

DTIC FILE COPY

2

AD-A228 404

TRAIN AS YOU WILL FIGHT: FACTORS AFFECTING
DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGY TO TRAIN
NATIONAL GUARD UNITS TO THE LEVEL ORGANIZED

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ANTHONY L. BARNHILL, MAJ, ARNG
B.S., University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma, 1976
MBA, Tennessee Technological University, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1990

DTIC
ELECTE
NOV 08 1990
S E D

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Train As You Will Fight: Factors Affecting Development of a Strategy to Train National Guard Units to the Level Organized				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Anthony L. Barnhill					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This study gives a perspective on training National Guard units to the level organized. The problem is not new but has taken on new relevance as the Army undergoes a major reorganization. With the Total Force concept and the CAPSTONE program, the National Guard took on increased responsibilities in sustaining world peace. This thesis looks at how the Army has historically trained, reviews present National Guard training opportunities, and evaluates training strategies developed to guide future Total Force training. This study evaluates current Army training doctrine and regulatory guidance to ascertain whether clearly defined training strategies aimed at the National Guard exist. The study also examines future training directions of the standing Army and National Guard against the same criteria. Past and future uses of the Combat Training Centers are examined to determine whether "train as you will fight" is adhered to for all components of the Total Force or whether separate training events and standards are maintained for the standing Army and the National Guard. This thesis asks many questions concerning the Army's acceptance and support of the National Guard. It is my intent to answer those questions using existing policy, historical examples, and current and future training programs.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS National Guard, Training, Total Force, Combat Training Centers, Assessment, Evaluation, CAPSTONE, Level Organized, Battle Focus, Training Strategy, Future Directions, Thesis				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 141	
				16. PRICE CODE 5.	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL		


TRAIN AS YOU WILL FIGHT: FACTORS AFFECTING
DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGY TO TRAIN
NATIONAL GUARD UNITS TO THE LEVEL ORGANIZED

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ANTHONY L. BARNHILL, MAJ, ARNG
B.S., University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma, 1976
MBA, Tennessee Technological University, 1982



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1990

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited.


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Anthony L. Barnhill

Title of Thesis: Train as You Will Fight: Factors
Affecting Development of a Strategy to Train National Guard
Units to the Level Organized


Approved by:


LTC Robert B. James, Jr., M.Ed., Thesis Committee Chairman


Dr. Jerry M. Cooper, Ph.D., Member, Graduate Faculty


MAJ Dwain L. Crowson, M.A., Member, Graduate Faculty

Accepted this 1st day of June 1990 by:


Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree
Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
the student author and do not necessarily represent the
views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or
any other governmental agency. (References to this study
should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

TRAIN AS YOU WILL FIGHT: FACTORS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT OF
A STRATEGY TO TRAIN NATIONAL GUARD UNITS TO THE LEVEL
ORGANIZED. by Major Anthony L. Barnhill, ARNG, 141
pages.

This study gives a perspective on training National Guard units to the level organized by evaluating several factors affecting the Guard's ability to do so. The problem is not new but has taken on new relevance as the US military undergoes the throes of a major reorganization.

With the advent of the Total Force concept and the CAPSTONE program, the National Guard took on more important and increased responsibilities in sustaining world peace. This thesis looks at how the Army has historically trained, reviews present National Guard training opportunities, and evaluates training strategies developed to guide future Total Force training.

This study evaluates current Army training doctrine and regulatory guidance to ascertain whether clearly defined training strategies aimed at the peculiarities of the National Guard training environment exist. The study also examines documents outlining future training directions for the standing Army and the National Guard against the same criteria.

Past and future uses of the Combat Training Centers are examined to determine whether "train as you will fight" is adhered to for all components of the Total Force or whether separate training evaluation events and standards are maintained for the standing Army and the National Guard.

Throughout, this thesis asks many questions concerning the Army's acceptance and support of the National Guard as an equal member of the Total Force. It is my intent to answer those questions using existing policy, historical examples, and current guidance for developing future training programs.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The following persons have been both patient and tirelessly encouraging throughout the progress of this study. LTC Robert B. James, my committee chairman and longtime friend, was both brutal and fair. Dr. Jerry M. Cooper and Major Dwain L. Crowson, my graduate faculty members, have given generously of their time and efforts to assist me in developing a respectable and informative thesis.

Major General James L. Miller, Deputy Commanding General of TRADOC and Dean of the School of Education at Southern Utah State University, mentored me and provided me his insight gained during many years in the National Guard.

Colonel Craig E. Norman, Senior ARNG Adviser to the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, graciously put up with my "after 5 PM" diatribes about my progress and Army training in general while providing intellectual stimulation.

Ms. Helen Davis and Ms. Marilyn Harre, Graduate Degree Programs, were gracious and helpful, and spent many hours ensuring I met standards.

Last, albeit preeminent in my opinion, my wife Jerri put up with my many late hours in the library and on the computer, my grumpy disposition, having to read "stuff she wasn't interested in," and me in general.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
APPROVAL PAGE.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
FIGURES AND TABLES.....	ix
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION.....	1
Introduction.....	1
Purpose.....	5
Methodology.....	6
Assumptions.....	6
Limitations.....	7
Delimitations.....	8
Definitions.....	8
Concepts.....	10
Level Organized.....	10
Large Unit Training.....	11
National Guard Annual Training Program.....	13
Responsibility for National Guard Training..	14
Components of Total Force.....	17
National Guard Wartime Mission Assignment..	17
CAPSTONE Training Associations.....	20

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	<u>PAGE</u>
1 INTRODUCTION AND ORGANIZATION (continued)	
Concepts (continued)	
National Guard Training Evaluation	
Reporting.....	24
Significance of Study.....	27
Endnotes.....	28
2 HOW THE ARMY TRAINS.....	31
Background.....	31
Reserve Component Impact On the Total Force.	32
Training Management Cycle.....	35
National Guard Four-Year Training Cycle.....	38
Evaluation Tools.....	39
Pre-WWII Large Unit Training.....	41
Train As You Fight.....	44
Post-WWII Large Unit Training.....	46
Combat Training Centers.....	49
Summary.....	54
Endnotes.....	57
3 NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES.....	59
Background.....	59
REFORGER and Team Spirit.....	64

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	<u>PAGE</u>
3	NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES (continued)
	Recent Central American Experiences..... 66
	Arctic Training Opportunities..... 68
	FIREX 88..... 70
	Cabin Cyclone VII..... 73
	Combat Division Refresher Course..... 74
	Sante Fe and Wagon Wheel..... 75
	Summary..... 78
	Endnotes..... 80
4	FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF TRAINING..... 83
	Directions..... 83
	Army Long Range Training Plan, 1989-2018.... 84
	Army Training 2007 (Draft)..... 89
	TRADOC Long-Range Plan, FY 1991-2020..... 91
	RC Training Development Action Plan..... 92
	ARNG Plan, 1988-2002..... 94
	Summary..... 97
	Endnotes..... 101
5	CONCLUSION..... 103
	Background..... 103
	Old Wounds..... 104

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	<u>PAGE</u>
5 CONCLUSION (continued)	
Training Strategies.....	107
Summary.....	111
Conclusion.....	113
Endnotes.....	118
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.....	120
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	123
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	130
VITA.....	132

FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES

<u>FIGURE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
1-1	Joint Operational Planning Process.....	18
2-1	Training Management Cycle.....	36
2-2	Types of Evaluations.....	39
5-1	CGSC Precommand Course--RC Aligned Unit Commander.....	115

TABLES

<u>TABLE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	
1-1	Major RC Unit Training Requirements.....	4
1-2	FORSCOM 1-R Levels of Training.....	26
2-1	Comparison of ARNG and AC Unit Rotations to CTC's, 1982-1989.....	52

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION

We should remember that our nation's wars have always been fought successfully by citizen soldiers, not praetorian Guards or elite units.

-Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr.¹

INTRODUCTION

After the 45th Infantry Division of the Oklahoma, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado National Guard proved itself through a series of successful operations in the North African campaign, General George S. Patton expressed his respect for the fighting Thunderbird Division in his famous statement:

The 45th Division is one of the best, if not actually the best division in the history of American arms.²

General Patton's assessment of the division's capabilities can be directly attributed to the training it conducted prior to deployment into the North African Theater and to its employment as a homogenous unit.

A look at how other National Guard units have been used in combat shows that they were also placed on the battlefield as complete units capable of performing successfully alongside their Active Component (AC)

counterparts. For example, the 32nd Infantry Division, Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard, had trained extensively for the European Theater prior to 1942 and had been alerted for movement to Northern Ireland. As elements of the 32nd were being transported to Europe, its orders were changed and it was redirected to the Pacific Theater.

In that new environment with less than five weeks to train to face battle-hardened Japanese troops in jungle warfare, the 'Red Arrow' led the American victory at the Battle of Buna in New Guinea.³ The 32nd's successes were a tribute to the quality of its predeployment training--though focused on the European Theater--and a unit tenacity steeped in loyalty to its National Guard heritage.

Unit identity and the training the National Guard units received prior to deployment during WWII were major factors in their successes on the battlefield and have continued to be the foundation of the National Guard recruiting effort. 'Join your hometown unit,' 'Americans at their best' and 'Fight alongside your buddies' have long been National Guard recruiting battle cries.

Another factor in the battlefield success of those WWII National Guard units was the continuity developed through extended training relationships. That strength and the readiness that comes from it are, in turn, critical

to the success of our national will of depending upon an army of citizens turned soldier in times of strife.

The same global war that demanded total mobilization of our nation required that America quickly build a first class military force. That was accomplished by using thousands of National Guard commissioned and non-commissioned officers to cadre newly formed combat units. Their flexibility and capability to organize units and train civilians to meet the demands of combat are indicative of the value of the training they received in the National Guard. Led by the 75,000 National Guardsmen who attended Officer Candidate School, the success of those new units can be attributed to the knowledge their cadre gained while training National Guard units to the level organized during the period immediately before WWII.

Following historical precedent and looking at how National Guard units have habitually recruited and trained, Lieutenant General (Retired) Herbert Temple, then Chief of National Guard Bureau (NGB), stated during an address to the 1988-89 Army War College class that National Guard units should be trained to the "level organized."

That mandate was officially adopted in May 1989 when the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and NGB jointly published FORSCOM/NGB Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component (RC) Training. It states that "RC units must maintain

company level proficiency, attain battalion level proficiency and train to the level organized."^o

Underlining the importance FORSCOM and NGB place on training to the level organized, the regulation also

TRAINING REQUIREMENT	ELEMENT					
	COMBAT DIVISION	CA/CS/CSS BDES, GRPS AND REGIMENTS	CS/CSS HHC/HHD	FA BATTALION	BATTALION/SQUADRON	COMPANY
CPX	Annually • ••	Annually • ••	Annually. Quadrennially with CAPSTONE-aligned subordinate units • ••	Annually • ••	Annually • ••	Annually. Cell with higher Headquarters, where feasible
FTX	As a minimum, Quadrennially, for at least 5 consecutive days during AT ••••	Annually ••••	Annually ••••	Annually ••••	Annually ••••	Annually ••••
External ARTEP Evaluation	No mandatory requirement	No mandatory requirement	Quadrennially •••••	See Appendix A to this regulation	No mandatory requirement	Quadrennially •••••
USAR MOBEX	Biennially Note 1 Note 2	Biennially Note 1 Note 2	Biennially Note 1 Note 2	Biennially Note 1 Note 2	Biennially Note 1 Note 2	Biennially Note 1 Note 2
• Participation in a higher headquarters exercise or CFX satisfies requirement. •• Use of combat simulations (ARTBASS, FB BC, BBS or DBS) satisfies requirement. ••• Participation in an External ARTEP Evaluation satisfies requirement. •••• Completion of BCTP satisfies requirement. ••••• Completion of CTC (NTC, JRTC) satisfies requirement. Note 1: Units participating in Overseas Deployment Training (ODT) as a complete unit will incorporate an exercise of the unit's mobilization and deployment plans/procedures. Note 2: Participation in MS CPX, MS FTX, or 200K Limited Notice Exercise satisfies requirement.						

Table 1-1

Major Reserve Component Unit Training Requirements^o

requires specific periodic major training events through the division level. Table 1-1 is a reprint of those requirements.

General Temple's speech was not, however, the first time that training to the level organized entered the National Guard vocabulary. WWII training strategies demonstrate that it existed then. Later, during the 1968-70 mobilization of the 29th Infantry Brigade (Separate) of the Hawaii National Guard in support of our nation's military actions in Vietnam, training-to-the-level organized surfaced once again. Records of that period show that the brigade trained to battalion and brigade organizational levels and achieved combat ready operational ratings for the brigade even though its personnel would be levied to Vietnam as individual replacements.⁷

PURPOSE

To be successful in combat, National Guard units must be capable of performing their wartime missions to the same exacting standards demanded of all units on the battlefield. This thesis will examine available training events and evaluation tools to determine whether DA or NGB have a training management strategy that ensures General Temple's advice that units must train as they will be employed in combat is heeded.

METHODOLOGY

To begin this study, it is necessary to present assumptions and establish definitions that serve as a basis of understanding and to set parameters of what will be examined.

Then, training programs in effect will be analyzed to determine whether they accommodate National Guard training needs. Those needs dictate that the National Guard be ready to fight a 'come as you are trained' war on short notice in an austere theater under the conditions of someone else's battlefield. To accomplish that, it cannot afford to continue to train individual battalions to fight one time battles.

Finally, future directions of training will be evaluated for their impact on the National Guard's ability to train to the level organized.

ASSUMPTIONS

The primary assumption of this thesis is that future training for National Guard units should mirror that of AC units if they are to train to the level organized and be considered equal in combat ability to AC counterparts. That does not mean the time devoted to the training, or the facilities, must be the same. It does mean that the terminal learning objectives (TLO), the standards against

which success is measured, and the endstate combat capabilities are the same.

It is also assumed that the National Guard will continue its heritage as a viable member of the Total Force team charged with protecting America's interests and implementing national policy across the spectrum of conflict. Present changes caused by recent political restructuring in Eastern Europe are not considered to adversely impact the role the National Guard will play in future national defense planning. While the world may be leaning towards peaceful resolution of economic, social and political problems, the instability in Europe probably increases the chance of armed conflict, not decrease it.

Last, it is assumed that National Guard units will be deployed to and emplaced on the next battlefield as complete units and not disbanded and used as individual replacements for AC units attrited by combat.

LIMITATIONS

Classified documents defining recent lessons learned during training were not considered in the development of this thesis. Actual warplan latest arrival dates (LAD) of National Guard units are not considered when defining the National Guard's role in the Total Force or future conflicts.

DELIMITATIONS

This is a paper about National Guard training strategies or the lack thereof. The United States Army Reserve (USAR) and its training strategies and problems will not be analyzed in this paper.

While looking at the entire training management cycle, this thesis will concentrate on analyzing a National Guard commander's capability to make a quantifiable assessment of his unit's ability to perform its wartime mission. The perspective the commander develops from that assessment is the basis he uses for planning future training.

DEFINITIONS

Seven terms are pertinent to this study: training, individual training, unit training, leader development, inactive duty training, annual training, and battle focus.

Training is the instruction of personnel to individually and collectively increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks.*

Individual training is that instruction aimed at the development of individual soldier skills and may include instruction in small team or squad operations so as to better develop the ability of the individual to work as a member of a team.*

Individual training is distinct from unit training which is training specifically conducted to develop collective unit skills.¹⁰

Leader development is a program that develops a warfighter's professionalism.¹¹ It is a continuous process that encompasses more than periodic officer or NCO professional development classes. It causes leaders to make fast and independent decisions based on broad guidance, mission orders, and a shared vision of the future battlefield.¹²

Inactive Duty Training (IDT) is authorized training performed by an RC member not on active duty or active duty for training (ADT), and consists of regularly scheduled unit training assemblies (UTA), additional training assemblies (ATA), or equivalent training periods.¹³

Annual Training (AT) is the minimal period (15 days) of annual active duty training a member performs to satisfy the annual training requirement associated with a National Guard assignment.¹⁴

Battle Focus is the process of deriving peacetime training requirements from wartime missions.¹⁵ It is an examination of everything a unit could doctrinally be expected to do and the linkage of those tasks to its combat mission.

CONCEPTS

In addition to the above definitions, several other concepts collectively form a basis for understanding the precepts presented in this thesis. These are:

1. Level organized.

Though discussed frequently by General Temple and other National Guard general officers, there is no doctrinal definition of the term "level organized." However, available guidance allows one to define it as the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) under which a unit is formed and operated. For example, an infantry division commander, though concerned with the fighting of battalions, trains his division to operate as a single entity; a brigade commander trains his unit to fight as a brigade combat team; and, a battalion commander trains and fights a battalion task force.

Training to the level organized is combined arms METL training employing combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) using all seven battlefield operating systems (BOS), in a demanding maneuver oriented field training exercise (FTX). Training to the level organized does not, however, mean that the entire unit is required to execute the training at the same time. Conducting training to the level organized requires employing a brigade-based combat team in accordance with

AirLand Battle doctrine, under the control of a division or corps command element, with the support of the appropriate organic or attached corps, joint and coalition slices. Training to the level organized is conducted by corps level brigades and groups as well as divisional brigades and each of their subelements.

Being trained to the level organized means, therefore, that a unit is capable of performing those generic organizational tasks outlined in its TOE plus those tactical tasks required to accomplish its Mission Essential Task List (METL).

2. Large Unit Training.

Whenever one thinks about military units, companies and battalions come to mind. Those units are considered small units. Historically, divisions and corps have been considered large units. However, Lieutenant General (Retired) Arthur S. Collins, Jr., in his book Common Sense Training, includes brigades in the definition of large units.^{1*}

In an attempt to gain a consensus definition of training to the level organized, Colonel Craig C. Norman, Senior National Guard Advisor to the Commander of the Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, wrote: "Training at the level organized is conducted by the highest level unit, or by a functional combination of that parent unit's

elements when it improves the higher unit's end state capability to fight at that level."¹⁷ In his book, General Collins amplifies that definition and the impact of large unit training by explaining that "the benefits from a field training exercise extend to the units two levels below the highest headquarters participating."¹⁸

To better understand the importance of large unit training, one can look at the attempted crossing of the Rapido River in Italy in 1944. During the Salerno to Cassino portion of the Italian Campaign, the 36th Infantry Division, Texas National Guard, was chosen to make the main crossing of the Rapido River. For several reasons, the division commander, Major General Fred L. Walker, did not have confidence in his unit's ability to successfully assault the Rapido.¹⁹

One of General Walker's main concerns was that his engineers and infantry had not developed a close relationship and did not work well together. But close teamwork was lacking throughout the division, something he had recognized earlier. Lessons learned after the operation show that, while the separate and highly motivated battalions attempted numerous heroic bridgeheads, a lack of combined arms training and the inability of the division staff to fully develop the crossing plan led to

the death of some 2,000 of the 6,000 soldiers in the division.²⁰

Although Training devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) are available today to provide a means for initial and sustainment training on warfighting fundamentals, there is no substitute for the more robust training experiences of major training events.²¹ One can simulate everything on the battlefield except for the fog and friction of battle that stresses and eventually overloads CS and CSS systems and the situational effects of weather, fatigue, honest mistakes and other factors that are condition oriented. For that reason, realistic training requires that large organizations, just like small units, fight or support exactly as they will on the battlefield.²²

3. A National Guard unit's annual training program.

National Guard units normally train one weekend each month, called IDT, and two weeks during the summer months, labeled AT. Together, these equal a minimum of thirty-nine annual unit training days. FORSCOM/NGB Regulation 350-2 delineates exactly what types of training will be conducted during the two periods.

During IDT, units concentrate on common task training (CTT), soldier's manual tasks, professional and military occupational skill (MOS) development, intensive

leader training, individual and crew-served weapons training, and collective training at squad and platoon levels. During AT, only wartime mission related collective training should be conducted with the maximum amount of training time devoted to tactical field training.²³

4. Responsibility for National Guard training.

As in any military organization, the commander is responsible for training his unit. Unlike the AC commander who looks only to his wartime commander and installation support staff, the National Guard commander must look to the AC or RC headquarters within his wartime organization, the appropriate Readiness Region, his state National Guard headquarters, NGB, and FORSCOM since readiness oversight and actual training support responsibilities are split between several organizations in the AC and the National Guard itself.

Within each state and territory (Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands) are organizations known as STARCs, State Area Commands, which are charged with administering the training of National Guard units of that state or territory.²⁴ The STARC provides guidance, administers resources provided from NGB, and acts as the final link between FORSCOM, the AC Readiness Groups, and National Guard headquarters and units within the state or territory. Internally, it evaluates the readiness of the

various state or territorial units and reports that status to the governor. The STARC also compiles and forwards Unit Status Reports (USR) specifying personnel, equipment, and training readiness levels to NGB and FORSCOM.

NGB is a planning and resourcing link between the fifty state and four territorial National Guards, under the peacetime control of their governors, and Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). In that role, NGB provides regulatory guidance and resources to the governors so they can, in turn, administer the programmed training of their units to federal standards. Additionally, NGB acts as the subject matter expert for National Guard matters whenever DA develops or amends regulatory guidance for the Total Force.

As a result, the states and territories are responsible for monitoring resources and overseeing the actual training of National Guard units within their boundaries while NGB is responsible for resourcing training and acting as a conduit between the state/territorial units and DA.

DA, on the other hand, has oversight responsibility for readiness of the National Guard and for reporting that status through Army channels to the Congress. Article I, Section 8, Items 15 and 16 of the Constitution of the United States requires that the Congress provide for

organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, the predecessor of the National Guard. The term "discipline" is generally accepted as synonymous with "training" since the training standards of the National Guard are prescribed by the discipline Congress determines.

Congress has defined that discipline repeatedly by stating that the training of the National Guard should conform to that of the Regular Army (RA). The Dick Act passed in 1903 and amended in 1908, as interpreted by its author, Major General Charles Dick (Democrat, Congressman from Ohio), ensured the National Guard was organized, armed, and disciplined like the AC. The act also called for federal arms to be issued to the National Guard, set standards for IDTs, mandated federal inspections of National Guard training, and made it possible that an AC soldier and a National Guardsman could not be told apart except by his unit shoulder patch.²⁵

Ultimately, FORSCOM has become the Army agency charged with ensuring compliance with federal statutes relating to training and readiness of the National Guard. To accomplish that mission, FORSCOM has provided its four Continental US Armies (CONUSA's) with the authority to evaluate and report the training readiness status of all National Guard units within their areas of operation. Additionally, to ensure Guard units are capable of

performing to the standards demanded by Congress, FORSCOM provides them with training assistance from Readiness Groups located throughout the country.

Thus, the training of National Guard units is the responsibility of the commander and state or territorial governor with resourcing and coordination by NGB, and with overwatch authority provided to FORSCOM as the senior Army agent.²⁶

5. Four basic components (COMPO) of the Total Force.

There are eight COMPO's in the Total Force. However, the Army's force structure is composed of four of the COMPOs.

Those four basic COMPO's are:

COMPO 1 - Active Component

COMPO 2 - National Guard

COMPO 3 - USAR

COMPO 4 - Unresourced, unmanned units²⁷

When one considers the units that must be trained, one thinks about the first three COMPO's. This paper is primarily concerned with COMPOs 1 and 2.

6. National Guard wartime mission assignment.

Every two years, the National Command Authority (NCA) publishes its defense guidance. That guidance provides national imperatives and priorities and starts three military planning systems that result in theater

warplans to support the strategy outlined by the NCA. Those planning systems, all part of the Joint Operational Planning Process, are: the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), and the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS).

Figure 1-1 shows the Joint Operational Planning Process, a process that begins with issuance of the NCA Guidance and ends with issuance of a wartime mission to a National Guard unit.²⁰




Figure 1-1
Joint Operational Planning Process

Within the JSPS, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is developed by analyzing the NCA Guidance and the world situation. Once the JSCP is published, it initiates JOPS. Through JOPS, each theater develops plans for fighting a war starting there and for sustaining operations should war start in another theater. Those theaters for which plans are developed are: Europe, Southwest Asia, Pacific, and Continental United States (CONUS) Defense.²⁰

After the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approve theater warplans, FORSCOM identifies the specific Army units necessary to accomplish the Army's portion and assigns them to the theater--regardless of component--in the order they are needed. That assignment and the associated command and control to accomplish the theater mission is called the Time Phased Forces Deployment List (TPFDL) which ultimately generates a wartime mission assignment and a CAPSTONE command trace for each National Guard unit.

CAPSTONE is not an acronym. Instead it is the name of a program bridging peacetime training relationships and wartime chains of command by developing the command and control relationships needed to implement a theater warplan. It provides commanders at all echelons of the

Total Force with a single message: train and plan for your wartime mission.³⁰

FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Training Under CAPSTONE, describes CAPSTONE-aligned units as: "Units which are aligned in one or more of the principal scenarios or the CONUS base."³¹ Training of National Guard units is affected by CAPSTONE relationships. National Guard units exist only if they are a TPFDL requirement in one of the six CAPSTONE theater planning and training association (PLASSN) scenarios.

Once a wartime mission is assigned to a National Guard unit, through CAPSTONE trace alignments, all training conducted by the unit should be focused on that mission.³² Since National Guard units are usually assigned missions in different scenarios, the STARC, NGB, and FORSCOM resource, assist with, or evaluate all training the unit conducts against its priority wartime mission.³³

7. CAPSTONE training associations.

To understand CAPSTONE relationships, one must first understand how FORSCOM categorizes units when developing TPFDL's. Major combat forces, regardless of component, such as divisions, separate brigades, cavalry regiments, and selected functional units such as Civil Affairs, air defense artillery, and psychological operations (PSYOPS) units are apportioned in

the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) to the CINC by type for planning purposes.

Those units are called above-the-line units.³⁴ All other units required to support the theater warplan, but reserved for alignment by FORSCOM until after warplan approval, are called below-the-line units.

As an example of above-the-line unit apportionments, AMOPS would tell the Army component commander reporting to a U.S. Central Command Commander-in-Chief (CINC) that one armor division, one airborne division, two cavalry regiments, and a Civil Affairs battalion are apportioned to the theater for warplanning. After the warplan has gained JCS approval, FORSCOM identifies those apportioned units by specific unit identification. That identification begins the CAPSTONE-alignment process.

Continuing to follow the example above, once the plan is approved and FORSCOM identifies the above-the-line units, the CINC then determines the number of CS and CSS units needed to support the above-the-line units. FORSCOM follows up by identifying those CS and CSS units by specific unit identification.

After filling the TPFDL, FORSCOM is charged with ensuring RC units are capable of deploying within required times to the appropriate theater capable of accomplishing

their missions. That is accomplished through directed training associations (DTA) between AC and RC units. The CAPSTONE DTAs are:

a. ROUNDOUT: A HQDA managed program which brings units of one component up to a designated structure by filling intentional organizational voids with units from a different component.³⁵ For example, one of the three authorized AC brigades of the 4th Infantry Division (ID) based at Fort Carson, Colorado was recently deactivated because of many factors, one being resources. The 4th will, however, need its third brigade upon deployment into a combat zone.

To ensure it can deploy and fight as a division, the 116th Heavy Separate Brigade of the Idaho, North Carolina, Nevada, and Oregon National Guard has been assigned responsibility for becoming that third brigade when needed.³⁶ The 4th ID is, therefore, responsible for training the Guard brigade, in concert with the appropriate STARCs, since the division is the wartime parent headquarters of the 116th. Also, the 116th is at the same authorized level of organization (ALO) and DA master priority list (DAMPL) authorization as the 4th ID since it will deploy with the division, or as soon afterwards as is possible.³⁷

b. WARTRAIN: A FORSCOM program associating above-the-line units that are CAPSTONE-aligned to a CONUS-based corps under that corps for training. A subset of the WARTRAIN program is CORTRAIN. Through CORTRAIN, above-the-line units that are CAPSTONE-aligned to forward deployed corps/other commands are associated with a CONUS-based corps for training.^{3*} Those corps assist the aligned National Guard units with training opportunities that allow the National Guard to perform to the level organized within the corps system. For example, when the XVIIIth Airborne Corps conducts corps-level training, it should invite all National Guard units that are subordinate to it in its CAPSTONE traces as well as those that are CORTRAIN-aligned to it for training.

c. Affiliation: Provides for DTA training opportunities for RC CS, and CSS units that are not organic to above-the-line units or are not already included in WARTRAIN.^{3*} An example of this type of relationship would be the 212th Transportation Corps Company (Heavy) of the Tennessee National Guard that is affiliated for training support with the 533rd Transportation Corps Company (Medium) at Fort Benning, Georgia.^{4*} The AC unit at Ft. Benning is charged with providing its National Guard counterpart with resources needed to improve its technical and tactical proficiency. These resources include personnel

and equipment necessary for training or the evaluation of training up to the level organized.

8. National Guard Training evaluation reporting systems.

In addition to the Unit Status Report (USR) completed by each headquarters that reports readiness to DA, FORSCOM Pamphlet 135-3, Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Guide for the Analysis of Training Performance, requires an additional, external system be used to evaluate National Guard training conducted during AT. The system uses the 1-R report, Analysis of Training Performance of Reserve Components of the Army, consisting of an evaluator's quantitative and narrative descriptions of training and the Mission Essential Task List (METL).

AC evaluators are charged with analyzing the quality of training conducted during AT and the unit's proficiency on METL tasks performed during AT.⁴¹ That analysis then drives the training for the next year and, in many instances, becomes the foundation for a commander's Officer Evaluation Report (OER) evaluation.

While the optimum situation is for AT evaluators to be from within the CAPSTONE chain of command, resources and mission requirements often prevent that from occurring. Many times, evaluators are drawn from AC units that are simply charged with performing AT evaluations without regard to prior training, knowledge of differences between

AC and National Guard soldiers and units, or other relationships with National Guard units.

Though AC evaluators compare training conducted during AT to proficiency at METL tasks, a shortcoming in the evaluation and reporting system is that the l-R evaluation is not related to strengths and weaknesses within the seven battlefield operating systems (BOS) against which FM 25-100 requires commanders to assess their ability to perform METL tasks.⁴²

AC and RC commanders, when assessing their unit's ability to perform METL tasks, break the METL tasks into the BOS to determine where weaknesses exist. The BOS are: maneuver, fire support, air defense, command and control, intelligence, mobility and survivability, and CSS.⁴³ Once the weaknesses are identified by BOS, specific corrective actions can be determined.

The l-R does not provide commanders with an evaluation by BOS. Instead it provides one by tasks or functional areas of concentration. The l-R evaluation is based primarily on administrative actions and items such as availability of regulations, operation of dining facilities and arms rooms, maintenance and qualification of personnel to perform technical tasks. However, it is ultimately used to determine the level at which the unit must focus its training during the upcoming year.

Table 1-2 outlines the various levels to which National Guards units may train, not all of which are the level at which the units are organized.

CODE	LEVEL
L	IF THE LEVEL AT WHICH ORGANIZED HIGHER THAN BATTALION/SQUADRON
A	BATTALION/SQUADRON
B	COMPANY/BATTERY/TROOP
C	BELOW COMPANY/BATTERY/TROOP LEVEL
E	INDIVIDUAL

Table 1-2
FORSCOM 1-R Levels of Training⁴⁴

For example, levels 'C' and 'E' indicate that company-sized units must concentrate on levels lower than that which they are organized while level 'B' stipulates the same for battalion-sized units. These levels are assigned because of perceived weaknesses identified by AC evaluators during training observed at AT--not based on how the unit will be employed on the battlefield.

SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

This thesis is significant to the National Guard, and the Total Force, for three reasons:

(1) Commanders and staff officers will find it a useful source of information that can be used when developing a long-range strategy for training National Guard units to the level organized.

(2) A person uninitiated into the workings of the National Guard can read it as an overview to understand training to fight implications. It will also help to understand how the National Guard is integrated into the Total Force planning process and to develop an understanding of how National Guard units are trained.

(3) Training differences between the National Guard and AC counterparts are examined from an historical perspective and as they affect future planning giving the reader a glimpse into historical truths or myths that can either strengthen or undermine the maturity of the Total Force concept.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

1. Letter, LTG Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief, National Guard Bureau, to Senators Wendell H. Ford and Christopher S. Bond, 23 June 1989.
2. Interview with LTC Arnold D. Droke, 45th Infantry Division Museum, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
3. America's First Battles 1776-1965 (1986), edited by Heller, Charles E. & Stofft, William A., University Press of Kansas, Lawrence. pgs.186-225.
4. Interview with COL Craig Norman, member of the Army War College class of 1988-89 (August 1989).
5. FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training (15 May 1989) referred to hereafter as FORSCOM 350-2, p.2.
6. FORSCOM 350-2, p.13.
7. Study of the 29th Infantry Brigade (Separate), Hawaii National Guard, 1 January 1968-30 June 1970 (U) (29 March 1971), HQ, US Army Pacific.
8. Army Field Manual 25-100, Training Th Force (November 1988), referred to hereafter as FM 25-100, glossary-7.
9. Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training (11 October 1985), referred to hereafter as AR 350-1, p.3.
10. AR 350-1, p.3.
11. FM 25-100, p.1-6.
12. FM 25-100. p.4-4.
13. FM 25-100, glossary-5.
14. FM 25-100, glossary-3.
15. FM 25-100, glossary-3.
16. Common Sense Training (1978), LTG(R) Arthur S. Collins, Jr., Presidio Press, San Rafael, CA, p.146.
17. Memorandum "Proposed Common Working Definition of 'Training to the Level Organized,'" COL Norman, E. C. (8 March 1990), Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES
(continued)

18. Collins, p.147.
19. The 36th had been inducted into federal service in 1940. General Walker, a Regular Army infantry battalion commander in WWI, had taken command in 1941. He was not a Guardsman.
20. Salerno to Cassino, U.S. Army in World War II, Mediterranean Theater of Operations (1969), Martin Blumenson, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, Pgs.322-352.
21. FM 25-100, p.4-3.
22. FM 25-100, p.4-3.
23. FORSCOM 350-2, p.15.
24. The District of Columbia (DC) National Guard is an anomaly among state and territory National Guard organizations. DC does not have a governor nor a politically appointed Adjutant General. Instead, it has a Commanding General (CG) appointed by the President of the United States and who is responsible to the Undersecretary of the Army for day-to-day training of the DC National Guard. Likewise, DC does not have a STARC. Instead, it has a District Area Command (DARC) that performs the same functions of state and territorial STARC's.
25. 'When General Dick Took a Look at the Dick Act' reprinted from National Guard magazine, January 1910 by the Combat Studies Institute in Citizen Soldier: A History of the Army National Guard (1989), pgs.214-217.
26. FORSCOM Pamphlet 360-2, FORCES Command (undated), Fort McPherson, GA.
27. Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice (18 August 1989) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, P.11-14.
28. Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1988 (1 July 1988) National Defense University, Norfolk, Virginia, p.124.
29. FORSCOM Regulation 11-30, The Army CAPSTONE Program: Program Guidance (1 June 1989) referred to hereafter as FORSCOM 11-30, p.3.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES
(continued)

30. FORSCOM 11-30, p.3.
31. FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Training Under CAPSTONE (1 August 1988) referred to hereafter as FORSCOM 350-4, Glossary-1.
32. FORSCOM 11-30, p.6.
33. FORSCOM 11-30, p.6.
34. FORSCOM 11-30, P.5.
35. FORSCOM 350-4, GLOSSARY-1.
36. The Divisions of the United States Army (1 October 1989), prepared under the auspices of the Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army.
37. Army Regulation 11-30, CAPSTONE Program, (1 September 1985) referred to hereafter as AR 11-30, p.5.
38. FORSCOM Reg 350-4, p. 15-16.
39. FORSCOM Reg 350-4, Glossary-1.
40. FORSCOM 350-4, p.B3.
41. FORSCOM Pamphlet 135-3, Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Guide for the Analysis of Training Performance (1 October 1989) referred to hereafter as FORSCOM 135-3, p.1-3.
42. FM 25-100, pgs.3-2 and 3-3.
43. FM 25-100, p.2-4.
44. FORSCOM 135-3, p.A-8.

CHAPTER TWO

HOW THE ARMY TRAINS

The problem with lessons learned from history is that we usually read them best after falling on our chins.

-Robert A. Heinlein¹

BACKGROUND

In the months following the end of WWII, as the American military institution was discovering and evaluating lessons learned from that protracted conflict, one of the new and major lessons identified was that "all military staffs in peacetime should function, as nearly as possible, as it is expected they will in wartime."² That need for battle staff training has been relearned many times since, but was best restated by General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, in his 1988 preface to FM 25-100. In that preface, General Vuono wrote:

As recent events have illustrated, our nation's ability to deter attack or act decisively to contain and de-escalate a crisis demands an essentially instantaneous transition from peace to war preparedness. This requires that all leaders in the Army understand, attain, sustain, and enforce high standards of combat readiness through tough, realistic multi-echelon combined arms training designed to challenge and develop individuals, leaders, and units.³

FM 25-100 goes on to state that "we train the way we intend to fight because our historical experiences amply show the direct correlation between realistic training and success on the battlefield."⁴

While that lesson hasn't changed from when it was first identified in 1955 nor has the make-up of the Army changed since the Dick Act, what has changed is the impact the National Guard has on the Army.

RESERVE COMPONENT IMPACT ON THE TOTAL FORCE

FM 100-5, Operations, the Army's keystone warfighting manual charges that "rigorous, realistic training for war must therefore go on continuously to assure Army units' readiness to fight short-notice wars, campaigns, and battles."⁵ According to FM 100-1, The Army, "...the Army" consists of "the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Army Reserve...."⁶

Unfortunately, the basic components of the Army weren't completely integrated until the hollow army of the 1970s collapsed. Realizing it could not support theater warplans with the end strength authorized by Congress after Vietnam, the leadership of the Army finally adopted the Total Force program in 1970.

With implementation of the Total Force through the 70's and into the 80's, National Guard units were given larger portions of the national defense. By requiring them to actively become part of the wartime organizations that will implement theater warplans, CAPSTONE has become the organization for the way the American Army will train to fight.

To determine whether battle focused training for CAPSTONE missions works, one need only look at the recent military action in Panama, Operation JUST CAUSE. An example of National Guard unit involvement in the military action is demonstrated in the role played by the 1138th Military Police (MP) Company, Missouri National Guard. The 1138th, performing its AT, was the only MP unit with prisoner of war (POW) processing capabilities in Panama. Its AT was extended and it was augmented by other National Guard MP's to continue processing, establishing and maintaining a POW camp through the duration of the exercise.⁷

Of our twenty-eight combat divisions, ten are in the National Guard. More Guard brigades and battalions are ROUNDOUT to AC divisions. When the components of the Total Force are compared, one finds that forty-one percent of the Total Force combat division structure is in the National Guard. Additionally, National Guard non-divisional combat

units make up fifty percent of the Total Force non-divisional combat structure.⁸

In addition to growth in RC combat unit involvement in the Total Force, RC CS and CSS unit involvement has also grown. As of Fiscal year (FY) 1989, fifty-eight percent of the Army's NBC defense and decontamination (NBC) capability was in the RC; sixty-four percent of its combat engineer battalions were in the RC; and, seventy-five percent of combat hospitals were in the RC. The list continues in the same manner through all the support functions.⁹

To summarize and underline the growing involvement of the RC in our national defense programs, in 1989 the Government Accounting Office (GAO) released a report on the training of the RC in which it stated that seventy percent of total deploying forces are in the RC. To underscore that figure the GAO stated in its report that "Reserve components provide more than one-half of the many functions that are essential to the Army's war-fighting capabilities."¹⁰

The facts are clear--the Total Force is made up of a majority of RC units and a minority of AC units. It stands to reason that training and readiness should be geared to ensuring that the major partner is ready for the demands the nation might place upon it.

TRAINING MANAGEMENT CYCLE

From FM 25-100, one learns that training is a multi-phased continuous cycle. This cycle begins after the commander has evaluated his wartime mission, developed a Mission Essential Task List (METL), and has made an assessment of what his unit's present training status is compared to what it should be to accomplish that wartime mission. Figure 2-1 shows the phases of the Training Management Cycle.

The first phase of training is the planning phase. During this phase, commanders and their staffs develop long-range, short-range, and near-term training plans to ensure training objectives are met within resources allocated.

Though FM 25-100 is applicable to AC and RC units alike, planning horizons for the two are different. For example, in the long-range planning cycle, the RC battalion plans three years into the future while the AC battalion plans one year out; the RC brigade plans five years into the future while the AC brigade plans eighteen months out; and, the RC division plans five years into the future where the




Figure 2-1
Training Management Cycle¹¹

AC division plans two years out.¹² Thus, large unit RC commanders plan major training exercises for years when they may not be in command since the average RC commander spends three years in command of a unit. Conversely, RC commanders are called upon to execute the training their predecessors planned long before they assumed command of their units.

Likewise, National Guard division commanders develop training plans for five-year periods based on assigned CAPSTONE missions and projected resources. However, each time NCA Guidance is issued, CAPSTONE missions for some units change. FORSCOM attempts to manage CAPSTONE mission

changes so that less than ten percent of all Army units face changes in their wartime missions. Unfortunately, ten percent means that, of the ten National Guard divisions, one could have its CAPSTONE mission changed every two years.

FM 25-100 is specific in how senior leaders develop training strategies. It states that during long-range training planning "commanders and their staffs make a broad assessment of the number, type, and duration of training events required to accomplish METL training."¹³

During the second phase, training execution, the unit executes the training planned during phase one. In phase three, training evaluation--an ongoing phase that overlaps phase two--training is evaluated to measure the unit's demonstrated ability against specified training standards.

The evaluation phase is integral to training execution since, without an evaluation, the effectiveness of a training event or an entire program cannot be determined.¹⁴ Without that determination, the direction of future training cannot be charted. This could lead to National Guard units not knowing whether they are adequately training to perform their CAPSTONE mission to the level which they are organized.

Evaluation, however, is only a momentary snapshot of how a unit performed certain tasks at a specific time. That

snapshot alone is not adequate for making changes to the unit's training direction. The commander must assess that snapshot based upon the reasons for his unit's performance along with all other quantifiable and subjective information he has about his unit.

Consequently, assessment is equal to, if not more important than, the actual evaluation. However, an assessment made from incomplete data can generate as faulty a directional change as using an assessment taken from only the evaluation snapshot.

NATIONAL GUARD FOUR-YEAR TRAINING CYCLE

National Guard units train in a four-year cycle culminating in an external ARTEP evaluation.¹⁵ This means that the training a unit undertakes in a particular year could be oriented to individual training, small unit collective training, or training to the level organized. In maneuver units that must qualify with a main weapon system such as tanks or Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV), every other year is devoted to gunnery training in preparation for record firing. During those years, maneuver training does not have the same priority as gunnery training. In the maneuver years, gunnery training is undertaken only as it supports maneuver training or for sustainment of gunnery skills.

EVALUATION TOOLS

Training is a process, not a product. The Army training system depends on feedback, assessment, and modification. The only way to benefit from those three elements is to rigorously evaluate training to identify current weaknesses. The tools used to evaluate training range from the informal internal evaluation, an analysis of the unit's capabilities that is resourced and conducted by its commander and his staff, and end with the external formal evaluation. Program and budgetary decisions are made from assessments determined after an external formal evaluation. Figure 2-2 depicts the ascending nature and relationship of the various types of evaluations.

		INFORMAL	FORMAL
INTERNAL	INDIVIDUAL		
	COLLECTIVE		
EXTERNAL	INDIVIDUAL		
	COLLECTIVE		

Figure 2-2
Types of Evaluations

Every commander should be capable of accomplishing the first type of evaluation. The latter, however, requires outside support which, many times, is beyond the capability of the unit, its parent organization, or the STARC. Where that external support comes from is a factor of level organized and of CAPSTONE relationships.

If the unit is a battalion, its next higher headquarters within the National Guard supported by CONUSA and AC counterparts is responsible for administering an external formal evaluation, normally an ARTEP to Army standards. At the battalion level, there appear to be relatively few problems in the administration of a formal external evaluation, in making assessments of training readiness, or in making direction changes to training programs other than those problems inherent to the I-R evaluation system.

However, as one climbs higher up the level organized ladder, the problem of conducting proper external formal evaluations is aggravated. These problems are amplified as one encounters brigade or division-sized National Guard units that are CAPSTONE-aligned to forward-deployed headquarters or to AC units located long distances from National Guard home stations and training areas.

Add to that budget constraints, equipment and personnel shortages, and other training distractors and the

need to evaluate large unit capabilities increases as quickly as do the reasons for not conducting large unit exercises. The Congress authorizes spending to train to the level organized. That training needs to be evaluated and assessed well. One needs only look to our last large-scale mobilization of the National Guard in 1940 to see the effect of large unit evaluations on our nation's warfighting capabilities.

PRE-WWII LARGE UNIT TRAINING

The National Defense Act of 1933 started the process that eventually linked the National Guard to the nation's defense by making it a permanent component of the Army of the United States, along with the Regular Army and Organized Reserve.¹⁶ The law organized the three components into combat divisions under the control of nine geographic corps across the country. In spite of not having adequate equipment, personnel or training time, the goal of National Guard units after 1933 was to attend AT prepared to engage in battalion and regimental exercises.¹⁷ Unfortunately, they frequently fell far short of that level.

This shift to a three component Army was as significant to the posture of our national military machine when America approached WWII as it is today. In 1939, as the German war machine was moving towards Poland, the

American standing Army was described by General George C. Marshall as seventeenth in size among the armies of the world. It consisted of three combat divisions, while the National Guard consisted of twenty-two combat divisions. General Marshall later admitted that the Army, woefully under-equipped, wanted the Guard's equipment more than its personnel.^{1*}

During late July and early August 1940, National Guard divisions, along with many non-divisional units, took part in the Minnesota or Louisiana tactical field exercises. According to Col. W. D. McGlasson, "those exercises were the largest series of army-size field exercises in U.S. Army history" and made the mobilization and subsequent training of federalized National Guard units easier since commanders had a recent evaluation from which to make assessments of organizational strengths and weaknesses.^{1*}

Those exercises were clearly lacking by today's training management standards. But, those early exercises were at least an attempt to train National Guard units to the level organized and to evaluate their combat abilities against perceived wartime missions. The small gains made during those ill-equipped and understaffed exercises would be vital to America's military capability during the upcoming years.

After almost two years of post-mobilization training, the first division to deploy to Europe arrived in Ireland in January 1942; the first to deploy to the Pacific arrived in New Caledonia in November 1942²⁰. Both were National Guard units. All eighteen divisions of the National Guard that were mobilized in 1940 eventually fought in WWII.

The Army has made several steps backwards since then. Given today's resource constraints and environmental concerns, rarely do National Guard brigades, regiments, or divisions get the opportunity to conduct exercises to the level organized as they did prior to WWII.

Unfortunately, with modern technology, the world has shrunk to a size that the extended training time afforded the National Guard prior to WWII doesn't exist today. Coupled with a shrinking AC, it becomes doubly important that all units of the Total Force be capable of reacting swiftly to any worldwide flashpoint whether included in a theater warplan or existing only as a contingency plan (CONPLAN).

Unfortunately, National Guard units are stuck at lower levels of training by the increasing demands of complex individual tasks and wide ranging company and battalion METL training. This condition might be acceptable if it is America's policy for National Guard units to only

round out AC divisions or provide individual replacements. But, that is not their purpose. National Guard brigades and divisions are charged to fight as separate units and they must be trained and evaluated appropriately.²¹ Thus, all units of all components of the Total Force must train in peacetime as they will fight during times of crisis.

TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT

The lessons of past wars prove that the American military has not historically been prepared for its first battles. We've repeatedly had to reorganize, retrain, and re-equip our military to face the next foe on a new battlefield.

The concept of training focused on the next battle that we learned after WWII was not fully heeded until our post-Vietnam military rebuild. In the mid-seventies, the premier Army doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, took a turn towards the future with a revolutionary new term and idea 'Air-Land Battle.' According to that manual, the U.S. Army had to prepare to fight outnumbered and win. To do so, it had to prepare to win its first battles well as its last. The distinct difference in the new FM 100-5 and its predecessors was that it attempted to change the way the Army thought about and prepared for war.²²

And, change the way the Army thought about war, it did. Though met with criticism the likes of which no other field manual had received, FM 100-5 caused the Army to turn away from Vietnam and look to its future.²³ As the generations of TRADOC inspired manuals linked to the original FM 100-5 have been published and revised, the Army has come to its latest visionary manual: FM 25-100.

That manual has also brought with it new ideas and concepts for preparing for future conflict. One important difference in the two, however, must not be overlooked. While FM 100-5 was a fairly forward looking document, FM 25-100 looks to the future by tying it to historical precedent.

From the opening pages of chapter one to the closing pages of chapter five, FM 25-100 takes its reader on a history lesson of training successes and failures. It paints a picture that future battlefield successes or failures will be based upon how we train today to fight tomorrow. Programs developed under the auspices of FM 25-100 are historical in scope and content while being futuristic in technology and doctrine.

POST-WWII LARGE UNIT TRAINING

'Train as you will fight,' the theme of FM 25-100, is not a new idea. That lesson was learned years earlier after WWII yet was apparently ignored as America geared up for its next conflict, Korea.

The Korean War brought with it new national policies that have affected the training of the National Guard ever since: the concept of the military playing a deterrant rather than a warfighting role and partial mobilization. The Truman administration believed Korea was only a diversion designed to make way for a Soviet invasion of western Europe. Eight National Guard infantry divisions, three Regimental Combat Teams, forty-three anti-aircraft battalions, and many other nondivisional units totalling 1,698 National Guard units were mobilized into federal service during the Korean War.

Of these, only two divisions were directly involved in the Far East.²⁴ The rest, totalling one-third of the National Guard, were used as individual replacements or to strengthen US involvement in Europe. During this time, civilians were drafted into military service to both meet the demands of combat or be assigned to active and National Guard units.

Instead of relying on National Guard units that had trained and developed unit integrity and combat readiness

through service with one another, the Army decided to rotate individual soldiers from Korea after a year's service. Unit integrity and training were no longer important. Individual survival was. Because of that, unit training in the National Guard after Korea suffered. After Korea, National Guard units had to rebuild to offset the effects of the draft, partial mobilization, and individual rotations from the combat zone with the subsequent breaking up of National Guard units.

AC units, as opposed to National Guard units, continued to participate in large-scale training after Korea to evaluate their ability to wage war. One need only look at the after-action reports of the large unit FTX's and CPX's conducted during the 1950's and 1960's to see this. The goals of those exercises, to train to the level organized, became imbedded in the AC at the same time the National Guard was struggling to rebuild its individual soldier proficiency at the expense of large unit training.²⁵ However, while attempts were being made to train the AC as it expected to fight, the Army was again sidetracked by another impending war, Vietnam.

With the help of the Vietnam conflict and Secretary of Defense McNamara, training to the level organized in the National Guard was further crippled. Vietnam hurt because, once again, the leaders of our nation relied on a draft and

individual rotations into the combat zone instead of on National Guard units. Realizing the Guard would play a small role in Vietnam, Americans not supporting national policy chose to enlist and serve in the Guard rather than chance being drafted to serve in Vietnam.

McNamara, in his quest for efficiency, tried to merge the National Guard and USAR into one component. Foiled in that attempt, he imposed massive changes in National Guard structure at a dizzying pace that resulted in deep cuts and the mandate to return to individual training. McNamara was able to do so because of the Johnson administration's decision to rely on the draft for manpower for Vietnam.²⁶

Johnson ordered thirty-four major National Guard units into federal service but only 7,000 Guardsmen reached Vietnam; 4,000 as individual replacements.²⁷ National Guard involvement was so minor that in mid-1969 the war in Vietnam was over for Guardsmen, four years before the last American troop left.²⁸

The National Guard, keyed to full mobilization, found it difficult to adjust its recruiting efforts to the partial mobilization applied during Korea and Vietnam. Likewise, because of personnel turbulence caused by annual rotations into and out of the Korean and Vietnamese combat

zones. National Guard units had to continue to constantly retrain at the individual level after WWII.

After Vietnam, while the National Guard recovered from the plight of individual replacement duty and the charge of becoming a haven for draft dodgers, the AC turned back to Europe and large unit exercises such as Mesquite Drive, Big Thrust, AURORAL, Angry Arm, and REFORGER.²⁹ The NATO focus of the AC during that era remains with the Total Force today.

COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS

A relatively new development in the continuing refinement of the AC large unit training philosophy that takes advantage of new technology while efficiently using shrinking resources is the Combat Training Center (CTC) program. The CTCs have been developed to provide commanders of larger organizations with external formal evaluations much like that those provided during the Minnesota and Louisiana exercises prior to WWII and the large unit exercises of the 1960s and 1970s.

The CTC experience is both a training vehicle and an evaluation opportunity for units that rotate through one of its four centers. The National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, CA is designed to provide training and evaluation for brigade-sized heavy units consisting of a brigade

headquarters and two maneuver battalions stationed in CONUS. The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfeld, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is designed to do the same for similar type units stationed in Europe.

Light forces rotate through the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft. Chafee, AR in battalion-sized packages. Finally, corps and division staffs are provided training and evaluation opportunities through the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

At NTC, CMTC, and JRTC, units undergo an extended period of field training and an evaluation at intensity levels simulating actual combat. This is accomplished through rigorous tactical field exercises conducted against a world-class OPFOR using Warsaw Pact tactics and equipment. Those training periods are known throughout the Army community as "rotations."

Division and corps commanders and their staffs rotate through BCTP at Ft. Leavenworth. Initially they participate in a week-long seminar designed to perfect battle staff estimate, decision making, and staff planning and interaction procedures. That seminar is followed by a computer driven tactical command post exercise (CPX), or Warfighter, at the unit's home station. This exercise simulates the stresses and demands of combat while pitting the commander and his staff against a world-class OPFOR.

For National Guard commanders as well as AC commanders, a rotation to a CTC provides the only quantifiable performance evaluation tool available for assessing their unit's ability to perform its wartime mission. (ARTEPs, while evaluating task proficiency, do not measure combat capability.) Of the four CTCs, National Guard units should normally expect to participate in training and be evaluated at the three CTCs located in CONUS.

However, during FY 90, the NTC will conduct fourteen unit rotations of which two involve National Guard ROUNDOUT units; JRTC will conduct nine battalion-sized rotations, of which one has been provided to NGB; and, BCTP will conduct ten division and two corps staff rotations of which NGB is allocated one.³⁰ As a result, one half of the Total Force is being shortchanged by receiving only one tenth of the best training and evaluation opportunities.

Historically, National Guard involvement at the CTCs is not much better than the upcoming year. Table 3-1 compares the number of National Guard units that have rotated through all of the CONUS CTCs since 1982 to AC units that have done so.

Interestingly, because the AC controls units scheduled for rotations to the NTC, National Guard involvement as 'player units' has been restricted to those

	NTC						
	AC UNITS	GUARD ROUNDOUT BNs/BDEs	GUARD DIV/BDE				
1982	8	0	0				
1983	10	1 - BN	0				
1984	12	1 - BN	0				
1985	14	5 - BN	0				
1986	14	2 - BN	0				
1987	13	2 - BN 1 - BDE HQ	0	AC	GUARD	AC DIV	GUARD DIV
1988	14*	1 - BN	0	8	1	4	1
1989	14**	2 - BN	0	7	2	7	2
1990	12	2 - BN 1 - BDE HQ	0	8	1	9	1

* 8 NATIONAL GUARD BATTALIONS ASSISTED OFFOR
 ** 11 NATIONAL GUARD BATTALIONS ASSISTED OFFOR

Table 2-1
 Comparison of National Guard and AC CTC Rotations
 1982-1990³¹

units that ROUNDOUT an AC division. The NTC has not provided NGB with dedicated rotations for National Guard divisions or separate brigades that are not ROUNDOUT to the AC. Additionally, JRTC and BCTP provide NGB with minimal rotations that are dedicated to National Guard units without

regard to CAPSTONE DTAs. Why only ROUNDOUT Guard units need an opportunity at a CTC training rotation is an interesting question.

Considering the make-up of the Total Force cited earlier by GAO in its report on National Guard training, one could argue that, since seventy percent of total deploying forces are in the RC, a majority of the CTC rotations should be provided to the RC for unit training and evaluation if the CTC is an essential Total Force training and evaluation program.

Like the AC, the ten National Guard divisions, the fourteen separate brigades, and two armored cavalry regiments and their commanders and staffs should rotate through one of the CTCs or be provided another comparable vehicle for evaluating their training during each commander's tour. Additionally, the six National Guard brigades that are ROUNDOUT to AC divisions should rotate through one of the CTCs with their parent AC division if that is how they are programmed to fight.³²

Were resources available, every AC and National Guard unit could attend the CTC designed for it during each commander's tour of duty. However, we know this is not possible. Therefore, how DA and NGB determine which units will be provided the opportunity to train and be evaluated becomes crucial to the overall effectiveness of the Total

Force in executing national strategies through the various theater warplans.

SUMMARY

Historically, the Army has strived to train AC and National Guard units to the level organized. That training, before the mobilization of WWII, helped set the stage for the additional intense training that was to occur after mobilization and impacted upon the National Guard's ability to perform its wartime missions. However, after WWII and Korea, National Guard training and readiness was allowed to languish as the AC turned towards the defense of Europe and counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam.

After Vietnam, technology and its cost caused the world and defense budgets to shrink. As a result, the National Guard has been given a larger role in our national defense and has become one of the major partners in the Total Force concept, supplying most of America's combat power. At the same time the National Guard is taking on those additional roles and responsibilities, the US Congress is starting a reorganization process that will ultimately result in a much smaller active military force with more reliance upon citizen soldiers.

The leadership of the Total Force envisioned a philosophy demanding that all units train for the first

battle of the next war. To do so, the Army developed programs concentrating on unit training at the level organized in a battle focused environment that allows commanders to face the stress of combat without its casualties.

Realizing that, to be successful, the Total Force must train as it will fight, the Army implemented training doctrine aimed at ensuring it is prepared for the next battle. However, while doing so, it developed programs geared to improving the training of AC units at the expense of RC units. One of those programs, the CTC, has greatly improved the readiness of units that are trained and evaluated there. Unfortunately, the CTCs are used by AC units almost to the exclusion of the National Guard.

In a time of relative peace and declining resources, the CTCs were designed to provide the combat units of the Total Force with training experiences replicating actual combat. Leaders of the today's Army apparently feel that the training and evaluation of combat units under realistic conditions to the level organized is important enough to offset the enormous costs of AC unit rotations to the CTCs.

If the National Guard is to continue as one of the majority partners in the Total Force, a Total Force long range training strategy must be developed. That strategy must identify the differences between AC and RC training

conditions. It must allow National Guard commanders to train to the level organized and assess their unit's training status. For, without that assessment, training conducted during the limited periods of IDT and AT could well be focused on the wrong finish line.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

1. Starship Troopers, Heinlein, Robert A. 1959, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, N. Y., p.121.
2. DA Pamphlet 20-212, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945 (November 1955), p.696.
3. FM 25-100, p.i.
4. FM 25-100, p.1-1.
5. FM 100-5, Operations (May 1986), p.2.
6. FM 100-1, The Army (August 1986), p.7.
7. "Army, Air Guard aid 'Just Cause'" On Guard (February 1990), p.7.
8. Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve FY 89 (1988), A Statement of Major General William F. Ward before the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, Second Session, 100th Congress., p.D-3.
9. Ibid, pgs. D-4 through D-20.
10. Army Training: Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance Reservists' Training, Feb 89 (Draft), Government Accounting Office, p.14.
11. FM 25-100, p.1-9.
12. FM 25-100, p.3-5.
13. FM 25-100, p.3-9.
14. FM 25-100, p.5-1.
15. FORSCOM/NGB 350-2, p.3.
16. A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard, (July 1986) Wright, Robert K., Jr., and Hylton-Greene, Renee, National Guard Bureau, Washington, p.35.
17. Citizens As Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard, Cooper, Jerry M., The North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, 1986, Fargo, pgs.220-235.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES
(continued)

18. A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard, (July 1986) Wright, Robert K., Jr. and Hylton-Greene, Renee, National Guard Bureau, Washington, p.36.
19. "Mobilization 1940," McGlasson, W.D., National Guard magazine, September 1980.
20. Wright and Hylton-Greene, pgs 39-40.
21. White Paper, "Total Force Training: Can Double Standards Meet Tomorrow's Challenge?" Maj Livingston, N. B., III (8 December 1989), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, p.2.
22. Deciding What Has to Be Done General William E. DePuy and the 1970 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Herbert, Paul H., Leavenworth Papers, July 1988, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS, p7.
23. Ibid, p.95-107. (Because it dwelt with the defense as the stronger form of combat, the 1976 version caused a furor among military and political leaders.)
24. History of the Militia and the National Guard, (1983) Mahon, John K., Macmillian Publishing Co., New York, p.209.
25. After-action reports in the classified section of the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Ft. Leavenworth.
26. Mahon, p.236.
27. Ibid, p.243.
28. Ibid, p.243.
29. Again, after-action reports are available in CARL.
30. Interview with LTC Ronald Wurtele, National Guard Advisor to the Combined Arms Training Activity, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 1990.
31. Interviews with CPT Ladig, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Ft. Leavenworth; MAJ Balliett, BCTP, Ft. Leavenworth; and, Mr. Corby, NTC, Ft. Irwin (February 1990).
32. The six National Guard brigades are ROUNDOUT to the 4th, 5th, and 24th Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 10th Mountain Divisions. The 1st Cav and 6th ID also have separate Guard infantry battalions that are ROUNDOUT to them.

CHAPTER THREE

NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES

...to limit us just to company-level training is wrong. Training is progressive. Following individual training, you train at the squad or platoon level, then the company level, then at battalion and brigade levels and finally at division level.¹

-Major General Donald Burdick¹

BACKGROUND

Moving into the Total Force era, the National Guard found itself in the untenable position of fighting an uphill battle to become an equal member of the national military team. Federal policies allowed new equipment to be purchased for the AC while older, antiquated equipment was passed down to the National Guard. That and a military establishment recovering from the effects of the draft that had supported Vietnam policies, forced National Guard leaders to look for new ways to train to meet the demands placed on them by Congress.

In one of the earliest initiatives to incorporate National Guard units into AC training programs, Arizona's 258th Infantry Battalion and the Second Brigade of California's 40th Armored Division played key roles in the U.S. Strike Command's 17-30 May 1964 annual DESERT STRIKE

exercise. During that exercise, which pitted the forces of the neighboring imaginary nations of Calonia and Nezona in a battle over water rights and ownership of dams on the Colorado River, those National Guard units were placed on opposing sides. The objectives of the exercise included training participants in the conduct of joint operations and evaluating those operations. As U. S. Strike Command was an Air Force headquarters, the exercise effectively evaluated the ability of various components of the Army to work with one another while evaluating the Army's ability to work jointly with the Air Force.

The 258th was part of the supporting attack of Nezona under control of III Corps; the 2nd Brigade of the 40th Division was part of the Calonia reserves released to XVIII Corps as part of its counterattack force.² In his comments during the critique of the operation, Lieutenant General C. B. Westover, commander of Joint Task Force MOJAVE to which the 2nd Brigade of the 40th Division was attached, made laudable comments about the accomplishments of units of the California National Guard.

He even went so far as to say that they were a forerunner in a number of tactical achievements. Those comments are especially important when one researches the execution of the exercise and finds that the 2nd of the 40th

operated deep in the enemy's rear alongside units of the 101st Airborne Division.³

So credible was their performance in the barren strip of wasteland bordering the Colorado River in Southern California that some long-closed resourcing and training doors were opened to other National Guard units.⁴ Because of their ability to maintain the same tactical pace and undergo the same training stresses as their AC counterparts, Army officials once again began looking upon the National Guard as a credible combat partner. Soon National Guard units were training in cooperation with AC units in a wide array of exercises.

Overseas (OCONUS) training for the National Guard began in 1965 when the 122nd Quartermaster Command, Alabama National Guard, deployed to France.⁵ Since that first overseas training deployment, National Guard units have been involved in most major OCONUS training exercises, and have even developed OCONUS training exercises designed especially for National Guard units.

Examples of the impact OCONUS training now has on National Guard readiness can be found in the following statistics. During FY87, 34,000 National Guardsmen and members of the USAR deployed overseas for training in support of their wartime missions. In FY88, 41,000 deployed overseas for training with 5,000 training in Germany during

REFORGER, 4,500 in Korea during Team Spirit, and 9,000 training in Central America.®

In addition to these training events, National Guard leaders have zealously moved into other international training arenas to certify the Guard's ability to perform its wartime missions through involvement with nation building programs in Central America and other regions of the world.

That action has caused controversy within the governments of several states whose governors don't support our national policies or are concerned with states rights and their control of the National Guard. So provoking are the memories of Vietnam and the possibility of another such conflict that several governors have even refused to allow their National Guard to deploy to Central America for training.

As this paper is being written, results of several court cases are pending. The issue is so volatile that it has caused considerable apprehension within DA.7 To further cloud the issue, NGB and the Adjutants General have taken a stand against those governors and are proceeding as friends of the court. This political problem and its effects on training will be discussed briefly later in this paper.

Earlier in this paper, the annual training program of a National Guard unit was defined as consisting of thirty-nine days of IDT and AT. That time fulfills the minimum program mandated by the National Defense Act of 1916. It is not, however, what really happens in most National Guard units. They must participate in more training activities than the allotted thirty-nine days to train to accomplish CAPSTONE assigned missions.

In a presentation to senior leaders of the Army during a 1985 meeting convened by General John A. Wickham, Chief of Staff of the Army, MG Joseph W. Griffin, the Adjutant General of Georgia, stated:

I would like to dispel any notion that the Guard of today trains strictly within the confines of the 39 training days a year...Guard officers and enlisted personnel train an average of 66 and 45 days, respectively, in 1984. This doesn't include what we call 'LADS,' Love and Devotion: unpaid time given to the Guard.*

While those times seem might abnormally high and could be construed as only one state's answer to the training problem, they are a nationwide fact. Throughout the National Guard, Guardsmen are devoting more time than allotted to preparing for combat.

LTG Temple echoed the same sentiments when, in 1989, he stated:

Officer and noncommissioned leaders throughout the Army Guard have been faced with unprecedented demands on their time, working well beyond regularly scheduled drill periods to ensure that their units are prepared for and indeed conduct meaningful training. Although the average Guard-member may train no more than 39 days each year, on an average, the officers train from 80 to 90 days per year while the noncommissioned officers corps member averages from 40 to 45 days of training each year.²

These nationwide increases in funded time devoted to leader development training are a direct result of the additional missions assigned to the National Guard through the Total Force and CAPSTONE. They are also a credit to the tremendous willpower and dedication of National Guardsmen. Ultimately, however, they are an indication of the amount of training time the National Guard needs to attain success as an equal member of today's Total Force.

This chapter will look at ways National Guard leaders have attempted to train to the level organized in support of their CAPSTONE missions. Some are Army-wide while some were devised by senior National Guard commanders to offset perceived training shortfalls identified from years of experience and assessment.

REFORGER AND TEAM SPIRIT

Two OCONUS training exercises have been developed to project national power and exercise the Army's ability to react to threats to US interests on the European continent

and in Korea. They are also used to provide OCONUS training opportunities necessary for National Guard units to meet the requirements of CAPSTONE.

The oldest of the two, the return of forces to Europe or REFORGER, began in 1969. It was initially developed as an AC exercise to verify our ability to return forces to Europe in the event of hostilities. However, it has grown until, by the winter of 1986, some 8,000 Guardsmen including the entire 32nd Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), Wisconsin National Guard, trained as major partners.¹⁰

The 1986 REFORGER deployment of the 32nd with all its personnel and equipment was unique as it was the first time since WWII that so large a National Guard unit had deployed to Europe. It was also a high point of large unit National Guard training as the size of Guard units deploying on REFORGER have diminished since.

Throughout the evolving history of National Guard involvement with REFORGER exercises, units from individual companies to the 45th Infantry Brigade, Oklahoma National Guard, have participated. Their successes prove the National Guard's ability to mobilize, deploy, and fight alongside its AC counterparts. With most of the M+10 essential force in the RC, continued National Guard deployments in support of REFORGER are necessary to show the National Guard is a viable part of the defense of NATO.¹¹

Following the successes of REFORGER, the first combined U.S. and Korean exercise, Team Spirit, was held in Korea in 1975. Since the early years of Team Spirit, National Guard combat, CS, and CSS units have participated and proven that they can deploy to and fight in Korea alongside their AC counterparts.

However, war is not confined to the European and Korean theaters and, in keeping with its worldwide responsibilities to the defense of America and its allies, the National Guard has to be prepared for contingencies in other potential combat zones around the world. For that reason, National Guard leaders have looked to other DA sponsored or Guard initiated training opportunities.

RECENT CENTRAL AMERICAN EXPERIENCES

From November 1987 to June 1988 7,500 National Guardsmen built 11.5 kilometers of road in the Yoro province of north-central Honduras and rebuilt 2.5 kilometers of road from Blazing Trails 87.¹²

While engineers completed the thirty mile farm-to-market road that was begun by AC units in 1985, National Guard medical personnel also provided much needed medical support to local residents while construction

engineers and volunteers assisted with the construction of schools and other buildings.

That was only one of many National Guard AT rotations into Central America to accomplish nation building projects. Additionally, National Guard combat, CS, and CSS units have trained Central American counterparts while experiencing training in a tropical environment themselves. In all, more than 65,000 National Guardsmen and Army Reservists have assisted their AC counterparts in accomplishing their nation building missions or have deployed to Central America to accomplish battle focused training.

In FY89 alone, more than 8,000 soldiers from twenty-one states trained in Central America as part of America's nation building program.¹³ Like no other OCONUS training of National Guardsmen, those rotations to Central America have unleashed a furor of legal activity that further defines the president's right to call on National Guardsmen to train in foreign lands or assist the AC in mission accomplishment.

For the first time since Vietnam, due to the volatility of national policy concerning the region, leaders in the public and private sectors have voiced their opinions about National Guard units training in areas where they have no CAPSTONE alignments. Yet as the threat from the Warsaw

Pact continues to recede in Central Europe, all of the military services recognize that the war for which they've trained these past forty years is very unlikely to be the war they actually had to train to fight.¹⁴

As a result, the CAPSTONE mission of National Guard units, priority that it might have been, could well take second place to contingency missions to help counter insurgencies against guerilla-style opponents in Third World nations around the globe. Unfortunately, the stigma of our national policies concerning the Army of yesterday fighting an unconventional war in Southeast Asia linger today as we shape and train the force of the future.

The importance of National Guard OCONUS training in Central America was, however, best summed up by Brigadier General Marc A. Cisneros, then commander of U.S. Army South, when he said:

The National Guard has been a lifesaver for us. I consider them a mainstay of our exercise program here.¹⁵

ARCTIC TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES

Except for the WWII Battle of Attu, an island of the Alaskan Aleutian chain, America has never faced a foe in an arctic or subarctic environment. Russian history after WWI, Korean, and our own lessons teach us that a nation bounded

as we are by arctic regions rich in oil, minerals and other natural resources should prepare for combat there.¹⁶

Having lived through the Battle of Attu, and understanding the need for qualified "Arctic Warriors," members of the unique Scout Battalions of the Alaskan National Guard not only prepare for their wartime missions but also train the Army's elite special operations forces sent to Alaska periodically for arctic training.

Combat training is, however, secondary to the Scout's mission of watching for any air, sea and land military operations from the Soviet mainland just thirty-seven miles west of the northern border of the United States.¹⁷ So important is arctic military training that the Alaska National Guard's biennial BRIM FROST exercise has been adapted for annual use by the 6th Infantry Division (Light).

Understanding the need for similar arctic training opportunities, the Minnesota National Guard and the Norwegian Home Guard began a joint exchange of units in 1974.¹⁸ The benefits of such an exchange are far reaching when one considers that the training exercise brings together two allies who might one day have to fight alongside one another in that frozen European northland.

So successful has National Guard training in Norway become that light infantrymen from the 29th Infantry

Division, Virginia National Guard, participated in NORTHERN WEDDING, a joint NATO exercise conducted during the summer months of 1986.¹² And, other state National Guard units have opted for OCONUS training in mountain and arctic environments replicating the areas where they will be expected to fight. In each case, the leadership of those units attempted to train to the level organized under realistic conditions to take advantage of those rare opportunities.

FIREX 88

Understanding that OCONUS training exercises were becoming too expensive and that simulations alone don't provide the commander with adequate information from which to make an organizational assessment, Major General James L. Miller, then I Corps Artillery Commander, had a vision of conducting the largest live-fire exercise since WWII in the desert of Utah. That vision became reality as FIREX 88, a live fire maneuver exercise at the level I Corps Artillery was organized.

Conceived during an I Corps Artillery deployment to Korea, the exercise was designed to take the place of costly OCONUS deployments for training and to prove that AC and RC field artillery and CSS units from the three basic components could mobilize, deploy, and fight alongside one

another in support of I Corps CAPSTONE missions, much like the earlier DESERT STRIKE in 1964. FIREX eventually became more than just a fire support exercise. It was essentially 'an exercise for all branches, medical, postal, ordnance, maintenance, engineers, air cavalry, military police, aviation, and so on.'²⁰

Coordination between components and branches was integral to successful operations. Since I Corps consists predominantly of Guardsmen and Reservists from all over the country, it became the standard for corps level synchronization training to the level organized within I Corps and is being evaluated today for relevance to future National Guard training.

During the continuous three-week exercise involving fourteen artillery battalions and approximately 17,000 soldiers and airmen from thirty-three states across the nation²¹, units of I Corps Artillery and I Corps COSCOM, supported by Air Force and Army fighter and support aircraft, fired over 17,000 rounds of artillery ammunition in their effort to practice fire support, logistics, and rear area operations.²² The terrain and distances over which the exercise was played replicated that which the COSCOM and CORPS Artillery could expect to operate within during war.

Another primary reason for creating such a large exercise was the interaction that would be afforded individual units as they came together as part of the corps. MG Miller also wanted to evaluate the corps logistics system's ability to support corps artillery operations over the distances I Corps could expect to fight in support of its CAPSTONE mission while identifying any synchronization weaknesses.

Summing up his reasons for insisting that the I Corps system be stressed, MG Miller told the author:

You can simulate all you want, and get pretty good at your job. But, if you never get into the field, smell the cordite, and run the machine until its wheels fall off, you'll never know if the thing works. Simulations don't show the results of soldier fatigue, equipment failure, mud or heat, or just 'Murphy.' That's what FIREX was all about.²³

An exercise such as FIREX 88 couldn't have been successful without excellent staff planning. That lesson is as basic to present training doctrine and large unit training as it was when first identified after WWII. Adding to the necessity for staff training, FM 71-100, Division Operations, states that 'the AirLand Battle is won or lost by the division integrated fight.'²⁴

Reiterating the importance of integrating the pieces of a unit into the whole before facing the enemy, FM 100-5

requires that "units and headquarters that will fight together in teams, task forces, or larger units should train together routinely."²⁵ FIREX 88 fulfilled that mandate and proved I Corps Artillery could operate at the level organized while providing training at that level.

CABIN CYCLONE VII

Echoing the sentiments of both FM 71-100 and FM 100-5, and understanding the necessity for training his staff as it would be expected to fight, Major General Kenneth W. Himself, the former Commander of the 38th Infantry Division, Indiana National Guard who conducted his own large unit staff training exercise, CABIN CYCLONE VII, said:

A CPX is one of the most effective methods of exercising staffs at all levels in order that they may be sufficiently trained to coordinate the tactical and strategic efforts of their troops, thus insuring success in combat.²⁶

CABIN CYCLONE IV was a training exercise, not a test. The exercise goals allowed the division staff to perfect their staff estimate and order production functions while improving the effectiveness of division standing operating procedures (SOPs).

Additionally, the exercise gave MG Himself an opportunity to assess his staff's proficiency across the

spectrum of battlefield operating systems and plan future training. To accomplish that, MG Himsel was the primary trainer supported by the 75th Maneuver Area Command (MAC), a USAR unit headquarters in Houston, Texas.

COMBAT DIVISION REFRESHER COURSE (CDRC)

FIREX 88 and CABIN CYCLONE VII were not anomalies. Brigadier General J. Binford Peay, Deputy Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), also realized the problems of training National Guard divisions to the level organized. Acting from experience with problems associated with training National Guard units gained while on the staff of I Corps, he issued directives calling for a new direction for CGSC's Combat Division Refresher Course (CDRC).

BG Peay's directives called for teams of CGSC instructors to write a European scenario aimed at improving a division staff's ability to make an estimate of a situation and issue the necessary orders to execute combat operations. The ten instructor teams were teamed with the ten National Guard division commanders and charged with assisting the commander to train his staff. The teams worked with the divisions before the staffs came together at Ft. Leavenworth in March, 1989 for a three-day command

post exercise (CPX) similar to the one MG Himsel had orchestrated in Indianapolis.²⁷

The objective of CDRC was not to evaluate the division staff's proficiency but to allow the division commander to coach his staff while providing them with a training vehicle to train to the level the staff is organized. From CDRC, division commanders can assess their staff's proficiency and develop future training programs to correct staff weaknesses before incorporating other pieces of the division into an integrated division-level exercise.

CDRC is, therefore, another attempt at training National Guard units to the level organized while preparing them to receive the best experience possible when they rotate to BCTP for their evaluated CPX.

SANTA FE AND WAGON WHEEL

Also realizing that units never develop collective capabilities unless they exercise and maneuver at the level they are organized, MG Paul G. Collins, Commander, 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized) of the Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Nebraska National Guard, charged his Chief of Staff, Colonel Joseph H. Guerrin, with developing a training program that ensured the division was capable of performing its wartime mission. The guideline MG Collins wanted COL Guerrin to follow was that, to inculcate combined arms

training into the division, the 35th staff had to see the battle as it occurred and experience the span of control necessary to synchronize operations.

He also wanted the training program to build a team out of the division which is made up of units in several states, reporting to multiple TAGs and subordinate staffs. MG Collins wanted a "crawl, walk, run" program that stimulated multi-echelon training and caused the integration of all battlefield operating systems (BOS) to occur naturally. With that guidance, Col Guerrin developed a training program that initially consists of four CPXs annually.^{2*}

The program begins with CDRC as it is initiated and controlled by CGSC. Using MG Collins' assessment from that exercise, the 35th Division moves to its first internal benchmark, Operation Rainfire. Rainfire is a division staff command and control exercise (STAFEX) conducted during AT at Pinon Canyon, Colorado. It is conducted in conjunction with the AT of some 8,000 soldiers of the division. Thus, the division staff must continue to train itself under MG Collins tutelage while executing its daily AT tactical and support missions.

After AT, the next division training benchmark is Operation Santa Fe. Santa Fe is a brigade and division staff CPX conducted much like a BCTP Warfighter. To assist

the division with the flow of the CPX, external Joint Exercise Simulation System (JESS) computer support of the National Simulation Center is used. Santa Fe is conducted with the division staff and two brigade staffs in the field at their home stations linked to the 75th Maneuver Area Command acting as CPX controller from Houston, Texas. (For example, the 149th Infantry and 35th Aviation Brigades in Frankfort, KY were the player units last year.) The 75th also acts as the corps headquarters, the Field Artillery brigade supporting the division, and the adjacent units.²⁹

Following Santa Fe, the 35th moves to its last exercise, Wagon Wheel. Wagon Wheel is as close to a BCTP Warfighter exercise as a division staff can come without actually undergoing that training. The only major deviation from a BCTP Warfighter exercise is that the external observer/controllers are not present and the length of training is different.

Wagon Wheel is conducted over a long IDT weekend known as a MUTA 5.³⁰ The division commander and his Senior Army Advisor are the major trainers of the division with computer and personnel support from the National Simulation Center and CGSC.³¹

During Wagon Wheel adequate subordinate units are linked to the division to provide enough stress for staff and subordinate commanders to feel the fog of battle.

Logistics and fire support systems are stressed to the limit JESS allows. Unlike FIREX 88, no units actually maneuver, no live rounds are fired, and no materiel is handled by logistics elements. Instead, staffs at the different levels of command are stressed as they control simulated combat operations.

Though Wagon Wheel is probably one of the most important staff training exercises of the year. COL Guerrin expressed his feelings about such exercise when he said:

I don't know that you have to put the whole division in the field but you have to put a significant portion in the field to test the span of control, logistics, etc. How do you train Company A of the MSB for ration distribution without going to the field and facing the full division workload?³²

SUMMARY

As the National Guard has taken on more complex and important roles in the security of US national interests abroad, senior leaders have begun to realize that the training objectives of National Guard units must mirror those of AC counterparts. At the same time, faced with increasing roles, different conditions, and decreasing resources, the competition between the AC and National Guard for training opportunities has reached a critical stage.

While commander of the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, General Jack Galvin told the story of

a conversation he had with one of his infantry company commanders.

As General Galvin tells it, he asked the young captain if his unit was ready to go to war. "Yes sir!" the young captain replied enthusiastically. "Well," said General Galvin, "How about the NTC; you ready to go to the NTC?" With having to face the results of that question, the young captain balked. "Well, sir," he hesitantly answered, "you better give me a little time to train up."³³

So important is a rotation to the NTC that combat commanders want "a little time to train up." However, in impending "come as you are wars" where little or no time will be available for preparing National Guard units, precious few rotations are afforded National Guard divisions and separate brigades.

That concern was echoed by LTG Temple during his parting thoughts to the National Guard upon his retirement earlier this year:

There will never be time or the opportunity to train divisions, brigades and battalions after mobilization. We will only have time to polish up the basic tasks.³⁴

Thus, the trend for National Guard commanders to develop their own separate training exercises at the level their units are organized.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

1. "MG Donald Burdick Discusses Army Guard Readiness," an interview with the editor of National Guard magazine, (January 1990), p.68.
2. After action reports of DESERT STRIKE are still classified. They are located in the classified section of CARL where readers can peruse them.
3. Joint Exercis DESERT STRIKE Critique Notes (U), HQ U.S. Strike Command, McDill Air Force Base, Florida (9 June 1964). While the contents of thereport are classified, readers will want to read LTG Westover's remarks.
4. "National Guard Training: Then and Now," McGlasson, W.D., National Guard (November 1988), p.31.
5. Ibid, p.31.
6. Ibid, p.31.
7. "The National Guard: Whose Guard Anyway?" Newland, S. A., Parameters (June 1988), p.40-50.
8. "The Guard of the 80's: 15 Years of Progress." MG Griffin, J. W., reprinted in National Guard (January 1986), p.25.
9. "Committed to Readiness: Army and Air Guard Fill Defense Role." LTG Temple, H. R., The Officer (February 1989), p.95.
10. "Red Arrow: Largest Overseas Deployment Goes Without a Hitch." Zweifel, D. A., National Guard (May 1986), p.16-19.
11. The M+10 force consists of the 10 division equivalents General Marshall promised NATO that America would provide in the event of a major incursion into Western Europe by Warsaw Pact forces. The essential force is that support infrastructure necessary to sustain combat operations of the 10 divisions.
12. "Building Strong Roads," Reider, R. W., Engineer (November 1988, p. 30.
13. "Latin America: U.S. Southern Command Offers Realistic Training." Collins, S. S. and Rhodes, G. R. National Guard (March 1990), p.24.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES
(continued)

14. "Training Today, Ready Tomorrow?" Kitfield, James, Government Executive (April 1990), p.28.
15. "Latin America: U.S. Southern Command Offers Realistic Training." Collins, S. S. and Rhodes, G. R. National Guard (March 1990), p.24.
16. The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944., Leavenworth Papers Number 17, Gebhardt, J. F. (September 1989), Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth.
17. "Alaskan Scouts." Moore, M., National Guard, (January 1989), p.57.
18. "Minnesota Vikings 'Conquer' Norway." Hildreth, R. C., National Guard, (April 1988), p.16.
19. "Virginians Participate in Blue Fox." Super, David National Guard, (May 1987), p.17.
20. "FIREX '88: Corps Level Training At Its Best." Reilly, Belinda, National Guard, (October 1988), p.34.
21. Ibid, p.31.
22. "FIREX 88: The Elephant Danced." Miller, R. O., Field Artillery, (April 1989), p.52.
23. From a series of discussions with MG James L. Miller (Utah National Guard) Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC-National Guard, September 1989 - Jnuary 1990.
24. Army Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations (Approved Final Draft 15 November 988), referred to hereafter as FM 71-100, p.1-1.
25. FM 100-5, p.6.
26. "Division CPX: Still Combat's Best Teaching Tool." Boine, Thomas, National Guard, (March 1986), p. 33.
27. The author was a member of one of the instructor teams, assisting the commander of the 29th Infantry Division (Light) of the Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and District of Columbia National Guards.

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES
(continued)

28. Series of interviews with Colonel Joseph H. Guerrin, Chief of Staff, 36th Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Wagon Wheel, 2-4 February 1990 and 20 March 1990.
29. "Final Report: Sante FE IV and Wagon Wheel 90." (20 February 1990), National Simulation Center, CATA, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, p.4.
30. A MUTA 5 is an IDT that normally begins on a Friday afternoon and runs continuously through Sunday afternoon. In the case of the 35th's Wagon Wheel, unit members reported Fridy afternoon with the actual exercise beginning at midnight and running continuously through Sunday afternoon. It was then followed by an after action review (AAR) of weekend activities conducted by the 35th's Senior Army Advisor.
31. "Exercise Wagon Wheel (CPX) 90: Exercise Directive." (8 Novmber 1989), Headquarters, 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Ft. Leavenworth, KS.
32. Interview with COL Guerrin, 20 March 1990.
33. "The Guard of the 80s." Griffin, J. W., National Guard, (January 1986), p.26.
34. "Parting Thoughts from the Chief," LTG Temple, H. R., National Guard, (January 1990), p.80.

CHAPTER FOUR

FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF ARMY TRAINING

Brigades and divisions must be prepared to deploy and fight as brigades and divisions. Therefore, they must be periodically exercised at the level organized and as they will fight. We cannot afford to train units piecemeal and then expect to employ them as a whole unit...

-Major General Donald Burdick¹

DIRECTIONS

'Train as you will fight' has come a long way. It is the wave upon which emerging doctrine rides. FM 25-100, Training the Force, has generated FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training: Battalion Level and Lower, which will appear soon. President Bush made a stand to improve training in the National Guard when, during his election campaign, he said:

A Bush administration...will prioritize the manning, training and equipment modernization of the National Guard and the Reserve Component not on the basis of their peacetime status as forces 'in reserve,' but on their direct and complete integration into the operational plans and missions of the nation.

Accepted doctrine states that we must concentrate on tough, realistic, and intellectually and physically challenging training to be successful on tomorrow's

battlefield.³ CAPSTONE warlans call for the National Guard to provide battalions, brigades and divisions to theater CINCs, not individual replacements. Therefore, Guard training must be focused on units at the level they are organized and expected to be employed on the battlefield. An examination of approved or emerging concepts will help determine whether the leadership of the Army actually expects to accomplish that level of training within the National Guard.

ARMY LONG RANGE TRAINING PLAN (ALRTP), 1989-2018

The ALRTP describes AC and RC training strategies for the near term (the Budget and POM years) and through the turn of the century to the year 2018. In conjunction with The Army Plan, it provides priority and resource allocation guidance projected twenty-eight years into the future.

One of the basic tenants of the ALRTP is that the Army's ability to mobilize will be of increasing importance.⁴ This is especially true as we move from a large standing Army, that is forward deployed, to a smaller reserve Army that is more mobilization oriented. In light of these facts, it is not a surprise that the ALRTP assumes the National Guard will be expected to perform its missions to Army standards.⁵

In concert with FM 25-100, the ALRTP requires that units train as they intend to fight while admonishing trainers to 'be willing to make significant changes in the way they do business.'*

Chapter 2, The Near-Term Strategies, of the ALRTP goes in two divergent directions by stipulating an AC training strategy and an RC strategy. Different AC and RC strategies are not uncommon and are usually necessary when one considers the differences in training environments between the two components. However, the two strategies outlined in ALRTP are different in ways that make one question whether or not 'train as you will fight' will be adhered to where the National Guard is concerned.

For example, AC CONUS-based mechanized and armor battalions are required to train at the NTC once during each commander's tour. AC CONUS-based non-mechanized battalions do the same at the JRTC. Supporting General Vuono's edict, corps and division commanders and their staffs are required to train using BCTP once during each commander's tour. Conversely, the ALRTP requires that only National Guard ROUNDOUT units rotate to the appropriate CTC.⁷

Certainly there are differences in the way National Guard and AC units recruit and retain personnel, train, and operate. Those different conditions do not, however, allow separate training objectives or standards for the two

components since National Guard units are expected to achieve the same measure of success on the battlefield as AC units. Their training objectives must, therefore, mirror those of AC units

As one examines the objectives of both AC and RC near-term plans outlined in the ALRTP, an important word is appended to the RC objectives: battalion. While the National Guard is expected to be able to accomplish its missions, an objective of the ALRTP is for the National Guard to attain battalion level proficiency on METL tasks.* No mention is made of training to the level organized above battalion except that RC units must demonstrate the 'capability to execute wartime missions, at level organized, prior to employment under gaining CAPSTONE command OPLAN.'*

What will be the outcome if National Guard brigades and divisions do not get an opportunity to train at the NTC? Is large unit maneuver training necessary for Guard units to demonstrate their capability to perform wartime missions?

Apparently, the leadership of the Army was concerned with the same question when they authorized execution of Nifty Nugget 1987. Review of the Guard and Reserve: A Framework for Action, a study produced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 1979, states that the US

response to a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO would require a 'come as you are' employment of both active and reserve forces. Concerned with that finding, Nifty Nugget was scheduled to ascertain whether or not the US could mobilize the large forces needed to counter such an incursion into Europe.

Just as OSD had concluded, Nifty Nugget confirmed that there will be little or no time available for post-mobilization manning, equipping, and training of the National Guard. It also confirmed that National Guard personnel will be deployed overseas whether ready or not, to offset the shortage of trained individuals in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).¹⁰ Conclusions such as that make one wonder whether the Army intends to use the National Guard as complete units or use its personnel for individual replacements for AC units.

Moreover, historical precedent shows such as overnight deployment of untrained Reservists is not unusual. Marine Reservists called up during the Korean War found themselves embarked for the Inchon landings only two weeks after being activated.¹¹ Additionally, Army lessons, since WWII, show that Guardsmen are more likely to be used as individual replacements than employed as units.

Training to the level organized is a method of ensuring National Guard units are not found wanting if

called upon to execute their CAPSTONE or contingency wartime missions. As a side note: not providing Guard units the ability to train to the level organized is a covert method of ensuring adequate well-trained individual replacements are available during the early days of a conflict.

The necessity for training to the level organized was also recognized by the leadership of FORSCOM and NGB again in 1989 when they published FORSCOM/NGB Regulation 350-2 which states that "RC units can expect to be deployed in a come-as-you-are posture."¹² To prepare for that event, the regulation requires that National Guard units be able to deploy on schedule and successfully accomplish their priority wartime missions.¹³

Chapter 3 of the ALRTP, Long Range Strategies, embraces that philosophy by attempting to integrate AC and RC training strategies. In chapter 3, the Army leadership goes so far as to state that the Army must employ concepts and strategies with greater emphasis on RC forces. To do so, the ALRTP attempts to integrate AC and RC training where possible.¹⁴ However, NTC does not appear to be one of those possibilities.

There will also be a shift to developing regional National Guard training centers that provide Guard units the ability to maneuver and conduct their own live fire exercises. That shift is necessary if, as it appears, the

CTC's, training imperatives by AC standards for success on the battlefield, remain the domain of AC combat units and their National Guard ROUNDOUT elements. However, further analysis shows that these regional training centers, while allowing maneuver and live fire, are not designed to take the place of a CTC rotation.

ARMY TRAINING 2007 (DRAFT)

Published as TRADOC Pamphlet 350-4 (Draft), this document describes conceptual training strategies that will guide TRADOC into the 21st century. Herein is the first mention of an RC Training Development Strategy designed to accommodate the unique training environment of National Guard units.¹⁵ In the near-term, the strategy focuses National Guard training on priority CAPSTONE TPFDL's.¹⁶

In chapter 4, Forces Training, another new term enters the training arena: five-year training cycle, as opposed to the four-year training strategy of FM 25-100. The five-year training cycle is defined as a training program "for ARNG units to train division headquarters, maneuver elements of battalions and brigades, and corps slices."¹⁷ While vague in any further explanation of the five-year cycle, the pamphlet asserts that it will be supported in the mid-term period (the ten to fifteen years

following the last POM year) by a regional training program that emphasizes support of RC unit training.¹⁹

However, as one delves farther into the document, one again finds that ROUNDOUT units are the only National Guard units that will be programmed into CTCs until the year 2015²⁰. Included earlier in the planning cycle, however, is a plus up after 1993 from thirteen to thirty-nine annual rotations at the NTC without increasing National Guard rotations other than those for ROUNDOUT units.²⁰

Apparently, National Guard ROUNDOUT units must undergo the NTC training experience to prepare for combat with their parent AC organizations but National Guard divisions don't need the same realistic and stressful training experience.

Conversely, as BCTP expands its base after the year 2001, Army Training 2007 calls for the ten National Guard divisions to undergo a BCTP-like experience once every four years.²¹ The draft pamphlet describes a National Guard BCTP experience as 'consisting of a three to five-day decision exercise conducted at either the unit's homestation or Ft. Leavenworth followed by a nine-day CPX at the corps battle simulation center.'²² After reading that, one thinks of a CDRC-like exercise followed by a shortened AC BCTP Warfighter exercise, not a BCTP training event with similar objectives for both components.

Using the TRADOC philosophy, a BCTP experience for the commander and staff combined with individual and collective unit training to levels lower than organized during IDT and AT appear adequate to prepare an entire National Guard division for war.

TRADOC LONG-RANGE PLAN, FY 1991-2020

This document is the TRADOC integration effort to meet the challenges facing the Army of the future. It has a thirty year horizon and provides detailed planning guidance for developing long-range school plans. To assist the reader, the plan identifies the various planning periods.

Those are:

Long-Range Future: 2008-2020

Extended Planning Period: 1998-2007

POM Period: 1992-1997²³

Significant planning criteria affecting the National Guard include implementing BCTP at each level from brigade through echelons above corps (EAC) by remoting it worldwide during the 1998-2007 timeframe.²⁴ Again, the AC training plan for National Guard units appears to center on staff training while its plan for AC units integrates staff training with large unit maneuver at CTC's under conditions replicating combat.

Although seven chapters long, only one chapter is devoted to training. The other chapters address the marketing of TRADOC, mission support for TRADOC schools, TRADOC goals, and an explanation of doctrine development.

RC TRAINING DEVELOPMENT ACTION PLAN (RC TDAP)

Developed in 1989 by the now defunct Army Training Board, the RC TDAP is intended to be a single source document designed to improve the effectiveness of RC training. Additionally, it attempts to articulate the Army's RC training strategy. In doing so, it is actually a compilation of thirty-eight issues that the AC feels should be corrected to effect quality training in the RC. Noticeable in the RC TDAP is the identification of actions to be completed to solve training deficiencies or correct problem areas along with the assignment of responsible agencies to complete those actions.²⁵ The issues range from initial active duty training (IADT) disparities to the distribution of adequate training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS).

Here again, the theme of training to the level organized is sounded as a focus for National Guard training efforts. The RC TDAP ties training to the level organized to unit tactical training focused on the BOS and simulating, as closely as possible, the tempo, scope, and

uncertainty of the battlefield.²⁶ However, while making that declaration, the document, just as the previous ones, states that only National Guard ROUNDOUT units will rotate to the NTC.²⁷

How the Army Training Board planned to accomplish realistic training for National Guard units without providing an NTC-like training and evaluation vehicle is not explained. Interestingly, while limiting National Guard involvement at the NTC, the document declares that all nonmechanized battalions of the National Guard should rotate to the JRTC to gain battle-focused training at the same intensity as combat.²⁸

The RC TDAP attempts to correct National Guard training problems by educating AC members to the differences between the two components. For example, realizing that AC criteria and methods for evaluating National Guard units are not standardized, the RC TDAP charges TRADOC with developing schools to teach AC personnel how to evaluate National Guard units.²⁹ It makes no mention of the systemic problems within the 1-R reporting system discussed earlier in this paper.

While the RC TDAP is the primary source for actions designed to improve National Guard training, the single highest priority of the document is HQDA oversight of National Guard training.³⁰ That theme runs throughout the

document from NGB involvement on the Colonel Level Review and General Officer Steering Committees to the NGB points of contact (POC) with action responsibility.

The RC TDAP is an AC document that attempts to solve RC problems. It is, however, a good first step in the right direction.

ARNG PLAN, 1988-2002

In February 1986, NGB produced the The Army National Guard Plan, 1988-2002. The plan guides the development of National Guard units into the 21st century. It reiterates the DA objectives covered in Title 10 USC 3062(a) and AR 10-5 which outline that the federal purpose of the National Guard. The plan defines one of those objectives as "to provide combat ready units" to theater CINCs.³² It attempts to meet that objective by emphasizing National Guard unit training to the level organized, and further defines the level organized as "division, brigade, battalion, etc."³³

The ARNG Plan, keying on the importance of training to the level organized, amplifies NGB's desire to have its units rotate to the NTC by supporting the expansion of NTC to include National Guard brigade task force rotations during the POM period (1988-1992).³⁴ It also states that

NGB will "continue to provide maneuver battalions for training rotations at the NTC."³⁵

One could assume that NGB has met its goal of having Guard units train at NTC since National Guard ROUNDOUT brigades rotate to the NTC as part of their AC parent organization. The ARNG Plan does not, however, differentiate between rotations to the NTC for National Guard units that are ROUNDOUT to AC divisions and battalions of National Guard divisions and separate Guard brigades. By omitting the term "ROUNDOUT" when talking about National Guard rotations to the NTC, the ARNG Plan provides a different slant to strategies developed in NGB and those developed by DA.

The ARNG Plan further states, in bold italics, that National Guard units should conduct "division/brigade level exercises at AT" to test the entire unit.³⁶ Possibly, while NGB understands that the majority of its units are heavy, the AC hasn't connected the importance of NTC exercises or similar experiences to heavy Guard units.

The ARNG Plan charts NGB's aggregate force development desires for the future. However, as the main planning document in the field addressing future directions for the National Guard, the ARNG Plan does not go far enough. While calling for training to the level organized and specifying NTC rotations for all Guard units, the plan

does not explain how to train to the level organized or resource and conduct NTC training exercises.

NGB can only accomplish that training which Congress and DA resource. It has historically operated in an advisory capacity, not mandating specific training strategies to the various states. However, NGB can no longer afford to continue in a reactive mode.

NGB must become proactive with DA and the Congress when defining training requirements. Only by asserting the training requirements of National Guard units will it receive adequate training resources to train units to the level organized. It must also become more involved in the funding and management of long range training strategies of separate units that it will provide to theater CINCs, even if that involvement usurps the control of the STARCs.

Continuing to take a 'middle of the road' approach will ensure resources go to the AC or are used by STARCs for purposes different than for which originally designed. The 'middle of the road' approach will also ensure specific programs for National Guard training either go unfunded or take a lower precedence than AC programs.

SUMMARY

The honorable Mr. Stone, Secretary of the Army, and General Vuono explained to the 101st US Congress that:

The ultimate measure of readiness is whether soldiers, leaders, crews, and teams can perform as a unit to synchronize their efforts and project combat power at the decisive place and time in battle.³⁷

The Army, following that lead, has attempted to develop a training strategy that ensures the Total Force is capable of doing just that.

Each of the Army documents analyzed in this chapter has alluded to a National Guard training strategy. Yet, beyond a regurgitation of the ALRTP objectives used to focus RC training, that strategy was never clearly delineated.³⁸

While focusing on National Guard training, those objectives do not provide the platform for a concise training strategy for the National Guard as a whole. Instead, they lead to a system designed to train individual soldiers and leaders in job qualification and to prepare units to achieve proficiency on METL tasks. In essence, each of the Army documents, while supporting FM 25-100, fail to provide the training benchmarks through which a National Guard unit must pass to be considered ready for employment on the battlefield at the level organized.

The military tactician would call the strategy outlined in the various documents a campaign plan. While providing broad objectives, the strategy does not contain the concise direction and guidance necessary to implement a 'crawl-walk-run' course of action to take a National Guard unit from its present state of readiness to the end-state demanded by the CAPSTONE-gaining commander.

Though charging Army trainers to think differently in the future and to look for new or better ways to train, none of the Army documents examined provides new ideas for assisting National Guard units with training problems other than those identified in the RC TDAP. Those in themselves are an indication that, except for changes necessitated by technological advances, the Army expects to continue 'business as usual' in the arena of National Guard unit training.

What is evident throughout each of the Army documents is an integrated rationale that, since training differences exist, National Guard units that are scheduled to fight as separate entities will either not require the intense training opportunities provided in a rotation to NTC or will be able to get those opportunities after mobilization. The Army plans to protect its CTC program through the upcoming round of budget reductions. However, it appears as though the Army has never planned to include

elements of National Guard divisions and separate brigades in that program.

At the same time, NGB has not taken a definitive stand to produce the necessary guidance or demand equal treatment in the training arena. Once the Army Training Board identified the areas of training differences between the National Guard and the AC, every agency seemed to accept them as chasms that are too broad to close. Only the RC TDAP has attempted to reduce the effects of those training differences. In its development, NGB was a minor player instead of the lead agency.

FM 25-100's theme, train as you will fight, and other sources cited in this paper prove time will not be available after mobilization to train National Guard units to the level organized. Thus, since NTC is not available to National Guard units, they will be expected to get the same level of training at the regional training sites that the Army documents propose constructing.

Where an OPFOR for those training sites that is equal to the one AC divisions face at the CTCs will come from is not addressed. Without that OPFOR and the force-on-force opportunities it presents, how National Guard maneuver training will approximate the tempo and fog of battle is also omitted. Clearly, the Army intends that

Total Force units train as they expect to fight but only provides resources to ensure that AC units do so.

NGB, on the other hand, recognizes that all its units, like those of the AC, must train to the level organized under conditions approximating those expected to occur during combat. It cannot design and implement its own large unit training areas, however, without adequate funding from DA and the Congress. Thus, the disparity between NGB and DA planning documents.

Has the Army developed a clear and concise strategy for training National Guard units to the level organized? My research shows that, while addressing the issue and attempting to do so, it has not.

Has NGB defined such a strategy? To the extent that it has stated that National Guard units must train to the level organized and has identified standards for individual, leader, and unit training, yes. However, it has not provided explicit guidance to Adjutants General outlining the benchmark events that units must pass through to be trained to the level organized. Nor has it provided the resources for STARCs to execute such a program. Finally, it has no centralized strategy to ensure all National Guard units, regardless of state affiliation, develop standardized training programs.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

1. "The Guard: America's Army On Call." MG Burdick, Donald, Army, (October 1988), p.125.
- 2.
3. FM 25-100, p.1-4.
4. Army Long Range Training Plan 1989-2018, (21 July 1989), referred to hereafter as ALRTP, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, hereafter known as ALRTP, p.4.
5. Ibid, p.6.
6. Ibid, p.7.
7. Ibid, p.14.
8. Ibid, p.12.
9. Ibid, p.13.
10. "Mobilization for a European War: The Impact of Habeas Corpus." Bruinooge, Jon P., The Gurd and Reserve in the Total Force, edited by Wilson, Bennie J, National Defense University Publications, Washington, p.224.
11. Ibid, p.225.
12. FORSCOM/NGB 350-2, p.3.
13. Ibid, p.3.
14. ALRTP, p.22.
15. TRADOC Pamphlet 350-4, Army Training 2007 (Draft), (25 August 1989), U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, p.2-4.
16. Ibid, p.4-3.
17. Ibid, p.4-3.
18. Ibid, p.4-3.
19. Ibid, p. 4-3.
20. Ibid, p.4-9.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES
(continued)

21. Ibid, p.4-10.
22. Ibid, p.4-11.
23. TRADOC Long-Range Plan FY 1991-2020, (November 1988), U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, p.4-4.
24. Ibid, p.4-5.
25. Reserve Components Training Development Action plan, (18 May 1989), Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, p.1-1.
26. Ibid, p.2-5.
27. Ibid, p.2-5.
28. Ibid, p.2-5.
29. Ibid, p.6-8.
30. Trained and Ready: The United States Army Posture Statement FY 91 before Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, Second Session, 101st Congress, The Honorable Michael P. W. Stone and General Carl E. Vuono, p.VI-5.
31. RC TDAP, preface.
32. The Army National Guard Plan 1988-2002, (February 1986) National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., p.1.
33. Ibid, p.3.
34. Ibid, p.11.
35. Ibid, p.11.
36. Ibid, p.12.
37. Stone and Vuono, p.VI-1.
38. ALRTP, p.12.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

The National Guard is the foundation for the training, mobilization and transfer into the regular Army of divisions, regiments, and battalions.¹

-LTC I. Aleksandrov, Soviet Army

BACKGROUND

Is the Total Force concept working?

To answer that question, one need only look at the concerns the Soviets have about the Total Force and the effectiveness of our National Guard divisions, brigades, and battalions. During a recent visit to London, General Makhmut Gareev, a Soviet Deputy Chief of Staff, complained that "NATO's force ratio calculations of the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact do not include the (US) National Guard."² His main concern was that "the US National Guard level of preparedness can be higher than some of our cadre units."³

Thus, the National Guard's standing as a world class military organization is not questioned outside our national borders. That it has been a major player in the maintenance of peace in Europe and elsewhere is also undisputed in the

world arena. Considering the concerns of the Soviet Union and the changes taking place today, the Total Force concept has to be considered a success.

How, then, is it possible that, within our own society, we question the effectiveness of our National Guard and even go so far as to ensure it remains a second-class member of the Total Force team?

OLD WOUNDS

Historical rivalries have kept the Regular Army and the National Guard from melding together completely as a homogenous entity. Those rivalries go back to the Revolution. One of the more recent examples is a 1944 memorandum, once classified SECRET, from Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, then commander of the Army Ground Forces, to General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff. In that memorandum, LTG McNair stated:

One of the great lessons of the present war is that the National Guard, as organized before the war, contributed nothing to National Defense. On the other hand dependence on this component as a great part of the Initial Protective Force of our nation was a distinct threat to our safety....⁴

Ignoring the many successes of the eighteen National Guard divisions that were mobilized to fight in WWII and the

later AC divisions that were formed, trained and led by a cadre of National Guardsmen, LTG McNair went on to recommend that "the National Guard be dispensed with as a component of the Army of the United States."⁶ That was not a casual thought brought on by the hysteria of WWII. Shortly after WWI, General John J. Pershing had also said that "the National Guard never received the wholehearted support of the Regular Army during the (First) World War."⁶

In the years immediately following both WWI and WWII, as the nation faced the reorganization of its military forces to face the impending peace, the Regular Army supported legislative bills designed to institute universal military training (UMT) for all eligible males. Inherent in each of the actions placed before the Congress in 1919, 1948, and 1951 were large increases in the standing Army. None of the proposals left room in the national military establishment for the National Guard.⁷

Thus, set in the receding moments of world conflicts or whenever peace is breaking out everywhere, the age-old feelings the AC holds for the National Guard come to the front. Years after the failed UMT actions, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley voiced the same negative opinions about the National Guard as a viable force in maintaining the newly won peace that the Army had used to support those actions.⁸

The National Guard has not been without fault in the rivalry. Its antiquated system of naming general officers to command divisions based on their political connections rather than on tactical proficiency created many of the doubts and concerns voiced by Generals Bradley, McNair, and other regular officers. Coupled with the political appointments of division commanders, their long tenures in command--sometimes up to ten years--caused concerns both within and outside the National Guard.

Fortunately, both situations have been corrected so that, with minor exceptions, commanders and staff officers are now chosen for their positions based on military education and demonstrated proficiency for the new position, not political associations.

The fact remains, however, that during the short peace after WWII, when America needed a strong National Guard, the Guard was allowed to wither and die. Then, as America moved into Korea and Vietnam, the weaknesses within the National Guard--created by a lack of support from the Congress and the Regular Army--caused the AC to attempt to fight America's battles alone.

Secretary McNamara's 1963-68 attempted realignment of the National Guard was not the first such attempt. But, McNamara rekindled the fires of the longtime rivalries between the two components.* Since then, however, events

and systems have changed so that those old rivalries should have been set aside. With the adoption of the Total Force, the Congress moved the military to a point where it must learn to fight together, not one another. However, as the various components of the Total Force have struggled to learn to live with one another, the old rivalry, is "always there, under the surface like a ticking time bomb."¹⁰

TRAINING STRATEGIES

As the Army set about developing its training strategies to prepare for the next battle, it looked to the past to find the reasons for its successes. "Train as you will fight" became the theme for Army training. The strategies designed to support that theme call for realistic, stressful collective training that is focused on the first battle of the next war.

The Total Force training strategy demands that all units develop their METL from an assessment of their combat missions and a training program to support that list of essential combat tasks. Then, units must periodically undergo an Army Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP) evaluation to determine their level of training proficiency against that METL.

In 1986, AR 350-41, Army Forces Training, called the ARTEP the "cornerstone of unit training" and defined it as

'a complete program enabling commanders to evaluate and to develop collective training based on unit weaknesses, then train to overcome those weaknesses and reevaluate.'¹¹ The regulation goes on to state emphatically that an ARTEP is 'a training program and not a test.'¹²

In addition to the ARTEP, the Army created the CTC concept as a capstone training experience. The CTCs are touted as another training and evaluation opportunity and, again, not as a test. A rotation to one of the CTCs is designed to provide unit training at intensity levels approximating combat. It also provides the commander another training evaluation vehicle. A CTC rotation has become the new cornerstone of Army training relegating an ARTEP to the role of just another benchmark in a commander's training program.

The CTCs appear to complete the circle of battle-focused training that starts with METL development and ends with attaining combat proficiency. Unfortunately, throughout the life of the CTCs, they have been primarily used for training AC units and their ROUNDOUT National Guard elements. The AC has not opened them to National Guard units in general. Thus, 'train as you will fight' applies to the AC but not to the Total Force. National Guard units are not afforded the opportunity for large unit maneuver

training under combat conditions while pitted against a world class OPFOR.

All training strategy documents evaluated for this paper started out by explaining the differences between the training environments of the AC and the National Guard. Those differences were then invariably used to explain why National Guard training strategies must be different from AC strategies and must be directed at the environment Guard units face. Such a philosophy could result in training strategies that are not necessarily aimed at what is necessary to prepare National Guard units for combat.

The differences in the training environments of the two components and resource constraints are also cited as reasons why the National Guard cannot train using the CTCs and other AC programs. Thus, National Guard heavy units, while being mandated to train to the level organized as they will fight, have never been programmed to train at the NTC, the Army's premier training opportunity. Their training opportunities end with an ARTEP or some locally designed command training program that attempts to train them to the level organized under less than realistic conditions.

Citing the lack of large unit training areas for National Guard non-ROUNDOUT units, the NTC plans to allow National Guard units to train there during the rotations

vacated by AC force structure reductions--"the Army is looking for ways to justify the NTC."¹³

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, a decreased Soviet threat, reductions in the Army Budget, and a reduced force structure, the NTC will require additional justification to prevent budget and rotation reductions."¹⁴

The leadership of the Army realizes it will also "require additional justification to convince Congress and environmentalists to expand Ft. Irwin by 200,000 acres."¹⁵ Thus, to protect the NTC, the Army will allow the National Guard to train there to increase its probability of having the 200,000 acre NTC land expansion approved.¹⁶

In a recent issue of Army Times, Mr. Douglas Hansen, Director for Base Closure and Utilization, was quoted as stating:

As threats are reducing in Europe, we will be bringing forces home... (It's) possible that National Guard and Reserve forces may grow...and place a greater burden on public lands for training.¹⁷

That line of reasoning could be used to support increased National Guard involvement at the CTCs, which the Army is taking advantage of. It could also be used to support the development of completely separate National

Guard large unit maneuver areas designed to accommodate the unique training environment of National Guard units. The race for constrained resources is once again in full swing.

SUMMARY

Though supporting simulation-based training, the Army continues to support field training for rapid deployment battalions (JRTC), large unit training areas to train its armor and infantry brigade-sized forces (NTC), and combined classroom and field training to train division and corps staffs (BCTP). It even plans to use an additional 200,000 acres of land adjacent to the NTC to allow it to put entire brigades in a field training mode. Thus, along with new simulation technology and computer enhanced training opportunities, large unit field training, to tempos expected on the battlefield, is the cornerstone of AC strategies for developing unit proficiencies necessary for combat.

"Train as you will fight" is the wave of the future. If AC infantry and armor brigades and divisions must train that way to obtain proficiency with newer, more complex weapons systems, so must National Guard units equipped with the same systems or integrating into a battlefield designed around them. Beyond the AC lobbying effort designed to secure continued funding for the NTC,

either the CTCs are necessary for all combat units of the Total Force, or they are not necessary for any.

Likewise, any strategy developed for training National Guard units, large or small, to the level organized must first consider the combat mission requirements of the unit. Then, the strategy must ensure that Army standards are met through development of appropriate training objectives and an evaluation instrument. Those objectives should include benchmark events that will be used to train and evaluate both combat proficiency and unit deployment readiness. Finally, the environment in which training will be conducted comes into play only as the actual training experiences are designed to ensure training objectives are met.

Following that sequence, appropriate benchmarks will occur naturally within a four or five year training cycle at the pace of the unit being trained and within its particular training and resource constraints. Thus, the training strategy for an AC unit will differ from that of a National Guard unit with similar missions only in the time devoted to any particular training period, not to the training objectives necessary to accomplish assigned combat missions.

CONCLUSION

This paper looked at National Guard large unit training prior to WWII and the resulting performance of National Guard divisions during that war. While not the best example of training to the level organized, those early exercises were at least an attempt by the National Guard to prepare for war. They did, however, form the basis for most divisions of the Army that fought and won WWII.

The intercomponent rivalries of the past and the affect they had on National Guard training in the years between major conflicts was also examined. Though Congress instituted the Total Force concept in the early seventies, those rivalries are still present. They are not so blatant as they were immediately after WWII, Korea, and Vietnam. They are more sophisticated and have become inbred in both the AC and the National Guard. Until they and competition between the two components are eliminated, the Total Force concept will never mature into a reality.

Partial mobilization and the draft were also examined as they affected training of National Guard units to levels organized and as they fed the fires of past rivalries. Tying to partial mobilization, the Army's political maneuvers aimed at reducing the National Guard's involvement in national defense and its dependence on the

Guard to successfully fight future conflicts were also examined.

While this paper made no attempt to project the aftermath of those actions into the future, the reader will readily develop his own conclusions from the facts presented. An example of the rivalries, resource competition, and ego bolstering among components is evident in the ongoing fight for training rotations to the NTC.

FM 25-100, is directed to the AC and National Guard alike. Component differences are explained with standards for implementing the philosophy of the manual outlined. 'Train as you will fight' should guide everything a Total Force unit does. It should guide the development of training programs to ensure the integration of National Guard units into the AC wartime chain of command. It should also provide AC units the opportunity to integrate into the National Guard wartime chain of command.

CAPSTONE is designed to do just that. However, the preponderance of AC soldiers and leaders consider CAPSTONE an RC program. They understand that National Guard commanders have both a peacetime and wartime chain of command. The AC PreCommand Course (PCC) at Fort Leavenworth even teaches that as demonstrated by the VGT replicated at figure 5-1. What they do not understand is that they also have dual chains of command. Until the AC is provided


RESERVE COMPONENT METL DEVELOPMENT




PEACETIME COMMANDER



WARTIME COMMANDER



RC ALIGNED
UNIT COMMANDER



89-2220

Figure 5-1

CGSC PreCommand Course VGT--RC Aligned Unit Commander

training opportunities to integrate into National Guard CAPSTONE chains of command, integration of the components will not be complete.

Ultimately, the philosophy of FM 25-100 should provide every commander the opportunity to train his unit as it will be expected to fight and provide an assessment of his unit's readiness and ability to integrate into chains of command necessary for CINC warplan success. The CTCs have proven that the training must be based upon facing an actual foe under conditions approximating the battlefield.

To determine if that is occurring, training planning documents were examined to ascertain whether future directions of training will allow full integration of the National Guard into "train as you will fight" programs. The evidence does not support that integration. While discussing Total Force training strategies, those documents were myopic in vision.

If they were AC documents, they supported AC training programs and involved the National Guard as an afterthought or they discussed ways to overcome National Guard training problems within AC priorities. If they were National Guard documents, they addressed training at the aggregate while not overstepping the bounds of state control or alienating the AC.

The underlying question surrounding training to the level organized is: how will National Guard units be used in the next conflict? Doctrine says one thing; historical precedence and future directions hint at another.

Thus, with historical precedence blocking a clear path into the future, both the AC and NGB are hesitant to make a definitive step towards defining specific training strategies that will ensure Guard units are trained to the level organized. Without that training, America could find itself just as unprepared for the next conflict as it was at the beginning of each of our past conflicts.

CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES

1. "Soviet Perception of the Army National Guard." Vivian, Paul H., National Guard (January 1990), p.31.

2. Ibid. Paul H., p.30.

3. Ibid. p.30.

4. Memorandum, subject: "Recommendations on the Post-War National Guard," LTG McNair, L. J. (12 July 1944), Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Washington, D.C.

5. Ibid.

6. "Fall Offensive," Time (20 May 1944), p.65.

7. History of the Militia and the National Guard, Mahon, John K. (1983), Macmillian Publishing Co., New York, N.Y., pgs.169-216.

8. A General's Life, Bradley, Omar N. and Clay, Blair (1983), Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, N.Y., p.483.

9. In 1944, the Army proposed that eligible eighteen year old males undergo mandatory universal military training for one year to create a pool of qualified replacements. As part of that recommendation, the Army wanted to federalize some National Guard units to develop a permanent regular force of around 4,000,000. It planned to go along with LTG McNair's recommendation and disband the remainder of the National Guard as members of the Army and give them back to their governors with only a state mission.

10. Major General (Retired) F. S. Greenlief as told to Major General (Retired) Bruce Jacobs concerning an incident that took place during the Berlin Wall crisis. The story was related to the author and a group of National Guard officers attending the National Guard Brigade and Battalion Commanders Course by MG Jacobs in 1989.

11. Army Regulation 350-41, Army Forces Training (26 September 1986), referred to hereafter as AR 350-41, p.7.

12. AR 350-41, p.19.

13. Interview with COL Ralph B. Kelly, Senior ARNG Advisor to the National Training Center (NTC) and Fort Irwin (4 April 1990).

14. Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES
(continued)

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. "Appetite for Land Growing." Olsen, Ted, Army Times (9 April 1990), p.7.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

-A-

AC	Active Component
ADT	Active Duty for Training
ALO	Authorized Level of Organization
ALRTP	Army Long Range Training Plan
AMOPS	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System
AR	Army Regulation
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
AT	Annual Training

-B-

BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BOS	Battlefield Operating Systems

-C-

CDRC	Combat Division Refresher Course
CG	Commanding General
CINC	Commander in Chief
CMTC	Combat Maneuver Training Center
COMPO	Component
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
CONUSA	Continental United States Army
COSCOM	Corps Support Command
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
CTC	Combat Training Center

-D-

DAMPL	DA Master Priority List
DARC	District Area Command
DTA	Directed Training Association
DA	Department of the Army

-F-

FM	Field Manual
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTX	Field Training Exercise

-G-

GAO	Government Accounting Office
-----	------------------------------

-H-

HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
------	--------------------------------------

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
(continued)

-I-

IDT Inactive Duty Training

-J-

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JESS Joint Exercise Simulation System
JOPP Joint Operations Planning Procedure
JOPS Joint Operations Planning System
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPD Joint Strategic Planning document
JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System

-L-

LAD Latest Arrival Date
LUMA Large Unit Maneuver Area

-M-

MAC Maneuver Area Command
MSB Main Support Battalion
METL Mission Essential Task List
MOS Military Occupational Skill
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
MTP Mission Training Plan
MUTA Multiple Unit Training Assemblies

-N-

NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NCA National Command Authority
NGB National Guard Bureau
NTC National Training Center

-O-

OCONUS Outside the Continental United States
OER Officer Efficiency Report
OPLAN Operations Plan
OPFOR Opposing Forces

-P-

PLASSN Planning and Training Association
POM Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PSYOPS Psychological Operations

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
(continued)

-R-

RA	Regular Army
RC	Reserve Component

-S-

SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
STAFEX	Staff Command and Control Exercise
STARC	State Area Command

-T-

TADSS	Training Ammunition, Devices, Simulations, Simulators
TLO	Terminal Learning Objective
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPFDL	Time-Phased Forces Deployment List
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command

-U-

UMT	Universal Military Training
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USC	United States Code
USR	Unit Status Report
UTA	Unit Training Assembly

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Omar N. Bradley and Blair Clay, A General's Life, New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1983.
- Collins, Arthur S., Common Sense Training, San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978.
- Cooper, Jerry M., Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard, Fargo, N.D.: The North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, 1986.
- Blumenson, Martin, Salerno to Cassino, U.S. Army in World War II, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969.
- Gebhardt, J. F., The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944, Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1989.
- Heinlein, Robert A., Starship Troopers, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959.
- Herbert, Paul H., Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988.
- Charles E. Heller & William A. Stofft, ed., America's First Battles 1776-1965, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986.
- Renee Hylton-Greene and Robert K. Wright, Jr., A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard, Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1986.
- Mahon, John K., History of the Militia and the National Guard, New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., 1983.
- Wilson, Bennie J., ed., The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, Washington: National Defense University, 1985.
- Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1989.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(continued)

The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Norfolk: National Defense University, 1988.

REGULATIONS, PAMPHLETS, AND FIELD MANUALS

Army Regulation 11-30, CAPSTONE Program, 1985.

Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training, 1985.

Army Regulation 350-41, Army Forces Training, 1986.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945, 1955.

Field Manual 25-100, Training The Force, 1989.

Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations, 1988.

Field Manual 100-1, The Army, 1986.

Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1986.

FORSCOM Regulation 11-30, The Army CAPSTONE Program: Program Guidance, 1989.

FORSCOM/NGB Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training, 1989.

FORSCOM Regulation 350-4, Training Under CAPSTONE, 1988.

FORSCOM Pamphlet 135-3, Army National Guard and Army Reserve: Guide for the Analysis of Training Performance, 1989.

FORSCOM Pamphlet 360-2, FORCES Command, (undated).

TRADOC Pamphlet 350-4, Army Training 2007, 1989.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(continued)

REPORTS - PUBLISHED

ARMY'S ABILITY TO EXPAND TRAINING BASE UPON MOBILIZATION
REMAINS LIMITED, Washington: United States
Government Accounting Office, 1983.

Army Long Range Training Plan, 198902918, Washington:
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for operations
and Plans, 1989.

The Army National Guard Plan, 1988-2002, Washington:
National Guard Bureau, 1986.

Army Training: Management Initiatives Needed to Enhance
Reservists' Training, Feb 89, Washington:
Government Accounting Office, 1989.

EVALUATION REPORT OF MOBILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
CAPABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH EXERCISES PETITE
SPIRIT AND PROUD SPIRIT-80, Arlington: System
Research & Applications Corp., 1981.

HEARINGS ON H.R 2637 TO AMEND CHAPTER 39 OF TITLE 10, US
CODE, TO ENABLE THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE THE
INVOLUNTARY ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY OF SELECTED
RESERVISTS, FOR A LIMITED PERIOD, WHETHER OR NOT A
DECLARATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY HAS BEEN
DECLARED, Washington: U.S. Congress. House Armed
Services Committee.

Heymont, Irving, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT
MOBILIZATIONS AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. ARMY
RESERVE COMPONENTS, McLean, VA: Research Analysis
Corp., 1972.

Edward V. Karl and William Fedorochko, A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH TO THREE REAL WORLD PROBLEMS: NEAR TERM
READINESS, SURGE, AND MOBILIZATION, Washington:
National Defense University, Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, 1981.

MOBILIZATION IN THE KOREAN CONFLICT, Dunn Loring, VA:
Historical Evaluation and Research Organization,
1982.

Odegard, Donald C., NON-MOBILIZATION AND MOBILIZATION IN
THE VIETNAM WAR, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 1980.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(continued)

Panlus, John E., CAN THE US MOBILIZE TO MEET A SUSTAINED WAR IN EUROPE?, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1982.

Posture of the U. S. Army Reserve, FY 89, A Statement of Major General William F. Ward before the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, Second Session, 100th Congress, 1988.

PROVIDING GREATER FLEXIBILITY FOR THE ARMED FORCES IN ORDERING RESERVES TO ACTIVE DUTY, Washington: U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1980.

Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan, Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, 1989.

THE RESERVE FORCES IN THE 1990s, Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1980.

ROGAR: REVIEW OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, Washington: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1987.

Study of the 29th Infantry Brigade (separate), Hawaii National Guard, 1 January 1968-30 June 1970, HQ, U.S. Army Pacific, 1971.

TRADOC Long-Range Plan, FY 1991-2020, Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1989.

Trained and Ready: The United States Army Posture Statement FY 91 before Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, Second Session, 101st Congress, Washington: Office of the Secretary of the Army, 1990.

TRANSITION TO MOBILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST TEN DAYS, Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces; 1980

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(continued)

REPORTS - UNPUBLISHED

- Combined Arms Training Activity: National Simulation Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. "Final Report: Santa Fe IV and Wagon Wheel 90." 1980. (Typewritten.)
- Headquarters, 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Ft. Leavenworth, KS. "Exercise Wagon Wheel (CPX) 90: Exercise Directive." 1989. (Typewritten.)
- Livingston, Noyse B., "Total Force Training: Can Double Standards Meet Tomorrow's Challenge?" White Paper, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1989.

JOURNALS OR MAGAZINES

- Bodine, Thomas, "Division CPX: Still Combat's Best Teaching Tool." National Guard, March 1986.
- Burdick, Donald, "The Guard: America's Army On Call." Army, October 1988.
- S. S. Collins and G. R. Rhodes, "Latin America: U.S. Southern Command Offers Realistic Training." National Guard, March 1990.
- Griffin, J. W., "The Guard of the 80s: 15 Years of Progress." National Guard, January 1986.
- Hildreth, R. C., "Minnesota Vikings 'Conquer' Norway." National Guard, April 1988.
- Kitfield, James, "Training Today, Ready Tomorrow?" Government Executive, April 1990.
- McGlasson, W. D., "Mobilization 1940." National Guard, September 1980.
- McGlasson, W. D., "National Guard Training: Then and Now." National Guard, November 1988.
- Miller, R. O., "FIREX 88: The Elephant Danced." Field Artillery, April 1988.
- Moore, m., "Alaskan Scouts." National Guard, January 1989.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(continued)

- Newland, S. A., "The National Guard: Whose Guard Anyway?" Parameters, June 1988.
- Reider, R. W., "Building Strong Roads." Engineer, November 1988.
- Reilly, Belinda, "FIREX 88: Corps Level Training At Its Best." National Guard, October 1988.
- Super, David, "Virginians Participate in Blue Fox." National Guard, May 1987.
- Temple, H. R., "Committed to Readiness: Army and Air Guard Fill Defense Role." The Officer, February 1989.
- Temple, H. R., "Parting Thoughts from the Chief." National Guard, January 1980.
- Zweifel, D. A., "Red Arrow: Largest Overseas Deployment Goes Without a Hitch." National Guard, May 1986.
- _____, "MG Burdick Discusses Army Guard Readiness." National Guard, January 1990.
- _____, "Fall Offensive." Time, May 1944.

NEWSPAPERS

- "Appetite for Land Growing." Army Times, 9 April 1990.
- "Army, Air Guard aid 'Just Cause.'" On Guard, February 1990.

INTERVIEWS

- Droke, Arnold D. LTC, 45th Infantry Museum, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Interview: 23 January 1990.
- Guerrin, Joseph H., COL, Chief of Staff, 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Ft. Leavenworth, KS., Interview: A series of discussions between 2 February and 20 March 1990.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(continued)

Kelly, Ralph B., COL, Senior ARNG Advisor to the National Training Center (NTC) and Ft. Irwin, Ft. Irwin, CA., Interview: 4 April 1990.

Miller, James L., MG, Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC, Ft. Monroe, VA., Interview: A series of discussions between September 1989 and January 1990.

Norman, Craig E., COL, Senior Guard Advisor, Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., Interview: 22 August 1989.

Wurtele, Ronald, LTC, National Guard Advisor, Combined Arms Training Activity, Ft. Leavenworth, KS., Interview: 10 January 1990.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
2. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
3. National Guard Library
ATTN: Major General (Retired) Bruce Jacobs
1 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
4. Tennessee National Guard Library
ATTN: Major Lloyd Cross
Houston Barracks, P.O. Box 41502
Nashville, TN 37204-1501
5. Major General Donald Burdick
Director, Army National Guard
ATTN: NGB-ARZ
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-2500
6. Major General James L. Miller
Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC, National Guard
ATTN: ATTG-G
Ft. Monroe, VA 23651-5000
7. Major General Kenneth D. Himsel
Deputy Commanding General, FORSCOM, National Guard
ATTN: FCDC-NG
Ft. McPherson, GA 30330-6000
8. Colonel Kenneth D. Rhoades
Senior ARNG Advisor, TRADOC
Ft. Monroe, VA 23651-5000
9. COL Gary Adams
Senior ARNG Advisor, Combined Arms Center
ATTN: ATZL-RC
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
(continued)

- 10. Colonel Craig E. Norman
National Guard Bureau
ATTN: Force Structure Division
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-2500
- *11. LTC Robert B. James
Command Group
USACGSC
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
- *12. Dr. Jerry M. Cooper
Combat Studies Institute
USACGSC
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
- *13. MAJ Dwaine L. Crowson
Combat Studies Institute
USACGSC
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
- 14. LTC Michael Keohane
Center for Army Leadership
USACGSC
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-69005.

* MMAS Thesis Committee Members

VITA

The author, Anthony Leo Barnhill, is a Tennessee National Guardsman serving in Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Long Tour status (USC 672, Title 10).

In 1976, he received the degree of Bachelor of Science (BS) in Business Management from the University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma in Chickasha, Oklahoma. In 1982, he earned the Masters of Business Administration (MBA) degree from Tennessee Technological University in Cookeville, Tennessee. From 1985 until 1988, he was an Associate Professor at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks, Fairbanks, Alaska.

He is presently a member of the graduate faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, teaching Army training management doctrine. He is a veteran of Vietnam and a graduate of several advanced military schools. Among them are the Defense Language Institute, Inspector General Course, Mobilization and Deployment Planning Course, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the Command and General Staff College.

His thesis for the Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) degree was completed while serving on the faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College.