Strategic Reassessment in Vietnam: The Westmoreland 'Alternate Strategy' of 1967-1968
Abstract
This essay examines the efforts of General William C. Westmoreland to stimulate a reassessment of American strategy in Vietnam from 1967 to 1968. Reflecting his misgivings about the strategy of attrition in early 1967, Westmoreland turned to an alternate strategy aimed at convincing Hanoi through the isolation of the battlefield by ground operations in Laos and North Vietnam that it could not win. Throughout much of 1967 Westmoreland systematically sought to stimulate such a reconsideration of American strategy by Washington, but the approach of the 1968 election proved too formidable an obstacle. Westmoreland was drawn into the partisan debate and muted his pessimism about attrition. Despite important misgivings on the part of the senior field commander in Vietnam, American strategy continued without reconsideration. Westmoreland resurrected his alternate strategy following the Tet Offensive in early 1968. His failure at that time to articulate it forcefully, combined with inept tactics by the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again denied it serious consideration and was another missed opportunity for a systematic reassessment of Vietnam strategy. Keywords: General/officers/history, President United States, Military strategy, Southeast Asia, South Vietnam.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA227314
Entities
People
- Charles F. Brower Iv
Organizations
- Naval War College