The Evolution of Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Abstract
This paper examines evolutionary dynamic behavior in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. It is first noted that the fitness of cooperation found in the best known simulation of this type, that by Robert Axelrod, stems from strategy set restrictions that altered Nash equilibrium behavior: Axelrod's restricted game has a continuum of pure cooperation equilibria and no pure defection equilibrium. New simulations, maintaining the finite game's equilibrium structure, are presented here. It is found that although cooperation is ultimately exploited and extinguished, dynamic paths can pseudo converge in ways that allow partial cooperation to flourish for extended periods of time. (Author) (kr)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA228414
Entities
People
- John H. Nachbar
Organizations
- RAND Corporation