowed to use its bases in the Philippines? These questions have often been politically touchy. However, as the U.S. Navy's assets are reduced, increased clarification of fundamental allied support is required before crises develop to ensure the most efficient planning of limited resources.

3. Maritime Strategy: Warfighting

"The basis of our national strategy is to deter and, if necessary, defeat the enemy as far forward as possible. This means first deterring any potential aggressor with on-scene forces and, if required, fighting in the enemies waters and on his shores rather than our own." (Trost, May 1989, p.21)

[Adm. C.A.H. Trost]

To meet the enemy as far forward as possible, the Maritime Strategy envisions the early movement of forces and relies upon rapid decision making from national leaders. This early action will "make clear (U.S.) intention to cede no area to the Soviets [the currently perceived enemy] by default and to deny them the option to engage in hostilities on their terms." (Watkins, 1986, p.9)

The main goals of the warfighting phase are to:

- Deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure...
- Destroy the Soviet Navy...
- Influence the land battle...[and]
- Terminate the war on terms acceptable to (the U.S) and (its) allies... " (Watkins, 1986, p.9)

This strategy reflects the willingness to prosecute the war in all theaters. Rather than simply reacting in areas of an enemy's strength, the U.S. Navy will respond in areas of relative advantage. In the Soviet example, should the main conflict occur in Europe, U.S. naval action would be directed against the Soviet's flanks. In a global war, the U.S. Navy must be able to counter maritime threats to U.S. interests anywhere in the world. In his report to Congress, Secretary Carlucci wrote:

"Although ground forces are central to the Sino-Soviet balance, the Korean peninsula balance, and the Southeast Asia balance, naval and air forces would be key elements in any U.S.-Soviet confrontation. In the event of global war, two key U.S. missions will be countering Soviet submarines and dealing with the land- and sea-based threat to our carrier battle groups operating near the Soviet periphery." (Carlucci, 1989, p.22)

One of the missions of the Navy in a global war will involve action in East Asia. In addition to demonstrating U.S. regional commitment and ensuring control of Pacific sea-lanes, this action will tie down forces that would otherwise be available for Europe. This concept is significant given the ongoing conventional arms control talks in Europe. Whereas current (1990) conventional asymmetries may discount the strategic utility of Soviet Far Eastern Forces, conventional parity could significantly increase their relative importance in a Soviet 'swing' type strategy.

E. THE NAVY'S FUTURE UTILITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The United States' growing regional obligations and its commitment to deterring multiple threats requires a continued naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Navy will find it increasingly difficult to carry out its traditional missions in Asia and the Pacific as its force structure is reduced in the 1990s. How must the roles of the United States' allies and friends change as the Navy adapts to this smaller force structure? Will the Pacific Fleet have the seven carrier battle groups and two battleship surface action groups that Secretary Lehman (Lehman, 1987, p.22) required for the Maritime Strategy?

Far too often, strategies have responded to changing force structures. Weapons do not determine strategy, national interests and threats to those interests determine national strategy. The Maritime Strategy is only a part of the national strategy designed to counter a wide spectrum of threats to the United States' national interests. It provides policymakers a wide range of responses to possible regional crises. As Adm. Trost wrote, recent events in the Persian Gulf demonstrate "that flexible, capable, general purpose forces are in fact the right forces for dealing with both high-level and low-level threats." (Trost, 1989, p.12)

Although Soviet initiatives may diminish the perception of a "worst case" threat, the U.S. Navy must nonetheless maintain its flexibility and remain capable of defending against adverse changes in Soviet security policies.

As the political events in Eastern Europe reshape the Soviet military threat to NATO, the central orientation of the warfighting aspects of the Maritime Strategy must be re-evaluated. Concern over Japanese support for horizontal escalation may soon be overshadowed by questions of Japanese support for crisis and peacetime missions. The United States Navy must recognize that the international environment is changing and develop a new strategy designed to meet the new circumstances.

III. CHANGING SOVIET PERSPECTIVES

As this chapter will demonstrate, Mikhail Gorbachev has directed considerable effort at influencing political events in the Far East. Although the Soviets have Asian as well as European roots,⁶ Gorbachev's diplomatic initiatives have eclipsed traditional rhetoric. He has resurrected Leonid Brezhnev's "Asian Collective Security System" and actively pursues bilateral and multilateral economic agreements. Combining support for nuclear-free zones with an unprecedented military build-up, Gorbachev is pursuing active involvement in all spectrums of Asian security.

Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen for General Secretary during a period of severe economic decline and political unrest. In order to maintain his position, the internal economic situation must improve. Currently, he continues to consolidate control over the military and is overseeing a reorientation of its military doctrine to allow for increased resource allocation towards domestic needs. Given that traditional Soviet foreign policy in East Asia relied heavily upon the military, how has Gorbachev's internal reorientation of domestic priorities effected his foreign policy? Is it safe to assume that recent Soviet initiatives are not a threat to the U.S.? This chapter will examine Soviet policies towards East Asia since Gorbachev in order to determine the relationship between the perception and the reality of the "Soviet Threat" and determine possible implications for U.S. policy in East Asia and the Pacific.

A. HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF EAST ASIA TO THE SOVIETS

Russian emphasis on East Asia has normally been overshadowed by events in Europe. It was the nineteenth century before Russian Czars seriously directed their attention to the vast expanses of East Asia. During the Crimean War British and French naval attacks

⁶As early as 1941 Stalin toasted a visiting Japanese foreign minister "You are Asiatic, so am I." (Stephan, 1982, p.36)

along Russia's Pacific coast demonstrated the need for increased security.⁷ By the 1890s treaties with China and military operations in Central Asia significantly expanded Russian territory and influence in Asia. Following its humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's attention was again directed towards Europe. Events beginning with World War I and culminating in the Russian Civil War returned East Asia to the Soviet global picture.

The growing threat of a second World War redirected Soviet attention to the economic potential, expansiveness, and vulnerability of the Soviet Far East. The end of the War found Soviet heavy industries relocated east of the Urals, Soviet troops throughout Manchuria and northern Korea, and the Soviet flag flying over former Japanese islands in the Northern Pacific.

Although the Soviet Union emerged from World War II a military superpower, its status as an "Asian nation" took on new meaning. Western identification of China with the communist camp increased Soviet ideological as well as geographical prestige in the area. Support for the unsuccessful communist unification of the Korean peninsula reflected Soviet desires to protect its interests in its eastern flank. A communist (and united) Korea plus China would have combined to form a respectable front against Japan and the United States.⁸

Khrushchev's leadership oversaw the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. By the late-1950s the mutually beneficial Sino-Soviet alliance degenerated into an ideological confrontation over the correct "road to socialism." An increasingly independent and outspoken Mao Zedong challenged the Soviets for the ideological leadership of Third World revolutions.

⁷For histories of this period see: John Stephan's "Asia in the Soviet Conception," Osamu Miyoshi's "Soviet Strategy in Asia: A Japanese View," and Harvey Nelsen's Power and Insecurity.

⁸Some prominent experts interpret much larger Soviet goals. Adam Ulam suggests that the Soviets felt a united communist Korea would produce rising Japanese dissatisfaction with continued American occupation, resulting in a demilitarized Japan. "Once that occurred, prospects for a Communist takeover of Japan... would be bright indeed." (Ulam, 1974, p.520)

Soviet efforts in East Asia during the 1960s centered around the military and diplomatic isolation of an increasingly hostile China. In response to growing border disputes, Soviet military presence was significantly increased from 15 divisions in 1964 to approximately 27 divisions by 1969 (Nelsen, 1989, p.70). In March, 1969, Sino-Soviet border skirmishes erupted into major battles over disputed territory on the Ussuri River (Heller and Nekrich, 1986, p.639). In June, 1969, General Secretary Brezhnev attempted to reinforce diplomatic isolation of China through proclamation of an "Asian Collective Security System." Regional states' reluctance to become involved in the growing Sino-Soviet dispute prevented establishment of this System. Instead, Soviet diplomatic isolation of China was pursued through extensive bilateral security relationships with assorted Asian and African countries.⁹

Soviet foreign policy throughout the 1970s emphasized the use of military force to increase political influence. Initiation of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty in 1971 was soon followed by India's invasion of East Pakistan. The resulting new state of Bangladesh furthered Soviet regional influence and demonstrated Soviet commitment to its friends (Nelsen, 1989, pp.112-113). Also, support for the North Vietnamese against the United States and South Vietnam furthered Soviet political and military influence in Southeast Asia during this same period. The withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam underscored Soviet reliability and enhanced Soviet prestige. Support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia following the signing of the 1978 Friendship Treaty significantly improved Soviet military capabilities by opening Cam Ranh Bay naval facilities and Da Nang airfields to Soviet forces.

⁹These treaties included "the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and next, the Soviet-Indian Peace, Friendship, and cooperation Treaty in 1971; it then entered into a series of treaties with Iraq (1972), Somalia (1974), Angola (1976), Mozambique (1977), Vietnam, Afghanistan and Ethiopia (1978), South Yemen (1979), Syria (1981), and North Yemen (1984)." Additionally, the Soviets revised Warsaw Pact treaties so that mutual defense was no longer limited to Europe, thus ensuring unified communist support in a potential clash with China. See Miyoshi, p. 5.

However, Soviet support of military action did not always yield favorable results. Indeed, Soviet support for wars of national liberation significantly altered the political balance in East Asia during the late 1970s. Eventually, Soviet actions in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan undermined U.S.-U.S.S.R. detente and encouraged stronger Sino-American relations. Closer relations between China and the United States resulted in U.S. recognition of the PRC in 1979 and encouraged the August 1978 Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan directly resulted in U.S. arms sales to the PRC and stationing of U.S. intelligence gathering facilities in the Pamir Mountains of China (Nelsen, 1989, pp.107-8).

Soviet response to this strategic realignment compounded the adverse affects of their foreign policies and affected regional relations well into the 1980s. In response to improved Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations, the Soviets militarized the Northern Territories and significantly upgraded their overall military forces in the Far East. Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia remained a stumbling block to improved relations with regional countries and required significant financial support from Moscow. Although emphasis upon military solutions did result in short term benefits for the Soviets, long term regional distrust continued to hinder improved economic relations. It is this distrust among other factors that Mikhail Gorbachev must meet in order to improve the Soviet position in East Asia.

B. ECONOMIC VALUE OF EAST ASIA TO THE SOVIETS

Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power as General Secretary of the Communist Party in March, 1985, foreshadowed a decreased emphasis upon military solutions to foreign policy problems in the Far East. In May, 1985, during a Moscow dinner for India's Prime Minister, Gorbachev asked "Is it not advisable... to think of a common, comprehensive approach to the problem of security in Asia and a possible pooling of efforts by Asian states in this direction?" (Gorbachev, 1985, p.D5) In an address to the 27th Party

Congress in February, 1986, he expanded on his views for an "international strategy." He called for "a stop to material preparations for a nuclear war," and announced the Party's support for "an integral program for the complete liquidation of mass-destruction weapons before the end of the present century." (Gorbachev, 1986a, pp.O1-34)

Given that the Soviet position in Asia failed to improve since Brezhnev first proposed his collective security system in 1969,¹⁰ why would Gorbachev now be interested in resurrecting it? His call to destroy all nuclear weapons was quite provocative. Why would the nation with the largest nuclear stockpile support its entire destruction? What political gain can be accrued from supporting a nuclear-free world?

The answers to these questions are suggested in Gorbachev's July, 1986, Vladivostok speech. In what has become his traditional style, Mikhail Gorbachev criticized his countrymen for their poor economic performance, then went on to propose sweeping initiatives to reduce tensions throughout the region.

Again, why were these proposals being made? Why was Gorbachev supporting nuclear-free zones and reductions in naval forces? As discussed above, he inherited a country in economic and political disarray. Traditional Soviet foreign policy centered around influencing events in Europe. Meanwhile, East Asia remained a purely secondary theater. At best, it was hoped that Siberia would develop into a major supplier of natural resources. At least, the Eastern Soviet Union would remain economically self-sufficient to allow for re-building the Western Soviet Union. Gorbachev felt that "the Far East must be turned into a highly developed national economic complex," (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R4) and viewed the new five year plan as "the beginning of the job of speeding up the development of the whole region." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R5)

Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech lays the cornerstone for future Soviet foreign policy in Asia. Gorbachev seems to have recognized that speeding up development of the

¹⁰Indeed, in a March 1982 speech in Tashkent, Brezhnev implied that the Soviet Union was interested in improving relations (Miyoshi, 1987, p. 12).

Soviet Far East will require the support of regional nations. Indeed, most of the major problem areas outlined in his speech have since been supported through Soviet foreign policy initiatives. Thus, by reviewing the major areas of concern addressed in his Vladivostok speech one can better understand why Gorbachev responds as he does and perhaps determine what direction he is likely to go in the future.

1. Fishing Industry

In addressing his first concern Gorbachev called for improvements in the fishing industry. He saw the Soviet fishing industry moving "more and more to the Far East," and concluded that "serious, comprehensive measures are required for the development of the Far Eastern fishing industry." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R5)

One foreign policy measure that supported development of the Soviet fishing industry involved bilateral fishing agreements with South Pacific nations. In August, 1985, such an agreement was reached with Kiribati and then in June, 1986, a similar agreement was reached with Vanuatu (Kimura, 1987, p.16). Although neither agreement remains in effect, recent reports indicate the Soviets continue to aggressively seek new arrangements (Martin, 1989, p.19).

In the Northern Pacific the Soviets continue to maintain fishing agreements with the Japanese. Recently concluded negotiations reportedly reduce the amount of salmon the Japanese may catch while maintaining the previous year's "fishery cooperation fee" of 3.35 billion yen ("Japan, USSR....," 1989, p.26).

Foreign policies needed to support continued development would primarily concentrate on the North and South Pacific. Perhaps this is one of the reasons behind Soviet support for nuclear disarmament and nuclear-free zones. Gorbachev's call for nuclear disarmament in 1985 coincided with the finalization of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). His speech also supported future nuclear-free zones in the Indian Ocean, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Support for these movements may be seen as a small

cost in the battle to change regional perceptions of the 'Soviet Threat.' Through appeals to local concerns over nuclear proliferation, the Soviets may hope to make local governments more receptive to an expanded Soviet fishing industry.

2. Other Natural Resources

A second problem Mr. Gorbachev outlined in his Vladivostok speech was the need to improve the "comprehensive utilization of the region's extremely rich natural resources." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R6) In particular, he concluded that:

"The Far East must not be looked upon just as a raw-material base. The tremendous raw-material potential must be utilized here for building enterprises with complete cycles, to produce here, as a minimum, simifinished products, but better still, end products."(Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R6)

Perhaps the country best qualified to receive these low-quality "end products" is the Soviets' immediate neighbor to the south, China. In fact, Gorbachev goes on in his speech to comment that:

"As far as one can judge, our priorities and those of China are similar -- the acceleration of socioeconomic development...We are convinced that the mutually complementary nature of the Soviet and Chinese economies which has been historically established, offers big opportunities for the expansion of these ties, including in the border regions."(Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R14)

Since the relaxation of tensions in 1982, trade between the Soviet Union and China has steadily increased. In 1983 about \$300 million in trade occurred; this rose to an estimated \$1.4 billion by 1985 (Miyoshi, 1987, pp.12-13). Comparing the first half of 1988 to the same period in 1987, total bilateral trade increased by 32%, with trade between the Soviet Far East and China's north-easternmost province, Heilongjiang, jumping by 600% to \$160 million ("Gorbachev casts....," 1988, p.38).

However, full economic and political rapprochement was prevented by the failure of the Soviets to meet China's "three obstacles." These were: (1) withdrawal of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border; (2) withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and (3) withdrawal of Soviet support for the Vietnamese troops in Cambodia (Kimura, 1987, p.6).

If Gorbachev, in 1986, desired improved political and economic relations, he was well aware of the foreign policy decisions he would have to make. In February, 1989, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. By March the Soviets announced the planned withdrawal of "three full divisions" from Mongolia by the end of 1990 ("USSR to withdraw...., 1989, p.16), and by September, 1989, Vietnamese troops had withdrawn from Cambodia. Although it may be too simplistic to attribute Soviet compliance with all of the "obstacles" solely to a desire to improve trade with China, Gorbachev initiatives nonetheless led to the May, 1989, Sino-Soviet summit and restoration of diplomatic relations.

Since the events in Tiananmen Square in June, 1989, Sino-Soviet relations turned cooler. Recent reports of Vietnam's re-entry into Cambodia (Erlanger, 1990, p.A1) may serve to further strain relations. Gorbachev's East Asian initiatives, particularly those regarding China, may be temporarily overshadowed by short term concerns with internal ethnic unrest and multi-party government.

3. Need For Western Technology

Increasing efficiency was another major goal Gorbachev stressed. He felt that a solution to the "lack of coordination" would include "equipping enterprises with the very latest technology." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R7) One of the most convenient suppliers of this modern technology would certainly be Japan. Later in the speech Gorbachev praises the "signs of change" in his country's relationship with Japan, and insists that "economic cooperation is of mutual interest." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R15)

Yet, despite increased diplomatic activity between both countries, the signs of change seen in Vladivostok have yet to lead Gorbachev significantly in his desired direction. A major obstacle to better Soviet-Japanese relations remains the Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories. As a Pravda commentator recently remarked, "official Tokyo circles are making the normal development of bilateral relations dependent

on the satisfaction of Japan's *unfounded* territorial claims against the Soviet Union and are making them a stumbling block to trade and economic and other ties." (Ovchinnikov, 1989, p.24. Emphasis added) Unfortunately for the Soviets, the Japanese consider their claims far from "unfounded" and therefore are unlikely to dismiss them in order to engage in trade with the Soviets.¹¹

In his speech, Mr. Gorbachev called for increased cooperation "unburdened by the problems of the past." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R15) Yet it is these very problems that must be addressed in order to improve trade. Japanese claims are founded upon treaties that existed long before World War II. The Soviets gained final clearance for the take over of the southern half of Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands at the Yalta Conference in "payment" for their agreement to enter the war against Japan.¹² The Japanese view the continued occupation and recent militarization of these islands as illegitimate. Just as the Allies withdrew from West Germany and the United States returned sovereignty of Okinawa to Japan, so too, the Japanese insist the Soviets must return the Northern Territories before they are likely to engage in significant trade.

Thus, diplomatic efforts to woo the Japanese remain unsuccessful. As one writer explained, "Gorbachev's strategy is to hold out hope that improved Japanese relations with the Soviet Union will eventually lead to the return of the Northern Territories." (Kimura, 1987, p.9) Since it is more in the interest of the Soviet Union rather than Japan to improve relations, this strategy is not as yet succeeding.¹³ Possible proof of this is that despite a visit by Shevardnadze to Tokyo, Mikhail Gorbachev's planned trip continues to be "rescheduled."

¹¹For an excellent analysis of the historical background see: (Kamiya, 1982, p. 121-144).

¹²For the text of the Yalta Conference see: (U.S. Relations with China, 1949, pp.113-114).

¹³Indeed, some suggest that the natural resources of the Soviet Far East are of increasingly limited value as the Japanese industry becomes more "high tech." See: ("Back in the Deep Freeze," 1989, p.43).

4. Trade

The most important area of concern Mr. Gorbachev addressed centered around increasing trade. He noted:

"opportunities for the export-oriented development of the Far Eastern economy must be fully utilized... Here, too, cardinal changes and new approaches are needed in order to animate trade in both the coastal and border areas, to master progressive forms of economic links with foreign countries, including... joint enterprises." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R7)

In order to attract joint ventures and promote increased cooperation, Gorbachev must improve the Soviet image in East Asia and reorient his economic system to support foreign investments. As discussed, given the extraordinary build-up of Soviet military forces in the region during the 1970s and 1980s, improving the Soviet image will be difficult.

Yet, improving trade is vital to restructuring of the Soviet economy. Presently Soviet trade with East Asia and the Pacific totals approximately 4 percent of exports and 8 percent of imports (Thomas, 1988, p.56). The Soviets view upgrading of their observer status at the Pacific Rim Economic Talks as one avenue to increasing their trade with the region. One Soviet diplomat supported this view when he commented that, "If (the meeting) is aimed at expanding economic cooperation, we would like to participate, whatever moves it may seek." ("USSR Seeks to Attend....," 1989, Annex pp.6-7) However, it is uncertain how quickly the Soviets can accomplish the required "moves". Indeed, according to a recent CIA/DIA report, even though joint ventures with foreign firms increased from 20 in 1987 to 191 in 1988, "Western businessmen are reportedly disappointed... that Moscow failed to offer solutions to the problem of profit repatriation--the main barrier to foreign involvement." ("The Soviet Economy....," 1989, p.24)

In addition to changing his economic system, Gorbachev must also convince the nations of the region that his "new thinking" is sincere. Gorbachev used his Vladivostok speech to expand his "peace offensive" in East Asia. Conveniently overlooking his naval presence in Vietnam and Soviet troops then in Afghanistan, Mr. Gorbachev claimed that

"the Soviet Union is a convinced supporter of the disbandment of military groups, of the renunciation of foreign bases in Asia and in the Pacific Ocean, and the withdrawal of troops from others' territory." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R16) He again publicly supported an Asian Security System by proposing "a Pacific Ocean conference along the lines of the Helsinki conference." (Gorbachev, 1986b, p.R17) Gorbachev concluded his speech with sweeping calls for reduced naval activity in the Pacific, including limitations on anti-submarine warfare and additional confidence building measures.

C. CHANGING SOVIET ATTITUDES

Gorbachev continues his efforts to decrease regional perceptions of a "Soviet threat". He expanded his "peace offensive" a year after his Vladivostok speech through an interview in the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka. Gorbachev downplayed the threat from Soviet naval forces in Cam Ranh Bay by expanding upon his proposals for naval arms control. He suggested it might be "possible" to limit areas of navigation of nuclear armed ships and to ban anti-submarine activity in certain zones. He suggested limiting the numbers of naval exercises and restricting their operating areas. Altogether he suggested nine major proposals for limiting the operations of U.S. and Soviet naval forces, all designed to demonstrate that his "new thinking" was sincere. (Diah, 1987, p.CC4)

In his September, 1988, Krasnoyarsk speech Gorbachev again called for increased confidence-building measures and pre-notification of naval exercises. Additionally, he proposed a freeze on naval and air forces on a multilateral basis in the Northern Pacific and expanded on a theme from his Vladivostok speech by specifically calling on the United States to withdraw from its bases in the Philippines and in return the Soviets would withdraw their forces from Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. (Kato, 1989, pp.62-64)

Recent bilateral negotiations suggest that the Soviets are making limited inroads into the region. During an official visit to the Soviet Union in March 1989, the Philippine Trade Minister signed a agreement designed to increase trade fourfold, to total \$90 million by

1992 ("Katushev, Philippine Minister....," 1989, p.21). It was also announced that President Aquino would visit the Soviet Union during 1990 in an effort to better relations and improve trade (Pastor, 1989, p.23). Similarly, Mikhail Gorbachev used the 1988 Olympics as an avenue to better relations with South Korea. Both countries seem interested in expanding their bilateral trade which totalled \$300 million in 1987 ("Russia, very pacific....," 1988, p.42). Gorbachev must balance his overtures to South Korea against possible adverse effects those overtures might have on his relationship with North Korea.

Despite all of Gorbachev's efforts, Soviet-Japanese relations show little sign of change. Ongoing negotiations have yet to conclude the official peace treaty ending World War II. As discussed above, the continued Soviet occupation and militarization of the Northern Territories remains the major issue. According to reports, during an earlier meeting of the permanent working group dealing with peace treaty negotiations, the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama "informed the Soviets that Japan 'has no duty' to be bound by the Yalta agreement because it was not party to the secret pact." (Kamiya, 1989, p.25) Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev reiterated that Moscow "has no doubt whatsoever" of its right to the Islands due to both the Yalta agreement and the "enemy state clause" of the U.N. Charter.¹⁴

Following the December, 1989, meeting of the working group, Mr. Rogachev conceded,

"we have again not been able to close the gap between the positions of both sides on certain issues. This refers, first, to the geographical aspect, that is, the issue of drawing a national boundary between the USSR and Japan." (Potapov, 1989, p.8)

It is unknown how far Gorbachev will go to improve relations with Japan. Significant political and economic gains may be available should he suddenly negotiate a return of these islands to Japan. He would improve relations while concurrently fueling the

¹⁴ Under the clause, action taken during World War II by the allies against an enemy state cannot be invalidated by the U.N. charter. According to Kamiya, "Japan contends that the UN clause concerns only those measures taken by the war time allies to end hostilities and has nothing to do with territorial problems." (Kamiya, 1989, p.26)

Japanese debate over continued military relations with the United States. Gorbachev must balance these possible gains against the strategic role the Kurile Islands serve in the defense of submarine bastions in the Sea of Okhotsk. When asked if he thought returning the Kurile Islands was a fair trade for increased Soviet-Japanese relations, the Commander of the Soviet Navy responded:

"Peaceful coexistence and the reduction of the military presence in the region were proposed by Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev several times, including in his speech in Vladivostok, where I was present. That, *and not an attempt to trade territories*, is what must determine our relations." (Lazanske, 1989, Annex p.6. Emphasis added)

The "trading of territories" may become an increasingly difficult issue to oppose given the potential economic benefits and the internal "territories" issue in the Baltics. As Gorbachev again re-schedules his visit to Tokyo, some sort of concession regarding the Kuriles should not be unanticipated by U.S. policymakers.

D. CHANGING SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH NATIONS IN EAST ASIA

Despite changes in their foreign policy, the Soviets continue to broaden their military relationships in East Asia. The Soviets have strengthened their alliance with North Korea, continue their operations out of Vietnam and actively seek a larger presence in the South Pacific. In North Korea the Soviets have delivered SA-3 and SA-5 missiles, SU-25 and MiG-23 aircraft, and their very latest fighter--the MiG-29 (Armitage, 1988, p.5). In return, the Soviets have obtained overflight rights and conducted the first port visit by Soviet naval vessels to North Korea. The new overflight rights allow for direct flights from Vladivostok to Danang without having to 'detour' over the Tsushima strait (Miyoshi, 1987, p.21).

From a re-vitalized relationship with North Korea, to the build-up of Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviet Union supports a large military presence throughout the region. They spent \$2 billion to expand the old U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh Bay to accommodate up to 30

warships. Soviet naval aircraft in Vietnam have included Bear D/F reconnaissance and ASW aircraft, TU-16 Bombers, and MiG-23 fighters (Hansen, 1987b, p.26).

In addition to its bases in Vietnam, Soviet military presence in Indochina is reported to include approximately 500 military advisors in Laos (Nishihara, 1985, p.32) and the construction of submarine facilities at Ream and Kompong Som, Cambodia (Kerdphol, 1986, p.115).

However, Soviet interest in Indochina should not be seen as primarily military. The political and ideological benefits may be more important. Indeed, the Soviets continue to minimize the value of their bases and often seem reluctant to publicly pressure the Vietnamese regime. For example, despite the adverse affects of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia on Sino-Soviet relations, and despite over \$3 billion a year in aid they were supplying Hanoi (Armitage, 1987, p.5), the Soviets never publicly demanded the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. Meanwhile they continue to downplay the importance of their bases. As discussed, Gorbachev offered to withdraw from his bases if the United States withdrew from the Philippines. During a recent interview a Soviet Navy Captain commented that: "We need the station very much, but it only plays a supplementary role... I can say that this role can be replaced by other methods, such as a mobile method." ("Dismantling of Subic...", 1989, p.16)

Although Soviet bases in Vietnam represent a *military* benefit, U.S. policymakers should not underestimate their importance in *overall* Soviet strategy. Indeed, a unilateral withdrawal could place additional pressure on the United States similar to the announced unilateral cuts in the Soviet armed forces. Indeed, recent reports indicate a partial withdrawal from Cam Rahn Bay has already occurred. According to Pentagon officials, the Soviets have withdrawn all of their MiG-23 aircraft and about half of their TU-16 bombers (Gordon, 1990a, p.A8). Although their ships and long-range reconnaissance aircraft remain, this initial withdrawal may be intended to place additional pressure on the United States prior to its Philippine base negotiations and concurrently appease Chinese

concern over Vietnamese re-entry into Cambodia. If true, this would certainly reflect a political rather than military decision and might imply that a long-term Soviet military presence in Vietnam should not be taken for granted.

The final area of Soviet military interest appears to be the South Pacific. According to Rear Admiral Edward Baker, the South Pacific provides distinct military advantages to the Soviets, including, "proximity to US territory, surveillance of US missile and SDI research on Kwajalein, advantages in space and military operations, missile-testing advantages, support for seabed mining of strategic minerals, and trans-Pacific capabilities."¹⁵ Previous Soviet inroads into the South Pacific were successfully countered when the U.S. government coordinated an agreement between the South Pacific countries and the U.S. Tunafish Association.

When developing new strategies for the U.S. Navy in the Far East, policymakers must constantly reappraise Soviet political and military interests in the region. Gorbachev's willingness to reduce his troop strength to help improve Sino-Soviet relations demonstrates the increased influence of political interests.¹⁶ Nonetheless, Gorbachev controls a powerful military organization with a long history of political intimidation. If he intends to expand Soviet influence and improve its image in Asia, Gorbachev must convince regional nations that his armed forces are no longer a threat. U.S. policymakers must evaluate his actions to determine if concrete changes are truly implemented.

¹⁵From "USSR Discovers Strategic Value of Pacific Islands," (text of testimony before the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on September 10, 1986, by Rear Admiral Edward Baker, Jr., director of the East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs), Washington, DC, cited in (Kimura, 1987, p.16)

¹⁶In March 1989 the Soviets announced the planned withdrawal of "three full divisions" from Mongolia by the end of 1990. See ("USSR to withdraw....," 1989, p.16)

E. CHANGING SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

"Today the likelihood of conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is perhaps as low as it has been at any time in the postwar era." (Soviet Military Power, 1989, p.140)
[Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change 1989]

In Mikhail Gorbachev's first speech to the United Nations, on 7 December, 1988, he denounced the use of force in foreign policy and outlined his plans for the unilateral reduction of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe. Why is Gorbachev suddenly reducing his forces? What is behind recent moves of the Soviets to suddenly appear "defensive"? Are the renewed calls for "peaceful coexistence" yet another propaganda campaign to lull the United States into complacency while the Soviet Union regroups and emerges stronger and more threatening? Or are the calls for "new thinking" and "restructuring" reflections of a rational acceptance of an economic and political crisis that requires immediate and drastic action? What are the implications of this 'new thinking' for the Soviet forces in its Far East? U.S. leaders must factor in the implications of official changes in Soviet military doctrine when developing a strategic policy for East Asia and the Western Pacific.

Beginning with the 27th Party Congress in February, 1986, the Soviet leadership has repeatedly emphasized its shift to political control over military doctrine. The Congress stated:

"It is under the Party's guidance that policy in the area of defense and security and Soviet military doctrine, which is purely defensive and directed at defending against an attack from without, are developed and implemented." (Larrabee, 1988, p.1004)

Under the Party's guidance future conflicts are intended to be solved by political rather than military means. The Soviet Minister of Defense Dimitriy Yazov supported this in his April 1988 statement that "the Soviet Union has never associated and does not associate its future with a military solution to international problems, and unreservedly rejects war as a means for resolving inter-state contradictions." ("For the sake....," 1988, p.88) Mr. Yazov seems to have belatedly applied the "inter-state contradiction" even to Afghanistan.

Gorbachev used his U.N. speech to shape international perceptions of Soviet foreign policy. Acknowledging that "specific interests underlie all differences between social systems," he agreed that "their balance is a vital condition of survival and progress." (Gorbachev, 1988, p.230) This statement reflects his support for a stable international environment.

Gorbachev continues on to say "force or the threat of force neither can nor should be instruments of foreign policy... All of us, and first of all the strongest of us, have to practice self-restraint and renounce the use of force in the international arena." (Gorbachev, 1988, p.230) To date, Mr. Gorbachev's restraint has extended to include the breakup of Eastern Europe and the abandonment of communist party domination within the Soviet Union. If events have forced him to accept the once unthinkable in Europe and his own country, what does this imply for the future of such countries as North Korea and Vietnam?

The Soviets first implemented their 'new thinking' during a May, 1987, meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee. The Soviets unveiled a 'defense oriented' military doctrine renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons. In July, 1987, Defense Minister Yazov added to the new doctrine the principle of defensive sufficiency. He commented that:

"The Warsaw Pact member states, proceeding on the *principle of sufficiency*, propose to reduce...military potential to such a level that neither side, while assuring its defense, has the forces or means enabling it to mount offensive operations." (Garthoff, 1988, p.146. Emphasis added)

Defensive sufficiency is the central principle of new thinking in the Soviet military doctrine. Although many definitions exist, the basic concept calls for all sides to reduce their offensive capability to a strength less than their opponent's defensive capability. The principle presupposes reduced international tensions while maintaining strategic and conventional parity. As Defense Minister Yazov explains, "the USSR and its allies are not aiming at military supremacy, but will not tolerate somebody else's. They do not call for greater security, but they cannot accept less security." (Yazov, 1988, p.85)

In his U.N. speech Gorbachev claims that under the new doctrine Soviet forces "will become strictly defensive." (Gorbachev, 1988, p.235) However, various military leaders who actively support the principle of defensive sufficiency have claimed that Soviet troops are prepared to take the offensive if needed. In an April, 1988, interview Col. Gen. Vitaliy Karpov, of the Moscow Military Academy, admitted that:

"the exercises in which the Soviet Army is now engaged are devoted, first and foremost to defense. However, a certain offensive element is always present." (Udgaard, 1988, p.76)

According to William Odom, during his 1988 visit to the United States, Marshal Akhromeyev:

"insisted that the new doctrine means the Soviet Union will initially remain on the defensive for about twenty days while trying to negotiate a peace. If that fails, Soviet forces will have to launch a 'counteroffensive'." (Odom, 1988-89, p.130)

If the Soviets reorganize their troops such that they are strictly defensive, how will they conduct counteroffensives?

Rather than relying upon increasingly more numbers, the Soviet military must become more efficient. This message was emphasized in statements from the 19th All-Union Party Conference held in the summer of 1988. Specifically, the Conference concluded that "all defense construction must henceforth be oriented on qualitative parameters, both with respect to equipment and military science and to the composition of the Armed Services." ("Interview with...", 1988, p.28) Concern over the high cost of numerous weapons systems is a significant driving force behind the emphasis upon quality. As Yazov explained:

"emphasizing quantitative features is not only becoming increasingly expensive, but increasingly ineffective, from both a military-political and the actual military point of view." (Yazov, 1988, p.73)

Gorbachev's appears to be using "new thinking" in the military to help improve the Soviet's image through broad statements that satisfy international norms without significantly threatening the Soviet military's national security concerns. Additionally, he needs cuts in the armed forces to release scarce resources to his struggling economy. By

combining the new 'defensive' doctrine with his new foreign policy initiatives, Gorbachev hopes to stimulate trade with the Far East and establish the Soviet Union as a major player in regional international relations.

Soviet military leaders have initially accepted the politically imposed military doctrine. Just as Gorbachev requires economic progress for sustained political legitimacy, the military desires an increased industrial capacity to design and deliver the most advanced technology. While awaiting economic recovery, the military is using 'new thinking' to increase its combat efficiency and correct personnel related problems. New thinking is being used to counter manpower reductions by increasing the effectiveness of combat training; to overcome the technology gap by stressing quality over quantity; and to correct personnel problems by improving leadership skills.

Although Gorbachev's statements outline fundamental changes to the character of the Soviet military, U.S. policymakers must recognize that these statements have yet to produce concrete results in East Asia. Although Gorbachev's intentions may be clearly defined, the combat capability of his military forces in East Asia have yet to undergo a significant change. The United States must encourage explicit changes that demonstrate a reoriented military doctrine and art. U.S. policymakers must gain the initiative by challenging Mr. Gorbachev to produce real results that truly reflect a "new" doctrine. If the Soviet military is now "strictly defensive" as Mikhail Gorbachev promises, then this must be reflected in its organization, its exercises and its equipment. Due to its size, power and presence, the Soviet Pacific Fleet should best demonstrate if these changes are intended for the Far East.

F. SOVIET NAVY'S RESPONSE TO "NEW THINKING"

"The growing sea might of our country ensures the successful conduct of its foreign policy, helps constantly to widen trading, merchant scientific, and cultural links with other countries... and it places in the hands of our people a most important means for fulfillment of its historic mission-- the constant expansion of economic aid to all countries which have begun independent development." (Gorshkov, 1979, p.58)

[Adm. Gorshkov]

Ever since the Kronshtadt Rebellion the influence of communist ideology upon the navy has been significant. Capt. Steve Kime, former U.S. naval attache to Moscow, wrote that "the Soviets must be viewed as disciples of Clausewitz who thoroughly believe not only that war is a continuation of politics, but that politics itself is war." (Kime, 1987, p.47) The Party controls politics, therefore the Party controls war.

Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing into the mid-1980s Soviet military doctrine envisioned a power projection role for the Soviet Navy. In addition to its military function, power projection fulfilled two political goals. First, it legitimized the superpower status of the Soviet Union. The presence of the Soviet Navy in foreign ports presented the facade of a technically advanced and economically sound superpower. Adm. Gorshkov wrote that "the navy, as a constituent part of the armed forces of the state, has... the ability to demonstrate graphically the real fighting power of one's state in the international arena." (Gorshkov, 1979, p.247)

The second political utility of power projection is its ability to influence events through the threat of force. The Soviet Navy is ideal because "demonstrative action by the fleet in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one's own military might and threatening to start military operations." (Gorshkov, 1979, pp.247-248)

As discussed, Gorbachev has implemented a "defensive" doctrine to further his economic and political goals. As the defense budget is reduced the Soviet Navy is being forced to streamline its operations and improve its efficiency. Under the new doctrine, the

Navy's mission of power projection appears to have been abandoned. The Commander of the Soviet Navy, Adm. V. N. Chernavin, recently referred to the tasks of the navy as "to guarantee the security of the Motherland and our Warsaw Pact allies in sea and ocean directions." ("Interview with....," 1988, p.29) Similar to many other articles, no mention is made of "putting on pressure" or "threatening to start military operations."¹⁷

Politically, Gorbachev is using the reorientation of naval forces to improve his international image. Reports on the new "defensive" orientation of the military doctrine proudly point to exercises involving surface fleets while the recent build-up of the Soviet Navy is downplayed (Dmitrikov, 1989, p.61).¹⁸ In an interview with a Japanese newspaper the former Deputy Commander of the Navy, Adm. N. N. Amelko, was reported to have

"severely criticized the rapid Soviet naval build-up in the past few years, saying that 'the Soviet Navy should not have made a desperate effort to have the same types of vessels as the U.S. Navy.' The retired admiral called for the reduction of naval forces and the restrictions on military activities to consolidate trust between East and West." (Furumoto, 1988, p.14)

Overall, however, the present naval leadership is inconsistent in its support for the new military doctrine. New thinking is being interpreted in extremely limited and technical ways. While agreeing that quality must be improved in areas such as ship construction, combat training, and personnel leadership, force reductions and operational limitations are opposed. As Adm. Chernavin warned:

"The operations of the Soviet Navy cannot be limited to coastal regions... The further reduction in the operations of the Soviet Navy in ocean areas on a unilateral basis would decrease the security of our country, and could prompt aggressive forces to launch a sudden attack. We cannot give up our security." (Chernavin, 1989, p.75)

Thus, while naval leaders may officially support "new thinking" in the military, it appears they are uncomfortable with politically imposed restrictions upon their operations.

¹⁷Of course, should events in Eastern Europe eventually create a "United Europe", even this definition may soon be updated to exclude the reference to the "old" Warsaw Pact!!

¹⁸Of course, the substantial offensive capabilities of the Soviet submarine force are dismissed. These forces will be used to "defend" the homeland and are therefore within the defensive orientation of their military doctrine!

They seem upset with continued demands to reduce the military budget in order to improve the nation's economy. Adm. Chernavin recently complained that:

"the reduction in appropriations for defense must be within reasonable limits, and I would say that reasonable sufficiency must be displayed in the approach to this question. It is unrealistic to use mainly (the armed forces) to provide cover for all the country's troubles, as certain comrades believe." (Lukashevich, 1989, p.75)

Therefore, it appears uncertain the extent to which "new thinking" will actually change the orientation of the Soviet Navy. When new thinking can be used to their advantage, such as increasing combat efficiency, naval leaders are willing to go along. However, when the defensive doctrine threatens their operational capability these same admirals seem to balk. Given the inconsistent support for "new thinking" in the Soviet Navy, U.S. policymakers cannot base their judgements solely on stated intentions. It is too early to accept Adm. Chernavin's claims that the "the organizational and technical measures have been implemented, and requirements are formulated for the development of (the new) military art." (Lukashevich, 1989, p.75) If this new naval art truly supports the politically imposed "defensive" doctrine, then the changes should be reflected in the Navy's size and its application.

G. TRENDS IN THE SIZE AND APPLICATION OF THE SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET

"The key to analyzing any military organization is a realistic examination of its military capability. Stated intentions are not meaningful when compared with the ability to inflict enormous punishment on an opponent." (Trost, 1989a, p.30)

[Adm. C.A.H. Trost]

When defining the strategic utility of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific one must factor in the intentions and capabilities of its potential enemies. The above analysis suggests that current Soviet policies towards the Asia-Pacific region are fundamentally oriented towards improving its image in order to expand trade and legitimize its status as a global superpower. When balancing the roles and missions of the U.S. Navy against the present "peace offensive" from Moscow, policymakers must be careful not to be mesmerized by its

ambiguous rhetoric. Indeed, despite its "defensive" doctrine, Soviet military power remains a formidable force that cannot yet be discounted.

As discussed above, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is the largest of the Soviet fleets with a capability to project its power throughout East Asia and the Western Pacific. With visitation rights in North Korea and facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet naval presence may be capable of disrupting vital sea lines of communication and influencing regional crises. Although this presence may temporarily decrease for political reasons, the Soviet Pacific Fleet will nonetheless maintain the capability to project its forces and therefore must be factored into any strategic analysis of the Asia-Pacific region.

According to Adm. Hardisty, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, "the reality is that since Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speech and his subsequent addresses at Krasnoyarsk and the U.N., his pacific forces have improved qualitatively and quantitatively across the board." (Bilveer, 1989, p.14) With its 1979 addition of the CVHG Minsk, the Soviet Pacific Fleet began its qualitative and quantitative modernization. Recent additions include the CVHG Novorossiysk in 1983 and in 1985 the battlecruiser Frunze as well as Sovremennyy and Udaloy class destroyers. In late 1988 more ships were added including the Admiral Tributs and the 'Kashin' DDG Strogy (Jacobs, 1989, p.89). Its submarine force includes all three of the Soviet Navy's most advanced attack boats of the Akula Class (Gordon, 1988b, p.35).¹⁹

According to U.S. navy officials, since coming to power, Gorbachev has made no obvious changes in the Soviet shipbuilding program (Gordon, 1988b, p.1) This continued build-up appears to be part of an overall military modernization program. According to John Berbrich, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Special Assistant for National Estimates,

¹⁹According to The Military Balance 1989-90, the Soviet Pacific Fleet includes 77 major surface combatants-- two carriers, 11 cruisers, eight destroyers and 56 frigates. The fleet also includes 84 tactical and 24 ballistic missile submarines. This compares to the U.S. Pacific Fleet with 107 major combatants-- seven carriers, 24 cruisers and battleships, 29 destroyers and 47 frigates.

"The basic modernization trend apparent in the overall forces is reflected in the military programmes in Asia." (Jacobs, 1989, p.35)

Nonetheless, the Soviets continue to promise changes in their military that will reflect their defensive doctrine. A recent 21 ship exercise by the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan was officially classified 'defensive' (Asadorov, 1989, p.118). Mr. Rogachev has assured interviewers that Soviet reductions, (including 120,000 troops, 11 air regiments, and 16 warships) will be accomplished in the Soviet Far East during 1990 (Rogachev, 1990, p.15). These statements reflect continued efforts by the Soviets to appear to be implementing changes. Unfortunately, behind the facade little substantial changes have been implemented.

In summary, Mikhail Gorbachev's policies should significantly shape the U.S. Navy's strategic landscape in East Asia and the Pacific. So long as he maintains an interest in influencing regional events, Mr. Gorbachev's foreign policies and his defensive military doctrine should check the substantial Soviet military power in the region. However, should internal events mitigate Soviet desires to improve regional relations, or external events result in actual combat, then the formidable Soviet military capabilities will pose a significant threat to the United States' regional interests, with its obvious effect on the U.S. Navy.

These are important considerations that must be accounted for when updating the U.S. Maritime Strategy. If Soviet military forces will not be aggressively deployed during peacetime, what are the regional implications for the U.S. Navy? How will perceptions be influenced and how might those perceptions hinder the crisis role of the U.S. Navy? Before considering these questions in detail, a closer examination of the changing international environment is necessary. Will changes in the international environment result in growing calls for arms control negotiations? Might such initiatives constrain the Navy's ability to defend U.S. regional interests? These factors must be understood in order to determine the future strategic utility of the U.S. Navy as deployed in the Western Pacific.

IV. CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Unprecedented changes throughout Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union are challenging the political and economic legitimacy of its communist system. Sweeping reforms are introducing multi-party systems, open markets and free elections. Who could have predicted just one year ago that Poland would establish the Warsaw Pact's first non-communist government, that German unification would seem so likely, or that an official Soviet spokesman would state that Hungary was free to leave the Warsaw Pact?²⁰ As these dynamic events continue to unfold, it is impossible to predict where they might lead. However, it certainly appears that we have reached a watershed in the Cold War. Utopian dreams of a free and peaceful world may have never before seemed so real.²¹

One element of the international environment most likely to be catapulted forward at the crest of these reforms is the arms control process. As the euphoria of peace captures the imagination of the peoples and governments of the West and the East, arms control negotiations are likely to produce fundamental changes in Europe's strategic landscape. Conventional arms control proposals that seemed revolutionary only six months ago now are viewed as shortsighted and restrictive. As evolving forces push forward Europe's realignment, how will these events influence the strategic function of each service of the U.S. armed forces? Will events in Europe influence the U.S. Navy's role in the East Asia and the Western Pacific?

As conventional arms reductions are pursued in Europe, ongoing Soviet efforts to engage in naval arms control negotiations will undoubtedly gain growing international and domestic U.S. support. Before the momentum overcomes the negotiations, we must first

²⁰Central Committee spokesman Nikolai Shishlin acknowledged this during a 29 Oct. 1989 interview with George Will on the ABC News show "This Week With David Brinkley." Will asked "Would any Soviet interest be threatened if Hungary were to become an Austria, that is outside the Warsaw Pact?" Shishlin responded, "We will respect the Hungarian choice, anyhow. And we are not afraid of these changes." Will then followed-up with the question "They are free to leave the Warsaw Pact?" Shishlin replied, "Surely, but you know that Hungarian officials declared that they are ready to be in the Warsaw Pact, till now."

²¹This is written 1 March 1990.

determine the extent to which the probable results will support our national interests. This chapter will examine various arms control initiatives to determine how changes in the international environment might ultimately impact the U.S. Navy's strategic utility in East Asia and the Pacific.

A. ONGOING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

Two ongoing negotiations likely to influence the Navy's strategic utility are the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). START will reduce both U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals by fifty percent, establishing a 6000 warhead limit for both sides.²² Additional sublimits have been agreed to, such as a 4900 warhead limit for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. The marginal impact of these sublimits on the U.S. Navy's strategic utility is minimal given proportional reductions on both sides. Recent negotiations have clarified the question of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). According to reports, both sides have agreed not to include SLCMs in START, but instead to issue "'politically binding declarations' outside the treaty." (Gordon, 1990c, p.A14)

During President Bush's 1989 Summit with NATO leaders he outlined the U.S. proposals for conventional reductions.²³ As part of a four point plan, President Bush urged "eastern acceptance of the proposed western ceilings" for tanks (20,000 each) and armored troop carriers (28,000 each). He also agreed to include combat aircraft and helicopters in the negotiations (Secretary Baker later established this limit as 5700 combat aircraft and 1900 combat helicopters for each side²⁴). President Bush proposed limiting "ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic to the Ural zone at approximately 275,000 each." Finally, the President called for an acceleration in the timetable, suggesting "it should be possible to reach such an agreement in six months or

²²For an overview see: (Gordon, 1989, p.A11).

²³For his complete statement see: ("President's Statement...", 1989, p.A13).

²⁴For an overview of the U.S. position, including Secretary Baker's update, see: (Friedman, 1989, p.1).

maybe a year and to accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993." After these reductions are implemented, the President recommended the excess equipment be destroyed and soldiers and airmen demobilized.

Following the virtual collapse of the "Communist Bloc" in Eastern Europe, the above recommendations themselves appeared too broad. Thus, during his 1990 State of the Union address, President Bush called for lowering the troop limits in Central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 ("Transcript of Bush's....," 1990, p.C18). Since the U.S. maintains troops in Southern Europe and England, the proposal permitted the United States a European force level 30,000 men above the Soviets (Apple, 1990, p.A1). Nonetheless, the Soviets accepted the U.S. proposal (Friedman, 1990, p.A1).

Gorbachev's acceptance of equal force levels in Central Europe significantly increases the deterrent value of the U.S. Navy during a "worst case" U.S.-Soviet confrontation. If both sides agree to destroy and demobilize excess equipment and personnel, then U.S. and Soviet conventional forces will be quantitatively equal from the Atlantic to the Urals. Should the international environment later deteriorate to such a point that the Soviets plan for the invasion of Central Europe, previously imposed CFE limits will require the Soviets to significantly augment their forces in order to develop an "offensive" potential. Threat of attack from U.S. naval and air assets in the Pacific could tie down Soviet Far Eastern forces. Therefore, Soviet augmentation would require production of new assets and/or mobilization of reserve units, both of which will increase the chances of U.S. detection prior to an attack. Whereas previous Soviet asymmetrical advantages in Europe may have minimized the strategic value of horizontal escalation, post-CFE limits legitimize the Navy's deterrent value in a worst-case (albeit increasingly unlikely) U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

B. FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

As reviewed earlier, the United States views its Navy as a stabilizing influence capable of both responding to regional crises and deterring Soviet aggression. Due to the United States' "island nature", freedom of navigation on the high seas is vital for protecting SLOCs and maintaining its global commitments. Secretary Carlucci supported these views during his visit to the Soviet Union. When questioned about Soviet naval arms control initiatives, he said that, "Asking the US to cut back its naval capabilities would be similar to asking the USSR to tear up its road system and railways: given our geopolitical circumstances, neither of us could afford to cut these vital lifelines."²⁵

However, just as the changing international environment has supported conventional and strategic arms reductions talks, so too it appears to be encouraging naval arms control negotiations (McArkin, 1989, pp.55-63). Although conventional arms reductions will increase the Navy's strategic utility in a "worst case" U.S.-Soviet type conflict, naval arms control initiatives will constrain the Navy's ability to respond to regional crises by threatening its freedom of navigation. As Adm. Trost warned:

"Our naval forces must not become a bargaining chip. Our unrestricted use of the sea is more important to us than any agreement...Therefore we must curb this peculiarly American tendency toward unrequited altruism and deal strictly in our own interests and those of our friends and allies."
(Trost, 1988, p.16)

The Soviets are aggressively pursuing naval arms control negotiations with the clear understanding of U.S. opposition. Although their proposals are not new²⁶, the Soviets have recently increased the intensity and numbers of proposals. These proposals fall into one of three types: numerical limitations on ships or weapons; physical limitations on naval operations; and confidence-building measures. While numerical limitations seem to focus upon SLCMs, operational limits cover the complete spectrum from nuclear-free zones to

²⁵Comments made during his 1988 visit to the Soviet Union (RUSI NewsBrief, 1989, p.6).

²⁶As early as April 1957, the Soviets submitted a UN proposal to consider abolishing military bases on foreign territories. In 1959 Krushchev proposed making the Scandinavian peninsula and Baltic a 'rocket and atomic-free zone.' And in August 1968 the Soviets proposed limiting submarine operational areas.

limits on naval exercises. Confidence-building measures have received the most favorable reception, perhaps due to the relative success of the Incsea Agreement.²⁷

1. Numerical limitations

The Soviets view U.S. development of advanced SLCMs with growing concern. This concern was reflected in their relentless efforts to include SLCMs in START. As the Chief of the Soviet Navy Main Staff, Adm. Makarov, warned:

"One of the fundamental questions is the limitation of SLCMs. This is a serious obstacle on the road toward an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive arms. It must be born in mind that SLCMs are extremely dangerous arms whose proliferation in the world's oceans clearly destabilizes the strategic situation as a whole and increases the risk of an armed conflict being unleashed." ("Flying the Motherland's....," 1988, p.59)

The U.S. Navy successfully opposed including SLCMs in START. In an appearance before the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Vadm. Larson, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy, warned that SLCMs are necessary for the United States' national interests. He emphasized that:

- their wide dispersal complicates Soviet planning and increases deterrence by raising the risks of starting a war;
- their "expanded strike capability" makes them an "unmatchable force multiplier";
- their deployment flexibility allows theater commanders the same deterrence "without basing problems"; and
- their flexibility during low-intensity conflicts extends their utility beyond the scope of traditional U.S.-Soviet confrontations (Larson, 1989, p.11-12).

After outlining these advantages, Vadm. Larson recommended against including SLCM in START. He warned that:

"U.S. negotiating strategy has consistently maintained that SLCM does not belong in START. It is clearly a case of Soviet attempts to negotiate systems of lesser importance to them in return for systems and technologies of critical value to a maritime coalition. Furthermore, the covert possibilities for production, storage and deployment, as well as difficulty in distinguishing between nuclear and conventional variants, all make verification impossible. It is absolutely vital that we

²⁷On May 25, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed The Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (Incsea Agreement). The Incsea Agreement prohibits provocative naval operations by naval vessels or aircraft. Prohibited operations included harassing maneuvers (such as fly-bys or simulated attacks), maneuvers that might lead to risk of collision, or naval maneuvers through heavy traffic. The agreement has been extremely effective at reducing risk and maintaining stability. For one of many analyses, see: (Hill, 1989, pp. 28-29).

protect our long-range nuclear and conventional capabilities at sea, and above all, ensure that future technologies and options are not foreclosed." (Larson, 1989, p.13)

Nonetheless, Soviet efforts to engage the United States in further arms control negotiations to specifically include SLCMs must not be ruled out and must continue to be opposed.

Although the CFE mandate specifically exempts naval forces ("To strengthen stability....," 1989, p.5), the Soviets seem intent upon linking CFE's results to some sort of naval agreement. During an interview with a Japanese newspaper, a Soviet delegate to the CFE talks, Maj. Gen. Viktor Tatarnikov, is reported to have "revealed for the first time the Soviets' clear intention to link the issue of reducing conventional forces with that of reducing naval forces." He commented that "at the moment the first step in negotiations... is made, I would like to have the talks for reducing naval forces start separately." (Furumoto, 1989, p.5)

American negotiators and political leaders must deal with calls to enter into negotiations on 'reducing naval forces'. As the Soviets proceed with their highly publicized 'peace offensive', it will become increasingly difficult to counter their proposals through passive denial. Previous arguments justifying western maritime superiority based upon Soviet ground force asymmetries are no longer sufficient.²⁸ The United States Navy must continue the discussions Vadm. Larson began, demonstrating the Navy's global, rather than purely European, responsibilities.

2. Confidence-Building Measures

The Soviets are also pursuing what may be the most likely avenue for naval arms negotiations-- confidence-building measures.²⁹ At a special U.N. session on disarmament, Shevardnadze called for notification of naval exercises, limitations on their scope and

²⁸Indeed, Gen. Tatarnikov argued that "As the war capabilities of ground forces in Europe decrease, NATO's naval forces, which compromise vessels equipped with anti-ground attack cruise missiles and carrier-borne attack aircraft will become a threat to all East bloc nations." (Furumoto, 1989, p.5)

²⁹The Navy supported this statement in their recently released "White Paper" on Naval Arms Control. They wrote: "Inclusion of naval forces in measures designed to increase openness and transparency (CSBMs) is the most likely form of arms control which could affect the Navy. See: Naval Strategic Objectives...., 1989, p.10)

numbers, and requirements for observers (Shevardnadze, 1988, p.7). The Soviets tried to include naval forces in the CSCE follow-on meeting held in Vienna on 6 March 1989. One week prior to the conference, Maj. Gen. Tatarnikov wrote that the talks should "place chief emphasis on ensuring that confidence-building measures and information on military activity extend to naval and air forces in sea and ocean regions adjacent to Europe and in the airspace." (Tatarnikov, 1989, p.8)

The U.S. Navy opposes applying confidence building measures to naval forces. Admiral Larson warned against such agreements because "independent naval forces would be captured by a regional agreement to the detriment of our global posture." (Larson, 1989, p.20)

Admiral Larson concluded that CSBMs are "counter to western security interests" because, among other reasons, they:

- are regional in character, while naval forces have global responsibilities;
- are not necessary since naval forces are easily verifiable by national technical means;
- would result in unacceptable levels of intrusiveness and would tend to give a greater advantage to the Soviets; and
- would make naval forces more predictable, thus undermining their deterrent value (Larson, 1989, pp.18-19).

However, the above arguments may not succeed in preventing confidence-building measures from eventually including naval forces. Some "non-binding" initiatives could allow the U.S. Navy to appear to engage in arms negotiations without restricting its forces. For example, on 12 June, 1989, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William Crowe, and the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, signed a bilateral agreement for the prevention of dangerous military activities.³⁰ This agreement entered into force on 1 Jan. 1990 and is designed to "ensure expeditious termination and resolution by peaceful means... of any incident which may arise as a result of dangerous

³⁰Official title: Agreement between the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the government of the United States of America on the prevention of dangerous military activities.

military activity."³¹ Provisions concentrate on situations in which both sides are operating in close proximity.

Articles of the agreement will cover naval forces:

- upon entering the other's national territory either unintentionally or owing to circumstances brought about by *force majeure* (Art. III),
- when using laser's in proximity to personnel and equipment of the other's armed services (Art. IV),
- for designating "Special Caution Areas" which establish unique operating procedures for both parties (Art. V), and
- regarding special communications procedures between both parties (Art. VI and VII).³²

It appears that a precedent has been established; that the Navy may now become involved in confidence-building agreements that do not constrain its freedom of navigation.

3. Operational Restrictions

The final area of naval arms control deals with operational limitations of naval forces. These are the most politically oriented initiatives and have been used by Mikhail Gorbachev as cornerstones to his major foreign policy speeches. Due to the United States' "island" nature and its incumbent reliance upon forward deployed naval forces, Soviet initiatives generally restrict U.S. operations with relatively minimal impact upon their own forces. Nonetheless, Soviet proposals have political appeal and are being used to help reduce regional perceptions of the "Soviet Threat".

Operational limitations can be divided into four categories, those dealing with: nuclear free zones or zones of peace; limitations on regional deployments; reductions in naval exercises; and the presence of naval bases on foreign soil.

Limitations dealing with nuclear-free zones are the most traditional operational restrictions. As early as 1970, at the Third Non-Aligned Conference, the Soviets

³¹Ibid., Art. II paragraph 2.

³²Ibid., Art. III through Art. VII.

supported a proposal for a U.N. resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace" (Camilleri, 1987, pp.170-171). At the 1974 summit between Brezhnev and Nixon, Brezhnev reportedly proposed a ban of all nuclear armed warships from the Mediterranean (Blechman, 1974, p.36).

Nonetheless, previous Soviet proposals fail to match the political appeal of Mikhail Gorbachev's recent initiatives. As discussed earlier, Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech combined calls for nuclear-free zones with limitations on naval exercises (Gorbachev, 1986b, pp.R17-18). This speech was followed by speeches in New Delhi (proposing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean); Murmansk (Arctic zone of peace and limitations on ASW exercises); Belgrade (freezing naval forces in the Med.); and his most recent naval proposals at Krasnoyarsk (Kato, 1989, pp.62-64).

Gorbachev's limited ability to significantly influence regional perceptions is a positive sign for the U.S. Navy. There appears little chance for domestic pressures in other countries to force the Navy into operationally limiting arms control negotiations. The Navy's "White Paper" echoed this conclusion when it found that "serious negotiations which could lead to operational constraints remain unlikely." (NSO, 1989, p.10)

The above analysis demonstrates the direct impact of the changing international environment upon the U.S. Navy's strategic utility in East Asia and the Pacific. Reductions in conventional forces in Europe will significantly increase the deterrent role of U.S. naval and air assets in the Pacific. As long as Soviet Far Eastern forces can play a pivotal role in the European balance, the threat of horizontal escalation will be necessary to deter those forces from "swinging" west.

As the international environment decreases the likelihood of a U.S.-Soviet type conflict, the Navy's ability to respond to regional crises will be of increased importance. To maintain this ability the United States must protect its freedom of navigation on the high seas. Politically inspired Soviet naval arms control initiatives threaten this freedom and

could eventually constrain the U.S. Navy's ability to meet its global responsibilities. The Navy must counter Soviet initiatives by demonstrating its commitment to global stability through non-constraining confidence-building agreements and through increased regional cooperation. By working with regional nations to fulfill common interests, the U.S. Navy can counter Soviet propaganda and demonstrate its commitment to peace.

V. CHANGING REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS

Lowering perceptions of international threats, combined with regional political and economic developments, undermine traditional U.S. security relationships in the Far East. American policymakers must adapt to this changing environment and identify common interests between the United States and its regional partners. Although these nations will always maintain an interest in their national security, the changing environment encourages increased emphasis upon economic growth. When attention is directed towards national security it tends to concentrate on regional or internal threats. Although unofficial statements support a continued American presence, official actions appear directed at the inevitable withdrawal of American military forces. If the United States requires a continued presence to protect its own interests, then U.S. policymakers must identify common interests and forge regional public support for a continued American military presence. Given growing nationalistic resentment towards the physical presence of American forces, the U.S. Navy's flexibility and maneuverability should allow for diplomatically acceptable solutions to American security interests in the Far East.

A. CHANGING REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Changing regional factors require a re-evaluation of U.S. security relationships in the Far East. As reviewed in Chapter One, the United States maintains bilateral security agreements with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. Given previous regional concerns, these bilateral security agreements have served a common interest for some time. However, as tensions decrease and Soviet policymakers push their "new thinking", regional concerns are being directed away from security threats.

1. Northeast Asia

The changing international environment is influencing U.S. relations with both Japan and The Republic of Korea. U.S.-Japanese relations are evolving as each adjusts to

Japan's emergence as an economic superpower. Growing nationalistic sentiments within each country are creating increased strains in the relationship. U.S. criticism is directed at Japan's unfair trade practices while the Japanese consider the growing U.S. deficit a major problem (Okita, 1989, p.132). As the former Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saburo Okita, wrote, "Instead of blaming each other for their problems, the two countries need to look for new areas of fruitful cooperation, including the Latin American debt problem and Philippine economic stabilization." (Okita, 1989, p.131) U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle echoed these views during an interview following his September, 1989, Asian trip. Mr. Quayle remarked that as an "economic superpower" Japan can help out in areas such as "the war on drugs, a space agreement, and Eastern Europe." (Quayle, 1989b)

Unfortunately, such diplomatic niceties have yet to influence the growing political rhetoric. Indeed, unresolved economic frustrations are beginning to impact U.S.-Japanese security arrangements. As former Ambassador Mansfield explained:

"Much of the debate focuses on Japan's defense spending. Some argue that Japan spends too little, yet the one percent of GNP that it spends on defense amounts to \$30 billion. This is comparable to the \$35 billion spent by the United Kingdom, the \$32 billion spent by France and the \$31 billion spent by the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, if one includes the additional \$10 billion worth of pensions and survivors' benefits, which the Japanese handle in a separate budget (unlike the United States and European nations), Japan's defense spending considerably exceeds the expenditures of our European allies." (Mansfield, 1989, p.8)

Nonetheless, dissatisfied U.S. congressional leaders are demanding increased burdensharing from Japan. Senator Levin recently remarked that, "I believe we must challenge Japan with a far broader burdensharing framework... (they) should be challenged to support U.S. forces in the Asian theater, not just in Japan." (Halloran, 1989, p.A12) Although administration sources appear reluctant to jeopardize U.S. security relations with Japan, they must also respond to domestic political discontent. This balance was reflected in the most recent Department of Defense Annual Report to the Congress. Then Secretary Frank Carlucci reported that, in 1989, Japan will spend:

"a total of \$2.5 billion in direct and in direct host-nation support for U.S. forces in Japan. This is the most generous financial host-support arrangement that we enjoy anywhere in the world. Furthermore, in 1988 the Japanese announced they would spend at least \$50 billion on economic aid

over the five-year period between 1988 and 1992. This will make Japan the largest provider of overseas development assistance in the world. In sum, Japan's efforts in response to calls for greater burdensharing have been noteworthy. Still, we look for Japan to shoulder a greater share of the common defense burden, commensurate with its rapidly growing power and influence." (Carlucci, 1989, p.62)

Additionally, during Secretary Cheney's February, 1990, visit to Japan he announced plans for a ten percent reduction in American forces stationed in East Asia. This would mean a reduction of between 5,000 to 10,000 troops stationed in Japan. According to reports, Japan's Foreign Minister Nakayama warned Mr. Cheney that despite changes elsewhere in the world "we have to be mindful of elements of instability and unpredictability" in Asia. (Weisman, 1990, p.A6)

Indeed, although increasingly vocal minorities in Japan are questioning the need for a continued U.S. military presence, Japanese policies are still influenced by the Soviet build-up in the Far East, militarization of the Northern Territories, and the lack of Soviet-Japanese Peace Treaty from World War II. Although 120,000 of the 500,000-man reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces will come from the Far East, these reductions will not include forces stationed on the Kurile Islands ("Comments on USSR....," 1989, p.21). Unless Gorbachev grants sweeping concessions regarding the Northern Territories, it appears unlikely that Japanese perceptions will be swayed by his "peace offensive." Indeed, in May, 1989, Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, noting that "world peace is still maintained by the balance of power and deterrence," informed senior officers of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces that Japan's arms build-up should continue despite changes in the international environment ("Japan Arms Build-up....," 1989, p.23).

This sentiment is supported by many retired and active duty officers of the Self Defense Forces. As retired Lt. Gen. Hisotoma Matsukane, former commander of the Japanese Northeastern Army, wrote, "It is in the manifest best interests of the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the United States to undertake enhanced cooperation to secure every advantage in the face of the ongoing Soviet buildup of capabilities in the area." (Matsukane, 1987, p.62) As Secretary Carlucci reported to Congress, Japan has responded to the

Soviet build-up by pledging "to defend its territory, airspace, and sea lines of communication out to 1,000 nautical miles, and is making solid progress towards this goal." (Carlucci, 1989, p.54) Additionally, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force continues to improve its degree of cooperation with the U.S. Navy. As Adm. Trost reported to Congress, "We see superb cooperation and assistance from our sister navies... the Japanese military capability improvements in the Pacific are examples of the positive cooperation within this maritime coalition." (Trost, 1989a, p.20)

What is uncertain about the Japanese build-up is the extent of their commitment to the U.S. strategy in the Pacific. Although Gen. Matsukane wrote that "the preparation of coordinated strikes on regional Soviet facilities would be essential to a credible deterrent posture," (Matsukane, 1987, p.61) some U.S. officials question whether the Japanese would support such coordinated attacks if they were in response to Soviet aggression in Europe. Indeed, they suggest that the Japanese might instead fulfill the role of the "bastion of democracy," similar to U.S. actions prior to entering the second World War.³³

Japan's emergence as a global economic superpower (and a regional military power) raises many questions regarding additional assumptions in the U.S.-Japanese partnership. Economically, the United States and Japan are becoming increasingly dependent upon each other. The United States is Japan's fourth largest foreign investor, with holdings totalling \$14.3 billion at the end of 1987. In 1988 U.S. exports to Japan increased 34 percent to \$37.7 billion (Mansfield, 1989, p.5). As U.S.-Japanese interdependence grows, how will mutual perceptions change? As Japan emerges as an equal partner, how will it view its security obligations? Will the Japanese be willing to assume a larger share of the regional security responsibilities? If so, how might other nations react? If not, what, if anything, should the United States do?

³³Based on author's conversations with U.S. Defense Department officials Sept. 1989.

Growing South Korean nationalism combined with U.S. fiscal concerns has rekindled the debate on the need for U.S. troops in Korea. U.S. and Korean leaders must determine the ultimate benefit from these forces and weigh them against the growing tide of anti-Americanism. Stressing the need for stability, Secretary Cheney recently declared that,

"We are not going to move precipitously, our commitment remains strong. The threat remains undiminished." ("Seoul Agrees on....," 1990, p.A8)

Earlier, during his July 1989 visit to Washington, Korean Defense Minister Lee Sang Hoon announced that his country would add an additional \$30 million to the \$40 million already dedicated to improving war reserves and maintenance facilities ("US unlikely to....," 1989, p.14). Although both countries have accepted in principle the gradual withdrawal of 5,000 non-combatants ("Seoul Agrees on....," 1990, p.A8), their official statements appear to be part of an effort to counter growing criticism.

Indeed, as the international environment promotes perceptions of global peace, politicians in both countries are questioning the need for U.S. troops in South Korea. As reviewed earlier, U.S. Senators Carl Levin and Dale Bumpers have called for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces over the next three years (Halloran, 1989, p.A12). Commenting on Sen. Levin's proposal, Kim Dae Jung, the leader of South Korea's largest opposition party, the Party for Peace and Democracy, replied "We should study [the proposal] affirmatively." ("Kim Dae Jung....," 1989, p.20) Kim Dae Jung also supports calls for placing a Korean in command of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), moving a US military base out of Seoul and reassigning the armed forces television station's spot on the airwaves (Clifford and Hoon, 1989, pp.28-29). Kim Young Sam, leader of the more moderate opposition party, the Reunification Democratic Party, has also supported calls for change. Although Kim Young Sam continues to regard U.S. troops as necessary for deterrence, he supports some reforms of the military's command structure (Clifford and Hoon, 1989, pp.28-29).

Growing internal dissent is challenging the legitimacy of the official statements. U.S. policymakers have already agreed to remove U.S. headquarters from Seoul and demands for Korean control of the CFC may become increasingly sensitive should Soviet troops be affected by the political reshuffling in Eastern Europe.

However, Korean support for the withdrawal of U.S. troops is universally keyed to development of better relations with the North. Defense Minister Lee went so far as to link withdrawal to the DPRK's abandonment of its goal of communizing South Korea ("Seoul resists call...", 1989, p.26). Such an event appears highly unlikely. Their abandonment of this goal would certainly depend upon initiatives from both China and the Soviet Union.

While the Soviets want to maintain positive relations with the DPRK, they are also interested in improving economic ties with South Korea and improving relations with China. During the recent Sino-Soviet Summit, Mikhail Gorbachev confirmed his:

"unvarying support for the efforts of the DPRK aimed at a peaceful, democratic unification of Korea. Obviously, this requires the removal of tension on the peninsula and the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the continued presence of which in this region for a long time now cannot be justified by any kind of argument." (Gorbachev, 1989, p.11)

However, this "support" may not reflect the North's goal of a united and *Communist* Korea. As Sino-Soviet relations improve and democratic reforms sweep Eastern Europe, the DPRK is finding itself increasingly isolated.

This isolation may be reflected in the DPRK's changing attitudes (Delfs, 1989, p.18). In January 1989 the South Korean founder of the Hyundai Corp. visited North Korea for discussion on joint ventures and on 6 December, 1988, and 24 January, 1989, diplomats representing the U.S. and the DPRK met in Beijing for their first direct talks since the Korean War. After these talks the North Korean Ambassador remarked that:

"Our country is on the globe, and the U.S. is also on the globe. Living together on one globe, it is impossible for us to have no contact whatever. If the U.S. withdraws their troops from South Korea and doesn't interfere in our internal affairs, there will be no conflict in our relations." (Delfs, 1989, p.18)

Although the DPRK meetings with U.S. officials and discussions on joint ventures do not necessarily indicate a softening of their hard line, these events nonetheless demonstrate that North Korea is equally susceptible to influences from the changing international environment. Should those influences result in changes similar to those now developing in Eastern Europe, it could fundamentally effect U.S. policy in the region.

It is time to challenge traditional assumptions and determine if the continued presence of U.S. *ground* forces in South Korea is necessary. The U.S. and the R.O.K. must outline their fundamental goals and determine how best to support them. Given the apparent interest of both the Soviet Union and China in promoting economic development, does North Korea remain such a threat to the ROK as to justify a U.S. "tripwire" on the peninsula? Have not U.S. economic, military and humanitarian assistance since the end of the Korean War demonstrated our concrete commitment to the security of the ROK? Yet, it still appears that South Korean political and military leaders require a physical presence to demonstrate U.S. commitment (Clifford and Hoon, 1989, p.28). *This is absurd.* During his confirmation hearings Ambassador Donald Gregg stated it was time to start considering the withdrawal of U.S. troops (Clifford and Hoon, 1989, p.28). We must not waste time. The U.S. must sit down with Korean political and military leaders and determine, given the changing political, economic and international environment, how our mutual benefits can best be accomplished.

2. The People's Republic of China

Recent events within the People's Republic of China (PRC) will significantly affect the East Asian strategic calculus. International repercussions from the June 1989 military crackdown in Tiananmen Square included an abrupt cessation of military exchanges and high-technology trade between the PRC and the U.S. U.S. policy appears to center upon a balance between moral and strategic imperatives with the hope that future political and economic reforms may eventually re-build U.S.-P.R.C. ties.

Deng's reform program sought foreign technology, trade and investment in order to modernize and stimulate the economy.³⁴ Most of the emphasis was placed on modernization of the civilian sector. Indeed, at the May, 1985, meeting of the Central Military Commission "large portions of the defence and military-industrial complex were switched over to civilian tasks." (Cheung, 1989a, p.50) At the same meeting "operational strategies were revised from assuming major, imminent and nuclear wars to preparing for smaller-scale, less expected, conventional encounters." (Cheung, 1989a, p.50) Recent reports indicate that Deng continues to stress this view of the global threat ("Chinese CMC debates....," 1989, p.1275).

Decentralization of control was key to Deng's economic modernization. Provincial and local governments were encouraged to direct their industries and agriculture towards the most profitable areas. However, decentralization of control to local governments unaccountable to their people soon resulted in shortages of basic supplies and widespread corruption.

Lacking its own modernization, the political system was unable to respond to growing dissatisfaction with the economic situation and the lack of individual freedoms. The intellectual elite rose to fill this void. Indeed, their traditional role of advisors to the central government was represented in student movements that eventually erupted at the funeral of Hu Yaobang. As former Ambassador Winston Lord explained, these students:

"wished to work within the system, seeking gradual reform in the context of communist rule, indeed promoting the very goals the party had proclaimed. They petitioned for rights set forth in the Chinese constitution... For weeks the students' platform boiled down to two concrete requests: an acknowledgment that the demonstrators were patriotic and a dialogue between genuine student leaders and the political leaders." (Lord, 1989, p.3)

Eventually, of course, the student movement became a mass demonstration of dissatisfaction that eventually led to the military crackdown in June 1989.

³⁴For excellent analysis of this period, see: (Harding, 1987) and (Fairbank, 1987).

It is too early to judge how the military crackdown will affect the strategic calculus in East Asia. Three areas that could influence the U.S. Navy's role include the future of the PLA Navy (PLAN), the eventual status of the Republic of China, and the final U.S. policy towards the P.R.C.

With Deng's 1985 reassessment of the global threat, increased emphasis was placed on "rapid response" forces including "naval and air forces and light, strategically deployable land forces." (DuBois, 1989, p.1484) The PLAN's traditional mission emphasized a coastal defense role in support of the overall PLA doctrine of "combined operations." Its structure is primarily composed of coastal patrol boats and submarines intended for local operations.³⁵ Indeed, their largest surface combatants are two 4200 ton destroyers now under construction (Preston, 1989, p.78), and the future reliability of these 'showboats' remains in question.³⁶

Nonetheless, the PLAN has demonstrated a limited capability for open ocean operations. The PLAN's blue-water capability centers on its 14 Luda class destroyers, a locally built version of the Soviet Kotlin class. Although these vessels are old (late sixties design), they have demonstrated a seakeeping and underway replenishment capability. In 1980 several Ludas escorted the fleet to an area northeast of New Guinea for ICBM tests (Jencks and McDonald, 1988, p.37). Other cruises include a 1984 Antarctica and 1985 Indian Ocean voyage. Overall, according to a senior PLAN officer, about 80 per cent of the Navy's "principal officers" and cadres have completed long-range navigational training (Hahn, 1988, p.49).

The primary "long-range" intentions of the PLAN have centered on operations in the South China Sea. The March, 1988, conflict in the Spratly Island's between Chinese and Vietnamese naval units may indicate an increased Chinese maritime role in the South

³⁵For an overview of the build-up of the PLAN see the annual reports of The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. These reports clearly demonstrate the preponderance of motor gunboats and river defense craft. Although these tables reflect a steady build-up of destroyers and frigates (from a total of 25 in 1979/80 to 56 in 1989/90) the overall blue-water threat remains limited.

³⁶Based on author's conversation with U.S. official 20 Feb. 1990).

China Sea. This conflict has continued and allegedly included a Chinese attack upon a Vietnamese naval vessel on 19 November, 1988 ("China denies attack....," 1988, p.10). One of the motivators for the renewed emphasis on territorial claims to the Spratlys may be economic. As one analyst noted,

"One quarter of China's foreign exchange is supplied through the sale of oil. Spring 1987 oceanographic surveys in the South China Sea by PRC research ships led to the announced discovery of an area in the Spratly Islands possibly rich in oil and gas reserves." (Greene, 1989, p.44)

Whether its mission expands into the South China Sea or remains oriented towards traditional coastal defense roles, the PLA Navy requires high technology trade to maintain its rate of modernization. Weapons platforms built during the 1980s utilized a vast array of western technology.

Just a sampling of this imported technology included:

- French DUUX-5 passive sonar systems-- used on the Han SSNs (Tracey, 1989, p.44);
- Litton of Canada APS-504(V)3 search radar-- used on a modified Yun-8 naval reconnaissance aircraft (Preston, 1989, p.75);
- G.E. LM-2500 gas-turbine engines-- intended for the new destroyers (Tracey, 1989, p.44); and
- Honeywell's Mk 46 ASW torpedo-- initially intended for eventual use on all Chinese frigates and destroyers (Tracey, 1989, p.44).

Although the Chinese have a limited capability of reproducing weapons systems supplied to them, the PLAN should be expected to support re-establishment of high technology trade in order to further their modernization. Recent reports indicate that high-technology trade sanctions may threaten the completion of their newest destroyers and frigates ("Chinese CMC debates....," 1989, p.1275). Lacking continued modernization, the aging blue-water assets of the PLAN should pose an increasingly limited threat.

From this perspective, the PLAN may be able to serve as a "liberalizing" influence to counter the hard-line elements in Beijing. However, the recent revolutions in Eastern Europe have only increased the hard-line position relative to the armed forces. According

to the People's Daily, following the Rumanian rebellion the Chief of the General Staff, Chi Haotian, rushed back from the provinces to join classes which stressed that "the party must exercise absolute control over the army." (Kristof, 1990, p.A16)

The final result of the conservative crackdown will determine the character of U.S.-P.R.C. relations. Should economic and political reforms rekindle, as they were allowed to do following both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, then strategic analysts should expect the eventual re-establishment of military liaisons and technical trade. Unfortunately, it is not at all certain that the ruling octogenarians are predetermined to re-establishing such reforms.

Indeed, the vast extent of the mass demonstrations indicates a widespread challenge to the legitimacy of the central government. The major reforms required to counter these challenges may require a new leadership more amiable to political compromise. Apart from a "Romanian reform", these new leaders will have to await the natural "retirement" of the venerable old guard.

Meanwhile, continued repression will constrain U.S. policy options towards the P.R.C. In his 20 June, 1989, White House statement announcing the suspension of high level government exchanges between the U.S. and the P.R.C., President Bush reiterated U.S. support for "the legitimate democratic aspirations for freedom of peoples throughout the world." ("What U.S. said.....," 1989, p.A9) As Ambassador Lord wrote,

"The current course is full of ambiguities and tough decisions. Our strategic imperative is to preserve a long-term relationship. Our moral imperative is to project our principles as we survive this cold season of suppression." (Lord, 1989, p.25)

Until the situation stabilizes, the U.S. government must balance the strategic and moral imperatives. In July, 1989, President Bush sent his National Security Advisor, General Scowcroft, to China "to impress upon the Chinese government the seriousness with which this incident was viewed in the U.S." (Maureen, 1989, p.A9) Similarly, in December 1989, General Scowcroft again visited China to brief its leadership on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Summit in Malta. According to his Press Secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, the

President "concluded that it is in the long-term interests of the United States to inform the Chinese leadership of his discussions with the Soviet leader." (Erlanger, 1989, p.A22) President Bush himself commented, "I don't want to see that China remains totally isolated." (Sciolino, 1989, p.A9) The administration must maintain cool but responsible communications with Beijing, thereby implicitly supporting the lower level bureaucrats, teachers, workers and students who still strive for political and economic reforms.

Meanwhile the modernization hopes of the PRC rest with the West. The United States and Japan are the two central players. Growing internal dysfunctions, both economically and politically, should prevent the Soviet Union from filling the high-technology void created following the imposition of sanctions in 1989. Although Japan has demonstrated its willingness to re-establish economic arrangements following the recent visit of General Scowcroft (Weisman, 1990, p.A5), high-technology sanctions remain the overwhelming motivator for a liberalization of governmental repressions.

3. The Republic of China

While international attention focuses upon power struggles within the PRC, the Republic of China (R.O.C.) has begun to reassess its previous assumptions regarding Beijing's modernizations. Taiwan is using its strengthened political and economic systems to support a renewed diplomatic effort directed at Third World countries. But beyond that, should the P.R.C.'s political and economic future be incompatible with U.S. national interests, a economically strong and politically legitimate government on Taiwan could become a major U.S. partner in Pacific security.

Since the 1972 Shanghai Communique, U.S. relations towards Taiwan have been irrevocably linked to its relationship with the P.R.C. In the Joint Communique issued at Shanghai on 27 February, 1972, the U.S. acknowledged:

"that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In

the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes" ("Text of Joint.....," 1972, pp.437-438)

Later, in the Joint Communiqué issued on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C., the U.S. stated its intent to "maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan."³⁷ In the United States' statement on the communiqué, the U.S. announced the termination of the U.S.-R.O.C. mutual defense treaty and reiterated its "interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves." (Snyder, Gregor, and Chang, 1980, p.102)

On April 10, 1979, the 96th Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act. The Act was created to "help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan..."³⁸ It declares:

"It is the policy of the United States-

(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan...

(2) to declare the peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargos, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and

(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." (Snyder, Gregor, and Chang, 1980, p. 104)

³⁷For the text of the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, January 1, 1979, see: (Snyder, Gregor, and Chang, 1980, p.101).

³⁸For the complete text of the Taiwan Relations Act see: (Snyder, Gregor, and Chang, 1980, p.104-111).

The Act further clarified that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability," and that "(t)he President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgement of the needs of Taiwan...." (Snyder, Gregor, and Chang, 1980, 105)

Finally, under the Taiwan Act, the American Institute in Taiwan was established to oversee "(n)rograms, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan...." (Snyder, Gregor, and Chang, 1980, p.107) Similarly, in order to protect Taiwan interests in the United States, the North American Institute was established in Washington, D.C..

On August 17, 1982, the United States and the P.R.C. issued a Joint Communique that clarified the U.S. position on arms sales to Taiwan. The Reagan Administration felt that removal of the arms question in U.S.-P.R.C. relations would "help to insure that both countries can continue to cooperate on mutually shared international objectives." ("U.S.-China Joint....," 1982, p.4) As John Holdridge, then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

"As we went into these negotiations we had two things in mind-- our historic obligations to the people of Taiwan and our important and growing relations with the People's Republic of China...

We undertook these discussions, therefore, with the hope that a formula should be found which would permit the continued growth of our relations with China, but also with the firm resolve that there were principles regarding the security of Taiwan which could not be compromised...

Let me summarize the essence of our understanding on this point: China has announced a fundamental policy of pursuing peaceful means to resolve the longstanding dispute between Taiwan and the mainland... While we have no reason to believe that China's policy will change, an inescapable corollary to these mutually interdependent policies is that should that happen, we will reassess ours. Our guiding principle is now and will continue to be that embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act: the maintenance of a self-defense capability sufficient to meet the military needs of Taiwan, but with the understanding that China's maintenance of a peaceful approach to the Taiwan question will permit gradual reductions in arms sales...." ("U.S.-China Joint....," 1982, pp.1-3)

In the Joint Communique, the U.S. reiterated "that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or

pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The U.S. stated that it "does not seek to carry out long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution."³⁹

In his official statement on the Joint Communiqué, President Reagan reiterated the U.S. position that:

"(t)he Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful." ("U.S.-China Joint....," 1982, p.3)

Although the Taiwan Act legalized the present U.S.-Taiwan relationship, the Shanghai Communiqué, the Communiqué on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, and the 1982 Joint Communiqué serve to define the limits of that relationship.

In summary, the United States:

- Supports the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese people (Shanghai Communiqué);
- Will view a settlement on other than peaceful terms with grave concern and will maintain the capability to resist any resort to force (Taiwan Act);
- Views the stability of the area as a security interest and supports that stability by providing defensive arms to Taiwan based solely on the needs of Taiwan (Taiwan Act);
- Recognizes that China's fundamental policy of peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue will permit the gradual reductions of arms sales to Taiwan (Joint Communiqué of 1982); and
- Has no intention of pursuing a two-China or one-China, one-Taiwan policy (Joint Communiqué of 1982).

³⁹For the complete text of the 1982 Joint Communiqué see: ("U.S.-China Joint....," 1982, p.2).

During the late 1980s it appeared that Deng's economic modernizations might bridge the ideological gap between the P.R.C. and Taiwan. Indeed, in 1988 the P.R.C. hosted over half a million visitors from Taiwan and two-way trade reached \$U.S. 2.4 billion (d'Antoine, 1990, p.41). The issue over the status of Taiwan seemed to take second place to increased economic and personal relations.

However, as a result of the June crackdown Taiwan officials reassessed their relationship with the P.R.C. Since June, plans for direct shipments between the two countries were put on hold and Taiwan has begun a diplomatic campaign to woo Third World countries (Kristof, 1989a, part IV p.2). With foreign exchange reserves of more than \$75 billion (second only to Japan), Taiwan has been able to use its riches to court smaller Third World countries (Kristof, 1989c, p.A6). This year four countries, the Bahamas, Grenada, Liberia, and Belize have recognized Taiwan as The Republic of China. Of course, no one is deceived by the relationship of the United States in these diplomatic discussions.

Taiwan has adopted a "flexible diplomacy" that allows dual recognition of both the P.R.C. and the R.O.C. Grenada, Liberia and Belize initially recognized the P.R.C. However, after each recognized Taiwan, the P.R.C. suspended diplomatic relations (Kristof, 1989c, p.A6). Each country anticipated that possibility and apparently considered it a small price to pay. According to one report, "Liberia is said to have received \$20m in aid from China in the past 12 years-- but \$140m from Taiwan last year for a highway project." Similarly, Belize "can now expect a timely \$10m in concessionary loans." ("Taiwan: We try....," 1989, p.34)

In addition to its economic strength, Taiwan is beginning to develop a truly democratic political system. In December, 1989, for the first time in 40 years elections were held with legal opposition candidates (Kristof, 1989b, p.A5). The opposition party concentrated on the top county and city posts, capturing 6 of 21 seats, with another seat

going to an independent candidate and the remaining 14 to the ruling Nationalist party. Although it was technically illegal for opposition candidates to oppose the governments position on Taiwan, according to reports "many opposition candidates did publicly endorse independence for Taiwan." (Kristof, 1989b, p.A5) Commenting on the election, U.S. Congressman Steven Solarz remarked, "What we've witnessed here today is a step forward for democracy." (Kristof, 1989b, p.A5)

As a responsible superpower the United States can not afford severed relations with the most populous country in the world. However, Taiwan is developing into a major player in East Asian politics and its economic strengths could support U.S. regional interests.⁴⁰ As the younger generation of political leaders emerge, their nationalistic identification with the island of Taiwan, especially in light of the examples within the P.R.C, may yet lead to a policy of one China, one Taiwan (Scalapino, 1985, p.127).

Taiwan's political stability as reflected in the recent elections, its economic strength from its growing industries, and its strategic advantages from its naval and air facilities justify closer U.S.-R.O.C. relations. As former R.O.C. Vice-Minister of Defense, Vadm. Tun-Hwa Ko (ret.), noted, "strengthening Taiwan's air force and navy will keep the collective sea lines of communication safe in the Bashi Channel and the Taiwan Strait." (Ko, 1985, p.279) In his view,

"The ROC would like to have the United States adopt the following policies to preserve mutual security interests in the Pacific Basin:

1. Keep the Taiwan Relations Act intact.
2. Make no further concessions to the PRC's demands concerning Taiwan.
3. Encourage informal, cooperative studies on such matters as lines of communication and naval cooperation in the Pacific Basin." (Ko, 1985, p.279)

A. James Gregor echoed similar views when he wrote, "In view of the balance of forces in the Far East, the U.S. decision concerning military sales to the R.O.C. should

⁴⁰For an example of some of the projects Taiwan is involved in in Southeast Asia, see: (Richardson, 1989, p.52).

turn not on what weapons Taipei needs to deter an attack from the communist mainland, but on those weapons required to play a role in a coordinated defense of the West Pacific sea-lanes of communication against a potential Soviet attack..." (Gregor, 1986, p.145) Although the threat of Soviet attack may have lessened, Taiwan assets could still be used to assist the U.S. Navy in its maritime patrol of the East Asian SLOCs.

Increased security cooperation with Taiwan will not necessarily violate U.S. policy. Joint ventures and maritime exercises do not violate either the Taiwan Act or the various Joint Communiques.

Ambassador Lord recently warned:

"It would be a serious mistake to tamper with the balanced U.S. approach, which has enjoyed broad bipartisan support and has worked so well. For us to shift toward a two-China, or a one-China, one-Taiwan policy could wreck our relations with the People's Republic of China... It would not find favor with the authorities in Taiwan who also subscribe to a one-China policy... any Beijing leader would be obligated to downgrade, perhaps severe, relations with Washington were there a fundamental U.S. shift on the Taiwan question. To anyone who grasps the long-term importance of Sino-American relations the case for maintaining our successful posture on Taiwan is irrefutable." (Lord, 1989, p.19)

Ambassador Lord's warning might be reexamined if new circumstances prevail on the Chinese mainland. Policymakers now might question how Sino-American relations might be improved by possible shifts in our current policy. If the crackdown in the P.R.C. continues, would not strengthened U.S. support for an economically stronger and increasingly democratic Taiwan serve as implicit support for the millions of repressed mainland Chinese? Should the "liberal" elements prevail within the P.R.C. and Taiwan eventually becomes a 'special economic zone' of mainland China, then our support will be viewed in retrospect to have benefited China as a whole. If an internal revolt overthrows the morally bankrupt communist system in China, then would not the new leaders be more open to countries (including the United States) who consistently demonstrated their opposition to the old hard-liners? Indeed, the warning against significant shifts in our Taiwan policies now should not blind us to the need to keep our options open for an uncertain future.

4. ASEAN⁴¹

The ASEAN countries have together undergone perhaps the greatest evolution in their perception of regional security requirements. During the past decade the ASEAN members have strengthened their defense forces and increased regional military cooperation. Until this year, the major security threat uniting these politically diverse countries was Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia. As the threat from Vietnam's occupation subsides, significant individual differences, such as mutual claims to the Spratly Islands or overlapping maritime zones,⁴² may undermine ASEAN unity. Indeed, Southeast Asia remains a potpourri of diverse political, ethnic and religious cultures whose only mutual interests seem to center on economic and political survival.

As reviewed earlier, under the 1954 Manila Pact the United States maintains bilateral security agreements with both the Philippines and Thailand. As Secretary Carlucci reiterated, in Thailand the U.S. is committed to "close security cooperation to deter any potential aggression." (Carlucci, 1989, p.31) The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia significantly increased Thailand's cooperation with the United States. Part of this cooperation included joint U.S.-Thai maritime exercises in the Gulf of Thailand.⁴³

With Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia, U.S.-Thai relations will undoubtedly center on trade issues. The United States is Thailand's largest market. However, the United States is wary of Japanese development of Thailand's manufacturing base.⁴⁴ Additionally, U.S. concern over its trade deficit with Thailand has sparked renewed calls for more open markets. Indeed, commenting on these concerns, U.S. Ambassador to

⁴¹The Association of Southeast Asian Nations include: The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei.

⁴²For example the Philippines and Malaysia have scheduled talks to discuss their conflicting maritime boundaries. See: ("Philippines and Malaysia....," 1989, p.12).

⁴³For example, a Feb. 1987 naval exercise included "some 18 ships, a U.S. submarine, and 43 aircraft." (Thomas, 1988, p.58).

⁴⁴"One such indication was a U.S. Commerce Department decision in March [1989] to impose a 20% duty on anti-friction ball bearings produced and exported from Thailand by Japanese electronics giant Minebea in retaliation for violating U.S. anti-subsidy and anti-dumping regulations." (Sricharatchanya, 1989, pp.32-33).

Thailand Daniel O'Donohue remarked that, "The problems are concrete, inevitably driven by a variety of circumstances, and they have to be addressed concretely." (Sricharatchanya, 1989, pp.32)

However, Thailand's Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, is maintaining a strong, nationalistic attitude towards U.S. relations. Indeed, his December, 1988, rejection of U.S. efforts to protect American designed computer software improved his domestic popularity (Sricharatchanya, 1989, pp.32). Thailand's growing independence is also reflected in its military arms diversification. From 1983 to 1987 the U.S. transferred \$800 million of arms to Thailand. During the same period Thailand purchased \$90 million of arms from the PRC.⁴⁵

Although Thai military leaders continue to support the U.S.-Thailand security alliance, some Thai analysts warn that Vietnam's withdrawal, combined with growing Thai-U.S. trade disputes, may undermine the alliance's utility to Bangkok (Sricharatchanya, 1989, pp.32). Perhaps Prime Minister Chatichai's former policy advisor, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, explained the growing friction best. He suggested that:

"The root cause of the problem is structural and it simply will not go away. Perhaps it requires some adjustment in both countries' perceptions of the other." (Sricharatchanya, 1989, pp.32)

The Philippines represent the largest regional dilemma for U.S. policymakers. Although the Philippines are home to U.S. bases, internal economic and political disarray has fed insurgencies that are threatening the stability of the Aquino government (Torregrosa, 1990, p.A11). While struggling to improve the economic situation, President Aquino must both counter the leftist insurgency and appease powerful rightist political forces within the military. In addition to balancing these internal forces, Ms. Aquino must also satiate American concerns over the future of the U.S. bases in the Philippines. As reviewed earlier, the U.S. views these bases as vital to its national interests. Vice-

⁴⁵These purchases reflect close Sino-Thai relations that developed during Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. The only other ASEAN member to purchase arms from a communist bloc country was Indonesia who received \$5 million of arms from the PRC during the same period. See: (World Military Expenditures..., 1989, p.112).

President Quayle recently remarked that, "Not only do (they) offer stability for the Philippines, but (they) also offer stability in the region." (Quayle, 1989b)

According to an amendment to the Military Basing Agreement (MBA),

"this agreement and agreed revisions thereof shall remain in force for a period of 25 years from September 16, 1966 after which, unless extended for a longer period by mutual agreement it shall become subject to termination upon one year's notice by either government." (Indorf, 1988, pp.25-26)

Thus, in 1991 either the U.S. or the Philippines can issue a one year notice and then in 1992 the leases would be terminated. Rather than waiting until 1991, the U.S. proposed, and the Ms. Aquino accepted, beginning base negotiations in 1989. These negotiations were postponed to 1990 following the sixth coup attempt.

There are many economic benefits to the basing agreement that may influence the Philippine government during the negotiations. In addition to direct U.S. economic and security assistance, which totalled approximately \$452.46 million in 1986, indirect bases-generated expenditures in 1986 were estimated by a report from the National Defense College of the Philippines to total \$2.4 billion. Additionally, American investments in 1986 totaled \$1.1 billion. The U.S. presence also supports 68,000 jobs. (Indorf, 1988, pp.25-26)

Despite these economic benefits, the long term status of the U.S. bases remains in question as internal opposition threatens the continued stability of the government and Presidential elections near. In February 1989, Philippine Vice-President Salvador Laurel supported the gradual phase out of U.S. bases ("Laurel calls for....," 1989, p.14). A year later, in the aftermath of the latest coup attempt, it is not at all certain how the Philippine government will approach the upcoming negotiations.

The Philippine government does not appear to perceive a mutual strategic benefit from these bases. Instead, they continue to talk in terms of the "rent" the U.S. will pay for staying at the bases. In 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz told Philippine Congressmen, "when the day comes that you don't want us here, but you are willing to

rent this area as bases, then we don't want to be here." (Indorf, 1988, p.27) Vice-President Quayle also supported this position when he remarked that, "Obviously, if the Philippines and the Philippine government does not want the United States to continue there, we will not continue there and will find other options." (Quayle, 1989b)

Based upon recent statements, the United States is not likely to develop similar long-term basing options in any of the other ASEAN countries. Responding to the Philippine government's complaints of shouldering the burden of U.S. troops alone, other ASEAN countries announced their willingness to either expand existing relationships or develop new ones. However, each of these proposals appear to be limited to offers of support facilities rather than actual basing initiatives.

On August 4, 1989, Singapore announced its willingness to accommodate some of the U.S. naval and air forces stationed in the Philippines. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, George Yeo, announced that feasibility studies, conducted in June, 1989, would be used as a basis for further discussions (Balakrishnan, 1989, p.12). According to a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman,

"No decision has been made yet as to which of the facilities, reviewed by the site survey team of US military experts, Singapore might provide and the US might use... Singapore is viewed by the US military in light of its own strategic significance and with no regard to the situation in the Philippines." ("Whistling up a....," 1989, p.9)

Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Mohamad opposes US bases in Singapore. Such permanent bases would counter long standing political desires to develop a Zone of Peace and Neutrality. According to Mahathir, "Malaysia is not against the American military using facilities in Singapore for supplies and repairing of warships and planes, but is opposed to the idea of a permanent base." ("Whistling up a....," 1989, p.9) Indeed, according to Mahathir, Malaysia itself is willing to provide repair and support facilities for US forces. It is only the permanent bases which are objectionable ("Malaysia offers military....," 1989, p.14).

Indonesia is privately opposed to U.S. bases in Singapore. According to reports, Indonesia is concerned that its failure to oppose a US presence "would tarnish the countries non-aligned credentials as it lobbies for chairmanship of the movement in 1992." ("Whistling up a....," 1989, p.10)

However, these statements do not imply that the ASEAN countries are disinterested in security issues. On the contrary, during the past ten years ASEAN regional military cooperation has significantly increased. For example, there has been growing cooperation between Singapore and its neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia. On March 16, 1989, Singapore and Malaysia announced they would conduct joint infantry training. One week later Singapore and Indonesia signed an agreement on ground forces training (Vatikiotis and Baladrishnan, 1989, p.29).

Furthermore, Malaysia has significantly increased its military in response to growing concerns over China's role in Southeast Asia.⁴⁶ Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Abu Hassan Omar has even suggested that ASEAN establish a "defense arrangement to ensure that the region is safe from foreign threats." (Cheung, 1989b, p.30) According to reports, he does not envision a "formal military alliance", rather, "[the] defense accord among member countries will be an extension of the joint military exercises we have now." (Cheung, 1989b, p.30) Although the Chief of the Malaysian Defense Forces, Gen. Hashim, supports bilateral security agreements, he warned that "a regional defense pact creates more problems than it is intended to solve, including the fact that someone will attempt to dominate such an arrangement." (Cheung, 1989b, p.30)

The above debates demonstrate the significant difficulties that will be encountered when identifying mutual strategic benefits from a U.S. naval presence in Southeast Asia. Economic and political factors may out way any unofficial support for a continued U.S. presence.

⁴⁶According to the Malaysian Chief of Defense forces, Gen. Tan Sri Hashim Mohamed Ali, the March 1988 clash in the Spratlys between Chinese and Vietnamese warships reoriented Malaysian defense priorities in the area from "secondary to very much top priority." (Cheung, 1989b, p.30).

5. Australasia

In Australasia, regional developments have significantly altered the strategic landscape during the 1980s. The evolution of anti-nuclear forces in New Zealand led to its suspension from the ANZUS alliance. The South Pacific Forum, (Australia, New Zealand and Independent South Pacific Island nations), established the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Finally, Australia's recent economic initiatives may provide insight into potential hurdles that face development of any mutually beneficial security arrangement in the Far East.

As reviewed earlier, New Zealand's 1985 challenge to the United States' NCND policy led to its suspension from the ANZUS treaty. As a result of this suspension, New Zealand's access to U.S. intelligence information has been sharply reduced; its weapons procurement preferences removed; and its access to U.S. officials above the Assistant Secretary level has been denied ("Regional Security Developments....," 1989, p.3).

New Zealand's defense priorities now emphasize only regional issues. In February 1987, a New Zealand defense policy paper established these priorities as:

- policing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around New Zealand (the fourth largest in the world) and, with Australia, the EEZs around Pacific island states;
- close cooperation with Australia;
- assertion of New Zealand's interests in the Antarctic; and
- protection of its long sea-trade routes. (James, 1989, p.12)

New Zealand's regional orientation has resulted in a much closer alignment with Australia and the Oceania countries. Indeed, from 1987-88 New Zealand provided US\$39.9 million in assistance to regional states ("Regional Security Developments....," 1989, p.28). Although it has maintained its membership in the Five Powers' Defense Agreement, New Zealand has withdrawn its infantry battalion from Singapore in

recognition of its new priorities.⁴⁷ Additionally, New Zealand has agreed to purchase two Australian-built frigates to assist in its expanded maritime obligations ("New Zealand agrees....," 1989, p.18). The government has countered domestic criticism of the purchase by explaining how the new frigates will both increase domestic employment during construction and meet Defense Ministry goals when operational.⁴⁸ These goals are:

"to operate independently, though more probably in concert with Australia, to preserve security and to counter low-level contingencies in the area of direct strategic concern- the South Pacific, Australia, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica." (James, 1989, p.12)

This strategic area includes the territories of the South Pacific Forum. Although the Forum represents a politically diverse group,⁴⁹ united opposition against both the dumping of nuclear waste and French nuclear testing at the Mururoa Atoll, eventually lead to the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ).⁵⁰ Under the major Articles of the Treaty, each party undertakes:

- not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device... (Art. 3);
- to support the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system. (Art. 4);
- to prevent in its territory (and not to assist or encourage) the testing of any nuclear explosive device. (Art. 6); and,
- to prevent the dumping of radioactive wastes in its territorial waters. (Art. 7).⁵¹

Recognizing that the United States was already a party to three other nuclear-free zones, Australian delegates ensured that the wording of SPNFZ was consistent with these

⁴⁷Other members of the Five Power Defense Agreement are the United Kingdom, Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore. ("Regional Security Developments....," 1989, p.16)

⁴⁸With a projected cost of US\$58.9 million a year for eight years, this purchase has been opposed by the same peace groups who initially helped propel the Labour Government into power (James, 1989, p.12).

⁴⁹"At one pole is left-neutralist Vanuatu, which has barred United States visits since 1982, recognized Cuba, and joined the Non-aligned movement. At the other end is Tonga, which... did not support any free-zone until the 1985 forum conference, in the belief that anti-nuclear schemes were unnecessary and would only feed anti-American opinion... Kiribati, New Zealand, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea cluster towards the "radical" end, while the other members- including Australia- fall between them and the "conservative" pole." (Power, 1986, pp.464-465).

⁵⁰The idea of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone is not new and dates back to the 1960s and the Australian Labour Party's objections to French Atmospheric testing. For an excellent review of the events leading up to the SPNFZ see: (Disarmament, 1986, Chapter 16).

⁵¹For a copy of the SPNFZ see: ("Documentation: South Pacific....," 1987, pp.263-265).

previous treaties.⁵² Therefore, under Article 5, although each Party "undertakes to prevent in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device," a provision is included that allows each party to decide for itself "whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in the territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage or transit passage of straits." ("Documentation: South Pacific....," 1987, p.264)

Despite initially positive signals regarding SPNFZ,⁵³ the Reagan Administration decided not to sign the Treaty. According to a recent U.S. Congressional Report:

"The U.S. position at that time (and for that matter, today) is that the treaty does not directly affect U.S. military operations in the South Pacific. The Reagan administration... assessed that acceding to a nuclear-free zone arrangement could cause similar and more restrictive proposals to be advanced elsewhere, threatening the system of nuclear deterrence." ("Regional Security Developments....," 1989, p.21)⁵⁴

⁵²The August 1960 Antarctic Treaty prohibits "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type weapons [south of 60° South Latitude]." See: (ARMS, 1982, p. 22).

The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (The Seabed Treaty) was ratified by the U.S. Senate in February 1972 and entered into force May 18, 1972. Under Article I of the Treaty, the U.S. may not "implant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond (12 miles from land) any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons." Note: This prohibition does not cover submarine operations. (ARMS, 1982, p. 102)

The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), prohibits the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America. The Treaty prohibits the U.S. from testing, storing or manufacturing nuclear weapons on U.S. territories. (These territories presently include: Guantanamo Navy Base, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.) Although Protocol II was ratified by the United States in May 1971, Protocol I was not ratified until November 1981. Under Protocol I, Article 1, the U.S. agrees to "apply the statutes of denuclearization... in territories for which, *de jure* or *de facto*, they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in (the) Treaty." (ARMS, 1982, p. 76) The U.S. added understandings reemphasizing its right to transport nuclear weapons and warned that "an attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty." (ARMS, 1982, p. 62)

⁵³According to Power, "After the free-zone norms became known in 1984, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., then American Pacific forces commander, said that the United States would probably not find anything objectionable in a South Pacific free-zone. Shortly before the (SPNFZ) emerged, Secretary of State Shultz commented during a Pacific trip that he thought the treaty was carefully drafted." (Power, 1986, pp.471-2)

⁵⁴Comments in parenthesis part of original text.

The report recommended "not (endorsing) the concept of accession at this time, particularly in view of our finding that U.S. interests in the South Pacific are not suffering in an acute way from failure to accede to the treaty." ("Regional Security Developments....," 1989, p.26)

Thus the U.S. decision not to sign the SPNFZ Treaty reflects its concern over the possible spread of similar initiatives into other regions, and an implied recognition of the South Pacific's strategic stability.

U.S. concern over the possible spread of nuclear free zones into other regions is justified by previous Malaysian and Indonesian efforts to establish a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Although the South Pacific region is important to the United States for its alternative sea lines of communication or as a possible alternative to its Philippine bases, Southeast Asian sea lanes are vital to the economic stability of the United States and its allies. The establishment of a SEANWFZ would severely threaten the U.S. Navy's ability to protect these vital sea lanes and threaten the U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence.

Fortunately, ASEAN concern with the Cambodian situation eclipsed efforts to establish a SEANWFZ during the 1980s (Alagappa, 1987, p.173). U.S. security agreements with the Philippines and Thailand, combined with the need for ASEAN unity, should prevent the establishment of a restrictive SEANWFZ in the near future. However, with the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and the changing international environment, the United States can not afford to suggest that it now approves of nuclear-free zones. Therefore, it would be unwise for the U.S. to reconsider signing the SPNFZ Treaty least a mixed signal be sent to those ASEAN members still interested in pursuing a SEANWFZ.

Unlike the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, which encompasses an area with a relatively high potential for superpower conflict, SPNFZ is little more than a recognition of the status quo. Indeed, the Congressional Study found that, "the islanders tend to assert

that there is no major power security threat in the region and that what is needed for stability is simply the economic means to guarantee reasonable levels of sufficiency."⁵⁵

Thus, the island nations perceive their greatest problem to be economic development.⁵⁶ As reviewed earlier, one of the region's greatest economic assets is its abundance of tuna. The director of the South Pacific Forum's Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Philip Muller, is encouraging all degrees of competition for the catch- including Japan, Taiwan and the Soviet Union. He recently remarked that,

"What was inconceivable two or three years ago, is now reality. If the Soviets had not come, we would in large measure be at the mercy of the Asian fishermen. We want a fair return for our resource, and we don't want to miss a commercial opportunity." (Walls, 1989, p.31)

The United States' 1987 tuna fishing pact has helped to improve U.S. relations within the region. Under the agreement, the U.S. will pay \$50 million over five years plus an annual fee of \$250,000 (Addison, 1989, p.25). This agreement, combined with a projected \$6.5 million development assistance program for FY90 ("Regional Security Developments....," 1989, p.24), should counter any negative repercussions from the U.S. decision not to sign the SPNFZ. Another method of maintaining positive relations involve increased U.S. naval humanitarian assistance visits.⁵⁷ By coordinating these visits with regional needs, the U.S. Navy can help to maintain the "strategic" stability of the region.

Undoubtedly, the United States' most important partner in the Australasian region, both economically and strategically, is Australia. Although its defense priorities emphasis self-reliance, Australia nonetheless maintains a firm commitment to ANZUS. Australia's present defense policy was initially formulated in response to Britain's

⁵⁵Indeed, limited natural resources, (most rely upon primary production from copra, sugar or fish), plus vast distances between islands, and an underdeveloped transportation and communications networks, have all tended to perpetuate a dependency on foreign aid ("Regional Security Developments....," 1989, p.12).

⁵⁶Indeed, "the region is already the largest recipient of external assistance on a per capita basis." (Mediansky, 1988, p.288)

⁵⁷This concept is reflected in "Regional Security Developments in the South Pacific," p.27, and was suggested during the author's interview with Dr. Dora Alves at the National Defense University, 7 Sept. 1989.

withdrawal from "east of the Suez" and President Nixon's Guam Doctrine.⁵⁸ As Australia witnessed the gradual disengagement of superpower regional commitment, it responded by developing a defense force whose emphasis was one of "self-reliance." However, as the Defense White Paper of 19 March 1987 clearly established:

"Australia is part of the Western community of nations. Australia therefore supports the ability of the United States to retain an effective strategic balance with the Soviet Union. A redistribution of power in favour of the Soviet Union in the central balance, or an extension of Soviet influence in our region at the expense of the United States, would be a matter of fundamental concern to Australia, and would be contrary to our national interests." (Mediansky, 1987, p.158)

Australian strategic support centers on the maintenance of its Joint Facilities. According to a 1986 report by the Australian Parliament's Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, these facilities include:

North West Cape-- this facility provides "communications to submarines and surface ships of the United States and allied navies including U.S. attack submarines on patrol in the Indian and Pacific Oceans... The importance of these roles seems to be decreasing with the introduction of alternative means of communication between U.S. command authorities and its SSBN fleet." (Disarmament, 1986, p.465)

Nurrungar-- "The Joint Defence Space Communications Station at Nurrungar forms part of the U.S. satellite-based Defense Support Program (DSP)... [to] provide early warning to the United States of Soviet ballistic missile launches... The importance of Nurrungar's contribution to America's early warning and assessment capabilities is decreasing with the deployment by the United States of new technologies..." (Disarmament, 1986, p.465)

Pine Gap-- "The Joint Defence Space Research Facility at Pine Gap is part of the United States' satellite intelligence monitoring network which... can be used for a variety of purposes: to monitor compliance with arms control treaties; to provide early warning of a potential adversary's actions or intentions; for operational planning purposes; or to monitor existing operations-either conventional or nuclear." (Disarmament, 1986, p.466)

"Other Facilities"-- "There are a number of other facilities located throughout Australia which make some contribution to the United States strategic posture. These include the Omega navigation station in Victoria..., the Tranet satellite earth station in South Australia and the satellite ground station at Watsonia which is part of the U.S. Defense Satellite Communications System Network and links the Australian Defence Signals Directorate in Melbourne to the National Security Agency, the CIA and the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center...." (Disarmament, 1986, p.466)

Although some critics feel these facilities might involve Australia in a superpower conflict, according to the Committee, "(t)he Government considers that the risk of being attacked with nuclear weapons is small and that it is more than outweighed by the

⁵⁸For an excellent review of the evolution of Australia's defense policy see: (Mediansky, 1987, p.156).

contribution the facilities make to global stability through verification of arms control agreements and the maintenance of deterrence." (Disarmament, 1986, p.467) Indeed, the Committee concluded that:

"A decision to close down the facilities would not be supported by the Australian population at large. The Australian electorate sees the hosting of the facilities as a legitimate and necessary commitment arising from the ANZUS alliance and our continued support for the Western Alliance." And that "The facilities operate under the joint control of the two governments and therefore provide benefits to both sides as well as the Western alliance generally." (Disarmament, 1986, p.470,473)

Australian defense forces are oriented towards regional threats as opposed to global superpower type crises. In the past their perceptions of regional threats were sometimes at odds with the United States. For example, in a March 1987 comment on the Soviet involvement in Vietnam, Defense Minister Beasley remarked that:

"the US simply doesn't see it our way. They see it primarily in military terms. We see it as a serious political problem, as a serious political threat." (Mediansky, 1988, p.159)

In the past this "self-reliant" attitude has caused some concern from U.S. policymakers.⁵⁹ However, with the recent changes in the international environment, U.S. defense priorities should begin emphasizing low or mid-intensity type conflicts. Thus U.S. and Australian priorities will become more similar and may allow for mutual cooperation in an expanded regional security relationship.

B. THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS

1. Asia-Pacific Cooperation

Although some regional specific arrangements have developed in East Asia since World War II--including ANZUS, SEATO and ASEAN--no single arrangement has united all the free nations of East Asia and the Pacific.

However, economic interdependence is beginning to bring these countries together. The Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) is a privately managed

⁵⁹Indeed, in 1985 then U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger remarked that although a nation's territorial defense must be "one of the first priorities of any country... there are times in which defense can best be accompanied by actions farther from home than directly on the beach, so to speak." (Mediansky, 1988, p.157).

group that was founded to further trade among the nations of the Pacific Rim.⁶⁰ This concept has recently been expanded to the official level by Australia's recommendation for an Asia-Pacific Cooperation (APC). First proposed by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke in January, 1989, the organization will seek regional cooperation and promote free trade (Aznam, 1989, p.10).

The APC is important for its lessons in regional political cooperation. For example, the original proposal did not envision U.S. or Canadian participation. According to Hawke's special envoy, Department of Foreign Affairs chief Richard Woolcot, "differing degrees of support" were reflected from the original core group.⁶¹ Although Australian officials acknowledged that Japan was insistent on U.S. inclusion, "certain Thai and Malaysian leaders expressed concern about a dominating U.S. being included." ("Unspecific Pacific: Canberra's....," 1989, p.20) In the end, however, Woolcot found ASEAN members preferred U.S. and Canadian participation and, following the July, 1989, ASEAN post-ministerial conference, it was announced they would receive invitations (Aznam, 1989, p.10). Nonetheless, this initial concern over U.S. dominance of an *economic* arrangement would certainly be significantly greater when considering a possible *security* proposal.

In addition to their reservations over U.S. dominance, some members were concerned over political perceptions. According to reports from the July, 1989, ASEAN meeting, Malaysian and Indonesian concerns regarding their "non-aligned" status made it difficult "to justify the inclusion of South Korea but not North Korea." (Aznam, 1989, p.11). These questions are also likely to be raised regarding the status of Vietnam, China, and Taiwan. If these non-aligned nations are concerned over the perceptions of an

⁶⁰Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira proposed establishing the PECC in January 1981 to include Japan, Australia, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, the ASEAN members, and the South Pacific islands. See: (Fukushima, 1988, p.83).

⁶¹This included Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN, and the Australasian countries. See: ("Unspecific Pacific: Canberra's....," 1989, p.20).

"economic" alignment, is it even realistic to consider their inclusion in a region security arrangement?

Finally, global reaction was initially against the APC. This was reflected in EC Commissioner Juan Abel Matutes' remark that. "We cannot accept a forum of this kind, in which 50% of our external trade would be discussed [but] in which the community would not participate." (Aznam, 1989, p.10). U.S. policymakers interested in promoting some sort of regional security arrangement in the Far East will gain great insight into future hurdles by analyzing the developing political interrelationships in the APC.

2. India

One country whose changing attitude may be directly influenced by the U.S. Navy's future role in East Asia is India. India is developing significant "blue water" naval capabilities and may be more than willing to fill any "power vacuum" created by a future withdrawal of U.S. naval forces in the Far East.

India has become a South Asian power who may soon feel a need to become involved in the East Asian strategic calculus. Its fleet includes two World War II era aircraft carriers and 14 submarines, including a leased Soviet nuclear powered Charlie class submarine (Cheung, 1989c, p.16). Although Indian Defense Minister K. C. Pant claims that "All India is doing is strengthening its defences to take care of its security requirements which it cannot avoid," some Indian analysts believe that India's strategic cooperation "will extend to ASEAN and Southeast Asian neighbors, such as Burma, Indonesia and Vietnam, to help check Chinese encroachment into that region." (Cheung, 1989c, p.17)

Although an analysis of India is beyond the scope of this paper, it is obvious that India's status as an East Asian maritime power could significantly improve should the U.S. Navy's presence eventually decrease. This possibility must be anticipated when searching for solutions to regional security concerns.

3. Common Interests in Regional Security

In his 1987 article "A Peacetime Strategy for the Pacific," the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Adm. James Lyons, wrote that:

"Given the great diversity of the region, such an arrangement [as NATO] is not practical, nor do I believe necessary. A more dynamic and flexible strategy, recognizing regional diversity, is required in the Pacific. Make no mistake, however, it is a coalition strategy that is required." (Lyons, 1987b, p.44)

As regional perceptions change, has this observation remained valid? As national priorities continue to turn from security threats to economic cooperation, can the U.S. Navy be used to both protect its own national interests and fulfill common regional concerns?

The conclusion will balance the wide range of political and economic issues developed in this chapter with the evolving Soviet threat and the changing international environment. An analysis of this balance will demonstrate that Adm. Lyons' observation is even more valid today. Regional interest in economic issues demands increased cooperation in a maritime arrangement that ensures uninhibited access to East Asia's vital sea lanes without encroaching on individual national sovereignties.

VI. CONCLUSION

"We must never forget that security cannot be divorced from politics. Security relationships can only flourish where there are shared political values and institutions. Therefore, *the fostering of long-term democratic development in Asia and the Pacific must be seen as a central objective of our approach to collective security.*" (Quayle, 1989a, p.611)

[Vice-President Quayle]

Although Soviet foreign policy initiatives demonstrate an intent to downgrade its military threat, the Soviet Union nonetheless maintains the capability to threaten U.S. regional interests. Soviet military reductions are being used to produce a leaner and more efficient combat force. Soviet numerical strength coupled with an increasingly volatile domestic situation demands continued vigilance even as rational expectations of conflicts diminish. Therefore, the United States must determine a strategy that maintains a credible deterrent to future Soviet aggression without unnecessarily burdening the U.S. taxpayer.

Absent the Soviet threat, potential low-intensity crises range from terrorist actions to the proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. The United States must work on an equal footing with regional actors to develop mutually beneficial strategies that counter the full spectrum of possible crises. By developing peacetime strategies to counter common threats, the United States will maintain its regional credibility without threatening individual sovereignties. This framework could then be used to assist in periodic mid-to-high intensity conflicts.

The United States must maintain a capability to counter a global threat. That capability itself serves as a deterrent.

Due to its "island" nature the United States requires maritime forces to counter such a global threat. As Adm. Trost explained in his speech at the Leningrad Naval School,

"Geographic reality is such that many of our allies and trading partners are located on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. If the United States is to effectively participate in mutual defense of our own and our allies' interests, it is imperative that we have forces deployed close to regions of potential conflict." (Trost, 1990, p.163)

As the United States strives to promote the internal political stability and economic development of Asian nations, its successes may themselves undermine the U.S. policy of forward deployment. Rising Asian nationalism questions the need for forward deployed forces stationed within regional states. Rather than resenting such sentiment, the United States should acknowledge it for what it is--a reflection of American foreign policy successes. Although the nature of that deployment may change, it will not deny the value of maintaining a forward presence.

Policymakers should welcome the changing world dynamics and develop new strategies to balance the new circumstances. Rather than emphasizing *forward deployment* of ground and air forces, U.S. policy should overlap a periodic *forward presence* with increased emphasis on regional states. U.S. maritime assets could be deployed to regions of "potential conflict" to underscore U.S. commitment and maintain a credible deterrence. Such a presence could further serve as a stabilizing element in politically diverse areas such as Southeast Asia.

Forward presence via maritime assets would not jeopardize U.S. global responsibilities. Indeed, U.S. naval assets would allow for a reasonable power projection capability in time of crisis, yet would meet fiscal constraints during peacetime through a scaling down of deployed assets. Naval assets would continue to be supplied through regional repair and support facilities (such as Singapore). U.S. naval warfighting capability would be maintained through coordinated battlegroup and amphibious exercises.

At the same time, increased responsibility for local affairs must be relegated to regional economic and political "successes." For example, a gradual, phased, and coordinated assumption of responsibility by the South Korean military would allow forward deployed U.S. forces in Korea to be re-assigned. Periodic military exercises would maintain combat coordination between U.S. and Korean forces. An upgraded U.S. sealift capability would ensure the ability to deploy army assets if needed.

Similarly, a regional maritime organization could maintain open SLOCs for the promotion of free trade. Such an organization of regional states would have common interests in maintaining open trade routes to promote their individual economic development. As an equal partner, the United States would work with regional nations to coordinate individual responsibilities. Solely oriented towards freedom of navigation in international waters, the organization would not threaten any individual sovereignty. Indeed, it could be used to counter regional concerns such as the drug trade or piracy. It would bring together Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries, Australia and New Zealand in a regional effort to promote a common interest. This regional cooperation could promote regional stability.

A final area in which the U.S. Navy can be used promote regional stability is through an upgraded port visit program. In an effort to promote less economically developed nations, the Navy should establish a humanitarian visit program for the South Pacific Islands. A single office, perhaps under CINCPAC, could liaison with the State Department and the U.S. Army to coordinate port visits to complement planned or ongoing programs. Such a simple program could significantly enhance goodwill towards the United States while furthering the economic and political development of regional states.

Unquestionably, the international environment of East Asia and the Pacific is undergoing dynamic change. To ensure the protection of the United States' national interests, our strategies must adapt to this changing environment. They must reflect common U.S. and regional interests and allow appropriate roles for America's friends and allies. Clearly, as the United States enters the 1990s its strategy of forward deployment must be replaced by one of forward presence.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Addison, Paul, "Fishing for Praise: Japan appears to soften its stance on tuna access," Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 May 1989.

Alagappa, Muthiah, "A Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," Australian Outlook, December 1987.

"America, Asia and Europe: The pleasures of three-part harmony," The Economist, 24 December 1988.

Apple, R.W., "President says moment has come to fix each force at 225,000," The New York Times, 1 February 1990.

Armitage, Richard L., "Preparing the United States for 'The Pacific Century'," News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), presented to the World Affairs Council in Washington D.C., 12 July 1988.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations, (ARMS), (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Washington, D.C., 1982).

Asadorov, Col., "Soviet Naval Commander on Pacific Exercise: Interview of Vice Admiral Zubov," Moscow International Service, in Mandarin 10 Jul 89, translated in FBIS-(SOVIET), 24 July 1989.

Aznam, Suhaini, "Pacific Possibilities: ASEAN warily agrees to discuss Australian trade proposal," Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 1989.

"Back in the Deep Freeze," The Economist, 13 May 1989.

Balakrishnan, N., "Base motives: Malaysian disapproval may scupper U.S. facilities plan," Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 August 1989.

Bilveer, S., "Gorbachev's Peace Offensive and Soviet Military Policy," Asian Defense, August 1989.

Blechman, Barry M., The Control of Naval Armaments, Prospects and Possibilities, (Brookings Institute: Washington D.C., 1974).

Camilleri, Joe, "Arms Control and the Indian Ocean," in The Future of Arms Control, ed. Desmond Ball and Andrew Mack (Pergamon Press, 1987).

Carlucci, Frank, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990, Washington, D.C., 1989.

Chanda, Nayan, "A dispersion of power," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 March 89.

Chernavin, V.N., "Chernavin Responds," U.S. Naval Proceedings, February 1989.

Cheung, Tai Ming, "Buying British First: Accord on arms deal due soon," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 June 1989.

Cheung, Tai Ming, "Command of the Seas: Asian naval expansion contains potential for conflict," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 July 1989.

Cheung, Tai Ming, "No 2-- Challenge to US and Soviet interests in Asia," Pacific Defence Reporter: Annual Reference Edition, January 1989.

"China denies attack on Vietnamese ship," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 December 1988.

"Chinese CMC debates PLA changes," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 December 1989.

Clifford, Mark and Shim Jae Hoon, "Welcome wears thin: growing calls for US withdrawal alarms Seoul," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 July 1989.

"Comments on USSR Far East Troops," Kyodo, 19 July 1989, reprinted by FBIS-(SOVIET), 21 July 1989.

d'Antoine, Henri, "China: The great leap backwards," Pacific Defence Reporter: 1990 Annual Reference Edition, January 1990.

Delfs, Robert, "Delicate Dialogue: Washington and Pyongyang hold first talks," Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1989.

Department of State Bulletin, November 1987.

Diah, B.M., "Answers by M.S. Gorbachev to Questions from the Indonesian Newspaper Merdeka," reprinted in Pravda, in Russian 23 July 1987, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 23 July 1987.

Disarmament and Arms Control in the Nuclear Age, [Disarmament] (Report from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense of The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia; Canberra, 1986).

"Dismantling of Subic, Cam Ranh Bases Sought," Radio broadcast from Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, 4 April 1989, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 10 April 1989.

Dmitrikov, "Interview with Vice Adm. Korniyenko," Sovetskaya Litva, in Russian 26 October 1988, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 11 January 1989.

"Documentation: South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty," Survival, May/June 1987.

Dowd, Maureen, "Two U.S. Officials Went to Beijing Secretly in July," The New York Times, 19 December 1989.

DuBois, Jean V. "New Directions in Chinese Strategy," International Defense Review, November 1989.

Erlanger, Steve, "Top Aides to Bush are Visiting China to Mend Relations," The New York Times, 10 December 1989.

Erlanger, Steve, "Vietnamese Force Helping Cambodia, Diplomats Assert," The New York Times, 23 February 1990.

Fairbank, John King, The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985, (Harper and Row: New York, 1987).

"Flying the Motherland's Ensign. 31 July Is Soviet Navy Day," TRUD, in Russian 31 July 1988, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 5 August 1988.

Foley, Adm. S.R., "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," U. S. Naval Proceedings, August 1985.

"For the sake of peace and security," Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian 30 Apr 88, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 2 May 1988.

"Force Projection: China looks well beyond coastal waters," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 July 1989.

Friedman, Thomas L., "Baker Announces NATO Agreement on Aircraft cuts," The New York Times, 13 July 1989.

Friedman, Tomas L., "Moscow Accepts U.S. Advantage of 30,000 Soldiers Accross Europe," The New York Times, 14 February 1990.

Fukushima, Yasuto, "A Soviet Concept of an All-Asian Security and Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference," Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000: The 1987 Pacific Symposium, ed. Dora Alves, (National Defense University Press; Washington D.C., 1988).

Furumoto, "Arms Delegate Links Reductions to Naval Forces," Tokyo Shimbun, in Japanese 10 March 1989, translated in FBIS-(SOVIET), 5 April 1989.

Furumoto, Tokyo Shimbun, in Japanese 25 October 1988, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET) 20 December 1988.

Garthoff, Raymond L., "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1988.

"Gorbachev casts his net again," The Economist, 24 September 1988.

Gorbachev, Mikhail, "'Rivalry into sensible competition', delivered before the United Nations," 7 December 1988; rpt in Vital Speeches of the Day, December 1988.

Gorbachev, Mikhail, "Gorbachev 28 July Speech in Vladivostok," Moscow Television Service, in Russian 28 July 1986, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 29 July 1986.

Gorbachev, Mikhail, "Gorbachev CPSU Central Committee Political Report," Moscow Television Service, in Russian 25 February 1986, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 26 February 1986. (Presented at the 27th CPSU Congress).

Gorbachev, Mikhail, "M. S. Gorbachev's Speech," Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian 22 May 1985, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 22 May 1985.

Gorbachev, Mikhail, "Speech by M.S. Gorbachev at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing," Moscow Television Service, in Russian 17 May 1989, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 17 May 1989.

Gordon, Michael R., "Soviets Scale Back Naval Deployments and Large Exercises," The New York Times, 17 July 1988.

Gordon, Michael R., "U.S. Places Priority on Cuts in Troops, not Missiles," The New York Times, 19 June 1989.

Gordon, Michael R., "Soviets Said to Withdraw Fighters and Bombers from Vietnam Base," The New York Times, 19 January 1990.

Gordon, Michael R., "Discount Soviet Peril to Iran, Cheney tells his Strategists," The New York Times, 7 February 1990.

Gordon, Michael R., "U.S. and Soviets Appear to Agree on Main Elements of Arms Treaty," The New York Times, 11 February 1990.

Gorshkov, Adm. S.G., Sea Power of the State, 2nd edition, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979).

Greene, Dr. Dorian D., "Chinese Strategy in the South China Sea," Defense and Foreign Affairs, October/November 1988.

Gregor, A. James, The China Connection: U.S. Policy and the People's Republic of China, (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986).

Hahn, Bradley, "China: Third ranking maritime power-- and growing," Pacific Defence Reporter, October 1988.

Halloran, Richard, "U.S. Considers the Once Unthinkable on Korea," The New York Times, 13 July 1989.

Hansen, James, "Moscow Looks East- Part I," National Defense, October 1987.

Hansen, James, "Moscow Looks East-- Part II," National Defense, November 1987.

Harding, Harry, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao. (The Brookings Institute: Washington D.C, 1987).

Heller, Mikhail, and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia and Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, (Summit Books: New York, 1986).

Hill, Radm. J.R., Arms Control at Sea, (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 1989).

Indorf, Hans H., "The 1988 Philippine Base Review," Asian Affairs, Spring 1988.

"Interview with Adm. Chernavin," in Rabochaya Gazeta, in Russian 31 July 1988, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET) 18 November 1988.

Jacobs, G., "Growth in strength of Soviet Pacific Fleet," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 July 1989.

James, Colin, "Naval manoeuvres: Government faces opposition to plans for new frigates," Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 March 1989.

"Japan and America: Born to be wed," The Economist, 4 February 1989.

"Japan Arms Build-up Not Deterred by Detente," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 June 1989.

"Japan, USSR Conclude Salmon Fishing Pact," Kyodo, 29 April 1989, reprinted by FBIS-(SOVIET), 1 May 1989.

Jencks, Harlan W. and David M. McDonald, "Shipbuilding Capability of the People's Republic of China and its Relevance for Growing Navies," Defence Asia-Pacific, March 1988.

Kamiya, Antonio, "Soviet, Japanese Officials Clash in Treaty Talks," Kyodo, 29 April 1989, reprinted by FBIS-(SOVIET), 1 May 1989.

Kamiya, Fuji, "The Northern Territories: 130 Years of Japanese Talks with Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union," Soviet Policy in East Asia, ed. Donald Zagoria, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

Kato, M., "USSR Initiatives Should Be Studied," Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian 25 November 1988, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 6 March 1989.

"Katushev, Philippine Minister Sign Trade Pact," TASS, 15 Mar 89, in FBIS-(SOVIET), 15 March 1989.

Kerdphol, Saiyud, "A Thai Perspective," in Security of the Sea Lanes of Asia, Report from the International Security Council, (International Seminar Series: Vol. XXVI, February 1987).

"Kim Dae Jung supports US troop withdrawal," Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 June 1989.

Kime, Capt. Steve F., "War and Politics in the USSR," Strategic Review, Fall 1987.

Kimura, Hiroshi, "Soviet Focus on the Pacific," Problems of Communism, May-June 1987.

Ko, Adm. Tun-Hwa, "The Interests and Policies of the Republic of China," in National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin, ed. Claude A. Buss, (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985).

Kristof, Nicholas D., "How Taiwan Wins Friends and Miffs Beijing," The New York Times, 3 December 1989.

Kristof, Nicholas D., "In Reaction to Rumania, A Hardening in Beijing," The New York Times, 7 January 1990.

Kristof, Nicholas D., "Nationalists Lead Taiwan Elections," The New York Times, 3 December 1989.

Kristof, Nicholas D., "Taiwan Pulls In a Hand Extended to the Mainland," The New York Times, 20 August 1989.

Larrabee, F. Stephen, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1988.

Larson, Vadm. Charles, Unpublished report on his "Statement before the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Naval Arms Control," April 1989. [Not for publication until released by the House Armed Services Committee].

"Laurel calls for US bases withdrawal," Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1989.

Lazanske, Miroslav, "Interview with Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin," DANAS, in Serbo-Croatian 30 May 1989, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 13 June 1989.

Lehman, John, "Successful Naval Strategy in the Pacific: How We Are Achieving It How We Can Afford It," Naval War College Review, Winter 1987.

Lord, Winston, "China and America: Beyond the Big Chill," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1989.

Lukashevich, Captain 1st Rank V, "Responsibility for Restructuring," Kransnaya Zvezda, in Russian 9 June 1989, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 12 June 1989.

Lyon, Adm. James A. Jr., "A Peacetime Strategy for the Pacific," Naval War College Review, Winter 1987.

Lyons, Adm. James, "Interview in Proceedings," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1987.

"Malaysia offers military support facilities to US," Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 August 1989.

Mansfield, Mike, "The U.S. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68 No. 2, Spring 1989.

Martin, Geoffrey Lee, "Russians Seek To Expand Pacific Fishing Rights," London Daily Telegraph, 4 April 1989, reprinted by FBIS-(SOVIET), 5 April 1989.

Matsukane, Hisatomo, "Japan and Security of the Sea Lanes," Global Affairs, Vol. 4 #2, Spring 1987.

McArkin, William, "Troubled Waters: The Navy's Aggressive War Strategy," Technology Review, January 1989.

Mediansky, F.A., "The Defence of Australia and the American Alliance," Australian Outlook, December 1987, Vol. 41 No. 3.

Mediansky, F.A., "Threat Perceptions in the Southwest Pacific Region: an Australian perspective," Pacific Security Toward the Year 2000: The 1987 Pacific Symposium, ed. Dora Alves, (National Defense University Press: Washington D.C., 1988).

Miyoshi, Osamu, "Soviet Strategy in Asia: A Japanese View," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 6 No. 1 1987.

Nishihara, Masashi, East Asian Security and the Trilateral Countries, The Triangle Papers: 30, (New York University Press: New York, 1985).

Nathan, James A., "How's the Strategy Playing with the Allies?," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1988.

RUSI NewsBrief, January 1989.

"Russia, very pacific about the Pacific," The Economist, 15 October 1988.

Scalapino, Robert A., "In Quest of National Interest," in Power and Policy in the PRC, ed. Yu-ming Shaw (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1985).

Sciolino, Elaine, "President Defends Aides' China Visit," The New York Times, 12 December 1989.

"Seoul Agrees on a Plan to Reduce U.S. Troops," The New York Times, 16 February 1990.

"Seoul resists call for US troop withdrawal," Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 1989.

Shevardnadze, E.A., "E.A. Shevardnadze's Speech," Pravda, in Russian 9 June 1988, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 9 June 1988.

Snyder, Vice Adm. Edwin K., A. James Gregor, and Maria Hsia Chang. The Taiwan Relations Act and the Defense of the Republic of China, Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1980).

Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change 1989, U.S.G.P.O., September 1989.

Sricharatchanya, Paisal, "Growing pains: Government seeks a more equal relationship with U.S.," Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 May 1989.

Stephan, John J., "Asia in the Soviet Conception," Soviet Policy in East Asia, ed. Donald Zagoria, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

"Taiwan: We Try Harder," The Economist, 21 October 1989.

Tatarnikov, V., "On Eve of Vienna Talks," Krasnaya Zvezda, in Russian 1 March 1989, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 2 March 1989.

"Text of Joint Communique, Issued at Shanghai, February 27," Department of State Bulletin, 20 March 1972.

The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979/80-1989/90.

"The Soviet Economy in 1988: Gorbachev Changes Course," A report by the CIA and DIA Presented to the Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, 14 April 1989.

Thomas, Lcdr. G.S., "The Soviet Pacific Fleet: Ready for War, relevant for Peace. Part II," Naval Forces, No. 4 V.IX, 1988.

"To Strengthen Stability and Security: CFE, Negotiation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," U.S. Information Agency, March 1989.

Torregrosa, Luista Lopez, "Aquino's rule is imperiled as foes multiply and 'People Power' grows frail," The New York Times, 7 February 1990.

Tracey, Gene D., "China's Navy in the 1990s," Asian Defence Journal, October 1989.

"Transcript of Bush's State of the Union Message to the Nation," The New York Times, 1 February 1990.

Trost, Adm. C.A.H., "The Morning of the Empty Trenches: Soviet Politics of Maneuver and the U.S. Response," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1988.

Trost, Adm. C.A.H., "American Security Interests and the U.S. Navy," Naval War College Review, Spring 1989.

Trost, Adm. C.A.H., "Statement before the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1990/1991 Budget of the United States Navy," Washington, D.C., 4 May 1989.

Trost, Adm. C.A.H., "The U.S. Is A Nation That Rules On The Sea," Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 January 1990.

U. S. Defense Posture in the Pacific, U.S.I.A., September 1987.

"U.S.-China Joint Communique," Current Policy No. 413. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, August 1982).

Udgaard, Nils, "Top Soviet officer meets Holst," Aftenposten in Norwegian 13 April 1988, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 26 April 1988.

Ulam, Adam, Expansion and Coexistence, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.: New York, 1974).

"Unspecific Pacific: Canberra's Asia-Pacific proposal gets cautious nod," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 May 1989.

"US unlikely to withdraw troops from South Korea," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 August 1989.

U.S. Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period of 1944-1949, Dept. of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, Released August 1949, Washington D.C.

"USSR Seeks to Attend Pacific Rim Economic Talks," Sankei Shimbun, in Japanese 1 July 89, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 25 July 1989.

"USSR to withdraw Tank, Air Divisions in MPR," TASS, in Russian 15 March 1989, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 16 March 1989.

Vatikiotis, Micheal, and N. Baladrishnan, "Fading suspensions: Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia improve ties," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 1989.

Walls, Sarah, "Casting for a bite: Moscow's new approach for fishing rights," Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 1989.

Watkins, Adm. James D., "The Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986.

Webb, James H. Jr., "Remarks to the National Press Club," Navy Internal Relations Activity, 13 January 1988.

Weisman, Steven R., "Japan Still Wary of Loans to China," The New York Times, 15 January 1990.

"What the U.S. Said About China in June," The New York Times, 19 December 1989.

"Whistling up a storm: Singapore's US base offer continues to strain ties," Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 August 1989.

World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1988, (ACDA: Washington, D.C., 1989).

Yazov, Dimitriy, "Our military theory is too often paralyzed by laziness," Die Welt, in German 21 Oct 88, translated by FBIS-(SOVIET), 25 October 1988.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 1. | Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 | 2 |
| 2. | Library, Code 0142
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100 | 2 |
| 3. | Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs (56)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100 | 1 |
| 4. | Dr. Claude Buss
Department of National Security Affairs (56)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100 | 1 |
| 5. | Dr. Frank Teti
Department of National Security Affairs (56)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100 | 1 |
| 6. | Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, Virginia 22302 | 1 |
| 7. | Mr. Casimer Yost
Director, World Affairs Council of Northern
California
312 Sutter Street, Suite 200
San Francisco, California 94108 | 1 |
| 8. | Andrew Marshall
Director, Net Assessment
OSD/NA Room 3A930
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301 | 1 |
| 9. | Roger Brooks
Director, Asian Studies Center
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, D.C. 20002 | 1 |
| 10. | Office of the Secretary of Defense
Attn: Director, East Asia and Pacific Region
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155 | 1 |

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 11. | Head, Strategic Concepts Branch
OP-603, Pentagon Room 4E475
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350 | 1 |
| 12. | Head, East Asia/Pacific Plans & Policy Branch
OP-612, Pentagon Room 4E475
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350 | 1 |
| 13. | RADM James Dorsey, USN
ADCNO Plans, Policy and Operations
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350 | 1 |
| 14. | Chief, Pacific East Asia Division
AF XOXXP, Pentagon Room 4D1034
Office of the Air Force Chief of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20330 | 1 |
| 15. | East Asia and Pacific Region
OSD/ISA/EAP Room 4C839
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301 | 1 |
| 16. | Far East/South Asia Division
OJCS-J5 Room 2E973
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20301 | 1 |
| 17. | Far East Regional Desk
DAMO-SSM Room 3B545
Office of the Army Chief of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20310 | 1 |
| 18. | Library
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland 21402 | 1 |
| 19. | The Asia Society
725 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10021 | 1 |
| 20. | Representative Stephen Solarz
U.S. House of Representatives
Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515 | 1 |
| 21. | Representative Patricia Schroeder
U.S. House of Representatives
2410 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515 | 1 |

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 22. | Mr. Stan Roth
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Asian Affairs
707 House Annex 1
Washington, D.C. 20515 | 1 |
| 23. | Mr. Hank Kenny
U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Asian Affairs
419 Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C. 20510 | 1 |
| 24. | Mr. Larry Niksch
Congressional Research Services
Library of Congress, Room 315
James Madison Building
Washington, D.C. 20540 | 1 |
| 25. | Dr. Dora Alves
National Defense University
Ft. McNair
Washington, D.C. 20319 | 1 |
| 26. | Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02841 | 1 |
| 27. | Capt. Lee O. Smith, USN (Ret.)
2100 Golden Rain Road, #5
Walnut Creek, California 94595 | 1 |
| 28. | Lt. Michael E. Smith, USN
2100 Golden Rain Road, #5
Walnut Creek, California 94595 | 1 |