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Frederick the Great and Bismarck:

Standards for Modern Strategists

by

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
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
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
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Abstract

FREDERICK THE GREAT AND BISMARCK: STANDARDS FOR MODERN STRATEGISTS. by LTC William H. Janes, USA, 40 pages.

Makers of modern strategy have an unprecedented challenge in our complex world. American strategists have been criticized for strategic failures since World War II. Congressional investigations have been initiated to examine the strategic education of senior military officers. The news media is replete with criticism of our strategy. The lingering question is how can a nation with our sophisticated educational system and highly intelligent leaders fail to develop a coherent, consistent, and productive strategy? This study examines two historical strategists, Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck, to determine if history provides any solutions for modern strategists.

The study uses Michael Howard's elements of grand strategy. Five elements of grand strategy are discussed: operational, logistical, social, technological, and political. Frederick's and Bismarck's use of these elements is examined during the times they dominated policy making in Prussia. Their methods provide valuable insights about strategy development. This paper does not provide a solution to our modern problems with strategy. Rather, it focuses on two models. One model contains the elements of grand strategy. The second model provides criteria to evaluate the development and execution of strategy: determination, consistency of purpose, realism, creativity, vision, flexibility, and decisiveness.

→ The conclusions verify Frederick's and Bismarck's strategic effectiveness.

Frederick as King and Bismarck as Prime Minister provide numerous examples of successful implementation of grand strategy. Although our world is more complicated, there are definite applications for the modern strategist. The final section of the paper is a discussion of some modern strategic issues. We are not executing strategy effectively. However, if our leaders recognize the problem and develop a strategy which addresses the two models presented, our strategy will improve. If we do not, the lessons of Frederick and Bismarck will be lost.

→ Keywords: Military Strategy; Military Forces (United States); History; Military Forces (Foreign); Foreign Policy; Thesis (B.A.)

I. INTRODUCTION

Congressman Ike Skelton has recently opened hearings concerning how the military trains officers to develop strategy. He has asked, "Where are our strategic thinkers of today? Does our military spend so much time studying weapons systems and tactics that there is no room for strategic thinking?"(1) Congressman Skelton's concerns are echoed in even stronger terms by two political analysts, William F. and Harriet Fast Scott, who contend that:

. . . most people in the United States do not take military theory seriously. . . In the past the United States had such overwhelming military power that the doctrine and strategy of a potential opponent were of little interest to Pentagon planners. . . As the United States has no consistent, clearly discernible military doctrine or strategy of its own, there are few grounds for comparison with the Soviet Union in these areas.(2)

. Our wars in Korea and Vietnam have caused many leaders to question the adequacy of our national strategy. Congressman Skelton asserts that ". . . strategic thinking atrophied after 1945. In many ways the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had convinced many leaders, both military and civilian, that the nuclear age had rendered obsolete the ideas and thoughts associated with classical military strategy." (3) Congressman Skelton further states that ". . . inattention to strategy is part of the reason for the confused planning, wasted money, and military setbacks that have plagued our Armed Forces in recent times." (4) The arms for hostages scandal and turbulence in Central America and the Middle East raise further questions regarding the adequacy of our strategic competence.

The implications of these reservations are obvious and too widely asserted to be discounted. Analysts habitually praise the Soviets as strategists and

condemn the United States. An approach toward correcting this unsatisfactory situation is to develop standards for strategic thought based on historical analysis of successful strategists. This study focuses on two men recognized as eminently successful strategists: Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck.

Both were Prussians, but they lived in different centuries. Their objectives were similar, but the unique challenges of the different ages required varied responses. Both were equal to their tasks. Their achievements merit further study. This paper will examine their important treaties, domestic policies, and wars to determine what made them successful strategists. The focus will be the elements of grand strategy as discussed in Michael Howard's article, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy." (5) These are logistical, operational, social, and technological.

The paper will then compare Frederick's and Bismarck's policies and their impact on national strategy. Their effectiveness as strategists will be measured according to their determination, consistency of purpose, realism, creativity, vision, flexibility, and decisiveness. (6) These comparisons should provide valuable lessons for today's strategists. The final task is to apply the historical insights derived to contemporary problems in United States strategy. This study is intended to illuminate concerns about modern strategy but not to provide suggestions for improvement. There are two questions to be answered. How effective were Frederick and Bismarck in using the elements of grand strategy? What are the implications of Frederick's and Bismarck's strategic acumen for the modern practitioner of grand strategy?

II. ELEMENTS OF GRAND STRATEGY

What is meant by the term "grand strategy"? B. H. Liddell Hart equates grand strategy to "war policy." (7) Liddell Hart emphasizes that "the object in war is to attain a better peace . . . A state which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future." (8) Michael Howard states that "in the West the concept of 'grand strategy' was introduced to include those industrial, financial, demographic, and societal aspects of war that have become so salient in the twentieth century" (9)

Howard credits Clausewitz with making a distinction between ". . . the maintenance of armed forces and their use." Howard labels these aspects of grand strategy as the logistical and the operational. "Earlier writers had concerned themselves almost exclusively with the enormous problems of raising, arming, equipping, moving, and maintaining armed forces in the field -- an approach Clausewitz dismissed as being as relevant to fighting as the skills of the swordmaker were to the art of fencing." (10) According to Howard, Clausewitz went further in analyzing the use of armies:

Clausewitz's dogmatic assertion of priorities --his subordination of the logistical element in war to the operational -- may have owed something to a prejudice common to all fighting soldiers in all eras . . . But it cannot be denied that in the Napoleonic era it was operational skill rather than sound logistical planning that proved decisive in campaign after campaign. (11)

The first two elements of grand strategy we will consider are logistical and operational. Clausewitz also provided the third element of grand strategy -- the social. In his "remarkable trinity", Clausewitz described war as an amalgam of political objectives, operational instruments, and popular passions. Popular

passions were "social forces" that made the wars after the French Revolution different from previous conflicts. (12) The social element determined the fervor or involvement which a nation carried to war. Their sacrifices provided the logistical support essential for war. Their attitudes significantly affected those who waged war. These attitudes collectively became public opinion. As armies grew larger and demands on the populace increased, the strategist was forced to consider public opinion as an element of strategy.

Had the population of the North been as indifferent to the outcome of the Civil War as the leaders of the Confederacy had initially hoped, the operational victories of the South in the early years might have decisively tipped the scales. The logistical potential of the North would have been negligible value without the determination to use it. But given equal resolution on both sides, the capacity of the North to mobilize superior forces ultimately became the decisive factor in the struggle. (13)

The fourth element of grand strategy is technology. Clausewitz did not see technological change significantly affect warfare. However, technological changes had a major impact on strategies in the nineteenth century" . . . when Prussian armies equipped with breech-loading rifles defeated Austrian armies which were not so equipped. Four years later, in 1870, the Prussians revealed an even more crushing superiority over their French adversaries thanks to their steel breech-loading artillery." (14) Ever since, technology has been a major strategic consideration. The impact of nuclear technology substantiates the importance of this element of strategy.

Politics is the final element of grand strategy to be examined in this study. Although not specifically addressed by Michael Howard as a dimension of grand strategy, it must be considered. The nature of the government and its mechanisms to interact with the military and the people are major determinants of

strategy. Nations led by a Napoleon or a Hitler will have a much more centralized system of developing strategy than democracies where legislative bodies have a major role in strategy development. Political circumstances will largely determine the strategic scenarios which are most likely to occur.(15) The strategist must predict these circumstances in order to develop workable strategies.

These five elements of strategy: logistical, operational, social, technological, and political interact continuously in the formulation of grand strategy. One element may appear to dominate a particular situation; however, the strategist must be careful not to focus entirely on it. Michael Howard cautions that modern emphasis on technology has overshadowed other elements -- "the forgotten dimensions of strategy." Yet he emphasizes of the societal and logistical effects of a nuclear strategy. Additionally, ". . . the importance of the political objective, and the readiness of belligerent communities to endure the sacrifices involved in prolonging the war"(16) must be addressed by the modern strategist.

The five elements of grand strategy are also useful in examining past strategists. Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck were two successful strategists from Prussia. However, their achievements have not been measured against the elements of grand strategy. This comparison offers important lessons for today's strategist.

III. FREDERICK AND BISMARCK -- A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

William Shirer traced Frederick's and Bismarck's impact in his book, The

Rise and Fall of the Third Reich:

In the delirious days of the annual rallies of the Nazi Party at Nuremberg at the beginning of September, I used to be accosted by a swarm of hawkers selling a picture postcard on which were shown the portraits of Frederick the Great, Bismarck, Hindenberg and Hitler. The inscription read: 'What the King conquered, the Prince formed, the Field Marshal defended, the soldier saved and unified'.(17)

There were distinct differences and similarities between Bismarck and Frederick. Frederick was born the son of a Prussian King; Bismarck was from Prussian nobility. Frederick lived from 1712-86 and was King of Prussia from 1740-86. Otto von Bismarck lived from 1815-98 and was Chancellor of the German Empire from 1871-90. Both men dedicated their political careers to the aggrandizement of Prussia. Each engaged in political intrigue and warfare to achieve political objectives. They unquestionably improved the status of their country and gained great respect for themselves and their nation. Yet they were different men living in different eras. To understand their excellence as strategists, we must examine the major events of their time.

Frederick the Great became King of Prussia in 1740. He inherited an effective army that he deployed immediately. "Frederick's sudden thrust into Silesia in 1740 . . . propelled him into the center of a tumultuous diplomatic stage."(18) Silesia was part of Austria but adjacent to Prussia. The state had considerable resources and was of great value. "Frederick undertook the rapid seizure of Silesia, thus beginning the War of Austrian Succession . . . Henceforth, Prussia would weigh strongly in the European balance of power."(19) Frederick persuaded France to ally itself with Prussia against Austria. Inter-

estingly, Frederick betrayed France twice during this First Silesian War, once in the field when he refused to join forces with the French and again in formulating the Peace of Breslau, July 28, 1742, in which he concluded a separate peace with Austria, abandoning the French army isolated in Prague. Frederick's decision to conclude a separate peace was largely based on the economic costs of the war.

Prussia's absence from the war was short lived, as Frederick became concerned by British diplomacy. The British were negotiating with Austria, promising compensation if Austria left Silesia with Prussia. Frederick wanted no compensation given to Austria. Feeling isolated, he brought Prussia back into the war in 1743. This war continued until 1748 and concluded with the Peace of Aix-La-Chapelle. Under this treaty, Frederick retained Silesia much to the chagrin of Maria Theresa of Austria.

Frederick had demonstrated Prussia's military might during these wars. The discipline and proficiency of his army became well known.

Because of Prussia's limited resources, strategy and tactics were virtually governed by logistics. More than ever, the Army depended on supply depots and magazines . . . The decision to give or refuse battle was not infrequently dictated by the level of stocks remaining. . .(20)

Frederick had used the army that his father so often paraded. More importantly, he had moved Prussia to the front of German states:

The two Silesian wars were tests of strength that substantially improved Prussia's strategic posture and shattered the prestige of the Hapsburg Empire. Frederick had no illusions that what had been won by the sword could be defended in any other way; therefore, prosperity depended on keeping the

sword sharp and resolving to use it when necessary.(21)

In addition to improving his army, Frederick worked within Prussia. "Impatiently prodding his ministers, just as he urged his generals in battle, Frederick personally saw that laws were reformed, industries multiplied, marshes reclaimed, and finances put in order."(22) He was a servant of the state, indefatigable as an administrator. "Discipline and training were still closely checked by the King, who spent almost half of each year on field visits, ensuring that his directives were carried out."(23) Everyone was held to a performance standard by Frederick. He was a perfectionist who demanded no less of himself than of those who served Prussia.

Diplomacy was particularly important considering their geographic vulnerability of Prussia which faced three potential enemies on its flanks: France, Austria, and Russia. Frederick was a key participant in the European balance of power.

England, France, Austria, and Prussia were the weights in the power balance; Prussia stood at the fulcrum. If peace depended on maintaining equilibrium, it was necessary that the weights be evenly divided, and Prussia remain at the pivot. But statesmen were intent on disturbing the balance, and to Frederick, the safety of Prussia was more important.(24)

His immediate concern became Russia, so in January 1756, Frederick signed a treaty with Great Britain -- the Convention of Westminster. Frederick promised protection for Hanover while England would control Russia. This started a diplomatic revolution because of the unanticipated reactions throughout Europe.

Austria seized the opportunity to align concerned nations against Prussia. France signed a treaty with Austria ending decades of hostilities. Russia likewise disliked the new agreement between Prussia and Great Britain so she aligned herself with Austria. Suddenly, Prussia was isolated by the coalition. Frederick's only ally was Great Britain who added only a financial presence on the Continent. Frederick did not wait for the coalition to mass against him. Instead, he seized the initiative and thrust his army into Saxony. The Seven Years' War (1756-63) had begun.(25)

Fortunately, the coalition against Prussia was not strong. In 1756 and 1757, Frederick . . . "fought to retain the initiative with rapid, daring thrusts."(26) By 1760, he . . . "more often avoided battle, except to prove that Prussia could not be beaten. Not to be destroyed was to win."(27) During this lengthy war he had eight victories and eight losses. He escaped by fighting isolated forces that were not effectively massed by the coalition. He confirmed his title of Frederick the Great by his skillful maneuvering. The fortunes of war turned Frederick's favor when the Russian Tsarina, Catherine, died. Tsar Peter, newly crowned and a longtime admirer of Frederick, took Russia out of the war. The war ended for Prussia with the Treaty of Hubertusburg of February 15, 1763. This was a separate treaty with Austria which returned to the pre-war status quo. Considering the numerical odds at the start of the war, this was a major achievement for Frederick. Fortunately for Frederick, Prussian prestige had been upheld and Silesia retained.

Frederick participated in the partitioning of Poland in 1772. Poland was a border state of great concern to Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Russia had sup-

ported internal confusion in Poland to prevent cohesion that might result in demands of independence. Frederick wanted to increase Prussian involvement in Polish affairs in order to maintain a buffer on his east flank. Russia and Prussia realized that they could not partition Poland without Austria. The three nations divided Poland in 1772 with Prussia receiving all of West Prussia.

Frederick's diplomatic and military efforts had expanded Prussia considerably. He provided the main impetus for Prussian growth and prestige in the eighteenth century. We should now turn to the nineteenth century to see what Bismarck accomplished in world affairs.

Otto von Bismarck served in various diplomatic positions. He was ambassador to Russia and France. He was regarded as ". . . the most daring of Prussian diplomats."(28) He had also served as a delegate to the German Confederation. Bismarck had considerable experience by October 8, 1862 when he became Prime Minister of Prussia. Bismarck's appointment occurred during a constitutional crisis in Prussia. The Prussian King, William I, seriously considered leaving the throne. "It was Roon, the minister of war, who persuaded William I to remain on the throne and to entrust the government leadership to the conservative statesman . . . Bismarck."(29) This crisis was important because the King depended upon Bismarck to stabilize the government. This confidence provided Bismarck with great power.

Europe had witnessed nationalist revolutions in 1848 in Prussia, Austria, Italy, Belgium and France. The Concert of Europe, which had governed diplomatic interaction among states since Napoleon, was waning. Industrialism had spread

and imperialism had projected European influence throughout the world. The last half of the nineteenth century would see Europe at its zenith in world influence. It was also a time of intrigue as expansionism caused concern among the world powers. Armies were growing in size. The potential for major conflict was increasing. These challenges demanded a man of considerable talent.

Bismarck was up to the task. His immediate challenge was to resolve the constitutional crisis which had resulted in his appointment.

He first tried compromise, and literally offered parliament an olive branch . . . When his various proposals for a compromise were rejected, he seized the moral initiative and accused parliament of violating the constitution by claiming exclusive control over the budget. By refusing to negotiate with the crown, which had also been given budgetary powers in the constitution, parliament itself had caused the breakdown of constitutional government.(30)

Bismarck carefully managed relations with parliament in the following years. He used political dealing to gain parliamentary support when necessary and ignored parliament when it threatened his policies. He recognized that many members of parliament were liberals. They, like Bismarck, favored the unification of Germany.

Internationally, Bismarck recognized " . . . there were two major obstacles to Prussia's domination of Germany: Austria and France. Neither of these powers could be expected to concede Prussia the leadership of a united Germany unless compelled to do so, and such compulsion would very probably involve armed conflict."(31) Bismarck ensured that Prussia developed sound alliances, and he supported a strong army in order to assure victory should conflict develop.

"A revolt in the Russian part of Poland in February, 1863, gave Bismarck an opportunity to secure the goodwill of Russia." (32) While most of Europe supported the Polish revolt, Bismarck announced his support for Russia. This bold diplomatic move resulted in great dividends for Prussia in the years ahead. "The revolt was quelled, and as a result of these events, Prussia supplanted Austria as Russia's protege in German affairs." (33)

Bismarck continued his efforts in 1863 through a war with Denmark. German nationalists wanted Schleswig and Holstein as German states. Denmark was prohibited by an 1852 treaty from incorporating the two states into Denmark; however, a new Danish constitution in 1863 was interpreted as violating the earlier agreement. The German Confederation decided to send troops to Holstein. Therefore, Prussia and Austria were involved as allies. After skillful diplomatic action, Bismarck moved out from the direction of the German Confederation, secured Austrian support, and defeated the Danes. The Russians, British, and French stayed out of the war. Prussia emerged victorious and as the leader of the German states. (34)

In the Convention of Gastein of August 14, 1865, Austria and Prussia agreed to maintain joint sovereignty, with Prussia administering Schleswig, and Austria administering Holstein, which lay between Schleswig and Prussia. This move of Bismarck's created a situation which would make it possible to engineer an incident between Austria and Prussia whenever it might be required. (35)

Bismarck brought about the inevitable war with Austria in 1866. He carefully established a system of alliances. France and Russia promised neutrality; Austria was isolated. Austria underestimated the power of the Prussian army. The breech-loading rifle, strategic use of military railroads, and superior

Prussian leadership tipped the scales of Prussia. The peace treaty following the Battle of Koeniggraetz, crippled Austria's influence among German states. Bismarck achieved his war aims without annexing territory, conducting victory marches, or prolonging the war which could involve other European states. Austria was subdued.(36) Bismarck also ended the parliamentary crisis by using his new stature to appeal to the liberals. He implemented some liberal concepts in the constitution of the North German Confederation and plotted a course that ensured liberal support of his policies.(37)

Bismarck now turned to Napoleon III, who believed a united Germany was unacceptable to France. Bismarck again used diplomacy to isolate the enemy. Great Britain remained a longtime enemy of France. Austria did not support France, and Russia remained grateful for Bismarck's earlier support in the Polish revolt. There were great dangers in the Prussian adventurism. Austria was interested in exploiting Prussian failures; other European states could later oppose a powerful, unified Germany if Bismarck was successful. By manipulating a dispatch from the Kaiser at Ems which described an interview with the French Ambassador, Bismarck inflamed popular passions in both Prussia and France and caused Napoleon III to declare war. Prussia's preparation for war was excellent. Prussia defeated the French and annexed Alsace and part of Lorraine. The Prussian King was proclaimed "German Emperor".(38)

The French defeat, the establishment of the German empire, and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine created a hatred between France and Germany that would prevail until well after the Second World War.(39)

Bismarck continued to dominate unified Germany until his dismissal in 1890.

There were no major wars in Europe. Skillful, and in many cases, secretive negotiations kept the continent at peace; however, diplomatic efforts were perilous. The Three Emperor's League was created in 1873. With the demise of the Concert of Europe, European powers looked for strong alliances. The Emperor's League united Austria, Russia, and Hungary in an agreement of mutual cooperation.

However, problems in the Balkans emerged during 1875-77. Russia moved against Turkey. Bismarck tried to stay out of the conflict but was pulled in as a reluctant mediator. Russia lost prestige and Bismarck lost some diplomatic influence with Russia. Bismarck was concerned so he moved to strengthen his alliance in Europe.

Bismarck established the Dual Alliance in 1879 with Austria. This treaty promised mutual assistance if either country were attacked by Russia. It also addressed Bismarck's concern with isolation. This treaty was one of the first secret agreements among the major powers. This trend would continue until World War I with considerable potential to flame into war.

The Three Emperor's League of 1881 put Austria, Germany and Russia in an alliance. Russia was afraid that Austria and Germany would work together in the Balkans. Russia did not want to negotiate an alliance with France. The league promised neutrality if any one of the three members were involved in a war with a fourth European power. The next alignment for Bismarck was the Triple Alliance in 1882 uniting Austria, Prussia, and Italy. This agreement demonstrates how complicated the alliance system had become. Austria and Germany promised to help Italy if she were attacked by France.

The complicated alliance system became evident in the Bulgarian Crisis of the 1880's. Russia and Austria argued over a proposed railroad through Bulgaria. These opponents were both members of the 1881 Emperor's League. However, Bismarck negotiated a peaceful outcome. He had to appease both opponents. Moral questions surfaced regarding his techniques, but Bismarck, the Realpolitik proponent, achieved the desired end.

Ever since 1871 Bismarck had followed a policy of restraint. His motive was always fear, not conquest. The new Germany was conscious only of its strength; it saw no dangers, recognized no obstacles . . . Bismarck could keep a hold on the reins. His system was doomed, once an emperor representative of the new Germany was on the throne. Bismarck in office had been to the Great Powers a guarantee of peace, even though a peace organized by Germany.(40)

Bismarck was forced from office in 1890. He had skillfully unified Germany through a combination of war, diplomacy, and economic power. His system of alliances brought peace for twenty years but harbored suspicions about German motives among all the major European states.

IV. FREDERICK AND BISMARCK AS STRATEGISTS

LOGISTICAL. Any nation achieving the prominence of Germany in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries required a strong economic base. Frederick recognized the importance of economic growth and investment of adequate natural resources to support a strong army. He implemented the following important programs: importing British agricultural methods, liberalizing craft guilds, improving governmental bureaucracy, planning for Prussian industrialization, and carefully managing

skilled labor.(41)

Frederick inherited a strong treasury and army from his father's rule. However, " . . . the main problem, as in all other aspects of the Prussian army was economic. Every year Frederick's ministers had to struggle to produce the number and type of horses he demanded for his steadily growing arm of decision."(42) Frederick's personal involvement in his government's bureaucracy is legendary, . . . this obsessive pursuit of excellence was accomplished by a steady increase in the size of the Army."(43) His methods were widely imitated:

The instruments that had gained the crown this position were copied throughout Europe . . . A standing army supported by regular taxes made available by a well organized financial bureaucracy; royal courts administering the law in orderly hierarchies of jurisdiction and appeal . . . Added to these were sophisticated tariff and economic policies, a kind of state capitalism, which by providing impetus to trade and industry was designed to increase the nation's wealth.(44)

Frederick's efforts to build the economy were monumental. He toured the countryside inquiring of his subjects what progress was being made. His war annexation of Silesia vastly increased Prussia's population, land area, and wealth. However, his wars were costly, " . . . the largely agrarian Prussian economy could not accommodate major loans, and foreign credit was unattainable."(45) While his wars brought Prussia close to financial ruin, he escaped disaster and maintained Prussia's military strength through his economic programs.

Bismarck likewise capitalized on Prussia's economic strength:

So important was Prussia's economic strength that a number of scholars regard it as the decisive factor in the struggle for supremacy in Germany . . . Prussia's economic policies and

its successful defense of the Zollverein against Austrian attacks were far more crucial to Prussia's ultimate triumph in Germany than the more spectacular activities of Prussian diplomats and generals . . . (46)

This argument demonstrates the critical position economics held for Germany in the nineteenth century. The impact of the industrial revolution on economic and social forces was extremely significant for the Germans. Bismarck's initial crisis with parliament was important logistically as the budgetary deadlock had to be resolved to provide money for the military.

He first tried to compromise . . . When his various proposals for a compromise were rejected, he seized the moral initiative and accused parliament of violating the constitution . . . From 1863 to 1866 Bismarck simply ignored parliament. He solved the financial problem by collecting the taxes already voted in 1862 and 1863. From these funds money was allocated to the army to carry through the projected military reforms.(47)

Later, his diplomacy and eventual war with Austria resulted in Austria being supplanted as the dominant German state. The eventual unification of Germany increased prestige and opportunity for economic consolidation and advancement. Bismarck likewise benefited from economic growth. "After 1867 Bismarck's main support came from nationalists, both liberal and conservative, and from interest groups that were reaping profits as a result of German unification or of governmental policies."(48)

Bismarck frequently used a logistical/economic strategy in foreign affairs.

The most dramatic instance of this came in November 1887, when the German government forbade the Reichsbank to accept Russian security as collateral for loans . . . there is little doubt that Bismarck's primary motive was to create one more obstacle to effective Russian military action in the

The economic motivation for European powers' interest in the Balkans were major issues for Bismarck. As shown above, his strategy included not only internal growth in Germany but also economic coercion of adversaries.

Bismarck, like Frederick, used a strong national economy to maintain a strong army. He supported military reform and ensured the logistical support for the army was substantial. Frederick, as absolute monarch and commander of the army, made the army the main benefactor of Prussia's economic success. His political position as absolute monarch was stronger than Bismarck's and as commander, he emphasized the military role more than the diplomatic. While Bismarck certainly maintained a strong army, there can be little doubt of the logistical priority enjoyed by the army during Frederick the Great's rule.

Importantly, both men were determined and consistent in their commitment to make Prussia's army the finest on the continent. Their efforts were evident in the success achieved on the field. Frederick's work is commendable since he ran both the military and the government. However, as mentioned earlier, Frederick led Prussia to the edge of financial ruin during the 1st Silesian War. Although he escaped each predicament, Frederick's persistence in battle exceeded Bismarck's tendency toward moderation. Regardless, both men receive high marks in the logistical element of grand strategy. Their efforts built an economy and military machine that moved powerfully through three centuries.

OPERATIONAL. Frederick II, King of Prussia, earned the title Frederick the Great

from the operational employment of his army in battle. Bismarck, a diplomat and not a general, nonetheless had an unquestionable impact on the operational employment of the Prussian army. Both men were bold leaders in a militaristic society. Napoleon " . . . admired as Frederick's greatest achievement the ability to fight on regardless of circumstance." (50) His rigid discipline, demand for precision and compliance with regulations, high expectation of his officers, and unwavering personal control resulted in a truly remarkable army. Bismarck was no less bold in his willingness to employ the military. Although he did not personally lead the forces, Bismarck said " . . . the great questions of our time will not be decided by speeches and majority resolutions . . . but by iron and blood." (51) General von Moltke employed the army in the field, but Bismarck structured the strategic conditions under which the army would fight, ensured the army was well manned and supplied, and, ultimately, that the army was under his political control.

Operationally, Frederick was greatly influenced by "Prussia's geographic position, and the limitations of strategy . . . mercilessly forced him to divide his troops, to cover at least the key provinces, in order to secure his communications and supply." (52) Warfare was limited in the 18th century. Armies stayed close to supply depots. Desertion was a major concern as many in the army were undesirable, lower class, or foreign. Frederick limited his maneuver to control potential desertion as compared to the relative operational freedom enjoyed by the more nationalistic armies in Bismarck's time.

Bismarck's use of the army was characterized by more restraint than Frederick.

Bismarck was aware of the hazards of war, and of the danger that victories on the battlefield might create military heroes who could become serious political rivals . . . Iron and blood, if used at all, should be employed only under the most favorable possible circumstances. Even then he believed the risks to be so great that he never abandoned his efforts to attain his ends by peaceful means.(53)

Bismarck terminated the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 without annexations, victory marches, or unnecessary commitment of his army.(54) His political goals drove his strategy. He saw the army as a true political arm, and he did not hesitate to keep it under firm control.

Both Frederick and Bismarck were determined in their use of the army. They were creative in their strategy to ensure maximum advantage to Prussia. Frederick's dramatic thrusts into Silesia and Saxony seized the initiative from his opponents. Bismarck's great diplomacy isolated his opponents strategically to create favorable force ratios. Their actions were critical to Prussia's success because Prussia was constantly threatened on multiple fronts.

Frederick and Bismarck exhausted every energy for Prussia. Both men were dynasts, not nationalists. Bismarck expanded Prussia because he had to, not because he wanted to. In fact, his wisdom in dealing with nationalism was one of the greatest acts of statesmanship. They maintained this focus in all aspects of their strategy. This focus was important operationally because the army was often the tool of diplomacy. Combat readiness, initial deployment, force ratios, and maneuver were designed to generate maximum advantage for Prussia. This focus did not limit their flexibility. Both men entered wars, negotiated alliances, and terminated wars to achieve their ultimate objective. Interestingly, their

absolute focus on what was best for Prussia has resulted in some historians questioning Frederick's loyalty when he abandoned his ally, France, after the 1st Silesian War, and Bismarck's sense of morality when he worked both ends of his alliances in resolving the Bulgarian crisis. As mentioned earlier, Frederick abandoned France when financial ruin threatened. Bismarck tried to calm his allies, Russia and Austria, before they started a war. He unquestionably played both ends preventing a major war in Europe. Again, the moral aspect of his action and Frederick's disloyalty can be understood in the context of their strategic focus which was the betterment of Prussia/Germany.

Frederick's 18th century and Moltke's 19th century armies dominated Europe. They were masterfully employed. Other European countries tried to imitate the Prussian and German military. Operational success of this magnitude requires sound national strategy. Frederick devised Prussia strategy and employed his army. Bismarck secured repeated strategic advantages through diplomacy, ensured the army was logistically supported, and maintained political control of the army. Both the King and the Chancellor led their states with awesome military power.

SOCIAL. Frederick and Bismarck wielded great power; yet both were sensitive to public opinion at home and throughout Europe. Both manipulated public opinion to support their programs and to influence European diplomacy. However, both leaders would act authoritatively if public opinion or any obstacle blocked their path. For example, Frederick clearly defined the role of the state and the people as:

The first and most urgent aim of Prussian policy must be to turn the state into a major power. Other considerations even the well being of people, are rigidly subordinated to this purpose. The state insists that all subjects do their duty and serve it. The Prussian state is neither a union of expediency as revolutionary humanitarian ideals would consider it, nor an organization for the furtherance of the general good of the individuals within its borders whose private interests determine its institutions. The state has its own life and its own purposes, which stand far above the wishes and opinions of the individual. It demands service from rule and subject. . . (55)

This powerful statement clearly establishes the state's position. However, Frederick's involvement in the Enlightenment and the necessity to recruit qualified workers from throughout Europe dictated a calculated sensitivity to public opinion.

He was very interested in what motivated his soldiers. Although embryonic, patriotism was awakening in the country. "If consciousness of Prussia as a state was still absent, the men nonetheless possessed traditional regional pride, which Frederick knew better than to discount." (56) He also knew that discipline ". . . stemmed from local and regional comradeship, the patriarchal loyalty that the peasant owed to his squire, whose sons or brothers led him in the field, and of confidence in the great and victorious king." (57) Also important was the religious toleration granted in Prussia. "The most notable features of Frederick's reign were his reorganization of the administration of justice and his policy of religious toleration . . . In religious affairs, he was the most tolerant ruler in Europe." (58) He also allowed considerable freedom of speech and freedom of the press. These measures gained positive support for his rule.

Externally, Frederick was concerned with European public opinion. During

his rule, ". . . wars were waged without national passion. So far as possible, occupied enemy territory was treated considerately, if only because wars could be expected to continue for long periods, and armies were not self-sufficient."(59) He recruited skilled workers into Prussia. This required considerable awareness of his nation's capabilities and what would attract foreign labor.

Bismarck dealt with an entirely different social order than Frederick. The French Revolution and uprisings throughout Germany in 1848 made nationalism a major concern. Armies in the 19th century were nationalistic. Entire populations were involved in warfare. The people were more involved in government. Bismarck was forced to deal with major problems in public opinion. Part of the constitutional crisis which he had to eliminate after taking office was caused when:

. . . the most important constitutional rights and guarantees were simply disregarded. Freedom of the press was curtailed; public meetings and demonstrations were forbidden; liberal public clubs were dissolved; and the government removed inconvenient critics by arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.(60)

Bismarck worked through the crisis with strength and sensitivity. He would not be bullied by public opinion and he sought opportunities to improve the reputation of the government. He ". . . made his bid for the support of German public opinion by proposing a thoroughgoing reform of the German Confederation . . . "(61) As he considered ways to obtain the provinces of Holstein and Schleswig, Bismarck moved very carefully because he ". . . realized that the power that took the initiative in precipitating a territorial dispute would find German public opinion solidly against it."(62) He ultimately was successful as he masterfully used military victories, governmental compromise, and nationalism emerging from his efforts to unify Germany in his strategy.

In Europe, he manipulated public opinion to attain his goals. When France threatened to take Luxembourg in 1867, Bismarck informed the French that German public opinion would not allow it. Public opinion also was important in Poland. Bismarck carefully selected his opinions to gain public support.(63)

The existence of a new literate but gullible reading public, capable of being played upon by the apostles of integral nationalism, was one of the complications of the age. Statesmen who sincerely wanted to preserve peace had to spend increasing effort to inform and direct this impressionable public opinion.(64)

Bismarck's classic manipulation of French public opinion with the Ems telegram is a great example of his awareness of the influence of social factors on strategy. He changed the message to humiliate the French and agitate Prussian citizens. Prussia was ready for war, but Bismarck did not want to start it. The telegram and other diplomatic pressures prompted the French to declare war even though they were diplomatically isolated and militarily inferior. This astute maneuvering vividly demonstrates his strategic creativity.

Frederick and Bismarck faced different challenges in the social dimension of strategy. Nationalism was a significant factor for Bismarck. However, Frederick as a ruler and general had to deal with the public. Both men used force to deal with the public when necessary. Their consistency of purpose in improving the Prussian state was the cornerstone of all their strategy. To their credit, they effectively handled public opinion in Germany and in Europe.

TECHNOLOGICAL. Technology was not a significant dimension of strategy for either Frederick or Bismarck. Indeed, Frederick may have been restrained by the absence of technological development in his era:

After his soldiers, weaponry was the most vital concern. Advances in weapons development were remarkably rare during the Enlightenment. It is uncertain whether this was due to the soldier's inability to communicate his needs to the scientist, or the limited development of management, which was incapable of gearing the inventions of science to military requirements. Regardless of cause, technological progress had not substantially improved on the capabilities of weapons used in earlier wars.(65)

Frederick had to match the technology with the capabilities of his army. The basic arm was infantry, the weapon was the very inaccurate 75 caliber smoothbore musket. The character of this weapon caused volume of fire instead of precision aiming to be the principal consideration in infantry training. Artillery was also smoothbore and therefore limited in range and accuracy. Frederick did not aggressively use artillery until the Seven Year's War when he realized its potential in sparing lives of his infantrymen. His reluctance to accept artillery was evident in his allowing an eighty-six year old officer to serve as his general of artillery. Only after increasing artillery mobility with horses did Frederick see its benefits.(66)

Technological development brought about by the industrial revolution was a greater factor in Bismarck's era. The rifleman was armed with the "needle gun" that could be loaded in the prone position. This breech-loading rifle greatly reduced the soldier's vulnerability.(67) Strategically, the railroad and the telegraph enabled Moltke to maneuver the German army with remarkable speed and coordination. Armies could be concentrated with great speed. These additions greatly enhanced operational maneuver.(68)

Prussia was clearly the standard setter for Europe during Frederick's and Bismarck's leadership. They were determined in their efforts to build an incomparable army. This included maximum use of technological capability. Frederick used existing technology, and later, under Bismarck's political guidance, Moltke harnessed new technology to meet Germany's strategic needs.

POLITICAL. Comparing Frederick's and Bismarck's use of the political element is most instructional for the contemporary strategist. Political strategy must be focused internally for national cohesion and growth and externally to achieve strategic goals. Both leaders developed internal and external policies.

Frederick was 28 when he became king; Bismarck was 47 when he became Prussian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Frederick was not "a polished master of statesmanship" initially, but he certainly matured in the conduct of foreign policy.(69) Bismarck also learned to be a powerful diplomat while serving as an ambassador in the foreign courts of Europe.

Frederick's position as king and general of the army differed from Bismarck who trusted Moltke to lead the army.

Bismarck, in the long run, would have remained unsuccessful without Moltke. Frederick the Great triumphed because he combined in his person all the courage, daring, and military expertise that could be found in Prussia. If the system of personal absolutism was to reach classic completion it required this union of all royal talents in one man.(70)

This important distinction influenced their policies where Frederick so emphasized the army that it became the dominating aspect of his internal and external

diplomacy. Bismarck was not as inclined toward military domination: "In 1870 as in 1876, however, Bismarck had his way, pointing out that as long as he was responsible for policy, he could not cede his powers to soldiers simply because there happened to be a war on. . . ." (71)

Externally, both men dominated Europe when diplomacy among European nations underwent major changes. Frederick disrupted the balance of power that had characterized Europe during the first half of the eighteenth century. This balance of power had established an informal protocol for dealings among European nations. An upstart state like Prussia, with Frederick as ruler and general, greatly disrupted the status quo. Similarly, Bismarck emerged after Europe had developed another mode of cooperation, the Concert of Europe. The concern was a community reaction to Napoleon's adventurism. War and diplomatic manipulations disturbed the political tranquility desired by proponents of the Concert of Europe. Like the eighteenth century balance of power the Concert of Europe waned with time. Frederick and Bismarck were determined strategists with a consistency of purpose that overshadowed their contemporaries and defeated collective agreements that opposed Prussian/German growth.

Both men negotiated extensive alliances to support their strategic goals. These alliances created opportunities favorable to Prussia and of potential danger for their opponents. Frederick gained an alliance with France in 1740 placing Austria in a precarious position. He then occupied Silesia and retained the state as part of Prussia. This caused Maria Theresa of Austria to seek any opportunity for revenge and for regaining Silesia. Bismarck isolated Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. He seized Alsace and Lorraine from France and planted

seeds of hatred between France and Germany that bore bitter fruit in the twentieth century. This accession was probably a strategic mistake because the harsh terms of the 1871 Treaty of Versailles contributed significantly to the animosity between the two nations that would fight two world wars in the future.

Internally, Frederick's political bureaucracy". . . was for many decades the most creative force in Prussian history. . . This bureaucracy not merely reformed itself but adapted the Prussian state to the conditions of modern life, and in the first half of the nineteenth century, played a leading role in Prussian politics."(72) Frederick used this system to centralize all power and decision making. He was a political realist:

. . . rarely an innovator, and then only in relatively unimportant matters. He accepted Europe for what it was and he had a clear understanding of his own strengths and weaknesses; his success came from his willingness to exploit the potentials of both Prussia and the age to their limit.(73)

Bismarck also improved the internal operation of Germany. He trained government officials and foreign diplomats who could serve the state. As discussed earlier, he worked hard to calm the liberals in parliament. This required strong determination and diplomatic maneuvering to gain their support. Bismarck came to power to resolve internal problems of the state. He solved these and simultaneously projected German influence in Europe.

Frederick and Bismarck maintained strength of purpose in their efforts to improve Prussia and, in the nineteenth century, to unify Germany. Both men placed the future of their state ahead of moral obligations outside Germany.

Their alliance, wars, and strategies were focused and any obstacle affecting their strategic purpose was removed.

In summary, Frederick was determined to establish Prussia as the most prominent state in Europe. He worked diligently to achieve his strategic objectives. His occupation of Silesia demonstrated his resolve to improve Prussia. He was consistent and realistic as a strategist. His policies seldom varied, and he was predictable. He would fight if necessary. His vision may be questioned at the start of the Seven Year's War when he initially faced a coalition of France, Austria, and Russia.

Frederick had miscalculated European reaction to his alliance with Great Britain. This was a serious strategic error that could have ruined Prussia had the coalition been more effective. Frederick's brilliance on the battlefield and Tsarina Catherine's death, with Russia's subsequent withdrawal from the war, provided an escape. Importantly, although successful in war, Frederick took Prussia to the edge of disaster in conflict. However, ". . . without this army, the role of the Prussian monarch in the international politics of Europe would have been utterly negligible."(74)

Bismarck was a creative strategist. He created alliances that ensured Prussian success against Denmark, Austria, and France. His vision was remarkable as he charted the course of German unification and the future of Europe. He became Europe's main political figure and was asked to arbitrate in the 1870's Balkan disputes. His diplomacy later prevented war in the 1880's Bulgarian crisis. He also succeeded by knowing Germany's capabilities and what worked in Eu-

rope. He used the army as a political tool, ". . . it was his belief that an active and successful foreign policy, which demonstrated the need for an effective army, would break the opposition. . ."(75) However, there was a limit for war and use of the army. "All of Bismarck's wars were limited wars, in which he tried not to bring the neutrals in but to keep them out. . . ."(76) He emphasized that ". . . wars were fought for political objectives and should stop when these objectives are achieved."(77) He controlled German politics, trained and sent his skilled ambassadors throughout Europe, and developed a political strategy that has been studied for nearly a century after his dismissal.

Frederick and Bismarck centralized their power, Frederick as king and Bismarck as a strong advocate of the monarch. They were servants of the state committed to improving the state. However, they did not train their successors well. Prussia after Frederick would be defeated by Napoleon, and Germany after Bismarck would enter and lose World War I. Their achievements may have been too difficult to sustain. Nonetheless, their strategies ensured growth of Germany and domination of Europe during their leadership.

V. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 1980'S

The modern U.S. strategist is faced with a world far more complex than Frederick's or Bismarck's. Logistically, the military strength of today's superpowers consists of powerful air, ground, and sea forces. National mobilization is capable of rapidly expanding peacetime armies into millions of combatants. Defense expenditures are high; yet, funding ceilings limit capabilities and research. Combat readiness of regular forces for both the U.S. and USSR is high.

Forces are well equipped and, in short notice, ready for war. Between the superpowers, the Soviets enjoy a significant numerical advantage which must be countered. Third world nations lack the logistical sophistication in their military forces, but are routinely supplied with arms and technicians from the superpowers. As seen in Vietnam and Afghanistan, third world nations equipped with superpower technology can be formidable opponents.

Operationally, forces today are joint and combined. In Europe, NATO faces the Warsaw Pact. Multinational and multiservice forces demand true genius from field generals. Time and space have been compressed by technological improvements in speed, communications, and weaponry. Large forces can be projected rapidly over great distances. U.S. doctrine is emphasizing operational art. Soviets are credited with strong operational capability. However, the most likely conflict is predicted in a third world country with far less sophistication. Conflict short of war will require political, economic, and other stabilizing strategies in addition to the operational demands normally associated with maneuver. General purpose forces may not be as useful as specialized forces.

Socially, public opinion has never been more influential. The media is able to broadcast news instantaneously. Diplomats and military leaders are subject to constant scrutiny. Public opinion polls influence Congressmen and the President as they make strategy and provide resources for the military. Although more supportive in recent years, much of the nation still carries the scars of Vietnam. War is not popular and may be acceptable to the public only under the most serious circumstances.

Technologically, the machines of war continue to improve. As arms control treaties develop, more emphasis is given to conventional weaponry. Reactive armor, precision guided munitions, and remotely piloted aircraft typify of modern systems. The Strategic Defense Initiative promises to open new horizons as space is developed for the future. Communications and computer technology have greatly enhanced and complicated diplomacy and war. Time will be precious; decisions must be prompt and effective. Nuclear weapons remain a critical concern. As third world nations obtain nuclear capability, the superpowers will have to develop arms control strategies beyond bilateral agreements.

Politically, NATO and Warsaw Pact represent the world's most prominent alliances. Containment of the Soviets in Europe has been a cornerstone of American political strategy since World War II. Recent Soviet proposals for arms control and a more open society have encouraged some, but concerned many. What are their long term objectives? Central America, Southwest Asia, and the Middle East are areas of conflict with important implications for the United States. Internally, our trade deficit is abysmal. The national debt continues to grow and the dollar is in poor shape around the world. The upcoming Presidential election will provide new leadership but will also cause policy revision and changes in our makers of strategy.

This cursory review of the elements of strategy in today's complex world presents some of our challenges. How well is the United States developing and executing strategy? This can be answered with the same criteria used for Frederick and Bismarck.

The first assessment of recent U.S. strategy is determination. We entered Vietnam in a piecemeal manner and without a declaration of war. While American soldiers were dying in the jungle, the "Great Society" was being discussed at home. Protests, destruction of government property, and widespread condemnation of the war effort showed our lack of unity. More recently, the President openly supported CONTRAS resistance in Nicaragua. Congress did not. We stopped military funding of the CONTRAS, and then reacted to a Sandinista incursion into Honduras by sending a brigade-sized unit as a projection of United States power. Again, government and public opinion were divided. We have not, as a nation, made a firm commitment to a national strategy. The President's Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy recently confirmed the sad state of determination in our strategy:

Our failure in Vietnam still casts a shadow over U.S. intervention anywhere, and other setbacks - notably those we suffered in Lebanon - have left some predisposed to pessimism about our ability to promote U.S. interests in the Third World. Our ability to persevere in such wars is always questionable.(78)

The President's Commission forecasts continued vacillation in the future:

The resources available for defense will probably be constrained more than in the past, principally by concern over the national debt and pressures for social spending . . . These constraints are likely to increase risks to our national security. The United States came into the Eighties suffering from the cumulative effects of many years in which our military investment was below that of the Soviet Union. . . National security does not have much of a "natural constituency" in the United States, and Congress has repeatedly demonstrated that in the absence of a crisis is prone to cut back on defense. . . (79)

Lack of a realistic strategy may contribute to our poor determination. A realis-

tic strategy should match means to the desired end. The desired end should be based upon sound strategic objectives. Our strategy for defense has been:

. . . forward deployment of American forces, assigned to oppose invading armies and backed by strong reserves and a capability to use nuclear weapons if necessary. Resting on alliances with other democratic countries, the strategy aims to draw a line that no aggressor will dare to cross.(80)

Basically, we are the world's policeman. Our strategy does not state specific ends so our means are not well defined. We currently respond to the initiatives of our opponents. More significantly, we have not addressed the numerical superiority enjoyed by the Soviets against NATO. Instead, we hastily negotiate a treaty that removes an important nuclear deterrent. Military leaders echo support for the treaty because of the historical significance of gaining Soviet concessions. However, our strategy is again proven unrealistic as we further tilt the correlation of combat power to our potential adversary's favor. Finally, we have invested considerable dollars in support of the CONTRAS. This insurgent group lacks organization and supplies. The CONTRAS have failed to demonstrate a strong base of support in Nicaragua. Our support may have been an indirect approach to ousting the Sandinistas. To date, we have not achieved this goal. Our strategy is again unrealistic.

An effective strategy is consistent. Deviations in action and procedure may vary, but the means remain focused on the goal. An unrealistic strategy that is not determinedly executed will not be consistent. We have emphasized NATO in our strategy since World War II. We have been consistent in this part of the world; however, the recent arms for hostages scandal demonstrated our inconsistency. We condemn terrorists; yet, government leaders are involved in secret arms nego-

tiations. Consistency requires some prioritization of effort. We lack clear priorities as evident in our involvement throughout the world with few, if any, credible regional strategies. We have projected power into Central America and the Persian Gulf. Clearly defined end states have not been articulated in these regions. We seem to be there to react to the initiatives of Panamanians, Sandinistas, Iranians, or any group that wants to incite the United States. Who makes United States strategy? The President? Congress? LTC Oliver North? Theater Commanders-in-Chiefs? World events prove any or all of the above. The fact remains we do not consistently plan and execute strategy. We respond tactically.

The "world policeman" strategy does not reflect creativity. Decades of strategies labeled Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response further demonstrate our lack of sophisticated strategy. They are technology driven and indicative of our willingness to equate strategy with nuclear options. There are more dimensions to strategy and we must mature as strategists. The President's Commission emphasized the challenge for the future:

The decades ahead are likely to bring drastic changes: China, perhaps Japan and other countries, will become major military powers. Lesser powers will acquire advanced weaponry, diminishing the relative advantages of both U.S. and Soviet forces. Arms agreements may have a sizable impact on nuclear and conventional forces.(81)

Vision of the future will be essential if we are to create a strategy that meets the challenges of a changing world. This vision should include what conditions will exist throughout the world and what conditions we want for the United States. To date, we have failed to articulate such a strategy. President Arias

of Costa Rica demonstrated considerable creativity in his Central American peace initiative. This leader, whose country no longer maintains a standing army, seized the strategic initiative and proposed the most acceptable peace plan yet offered. Our strategists should better plan our regional strategies so we incite actions similar to Arias' peace plan. Instead, we invested dollars in the CONTRA effort which had no realizable objective. Our strategy lacked creativity and failed to visualize what we wanted in the future and how we could get there.

Our strategy in the Persian Gulf and Middle East also appears limited. We are escorting shipping but seem to be hesitant to present a long-term regional strategy. We introduce more combat power as Iranian strikes increase, but what are long range objectives? How long will it be before public opinion and congress sour on our involvement? What are we trying to achieve strategically in the long-term and what means have been identified? Likewise, in the Middle-East we are seeing hostilities increase. The area has been relatively quiet, but is again becoming volatile. We may have lost our opportunity to initiate action. We may be forced to react to emergency situations. What strategic progress has been made since the Camp David accords of years past?

A workable strategy must be flexible and decisively executed. A flexible strategy has a solid base and clearly defined limits. The strategist reviews the fundamentals of the base and then is able to maneuver diplomatically within the established limits. Examples cited above demonstrate our lack of strategic base. We emphasize a nuclear strategy (one dimensional) and our willingness to police communist aggression. Such a strategy fails to establish limits to achieve strategic goals. We project force and our strategy evolves or remains dormant. This

tragic model can be seen in Vietnam, Grenada, Central America and the Persian Gulf.

Strategically, we are reacting to situations and creating after the fact strategies. Congress has recognized our crisis action orientation and initiated the War Powers Act. The War Powers Act can be interpreted as a visible check upon our strategic ineptness--or as a brake on our strategic flexibility. Understandably, Congress lacks confidence in our strategic decisions. They have generated this legislation to influence any questionably executed strategy.

Our system of making and implementing is to develop a creative, realistic, consistent, and flexible strategy. Civilian and military leaders must actively participate in developing the strategy. Our strategy must include all of the dimensions of grand strategy. If not, we may find our nation isolated as did Frederick against the coalition; or we may face a Bismarck-like diplomat capable of exploiting our lack of precision or commitment to a national strategy. It is time to render the investigations of Congressman Skelton obsolete; it is time to produce a national strategy that clearly meets the standards of determination, decisiveness, and vision that marked the efforts of Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck.

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