START and Stability

Abstract

In this study, which extends our investigations of prevenient stability, we examine the effects of strategic arms reductions such as those proposed in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). We use exchange models and the theory of prevenient stability to look at the changes in crisis stability and deterrence that would be brought about by future cuts in the strategic nuclear forces of the US and the USSR. Our analysis includes strategic defenses and hypothetical technological breakthroughs. Our results indicate that, if force vulnerabilities exist on either side, arms reductions would erode deterrence - the greater the degree of vulnerability, the greater the effect. Defense of strategic strike forces, if perfected, would improve deterrence and increase crisis stability. Otherwise, it is clear that prevenient stability, as explicitly defined herein, would be decreased.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 15, 1990
Accession Number
ADA227166

Entities

People

  • G. C. Reinhardt

Organizations

  • Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Active Defense
  • Agreements
  • Air Defense
  • Air Force
  • Arms Control
  • Ballistic Missiles
  • Force Structure
  • Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
  • Kill Probabilities
  • Law
  • Motivation
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Simulations
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • United States Government
  • Ussr

Readers

  • Aerospace logistics and air mobility.
  • Computer Engineering
  • Educational Psychology