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
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PLANNING AUSTRALIA'S DEFENSE FORCES

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by

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THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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Abstract of
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DEFENSE FORCE PLANNING IN AUSTRALIA

CHAPTER I


INTRODUCTION

Australians have a right to expect that their nation is able to defend itself. The Australian government accepts its duty to provide Australia with Defence Forces able to meet that expectation¹.

Hon. Kim C. Beazley
Minister for Defence

Challenge. Australia exists on a grand scale, filled with opportunities, challenges and marvels which demand superlatives such as "most" or "biggest" or "best" to describe them. This paper discusses Australia's approach to one of its biggest challenges, planning the defense of an island continent. It is a process which has been made increasingly more difficult over the past fifteen years by the changing nature of Australia's economic and political environment.

Economic problems have been caused by diminishing industrial competitiveness and decreasing prices for Australia's agricultural and mineral exports on the world market. The result has been a decade of continuous balance of payments deficits and lower than planned government revenues which have placed great strains on the national budget. In spite of Australia's economic problems, the government remains deeply committed to delivering on its promises of greatly expanded social services for the citizenry.



Drawn by the National Mapping Section Department of the Interior Canberra, A.C.T. 1952

Figure 1-1

These enhanced social services were planned in the heady days of the early 1970s when Australia's economy was in a period of booming economic growth and development. Attempting to continue programs of enhanced medical, education and social benefits in the face of lower government revenues has focused increasing attention on defense spending as a possible source of funds for reallocation to support other areas of the budget.

In addition to budgetary pressures on defense spending, Australian military planning takes place in a political environment which is much different from that of the American experience. Most Australians perceive that they live in a secure country situated in a reasonably benign region of the world. Since the end of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, and the collapse of the policy of "Forward Defense," no national consensus has developed about the required nature, size or function of Australia's military forces. As the size of its post-Vietnam War military establishment decreased, Australia's political establishment placed great emphasis on reducing costs and improving effectiveness. These goals were to be attained by eliminating redundant capabilities among services and increasing the military's capability to conduct joint operations.

In the early 1970s most of Australia's military ills were blamed on inter-service rivalries and lack of planning for unified operations. The accepted solution was the abolition of separate Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force and consolidation of their responsibilities in a single Department of

Defence. This consolidation started a process which has led to near continuous reorganizations of Australia's defense establishment since 1973.


In spite of claims of success by reorganization advocates, the constant organizational turmoil appears to have been a major impediment to rational force planning by Australia's armed services. Service in-fighting for program funding continues unabated and the defense establishment's plethora of force structure oversight and planning committees do not appear to have functioned effectively. It also continues to be popular for politicians to blame service intransigence and parochialism for a whole host of problems related to national security planning in general and force structure planning in particular. These commentators usually call for more drastic reorganization measures to improve and streamline the defense planning process.

The organizational problems within Australia's Department of Defence present serious obstacles to efficient force planning by themselves. They have been exacerbated by a lack of clear and executable national security policies upon which to base force structure organization and development decisions. The combination of organizational turbulence and lack of credible strategy have resulted in almost insurmountable obstacles to rational force planning. Since the early 1970s, successive Australian governments have not been willing or, perhaps more accurately, politically able to articulate a credible and comprehensive national security policy. The major reason for

this phenomenon has been the lack of an identifiable physical threat to Australia around which such a strategy could easily be built.²

It is difficult in any democracy to justify expending scarce public funds on defense in times of relative peace. It is even more difficult when the citizens of a country do not perceive an impending danger which must be met by military preparedness. The citizens of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) democracies have experienced forty years of "armed peace" because of the immediate and tangible threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Armies in Europe. There has also been considerable public debate in NATO countries about their national security policies and levels of defense spending. The continuous scuffling between the President and Congress over the direction of foreign and defense policy in the United States keeps these issues perpetually in the arena of American public debate. The result has been a high degree of awareness by a majority of the American public of the need for a strong national security establishment and relative approval about the amount of public money that is spent for it.

This has not been the situation in Australia. Blessed as it is, with superb natural barriers protecting it from easy attack, Australia has never been confronted by an adversary intent on invading it. Australia has been somewhat insulated from most of the tensions of East-West confrontation because it is located far from the traditional areas of great power competition.³



Australia's Position in the World

Figure 1-2

The country is also allied with the United States, leader of the Western Alliance and the most powerful nation on earth. Many Australians feel that this alliance alone is a virtual guarantee of the security and national survival of Australia.⁴ For these reasons, among others discussed in the paper, the country appears very secure. Its citizens tend to concentrate more on domestic social issues, generally neglecting national security issues. Surveys confirm that the average Australian has no strong opinions about national security or defense issues and these issues are not usually part of the political landscape.⁵

In contrast to the United States, where Defense is one of the key positions in the Cabinet, Australia's Defence Portfolio has not traditionally been regarded as a very prestigious position. Cabinet positions dealing with domestic issues are considered most important and are most highly regarded, because it is domestic issues which usually decide national elections in Australia.⁶ Australian commentators have suggested that, until recently, many men appointed as Minister for Defence were placed there to keep them out of the Prime Minister's way.⁷

Australia has also developed a rather unusual defense organization with two separate branches, one military and the other civilian. Defense establishments in most countries usually include both civilian and military bureaucracies. These groups are usually portrayed as viewing each other warily, each regarding the other as an adversary. In spite of this popular view, however, there is usually a substantial amount of

intermixing of personnel between military and civilian staffs at the senior levels. In the United States, for example, about thirty percent of the staff of the Secretary of Defense is military, sixty percent is career civil service and the rest are political appointees.⁸ This cross pollination at the very top ensures policy is developed according to the Secretary's direction and that it is interpreted and executed properly. It also plays a crucial role in making sure the missions and views of all sides of the defense establishment are considered, if not always appreciated or understood.

In Australia, however, the defense establishment actually does have two distinct and separate branches. The military branch, collectively called the Australian Defence Force, is headed by the Chief of the Defence Force. The civilian branch is the Department of Defence, headed by the Secretary to the Department of Defence, a very senior civil servant.⁹ Each heads his own independent headquarters bureaucracy. There is no "joint military-civilian" organization comparable to that of the staff of the U. S. Secretary of Defense. One effect of this structure is that very few military officers ever serve on any civilian staff.¹⁰ The other result is that most of the military-civilian interface is done by committees and ad hoc working groups.

In addition, the senior military officer and the senior civil servant officially have equal standing when providing advice to the Minister for Defence. The senior civilian appears, however, "more equal" than his military counterpart when there is

a differing of opinions. This "Diarchy," or dual leader system, has caused continuous problems for Australia's defense establishment since it was established in 1976.¹¹ It has satisfied no one and has prompted the government to tinker constantly with the defense organization to try and make it fulfill the expectations of reorganization. The Australian defense establishment has, therefore, been subjected to a perpetual state of reorganization for over a decade.

Structural Overview of the Paper. This paper describes and discusses the process used to plan the structure of Australia's defense forces. Understanding the present processes of Australian force planning is easier if a framework for appreciating Australia's rather unique situation is established first. Establishment of this framework begins with surveys of Australia's history, government and strategic environment. These sections are followed by discussions of force planning fundamentals and the organizational structure of Australia's defense establishment. The paper culminates with an analysis of Australian force planning and a chapter of conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter Two provides the basis for understanding Australia in the context of both its history and geography. How and why it became a nation and the important influences on the development of Australia's national institutions and character are discussed. This chapter provides the crucial foundation for appreciating how the average Australian's view of the world differs from that of

the average American or West European. These differences play a key role in Australia's defense decision making process.

Adding to this foundation, Chapter Three presents an overview of the structure of Australia's government. The direct product of the long historical process of Australia's development, the national government has evolved in response to Australia's unique historical situation. Australia's national government is substantially different from the American form of government and the governments of most of its neighbors in Southeast Asia. The substance of Australia's government is even quite different from that of the British government, although it closely resembles it in form. The current form of the national government is the frame work within defense decision makers and force planners must work. No analysis of Australia's force planning process can be complete without an understanding of the structure of Australia's larger national decision making process.

Australia's government exists and functions in the context of its strategic environment. Chapter Four is a review of the strategic environment which influences Australia's defense decision making process. Such factors as geography, the economy and politics influence a nation to follow various courses of action. These factors necessarily weigh heavily in the force planning process. An overview of Australia's strategic environment is presented to round out understanding of Australia's unique situation and to place Australian defense planning problems in their proper context. Taken together

Chapters Two, Three and Four establish an essential frame of reference for the reader to understand how and why Australia's national defense establishment evolved to its present structure.

Chapter Five summarizes the fundamentals of force planning. Terms are defined and synopses of various approaches to force planning are presented. Each approach is briefly discussed to provide background information for subsequent review of Australia's force planning methodology. Chapter Five, in conjunction with Chapters Two, Three and Four, rounds out the information foundation required to approach Australia's force planning process.

The current structure of Australia's defense establishment is discussed in Chapter Six. Unique aspects of Australia's defense establishment are presented and explored. The relationship between the civil and military chains of command is also described. Without an understanding of the structure of the defense establishment, the force planning decision making process appears to be a mishmash of committees with overlapping and contradictory powers and responsibilities. Chapter Six clarifies, as much as possible, the relationship between various parts of Australia's defense establishment and identifies the important and influential decision making organizations.

Chapter Seven discusses and analyzes the current force planning process in Australia. This chapter reviews how the process is officially supposed to function and shortcomings of the established process are highlighted. The informal decision

making process is also presented and discussed. It is this informal process that actually drives the force planning process because the official process is essentially moribund. Fundamental steps in the published force planning process have not been completed for years and an alternate, but largely informal, decision making process has developed to compensate for the system's inability to operate properly. Current plans by the Australian military to attempt to refine and rationalize this process are also presented and discussed. Chapter Eight concludes the paper by summarizing the research and recommending areas for more study.

Relevance of this Research. Although the issues of Australia's national security strategy and policies are discussed, this paper concentrates on providing information about Australia's force planning process. There has been a tremendous amount of writing and debate about the pros and cons of Australia's defense strategy, but not much study of the force planning and decision making process required to support it. This research is relevant because it adds to the collective body of knowledge about an important ally in an area that has not been the subject of much study. There are, however, many other reasons which make this research timely.

American strategy has always been one of coalition warfare, involving as many allies as possible. The issues faced by strategic planners in the United States are really those of effective alliance management. It is important that planners in

the United States do not project America's perceptions and values onto our Australian allies. There exists a good deal of myth and legend surrounding the Australian-American alliance which could contribute to serious misunderstandings by both sides. This research paper provides background material which will allow American force planners to appreciate the contribution our Australian allies make to our own security, as well as the limitations of that contribution.

Often referred to as the "southern anchor" of the West's defensive bulwark in the Pacific, Australia plays a key role in sustaining the strength of the Western Alliance. Joint Australian-American facilities in Australia help reduce the possibility that surprise developments which could cause dangerous instabilities in the world.¹² The United States depends heavily on the intelligence information gathered by installations in Australia to evaluate the status of the strategic balance between East and West. Australia's space tracking and communications facilities also perform missions vital to ensuring the security of the West.¹³ In particular, however, we look to Australia to provide leadership and stability for the newly independent island micro-states in the Southwest Pacific.¹⁴ On the strategic level then, this type of research develops information that can assist in decisions about forces required for the defense of U. S. interests in the Southwestern Pacific and Southeast Asia.

Australia is a major purchaser of American manufactured military hardware and pays for this hardware in cash. Although again embarked on one of its periodic campaigns to increase "self-reliance" in defense, Australia still depends on the United States for most munitions and spare parts.¹⁵ On the economic level, therefore, this paper provides information for personnel involved in foreign military sales and project planning about the organizational dynamics of Australia's system for deciding which systems to purchase.

And finally, Australia's military has had to deal with planning defense forces in a political environment which has lacked a bipartisan national security strategy for over twenty years. The result has been a continuous trend of restructuring of the armed forces and a steady reduction in the size of the military forces. This paper is not about Australia's strategic policies, or lack of them. The lack of a coherent, long-term government policy has, however, had a substantial influence on Australia's force planning and development process. This influence is commented upon and lessons are drawn from Australia's experience. If the recent surprising trend of geostrategic retrenchment by the Soviet Union continues, there may be valuable lessons in the Australian experience for American force planners. We may soon be faced with trying to deal with demands, from politicians and citizens alike, to radically restructure the American military if the Soviet Union truly convinces the American people that "peace is breaking out all over."

Chapter I Notes

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CHAPTER II

Historical Overview

Discovery. The first authenticated European sighting of the Australian coastline took place at Cape York in 1606 by the crew of the Dutch ship Duyfken.¹ The Captain, William Janszoon, reported finding only wilderness and a land inhabited by "wild, black, cruel savages" that killed some of the crew.² Virtually nothing more was known about Australia until Dirk Hartog, a Dutch sea captain, landed on the west coast of Australia in 1616. He left an engraved pewter plate on Hartog Island, and also reported that the land was inhospitable and the inhabitants unpleasant.³ Hartog's pewter plate was recovered in 1696 by the Dutch sea-captain De Vlamingh and eventually returned to Amsterdam.⁴ De Vlamingh's expedition confirmed previous Dutch opinions that the territory was inhospitable and without commercial value.⁵

The famous Dutch explorer Abel Janszoon Tasman, commanding the ships Heemskirk and Zeehan, sighted the west coast of the island we know as Tasmania in 1642.⁶ He made exploratory landings on the east coast and called his newly discovered island "Van Diemen's Land" in honor of the Governor of the Dutch colony in Batavia. Tasman also gave the continent the name of "New Holland, but did not formally claim any of the territory he explored."⁷

Early Exploration of Australia




Figure 2-1

English Exploration. It seems somehow appropriate that the first Englishman to visit the continent was a buccaneer. On January 5th, 1688, an English buccaneer named William Dampier became the first recorded Englishman to step ashore in Australia.⁸ He later published New Voyage Round the World, a book about his adventures. In his book he described the Aboriginal inhabitants of Australia as the "miserablest people on earth" and the land itself as being particularly uninviting.⁹

English interest in the South Pacific and the new continent did not surface again until the late 1760s. Lieutenant (Later Captain) James Cook left England in 1768 on the first of his celebrated voyages of discovery in the Pacific. This time he was taking a scientific expedition to observe the transit of Venus across the sun from the south seas near Tahiti. Although in command of a scientific expedition, Cook also had secret Admiralty instructions to explore the South Pacific region on his return journey to England for "a continent or land of great extent" rumored to be in the area.¹⁰ After completing the expedition's scientific work, Cook headed Southwest to comply with the remainder of his instructions. The expedition first discovered New Zealand and spent from October 1769 until March 1770 charting the coastline. Cook and his scientists felt sure that islands of New Zealand were the object of the Admiralty's instructions. Finally, at the end of March 1770, the expedition headed west for England.¹¹

Early Exploration of Australia

Cook's Discovery - 1770




Figure 2-2

On 20 April 1770, one of Cook's officers sighted land where none appeared on Admiralty charts. It was the eastern coastline of the Australian mainland. Cook had made landfall at Cape Everard on the southwest coast of the present day state of Victoria.¹² The expedition sailed slowly northward along the coast and finally landed at Botany Bay, just south of present day Sydney, on April 28, 1770.¹³ Cook spent the next two and one half months charting much of Australia's eastern shoreline, moving north along the coast until reaching Possession Island. There, on 22 August, Cook claimed possession of the eastern side of the Australian continent for the British Crown and, for reasons which remain obscure, named the territory "New South Wales."¹⁴ Lieutenant Cook reported to the Admiralty that the land was suitable for colonization and that naval stores, such as flax and tall straight pines, were in abundance.¹⁵

Naval Supply Theory. One intriguing theory for explaining England's sudden interest in colonizing Australia is the "Naval Supply Theory." It centers on the Royal Navy's continuous need for access to strategic materials to support the constantly expanding scope of its operations. The Royal Navy required huge amounts of wooden timbers for masts and planks, flax and hemp for sails and cordage, and tar and pitch to waterproof its hulls. Extensive studies of the relationship between access to naval stores and British interest in secure sources were done by R. G. Albion, an American historian, in the 1920s. His work seems to support

the proposition that Australia was only coincidentally a penal colony. The Royal Navy's immediate need for a secure source of naval stores is proposed as the primary reason for establishment of the colony in Australia.¹⁶

The Royal Navy did need secure sources of naval stores. It initially obtained most of these from the Baltic states, but Russia's growing Baltic influence and the formation of various Scandinavian alliances made them uncertain suppliers. In the 1700s the North American colonies became the principal source of supply for the Royal Navy. American independence in the 1780s resulted in loss of access to the vast forests of the former American colonies. The British government began looking for another, more secure source of naval stores. According to the information brought back by the Cook Expedition, Australia met all the Navy's requirements as a source of strategic material.¹⁷

Traditional View. Most historians feel that the primary reason for Australia's colonization was to empty the jails of England, and not to obtain naval stores. Proponents of the plan to establish a penal colony in Australia listed four things such a colony would accomplish. First, it would remove the "criminal class" from English territory. The upper and middle classes in this era suspected that criminals had actually established themselves as a permanent class in England. The only way to defeat such criminals was to physically remove them from England. The second goal for the

penal colony was deterrence. The existence of such a place was designed to strike fear into those weak people who might be tempted to slip into a life of crime. The third goal was reform of those criminals sent to Australia. In the penal colony there would be time for criminals to reflect on their sins and plenty of hard work to keep them busy. Both of these factors were seen as important in reforming those members of the permanent criminal class who could be saved.

The last stated goal was to colonize the new continent and keep it out of the hands of other European countries. A penal colony was a sure way to get a lot of people to Australia in a reasonably short time. It was also hoped that the reformed prisoners would remain in Australia and take up constructive trades once released from their sentences. The plan only succeeded in fulfilling the last of these goals, that of colonizing Australia. There were too many people in jail to send to Australia, few were really deterred by a sentence of "transportation to Australia," and even fewer were reformed by the terrible ordeal of being sent to the Australian wilderness.¹⁸

The Penal Colony is Approved. The Crown certainly did not rush to pack prisoners off to the newly claimed continent. The idea was discussed intermittently by Parliament for over six years. Between 1779 and 1785 several proposals for establishing a penal colony in Australia were considered and none accepted. Sir Joseph Banks, a British naturalist who had

accompanied Cook on his expedition, repeatedly testified before Parliamentary committees about Botney Bay's suitability as a penal settlement. Parliament, however, remained unconvinced.¹⁹

Finally, in 1785, Admiral Sir George Young was directed to submit a plan to Parliament for a convict settlement in Australia. The twin pressures of the Navy's need for naval stores and jail overcrowding in England had come together and the British government saw a possible marriage of opportunity. A colony necessary to exploit the resources of Australia would be established by emptying the jails of England. The prisoners would pay for their own keep and provide inexpensive naval stores for the Royal Navy. Such an arrangement was projected to save the British government a substantial amount of money. By 1786, pressure was growing in Parliament to do something about the convict problem in England. This pressure finally led the Pitt government to announce plans to establish its convict settlement in Australia.

First Fleet. The Admiralty selected Captain Arthur Phillip, Royal Navy, as the first Governor of the new colony.²⁰ Phillip sailed from England on May 13, 1787, in command of the "First Fleet." It consisted of two warships, HMS Sirius and HMS Supply, six convict transports and three stores ships.²¹ Nearly seven months later, on 18 January 1788, Captain Phillip and the First Fleet arrived at Botany Bay. Upon arrival, Phillip immediately conducted a survey of




Figure 2-3

the surrounding area which proved to him that it was unsuitable for the new colony. After resting for several days, Phillip sailed his fleet north to Port Jackson, present site of Sydney Harbor, where the new colony was formally proclaimed on 26 January 1788. Approximately 290 officials, marines, women and children, 520 male convicts and 197 Female convicts were then disembarked from First Fleet ships.²²

As with most early colonies, things were touch and go for a while. Crops failed and starvation was a real possibility. For the first half of 1790 the entire colony was on half rations. Only the arrival of the second shipment of convicts on 20 June 1790 allowed the colony to continue. The colony survived and expanded, but it was years before it could grow enough food to protect itself from the possibility of starvation. A major step toward self-sufficiency was arrival of the first group of "free immigrants" in 1793. This group established the nucleus of farmers and craftsmen required to ensure that the colony would eventually be able to support itself.²³ Free colonists were particularly welcome because both convicts and jailers proved inept and unsuitable as farmers. Most of the convicts were from urban areas and had little or no experience in agriculture. The military men in charge of the colony were little better.²⁴

Australia Named. By 1810 the system to transport criminals from England to Australia was running just about at capacity. The adult population of Australia consisted of

2,804 colonists who had not been transported and 16,428 convicts or former convicts. Ten years later, the adult population of Australia reached 38,000, including 21,726 convicts transported during the preceding ten years.²⁵ The colony also received a new name during this time. Matthew Flinders, the explorer and cartographer, purposely used the name Australia on his charts and maps in the early 1800s. The name acquired semi-official status when Lachlan Macquarie, Colonial Governor from 1810 to 1822, began to use it on official correspondence. The "free born" settlers in the colony were the real driving force behind popularization of the term. They objected to being called "native born colonials."²⁶

Development of Government. The colony was considered well enough developed by the 1820s to need a more standard form of colonial government. The British Parliament enacted a statute to replace the military government with a regular form of colonial government in 1823. The statute provided for legislative power to be exercised within New South Wales by a legislative council. This act placed the first restrictions on the administration of the military governors since establishment of the colony in 1788. Until this act, the colonial governors were responsible solely to the Crown. The Act of 1823 started Australia on the long road to responsible (Parliamentary) government. Settlements in Western Australia,

South Australia and Tasmania were established and expanded over the next ten years. The continent's name was officially changed to "Australia" by an act of Parliament in 1834.²⁷

End of the Penal System. The next fifteen years were ones of slow, steady growth and gradual disenchantment with the convict transportation system. Although large land owners continued to view convicts as a necessary source of cheap labor, free immigrants did not share this view. The numbers of "free settlers" immigrating to Australia started to exceed the flow of convicts. The free men viewed the whole penal system as "a special scourge," one that should be removed from Australia. New and old free settlers viewed convict labor as holding down wages that honest men needed to make a go of it in Australia. By 1849, major protests in Sydney and Melbourne prevented convict transport ships from unloading in New South Wales.²⁸

Australian protests about the "dumping of prisoners" in the colonies forced the British government to make Western Australia, the principal settlement to convicts. Western Australia was chronically short of labor and was less developed than the eastern colonies. Its settlers wanted to continue importing convict labor. Resistance to the convict transportation system continued to build in the remaining Australian colonies and the system steadily lost its appeal, even for the English. The cost of sending each convict to Australia had become almost too expensive for the government.

Parliament was also questioning the wisdom of forcing convicts to go to Australia when so many other settlers wanted to pay their own way to settle there. In spite of its declining utility, it was not until 10 January 1868 that the last convicts arrived in Western Australia and the British government ended the system. A total of 160,663 people were transported to Australia as part of the English penal system. British records do not record what happened to most of the prisoners who served out their terms. How many were able to return to England, or even leave Australia, is not known.²⁹

Road to Federation. The next half century was one of remarkable growth and development in Australia. Parliament enacted the Australian Constitutions Act in 1850, and established the colony of Victoria from the southern portion of New South Wales. The act also provided for elected legislative councils in Tasmania, South Australia, and Victoria, and it signaled the start of responsible Australian self-government. The first university in Australia, Sydney University, opened on 5 August 1850 and in February of 1851 prospectors discovered gold in New South Wales. This discovery set off the first of three major Australian Gold Rushes. The word spread that Australia was the place to make a fortune and free settlers began to pour into Australia.³⁰




Figure 2-4

It was a time of tremendous social change and experimentation. Labor unions established themselves as a powerful force in Australia when they succeeded in having the Eight Hour Workday made standard for workers in the building trades in Victoria in 1856.³¹ This standard work day gradually spread throughout Australia and then to the world. The secret ballot, also called the "Australian" ballot, was introduced to the world in 1856 in general elections in South Australia. This political breakthrough forever changed the landscape of Australian politics and the nature of democracies worldwide.³²

By the 1880s Australia's separate and independent colonies all had responsible self-government, flourishing economies and distinct identities. As a group, the Australian colonies grew at a rate rivaling that of the United States between 1880 and 1900.³³ The British Secretary of State for Colonies began to nudge the Australians to establish a "federal council" which would enable them to take "joint action" on selected matters. It would also allow the Colonial Office to deal with a central representative for Australia, instead of the six fractious colonial governments.³⁴ In 1887, the Australian colonial premiers took a tentative step toward federation. They accepted an Admiralty scheme for naval defense of all the Australian colonies. The colonies paid 126,000 pounds per year toward maintaining an Australian naval squadron that was to be used only for local defense.³⁵

Australasian Federation Conference. It took until 1890, however, for the first "Australasian Federation Conference" to meet in Melbourne and seriously discuss the possibility of a convention to draft a federal constitution. The march toward federation started in earnest in 1891 with the first National Australasian Convention. The Convention prepared a draft federal constitution for consideration by all the colonies. A "Commonwealth Bill" to make the colonies on dominion was even produced in Parliament, but it failed to gain adequate support in the colonial legislatures. Many colonial legislators had cooled to the idea of Federation because the colonial governments feared domination by a central power. Federation was, however, an idea whose time had come and the chorus of popular support for it, encouraged by the British, continued to grow and become more strident.³⁶

Worries about Russian, German and Japanese colonial ambitions in the South Pacific, and an economic depression, led the colonies to realize that their political future and growing economies were interdependent. Pro-federation pressure from the citizenry finally led the 1895 Conference of Colonial Premiers at Hobart, Tasmania, to declare that federation was needed. The Colonial Premiers called for a constitutional convention with all delegates elected directly by the people.³⁷

Australia Becomes a Nation. Between 1895 and 1899 there were several conventions and referendums, culminating with the electors of New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia and Victoria approving a proposed federal constitution in 1899.³⁸ On 9 July 1900 the British Parliament enacted the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and on 1 January 1901 the Commonwealth of Australia was proclaimed formally in Sydney. The first national government was formed under Prime Minister Edmund Barton and the first Commonwealth Parliament opened in Melbourne on May 9, 1901. It had been a turbulent decade for the people of Australia.³⁹

Australia's Defense. The government created a Department of Defence in 1901, but it was a portfolio no minister particularly wanted. After a decade of federalism, Commonwealth defense arrangements still consisted of paying support money towards the upkeep of the Royal Navy's "Australian Squadron" and raising local volunteer militias in each state. The total Australian ground forces available to the new federal government were about 12,000 troops. The nation was still totally dependent on the British Crown to supply protection and security. Australia was essentially without the capability to defend itself against all but the most minor threats.⁴⁰ In 1908, Australia hosted the "Great White Fleet" during its around the world demonstration of emerging U. S. power and influence.⁴¹ Australian political

leaders appreciated that they had never seen that many Royal Navy ships in Sydney at one time and the sight made a lasting impression on them.

Australian nationalism had started to develop and the view had gained ground that if Australia was worth defending, then Australians should be able to do it themselves. Before instituting any permanent form of military establishment, traditional Australian hostility toward authority in any form had to be surmounted. In spite of a generally favorable attitude toward development of an adequate defense capability, most Australians did not view creation of any permanent military establishment favorably. Many distrusted such a step as the first in a series that would result in organization of some "Old World militaristic class" like they had left behind in Europe. The government concluded that a Navy would be somewhat less controversial than an army and establishment of the Royal Australian Navy was given priority.⁴²

In addition to the political and emotional reasons for favoring a navy, the government was already spending the money to maintain the Royal Navy's "Australian Squadron" in the Pacific Ocean. The Commonwealth government was also deeply concerned that the Royal Navy might not leave adequate naval forces to protect Australia if a crisis developed elsewhere in the world. Australian leaders recognized that Britain's naval power and military might would soon be challenged by the growing capability of other navies in Europe and Japan.⁴³ The

nucleus of the Royal Australian Navy was established in 1910 with the acquisition of two British warships to form a Commonwealth Squadron in 1910. The warships Yarra and Parramatta were paid for by the Australia taxpayer, manned by Australians and designated for use only in the waters around Australia.⁴⁴

Recognizing the need for continental defense, the Australian government quietly established the nucleus of the Australian Army a year later by reinforcing the state militias. Legislation was passed in 1911 which mandated compulsory military training for all males between fourteen and eighteen years of age.⁴⁵ To provide leadership for the citizen militias, an Australian military college for training officers was authorized at Duntroon, in the new Australia Capital Territory.⁴⁶ The wisdom of these moves was demonstrated by the superb performance of Australia's fledgling military in the First World War.

World War I. The First World War is considered a watershed event in the history of Australia. It marked Australia's first involvement as a country in affairs outside the South Pacific on a large scale. It also changed forever the way the world viewed Australians and the way Australians viewed themselves.⁴⁷ As a part of the British Empire, Australia considered itself automatically at war on 4 August 1914, and immediately placed the newly formed Australian Navy under British Admiralty control. The

government also pledged to raise a force of 20,000 troops to support England and called for volunteers to join the Australian Imperial Force (A. I. F) for combat assignments overseas.⁴⁸

Separate and distinct from the rest of Australia's general military forces, the A. I. F. was composed entirely of volunteers and eventually reached a strength of six complete divisions. By Australian law, members of the "citizen militias" and conscripted soldiers could not be sent overseas during hostilities. Government proposals to inaugurate conscription for overseas fighting during the latter years of the War were defeated twice by the Australian electorate.⁴⁹ At the beginning of the War, however, the tremendous number of volunteers permitted an extremely stringent selection process to be used. The resulting A. I. F. was "... a body of men called the finest ever brought together in modern times."⁵⁰

In spite of their excellent physical qualifications of A. I. F. personnel, at the start of the War the British staffs simply considered Australia to be a manpower reserve. British military experts did not think Australia's "Soldier-citizens" possessed the experience or ability to command larger units. They even doubted the reliability of the individual soldier. After all, these rough and ready Australians had a reputation for bridling at discipline and made no secret that they disliked the British. Australians were also tainted by the ill effects of both rampant pacifism and socialist unionism.

The heroic performances of Australian Army units in the Middle East and on the Western Front completely erased those opinions and firmly established the Australian Army's professional reputation.⁵¹

The brilliant senior command and staff work of Australian officers like Lieutenant-General John Monash, Brigadier-General W. T. Bridges and Major (Later General) C. B. B. White, resulted in the formation of the six Australian Divisions into their own Corps on the Western Front. Australian troops were superbly led and fought well. The British General Staff considered their Duntroon trained officers to be "literally worth their weight in gold."⁵² By the end of the fighting, the Australians had earned a reputation as the best shock troops in the Allied armies.

The Royal Australian Navy also established itself professionally during the War. Its ships operated with distinction in combat operations against the German Navy in both the Atlantic and Pacific, playing a key role in the capture of German New Guinea.⁵³ Only a limited number of Australian midshipmen and enlisted ratings were accepted for Naval service prior to the War, even in the Australian ships. As with the Army, it was the common view that Australian Naval Service personnel were not amenable to discipline.⁵⁴ The Admiralty also doubted the ability of an Australian crew to man and operate a ship effectively. Australian and British officers and ratings were always mixed aboard ships of the

Australian squadron and Australian officers were posted away on ships of the Royal Navy for additional training and experience.⁵⁵ Australians proved to be skilled and capable mariners during the War, fighting their ships especially well against ships of the German Pacific Naval Squadron.⁵⁶

When hostilities ended in Europe on 11 November 1918, fourteen percent of the male population of Australia had entered the military. Australia had sent 329,883 servicemen to support the Allied cause out of a population of less than five million, and every one was a volunteer! The A. I. F. suffered 59,342 killed and 166,818 wounded or incapacitated by gas for a staggering casualty rate of sixty nine percent.⁵⁷ This was the highest casualty rate of any segment of British or Empire Forces. The effects of this tremendous sacrifice strongly influenced Australia's approach to its relations with Britain and the world for the next twenty years.⁵⁸

Between the Wars. Although Australians greeted the end of the war with wild rejoicing and deep thankfulness, their leaders viewed the future with some apprehension. They were firm adherents to the old school of realistic politics. The post-war proposals being espoused by Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, were troubling to their vision of the future. While ready to join and support Wilson's proposed League of Nations, Australia's leaders were determined to obtain a measure of physical and social security for Australia in the post-war era.⁵⁹

Australia's specific goals at the Versailles Peace Conference were to gain control of the ring of islands to the north of the continent and to retain control over its own immigration policy. The Australian delegation succeeded in gaining control of "German New Guinea" under the guise of a League of Nations Mandate without much trouble. It also led the fight against Japan's resolution proposing the principle of racial equality in order to maintain control over Australian immigration policies. This immigration policy eventually became known as the "White Australia" Policy and caused Australia much trouble in the post-World War II era. Australia's successful defeat of Japan's proposal, which was initially supported by a majority of the delegations, served only to poison Japanese-Australian relations during the inter-war years.⁶⁰

With post-war demobilization came the rapid growth and development of the Twenties. Everything seemed to prosper in Australia and Australians considered their country as singularly and uniquely blessed. Australians accepted the League of Nations because it appealed to their idealism and because they recognized that Australia was a comparatively weak country. Australians felt it was advantageous to belong to an established international system for resolving disputes between nations. The League of Nations was also a perfect vehicle for giving Australia a voice in world affairs without

appearing to move away from its traditional position as a loyal British Dominion.⁶¹

Except for approving League membership, however, Australians reverted to their traditional mind set of complete disinterest in world affairs. They were far too preoccupied with the consuming tasks of nation building and developing the continent to worry much about far away events. The attention of the Australian people was concentrated on material exploitation and economic development.⁶²

Depression and Recovery. The onset of the "Great Depression" of the 1930s was particularly hard on the ever optimistic and idealistic Australians. At first their government reacted like all world governments, failing to grasp that they were faced with an economic catastrophe of the first magnitude. The world-wide depression was the first truly severe test of the social fabric and political philosophies which were the moral foundations of Australia.⁶³ The effects of the depression fell hardest on the working class members of Australia's labor unions, exaggerating class differences and firmly establishing antagonisms between labor and business. These antagonisms, which have become quite severe in some industries, continue to exert a strong, negative influence on labor-management relations in Australia to this day.⁶⁴

In politics, extremists of both the right and the left attracted substantial followings of desperate people who were

willing to grasp at any plan or policy, not matter how radical, which promised relief. There was even serious talk about secession of states by otherwise responsible state politicians. They spoke of secession as a viable way to solve their state's economic problems. By 1931, fully thirty percent of the work force was officially unemployed, wages throughout the country had been reduced by 10 percent and the government had been forced to slash spending on both social services and defense. The Labor Party government was paralyzed by a split within itself over the most appropriate path to take for recovery.⁶⁵

The tide of Australia's economic crisis began to turn before its government was able to decide on an effective course of action. Export prices began to rise and trade started to improve, largely because of activity by governments in other countries. Employment began to improve and Australia was able to restore equilibrium to its national budget by 1934. Little of the recovery was due to policies implemented by the Australian government. Australian Federalism had faced problems during the depression which it could not diagnose, let alone solve, and it had helplessly thrashed about and gesticulated. It had simply proven incapable of meeting the crisis.⁶⁶ The one real legacy of the "Great Depression," however, was the establishment of a national consensus about the need for "full employment" at any cost. Australian full employment has been the chief goal of all Australian

international and domestic policies since 1935 and continues to be a nearly unassailable icon.⁶⁷ No Australian politician can refuse to bow it and expect to stay in office.

As Australia began to ease out of the worst of the depression it was faced with a resurgent Germany in Europe and an expansionist Japan in the Pacific. Japanese and German activity forced Australia to think hard about foreign and defense policy for the first time since the First World War. The electorate realized that the world situation was getting dangerous and permitted the government to substantially increase spending for defense in both 1936 and 1937.⁶⁸ Australia commenced a three year program for building up national defense in 1938, just in time to ensure that Australia's war production industry was somewhat prepared for the events to follow.⁶⁹ A sense of the inevitability of war had settled across the country in 1939, but nearly all eyes were on the cataclysmic events unfolding in Europe. It was only a prescient few who were willing to believe that it would involve Australia in a fight for her life in the Pacific.⁷⁰

World War II. As in the First World War, at Britain's declaration of war on Germany, the Australian government felt itself immediately involved in the conflict without the need for a separate constitutional action. During the 1920s and 1930s, traditional Australian suspicion about British objectives had combined with pervasive anti-war sentiment among the electorate. This strong anti-war pressure had

caused Australia's political leaders to equivocate about Australia's obligation to fight alongside of England in another European war. Once the war actually started, however, the question was automatically resolved for the vast majority of the Australian people. They instinctively supported Britain.⁷¹

The Labor Party's prewar doctrine had been that Australians should only be used in the direct defense of Australia. By 1940, it no longer had a basis, either in the strategic facts of life, or in the mind of the Australian public. Staunch support for England, although no longer blind and unquestioning, was taken for granted. The government commenced raising a Second A. I. F. of volunteers to fight alongside British forces overseas and the Royal Australian Navy was immediately placed under British Admiralty control. An Empire Air Training Program was started which would train thousands of Australian airmen for service in Europe and the Middle East.⁷²

Throughout 1940 and 1941, three Australian divisions were heavily engaged in North Africa and the Middle East. Australians at home were disturbed by the mounting evidence that Britain was not in any position to guarantee Australian security. War in the Pacific was becoming a distinct, and growing, possibility. Singapore, the Pacific Bastion of Britain's Empire was rumored to be not as well equipped as publicly proclaimed. As the war in Europe mounted in its

intensity and ferocity, it became obvious that the British were preoccupied with their struggle against the Germans. It was also clear that the naval and air forces necessary to execute the "Singapore Strategy," around which the whole of Empire defense in the Far East had been planned, would not be available.⁷³

In December 1941, after two years of supporting England's fight against the Germans, Australia's strategic picture changed radically. Japanese naval forces attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, crippling the United States Pacific Fleet. On 8 December the Japanese Army commenced its lightening thrust south along the Malay Peninsula. For the first time, Australia was suddenly and directly threatened by a foe which appeared capable of destroying it as a nation. Australia's war was now the Pacific War and the Australian government respectfully diverged from Churchill's wartime strategy that the war was to be won or lost in Europe first. Australia demanded that the A. I. F. be returned to defend Australian territory.⁷⁴

Australia Looks to America. The Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, made a memorable and controversial "declaration on the Pacific Struggle" on 27 December 1941.⁷⁵ In it he aligned Australia with America as the leader for the long and bitter fight for survival in the Pacific. The government also demanded and got, over Churchill's strenuous objections, recall of the bulk of the A. I. F. to prepare for

the defense of Australia.⁷⁶ Any self-doubts about the wisdom of such a move became academic when the British Empire's vaunted "Fortress" at Singapore fell on February 15, 1942, and 17,000 Australian servicemen were surrendered to Japanese captivity.⁷⁷

The Second World War was a much greater challenge for Australia than the First World War. The territory of Australia was actually threatened by Japanese invasion and Britain was relatively weaker in 1939 than she had been in 1914. Australia's military forces could not count on British industry to provide the heavy equipment and military supplies needed to fight against Japan in the Pacific. Australia was forced to rely on herself more than ever before and maximum effort was placed on military related industrial development. Whole industries were created through heroic feats of development to support Australia's war effort, but it still was not enough. Australia needed the resources and industrial output of America.⁷⁸ American aid to Australia grew tremendously and by the end of the war over sixty percent of Australia's imports, previously supplied by British sources, came from the United States. American influence over the Australian economy increased as British influence dwindled⁷⁹

Victory in the Pacific. Ultimately, the Australian-American Alliance prevailed in the Pacific. With the war against Japan over, Australia's traditional aptitude for

retreating from international involvement again reasserted itself. The original warmth of the relationship with the United States, forged in the darkest hours of the war, cooled markedly in the initial post-war period. The somewhat abrasive directness, vigor and energy of the Americans that was so admired in combating the Japanese was now a source of national irritation. Australians had experienced the effects of American "imperialism" from the relatively benign position of a partner and many of them did not like the encounter.⁸⁰

In particular, Australians bristled at the brashness of American assumption that what was good for the United States was necessarily good for the rest of mankind. Australians looked back with some nostalgia to the more natural and easy-going pre-war relationship between themselves and England. Compared to their new relationship with the high-powered, dominant, victorious United States of the late 1940s, it looked particularly attractive.⁸¹ At any rate, few responsible Australians were prepared to envisage the risks to their security if the United States suffered another fit of traditional American post-war isolationism.⁸² There was simply too much at stake to allow America to recede from Asia like it had in the 1920s. Most Australian leaders recognized the Era of European Colonies was over in Asia and that independence for many neighboring territories would be the challenge of the future. Australia's security depended upon being able to maintain stability in its immediate strategic area. A daunting and expensive proposition.⁸³

Post-war Security and the Cold War. The key was to get Britain or the United States, or both, actively involved in guaranteeing the stability of the region and the security of Australia. Australian leaders sought an alliance with the United States for several years following the end of the war, wanting it clearly linked with NATO in Europe. The Americans were not eager for for such a pact because the military leadership in the United .paStates saw no reason for it. In the Pacific, the supremacy of the American Navy was unquestioned and it was clearly capable of handling any problem alone.⁸⁴

The Soviet Union's heavy handed consolidation of its hold over Eastern Europe, and North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950, changed American attitudes. These events prompted the United States to adopt a policy of "containing" the Soviet Union and preventing the "loss" of any more territory to Communist control.⁸⁵ The United States started to look for allies to stand up and be counted in the struggle against Soviet Communism. In the Northwest Pacific, America wanted to end the post-war occupation of Japan and develop it as the northern anchor of the containment line. The United States needed to finalize a peace treaty with Japan which would allow Japan to begin rebuilding a self-defense capability, something Australia strenuously resisted. An alliance was, in part, the price of Australia's agreeing to the liberal terms proposed by the United States for the Peace Treaty with Japan. The

alliance was not just a one way affair, however, because the United States gained an anchor the southern end of the Pacific containment line in Australia.⁸⁶

The ANZUS Alliance. Australia, New Zealand and the United States joined in the ANZUS alliance, which became effective on 1 September 1950.⁸⁷ Although the alliance has faced, and still faces, some significant problems, it remains one of the most successful alliances of modern times. It has succeeded mostly because its wording was vague enough to make it "all things to all parties" over the past forty years.

In Australia, the ANZUS Treaty was considered to have two complimentary roles. Its primary purpose was to be a hedge against the possibility of latent American isolationism, a guarantee of United States support and involvement in Asia. The second purpose, from the Australian view point, was to act as the vehicle which would allow the country to reduce its expenditures on defense to the absolute minimum. The United States, so went the reasoning, would assume the role recently abandoned by the British in the Pacific. America would essentially be responsible for the burden of maintaining Australia's security. The exclusion of the British from ANZUS was recognition by all parties that Britain was drained and exhausted by the war. The British were no longer in any position to play as significant a role in the affairs of Asia as they had before the war.⁸⁸

There was also a price to the alliance. ANZUS and the

obligations of post-war Commonwealth membership combined to force Australia to be more involved in the course of external events than ever before. Such activity was completely contrary to Australia's traditional isolationist role. In one world crisis or regional confrontation after another, Australia was placed in the unaccustomed position of having to make a public commitment, take a stand. Australia's interest in foreign events and defense matters had been minimal and straightforward before the War. Australia simply followed Britain's lead in foreign affairs.⁸⁹ After the War things were much more complex and challenging.

Forward Defense. As a corollary to the American principle of containment, Australia evolved the defensive strategy of "forward defense."⁹⁰ This strategy was really just a continuation of its prewar "Singapore Strategy." The major difference was the change in Australian attitude toward the participation in the strategy. In the British Empire's Singapore Defense scheme, Australia was expected to contribute funds to help pay for constructing the fortress. The prewar Australian governments always seemed to find a reason not to make full payments. Both conservative and liberal governments consistently demurred throughout the 1930s, saying that they were unconvinced that the strategy would work.⁹¹ The unspent money was not used to bolster Australia's defenses, however, it was used on social programs. It is interesting to note, especially in view of recent events within the ANZUS Alliance,

that New Zealand actually contributed more money to build Singapore than Australia.⁹²

With Communists in control of both Russia and China and Britain no longer in charge of an empire, the situation in Asia was much different. Australia now had more to say about the direction of its foreign affairs and defense policies and Australia's security depended more on its own actions. The domino theory guided strategic thinking on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. The theory stated that if any of the countries on the borders of China and Russia fell to communist control, others would surely follow like dominos, falling one after another. Eventually communist control would extend to countries close to Australia, threatening its independence. In the post-war era, Australia contributed substantial military forces to a common, western defense strategy in Southeast Asia. Australia's strategy was designed to ensure that any threat to Australia was met as far away from the continent as possible with as large a coalition force as possible.⁹³

"Forward Defense" became the cornerstone of Australia's strategic role in the world and the entering argument for Australian force planning and development. Australia was considered, and considered itself, to be a key member of the West's Defensive Alliance System in the Pacific. The new strategy required Australia adopt a defense posture which was totally out of character for peacetime. Australia maintained

a substantial peacetime military establishment for the first time in its history. Australia also permanently stationed sizable military forces outside Australian territory, particularly on the mainland of Asia, for the first time. As the nature of the threat to Western security changed, the logical extension of the Forward Defense Doctrine also led to accepting establishment of secret and highly sensitive American communications and intelligence gathering bases on Australian territory.⁹⁴

Starting with the Korean War, and continuing through suppression of the Malayan Insurrection and the confrontations with Indonesia, Australian combat troops were regularly available, if not actually committed, as a part of the "forward defense" strategy. Supporting this cold war strategy placed Australia's political and social value system under considerable stress. The people recognized the need for active foreign and defense policies, but such activity went against traditional Australian policy. Like the United States, Australia also started down the slippery slope of involvement in the Vietnam War with an almost insignificant act of military and foreign policy. In 1962 Australia committed a force of thirty advisors and logistics personnel to support the American effort against communist subversion in Vietnam. It was a natural part of supporting their Forward Defense policy.⁹⁵

Vietnam and its Aftermath. Australia's involvement in Vietnam peaked in 1968. The thirty Australian advisors had gradually expanded to over 8,100 combat troops. Australia also committed a significant number of Air Force and Navy units to the American cause in South Vietnam.⁹⁶ Like the United States, Australian society became bitterly divided over the morality, appropriateness and need for involvement in the war. Just as in the United States, the issue of conscription to fill the ranks of the army gave opponents of the war a potent domestic political issue around which to coalesce.⁹⁷ The strains of the Vietnam War and public pressure to end Australia's involvement in the fighting ultimately contributed to the fall of Australia's conservative government. It was replaced by a Labour Party government which was liberal in ideology and socialistic in outlook. The new government immediately took steps to reduce Australia's participation in Vietnam. By 1971 Australia had reduced its involvement in Vietnam to a small advisory role once again and in 1972 Australia ended its direct involvement in the conflict. At the same time Australia ended its program of peacetime conscription and, without specifically announcing it, ended its reliance on "Forward Defense" as the basis for its national security strategy.⁹⁸

Post-Vietnam. The end of Australian involvement in the Vietnam War also ended "forward defense" as a viable strategic concept. For several decades Australian strategy had been predicated on meeting the threat on someone else's territory.

In the post-Vietnam catharsis, Australia instinctively pulled back from involvement outside its own territory. Both foreign and defense policies became introspective with limited horizons. Attention was now focused on the territorial limits of the nation and strategic planning began to resemble the "Fortress Australia" model of the early 1930s. In rejecting "Forward Defence," Australia's national security philosophy had fundamentally changed. The government, however, failed to think through the requirement to change Australia's national security strategy and the structure of the military forces necessary to support their new security philosophy.⁹⁹ The government of the day simply declared that no threat was foreseeable for the next fifteen years.¹⁰⁰ This started a fifteen year process of benign neglect of Australia's defense establishment by both conservative and liberal politicians. Absent an immediate threat, Australia's elected politicians chose to concentrate on social development and labor issues.

Summary. In a way, that earlier evaluation of no serious threat was correct. Today, fifteen years later, Australia has not been seriously threatened and lack of involvement in their own defense has not proven to have been too dangerous. Times have changed, however, and the Southwest Pacific is now a much different place. So is Indochina. Along with a change of government in 1983, there was belated realization that Australia's strategic circumstances had changed. Australia's national security and its ability to influence regional events

were being undermined by lack of credible defense forces. The current government of Prime Minister Hawke has enunciated a policy of self-reliance in defense matters and has proposed an ambitious, yet limited, program of upgrading the Australian military. Although politically acceptable to most electorate right now, Australia's economic problems could unite those who think the new program buys too much military capability with those who regard it as not providing enough. Such a coalition could derail the program and seriously impair the Australian Defence Force's ability to ensure Australia's security. The debate over what to do continues, with no clear consensus about the path ahead.

Clearly, the most important historical influences on Australia have been the a sense of acute isolation and an awareness of distance on an overpowering scale.¹⁰¹ These two factors have dominated, and continue to dominate, all thought about defense planning in Australia. Australians have always understood the effect of being over 12,000 miles from England and the source of protection from the "mother country." In the early days of the colony it took the better part of a year to travel between England and Australia. Communications were irregular and attack and conquest by some other colonial power was always a possibility. A review of the correspondence between Australian leaders and successive British governments reveals a continuous thread of anxiety about defense issues. In particular, the low priority and lack of urgency accorded Australia in Britain's strategy

of Imperial Defense bothered Australia's political and military leaders. This concern was one of the driving factors in the support for federation at the end of the Nineteenth Century.¹⁰²

In the early years of the Twentieth Century, Australian leaders continued to be uneasy about Great Britain's ability to actually provide timely protection in the event of an attack. To their north, Japan was demonstrating a dangerous capacity for expansionism and imperialism on the Asian mainland and was developing a powerful, modern navy. Their apprehensions moved Australia take steps to improve its own defensive capability, but public support for defense expenditures rose and fell according to the perceived level of threat to Australia. Even establishment of a national Army and a "blue water" Navy in the years prior to World War I did not result in adequate levels of sustained defense spending over a long period of time. Australian leaders not only refused to subsidize British defense expenditures in Asia because of national pride, they also failed repeatedly to allocate sufficient funds to adequately support their own defense establishment.¹⁰³ Up to World War II, Australia's politician's concentrated on campaigning to ensure England would allocate resources to defend her interests in the Pacific. Australia's feeling of security depended largely on the amount of faith its government had in the Royal Navy's ability to defend their continent.

World War II proved a seminal event in the development of a unique Australia perspective on the events in the Pacific and the world as a whole. Australians realized that they were really a Pacific nation and that their future lay in Asia, not in Europe. The disasters of 1941 and early 1942 forced Australia to develop an independent foreign and defense policy and to demand a voice in deciding the course of the war effort. The focus of Australia's efforts shifted to the Pacific. This shift of focus also involved a shift in emphasis on relationships between Australia, Great Britain and the United States. America assumed a central role in Australia's defense planning for two reasons. The two countries shared a common foe in the Pacific and England could no longer provide the aid necessary to resist the Japanese. The United States, acting as the "Great Arsenal of Democracy," literally overwhelmed Australia with men and military supplies in a manner that England could never have hoped to match.

Following the war, British resolve and influence waned as America's role and influence in the Pacific increased. The Australian-American relationship continued to evolve and develop, both within the framework of the ANZUS Alliance and through expanded trade. The relationship was not the smooth and seamless friendship that popular myth would have us believe and with the end of the Vietnam War it had changed significantly. By the 1970's, some Australians began to regard America warily. The United States was seen as overly dogmatic, overbearing and always in too much of a hurry. Far

too ready to rattle swords at the Russians and irresponsible in its willingness to go to the brink of conflict. Critics were prompting reassessment of the alliance by charging that Australia had become little more than a southern dominion of the American empire as a result of the close Australian-American relationship.¹⁰⁴

In spite of these tensions and criticisms, Australian leaders felt, as they have since Australia was founded, that an alliance with some powerful country was crucial to the country's security. Their commitment to the alliance remains strong. The enduring strength of the Australian-American relationship has been proven by an increasingly close level of cooperation in the post-Vietnam era. Acceptance by both sides of the concept of equality in the partnership has played a key role in keeping the bond strong.

One specific result of the success of the Australian-American alliance has been continued deferrment of development of an articulate and concise philosophy of Australian national security. The continuing thread in Australia's planning for defense has been characterized by an overall attitude of ambivalence and an unwillingness to realistically appreciate their strategic situation. Defense is not a subject about which the average Australian has historically wanted to spend much time thinking. Except for periods of extreme and obvious national emergency, defense issues are generally ignored and given only the most abbreviated oversight by Parliament.¹⁰⁵

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DEFENSE FORCE PLANNING IN AUSTRALIA

CHAPTER III

GOVERNMENT

The ultimate responsibility of the civilian government for decision making is a central feature of Australian society.¹

Hon. Kim C. Beazley
Minister for Defence

The parliamentary system makes realistic force planning very difficult -- governments fall and changes in direction take place rapidly.²

Coral Bell

Inspiration. Australia has been an independent Federal Commonwealth within the British Commonwealth of Nations since 1 January 1901.³ Today it is a mature, stable democracy based on the British Parliamentary, or "Westminster," system of government. As the history of Australia indicates, national federation followed decades of thought and discussion which began as early as the 1850s. The framers of Australia's Constitution were able to draw from a great many sources for inspiration and guidance. They considered many alternatives when deliberating about the final shape of the new government. In the end, tradition and existing institutions played the most significant role in determining the shape of the new Australian Federal Government. Although Australia drew most of its concept of government from its British traditions, it also drew a good deal from the American system of government. There were even

complaints from the more tradition bound delegates to the Constitutional Convention that too much emphasis was placed on copying American institutions.⁴

Innovation. Australians were not content to simply imitate the English form of government. They were also radical innovators in the political process. An important political first for Australia was introduction of the "secret ballot" for all elections in the colonies of South Australia and Victoria in 1856.⁵ Use of the secret ballot spread rapidly to the other Australian colonies and then overseas to England and the United States. When the concept of the secret ballot was initially introduced in England and the United States, it was known officially as the "Australian Ballot."⁶

The very first electorate in the world to grant "full adult male suffrage with no strings attached" for males over twenty one years of age was the colony of South Australia, also in 1856. Although it only applied to the lower house of the colonial legislature, it was a radical political idea at the time.⁷ By the time of Federation in 1901, the idea of "one man, one vote" had been accepted as a fundamental pillar of the Constitution for all Australian states.⁸

Form of Government. The Constitution provides for three branches of government; an executive branch, a legislative branch and a judicial branch. The Constitution also divided governmental powers between the states and the central government. As in the American system, only specified and

clearly enumerated powers were originally vested in the federal government. All the residual, or unspecified, powers were to remain with the states.⁹ Like many other western democracies, however, Australia's Federal government has evolved into a powerful entity in its own right. It has gained the powers needed to deal with complex modern problems at the expense of the state governments. This process was justified by the central government's "temporary requirement" for exceptional powers to deal with specific national emergencies. The two World Wars and the Great Depression are the most obvious examples of events requiring temporary measures. In reality, once the federal government assumed a new or expanded power and established a supporting bureaucracy, it has proven nearly impossible for the state governments to regain them.¹⁰

Executive Branch. Executive power in the Commonwealth is vested in the British Monarch. The Queen of England is also the Queen of Australia and is recognized as Head of State. The Queen exercises executive power through the Governor-General, who is charged with maintaining the Australian Constitution and executing its laws. As the Crown's representative in Australia, the Governor-General also acts as nominal "Commander-in-Chief" of the naval and military forces of the Commonwealth. He is advised by the Federal Executive Council and supported by a Federal Ministry. The Federal Ministry consists of civil servants in

some twenty-two executive departments, such as Defense, Treasury, and Foreign Affairs and Trade. Table 3-1 provides a list of the current executive departments in the Australian government.

Table 3-1

Government of Australia*

Ministries

(Listed in alphabetical order)

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Department of Aboriginal Affairs
Department of Administrative Services
Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism
and Territories
Attorney-General's Department
Department of Aviation
Department of Community Services
Department of Defence
Department of Employment, Education and Training
Department of Finance
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Department of Health
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce
Department of Local Government and Administrative
Affairs
Department of Primary Industries and Energy
Department of Science
Department of Social Security
Department of the Special Minister of State
Department of Transportation and Communications
Department of the Treasury
Department of Veterans' Affairs

* The Far East and Australasia - 1988, 19th Edition
(London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1988), p. 193.

Federal Executive Council. The members of the Federal Executive Council who advise the Governor-General are all officers, or ministers, of the Crown. They are commissioned by the Governor-General to supervise the various ministries. This is a hold over from the colonial era when the colonial governor had an appointed council of advisors to assist in running the colony. Ministers must also be elected members of one of the houses of the Commonwealth Parliament. They are recommended to the Governor-General by his "chief minister," the Prime Minister. This form of government is known as "responsible government" because legislators are used as members of the executive branch of government. Executive branch ministers are drawn from Parliament and are responsible to it for the functioning of the government.¹¹ The Prime Minister's government holds office only as long as it "retains the confidence of Parliament" that it can govern effectively.¹² Once the Prime Minister no longer commands the votes in Parliament needed to get legislation passed, the government is essentially paralyzed. At this point Parliament is dissolved by the Governor-General and he calls for new elections.¹³

Cabinet. The key decision making body in Australia's government is the Prime Minister's Cabinet and not the Federal Executive Council.¹⁴ Cabinet membership is essentially the same as that of the Federal Executive Council, but the Prime Minister chairs meetings of the Cabinet. It is also up to the Prime Minister to decide which ministers attend meetings as part of his

decision making team. The Governor-General, as a member of the Executive Branch and representative of the Crown, is not a member of the Prime Minister's Cabinet.

The Australian Cabinet consists of an Inner Cabinet and an Outer Cabinet. The Inner Cabinet is composed of a relatively small group of important senior ministers selected by the Prime Minister to be his closest advisors. The Outer Cabinet includes both the Inner Cabinet members and all the remaining ministers in the Prime Minister's government. Membership in the Cabinet, and whether a particular minister is in the inner or outer cabinet, is entirely at the discretion of the Prime Minister as leader of the party in power. Table 3-2 provides a list of structure of the Australian cabinet as of January 1989.¹⁵

The Cabinet is not mentioned in the Australian Constitution, or any other Australian legal documents, and has no legal standing as a governmental or legislative entity. It is in the Cabinet, none the less, that the Prime Minister and his advisors make all the key decisions about running the government. There are no particular rules or procedures governing Cabinet meetings and records of formal votes are not usually kept. The Cabinet usually meets in private and its deliberations are not normally divulged to the public because it is not a "legal entity." Australia's form of parliamentary government places exceptional emphasis on reaching a consensus on issues in the privacy of Cabinet meetings. Much of the government's most important and controversial legislation is debated and decided upon in the

privacy of Cabinet meetings before its introduction in Parliament.

Table 3-2

Australian Cabinet¹⁶

Inner Cabinet

Prime Minister

Deputy Prime Minister

Attorney General

Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce

Minister for Transport and Communications

Minister for Industrial Relations

Treasurer

Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs

Minister for Finance

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade

Special Minister of State, Minister assisting the Prime

Minister on the Status of Women

Minister for Employment, Education and Training

Minister for Primary Industries and Energy

Minister for Administrative Services

Minister for Defence

Minister for the Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism and Territories

Minister for Social Security

Minister for Community Services and Health

Other Ministers (Outer Cabinet)

Minister for Resources

Minister for Science and Small Business

Minister for Trade Negotiations

Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce

Minister for Employment Services and Youth Affairs

Minister for Veterans' Affairs

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs

Minister for the Environment and the Arts

Minister for Home Affairs

Minister for Land Transport and Infrastructure Support

Minister for Consumer Affairs

Minister for Defence Science and Personnel

Based on their private deliberations, supporters of the Prime Minister's program and members of the majority party, are able to present a united front when announcing a policy or decision. The Prime Minister expects all remaining members of his party to support fully the decisions made during cabinet meetings. Because the Prime Minister controls a majority of votes in the House of Representatives, Cabinet approval of proposed legislation is tantamount to its approval.¹⁷

Judiciary. The Constitution of Australia provides for a Federal Supreme Court, called the High Court of Australia, to be vested with the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The Court consists of a Chief Justice and six other justices appointed by the Governor-General in Council¹⁸ to serve until reaching seventy years of age. Seventy is the mandatory retirement age for all Commonwealth, or Federal, justices and judges.¹⁹ There are also two subordinate courts in the federal judicial system, the Federal court of Australia and the Family Court of Australia.

The High Court has both appellate and original jurisdiction to execute its primary responsibility of interpreting the Australian Constitution.²⁰ Although recognized as the highest court in Australia, the constitution originally provided an additional avenue of appeal superior to the High Court. As a vestige of its colonial past, certain classes of Australian legal cases could be appealed around the High Court to the Queen's Privy Council²¹ in the United Kingdom.²² This avenue of appeal was abolished on March 1986 by the Australia Act and now the High

Court is the country's ultimate arbiter of legal issues and court of last resort for appeals from lower courts.²³

In addition to its role as an interpreter of the Australian Constitution, the High Court has original jurisdiction over all Australia's legal questions other countries arising from treaties. The High Court also rules on matters arising between Australian states and legal disputes between Australian states and the federal government. As with the United States Supreme Court, the High Court of Australia selects the appellate cases it desires to hear and rule upon. It usually hears appeals from lower courts only if the legal question involved is of public importance or if there is a difference of opinion between intermediate appellate courts as to interpretation of the law.²⁴

Immediately subordinate to the High Court is the Federal Court of Australia. This court consists of a Chief Judge and twenty-nine other judges and was created by Parliament in 1977 to relieve the High Court of some of its mundane caseload. The Federal Court has assumed jurisdiction over matters involving trade practices, industrial disputes, administrative law questions and federal bankruptcy proceedings. This court also hears appeals from Supreme Courts of the Territories and certain appeals from state courts. The other court in the Federal judiciary is the Family Court of Australia, consisting of a Chief Judge and forty-four associate judges. This court hears cases involving domestic and family matters involving federal law.²⁵

Legislative Branch. Legislative functions are vested in the Australian Parliament, which consists of two chambers of equal constitutional standing. The upper house is the Senate and the lower house is the House of Representatives. Except for revenue and taxation bills, either body may originate legislation.²⁶ By practice and tradition, the House of Representatives has acquired the real power in government. Most Australian constitutional scholars view the Senate most important role as that of a brake on the otherwise limitless power of the majority party rather than an initiator of legislation.²⁷

Senate. The Australian Senate has a function similar to the Senate of the United States. It was specifically designed to be "a house of the States" and act as a counterbalance to the power of the lower house. Each state has equal representation regardless of population size.²⁸ There are currently twelve senators from each state, two from the Australian Capital Territory and one representing the Northern Territory. Senators hold office for a term of six years, one half the senators from each state being required to stand for election every three years.²⁹

Proportionate Representation System. There are no senatorial election districts and senators are directly chosen by all the people of each state or territory. Election of senators is not, however, a straightforward "winner-take-all" process. Australia uses a system called "proportionate representation" to allocate Senate seats according to the ratio of votes cast for

the various candidates and their parties. This process ensures smaller political parties and splinter groups are represented in the national government if they receive a threshold percentage of votes cast. It also ensures that splinter groups and single issue parties can exercise a disproportionate amount of power if Parliament is evenly divided between major political parties.³⁰

The Senate has the same power to originate legislation as the House, except that it may not originate any legislation proposing the appropriation of money, or imposing taxation. Unlike the United States Senate, the Australian Senate may not amend revenue or taxation legislation originated in the House of Representatives. There is no process similar to the Conference Committee used by the American Congress to iron out differences in legislation passed by the two houses. If the Senate disagrees with a money or taxation bill, or wishes changes be made in the language of a bill, it only has two options. It may disapprove the legislation or return the legislation to the House, requesting specific amendments be made.³¹

House of Representatives. The lower house, or House of Representatives, is the "house of the people." It has the real power in the Australia government because it alone may originate revenue and taxation legislation. Members are required to run for election from a specific political district and they hold office for three years before having to seek reelection. The present Parliament consists of 148 members, including two from the Australian Capitol Territory and one from the Northern

Territory.³² The Constitution requires the number of Representatives always be more than double the number of Senators. Although seats in the House of Representatives are distributed to states in proportion to their populations, representatives do not all represent equal portions of the population in each state. Election districts are drawn to give preferential treatment to rural districts. Representatives from rural electoral districts represent fewer constituents than do members from urban areas. This gerrymandering has recently become a contentious issue in elections, in particular among the urban electorate. It is not unconstitutional but will probably be changed in the near future as more Australians leave the countryside and migrate to cities to take industrial and service sector jobs.³³

Preferential system of voting. In contrast to the Senate, Members of the House of Representatives are elected on the "preferential system" of voting. When they go to the polls in Australia, voters do not cast a "winner take all" vote for a specific candidate for Parliament. Each voter must rank all candidates running for election to Parliament, and every other office up for election, indicating an order of preference for each candidate. These "orders of preference" are part of a relatively complex process used by electoral commissions to determine which candidates actually gets elected.

If no candidate receives a clear majority on the first count of the ballots, the candidate with the least number of votes is

removed from consideration. The removed candidate's preferential position votes are distributed to the remaining candidates and ballots are recounted. The process continues until one candidate attains an absolute majority and is declared winner. The positive benefit to such a system is that there are no "run off" elections in Australian elections. The negative side to the process is the routine disqualification of about twenty percent of the ballots in any election due voting errors. If a voter does not indicate a specific order of preference for every candidate on the ballot, or gets confused and marks two candidates with the same preference order, the ballot is invalidated.³⁴

Party Discipline. In theory, members of the House of Representatives are responsible to the voters in their district and are able to "vote their conscience" on issues affecting their constituents. In Australia, however, this is only true only to a limited degree. Although the "party system" in the House of Representatives resembles that of England's, it deviates from the British tradition in one key area. British Parliamentarians are clearly entitled to a reasonable amount of freedom to judge difficult situations for themselves.

Australia runs things differently. In keeping with a society where "working man is king" and trade unions still enjoy enormous support, stiff rules of party discipline have become accepted. The system that has evolved in Australia requires loyal and nearly unquestioning support for party policy from

legislators. Those who do not toe the mark usually face dire political consequences, like withdrawal of party support, at election time. Members of the House of Representatives have been accused of being party delegates to the House rather than representatives of their constituents. This has caused all manner of problems for the frank formulation and discussion of policies and legislation. It has also seriously reduced the deliberative roles of both the House of Representatives and the Senate during the government of a strong Prime Minister.³⁵

Approved Legislation. All legislation must have the approval of both houses before it can become law. Legislation proposed by either the House of Representatives or Senate is transmitted to the other chamber for consideration and approval. If either body refuses to approve legislation from the other body, or passes it with amendments to which it will not agree, the Governor-General may dissolve Parliament and call for new elections. The last time this happened was when E. G. Whitlam's Labour Party government was unable to pass a national budget in the early Seventies because it did not control the Senate. The Governor-General precipitated a major constitutional debate when he dissolved Parliament and called for elections. The Labour Party failed to gain enough seats to control Parliament and control of the government passed to the conservatives.

After elections, if the two houses still cannot agree on legislation, the Governor-General convenes both bodies in a Joint Session. During the joint session, Parliament debates and votes on proposed legislation as a single body.³⁶ The lower house inevitably prevails in such legislative disputes because the Constitution requires that the number of representatives always be at least twice the number of Senators.

Once both houses approve a piece of legislation, Parliament formally transmits it to the Governor-General. He may then approve the legislation in the Queen's name, withhold assent, or reserve the law "for the Queen's pleasure." Withholding assent is similar to a Presidential Veto in the United States. "Reserving the law for the Queen's pleasure" means that the Queen herself will have to approve it.³⁷ The Governor-General may also return legislation to the body in which it originated for additional consideration, recommending changes. In general practice, the Governor-General seldom does anything but approve legislation sent to him by Parliament.³⁸

Summary. The Australia system of government is one of great strengths and significant weaknesses. This is particularly true of legislative branch, and the assignment of members of Parliament to supervise executive branch departments. The greatest strength of Australia's system is that once the government decides on a program, there is no question about its implementation. The Prime Minister, by virtue of his control of a majority of the members of Parliament, holds the commission to

form a government from the Governor-General. If the Prime Minister and his cabinet are convinced of the requirement for legislation, then the remaining members of the party are expected to support it.

The most significant weakness in this system is that the ministers responsible for supervising the departments in the executive branch are also elected politicians. Their primary goal in life is always to get themselves reelected on a regular basis. These politicians do not have the time to adequately supervise the large, complex bureaucracy required of a modern industrial state and execute their constituent duties as well. Commentators have recognized this as a problem and proposed the addition of several junior ministers to assist the principle minister for each major executive branch department. This action is especially necessary for managing large and complex departments like the Department of Defence, but it will not solve the oversight problem.³⁹ With Australia's form of Parliamentary government, politicians will continue to struggle with maintaining the balance between their responsibility to manage the government and their duty to the voters in a home district.

The Minister for Defence is forced, therefore, to place extraordinary reliance on his principal military and civil servant subordinates to manage the defense establishment. Without a separate minister providing oversight for each service, the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary to the Department have become essentially independent power centers

within the Department of Defence. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, each side of the defense organization vies for influence and access to the minister. Over the past twenty years, there has been a growth in the power and influence of the civil service within the defense organization and a proportionate diminution of the military's role in the defense decision making process. The result has been a sort of guerrilla warfare between the civilian and military branches of the Department of Defence which has almost paralyzed formulation of policy.⁴⁰

Notes

1. Hon. Kim C. Beazley, MP, "Civil-Military Relations," Speech delivered at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, ACT, Australia: 17 September 1986.

2. Bell, "ANZUS in Australian Foreign and Security Policies," Jacob Bercovitch, ed., ANZUS in Crisis: Alliance Management in International Affairs, (New York City: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 141.

3. Collins, p. 54.

4. Greenwood, pp. 180-193.

5. Ian Howie-Willis, Federation and Australia's Parliamentary System (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1987), p. 15.

6. Howie-Willis, p. 15.

7. Howie-Willis, p. 15.

8. Howie-Willis, p. 14.

9. Castles, p. 90.

10. Castles, pp. 90-91.

11. Howie-Willis, p. 13.

12. Castles, p. 90.

13. Don Whittington and Rob Chalmers, Inside Canberra: A Guide to Australian Federal Politics (Kent Town, SA: Rigby, 1971), pp. 87-88.

14. Whittington, p. 48.

15. The Far East and Australasia 1988 (London: Europa Publications, 1988), pp. 192-193.

16. These ministries are listed in order of precedence in the current government of Mr. Robert Hawke, the Prime Minister. Source: Far East and Australasia 1988, 19th Edition. (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1988), pp. 192-193.

17. Don Whittington & Rob Chalmers, Inside Canberra: A Guide to Australian Federal Politics, pp. 48 - 51.

18. When sitting with the Federal Executive Council which consists of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet as "ministers of the Crown." In reality, the Governor-General approves the appointments of persons recommended by the Prime Minister.

19. Castles, pp. 111 - 112.
20. The Far East and Australasia, pp. 195 - 196.
21. Originally a body of personal advisors and experts selected by the Sovereign to give advice in matters of state. By the time of the Australian Constitution, this function had, except in a formal sense, largely become the province of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
22. Whittington & Chalmers, pp. 72 - 73.
23. Europa World Book - 1989 (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1989), p. 370.
24. The Far East & Australasia, pp. 195 - 196.
25. The Far East & Australasia, pp. 195 - 196.
26. Australia: A Social & Political History. pp. .
27. Whittington, pp. 247.
28. Castles, p. 90 - 91.
29. Far East and Australasia, p. 191.
30. Whittington, pp. 247 - 249.
31. Castles, pp. 96 - 100.
32. Far East & Australasia, p. 191.
33. Whittington and Chalmers, pp. 91-94.
34. Whittington, pp. 276 - 277.
35. Wilson, pp. 237-243.
36. Castles, pp. 103 - 110.
37. Even though the Australia Act of 1986 severed all ties with the government of Great Britain, the Queen of England is also officially the Queen of Australia and as such may act on such legislation as requires her attention.
38. Whittington, pp. 150 - 151.
39. Gary Brown, "Management of Australia's Defence: Critique of the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade," Defence Force Journal: Journal of the Australian Profession of Arms, May/June 1988, pp. 5-7.
40. Brown, pp. 12-13.

CHAPTER IV


AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND DEFENSE INTERESTS

"Problems in the Pacific are different. What the United States and United Kingdom call the "Far East" is to us the "Near North."¹

Robert Menzies
Australian Prime Minister

Introduction. No discussion of force planning for a country can begin without a basic understanding of that country's strategic circumstances and basic national interests. Every country is "unique," in that it has distinct influences and concerns which set it apart from all other countries.² A country's geography, cultural traditions, history, economy and form of government all combine to exert pressures on force planners which must be taken into consideration when assessing the adequacy of a force structure. Australia has its own unique features which come into play when planning its security. These features make it both easier and, at the same time, more difficult for Australia to plan for its defense than it is for Australia's contemporaries in the Western Alliance and Southeast Asia to plan for theirs.

Overview. Australia is an island continent, located remote from the centers of world power and away from the traditional arenas of "Great Power" strategic competition. Australia shares



Map of Australia's Strategic Environment
Figure 4-1

no land border with any other country and its nearest neighbor is the island of New Guinea, about 100 miles to the north.³ These facts of geography provide Australia with considerable natural protection.

Physically, Australia is dry, and mostly infertile in the interior of the continent. The disproportionate amount of dry and infertile land in Australia means the country is incapable of supporting a population proportionate to the size of its land mass. Through advanced methods of grazing and agriculture, however, Australia's agricultural sector consistently produces quantities of meat, wool and cereal grains large enough for both domestic consumption and export. The land is also extraordinarily rich in minerals, which are successfully exported and contribute substantially to Australia's economic health.⁴ Australia's industrial sector has not been developed to compete on world markets and the country's economic well-being depends heavily on exporting its mineral wealth and agricultural commodities on favorable terms. Australia relies on agricultural and mineral exports to pay for the numerous manufactured products it must import to support its other economic sectors. This extensive export-import trade requires over 12,000 shipping movements to and from Australia and involves over 200 million tons of cargo each year.⁵ Surrounded by water, Australia is essentially a maritime country and depends on its sea lines of communication for its economic security.⁶

Economy. Australia's economy could once be described as "riding on the back of a sheep."⁷ The country's early economic structure was built around agriculture, particularly sheep grazing, and production of primary agricultural commodities for export to Great Britain. In return Australia imported the manufactured goods needed by its growing population. Although agricultural exports are still the chief source of national wealth, Australia's economy has experienced considerable growth and structural change since the end of World War II. Australia now has substantial petrochemical, iron and steel industries and is improving its capacity to manufacture textiles, electrical equipment and industrial machinery. Australia also has a very large tourist industry, which contributed more than \$1.3 billion to the economy in 1988.⁸ At \$220 billion, Australia's Gross National Product is third largest in the Asian/Pacific area, trailing only China and Japan in size.⁹

Australia is a major trading nation in the Pacific region with regional imports and exports valued at almost \$70 billion per year.¹⁰ In 1988 imports amounted to over \$36 billion and exports were more than \$33 billion.¹¹ Trade with Japan accounted for over twenty percent of Australia's imports (about \$6.6 billion) and twenty seven percent of Australia's exports (over \$8.9 billion) in 1988.¹² During the same period, trade with the United States provided twenty one percent of Australia's imports (\$7.56 billion), but accounted for only eleven percent of Australia's exports (over \$3.63 billion).¹³ Australia has recorded a deficit on its balance of payments every year since

1974, mostly because of the country's inelastic demand for imports and declining international prices for its major exports.¹⁴

Australia is in the unfortunate position of having too small a population to create a level of internal demand which would allow economies of scale in producing most manufactured goods. Additionally, it cannot create external demands for Australian manufactured goods because high labor costs result in uncompetitive prices in the external market.¹⁵ This is a major, long-term problem for Australia's economy which has substantial strategic implications.¹⁶ It will continue to loom large as Australia's policy of "defense self-reliance" requires increasing amounts of the manufacture and assembly of defense equipment be accomplished in Australia.

The government's policy of "Buy Australian" and of requiring more assembly of equipment in Australia will also have a substantial effect on the buying power of the funds allocated to defense. High technology and sophisticated military hardware will cost more, at least in the beginning. When Australia purchases equipment from major foreign suppliers, like the United States, lower unit pricing available because the U. S. buys in such large lots. It has been estimated by some Australian military officers that military hardware purchased from Australian manufacturers will be consistently ten to twenty percent higher than the same equipment manufactured in the United States and purchased "off the shelf."

Contributing to Australia's economic difficulties is Australia's emphasis on preserving existing industrial sector jobs in many economically inefficient industries. Responding to strong pressure from Australia's militant unions, the government maintains very high protective tariffs on imported goods which compete with domestically produced articles. Tariffs as high as 100 percent are not uncommon on the importation of any goods which would severely erode the health of an existing domestic industry¹⁷. One result of this protective policy is that Australia's industrialization continues to be based on import substitution, rather than on manufacturing for export. As long as it continues to manufacture goods inefficiently (in the economic sense), Australia will not develop the economic basis to be competitive in overseas world markets.¹⁸

Population. Australia's population is small in number, about 17 million, and concentrated in the southeast, the part of the country furthest removed from the rest of the world.¹⁹ Only New Zealand, 1,300 miles to the southeast, is close to the major population centers of Australia. Australia is predominately European in origin and culturally its strongest cultural and historical ties are with Europe and North America. It has few cultural links with the other nations of the nearby regions of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. As a nation, Australia's people are well educated and the work force is

skilled with a high proportion employed in advanced technology industries. The standard of living is high and comparable with those of the peoples of Northwest Europe and North American.²⁰

Politically Australia is democratic, conservative, egalitarian and stable. Political debate is open and opinions expressed cover the spectrum from the radical left to the reactionary right. Elections are contested with vigor and are well supported due to compulsory voting for all persons eligible to cast a ballot in national elections.²¹ Because of the relative well-being of the population, and its long democratic tradition, there are no chronic internal security problems which have any bearing on Australia's strategic situation.

Infrastructure. Although the population is relatively affluent and per-capita income is among the highest in the world, about \$14,458 in 1988,²² the population is so small that the government's revenue base is limited. Over half of Australia's 1988 national budget of \$65 billion was consumed by transfer payments in the form of social security (30%) and direct payments for health and education programs (21%).²³ Finding money in the national budget for development of the Australia's communications and logistics infrastructure of ports, airfields, roads, railroads and other facilities is a major challenge. By comparison, the continental United States has about the same land area as Australia, but it has fifteen times as many residents and a national budget that is over fifteen times bigger than Australia's.²⁴

The Southeast portion of the country, being the most populous part of the nation, is well developed. The infrastructure of the rest of the country, particularly the north, west and center, is poorly developed.²⁵ It is so difficult to move men and material through the central part of the country that a substantial portion of Australia's domestic commerce (about sixty five percent) travels from port to port by inter-coastal water craft.²⁶ These coastal routes could easily be interdicted by coastal raiders or by mining harbor entrances, causing severe dislocations to the economy.²⁷ Lack of a well developed internal communications and logistics system somewhat nullifies Australia's advantage of interior lines of communication in the event of an external attack.

Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). The most striking feature of Australia's strategic landscape is that it is an island, naturally well protected and inherently secure from invasion.²⁸ This also contributes to Australia's area of greatest vulnerability, the country's dependence on its sea lines of communications. Being both an island nation and a nation heavily dependent on trade, Australia needs to maintain its unrestricted lines of supply and communications. SLOCs are of particular importance to Australia because almost all (over ninety-nine percent) of Australia's export and imports are carried by sea.²⁹ Australia trades over thirty percent of its Gross Domestic Product, a figure proportionately higher than that of either the United States or Japan.³⁰

Australia also depends upon free use of its SLOCs for military resupply. Easy access to American military equipment and weapons stockpiles allows Australia's defense establishment to maintain lower inventories of expensive high tech equipment and munitions. This cost controlling procedure would not be possible without open SLOCs. Australian military planners know that, short of a general war, they can rearm and restock from United States sources. Trade is Australia's life blood and the ability to trade freely is the key to ensuring its national security.³¹

Because of its dependence on sea borne trade, a relatively small force could cause disproportionate disruption to Australia's economy by interfering with its movement. Forces of a hostile nation in the region, or even a band of terrorists, could severely damage Australia's economy by interrupting the movement of traffic along Australia's overseas SLOCs with Japan, the United States or other major trading partners. Such forces could also cause severe damage by interdicting Australia's domestic coastal shipping. This vulnerability is an aspect of national security that plays a considerable role in Australia's defense planning.³²


In spite of Australia's apparent security from outright invasion by another state, low-level territorial intrusions and raids would be difficult to both detect and repulse. These raids could cause considerable security problems for the government and significant economic disruption. Such intrusions into

Australia's resource and air spaces, for whatever reason, would be difficult to counter with Australia's existing force structure.³³

Australia's Strategic Environment. Australia's most recent statement on defense, The Defence of Australia,³⁴ was released in 1987. This document defined Australia's national security environment in terms of three inclusive and overlapping regions. Closest to Australia is an area of Direct Military Interest (DMI). Surrounding Australia's area of Direct Military Interest is an area of Primary Strategic Interest (PSI). Outside of Australia's PSI area and DMI area lies an area of global interests and issues which include the country's support for other nations of the Western Alliance and the prevention of global war.³⁵

Australia's area of Direct Military Interest is generally defined in the government's 1987 White Paper as a perimeter extending one thousand miles from the Australia continent and Tasmania in all directions. This area, which includes about ten percent of the earth's surface, covers a distance equal to the distance from Finland to the Suez Canal.³⁶ As the map in Figure 3-2 shows, Australia's DMI area stretches from the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean to New Zealand in the Pacific, and from the archipelago and island chains north of Australia to its Southern Ocean.³⁷ This area is fundamental in defining Australia's security planning problem.

Map showing view of the World from Australia



EQUIDISTANT AZIMUTHAL PROJECTION OF THE WORLD
WITH ORIGIN AT CANBERRA


Figure 4-2

THE SCALE OF MILES APPLIES ONLY TO DISTANCES ON THE SAME STRAIGHT
LINE THROUGH THE ORIGIN. THE DOTTED CIRCLE IS THE BOUNDARY OF
THE HEMISPHERE CENTRED ON CANBERRA

Australia's region of Primary Strategic Interest is defined as extending throughout "South-east Asia, the South-West Pacific and the East Indian Ocean."³⁸ This area includes the countries which comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the states of Indochina, Papua-New Guinea and the newly independent Southwest Pacific island nations.³⁹ Australia's strategic environment is best reviewed by considering the geographical regions which are included in its defined areas.

Southwest Pacific. Situated to the northeast of Australia, the Southwest Pacific is perhaps most important to Australia's force planners because it lies astride Australia's vital SLOCs with the United States.⁴⁰ Until recently the Southwest Pacific was considered a "boring strategic backwater" because it enjoyed a high degree of stability.⁴¹ The newly independent Pacific Island micro-states of this region are faced with uncertain economic futures and share an unfamiliar sense of insecurity brought on by their nominal independence. Each of these small countries has fragile internal social and political structures and is vulnerable to outside influences.⁴² Travel and modern communications have enhanced the adverse effects of political tensions, population pressures, urbanization and unemployment to create a feeling of dissatisfaction with the "old ways."⁴³

Major sources of political tensions that have recently developed in this area have been racial conflicts and coups in Fiji and increasing trade union militancy in Western Samoa, the



Map of the Southwest Pacific

Figure
4-3

Solomons and Kiribati.⁴⁴ In addition, French nuclear testing and the internal conflict in New Caledonia over the future of the French territory has the potential to further destabilize the South Pacific area. French policy and actions have served to unite the Pacific Island states, encouraging the more militant and assertive to demand that France allow them a role in the affairs of the French Territories in the Pacific. There are no neutral governments among the South Pacific island nations about these two contentious issues and their resolution does not appear on the horizon.⁴⁵

Although concerned about events in the area, none of the Pacific Island states appears able to pose any threat to Australia, now or in the near future. Successive Australian governments have made it a fundamental national policy to maintain good relations with these nations. The possibility that one or more of these small island states could eventually fall under the control of a power hostile to Australia cannot be discounted. Most of the island states do not have an established heritage of democracy, and their economic and racial or ethnic problems could give birth to radical governments hostile to Australian influence in the area. For the present, most of these states continue to look to Australia to provide leadership and stability for the region.⁴⁶ Responding to this need, Australia has initiated a policy of "cooperative defense agreements" with many of the Pacific Island micro-states. Under these agreements, Australia provides patrol boats and training programs for national self-defense and constabulary forces.⁴⁷

Indonesia and Papua-New Guinea. the Indonesian Archipelago, with the nations of Indonesia and Papua-New Guinea, stretches across the northern approaches to Australia. Indonesia is large in size, population and resources, and has the capacity to be the major power of the region. It has 150 million people and great economic and military potential. Although no strategic analysis can ignore Indonesia, it does not appear to present a military threat to Australia, now or in the foreseeable future.⁴⁸ In spite of the near constant attempts by some political groups in Australia to raise the specter of an Indonesian invasion, it is difficult to conceive of a less rational strategy for Indonesia than to try and overrun the continent of Australia. The folly of such an exercise is especially evident when the tremendous logistical problems of such an invasion are taken into consideration.⁴⁹

In fact, Indonesia resents always being painted as a possible villain in Australian defense debates. It considers Australia to be a very lucky country, because it is protected from external threats by Indonesia itself. In order to improve relations between the two countries, the Australian government recently launched a program explicitly aimed at increasing Australian-Indonesian contacts in the areas of trade and defense.⁵⁰ It will take some time, however, before the old animosities are finally laid to rest.

Papua New-Guinea is of special strategic interest to Australia because of its position as Australia's closest

neighbor.⁵¹ The newly independent country occupies the eastern half of the Island of New Guinea, the world's second largest island. PNG shares the island of New Guinea with the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya which occupies the western half of the island. The Island of New Guinea stretches across the northern approaches to Australia like great protective barrier. As long as New Guinea is in friendly hands, Australia's national security is enhanced. Were the island to fall under the control of a hostile power, Australia's security problems would be increased substantially.⁵²

Administered as an Australian "territory" until its independence in 1975, PNG has a population of about three million, most of whom live at the subsistence farming level in remote tribes and speak mutually unintelligible languages.⁵³ PNG has developed a thriving and vibrant, if somewhat chaotic, democratic tradition over the past twenty years and has continued to develop a foreign policy independent of direction from Australia. The country experienced an assortment of political crises early in its national life which tested and reaffirmed the country's commitment to the democratic tradition. Having successfully completed several changes of government by the democratic process, PNG has assumed an increasingly visible role as a leader in regional affairs.⁵⁴

PNG played a key role in helping Vanuatu put down an attempted secession by radical elements on the island of Espiritu Santo by dispatching PNG Defense Force Units to assist the

legitimate government.⁵⁵ Although undoubtedly the correct thing to do, PNG's actions have aroused the concern of other South Pacific nations about its aspirations to regional leadership. The success of this operation, as well as other less conspicuous initiatives have given PNG leaders an increased feeling of confidence when dealing with regional problems and issues. There is a large gap between the confidence felt by PNG politicians and the reality of the capability required to independently exert real influence in the region. PNG is still heavily dependent on Australia for economic and military support.⁵⁶

Australia also has a considerable economic stake in the future of PNG. About forty percent of the businesses in PNG are owned or controlled by Australians or Australian companies and Australia dominates the PNG economy. PNG imported nearly \$500 million worth of goods from Australia in 1988 and received nearly thirty percent of its national budget as direct aid from Australia.

Australia also has a defense "understanding" with PNG which is symbolic of the interest Australia has in the security of that country. Although not committing Australia to military action in PNG's defense, Australia has made it clear that military action would be seriously considered if a security threat to PNG developed.⁵⁷ One area of continuing friction where military

action is possible is PNG's common border with the Indonesian state of Irian Jaya, a former Dutch colony seized by Indonesia in the late 1950's.

PNG's difficult relations with Indonesia are a continuation of the Sukarno era confrontations with Australia over his annexation of the former Dutch colony in Western New Guinea and his threats against formation of the new nation of Malaysia. Many in PNG perceive that Indonesia has persecuted ethnic New Guineans in Irian Jaya, causing thousands to flee across the border into PNG. Indonesia's occupation of Western New Guinea also spawned an indigenous anti-Indonesian guerrilla insurgency which uses refugee camps on the PNG border as safe havens.⁵⁸

Indonesia's vigorous military operations to suppress guerrillas and its domestic policies in Irian Jaya have drawn outspoken criticism from PNG politicians and stirred up popular support for rebel activity. Diplomatic sparring over the fate of the refugees has been further exacerbated by border incidents between Indonesian military units in hot pursuit of guerrillas and PNG border patrols bent on ensuring the sovereignty of PNG territory.⁵⁹ In an effort to improve relations between the two countries, Australia recently brokered agreements designed to permit Indonesia and PNG to collectively ensure the integrity of the border and reduce incursions by guerrilla forces into Irian Jaya.

In spite of these efforts, exchanges of gunfire between military units, combined with vigorous anti-Indonesian political

rhetoric, have served as an increasing irritant to Indonesian sensitivities. Continued provocation of Indonesia by PNG politicians, PNG's weak economy and its very limited defense forces combine to produce potentially difficult problems for Australia's defense planners.⁶⁰

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Association of South East Asian Nations* is primarily an economic and trading organization and not a military alliance. It does, however, provide a forum for wide ranging discussions about a great many issues between the member states. Even without formal military ties, common security concerns are sure to be discussed during ASEAN conferences and meetings. Many observers of Southeast Asian events predict that ASEAN will ultimately evolve into some form of a regional security organization.⁶¹

The ASEAN member countries have experienced unprecedented economic growth and progress over the last twenty years and have recently embarked on programs to considerably expand their military and defense capabilities. The precise reasons behind this build up are not clear and probably differ markedly from nation to nation. These nations generally view social unrest and internal instability as their greatest threats,⁶² and their build-ups may be aimed more at enhanced internal security than meeting external threats. ASEAN military officers often

* The member states of ASEAN are Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines and Brunei. Papua-New Guinea holds non-voting "observer" status in the organization.

emphasize that external events and considerations play a secondary, but still important, role in their defense planning.⁶³

Among the external factors which may be contributing to this military build are fear of increased Soviet presence in the region, the possibility of a more aggressive and assertive China in the near future, the unresolved Cambodian problem and an unpredictable Vietnam with its well equipped army of 1.5 million troops. Any or all of these, coupled with concerns over a possible reduction of United States interest or influence in the region, adds to an increased level of anxiety among ASEAN nations.⁶⁴ ASEAN anxieties can only have been heightened by Mr. Gorbachev's proposals that the United States abandon its Far Eastern bases as a quid pro quo for Soviet naval units leaving Cam Rahn Bay.

In any case, it is in Australia's national self interest that ASEAN states maintain and develop an indigenous capability to protect themselves from outside interference. Australia actively participates in ASEAN efforts through various bilateral defense cooperation programs that promote a sense of "strategic community" in the region. There appear to be no major differences between Australia and ASEAN countries in terms of broad strategic defense interests at the moment or for the near future.⁶⁵

Indochina. Although not directly threatening to Australia at present, the situation in Indochina has the potential to

destabilize the whole Southeast Asian region. Until recently China and the Soviet Union conducted an intense struggle by proxy over Cambodia. Although this arena of super power conflict is quiet for the moment, the basic ingredients of instability remain unresolved and Cambodia could erupt in bloody civil war at any time. There is also the long history of warfare and conflict between China and Vietnam over attempts to dominate events in Indochina. The last large scale conflict between these two states took place just several years ago and their occasional border skirmishes routinely remind the world that their relationship continues to be a volatile one.

Vietnam's close relationship with the Soviet Union has given the Soviet military access to excellent bases at Da Nang and Cam Rahn Bay. The progressive buildup of Soviet naval forces in the South China Sea area, as well as the deployment of Soviet Badger maritime strike aircraft to Cam Rahn Bay, has raised the level of concern among countries in the region. The Soviet build-up has not gone unnoticed in Australia either. Continental Australia is now within potential air strike reach of Soviet Air Forces for the first time in history.⁶⁶

The struggles in and around Southeast Asia are major causes of tension in the region itself. Of considerable concern to Australia and the other nations of the region are the conflicting off-shore sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. These have the potential to lead to serious disputes because of the economic stakes and national pride issues involved. No where else in the

world is there a military situation as volatile as the one existing in the area of the Spratley and Parcel Island groups. Five nations (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia) have over-lapping territorial claims and a number of them have armed forces stationed on different islands of the group.⁶⁷

There have already been a number of incidents involving armed conflict over possession of certain islands in both the Spratley and Parcel Island chains. The most recent was a shoot out on 14 March 1988 between China and Vietnam for possession of the reefs of Chu Thap and Chau Vien. The Chinese assault involved an armada of some 30 vessels which significantly outgunned and outnumbered the Vietnamese military presence in the Spratleys. Two of Vietnam's three ships were sunk, the third was severely damaged and Vietnam suffered four confirmed killed and over seventy missing in action.⁶⁸ The important lesson for the nations bordering the South China Sea was that China has the capability to project its military power a thousand miles from its shores. It also made clear to all in the area that China has the political will to use its military might to assert its perception of reality on the region.

Although these disputed islands lie outside of Australia's area of "direct military interest," their position in the South China Sea makes them of strategic importance to Australia. The Spratley and Parcel Islands lie astride the crucial sea lanes between the Straits of Malacca and Japan, as well as the north-

south sea lanes between Japan and Australia. Events in the South China Sea cannot be ignored and must factor directly in Australia's security equation.

Beyond Australia's Area of Primary Strategic Interest.

Moving beyond the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Regions, Australia's direct security interests rapidly decrease in importance. Australia has a large economic stake in the future well-being of Japan, its major trading partner, but has no arrangements for mutual security or defense cooperation and none are planned. Australia also has considerable interest in the future of Europe, both Western and Eastern, and in the continued political, economic and social development of the Third World. These interests do not, however, play the direct part in Australia's regional security preparations as they did in the past, when Australia was committed to Britain's Imperial Defense Strategy. Australian political leaders have repeatedly stated that their response to world events outside of Australia's area of primary strategic interest does not include use of force. They have also stated that they cannot foresee any circumstance when Australia would become involved in an armed conflict outside of Australia's Area of Direct Military Interest.⁶⁹

Alliances and Security Commitments. Australia is a party to several bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. In addition to its bilateral defense "understanding" with PNG, previously discussed, Australia is a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) and is a signatory of the Manila

Treaty. Australia also has a bilateral treaty with New Zealand (ANZAC Treaty), dating from 1944. Australia's most important security arrangement is, however, its alliance with the United States, as a member of the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty.⁷⁰

Five Power Defence Arrangement. Australia has had long standing and close military ties with both Malaysia and Singapore, two of Australia's partners in the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA). The other members of the FPDA are Great Britain and New Zealand. Through FPDA, Australia is a major supporter of the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) which provides air defense for peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. Australia also uses the FPDA to participate in other cooperative defense activities with Malaysia and Singapore. IADS has always been commanded by an Australian and the system relies heavily on Australia for the training and technical support necessary to keep it at peak efficiency. In addition to supporting IADS, Australia stations P-3 maritime patrol aircraft detachments and rotates Australian F/A-18 fighter squadrons through the Butterworth Airfield on the central Malay Peninsula. The P-3 deployments from Butterworth are crucial to maintaining adequate surveillance of the Indian Ocean approaches to the Straits of Malacca and the Gulf of Thailand.⁷¹

Australia's involvement in Malaysian defense is largely the legacy of Australia's obligations under Britain's old Imperial Defense Arrangements and Australia's subsequent policy of

"forward defense." In the past, it had been Australia's policy to meet a threat on someone else's territory by stationing troops as far forward, or away from Australia's territory, as possible. In the post-war era this called for meeting the threat to Australia posed by communism's southward advance through Indochina on the Malay Peninsula. While now largely symbolic, Australia's commitment to Malaysia and Singapore is a powerful and positive signal of continued interest in, and credible support for, maintaining the security and stability of the region.

Manila Treaty. Although the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) is defunct, the Manila Treaty remains in force and Australia still has formal security agreements with both Thailand and the Philippines. It is unlikely that the treaty will ever be invoked, but it must still be included in any assessment of Australia's strategic situation. Internal developments in the Philippines do not have a direct bearing on Australian defense planning, but they are important because of their potential effect on America's regional presence and access to the Philippine bases.⁷²

Australia-New Zealand Agreement. The precursor to the ANZUS Treaty, it provided for close Australian-New Zealand defense cooperation and was originally designed to ensure the post-war stability and security of the Southwest Pacific. Signed by Australia and New Zealand in 1944, it defined an area of defense which included Australia, New Zealand and the islands to their

north and northeast.⁷³ Largely ignored following promulgation of the ANZUS alliance in 1951, it was never abrogated and has been resurrected since the ANZUS Alliance problems with New Zealand over nuclear weapons. It is once again the primary basis for Australia-New Zealand bilateral defense planning and is gradually replacing ANZUS as the cornerstone of New Zealand's security arrangements.⁷⁴

Australia-New Zealand-United States Alliance (ANZUS).

Signed in 1951 as a defensive alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, its rather vague wording made it "all things to all people." It was a part of the United States' policy of containment of post-war Soviet expansionism and provided the guarantee sought by the Australian government that the United States would come to Australia's aid in the event of an attack. It has evolved through the years and now plays the key role in Australia defense planning. The ANZUS Alliance is quite literally the foundation upon which all Australian defense planning is built.⁷⁵

ANZUS also involves Australia directly in the Superpower competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Australians recognize that any conflict between the two superpowers would have profound implications for Australia and that it could do little to influence the outcome. As a committed member of the Western Alliance, however, Australia contributes substantially to the deterrent capabilities of the United States and the Western Alliance. It does this by maintaining joint

intelligence gathering and communications facilities in Australia and providing support facilities for US Navy ships and US Air Force aircraft. Australia's current policy is to give priority to efforts to prevent global conflict rather than to make preparations for taking part in it.⁷⁶

Recent Policy. Australia's recently announced a policy of "increased self-reliance in defense," but it has emphasized that this policy does not degrade the importance of the ANZUS Alliance to Australia. The government has repeatedly stated that the ANZUS Alliance remains central to Australia's security. Leaders of all major political parties have made it clear that the ANZUS Treaty continues to provide grounds for confidence in support from the United States in the event of an overwhelming threat to Australia's security.⁷⁷

The facts of geography and potential reach of regional neighbors armed with increasingly sophisticated weaponry, dictate that Australia's national security policy have a northern orientation. Indonesia's protests notwithstanding, little could threaten Australia from the south. Any strategy developed for a country as large, complex and under populated as Australia must be flexible enough to confront simultaneous menaces occurring across a relatively wide threat spectrum. The unique aspect of being an island nation means that Australia's military preparations must focus on operations in a maritime environment.

In particular, Australia's strategy must consider the sea/air gap between Australia and its neighboring countries to the north as its primary area of concern.⁷⁸

In a low intensity campaign of harassment and intimidation, Australian dependencies, like the Christmas and Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean, could be easy targets for an aggressor. Australia's strategic off-shore economic facilities, such as oil rigs and fishing zones, are also relatively soft targets which require attention by defense planners. Forces must be available which are capable of responding quickly and positively to protect these valuable economic assets, as well as protecting Australia's continental territory.⁷⁹

In preparing for contingencies near the high end of the spectrum, Australia is faced with a dichotomy between the perceived level of threat and the requirement to maintain a credible conventional force structure.⁸⁰ Although Australia's intelligence organizations have repeatedly produced strategic assessments which foresee "no major conventional threat in the next fifteen years,"⁸¹ weapon systems required to counter conventional threats have become increasingly costly and complex. The length of time needed to obtain and make operational the sophisticated and technical capabilities necessary to counter high and medium level threat weapon systems is often longer than the strategic assessment horizon. Australian planners cannot overlook the implications and consequences of failing to prepare

to meet these higher level threats, even though the nature of such threats may not be immediately apparent, nor easy to articulate.

Current defense policy, stated in the 1987 Defence White Paper, is to maintain Australia's military capabilities at reasonable readiness to counter lower level contingencies which could occur with little advance warning. At the same time, the government will continue development of selected higher-level capabilities and an adequate supporting infrastructure which can be activated when justified by changes in the strategic environment.⁸² The key to this strategy is adequate intelligence and warning. Australia's policy makers place great faith in the Australian-American Intelligence System being able to provide the necessary "heads up" for the government to be able to increase the nation's military readiness in a timely manner.

It must be pointed out that however knowledgeable Australia is in its intelligence estimates, much in the world is unpredictable and remains unpredicted. Who could have predicted the dramatic rise in oil prices ten years before it occurred? Or the Israeli setbacks in the Yom Kippur War, the fall of the Shah of Iran or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan one or two years in advance? Which Western intelligence agency seriously predicted the startling events in Eastern Europe six months prior to their culmination with revolution in Rumania and the peaceful opening of the Berlin Wall. Who outside of Argentina foresaw the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands even a week before

it happened? Intelligence has its place in defense planning, but it is dangerous to put too much faith in it or to make it the central pillar around which a nation's force structure is built. In Australia's present circumstances it is better to be somewhat pessimistic and cautious when developing and maintaining a national security establishment based on intelligence and warning.

National Defense Interests. Like all countries, Australia's primary and overriding concern is to ensure its survival as a nation. This is fundamental to all defense planning. From statements of policy and speeches by government leaders, three categories of fundamental national security concerns can be derived. The most important category is protection of Australian society and its territory from military attack. A second category is the maintenance of peace and stability in the Southwest Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asian areas, Australia's stated area of Primary Strategic Interest. The third category concerns Australian desire to contribute to avoidance of global conflict.

To address these concerns, Australia has resolved to maintain strong defense relationships with both the United States and New Zealand. Government leaders also seek to promote a greater sense of strategic community between Australia and its Asian neighbors to the north. The policy of the present government continues to be one of economic and diplomatic involvement in the larger sphere of Asian and world affairs.⁸³

Australia now needs to consider its requirements in terms of real military muscle required to provide credible support to its goals of contributing to the political stability of the region.

Summary. Australians have a rather positive view of the world, and with good reason. Australia is a politically stable and economically well endowed nation in a physically secure strategic position. No nation presents an immediate threat to Australia and it enjoys a strong alliance with the world's most powerful nation. The world is, however, a less stable and predictable place than it was some ten or fifteen years ago. The familiar bipolar world is dissolving and the momentous events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are being watched with both hope and trepidation. Simultaneously with the easing of ideological tensions across the rusting remnants of Europe's Iron Curtain, ethnic, racial and economic tensions in other parts of the less developed world continue to increase. Third World armament levels are the highest they have ever been and the rate of growth is increasing.⁸⁴

Regional conflicts are also escalating in intensity and number as third world nations acquire military hardware of increased capability and sophistication and a willingness to use them.⁸⁵ Glasnost notwithstanding, the Soviet establishment of a military presence in Southeast Asia and the potential for intimidation of Indochina by their surrogates, the Vietnamese, continues to be unsettling. In spite of an apparent lull in actual fighting, this war racked area, which has not experienced

peace in over fifty years, is less stable now that it was even a decade ago. This instability can be traced to the shifting nature of great power support for its subversions and border disputes, as well as support for potential and existing nationalistic insurrections.

The Philippines, for example, is evolving toward a new social order under the beleaguered leadership of Mrs. Aquino. Confronted on all sides by economic problems and the pressures of revolutionary movements, some funded and supported from overseas, the country faces an uncertain future. The Aquino government has its hands full dealing with the internal forces which threaten the very fabric of its society. The easing of tensions in Europe does not necessarily mean this area of the pacific basin has seen the end of turmoil and conflict.

The key variable in Australia's security planning is its position as an inherently secure and stable democracy. This fact alone tends to remove national security issues from a central position in public debate during the political process. Politicians of nearly every political persuasion claim to be strongly in favor of improving and maintaining Australia's military capabilities during campaigns. After elections, however, sustained electoral pressure is seldom placed on politicians to make good their promises of an enhanced defense and a renewed emphasis on national security. Spending on domestic social programs is politically more popular and always seems to siphon off the funds planned for improvements in

defense. Without a readily apparent and immediate threat, most elected officials feel that military spending can frequently be deferred without any damaging Australia's security. Australia's politicians are not routinely forced to face the harsh security realities that confront their counterparts in many other nations. They appear unwilling to recognize that Australia's defense should not just be viewed in terms of levels of immediate threats.

To continue playing an effective and convincing role in the affairs of Southeast Asia and Oceania as a regional power, Australia must maintain both the diplomatic and military sides of the power equation. The reality of international relations remains that stronger powers do what they believe to be in their own best interests. The weaker powers exercise influence in proportion only to their own strength and perceived importance to the stronger states. No country can afford to allow its military strength to deteriorate if it truly wishes to play a serious role in determining its own destiny. It will take more money spent on defense, and long term resolve by politicians, to ensure that Australia continues to enjoy the level of security its people need and require. Perhaps, therefore, the most serious enemy threatening Australia is not another nation, but complacency brought on by its own good fortune.

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CHAPTER V

FUNDAMENTALS OF FORCE PLANNING

Force planning is the development of forces flowing from the requirements of declaratory policy or shortfalls in employment policy.¹

Function. The most important function of government is to ensure the survival of the nation. Every other function of government revolves around this simple statement.² Ensuring national survival is also the basic mission for any country's military and provides the foundation for all subsequent military force planning. Although conceptually easy to grasp, fulfilling this mission has evolved into a complex process involving every branch of governmental activity. National economic policies, trade programs, diplomatic activity, military force employment strategies, domestic policy and budgetary constraints are all closely interrelated parts of national security.³ This close interrelationship makes it easy to loose track of the ultimate objective of force planning. That objective is development of sufficient military capability to effectively counter any threat to the survival or well being of the nation.⁴

Influences. Force planning must be approached as part of a carefully integrated effort aimed at obtaining the maximum possible security from the relatively finite resources available to the national government. Because intelligence gathering

remains an imperfect endeavor, a nation's leaders are often forced to make decisions without having complete or precise information. Perceptions also play a significant role in the force planning process and influence a nation's understanding of threats facing it. The resources allocated for developing and maintaining a military establishment will depend upon the perceived need for spending on defense due to these threats.

Resource allocation is also influenced by the perceived ability to expend resources on defense.⁵ Spending for politically popular social service and economic development programs provides stiff competition for defense needs in making demands on a nation's budget. In any case, decisions about allocation of resources to a national security effort are part of the political process and not usually the province of the force planner. The task of the force planner is to take the guidance issued by a nation's leadership and develop an effective national security structure. The force structure proposed must be one that will efficiently utilize the allocated resources in support of the nation's declared strategy and policies.⁶

In the United States, for example, force planning is a function of the Executive Branch of the national government. The process actually begins with development of a document called The National Security Strategy of the United States.⁷ It summarizes the President's thoughts and sets forth an intellectual "road map" for development of supporting strategies by the rest of the

government.⁸ Many factors are considered in developing this document. A few of the most important are the national economy, diplomatic and alliance relationships, friendly and enemy force compositions, enemy intentions and capabilities, and the domestic political situation.⁹ Once the overall national strategy has been determined, supporting strategies and policies are developed which give substance and direction to the President's vision.

The President's statements of national strategy, objectives and goals, along with their supporting national level policies are then translated by the Secretary of Defense into a coherent National Defense Strategy. The Secretary of Defense also ensures that Defense Policy to support the national military strategy is developed and issued to the military departments. It is from the national defense strategy and amplifying Defense Policy that the services derive the roles and missions they use as the foundation for their force planning efforts. The logical flow of thought in the "rational" force planning process is shown in figure 5-1.

Force Planning Questions. Force planning can be most easily understood by focusing on two primary questions, each of which must be answered before proceeding further. The first is "What is the state of the existing force?" The second is "What force will be needed in the future?" To answer the first question, the force planner starts by taking an inventory of forces that are actually in hand at that time. This "Baseline Force" is

United States National Security Policy
(Broad Conceptual Outline of Objectives)

(leads to development of)

National Security Strategy of the United States

(Which determines formulation of)

United States Defense Policy

and

United States Foreign Policy

(from which is derived)

U. S. Defense Strategy

(Specific Guidelines for supporting
the above Objectives ultimately
guide the process of)

Force Planning

(Integrates objectives, policy, existing forces,
threats and risk to plan military forces required
to support strategy)

Recommended Force Structure and Several Alternates

Flow of Information In Force Planning Process

Figure 5-1

established by conducting a nose count of personnel, both active and reserve, and an inventory of the hardware available for use.¹⁰ The process is objective¹¹ to this point, in that the force planner is dealing with tangible objects; quantities of personnel and equipment. Completely answering questions about the current "state" of the force requires the force planner to introduce subjective¹² evaluations into the process. Determining current force capabilities to support national strategy, defend the nation, and respond to anticipated contingencies is essentially development of estimates and assumptions.

A tremendous amount of effort and thought has been expended on refining the force planner's ability to analyze both friendly and enemy military force capabilities. Even though the results of this estimating process are accepted as being reasonably accurate, the force planner must still rely on "probabilities" and professional experiences to make decisions. The force planner essentially must guess about an adversary's intentions and capabilities. Lacking "perfect knowledge" about future contingencies or knowledge about the ability of any given individual or piece of equipment to perform perfectly, the element of uncertainty will always be a major factor in force planning.¹³

Evaluation of the preparedness, readiness, or capability of existing forces is the point of departure in the force planning process. These evaluations become controversial because the

results are open to differing interpretations by those involved. Legitimate and often contentious questions about adequacy, training, capabilities, quality and even the correct quantity of military forces, all need to be decided. These questions are ultimately resolved by subjective decisions, even though these decisions are based on analysis that is elaborate, complex and as rigorous as possible. Once agreement is reached about the quantitative and qualitative status of the "baseline force," the more complex phase of force planning starts. Force planners begin "future force" development.¹⁴

"Future force" development may be as simple as specifying that current force levels are adequate and should be maintained.¹⁵ Given the nature of the world, it is more likely that the perception of "threat" has evolved in scope or degree and will continue to increase. An adversary may have started to develop a new weapon, improved the method of employment of an existing system, or started to expand and improve his military forces. Any of these requires a response be formulated or force structure modified. Additionally, national policies or strategies may have changed since the last baseline force evaluation and changes may be needed to balance forces available with forces required.

Force planners must take these and many other factors into account as they attempt to balance a nation's ends (national objectives, strategies and policies) with the "means" (military

forces) to support them. The element of risk also plays a major part in force planning calculations. Questions about uncertainty bedevil efforts to ensure national security. The major question which lurks in the back of the force planner's mind throughout the process of planning military forces is "What is the cost of being wrong?"¹⁶

A nation can be wrong by in two ways. It can waste funds and resources on unnecessary forces by over estimating the threat an adversary presents to the nation's well being. It can also be wrong by allocating too few resources to national security, making it unable to resist being overpowered by an opposing force. Because erring on the side of inadequate forces may end in disaster, there is a natural tendency to "hedge" by force planners. Hedging is over estimating the capabilities of the opponent and "padding" the proposed force structure to build in more of a margin of security.¹⁷

The objective of efficient force planning is, therefore, to find just the right balance of forces to accomplish the desired missions with the minimum level of risk and optimum resource utilization. The interrelationship between the major variables in the force planning equation is illustrated by the model in figure 5-2.


Basic Force Planning Variables¹⁸

Figure 5-2

Force Planning Methods. There are several different techniques available for the force planner to use during the process of balancing competing demands in structuring forces. Each technique provides a different focus, or starting point, for the force planner. They also lead to different solutions from which choices may be made regarding the final structure of the force. Different approaches are required to meet different national circumstances and no single approach can be considered the correct method for all occasions. The remainder of this chapter is largely based on a study of the various methodologies used in force planning published by Dr. H. C. Bartlett, a member of the faculty of the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Table 5-1 is drawn from his study, with some additions from other sources, and summarizes the most commonly recognized approaches to force planning.

Approaches to Force Planning¹⁹

<u>Approach</u>	<u>Focus</u>	<u>Other Emphasis</u>
Top Down	Objectives	Longer Term
Bottom Up	Current Capability	Shorter Term
Scenario	Circumstances	Opportunities & Vulnerability
Threat	Opponent Capability	Net Assessment
Mission	Mission Area Priority	Mission Area Balance
Hedging	Uncertainty	Flexibility
Technology	Technological Superiority	Technological Optimism
Fiscal	Budget	Dollar Constrained
Replacement	Status Quo	Technological Improvement

Table 5-1

Usually two or more of the approaches listed in the preceding table are combined during the force planning process. Hedging is almost certain to be present, although it may be an unconscious part of the larger process. The key to effectively using the different methodologies presented in this section is to realize which is most applicable to individual national circumstances. A short discussion of each of the techniques in Table 5-1 is presented in the following sections.

Top Down Approach. This process starts by first determining a set of objectives, and then developing a strategy to achieve them. Objectives and strategy are defined before any force

structure choices are made. Forces are then planned to implement and support the proposed strategy. The same process is consistently applied through each subordinate level of supporting objectives and strategy. Constraints or guidelines are applied at each level which help focus and define military force choices.²⁰

The most important advantage of the "top-down" approach is that force planners are required to concentrate on ends. It also provides a systematic way to think through force level requirements by starting at the level of the broadest possible perspective and working downward. Additionally, the various components of a clearly defined strategy serve as the basis for evaluation and choice of a force structure from among several alternatives. This process can also be reduced to a relatively simple and understandable model. For a given threat, the primary variables of objectives, strategy, forces and risk are manipulated to determine requirements.

One disadvantage of this process is the tendency of force planners to proceed too far along with the planning process before addressing resource limitations. Another danger is that force planners may begin to view national objectives and strategies as unchangeable and not open to challenge. They may continue to develop a force structure that is inadequate to function in a changing strategic environment. At the other extreme, planners can just as easily be captivated by emphasis on

future-oriented concepts and the promise held out by developing technologies, neglecting development of adequate current capability.

Bottom Up Approach. This approach is driven by current military capabilities and threats. Force planners are compelled to focus on handling the threat posed by adversaries with existing forces. Forces are added or modified only upon determination that existing forces and capabilities are inadequate to the task of responding to changing levels of existing threats.²¹

This approach has the advantage of focusing the force planner's attention on problems faces by his current force structure and how to best employ it. Such a focus may lead to realistic and critical reviews of strategies and war plans, which may further help in refining force requirements. This process also helps counter balance a tendency by force planners to excessively concentrate on the potential contributions to be gained from future capability. The major disadvantage of the bottom-up approach is that it can result in neglecting realistic consideration of future developments. Analysis of long-term strategic goals may be compromised by excessive concentration on the "here and now." Completely focusing on "bottom-up" planning may result in an organization simply losing sight of the "big picture" altogether.

Scenario Approach. Situationally driven, the point of departure for the force planner using this approach is a well defined set of circumstances. Scenarios are developed for all manner of global, national, theater, and regional level contingencies. The threat is usually defined in terms of warning and mobilization time, available and projected force levels, and attack plan assumptions. Force planners then construct forces to respond to the challenges presented by each scenario.²² This is a very popular technique among military force planners.

This approach provides the advantage of a specific and tangible focus for planning and encourages establishment of definite priorities. Scenario driven events are generally sequential and the results are cumulative. This makes it relatively easy for non-military decision makers to follow the decision logic. The results of alternative courses of action flowing from different force structure choices are clearly demonstrable and easy to understand.

The problem with this technique is that the world rarely conforms to assumed and predicted circumstances and an individual scenario may take on life of its own. Key assumptions, such as amount of warning and mobilization time, or anticipated initial activities of an adversary, tend to be regarded as absolute certainties rather than being viewed as probabilities open to question. History is full of examples where nations have focused on reacting to a specific threat according to a detailed and

rigidly planned sequence of events with disastrous results. Relying solely on scenarios for force planning also tends to stifle original or creative thought about alternative force structure development. It can also result in neglecting possible changes in a country's national security requirements.

Threat Approach. This approach requires a nation's military planners identify opponents and evaluate their capability to pose credible threats. Net assessments of the relative balance between a nation's forces and those of its major adversaries are used as starting points for development of force structure. These assessments usually focus on different segments of capability such as strategic nuclear delivery systems and warheads, army divisions, tactical aircraft or submarines.²³

This approach has the advantage of keeping both military planners and national leaders focused on threats at both the macro level of overall balance of forces, as well as on the micro level of individual weapon system capability. Force planners using this technique are engaged in constantly reevaluating relative military strength between nations and highlighting perceived imbalances. Timely determination of the magnitude and proximity of the threat is the most important aspect of using this technique. Improving a nation's ability to meet identified threats also increases the range of available force planning options and reduces the probability of being caught unprepared by surprise developments.

The problem with this approach is the tendency to evaluate forces too simplistically in tank-versus-tank (side-by-side) or tank-versus-antitank (head-to-head) comparisons. Comparisons like this can bias planners to emphasize quantitative data like types and numbers of weapons systems and overlook important qualitative factors like experience, leadership, morale, and doctrine. Furthermore this kind of analysis may be used as justification for development of forces which are not appropriate for stated national objectives or strategies. In this event, the result is wasted resources and unbalanced force structures.

Mission Approach. This approach provides a way of looking at military force capabilities across general categories of wartime activity. Force planners start with wartime mission categories, such as strategic deterrence, force projection, or sea control. These categories are then broken down into supporting subsets of specific activities such as antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and amphibious warfare. All military services actually use this approach to planning to some degree, usually integrating it with established doctrine to help in the force planning effort.²⁴

The primary advantage to this approach is that it affords an excellent structure for assessing the balance of force capability across war fighting functions. It also provides a systematic way of developing priorities for the allocation of scarce resources because missions are rank ordered by their importance and urgency

of accomplishment. The biggest disadvantage with this approach is the possibility that force choices may not be linked to national objectives and strategies. If too much emphasis is placed on fulfilling a specific mission or building up a single service, optimization to meet that particular mission may become an end in itself and not part of a supporting whole.

Hedging Approach. Hedging attempts to compensate for uncertainty and reduce the level of risk faced by the force planner. This approach tends to downplay emphasis on a specific adversary or group of adversaries in the process of developing a military force structure. Stress is placed on developing a balanced, all around force which can "take on all comers." It provides increasing levels of security and reduced levels of risk because force planners always increase estimated safety margins when developing force requirements. This technique is almost always present to some degree during the force planning process.²⁵

The advantage of this approach is that the handling of uncertainty in the future is unambiguous and direct, with the planner adding comfortable safety margins to his estimates of needed force structure. Force structure balance and flexibility are the key concepts used to reduce the risk of being wrong, especially when the consequences could be catastrophic. Force structure modernization, research and development programs,

readiness and sustainability all receive equal attention in order to reduce uncertainty.

Hedging also has several drawbacks. One is an undue emphasis on worst-case planning and a concomitant neglect of planning for eventualities at the lower end of the threat spectrum. Another is choice of a force structure which may not be the most cost-effective or resource efficient. The inevitable result of overemphasis on hedging is steadily rising expenditures for defense. It can also cause development of an expensive and oversized force structure possessing capabilities in excess of those required to deal with existing levels of threat.

Technology Approach. Force planners using this technique actively hunt for "high tech" concepts and systems like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Systems using the newest technologies are viewed as having significant potential to act as force multipliers. The central assumption in this approach is that application of new technologies will provide more "bang for the buck" in the attainable future. There exists an implicit belief that the new technologies will enhance existing force structure capabilities and also point the way for evolution of the force structure of the future.

The advantages of this process are that it maintains an emphasis on initiative and keeps organizations receptive to change and innovation. There is also the real possibility that a

substantial technological breakthrough might result from the research and development that could decidedly change the nature of warfare. One disadvantage of this approach are that a nation tends to invest far too much to obtain the last incremental improvement in capability obtained from the technology being applied.

This approach may also channel too great a proportion of the resources allocated to defense into too few unique, although highly promising, programs. All the defense eggs tend to go into fewer and more expensive baskets. Additionally, this approach can only be successful if a nation attempting to use it already has a substantial industrial and technological base, combined with at least some advantage over its potential adversaries in areas which are applicable to defense.

Fiscal Approach. Easily the most popular approach to force planning by the non-military branches of any government, and particularly with civil servants in established democracies. Force planning choices are compelled primarily by budget considerations, with military planners doing their best with what is made available for defense. Overall spending constraints are established at the beginning of the force planning process, usually based on an arbitrary funding allocation, such as a percentage of the gross national product or national budget. This technique is most commonly used by smaller powers that have

the security of an alliance with a larger power to rely on if they are wrong about the level or nature of a threat to their national security.²⁶

The primary advantage of this approach is its allocation of a specific level of resources for defense at the start of the process. In a democratic form of government, this allocation usually reflects the spending priorities and desires of the electorate. Application of this approach to defense planning spurs the nation's defense establishment to work seriously at increasing efficiency and improving the effectiveness of their existing forces.

On the other hand, this approach is truly fraught with danger. Spending allocated to defense may not be realistically related to threats. Maintaining required capabilities for defense may be impossible in an austere or politically volatile budget environment and new capabilities required to meet progressively increasing threats may remain unfunded until too late. Unless handled correctly by both military and political leaders, this approach may exacerbate inter-service rivalries at the expense of developing an optimum force structure to handle threats. The focus of the fiscal approach usually degenerates into some sort of "fair share" apportionment of overall defense resources among claimants. Development of an optimal, mutually supporting combined arms approach to force structure development becomes a casualty to ensuring services feel that they have been

treated with fairness and equity by the resource allocation process.

Replacement Approach. Closely related to the Fiscal Approach, this approach to force planning uses existing force structure as the starting point in the planning process. The structure of the military establishment is not significantly changed, but aging and worn out equipment is replaced with new equipment of about the same type and function. New equipment acquired under this process is customarily of the best quality and utilizes the most advanced technology available. Critical politicians refer to this process as "Gold Plating" military hardware. This approach is usually used by a country in a relatively benign strategic environment or by one facing a mostly static threat to its own security.²⁷

The advantages of this approach as a force planning tool are the continuous improvement and enhancement of the capability of the existing military force. Although structured to perform the same missions as in the past, forces improve their ability to perform because of technical improvements in the newly obtained equipment. Improvement is incremental and presents no distortion in the mix or capability of the existing forces.

There are two major disadvantages to this technique. First, the existing force structure is institutionalized as a force planning constant. The ratio of forces between the services is usually frozen and all decisions depend upon maintaining the

position of one service relative to each of the other services. The second disadvantage is that the equipment purchased, although increasingly complex and expensive, may no longer be relevant to the nation's external security environment and defense needs. Equipment is programmed to replace existing gear simply because the military already possess that capability. Military planners use this approach to protect the "status quo" of the defense organization when faced with politicians who want to reduce military spending. Military planners attempt to maintain existing force structure and existing capabilities by claiming new equipment is only designed to marginally improve their weaponry.

Summary. As the reader may have realized, there is no completely right or wrong approach to force planning. The approaches discussed are diverse and experience indicates that they are almost never used in isolation. It is not unusual for several different techniques to be emphasized in a nation's force planning process. The central measure of the success of any of these approaches is the effectiveness of the military's force structure in providing security for its nation. Does the developed force structure adequately support national strategy and contribute to attaining national goals and objectives? If the planner can give an affirmative answer to that question, then the method or methods used were correct.

Endnotes for Chapter V

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2. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988). p. 29.

3. Carnes Lord, The President and the Management of National Security (New York City: The Free Press, 1988), p. 36.

4. Richmond M. Lloyd, "Introductory Essay: Framework for Force Planning," Foundations of Force Planning (Newport, RI: NWC Press, 1986). p. 2.

5. Robert P. Haffa, Rational Methods, Prudent Choices: Planning U. S. Forces (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1988). Pp. 103-110.

6. Haffa, pp. 4-5.

7. National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988).

8. The Commission on Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988). Pp. 1-13.

9. Lloyd, Pp. 3-4.

10. Haffa, pp. 3-6.

11. Objective is defined as being free from personal feelings or prejudice, unbiased.

12. Subjective is defined as relating to or of the nature of a subject as it is known in the mind as distinct from a thing in itself.

13. George F. Brown, Jr. and Lawrence Korb, "The Economic and Political Restraints on Force Planning," John F. Reichart and Steven R. Strum, eds., American Defense Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 582.

14. Haffa, p. 3.

15. Haffa, pp. 3-6.
16. Brown and Korb, pp. 581-583.
17. Henry C. Bartlett, "Approaches to Force Planning," Naval War College Review, May-June 1985, pp. 44-45.
18. Bartlett, p. 39.
19. Henry C. Bartlett, "Approaches to force planning," U. S. Naval War College Review, May-June 1985, p. 37.
20. Bartlett, pp. 37-40.
21. Bartlett, pp. 40-41.
22. Bartlett, pp. 42-43.
23. Bartlett, p. 43.
24. Bartlett, p. 44.
25. Bartlett, p. 44.
26. Bartlett, p. 46.
27. This methodology was suggested by Ira Whisker in his student paper on Australia. The full citation is Ira H. Whisker, Australian Military Strategy, Unpublished Student Research Paper, U. S. Air University, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL: 1980.

CHAPTER VI


AUSTRALIA'S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

Introduction. This chapter describes the general composition and structure of Australia's Defense Establishment. It provides information necessary to understand the influence which various defense organizations play in the process of shaping Australia's military force structure. A brief historical overview is provided to put the present defense organization in context. This is followed by a description of the military arm of Australia's defense establishment, which consists of three military services and their operational joint organizations. The civilian arm of the Defense Department is discussed, paying particular attention to those branches that most influence the force planning process. Finally, Australia's "higher defence organization," composed of a system of interleaving and overlapping committees is introduced and reviewed.

Defense Establishment Overview. Australia's Defense Establishment is unusual because it consists of two distinct and separate organizations, a civilian organization and a military organization. The organizational diagram of Australia's Defence Establishment provided at Figure 6-1 shows the relationship between these two organizations. Both organizations are directly responsible the Minister for Defence, an elected Member of Parliament.

Defence Higher Organization

Australia's Department of Defence



Source: Defence Report 1987-88


Figure 6-1

The Minister for Defence, assisted by the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, is in turn responsible to Parliament for the proper administration of Australia's Defence Establishment.

The Minister for Defence is normally the single point of interface between Australia's policy makers in Parliament and the executors of policy in the Defence Establishment. Other than the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, the remaining individuals in the Australian Defence Establishment are all either a civil servants or members of the military. The amount of time the Minister for Defence can devote to exercising personal control over such a large and diverse organization is also constrained. As an elected politician, he must routinely invest considerable time and effort to convince his voting constituents that he is looking out for their concerns and interests. He is forced to rely heavily, therefore, on his two major subordinates for advice and assistance in providing for Australia's security.

The military organization of the Defence Establishment is composed of the three services and the joint operational staffs they support. Collectively known as the Australian Defense Force (ADF), Australia's military is under the command of the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). CDF is supported by a relatively small staff within the Headquarters of the Australian Defense Force, commonly referred to as HQADF.

Australian Defence Force Organization




As of 30 June 1988

Figure 6-2

Department of Defence

Defence Central Organization



Source: Defence Report 1987-1988

Figure 6-3

As the diagram in Figure 6-2 shows, the three service Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of Australia's standing joint commands report directly to the Chief of the Defence Force. The Australian Defence Force is collectively tasked with planning, developing and maintaining forces for contingencies in Australia's area of Direct Military Interest (DMI). It is also tasked to raise and maintain the forces necessary to defend Australia and its interests.¹

The civilian organization, known formally as the Department of Defence, is headed by a high ranking career civil servant with the title "Secretary to the Department of Defence." The Secretary, also referred to occasionally as the "Permanent Head of the Department," is the principal civilian advisor to the Minister for Defence. He supervises the civilian defence bureaucracy from main administrative offices in Canberra, usually referred to as "Defence Central." The Department of Defence also has numerous other establishments and offices in all the Australian states, as well as representatives overseas in many foreign countries.

Administrative and policy execution functions are carried out by a large Defence Central Staff under the immediate direction and supervision of the Secretary. As of mid-1989, the Defence Central Staff was organized into six functional groups as shown in Figure 6-2. The Secretary also supervises the activities of several semi-independent organizations which perform specialized defense related functions for the

government. These organizations are called "out-rider organizations," and include the Defence Signals Directorate, Natural Disasters Organization and Joint Intelligence Organization.²

A unique aspect of Australia's Defence Establishment is that the CDF and the Secretary are jointly and equally responsible for the efficient functioning of Australia's Defence effort. The top level of the Defence Establishment is essentially a "diarchy"* in which the CDF and the Secretary are expected to collaborate closely and submit joint advice to the Minister.³ The effectiveness of this arrangement depends greatly on close coordination between the two organizations and a good personal working relationship between the CDF and the Secretary.

Historical Overview. Australia's Department of Defence was created, along with the rest of the Commonwealth government, on 1 January 1901. Although always considered an inner cabinet portfolio, the defense position was not highly sought after by Australia's politicians because there were no real forces assigned to it. As discussed in Chapter II, Australia's defense was tied to the British Empire's plans for Imperial Defense and independent military action by Australia was not considered probable. External defense of colonies and

* Defined in The American College Dictionary (New York City: Random House, 1966) as "government in which power is vested in two rulers or authorities," p. 334.

dominions was a matter for the Royal Navy and the British Army to handle. The Minister for Defence's most important role was liaison and coordination with British defense planners to ensure that Australia's interests were considered sufficiently.

Australia's total defense resources consisted of about 12,000 troops in locally trained and maintained state militias in 1901.⁴ Since then, Defence has gradually evolved into one of the more sought after posts in Cabinet. Its true importance, however, has been closely related to either the degree of immediate external threat to Australia or the amount of political clout of the Minister holding the position.⁵ Australia's defense establishment has also evolved and experienced several significant reorganizations, expanding and contracting as Australia's strategic circumstances have changed since 1901.⁶

Australia's Department of Defence originally consisted of a small central bureaucracy divided into two branches, one for the Army and one for the Navy. This organization persisted through the rapid expansion of the Australian Army in World War I and its post-war reduction to peacetime strength. Until the start of the World War II, a single Minister for Defence was sufficient to oversee all aspects of Australia's defense effort. The position was not very taxing because Australia's normal peacetime defense establishment was small and national security was not a major issue with the Australian electorate.

In 1939, Australia's Army consisted of just 2,795 regular soldiers and 42,895 state militiamen. Australia's militiamen received only 18 days of training per year and were mostly equipped with left over World War I surplus material.⁷ The Royal Australia Navy was only marginally better off when war dawned, with a personnel strength was 5,400 regular officers and men and 5,000 reserves. It consisted of two Eight Inch Gun cruisers, four Six Inch Gun cruisers, seven old destroyers and two sloops, most of which were donated Royal Navy ships.⁸ The Navy was also supported by network of some 700 volunteer naval observers spread about the islands of the Southwest Pacific. This group became famous during the war as the "Coast Watcher Organization," providing crucial intelligence about Japanese movements to Australian and American military planners.⁹

Recognizing the crucial role the central defense establishment would play in coordinating Australia's wartime defense effort, the existing Department of Defence was reorganized in 1939 as the Department of Defence Coordination. Separate departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force were also established, each with its own minister and supporting bureaucracy.¹⁰ The wisdom of this change was verified by the massive scope of Australia's war effort in World War II. Involvement in on a truly global scale, supporting armies in North Africa, Europe and the Pacific, required a level of participation on a much larger scale than Australia's effort

in the First World War. It easily exceeded to ability of a single minister to supervise and guide it. For example, over the course of the war, more than 900,000 Australian men and women served in Australia's armed forces and a top, all-service personnel strength of 642,466 was reached in August of 1943.¹¹ That was an eleven fold increase in the size of Australia's armed forces in less than four years.

A streamlining of internal administrative organization, as well as resolution of some political problems, was accomplished by a reorganization of the Department of Defence Coordination in 1942. Again named the Department of Defence, the three service ministers were clearly made subordinate to the Minister for Defence and the Department of Defence was firmly established as primary bureaucracy in Australia's Defence Establishment.¹² Even so, each service chief still had direct access to a specific minister who could usually be depended upon to look out for service interests in the policy making councils of government. This basic organization lasted until 1973 when Australia's Defense establishment experienced a major, three year process of reorganization directly precipitated by the end of Australia's involvement in Vietnam, the subsequent sharp reduction in defense spending and the anti-military mood which swept the electorate.¹³

The requirement for reorganization of the defense establishment was reported to be intense and unresolvable inter-service rivalry. This inter-service rivalry was widely

thought to have paralyzed the decision making process within the Department of Defence. There a good amount of that, but the real catalyst for reorganization was provided by the near simultaneous retirement of two key individuals with long experience in the defence establishment combined with a change of government. The longtime Secretary to the Department of Defence retired from the civil service and the incumbent Minister for Defence retired from politics between 1969 and 1970. The 1973 change of government brought the socialist leaning, and ideologically anti-military, Labour Party into office. These events brought new men with different ideas about Australia's national security needs into the defense establishment.¹⁴

The impetus and driving force behind reorganization was the appointment of Sir Arthur Tange as the new Secretary to the Department of Defence. Sir Arthur moved to the Defence Department from the position of Secretary to the Department of External Affairs in 1970. He had a reputation as a very competent, but tough minded, public servant. Sir Arthur was also a dedicated and vocal advocate of civilianizing as much of the Defence Establishment as possible. He assumed his new position convinced that Australia's defense organization was hopelessly divided by inter-service rivalry and dominated by an ad-hoc, "old boy" approach to decision making. He was personally determined to do something about changing the way Australia's defense organizations did their business.¹⁵ By blaming defense troubles of the 1970s on the military, Tange

only attacked half the problem, and the easier half at that. The real problem with Australia's defense lay in the larger sphere of national strategy.

The new secretary was correct about the paralysis which obviously gripped Australia's Defence Establishment. It was, by any reasonable measure, in deep and serious trouble. By 1972 the strategic underpinnings of Australia's historic security policy of "Forward Defence" had been completely discredited. It was as obsolete as the "domino theory," and nothing had been developed by the nation's political leadership or by the defense establishment to replace it. Decisions about which national security policy Australia should pursue in the post-Vietnam era were consistently deferred as being too emotionally or politically explosive to tackle head on. The nation's security policy was allowed to drift without inspiration, direction or guidance from either the legislative or executive branches of the government.

Without a comprehensive and executable national strategy to use as a road map for planning, each military service attempted to husband its own unique capabilities and the ability to perform its own historic missions. The services became locked in increasingly bitter struggles over funding and resource allocations largely due to a lack of effective political decision making by Parliament. This struggle was readily interpreted by outside observers, as well as by civilian members of the Department of Defence, as simply

trenchant inter-service rivalry. In reality, it was the symptom indicating the failure by elected authorities to make the hard decisions expected of them in developing a viable and realistic national security policy for their country.

Sir Arthur, however, had concluded that the only solution to the problems he saw in the defense establishment was a total reorganization. For one thing, although Tange may have been the Permanent Head of the senior organization in Australia's defense establishment, but was just one of many individuals who had the ear of the Minister for Defense. In reality he was more like a "first among equals" because, in addition, to the individual ministers for each service, the Chief of each service also had direct access the Minister. With so many people being able to appeal his attempts to civilianize and rationalize (an Australian euphemism for "cost cutting") the defense establishment directly to the Minister, he was unable to make headway on implementation of his vision of defense reform during his first two years in office. Parliament's appointing him to study the requirement for defense reorganization provided Tange with the opportunity he needed to gain support for a proposal to make sweeping organizational changes and consolidations.

The results of Tange's study were published as a report, which was highly critical of Australia's entire defense organization. It was particularly severe in its evaluation of Australia's military services. According to Tange,

responsibility for the paralysis and malaise in Australia's national security establishment rested squarely on the military. Inter-service rivalry was identified as the primary impediment to a smoothly functioning, and less expensive, defense establishment for Australia.

It has been assumed by many that Tange's mandate from the government of the day included a requirement to validate substantial reductions in defense expenditures. The report points the way toward drastic reductions in military spending, but does so by citing the potential for improved capacity for joint operations and enhancement of the military's ability to provide for national defense through the reorganization. Closer reading of the report reveals a blueprint to increase the influence of Department of Defence public servants in the decision making process and concentrate real administrative power in the hands of senior civil servants. The proposed remedy to the defense establishment's ills was complete consolidation of all civil service functions of the military departments under Tange's control by abolition of the Departments of the Navy, Army and Air Force.

The interface between civilian and military sides of the organization would be through a system of twelve management and advisory committees, established specifically to administer and coordinate Australia's defense efforts. To diminish the power and influence of the professional heads of the services, whom he regarded as inflexible and superfluous

in the new organization, Tange strongly advocated designation of one senior military officer to exercise overall control over the Australian armed services. This senior officer was to act as the counterpart to the Secretary to the Department of Defence, thereby reducing those with ready and direct access to the Minister for Defence to just two individuals. The service chiefs would have to operate through this senior military officer like the Assistant Secretaries of Defence did through the Secretary.¹⁶


There had been other calls for consolidations of defense functions before, including a proposal by the Morshead Committee in 1957 to amalgamate policy making and supply functions, among others, into one large department. Although most of the Morshead Committee proposals were rejected by the government of the day, consolidation of some support functions did take place in the late 1950s. The seeds of reorganization had been planted, however, and Australia's political environment after the Vietnam War made some sort of Defence establishment shake out inevitable. Tange's recommendations were embraced in 1973 by the newly elected Labour Party government as a quick way to reduce the military's share of the national budget.¹⁷

The Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force were abolished on 30 November 1973 but, unlike the Canadian example, the three services remained distinct and separate. The civilian branches of the service departments were absorbed

by the Department of Defence and all their functions were transferred to the central organization. With this consolidation, the Defense Establishment assumed its present form. There have been other, relatively minor changes to supporting organizations, but the Australian defense establishment of today has not changed significantly from the 1973 reorganization.¹⁸

Australian Defence Force

Headquarters Organization



Source: Defence Report 1987-1988

Figure 6-4

Chief of the Defence Force

HQ Staff Organization




Figure 6-5

The Australian Defence Force

Overview. The Australian Defense Force (ADF) consists of three distinct military services and several operational joint staffs. The Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), supported by a joint headquarters staff, commands the ADF and is the principal military advisor to the Minister for Defence. The military arms of the ADF are the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the Australian Army, and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The ADF also has four joint commands and interfaces with the country's intelligence organizations. The joint commands reporting to the CDF are Maritime Command Headquarters, Land Command Headquarters, and Air Command Headquarters. A Northern Command Headquarters, subordinate to the Land Command, has recently been created. Figure 6-4 shows the overall command and higher military organization of the ADF.¹⁹

Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). The Chief of the Defense Force has command authority over the Australian Defense Forces. As the country's professional military head, CDF is responsible for the planning and conduct of military operations and for the military preparedness of the ADF. He is supported in this effort by a military staff at Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF). CDF chairs the Chiefs of Staff Committee and forwards the collective advice of the Service Chiefs to the Minister for Defence. CDF is

tasked with ensuring military staffs are responsive to Department of Defence staffs when they are acting within the scope of their responsibilities. CDF is specifically responsible to the Minister for Defence for advising on the following:²⁰

Military implications of strategic developments;

Military aspects of ADF capabilities necessary to meet defence policy objectives;

Military aspects of ADF development, including the size of the ADF and the balance within it;

Military aspects of supporting infrastructure; and

Military aspects of the disposition of the components of the ADF.

Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF). CDF is directly supported in exercising command and control over the ADF by his HQADF staff. HQADF is supervised by the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) who acts as principal staff officer for CDF and chief of the headquarters staff. VCDF is specifically responsible to CDF for coordination of ADF force development planning process. VCDF is assisted by four principle staff officers, generally referred to as Assistant Chiefs of the Defence Force. Their responsibilities are described below. Figure 6-5 provides the HQADF organization.²¹

Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Policy) assists CDF by staffing and developing policy to address military implications of strategic guidance, force development, defence facilities, science and technology, planning, programming and budgeting, and supply and support.

Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations)

assists CDF to discharge his ADF command and control responsibilities. These include oversight of staff work regarding military operations and plans, training, logistics, intelligence, command support systems and communications-electronics.

Judge Advocate General makes rules of procedure for military courts martial, reviews proceedings of service courts martial referred to him by service chiefs and reviewing authorities, and appoints Defence Force magistrates.

Surgeon General Australian Defense Force provides unified source of comprehensive health policy guidance and advice to the ADF. Exercises technical control over the health services of the ADF.

Joint Commands. CDF also exercises direct operational command over all joint military organizations of the Australian Defense Force. Maritime Command Headquarters is responsible for planning and conducting joint maritime operations. Headquarters Land Commander is responsible for planning and conducting joint land operations. Headquarters Northern Command (NORCOM) reports to Land Command Headquarters and is responsible for planning and conducting the land based defense of the northern part of Australia. Air Command Headquarters plans and conducts joint and specified air operations.²²

Australian Army. The largest of the military services with a listed strength of about 32,000 active duty personnel and about 27,500 reserves. The Army has four functional commands: Field Force Command; Logistics Command; Training Command and the Army Reserve. The Army's primary operational

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graph TD
    CGS[Chief of General Staff] --- D[Duntroon  
Royal Military Collag]
    CGS --- FFC[Field Force CDR]
    CGS --- LC[Logistics Command]
    CGS --- TC[Training Command]
    CGS --- MD[Military Districts 1 - 7]
    FFC --- 1[1 Div HQ]
    FFC --- 2[2 Div HQ]
    FFC --- 3[3 Div HQ]
  
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Australian Army

Headquarters Organization




Figure 6-7

combat component is the Field Force Command which consists of one infantry division, one armored regiment, one reconnaissance regiment, one armored personnel carrier regiment, three artillery regiments, three support regiments, two signal regiments and several smaller support formations. The Australian Army Aviation Corps (AAAC) was reestablished by the Minister for Defence in 1988 and is in the process of expanding its role in Army operations. Responsibility for all of Australia's ground attack helicopter assets has recently been transferred from the Air Force to the AAAC.²³ A diagram of the higher Army Organization is provided in Figure 6-6.

Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff (CGS) is the professional head of the Australian Army. He commands and administers the Army, directly reporting to the CDF and through CDF to the Minister for Defence. CGS is directly supported by a staff known formally as the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, and commonly referred to as either the Army Staff or the General Staff.²⁴

Office of the Chief of the General Staff. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS) controls and directs the activities of the staff elements within the Office of the Chief of the General Staff. The Office is divided into five branches each headed by an Assistant Chief of the General Staff (ACGS). The five major branches are Operations, Personnel, Logistics, Material and Reserves. There is also a Director General of Coordination and Organization who reports

directly to the DCGS.²⁵ The organization of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff provided at figure 6-7 emphasizes those positions most concerned with Army force development.

The Assistant Chief of the General Staff - Operations (ACOPS-A)* plays a key role in the Army's force development process. In addition to responsibility for Army operations, plans and training, ACOPS-A supervises the Army's development organization. Headed by Director General, Army Development, this organization is the starting point for nearly all force planning initiatives originated by the Army.

The other key individual in the Army's force planning effort is the Director General of Coordination and Organization who coordinates Army staff work for the DCGS, and reports directly to DCGS. Director General of Coordination and Organization assembles and reviews the Army's financial programming and estimate inputs and the Army's contributions to the Five Year Defence Program (FYDP). He also determines the detailed peace and war time establishments of all Army units in conjunction with the Operations Branch.

* This ACRONYM will not translate directly because it is generic and used to indicate billets with similar functions on all defense establishment activity staffs. ACOPS-A has counterparts on the Naval and Air Force Staffs with the Billet tags of ACOPS-N and ACOPS-AF.

Royal Australian Navy Operational Organization

Figure 6-8

Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The Navy is the smallest of the three services, with a listed strength of about 14,600 active and 1,200 reserve personnel. The RAN has recently been reorganized by the Minister for Defence to develop a "two ocean navy" concept for Australia's maritime defense. Current plans .pacall for increasing naval force strength on Australia's west coast and the gradual establishment of two separate fleets, one in the Indian Ocean and one in the Pacific. The RAN is in the midst of an impressive and comprehensive modernization program which is predicted to add substantially to the capabilities of the Navy. The current naval building program calls for building six new Kockum Type 471 submarines, eight new frigates and completing construction of the remaining guided missile frigates of the Adelaide Class* program. RAN commands consist of the Fleet, the Naval Support Command and Naval Area Commands of West Australia, Victoria, Queensland, North Australia and Tasmania which correspond roughly to Australian state boundaries.²⁶ A diagram of the higher RAN organization and command structure is provided at Figure 6-8.

Chief of the Naval Staff. The Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) is the professional head of the RAN. He commands and administers the RAN, reporting to the Minister for Defence through the CDF, and is responsible for all aspects of

* Similar to the United States Navy's Oliver H. Perry (FFG-7) class ship.

naval .pareadiness. He is supported by Deputy CNS (DCNS) who supervises the Navy Office staff.²⁷

Office of the Chief of the Naval Staff. The Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS) controls and directs the activities of the staff elements within the Office of the Chief of the Naval Staff. The Navy Office is currently divided into four divisions, each headed by an Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (ACNS). These four divisions are Naval Development, Naval Personnel, Naval Logistics, and Naval Material. All divisions of the CNS Staff play a significant part in the origination and staffing of force planning proposals, but the division with central responsibility for development of force planning recommendations is the Naval Development Division.²⁸ An organizational diagram of the Navy Office, or headquarters organization, is provided at Figure 6-9.

The Naval Development Division is headed by the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff - Development (ACDEV-N). This division is assigned responsibility to formulate and propose policies consistent with strategic guidance and other defense policies. ACDEV-N is responsible for initiating Naval force structure and capability proposals which will ensure the RAN can fulfill the missions assigned by the government. The Naval Forward Planning Branch, assisted by the Naval Warfare Branch, has the lead responsibility for initiation of the Navy's force planning proposals.²⁹

Royal Australian Navy HQ Staff Organization

Figure 6-9

Royal Australian Air Force

Operational Organization




Figure 6-10

Royal Australian Air Force

Headquarters Staff Organization




Figure 6-11

Royal Australian Air Force. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) is the newest of the three services. It is organized into two divisions, the Operational Command and the Support Command and has a listed strength of 22,500 active duty and 2,000 reserve personnel. The Operational Command is responsible for all combat activities and the Support Command has responsibility for logistics and training. The Operational Command currently consists of Twenty-one active squadrons, of all types, three communications units and an aviation conversion regiment. The Aviation Conversion Regiment is manned jointly by Army and RAAF personnel. It was formed solely to organize the transfer of Australia's ground attack helicopters from the RAAF to the AAAC and will be disestablished upon completion of its mission. Support Command operates over twenty major training facilities, including flying, technical and professional schools. Supply depots, logistic, research and development functions are also included in Support Command.³⁰ Figure 6-10 shows the organizational relationship between the major organizations of the RAAF.

Chief of the Air Staff. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) is the professional head of the Royal Australian Air Force. He commands and administers the Air Force, reporting to the CDF and the Minister for Defence. CAS is supported by the staff of the Office of the Chief of the Air Staff, also known as the Air Staff.³¹

Office of the Chief of the Air Staff. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS) controls and directs the activities of the staff elements within the Office of the Chief of the Air Staff. The Office is divided into five divisions each headed by an Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS). The five major Air Office divisions are Development, Personnel, Engineering, Material and Supply. The DCAS also supervises Air Staff Resource Management and Operations Branches within the Air Office organization. All Air Staff divisions play significant parts in originating and staffing force planning proposals, but Air Force Development Division has central responsibility for origination of force planning recommendations.³² The organization of the Office of the Chief of the Air Staff is provided at figure 6-11.

Air Force Development Division is headed by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff - Development (ACDEV-AF). This division is assigned responsibility for planning and development of RAAF capabilities and force structure. It is made up of the Operational Requirements Branch, the Policy and Plans Branch, and Facilities Branch. All RAAF force planning proposals are officially initiated in the Operational Requirements Branch. It is also responsible for coordination of initial staff work on RAAF force structure proposals both within the RAAF and with outside organizations of the Australian defense establishment.

Department of Defence

Overview. The Department of Defence is the civilian arm of Australia's Defense Establishment. It is presided over by a very senior career civil servant, the Secretary to the Department of Defence. By statute, the Secretary to the Department of Defence is the equal of the Chief of the Defence Force when advising the Minister for Defence on matters which fall in his area of responsibility. The Central Organization of the Department of Defence is composed of five functional divisions, each headed by a Deputy Secretary of Defence; the Defence Science and Technology Organization, headed by the Chief Defence Scientist; and several higher Defence Committees. There are also regional defense liaison offices and other outsider organizations which report to the Department of Defence.³³ Figure 6-13 shows the overall organization of the Department of Defence.

Secretary to the Department of Defence. The Secretary to the Department of Defence, as the principal civilian advisor to the Minister for Defence, is responsible for providing advice on policy, resources and organization. The Secretary is also responsible for financial planning and programming within the Department of Defence as well as for administration and control of expenditures. The Secretary personally chairs two very important and powerful committees, the Defence Committee and the Defence Force Development Committee. He is responsible for forwarding the advice generated by these

committees to the Minister for Defence. He ensures that the staff of the Department of Defence is responsive to the needs of the CDF, and other Defence Force organizations, and he coordinates with the CDF on issues which require combined action.³⁴

Of particular interest, is the requirement that the Secretary to the Department of Defence to concur in nominations of all military officers for promotion to the rank of two stars and above. He must also concur in the promotion of military officers to one star rank if the billet to be filled has joint service implications or requires working closely with civilian organizations in Australia's defense establishment. The Chief of the Defence Force, however, has no such review authority over the appointment of senior civil service personnel to ADF and Department of Defence positions of corresponding rank or stature.³⁵

Defence Central Functional Divisions. The central organization of the Department of Defence consists of six functional divisions. They are Manpower and Management Services; Strategic Policy, Force Development and Financial Programs Group; Capital Procurement Group; Defence Logistics Organization; Defence Science and Technology Organization; Office of Defence Production.³⁶ The responsibilities of each group are briefly outlined below.

Manpower & Management Services Group - Headed by a Deputy Secretary of Defence. Until March of 1990 this Deputy Secretary's official title will be Deputy Secretary A. This group is currently responsible for administration of manpower and providing management services to the Department of Defence and the ADF. Deputy Secretary A provides advice on work force, management improvement and policy coordination. He supervises the following: Human Resources Management Division, Management Improvement and Manpower Policy Division, the Policy Coordination Division and the Inspector-General.³⁷ Deputy Secretary A's position description will change in March of 1990 to Deputy Secretary, Budgets and Managements. The Resources and Financial Programs Division will be transferred into this group at that time.

Strategic Policy, Force Development and Resources and Financial Programs Group - Headed by Deputy Secretary B. In March 1990, this title will change to Deputy Secretary for Strategic Policy and Intelligence. Currently, this group provides advice on strategic and international policy, force structure, and programs and budgetary matters. Deputy Secretary B supervises the Strategic and International Policy Division, Force Development and Analysis Division, and the Resources and Financial Programs Division. Deputy Secretary B also nominally supervises the functions of the Natural Disaster Organization and the Defence Signals Directorate.³⁸ This group's organizational chart is provided at Figure 6-14.

This organization is of particular interest and importance in Australia's force planning process. It combines an analysis group, a policy group and a financial management group in one organization. There is some "cross pollination" between military and civilian staffs in the Strategic and International Policy Division because it has an internal military staff branch of military officers. The military-civilian interface in the Force Development and Analysis Branch (FDA) is not as good. In 1988 there were over one hundred and forty civil service analysts assigned to FDA and only four military officers. The relationship between the service force planning divisions and FDA can only be described as antagonistic. Very little in the way of advance coordination takes place between them on both new weapon system development proposals and on major equipment acquisition requests. This lack of coordination often means that the military service proposals are often given unusually close and critical scrutiny when forwarded for FDA's review.

This organization is, therefore, most often portrayed as the villain in the Force Development process and the civilian analysts are usually accused of failing to appreciate completely the military's requirement for specific programs. As a matter of practice, FDA initially puts negative endorsements on service requests for specific systems and equipment to guard against a perceived "gold plating" syndrome built into the military's proposal. FDA analysts aggressively develop and propose alternatives which they perceive as more

cost-effective ways to accomplish the same or similar missions. Given its concentration of talent and expertise, FDA can virtually kill any proposal the services can generate and it is accused of doing so ruthlessly and gleefully by the military force planning shops.

One reason for this situation is that the military force planning staffs are woefully inadequate to compete with FDA. The military staffs are not manned or equipped to conduct the rigorous and dispassionate analysis produced by FDA. The other is that FDA analysts remain in their jobs for much longer periods of time than military force planners who must periodically rotate positions. FDA analysts build up a valuable professional reputation which often provides the deciding factor in their favor during the inevitable disputes between the military and civilian analysts. In addition, much of FDA's organizational culture places a great deal of emphasis on cost/benefit considerations when conducting studies of military requirements. FDA's analysts tend to regard themselves as guardians of the public's tax dollars and the military planners as profligate spendthrifts interested only in getting their hands on the very latest in military technology, regardless of cost.

Capital Procurement Organization. This organization is responsible for all Department of Defence procurement functions and development of national defence industry policies. It manages the procurement of capital equipment to

the point of introduction into the services. This group is also tasked with supporting service offices in development of capital equipment acquisition proposals before they are submitted for review by the government. Capital Procurement Organization has the following .padivisions: Resources and Project Division, Industry Policy and Operations Division, and the Project Development and Communications Division.³⁹

Defence Logistics Organization. This organization provides advice on policy, resources and organization of defence logistics to the Secretary. It also plans and coordinates effective supply and logistic support for the military services and promotes improved effectiveness of logistic activities. There are six divisions in the Defence Logistics Organization: The Logistics Review Group, Logistics Development Division, Services Logistics and Engineering Division, the Facilities and Properties Division, Information Systems Policy Division and the Defence Contracting Organization.⁴⁰

Defence Science and Technology Organization (DSTO). This organization is headed by Australia's Chief Defence Scientist and has two major divisions: the Science for Policy Division and the Science Programs and Administration Division. The Chief Defence Scientist also supervises five major defense laboratories, several smaller research and development establishments and DSTO representatives stationed overseas. DSTO provides information on science and technology to the

Department of Defence and the Australian Defense Force. It works closely with all ADF branches to solve operational problems and maintains relevant scientific skills useful to solving problems in Australia's strategic environment.⁴¹

Office of Defence Production. This organization is charged with managing the wide range of specialized industrial capabilities needed by Australia's defense forces. It manages and operates all government dockyards, munitions factories, ordnance factories, electronics plants and the government clothing factory. It has three divisions: the Production Division, Budget and Support Division and the Corporate Development Division.⁴² The government is turning this organization into a public industrial enterprise which will have to compete in the free market for government contracts. It will no longer be carried on the Department of Defence Table of Organization after 1990. The subsidiary enterprises, like the dock yards, will also be able to compete for private contracts. It is estimated that the new Australian Defence Industries corporation will save the government over one hundred million dollars in annual wages alone.⁴³

Defence Outrider Organizations. There are three major semi-autonomous divisions, commonly called "outrider organizations," which function within the Australian Defence Establishment. These organizations are independent of the normal Department of Defence organization because of their specialized functions. Australia's Joint Intelligence

Organization (JIO) is the most important and reports nominally to both the CDF and the Secretary. The other two are the Defence Signals Directorate and the Natural Disasters Organization. They both report to the Secretary through Deputy Secretary B's organization.⁴⁴

JIO acquires information from all sources, assesses and interprets the information relevant to Australia's strategic environment, military security and defence policy formulation. Based on this formulation, JIO provides assessments and advice on international events and developments to the Prime Minister, the Australian Defense Force and Department of Defence, the Office of National Assessments and other elements of the national government.⁴⁵

Australia's Higher Defence Organization. An extensive council and committee system operates within the framework of what is commonly termed Australia's Higher Defence Organization. These councils and committees exist at every level of the defense establishment and were established to be the primary points of interface between the military and civil service sides of the defense establishment. This system was designed to facilitate communications between ADF and DoD staffs at each level of operations by bringing together representatives from each organization concerned with a particular aspect of national defense. These committees are supposed to consider all aspects of issues facing the Australian Defence Establishment and develop consensus

recommendations appropriate for the next senior level in the review and decision making chain of command.

This process has not worked as well as expected because the committees have often been unable to develop consensus positions on contentious issues being considered. This process of interlocking committees has proven cumbersome and unwieldy. Overlapping jurisdiction and authority diffused among its many layers means that controversial force structure proposals usually take a frustratingly long time to reach the Minister for Defence for his decision. A reorganization of this system, which will be addressed in the next chapter, has been proposed which is designed to eliminate some committees and improve the timeliness of the decision making process.

Even a quick glance through the committees listed in the rest of this chapter will reveal some interesting information about the decision making process in Australia. A review of the composition of each committee and its designated chairman will make it clear that civil servants from the Department of Defence dominate the majority of the committees. Most defense committees do not have a military member as chairman and on several of the most important committees, only a single, joint military representative is spokesman for all three services. Whether this is a problem worth noting is open to conjecture and depends upon where one stands in the defense hierarchy. This situation is the topic of considerable discussion and comment by observers of Australian defense matters. The

relationship between the various committees is graphically portrayed in Figures 6-11 and 6-12.

Council of Defence. This body considers and discusses any matter relating to the control and administration of the Australian Defense Force as a whole or any of its services referred to it by the Minister for Defence.⁴⁶ Unlike the rest of the defense related committees, this organization has decision making power about issues under consideration. All subordinate committees in the defense hierarchy are strictly deliberative organizations. They do not have any powers to make enforceable decisions. Officially, therefore, committees can neither approve nor disapprove, only make recommendations. In reality, they can, and do, greatly influence the Defence Council with both their recommendations and the way the committees deal with difficult issues.

Membership:

Minister for Defence (Chairman)
Minister for Defence Science and Personnel
Secretary to the Department of Defence
Chief of the Defence Force
Chief of the Naval Staff
Chief of the Air Staff
Chief of the Army Staff

Defence Committee. This committee advises the Minister on defense policy as a whole, on the coordination of military, strategic, economic, financial and external affairs aspects of defence policy; and on matters of policy or principle having a joint service or inter-departmental defense aspect. The

individual service Chiefs of Staff were formerly members of this committee, and are still shown as Committee members on the 1987-1988 Defence Report. During interviews with personnel in 1989 at the Australian Embassy, Washington DC, I was informed that the service chiefs had been removed from this committee as part of a recent reorganization.

Defence Committee Membership:

Secretary to the Department of Defence (Chair)
Chief of the Defence Force
Secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister &
Cabinet
Secretary to the Department of the Treasury
Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade

Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). This committee provides collective advice to the CDF, and through him to the Minister, on the military aspects of strategy, force development and operations, and the military implications of defense policy and activities. It considers and endorses military plans for approval by the CDF and recommends to the CDF allocation of forces and supporting assets to designated commanders engaged in joint or combined operations.⁴⁷ COSC considers and reviews information and proposals from the Defence Operational Requirement Committee, Joint Planning Committee and the Service Personnel Policy Committee.

Chiefs of Staff Committee Membership:

Chief of the Defence Force (Chairman)
Chief of the Naval Staff
Chief of the Air Staff
Chief of the Army Staff

Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC). DFDC

provides collective advice to the Minister, in the context of strategic assessments, on the most efficient use of resources. It advises on development of the Defense Force as a whole, and makes recommendations on inclusion of major weapons systems, equipment capability and facility requirements in Australia's Five Year Defence Plan (FYDP). DFDC initiates major reviews of Defense Force development progress, the FYDP and progress of preparation of proposals for submission to the government. All force planning and force structure proposals pass through this committee. Except in unusual cases, any proposal for changes in force structure must be favorably endorsed by this committee before it is considered by any higher committee.⁴⁸ DFDC considers information and proposals from The Consultative Group, the Force Structure Committee and the Defence Source Definition Committee.

Defence Force Development Committee Membership:

Secretary to the Department of Defence (Chairman)
Chief of the Defence Force
Chief of the Naval Staff
Chief of the Air Staff
Chief of the Army Staff

Australian Defence Establishment

Force Planning Committee Hierarchy




Figure 6-12

Advisory Committee Relationships Australian Defence Establishment




Figure 6-13

Consultative Group. This committee reviews the draft Five Year Defence Program (FYDP) of the Department of Defence and the draft Annual Defence Estimates (Annual Budget) Proposals. It forwards its recommendations about the FYDP and the budget to the Defence Force Development Committee.⁴⁹

Consultative Group Membership:

Deputy Secretary B (Chairman)
Chief of Defence Production
Deputy Secretary A
Chief of Capital Procurement
Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Policy)
Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
Deputy Chief of the Army Staff
Deputy Chief Defence Scientist
First Assistant Secretary, Strategic & International
Policy
First Assistant Secretary, Defence & Government Division,
Department of Finance

Force Structure Committee (FSC). This committee provides advice to the Defence Force Development Committee and participates in decision making on the development of force structure, the Five Year Defence Program (FYDP) and major equipment proposals.⁵⁰ FSC has been accused of being a major bottle neck in the force structure development process because it seldom reaches a consensus on controversial issues. Usually unwilling to go forward with a split decision, FSC's chairman routinely returns items under consideration to the services with requests for more analysis and review when no agreement can be reached or if members refuse to cooperate.

Because its chairman also controls FDA, many contentious issues are easily referred to FDA for further study and analysis. It is not uncommon for service proposals that FDA cannot support to get lost in the shuffle of paper and delay until overtaken by events.

Membership:

Deputy Secretary B (Chairman)
Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Policy)
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Operations)
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Development)
Assistant Chief of the General Staff (Operations)
Deputy Chief Defence Scientist
First Assistant Secretary, Force Development & Analysis
First Assistant Secretary, Programs & Budgets
First Assistant Secretary, Defence Industry & Material
Policy
First Assistant Secretary, Strategic & International
Policy
First Assistant Secretary, Defence & Government Division,
Department of Finance

Defence Source Definition Committee. This committee provides advice to the Defence Force Development Committee on the preferred source of supply of items of major equipment planned for acquisition by the Department of Defence. It also endorses all major projects, as well as selected minor projects, which need to be taken into account in planning for the effective, proper and orderly procurement of capital equipment.⁵¹

Defence Source Definition Committee Membership:

First Assistant Secretary, Defence Industry &
Material Policy (Chairman)
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Material)
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Material)
Assistant Chief of the General Staff (Material)
First Assistant Secretary, Technical Services and
Logistic Development.
Assistant Secretary, Resource Policy
Assistant Secretary, Project Development
Assistant Secretary, Purchasing

(Superintendents of major projects are also included if
the committee is considering issues related to their
project)

Defence Operational Requirements Committee. This
committee provides advice to both the Chiefs of Staff
Committee and the Defence Committee. It specifically
evaluates and makes recommendations on service staff
requirements for major equipment, Staff Targets* and Staff
Targets likely to become major equipment requirements.⁵²

Membership:

Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Policy) (Chairman)
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Operations)
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Development)
Assistant Chief of the General Staff (Operations)
Controller - External Relations, Projects & Analytical
Studies
First Assistant Secretary, Force Development & Analysis
First Assistant Secretary, Programs & Budgets
First Assistant Secretary, Defence Industry & Material
Policy
First Assistant Secretary, Strategic & International
Policy

* These are relatively broad, conceptual proposals presented
to begin discussion of equipment and capability acquisition.

Joint Planning Committee. This committee provides advice to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Defence Committee on the operational aspects of Defence Planning, and their progress on, and plans for, combined and joint operations and coordination of joint service exercises and training.⁵³

Membership:

Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations)
(Chairman)

Director General Naval Plans & Policies
Director General Operations and Plans - Army
Director General Policy & Plans - Air Force
Assistant Secretary, Strategic Guidance & Policy
Assistant Secretary, Defence Policy Branch, Department
of Foreign Affairs (Optional)

Summary. There are three particularly interesting aspects of Australia's Defence Establishment that should be noted by an American observer. One is the lack of political control and oversight, except at the very top, of Australia's defense establishment. Another is the domination of the defense establishment's decision making process by Australia's civil servants and resulting diminution of the military's role in defense decision making. The third is the nearly continuous debate in Australia over the appropriateness of Tange's organizational reforms and their ramifications for the effectiveness of Australia's Defence Establishment.

Lack of oversight and involvement in the defense decision making process by elected political leadership has been recognized as a problem by numerous Australian commentators.

As pointed out previously, Australia's Minister for Defence is also a member of Parliament and an elected politician. He must devote a considerable amount of time and effort to looking out for the concerns and interests of the voters who sent him to Parliament. As a member of the cabinet and the Prime Minister's hand picked representative to supervise Australia's defense establishment, his position is somewhat analogous to that of the American Secretary of Defense. Unlike his American counterpart, Australia's Minister for Defence has no personal staff of analysts and policy makers to whom he can turn for support and independent evaluation of controversial issues. He depends completely on other organizations and staffs to provide him information upon which to make a decision.

Another major difference between the American and Australian systems is the lack of political appointees in their Department of Defence organization. Unlike the American Department of Defense, there is no group of political appointees which fill key policy development and execution monitoring positions within Australia's defense bureaucracy. Without such a network of individuals who share similar ideological persuasions, the Minister's ability to informally monitor the pulse of his department is limited. He is forced to work through the Secretary, the CDF or some ad-hoc working group to develop policy and monitor its implementation. Since the abolition of the individual service minister positions,

this single minister has been individually responsible for exercising control over Australia's vast and diverse defense establishment. Many commentators feel this is the primary reason for the civil service ascendancy to control of Australia's national security apparatus.

Senior career civil servants, however, see nothing incorrect about this situation. Sir Arthur Tange epitomized this point of view, contending that the sole constitutional responsibility of any minister was directly to Parliament. In his view, the Minister for Defence should not be involved in the day to day operation of the Department of Defence or the military services. The justification supporting this view is that the Minister for Defence is an elected official with only a temporary appointment. He cannot expect to master all the complexities of running a large and expansive government department without substantial experience. Ministers for Defence are encouraged to exercise only the shallowest control over the defense establishment, leaving the permanent department head to execute policy with the widest possible discretion.

The consequence of the current defense organization is that Australia's public servants have managed to insulate the Minister for Defence from nearly all forms of contact within the department other than through the permanent head.⁵⁴ Given the nature of the diarchy, and the propensity of Australians to display a distinct lack of interest in things military in

times of stability and peace, it is not a surprising development. Department of Defence civil servants have been able to gradually wrest much of the influence the services used to exercise on formulation of defense policy and strategy away from the military. Australia's senior civil servants have the political savvy, positional tenure and knowledge that accumulates with longevity, which permits them to present a very convincing picture of quiet competence and trustworthiness. They are quite professional, dedicated and hard working, however, their views and opinions are not always the most correct or desirable for Australia's national security situation.

What has happened, in fact, is that control of the military is not just civilian control. The military has been relegated to influencing only those issues which fall strictly in the sphere of military operations. The ultimate result of the 1976 consolidations is a lopsided arrangement that greatly favors the Australian civil service hierarchy in the Defence Department.⁵⁵

The long term effects of the Tange Reorganization, and the passing of control of Australia's defense establishment to its civil service has yet to be determined. It appears that many in Australia are convinced that the pendulum of power and control has gone too far in the direction of the civil service and they are prepared to do something about it. There are a number of proposals for yet another reorganization of some

sections of Australia's Department of Defence which are being touted as making the system more efficient.

No Australian with any real political influence is currently suggesting that the Tange reorganization be dismantled, but dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs is growing. Commentators are increasingly troubled by the dominance of the civil service in the process of policy development and national security decision making. As time passes, we may yet see the reemergence of the service ministries as central to increasing the influence of the military in the defense decision making process. This will certainly come to pass if the deadlocks within Australia's defense establishment continue to impede rational and unambiguous national security policy formulation and development of the military's ability to support Australia's national strategy.

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CHAPTER VII

AUSTRALIAN FORCE PLANNING

The Parliamentary system makes real force planning very hard - governments fall, changes in direction take place rapidly, but change to the structure only takes place on the margins.¹
Coral Bell

Overview. Chapter V defined the objective of force planning as development of the military capability necessary to effectively counter threats to national survival.² Force planning can also be defined in terms of the mechanical process of translating a nation's strategy into the tangible ability to support and execute it. This chapter enumerates and discusses key factors influencing Australia's force planning process. The chapter also reviews the current process of force planning and development used by Australia's defense establishment, building on the organization introduced in the previous chapter. The chapter closes with a discussion of yet another proposal for organizational reform, this one primarily initiated by the Australian Defence Force.

Essentially the ADF's proposal would start the process of reasserting the military's role in the force planning process. The first step will be to establish the ADF's military force development staffs on an equal footing with the Department of Defence planning and analysis staffs.

Once described by an Australian Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence as being a broad and often controversial issue, Australian force planning takes place in an unusual environment.³ According to many participants in the process, the defense organization discussed in the previous chapter has not been able to properly perform its force planning functions with any credibility since the 1976 reorganizations. Like most countries with a sizable professional military, Australia has promulgated well defined procedures for both overall force development and the acquisition of major military equipment. These procedures appear clear and logical on paper, but they become convoluted and difficult to follow in detail during actual execution.⁴ Part of this is due to the unique nature of Australia's defense organization and part is due to a lack of an articulate and focused national security strategy for force planners to use as the foundation for their efforts. Although many observers blame defense establishment force planning problems on Australia's unresolved debate over national security strategy, there are also fundamental problems which are organizational in nature. These organizational problems virtually guarantee force planning takes place in an environment that is detrimental to efficiency and effectiveness.

Although there is no agreement about where responsibility for Australia's force planning problems rests, there is general agreement that the process needs to be made more responsive to Australia's real security needs. It is

interesting to note that in spite of its acknowledged shortcomings, there has been relatively little public writing or debate about Australia's force planning and development process in the past ten years. A review of available literature reveals that Australia's force planning and development process was studied in detail in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Recent study and analysis about the force planning process has been infrequent. Most of the recent literature available about Australian force planning that is in the form of instructions, memoranda, and manuals published by various government organizations. Other primary sources of information about this subject include both published and unpublished academic papers which incorporate sections on force planning as part of a larger study. Conversations with several Australian military officers, and others familiar with Australian defense issues, confirm that the continuing controversy surrounding Australia's national security strategy overshadows and truncates indepth discussions about Australia's force planning and force development process.

Factors influencing Australian Force Planning. It is important to recognize that Australian force planning proceeds on two levels, one explicit and the other implicit. The explicit process is defined in government documents and instructions which set forth the official procedures, or mechanical process, for force planning. The other process is an implicit process which influences every aspect of the

official decision making process. This implicit process is highly subjective and involves many factors, most of which are not quantifiable. Among the most important of these factors are the presence of allies, the domestic political environment and organizational difficulties within the defense establishment. These implicit factors are often "unstated assumptions" which play heavily in the decision maker's reasoning, but which are seldom officially acknowledged. I have identified five implicit factors which should be kept in mind during any discussion of Australia's force planning process.

Counting on U. S. Aid. The first, and most important, factor to keep in mind is the assumption of American aid to Australia in the event of any substantial threat. This assumption permeates all decisions about defense in Australia, even if not explicitly stated. In speeches and statements by Australia's politicians and civil servants, the issue of American aid is not a question of "If." The debate about the value of the American alliance centers on "how much" and "what kind of aid" America will be willing and able to provide Australia.⁵

Although this is a high compliment to the strength and durability of the Australian-American alliance, it has seriously inhibited and skewed Australia's force planning process. In order for Australia's military to plan an effective force structure, assumptions about expected

assistance from the United States must be included as a factor.⁶ A major part of this planning requires that Australia's political leadership establish what I have call Australia's Ceiling of Independent Operations (CIO) or an anticipated Threshold of Combined Operations (TCO). The CIO is the point up to which the Australian government expects to handle contingencies involving the use of military force by itself. For contingencies which cannot be met solely with Australian assets, those at the TCO or higher, American aid would be necessary. Australia's force planners need to know what TCO, if any, their politicians can tolerate and the level and kind of American assistance the government envisions for operations above that threshold.

Identification of this cross-over point is not an easy task. It requires both a concept of strategic vision and an analytic approach to evaluation of alternative national goals and priorities of the most rigorous kind. Until most recently, such periodic reviews of Australia's strategic circumstances and evaluations of the requirement to accurately establish a TCO, even on a general basis, do not appear to have been carried all the way through to a decision. Serious discussion of such a threshold has not appeared in the open press, except in the most vague and general terms. Many observers of Australia's defense establishment assume that it simply hasn't been accomplished because of concerns for international sensitivities and domestic political considerations.⁷

In any case, it is important for the government to establish at least a tentative TCO as part of its contingency planning spectrum. Only when such a threshold is established can force planners fix the environment with which they must cope. Australia's incumbent political leadership does not appear to have been able to adequately articulate the demarcation between these two operational environments and Australian force planning has been made more difficult because of it. As Mr. Kim Beazley, Australia's Minister for Defence, said in a speech in 1987, "Effective defence policy must be grounded in a sophisticated and accurate assessment of [the] political and military environment, but political pressures almost invariably work in favor of vague and simplistic fears over careful analysis."⁸

Lack of National Consensus. The second important factor to keep in mind when discussing force planning in Australia is the lack of a national consensus about current and expected threats to Australia's national security. The role its citizens expect the military to play in support of Australia's national security strategy is also relatively vague and ambivalent. At present, there appears to be no "national agreement" or consensus about the required size and structure of Australia's military establishment, or even its possible roles and missions. Australians are generally ill-informed about the ADF and its capabilities, as well as being unacquainted with Australia's overall defense requirements.⁹

The public's indifference both contributes to, and is derived from, a general lack of interest in defense issues among a majority of Australia's political leaders.¹⁰ Lack of consensus about national defense issues is reflected in the inability of the major political parties in the Australian Parliament to reach bipartisan agreement on support for most long term military programs.¹¹ Even Australia's conservatives, who routinely claim to be vigorous supporters of strong and vital defense establishment, have not consistently been kind to the military. Conservative party voting records reveal support for the latest military programs has been lukewarm in the 1980s, and they have not exactly rallied behind the current government's plan to improve and maintain ADF capabilities.

Environment of Fiscal Constraint. The third major factor which must be kept in mind is the environment of fiscal constraint in which Australian force planning is conducted. As in other countries with limited means and democratic governments, force planning decisions are ultimately bound up in the formulation of the national budget. The political implications of the budget, and the message it transmits, are clearly understood by all the parties involved in its development. A review of a country's national budget reveals which programs the government in power considers to be most important. How governments act, who decides what governments will do and who benefits from these decisions is ultimately


translated into the financial language of the national budget.¹²

The graph at figure 7-1 shows the proportion of Australia's national budget allocated to the top five budget categories, in order of magnitude, between 1968 and 1988. These categories are social security, health, interest on Australia's public debt, defense and education. Australia's general spending patterns are similar to those of most other western, industrialized nations. As outlays for social security and public debt interest consume increasingly larger portions of Australia's annual national budget, other government sectors are left with smaller budget shares. The result is an intense struggle between claimants to maintain existing programs in an era of diminishing funding. In times of relative peace and lack of obvious external threats, defense spending becomes the subject of vigorous public debate over possible alternate uses for its funding.

With the winding down of the Vietnam War, and the collapse of "Forward Defence" as a national strategy, domestic budget priorities took substantial amounts of money away from defense. As shown in figure 7-2, the portion of Australia's national budget spent on defense dropped about one percent per year between 1969 and 1975, from 16.8 to about 8.5 percent. Since 1975, however, the share of the budget allocated to defense has averaged 9.3 percent and has never exceeded ten percent of the budget.¹³ U. S. defense funding levels, as

aportion of the national budget, during the same period are provided for comparison. A positive result of this constant budget share has been defense planning in a relatively stable and predictable funding environment. The major drawback of this approach has been that funding levels have not necessarily been linked to matching the size and capability of the ADF with Australia's national security policies.

Australian Government Expenditures as % of National Budget




Budget Sector

—•— Education	—+— Debt Int	—*— Defence
—x— Social Sec	—o— Health	

Source: Defence Report 1987-1988

Figure 7-1

Defense Expenditures % of National Budget for Australia & USA



Source: Australia's Defence Resources

Figure 7-2

In fact, increases in defense spending in Australia have been difficult to obtain even when it has been commonly acknowledged that Australia needed to embark on a substantial military improvement program to correct previous years of benign neglect. In general, defense spending programs have been tightly developed to avoid political problems by remaining within the limitations of defense's traditional share of the budget. In spite of this careful effort, the last two successive budgets (1988 and 1989) passed by Parliament funded less than ninety five percent of the programs proposed for defense.

"Replacement Approach to Force Planning." The forth major factor influencing force planning decisions is a direct result of both limiting the military to a fixed portion of the national budget and lack of coherent national security policy. Until recently, most force planning decisions in Australia appeared to be controlled by the "replacement technique," discussed in Chapter IV. With defense spending as a relatively fixed share of Australia's national budget, the services have generally been allocated a "fair share" of available defense funds. This fair share, or proportionate allocation, of funding has often been unrelated to changing service roles and missions, or even to the need for maintaining existing capabilities and infrastructure.

A contributing element in this approach is that any service obtaining increased funding for new capabilities or

technological improvements does so at the expense of the other services. The loosing service, or services, naturally take a very dim view of this activity and attempt to ward off any reallocation of funds that would adversely effect their own capabilities. In the past, Australia's military capabilities were developed within the context of the broadest and most general possible guidance. The framework of a comprehensive national security plan, detailing how the service capabilities were to dovetail in support of each other, did not exist. As a result, each service tended to fight hard for the capabilities necessary to execute its own unique roles and missions.

Given Australia's political climate and the reluctance of Parliamentarians to become positively involved in debate over the direction of military developments, the services were loathe to have their differences of opinion move into public forums. When this happened in the past, their public disagreements over roles and missions resulted in cutbacks on funding, but still no resolution of the question of the sort of capabilities needed to support national policy. Substantial change in the capability of any service was sure to bring on what civil servants commonly referred to a "squabbling about funding" and failure by the services to cooperate fully in the joint planning process. Because arguing over funding required to change force structure made everyone involved look bad, none of the services has been willing to press the issue and Australia's force structure has

remained static since 1976.

Within the constraints of their allocated funds, military planners have simply replaced existing equipment with new equipment of a similar type containing the latest technology. This approach was acceptable to all sides in the defense establishment because it is relatively easy to sell to politicians. It also made it easier to keep spending within budgetary boundaries. The services were able to argue that a particular capability already existed and the service was only maintaining it. Such a decision is not politically controversial because the service can be said to be simply replacing older equipment with new equipment of the same type already in the inventory. Each of Australia's military services routinely used this technique to justify acquiring technologically advanced equipment to replace existing hardware.

Using this technique, the Army recently obtained funding for new German made main battle tanks to replace their older British made main battle tanks. At the time, some observers questioned the need for this type of heavy armor in the Army's inventory, suggesting a shift to a lighter and more mobile force structure as more appropriate for Australia's strategic environment. They were ignored because consideration of a different force structure mix would have opened the defense budget up to even more intensive parliamentary scrutiny than usual. In similar fashion, the Navy sought, and received,

approval to build new classes of destroyer-type ships and conventional powered submarines to replace older classes of ships on a nearly one-for-one basis. Again, there was the preservation of the status quo. The Air Force purchased substantial numbers of American F/A-18 high performance jet aircraft to replace its older French made high performance jets. Defense commentators questioned why the F/A-18 was required and proposed that a refurbishment of the existing fighters would be more appropriate, and less costly. RAAF leadership ultimately prevailed, although it was a difficult struggle and ultimately was reduced to terms of enhancing the American alliance rather than the technical merits of one particular aircraft over alternatives being considered.

"Problems with the Diarchy." The above factors have been included in, and generally overshadowed by, the last factor. This factor is the Australian defense establishment's higher decision making process. Since the Tange reorganization in the mid 1970s, Australia's national security establishment has been consumed by debate over both its beneficial and its deleterious effects on Australia's military capability. The Tange Plan has its defenders, mostly liberal politicians and civil servants, who claim "there is no questioning the wisdom"¹⁴ of the plan and its abolition of the separate departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Supporters claim it was the only way to force the services to develop the capability to operate jointly, as demanded by Australia's

strategic environment. They also point to the fact that the Tange Reorganization saved the government a considerable amount of money by consolidation of overlapping and redundant bureaucracies.

Critics of the plan, while acknowledging that his reorganization did reduce the money spent on defense, ridicule this line of reasoning as false economics. They assert that Australia's system of "decision by committee," institutionalized by Tange, has impeded the decision making process and had a detrimental effect on Australia's defense establishment. Many have questioned the reorganization's presumed benefits and claim they have been outweighed by the problems associated with the dual nature of Tange's defense organization.

As Tange calculated, splitting the defense establishment into two relatively equal halves has forced the organization to rely heavily on committees to function. The unanticipated result of his reorganization has been a lack of coordination between the two major branches and an inability of the defense committee structure to arrive at meaningful recommendations on difficult issues. One reason for this phenomenon is that the political climate in Australia places great pressure on defense establishment committees to forward unanimous recommendations to the next higher deliberative body. Compromise and adjustment are stressed and recommendations are only forwarded to the next senior committee after a

consensus is reached. If no consensus develops on an issue because committee members represent widely differing positions and deeply held opinions, the matter is usually returned to the next lower committee or defense organization for more staffing and study. This system has been criticized for being one which breeds indecision, frustration and bureaucratic empire building. The debate still raging today indicates that, even after fifteen years of living with the reorganization, the defense establishment remains uncomfortable with its present organization.

Many military officers feel that civil servants, and particularly the analysts in the Department of Defence's Force Development and Analysis (FDA) Division, exercise excessive influence over the force planning process. These officers feel that valid military requirements, generated by the services, are not being given the adequate consideration they deserve. Military planners are of the opinion that civilian analysts are organizationally predisposed to disregard the need for equipment with the latest capabilities in the interests of keeping costs low. Some defense commentators contend that the civil servants in Australia's defense establishment shamelessly emphasize politics and economy in their defense decisions to keep their political masters in Canberra happy and their jobs secure.

On the other hand, most civil servants see the problem as one of "tradition bound military attitudes" and an inability

of the ADF to plan forces that can operate on a joint level. Civilian analysts in the Department of Defence are highly trained and most have a great deal of experience in their field. These planners claim that they carefully review all military proposals to ensure that the equipment requested will actually fill stated mission requirements. They further maintain that their responsibilities include aggressive development of less costly alternatives to accomplish ADF missions. The common perception within Australia's civil service is that military force planning staffs do not develop their proposals adequately. The military's analysis to support development of new capabilities and equipment acquisition is generally perceived to be either faulty or incomplete.

Mechanics of Australian Force Planning. The intrinsic factors establish the environment in which the extrinsic, or structured, process of force planning takes place. In spite of its organizational problems, Australia's force structure development and major equipment acquisition process is not a static process. Each service routinely originates and submits numerous acquisition and development requests for review and approval each year. Plans are constantly being developed, updated or otherwise modified. The very structure which tends to impede attempts by the services to develop new capabilities, or significantly expand existing ones, excels at maintaining and supporting the status quo. The existing system requires an immense amount of detailed, routine work be

performed by a large number of dedicated people in the defense establishment just to maintain Australia's current force structure. After all, there are nearly 70,000 men and women in Australia's armed forces who must be equipped and provided for on a daily basis.

Much of this routine work is directed toward fulfilling the requirements for inputs to Australia's continuous Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle. Annual service, and other departmental, submissions required for PPBS are also used as inputs to generate Australia's rolling Five Year Defence Plan (FYDP). As in the United States, the FYDP is used to assemble diverse assessments on strategic, economic, force structure and other issues in a single master planning document. Australia's FYDP provides the real foundation for Australia's defense decision making process.

As a matter of routine, the FYDP is updated yearly to reflect changes in defense priorities and funding levels. Major revisions to the FYDP are programmed to take place about every three years. This coincides with the government's scheduled promulgation of its official national security statement and assessment of changes in Australia's strategic environment.

Strategic Assessment. The government's official position on Australia's national security situation is based on a strategic guidance report developed every three to five years.

A collaborative effort of Australia's Office of National Assessments (ONA) and Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO) generates a draft report which passes through a series of reviews and analyses prior to review by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. Upon acceptance and endorsement by Cabinet, the ONA/JIO report, in its final form, becomes a statement of official government policy known as the Strategic Basis Paper. Major steps in the overall process of developing the Strategic Basis Paper are shown graphically in figure 7-3 and described in the following paragraphs.

Strategic Basis Paper. Development of the initial draft of the Strategic Basis Paper is the responsibility of ONA. ONA starts with comprehensive and detailed evaluation of the strategic superpower situation on a global scale and incorporates information provided by JIO. When satisfied with this global assessment, ONA works progressively inward, through each layer of Australia's strategic interests, until it ends with consideration of Australia's immediate strategic environment. A wide range of elements, including economic factors, military and national intelligence estimates, and the domestic political situation, are included for careful consideration and analysis. Based on all the information available, a "Draft Strategic Basis Paper" is generated and forwarded to the Defence Committee for review and comment. The Defence Committee, chaired by the Secretary to the Department of Defence, has the authority to modify the draft

report as necessary prior to forwarding it for higher review. The committee also has the authority to reject the report altogether, or reject just parts of it, and return it to ONA for rewrite and further development.

Strategic Guidance Development and Approval

Economic Factors
Domestic Situation → **Office of National Assessments (ONA)** ← *Intelligence Estimates*

*Generates the DRAFT Strategic Basis Paper
and Forwards for Review*

*Chaired by Secretary, DoD
Has the authority to modify
Draft as desired*

**Defence
Committee**

*Can reject and return to
ONA for rewrite*

Members

*CDF
SEC, Treasury
SEC, Foreign Affairs
SEC, Dept of PM &
Cabinet*

Endorses and Recommends Adoption

Minister for Defence

Submits Draft and Recommends Approval

Cabinet

Endorses and makes Strategic Basis an official

Statement of Government Policy

*Used as guidance for development of Defence Policies
and Force Planning*

Figure 7-3

Once the "Draft Strategic Basis Paper" has been crafted to the Defence Committee's satisfaction, it is endorsed and forwarded to the Minister for Defence with a recommendation that it be approved. The Minister for Defence reviews the "Draft Strategic Basis Paper" and, if he agrees with the Defence Committee's evaluation, submits it to the Cabinet for its review and approval. If the Minister for Defence disagrees with the contents of the report, he can ammend it or return it for rewriting and resubmission. Once the Minister for Defence is satisfied with the wording of the draft report, he forwards it to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet, usually meeting in closed session, critically examine every aspect of the draft report and carefully consider its ramifications. If the Cabinet approves the contents of the "Draft Strategic Basis Paper," it is released as an official statement of the Australian government's national security policy. The promulgated Strategic Basis Paper is then used as guidance for development of more detailed defense strategy. The services use the Strategic Basis Paper as the foundation for their individual force structure planning efforts.

In practice, however, the process has always broken down at the intermediate committee level of review. So contentious are the issues, and so significant the potential effects on the military services, that it has been nearly impossible for the diverse organizations involved to reach a satisfactory

consensus on the draft report. The viewpoints of the various defense organizations involved in drafting and reviewing the report are generally clustered at two extremes of the spectrum of opinion. At one end is the optimistic group, which usually includes all the civilian Department of Defence organizations. These organizations usually approach defense planning from an econometric position and usually share a uniformly optimistic outlook on the defense picture. They believe that Australia's national security situation is quite good and that there are no powers regional powers that would wish to threaten the country in the foreseeable future. This group believes that the emphasis of the draft report should be on reduction of the size and cost of the military establishment, justified by the relatively rosy picture they wish the report to portray.

At the opposite pole are usually clustered the military services, which traditionally adopt a somewhat more pessimistic view of Australia's security situation. The military services tend to look at their neighbors' capabilities, rather than relying on another power's intentions. This requires the services to regard every other power in the area with some suspicion and to project all defense planning on the basis of a worst case, "what-if" scenario. The beliefs of each service about the right capabilities necessary for ensuring the security of Australia are deeply and sincerely held convictions.

The gap between the optimists and the pessimists, about

what is right for Australia, is not easily bridged. The dual chain of command environment of the Australian defense establishment simply serves to exacerbate the differences and generally polarize the conflict as one of military versus civilian. In fact, there has been only one successful completion of the drafting-to-approval cycle of a strategic basis paper in over a decade. The net effect of this impasse had been force planning based on out of date strategic policy statements. Australia's military force structure has been frozen, because assigned roles and missions, as well as threat assessments, remained officially unchanged.

This situation actually suited many in the military because it protected existing capabilities and force structure. It was not without its cost, however, and by the mid-1980s the individual services were generally viewed to be holding parochial service interests ahead of changes and necessary improvements in Australia's defense capabilities. After a lengthy and contentious period of development, the deadlock over Australia's strategic assessment was broken in 1987 and the government promulgated a strategic basis paper under the title of Defence of Australia 1987.

Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). With or without promulgation of a strategic basis paper, PPBS is the government's overarching framework for actually deciding on both present and future resource allocation. Similar to the system used by the United States, PPBS is a cyclical

process used to develop an annual defense budget. Consisting of distinct planning, programming and budgeting phases, PPBS follows an annual cycle which begins in September with the Planning Phase. The reports and planning documents, as well as the other inputs to PPBS, are subsequently used to update Australia's Five Year Defence Program (FYDP).

The Planning Phase. The PPBS cycle officially starts when the Department of Defence issues financial guidance to each of the services, and to its other functional divisions, each year in September or October. Designed only to provide the starting framework for the planning process, this guidance sets only broad expenditure targets and is usually framed in terms of the existing approved FYDP. The information issued by the Department of Defence is used by the services to prepare their individual requests for resources to cover current programs in the impending budget. The services, and other Australian defense activities, also use the government's currently approved strategic guidance to prepare their requests. These requests cover acquisition or development of new capabilities, equipment and facilities over the next five years as part of service unique FYDP inputs. Although each organization involved portrays its budget as requesting the absolute least with which it could function, the actual amount of money allocated to the Defence establishment, and its subsequent apportionment among the services, may differ significantly by the time Parliament approves the final Budget.

The Programming Phase. Once drawn up, the services and other defense organizations submit their budget requests to the Resources and Financial Programs (RFP) Division.* RFP then prepares a consolidated Department of Defence budget request, consisting of the "draft Annual Defence Estimates Proposal" and a draft of a new FYDP, and submits it to the Consultative Group (CG) for initial review. After carefully considering the proposed budget and new FYDP, the CG forwards the package to the Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) for its review and endorsement.

DFDC initiates a major review of the package, intensively scrutinizing both budget and draft FYDP by assigning Force Development and Analysis (FDA) Division, with its considerable analytic capabilities, to validate the FYDP and budget proposals. DFDC may also develop and consider alternative programs to attain required national security objectives and include them in the draft budget or FYDP. Once the DFDC has approved the package, it is forwarded to the Minister for Defence for examination and approval. When satisfied that the package fulfills the government's national security requirements and reflects the government's political agenda, the Minister submits the proposed Defence budget and FYDP to the Cabinet's Expenditure Review Committee. The Expenditure

* This division is currently in the Strategic Policy, Force Development & Resources and Financial Programs Group under Deputy Secretary B.

Review Committee considers the defense budget proposals along with budget proposals from all other government activities and provides feedback to the Department of Defence by annotating its budget package.

The Budgeting Phase. The budgeting phase of Australian PPBS starts each year in January or February. A firm budget package for the new fiscal year is developed, incorporating any additional budget proposals for the coming fiscal year, as well as reasonably firm estimates for the first three years of the new FYDP. This revised package is submitted to DFDC for review and then to the Minister for Defence for consideration during February and March. After the Minister's review, the defense budget package is passed to the Department of Finance for detailed examination and comment. When Defence receives its budget package back from the Department of Finance, it prepares comprehensive estimates for the pending budget in May. The May budget submission for the new fiscal year also corresponds to "Year One" of the new, "rolling" FYDP. This detailed budget proposal is submitted to the DFDC for final review before forwarding to the Minister for Defence. If the Minister accepts the proposed budget, he submits it to the Cabinet for consideration in June.

Current Force Development Process. Force development in Australia is a formal and distinct procedure, which supports the PPBS and FYDP development process. Designed to operate on a cyclical schedule complementing the budget cycle, the Force

planning cycle also uses promulgation of the government's revised strategic guidance as its starting point. Just as with development of the Strategic Basis Paper, Australia's force development cycle has never been successfully followed from start to finish as designed.

According to stated procedures, the Department of Defence's Force Development and Analysis (FDA) Division uses the updated Strategic Basis Paper to prepare a draft "Defence Capabilities Guidelines Paper." This document is issued to each of the military services for careful review and comment by headquarters planning staffs. The planning staffs for each service analyze the capabilities required by FDA's guidance, including in their evaluation such costs as the tempo of operations expected for utilization and level of training activity needed to maintain them. Based on their review, each service headquarters prepares a Service Capabilities Paper and submits it to FDA for consolidation. FDA Division uses these service inputs to prepare a draft "Integrated Defence Force Capabilities Paper."

The draft "Integrated Defence Force Capabilities Paper" is a detailed analysis of all factors bearing on the maintenance or development of the various capabilities the services must have, as well as those desired by each service. In addition to considering the military equipment, this integrated FDA document includes requests for various levels of operational activity, training tempo and research and

development stipulated by the services. The draft "Integrated Defence Force Capabilities Paper" is then forwarded to the Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) for assessment and endorsement. DFDC uses the Integrated Defence Force Capabilities Paper to draft and promulgate definitive guidance by issuing a document titled Defence Force Capabilities. Both the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence use this document as a guide when evaluating various proposals for ADF capabilities during the remainder of the force planning cycle and to support their PPBS efforts.

Although this force development system has been in place for almost ten years, its adequacy remains unknown because an entire force planning cycle has never been successfully completed. A major impediment cited by analysts has been the lack of an updated Strategic Basis Paper required to start the cycle. In the late 1970s, when the current system was implemented, the Australian defense establishment did have an effective document in the form of the government's 1976 strategic assessment. Even so, the system was organizationally dysfunctional and unable to surmount the same problems which have precluded development and approval of subsequent strategic basis papers.

The first part of the process, up to development of the DFC Paper, was completed during the official 1981 force planning cycle. FDA actually used the 1976 strategic basis paper to issue a "Defence Capability Guidelines Paper" and the

services dutifully returned their service capability papers. FDA then consolidated the service inputs and developed the required draft "Integrated Defence Force Capabilities Paper" and forwarded it to the DFDC. DFDC then used the FDA draft to develop Defence Force Capabilities 1981 (DFC 81). At this point, however, the process completely fell apart. The Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence were unable to reach agreement on the wording of the final version of DFC 81. It was ultimately issued for use as a "background document" only, but was never approved as government policy.

The crux of the disagreements between the ADF and the Department over DFC-81 was related to a continuing problem of the dominance of financial programming in force development decisions. The ADF refused to support a force structure plan decided on the basis of its ability to fit into the rolling FYDP at any given time rather than on national security considerations.¹⁵ DFC-81 was ineffective as planning guidance and largely ignored by the services because it was not promulgated as an official statement of policy. Australia's force structure essentially remained frozen, with both sides managing to agree to simply support the status quo in order to assemble the annual budget and FYDP inputs.

A fresh attempt to follow stipulated force planning and development procedures began in 1982 with development of Australian Security Outlook 1982, ONA's draft of a new strategic assessment. It continued with Cabinet consideration

of the draft Strategic Basis Paper, but the system again broke down because of a lack of consensus. The Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force were unable to reach agreement over on the wording of the Defence Force Capabilities Paper drafted by FDA. Although based on the service capability papers submitted by the military, FDA used development of the Defence Force Capability Paper to challenge the requirement for some capabilities that the services considered fundamental and made other force structure assumptions which the military simply refused to support.

Most of the controversy was involved with proposals which FDA considered to be more cost effective than those advanced by the individual services. The existence, within the defense establishment, of two markedly different interpretations of how to best fulfill Australia's national security needs implied a deep rooted lack of agreement between the ADF and the Department of Defence over the foundations upon which the government's strategic assessment was based. The result of this disagreement was rejection of Australian Security Outlook and complete paralysis of the formal force development process. The fiasco of 1983-1984 proved that Australia's defense establish was deadlocked and that there was very little comon ground upon which a concensus could be reached.

Although the formal force development process was moribund, force planning and development continued to take place and the ADF continued to provide for Australia's

national security. In the best Australian tradition of "making-do," Australia's defense establishment still managed to generate a budget and execute the most important aspects of PPBS on an annual basis. As long as Australia's strategic environment remained officially static, and the basis for strategic force planning remained unchanged, the defense establishment could maintain the effectiveness and vitality of the ADF. The formal procedures for acquisition of major military equipment was used as a surrogate force planning and development process. This approach was facilitated by Australia's traditional reliance on the "existing force" or "replacement" approaches to force planning and the existence of the security provided by a strong American alliance.

Acquisition of Major Capital Equipment. The acquisition and decision-making processes for major capital equipment begins at the service headquarters level. The service headquarters staff prepares a "Major Equipment Proposal" (MEP) or "Major Equipment Submission" (MES) for new equipment or to enhance the capability of existing equipment. These major equipment requests provide details about functions, principal features and required performance characteristics of the proposed equipment or capability. Conveniently, major equipment requests are developed from the same basic guidance documents that are used for the PPBS cycle.


Prior to the 1987/1988 budget cycle, the individual services submitted all MEP/MES documents to HQADF for review

by the staff of Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Policy) as the first step in the approval chain. HQADF staff was not adequately manned to conduct the rigorous examination necessary to ensure the major equipment requests were correctly prepared. No mechanism existed within HQADF to rigorously evaluate how the new capability would mesh with existing ADF force structure capabilities. In addition, the staff faced continuous pressures from the PPBS deadlines and the requirement to expeditiously clear the requests for review by higher authority. As a result, HQADF staff was usually able to give the service originated proposals only a cursory review prior to forwarding them to FDA.

In contrast with HQADF, FDA was, and remains, well staffed and adequately equipped to conduct a thorough and rigorous analysis of the service proposals when received for review. As in the other processes, FDA also generated alternatives. By comparing original service proposals against their own alternatives, FDA also made an effort to determine the most cost effective course of action. In addition to forwarding the proposal package to the Defence Committee with its comments, FDA also had the option of returning the proposal, along with its alternatives, to the originating service with a request for rework and resubmission. This process always placed the services on the defensive and service headquarters force planning organizations felt they were always reacting to FDA alternatives instead of proposing initiatives of their own.

FLOW of RECOMMENDATIONS

Major Equipment Acquisitions



Additionally, if FDA and the service were engaged in a serious dispute over the merits of a particular proposal, flooding the service staffs with alternatives to be evaluated was a time honored ploy used by FDA to try and kill or delay consideration of the request by higher authority. Due to the near total lack of pre-submission coordination, and the level of organizational hostility which exists between the service staffs and FDA, this "dueling by memo" was guaranteed to ensure each side felt the other was not cooperating. Eventually, however, the two organizations were forced to reach some sort of accommodation in order to get the proposals off dead center and forwarded for review by the appropriate committees.

Once a proposal finally clears FDA, it is sent to the Force Structure Committee for review. The Force Structure Committee, considering the proposal in detail, relies heavily on FDA analysis and recommendations. The committee will either forward the package to the Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC), or return the package to the originating service. If the Force Structure Committee forwards the proposal to higher committees with a positive recommendation, it was usually forwarded through the remaining committees and on to the Minister for Defence for final approval without serious delay.

This system has worked reasonably well to perpetuate the

existing primary force structure. Without effective strategic guidance, the existing force structure was accepted as legitimate and existing capabilities maintained. New equipment simply enhanced the existing capabilities. Therefore, old tanks were replaced with newer, more capable tanks and older aircraft were replaced with newer, more technologically advanced aircraft of the same general type and in approximately the same quantities. Maintaining the status quo required no bruising battles over reallocation of funds or reassignment of defense roles and missions. The replacement approach to maintaining the military's force structure was intellectually easy to explain to politicians and it was a comfortable way for the ADF to avoid internal conflict. The ADF was able to devote most of its energy to fending off proposals from the arm chair strategists in the public service.

Such a system was not without its costs and the ADF cannot lay the blame for all their defense ills at the feet of the Department of Defence. This comfortable system also had a certain amount of failure built in, because it served to harden the lines of demarcation between the capabilities recognized as important for defense by each service. As long as a specific capability was the total responsibility of a single service, it was supported and improved as a matter of course. If a capability required cross service cooperation, however, it was generally an orphan and suffered withering neglect. This neglect was due not so much to lack of inter-

service cooperation as it was the fear that support for cross-service capabilities would result in funding being diverted from the services' primary roles and missions. These turf problems are typified in the abysmal state of Australia's ability to conduct amphibious warfare.

No service really "owns" the amphibious warfare mission. Responsibility for it is divided between the Army and the RAN, with the role of the RAAF being somewhat muddled by the impending transfer of its helicopters to the Army. Amphibious operations require that each of the three services cooperate closely on developing doctrine and workable procedures. In a military environment like Australia's, maintaining an effective amphibious capability would be the ultimate in joint planning and operations. The political benefits of demonstrating to the public that the ADF is truly capable of joint operations would seem to outweigh the costs involved in supporting an effective amphibious capability.

This opportunity has been allowed to evaporate with tight budgets and service scrambling to protect more traditional roles. The Army refuses to support RAN proposals to build more helicopter capable amphibious ships because it would require a contribution of Army funds to help pay for the new ships. The Navy, continually rebuffed in its attempts to get Army cooperation, has adopted the attitude that they would prefer not to be seen as mere bus drivers, toting Army units around on RAN ships. That being the case, Australia is left

with one LSH* and six heavy lift landing craft (LCM-8 Type) to operate in an area of the world uniquely suited to amphibious warfare. All but one of the landing craft are now in reserve.

The Army has formally designated one of its brigades to develop and maintain expertise as Australia's amphibious force, and tasked it to develop Australian amphibious operations concepts. Very little practice, and no serious planning has actually taken place. These Army forces have been politely referred to as "minimally trained" in defense related writings, but the reality is that these troops are simply not ready for rapid deployment in an amphibious environment. At present, therefore, the ADF does not have an effective amphibious capability.

The Era of Reform and Renewal. The failure of the 1983-84 force planning and strategic assessment cycle coincided with the appointment of Mr. Kim Beazley as Minister for Defence. Although a staunch and dedicated member of the Labor Party, he assumed the Defence Portfolio without any of the traditional anti-military emotional baggage usually carried by Labour politicians. Publicly pro-defense, Mr. Beazley was a man with a vision. He had a goal of attaining an increased degree of self-reliance for Australia in defense matters. To accomplish his goal, Australia would have to concentrate on

* HMAS Tobruk is a 5800 ton amphibious heavy lift ship. It resembles an older style U. S. tank landing ship, but has a helicopter platform mounted aft of the superstructure.

developing a defense force structure capable and adept at operating in Australia's unique strategic environment. No longer would Australia be raising and training an army to fight someone else's war outside of Australia's immediate region.

Mr. Beazley recognized that his first task was to regain control of the formal defense planning and decision making process. His second was to conduct a thorough, critical and impartial review of Australia's national security requirements and capabilities. To do the first, Mr. beazley demanded the services begin to treat the existing force structure development and decision making process seriously. He required the Department of Defence and the ADF cooperate more on developing proposals for defense capabilities and stop regarding each other as adversaries. The new Minister for Defence also recognized that no organizational improvements could take place as long as the process for development and approval of the government's strategic basis papers remained moribund. He therefore resolved to move forward with a comprehensive review of Australia's national security situation in a unique and politically astute manner.

The Dibb Report. In 1985, the Minister for Defence commissioned Mr. Paul Dibb, a civilian academic at the Australian National University, to head a study group and conduct a penetrating analysis of the state of Australia's defense establishment. Dibb was also tasked to make

recommendations about the optimum sort of defense force Australia should develop in the future. He was given unrestricted access to all areas of the defense establishment and instructed to complete his work within a year.

Mr Dibb's Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, released in 1986 and popularly known as "the Dibb Report," provoked a fire storm of comment and debate on all aspects of defense. It was castigated for being both too radical and not radical enough, and many were critical of the underlying assumptions upon which the report's predictions were based. Mr. Beazley had managed to focus Australia's attention on the issues of defense without appearing to be engaged in partisan political maneuvering.

Essentially the Dibb Report called for the ADF to improve its capability to defend Australia's continental land mass through a strategy of layered defense in depth. Called the "Strategy of Denial," Dibb's plan was to deny an enemy the possibility of easily landing on the continent. The report suggested that the military structure of the ADF be modified to concentrate almost solely on continental defense, severely reducing its capability to operate away from Australia. Concurrent with advocating an increased level of self-reliance in defense, the report appeared to downgrade the importance of the American alliance to Australia. It generated the most controversy by implying that the Australian-American alliance no longer occupied a central position in Australia's national

security equation.

Australia's existing concept of having a small, but highly professional and well equipped force was validated, but the Dibb Report took the concept a step further. The ADF would continue to be a small, highly professional force, but greater emphasis would be placed on its role as a core force to supervise rapid expansion of the military and activation of the reserves to meet threats to continental Australia. Under Dibb's plan, the Navy would essentially loose its blue water capability, and concentrate primarily on coastal defense. The Air Force would have been limited to a continental air defense role, essentially loosing its long range strike capability. The Army would have had to place even more emphasis on its reserve formations, making it incapable of independent operations without activating key reserve units. The report also placed great emphasis and faith on Australia's intelligence and warning systems to provide adequate notice of developing hostile intent. Intelligence would identify a threatening nation in time to permit the military to expand to meet the threat. Critics have called this a "Fortress Australia" concept.

Mr. Beazley used the Dibb Report as a stalking horse for his own report on Australia's defense and his plans for the future of the defense establishment. Within a year the government had developed and released an official statement of defense policy in its Defence of Australia 1987, the first

comprehensive defense policy information paper published in over a decade. Defence of Australia 1987 also emphasized the theme of increased defense self-reliance for Australia, but it did so in the context of Australia's wider role in the affairs of its strategic region, as well as its interest in the affairs of the world. There was no hint of the isolationism and Fortress Australia concept which was evident in the Dibb Report.

Defence of Australia 1987 provided direction for the government's national security policy and established it on a firm intellectual foundation. The government's report presented a coherent and mutually interdependent program that combined military strategy, foreign policy, threat analysis and the force structure required to support it. There had, however, been other such documents released by previous governments, but the internecine warfare between the Department of Defence and the military services had routinely nullified a lot of fairly reasonable programs and continued to paralyze the system. In order to ensure that his ambitious program to improve Australia's defense establishment succeeded where previous attempts had failed, Mr Beazley concluded that he had to also reform the defense organization itself. Mr. Beazley's first major step was to revitalize the nearly moribund defense planning and decision making structure.

Revised Major Equipment Acquisition Process. Coincident with promulgation of The Defence of Australia 1987, a new

procedure was implemented which modified and strengthened Australia's major equipment acquisition process. The new procedure involved establishing a new set of preliminary documentation for major equipment requests and formation of a committee with specific responsibility for reviewing them. Australia's major equipment decision-making and acquisition processes now begins with generation of a Defence Force Capability Proposal (DFCP) for new equipment or a new capability by one of the military services. DFCPs utilize the same basic guidance documents that are used in the existing PPBS and FYDP development cycles but are not as detailed as major equipment proposals. Correct preparation of the DFCP, detailing the functions, principal features and required performance characteristics of the proposed equipment or capability is still the responsibility of the originating service.


The DFCP is forwarded via HQADF for review by the newly formed Defence Operational Characteristics and Capabilities Committee (DOCCC). If the DOCCC favorably endorses the DFCP, the service originating the request is authorized to proceed to the next step, development of a Major Equipment Submission (MES). As in the old process, the service routes its MES to FDA for further analysis and refinement. In contrast to the previous situation, however, the proposal has already been intensively reviewed at the DOCCC level. Receipt of DOCCC endorsement means the proposal has obtained tentative support

from the other branches of the ADF and is technically correct in all aspects prior to its delivery to FDA.

The new procedures make FDA and the originating service jointly responsible for coordinating necessary reviews and analysis of the MES with other branches of the defense establishment. This is an important change, because the previous practice had been characterized by minimal coordination between the military staffs and FDA during FDA's analysis. FDA's previous practice had been to challenge service proposals by unilaterally developing numerous alternatives, each requiring evaluation and comment by the services. This caused a good deal of friction between the organizations because the services felt FDA was purposely attempting to bury the proposal under excessive and unnecessary analysis. Although FDA's analysis may still involve commissioning specific feasibility studies and generation of alternative proposals, the services are now part of the process. With the services thus involved, most of the antagonism toward FDA's review has been reduced. The new procedure forces the services to interact continuously with FDA. The originating service now plays a substantial role in assisting FDA by analyzing and reviewing proposed alternatives as they are developed.

After this point the process is essentially the same as the previous procedures. When FDA is through with its analysis, the package is forwarded to the FSC for its review.

Major Equipment Acquisition New Process



Those proposals that are supported and endorsed by the FSC are submitted to the DFDC for further review and deliberation. Proposals accepted by the DFDC are then forwarded to the Minister for Defence with the recommendation that he approve them as part of the FYDP process.

Whether establishment of the DOCCC and forcing the services to work more closely with FDA will enhance the decision making process is hard to determine. This new process was only established for the 1987/1988 period and has yet to run a full cycle of DOCCC, FSC and Government approval. At the very least, the system will benefit because it will serve to expose the service force planning staffs to the rigorous analytical process used by FDA in reviewing proposals. Only time will tell about other benefits which may accrue from these changes.

Strategic Basis Paper Reform. In an effort to revitalize development of the strategic basis paper and get Australia's force development process back on track, two other major efforts were launched in parallel in 1988. The process of drafting the strategic basis papers was radically altered and responsibility for development was transferred to a division of the Department of Defence. The Minister for Defence also initiated an in depth and searching review of every aspect of Australia's existing force planning process.

Responsibility for drafting the next strategic basis paper, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s, has been


assigned to a Strategic Policy Coordination Division Working Group, composed of representatives of all branches of the defense establishment. Each step in the development of this new strategic basis paper has been closely coordinated with the HQADF staff and a high level, ad hoc steering committee has supervised and directed the entire effort. The ad hoc steering committee, chaired by Deputy Secretary B, has the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Assistant Chief of the Defence Force for Development, First Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy Coordination, First Assistant Secretary Strategic & International Policy, First Assistant Secretary Force Development and Analysis and Director, Joint Intelligence Organization as members.

Although not yet released, Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s reportedly will provide a thorough review of Australia's strategic environment. It will also contain explanations of major planning factors, state ADF capability requirements and set force structure development priorities. The paper will be organized to provide both broad policy objectives and the detailed guidance necessary to facilitate defense planning over the next ten years.

Force Structure Development and Planning Reform. The comprehensive review of Australian force planning resulted in a recommendation for substantial changes to the force planning and development process. The major recommendation was formation of a "Development Division" within the headquarters

Defence Force Organization

Proposed HQ ADF Organization



Note: ASSTCH stands for Assistant Chief of the Defence Force

Source: Como H. Donohue RAN

staff of the Chief of the Defence Force. If the plan is approved and implemented, Development Division will be formed by transferring the existing force planning organizations on the three headquarters service staffs directly to the CDF Headquarters Staff. This change will significantly increase the strength and authority of the CDF's staff through concentration of the capability to perform force planning and development functions in a single organization. It will also completely integrate the Australian Defence Force's planning and development effort.

Formation of the "Development Division," as proposed by the study group, will finally give HQADF the manpower adequate to perform its force planning and force development oversight role effectively. The major effect of this new organization is that all major force planning and development proposals will be staffed and originated within HQADF Development Division, rather than by individual service staffs. Such a move should facilitate better working relationships between the military force planners and the Department of Defence analysts.

Development Division HQADF. Development Division within the HQADF staff will be headed by the Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Development) (ACDEV). Development Division will have six subordinate branches organized along functional lines as shown in figure 7-4. The basis for the organization presented is that one branch will be responsible for

development of concepts, four functional branches will concentrate on service or field specific issues and one branch will be responsible for ensuring programs mesh with the FYDP.

Military Strategy and Concepts Branch - This branch will participate in the development of both overall defense and military specific strategy. This responsibility includes developing ADF operational concepts and planning for mobilization and force expansion. The work of this branch will provide the basis for the efforts of the other Development Division branches. This branch will have primary responsibility for developing and coordinating all ADF operational concept papers. Specific warfare advice will be sought from, and required of the service headquarters and joint command staffs, as well as from the other branches of the division.

Force Development Branches - Three force development branches will be established in the division, one each to focus on development of sea, land and air capabilities for the ADF. Although attached to HQADF, these branches will also be responsive to individual service Chiefs of Staff for development activities within each service chief's area of cognizance. These branches will coordinate closely with the service headquarters, the Military Strategy and Concepts Branch and the Programs and Resources Branch.

Command and Information Systems Branch - This branch will

be responsible for the establishment of communications and information systems requirements and unified policies for the ADF. It will develop requirements and concepts for strategic communications systems, major tactical systems with joint applications, and strategic electronic information acquisition systems, such as the new Jindalee Over the Horizon Radar System. This division will also be responsible for development of requirements and standards for acquisition of Electronic Data Processing hardware for ADF command and control and ADF general management systems.

Programs and Resources Branch - This branch will coordinate preparation of the ADF input to the overall Defence Program on behalf of CDF. Responsibilities will include taking a long term (Ten year) approach to Defence Force planning and development. The Directorates of Plans and Programs on each of the three service headquarters staffs will coordinate with this branch to enhance the ADF's overall joint planning and programming effort. The range of programming and planning covered by this branch includes force structure, joint and service specific activities, ADF readiness, manpower programs and facilities.

The net result of this new arrangement will be that HQADF, through the Development Division, will acquire primary responsibility for coordinating the ADF's force development and planning process. Development Division will be responsible for sponsoring service capability proposals from

first draft to acceptance for development within Australia's Higher Defence Committee System. The new procedures will also task Development Division to use a longer time horizon than currently used in force planning. In conjunction with cognizant divisions in the Department of Defence, HQADF's Development Division will be responsible for preparing resource estimates and timing of introduction of new capabilities proposed in the context of a "Ten Year Defense Plan." This ten year plan will consist of the current FYDP and a follow-on FYDP. Long range ADF planning will start at the ten year horizon and be a logical extension of the combined FYDPs.

Summary. Force structure planning in Australia has traditionally taken place in an uncertain and contentious environment. The national political debate about the need for, and political uses of, the Australian military has not been resolved. Until the government is able to establish a viable and credible national security strategy, the appropriate size and structure of Australia's Defence Forces cannot be determined. Rational and analytic force planning cannot proceed until the environment and contingencies in which these forces will be used is determined. Debate both within and outside of the defense establishment about the correct balance between army, naval and air forces for Australia will continue to have a hollow ring. Mr. Beazley's Defence of Australia 1987 provided one interpretation of the way ahead for Australia, but judging from the opposition

statements and commentary in defense related writings, there remains no general agreement in Parliament with the Labour Party's concept for Australian defense.

The existing force planning organization in Australia has failed to function to anyone's satisfaction for over a decade. Its failure to adequately meet Australia's needs is caused, in part by the lack of consensus over national strategy and the potential uses of the ADF to meet contingencies. The major cause of failure by Australia's force planning endeavors has been the dual nature of the defense establishment's organization and fragmented responsibility for force planning within the ADF. The two different organizations with their two different chains of command, are a guarantee of friction and problems. This is a particular problem where ineffectual committees are designed as the primary, and often only, point of interface between the two organizations. The unsatisfactory state of Australian force planning is reflected in the continuous efforts to fix the organizational problems left over from reorganization. This has resulted in near continuous defense reorganizations and promulgations of new, "improved" procedures to make it work better.

The latest reorganization being contemplated, if properly executed, will go far to place the ADF and the Department of Defence on a level playing field in the force planning process. Better oversight by VCDF and more coordination between Development Division and the Department of Defence

will go far to reduce the amount of ill feeling between the two sides of the defense establishment. The proposed organization will also serve to enhance the credibility of the military planners and their ability to influence the decision making process. Anything that can be done to facilitate communications and coordination between the ADF and the Department of Defence will improve the force development process and enhance Australia's defense planning efforts.

Notes

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5. Beazley's statement need note.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of conducting this research was to gain a comprehensive understanding of the organizational mechanisms and procedures used in Australian defense force planning. It was also initiated to study the effect of Australia's strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region on determining the size and composition of its military forces. Using Australia's experience in force planning and force structure development as an academic case study, the results of its force planning process were compared with Australia's promulgated national security strategy and policies. By studying the procedures used to match Australian strategy to force levels, lessons learned were developed which could be applied to America's situation.

Australia was selected for three reasons. First were the numerous similarities that exist between the United States and Australia. Both countries began as struggling colonial outposts on the periphery of the vast British Empire. Both countries were located in geographically fortunate circumstances of having a whole continent to conquer and exploit with relatively little resistance. These continental venues provided, and still provide, both nations with a great deal of natural protection and security. Australia and the United States continue to share identical challenges in today's

changing world. Each is attempting to balance the resources allocated to national defense with the need to provide increasingly comprehensive social programs demanded by their citizens. Americans also tend to view Australians as being so similar to themselves that many consider the only differences between the two peoples to be their accents and vocabulary.

The second factor in selection of Australia was the size and composition of its defense establishment. Studying Australia's defense establishment was more manageable than studying defense establishments of other significant nations in the Western alliance. Australia's overall military structure also closely resembles that of the United States military. The armed forces have been maintained as three distinct and relatively balanced services, each with a unique and specialized role assigned in the country's defense. Most important, however, was that Australia's military has been faced with constant demands from politicians for more emphasis on joint operations and elimination of inter-service rivalry in the name of efficiency and economy. The effects on the readiness and force structure of the Australian military of this increased emphasis on "jointness" are worthy of a study of and by themselves.

The third reason for choosing Australia as the object of this study was its unique strategic situation. Called "the lucky country," Australia occupies an island continent far from any of the great power arenas of competition. There appear to

be no immediately recognizable threats to its national security. Geopolitical realism, however, compels the government to maintain a substantial military establishment. One specific object of this project was to study how the ends of Australia's national security strategy were matched to the means required to support that strategy in an environment of very low apparent threat and tight national budgets.

Initial perceptions about Australia were quickly proven either erroneous or irrelevant. Although Australia has a defense establishment that is substantially smaller than that of the United States, it is a highly complex organization with its own unique strengths and weaknesses. The Australian military functions in a political and strategic environment that is much different than generally appreciated by observers in the United States. Their form of government, historical roots and perceptions about their role in the world exert influences on Australian military planners that are substantially different from those experienced by American military planners. It is also important to remember that, although Australia is a staunch ally of America, its friendship and support can no longer be taken for granted. The days of unquestioned backing for American policies are over. Australia is determined to chart its own course in the complex, multi-polar world of the future.

The unique aspects of Australia's national security establishment can only be appreciated by a detailed examination

of the cultural and political history of the country. This paper built a framework for understanding how Australia's defense establishment evolved to its present state. This framework was used to critically examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the Australia defense establishment's present force planning and development organization.

A key factor influencing all Australian national security discussions is the perception that most Australians perceive that themselves as living a secure country situated in a reasonably benign region of the world. Since the end of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, and the collapse of the policy of "Forward Defense," no national consensus has developed about the required nature, size or function of Australia's military forces. By all standard measures of success, however, Australia's armed forces and traditional national security policies have served the country exceedingly well. Australia has never been invaded nor does there appear to be any serious threat to national security on the horizon. A superficial study of the Australian experience would indicate that Australia's defense establishment is really the well oiled, professional and highly capable organization that some claim it to be.

Most of the conclusions which can be carried away from this study, however, are not positive. The Australian military's experience over the past twenty odd years should be viewed as one the United States should avoid if possible.

Although acknowledging that the Australian and American military establishments operate in different strategic and political environments, and that the frameworks in which force planning takes place in differ substantially, there are some valuable lessons to be learned and warnings to be heeded.

Australia's is confronted by two major obstacles which impede effective force planning and development. First is the continuing lack of a national consensus, both about Australia's national security strategy and about the role of the military in supporting that strategy. The second, and more deleterious from a military point of view, obstacle is the continuous organizational turbulence which has characterized the defense establishment since the Tange reorganizations in the mid 1970s. Individually, each would present a significant challenge to force planning. Taken together, these two factors ensure that force planning in Australia can never succeed in becoming effective or efficient as long as they remain unresolved.

Lack of national consensus around which to build a viable security strategy and the average Australian's lack of concern for national security issues are important problems facing Australia's defense establishment. Part of this disinterest can be traced to the fact that the process of developing and producing strategic assessments in Australia is essentially moribund. As indicated in the text of this paper, the Australian system of decision by committee has resulted in over a decade of paralysis in confronting difficult national

security questions. The process has become polarized to the point that promulgating even the basis for a meaningful national security strategy has become impossible. So hopeless had the situation become by the last years of the 1980's that Australia's government attempted to break the impasse by establishing an independent, non-government commission, headed by Mr. Paul Dibb, to review Australia's national security situation. The Dibb Commission did indeed provide the foundations for a national security strategy and recommend a force structure to support its strategy.

Commander John Kenney, who recently spent a year as a Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, studied the effects and ramifications of Mr. Dibb's effort. In particular, he compared the American experience at developing an articulate and coherent national strategy with that of the Australians. Commander Kenney concluded that, while our experience has not approached the nadir of indecision reached by Australia, our track record of developing national security strategies is not particularly good. As a matter of fact, Commander Kenney contends that our record of developing new strategic policies to respond to changes in our strategic environment has been uniformly poor. It has been our good fortune, if one can call it that, to have had a tangible and cooperative threat posed by the Soviet Union and world Communism around which to build our national strategy. Now that threat seems to be receding, Commander Kenny suggests that the United States may want to consider a

truly independent national commission, similar to the Australian effort, to review our national security strategy similar to the Australian effort. This is a proposal which deserves further serious study.

The organizational problems faced by Australia's defense establishment are probably even more fundamental and present more of an obstacle to effective force planning than the country's lack of strategy. The concept of a diarchy for management and organization of national defense, as proposed by Sir Arthur Tange's reorganization plans, may look logical and efficient on an organizational chart. The resultant organization is riven with confrontation and characterized by lack of coordination between the civil service and military branches of the defense establishment.

Analysis of Tange's proposals for reorganization of Australia's defense establishment leads to the conclusion that some of them had merit, but implementation of most of his recommendations was not wise nor necessary. In fact, the complete implementation of the Tange reorganization has probably resulted in less national security efficiency and a lower level of military preparedness because it contributed to paralyzing the force structure development decision making process.

Reorganization to improve the management and effectiveness of the defense establishment's support structures should have

been accomplished selectively, with a scalpel. Instead, it was executed with a cleaver, as an "all or nothing" reorganization package. The result has not been the hoped for strengthening of civil control over the military establishment. What has actually occurred has been the strengthening of control of the military by the civil service. The influence of the military services has been gradually and systematically diminished, with the civil servants in the Department of Defence routinely discounting the military's influence in matters connected with strategic policy, force structure, financial administration and control over defense expenditures. This is a fundamental flaw in Australia's system which results in unresolvable tensions between its distinct military and civil service organizations. The paralysis in decision making in such an organization is predictable and inevitable. The lessons for the United States are obvious, but bear repeating.

First, there is a tremendous difference between civilian political control of the defense establishment and its control by career civil servants. Second, the structure of the defense establishment must include "cross-pollination" with substantial military representation on civilian staffs at all levels of the organization. Third, the ability of the military service chiefs and joint operational commanders to influence strategic policy, force structure decisions and military planning must not be reduced or impeded by arbitrary organizational limitations. The military's ability to provide advice and council to the highest levels of civilian political authority

must not be curtailed. Finally, there is a definite need for the continued and vigorous participation of the individual military services, and the various service secretaries, in any large defense establishment.

Another organizational lesson to be learned from Australia is that there may be a limit to the positive effects of "jointness" on a military establishment. Increasing centralization of powers in the hands of the Chief of the Australian Defence Force, has not had the salutary effect on military preparedness and effectiveness that Australian defense theoreticians had hoped. In fact, many defense critics in Australia contend that their current joint military organization may be less effective at meeting a combined arms threat than their previous organization. The recent inability of Australia's joint staffs to respond to unsettling events in the South Pacific are indicative of the need to retain substantial warfare specific organizations. The corollary to these events is the experience of the United States in executing Operation Urgent Fury on the Island of Grenada. The lesson from Australia is that joint staffs cannot replace service staffs in providing depth for national defense effort. Development of joint command staffs should be complementary complimentary activities, designed to strengthen the defense establishment rather than to replace proven and effective parts of the organization.

On the specific issue of force planning and development, the debate over the size and type of forces necessary to support Australia's strategy for national security is moot until a strategy is decided upon. The latest government pronouncements not with standing, the strategy promulgated by the Minister for Defence in the government's 1987-1988 White Paper does not appear to be have consensus support from the opposition. A change of government could bring about an abrupt change in the country's strategic thrust. The lessons here for the United States are very clear and obvious. Any effective national security strategy must be concise and enjoy wide bipartisan support. In addition, the domination of the force planning process by the civilian analysts of the Department of Defence's Force Development and Analysis Division has caused them to be blamed for all Australia's force planning and force structure ills. When any single organization is allowed to acquire so much positional authority that it can stifle debate and act as a filter for programs which should be examined by higher levels of decision makers, there is a problem. The present level of influence exercised by FDA analysts on Australia's force development and force structure planning system is not healthy for the defense establishment.

The military services must, however, share in the responsibility for creating the force planning impasses and difficulties they find them selves in today. The failure of the military services to assume a more professional attitude toward their responsibility to conduct force planning with

rigors analytical effort has played a significant role in creating today's unsatisfactory conditions. Rather than conduct the advance coordination necessary to ensure that their proposals were adequately staffed and supported by analysis, the service headquarters have chosen to routinely forward force structure proposals independent of other considerations about appropriateness or cost-effectiveness. FDA was positioned to act as a central reviewer of all proposals from all services and to be the judge about which proposals would fit in the national security puzzle and which simply were not required. Closer consultation among the services and better cooperation between the military and the Department of Defence would, therefore, be a good idea in any climate. In the current climate of tight budgets and rising inflation it is absolutely mandatory.

The recent proposal to establish a Development Division within HQADF is a correct one. It will serve to immediately reestablish the military's analytic legitimacy in Australia's defense committee system. This move will also ensure that all military force structure proposals receive the proper attention and review prior to being submitted for consideration by higher defense committees. Development Division will ensure that proposals fit the needs of the military's integrated force and capability structure plans. Given the conditions existing in Australia, migration of the service planning staffs to HQADF is probably the only workable idea.

There are two key lessons to be learned from Australia's current force planning situation. First is that proposals to expend public funds cannot be made without the proper analytical rigor used to justify it. The second is that the services must cooperate or be completely dominated by some other external organization which may have totally different opinions about how the armed services should be structured and execute their missions.

The tenure of the current Minister for Defence, Mr. Kim Beazley, has resulted in great progress toward restoring equilibrium and direction to Australia's national security establishment. He has committed Australia to increasing its capacity for self-reliance in defense and to charting a national security course that will permit Australia to act in its own best interests in Asia and in the South Pacific. In the area of force planning, his administration has also presided over the gradual reassertion of a legitimate role for the military in planning Australia's force structure. Movements are again afoot to place the military in a position where its professional evaluation of the pros and cons of force structure proposals and the contribution these proposals will make to supporting national strategies will have equal standing with other power centers in the defense establishment. Whether his initiatives will succeed in revitalizing the defense establishment's decision making apparatus and preparing it for the next century is problematic. His success in these endeavors is critical to Australia's national well-being.

This study is not definitive. There are far too many changes taking place in Australia's defense establishment to permit a research project like this to collect all the information necessary to be considered comprehensive. It has served to establish a foundation for further research by providing a reference base, combining information from a diverse number of sources in one paper.

Proposals resulting from this paper involve the need for continuing research of this type about the force planning organizations of our allies. Additionally, further research should be conducted on a periodic basis about aspects of the Australian military's experience with its brand of "jointness." A more detailed comparison of the perceptions and assumptions influencing Australian strategic policy makers and force planners, both civilian and military is needed to fill out our understanding of their system.

Starting in the early 1970s, successive Australian governments were unable, or unwilling to articulate a credible and comprehensive national security policy. The major reason for this phenomenon has been attributed to the lack of an identifiable physical threat to Australia around which such a strategy could be built. In the 1990s, unique and breathtaking events are occurring throughout the world, and in particular in Eastern Europe. It appears to many that the nature of the threats to the security and survival of the

United States are changing so rapidly that we cannot keep up with them. Some have predicted that the United States may soon be facing a threat environment similar to Australia's. We may soon be confronted with attempting to maintain a force structure and develop role and missions to support a strategy radically different from the one which has sustained and legitimized the nature of America's commitment to world security over the past forty years. The time to start planning for such an eventuality is now.

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