



MORALITY AND PRAGMATISM
IN FOREIGN POLICY

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
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An Andrew R. Cecil Lecture on Moral Values in a Free Society, 12 November 1984, the University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas, by Dr. Eugene V. Rostow, Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Research Scholar, Yale University, and Distinguished Visiting Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy, National Defense University. To be published by the University of Texas in the collected Andrew R. Cecil Lectures.

It is an honor to participate in this distinguished lecture series, and a challenge to address its theme.

My thesis is simple but neither easy nor popular. It is that in the years ahead both our most earthy, pragmatic, and fundamental security interests as a nation and the moral imperatives of our culture demand that the goal of our foreign policy be the pursuit of a nearly universal regime of international peace. It is commonplace to suppose that morality and what is often called "Realpolitik" or "power politics" represent opposing principles for the conduct of foreign relations. The

circumstances of modern life require morality and Realpolitik to join hands. The paradox is not so shocking as it may appear. This is by no means the first time that democratic ideals have been reinforced by reality.

In a free and democratic society it is hardly necessary to point out that international peace is a moral idea. Throughout history a few romantic souls have loved war and praised it as ennobling, or preached holy war in the service of political or religious crusades. But free societies are committed to the conviction that peace among the states is good in itself, and the best possible environment for encouraging the achievement of other moral goals in social life. Under our moral code, this axiom fully justifies the profession of arms as we know it in the West.

In identifying international peace as one of the moral ideals of free societies, one should distinguish "peace" from what are loosely called "human rights." Of course the United States and other civilized societies should always encourage the universal acceptance and legal protection of human liberty. In the nature of things, they must; they do; and they will, unless they are cowed into a posture of ignoble silence on the subject by their fear of offending the leadership of the Soviet Union. But international peace is something quite different from antipathy to barbarism. To recall the language of the United Nations Charter, peace can be defined only as an effectively enforced rule of respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of all states, large and small, socialist or capitalist. In a world of states based on diverse social and political systems, the rule of peace is essential to the possibility of their peaceful co-existence.

If one examines the problem of our national security in the chilly perspective of power politics, one must reach the same conclusion. The United States and the other free societies have no alternative if they wish to survive: they must work together to achieve a general condition of peace throughout the world by seeing to it that the rules against aggression necessary to the peaceful cooperation of states are generally and reciprocally obeyed. The free world has more than enough power and potential power to achieve that end. But the free peoples will summon up the will to do so only when they are convinced it is their inescapable duty.

A policy of neutrality and isolation from entangling alliances served the United States reasonably well during the century between 1815 and 1917, when a state of world wide peace was maintained by the diplomatic Concert of Europe--not perfect peace by any means, but relative peace, and a great deal more peace than we have today. The memory of that period strongly appeals to the American mind. But isolationism and neutrality are no longer a feasible model for American foreign policy. Europe has lost the power to direct the orchestra. If the orchestra is to be led, we have to lead it. No other free state or combination of free states is capable of carrying out the task. The First and Second World Wars and their consequences; the dissolution of the old empires, except that of the Czars; the emergence of the Soviet Union, Japan, and China as major actors in world politics; and the adhesion of Germany and Japan to the Western Alliance system have transformed the dynamics of world power. At the same time, technological change--including the development of nuclear weapons and the position of the United States and the Soviet Union as nuclear superpowers--has revolutionized the art of war and made the world smaller, more volatile, more interdependent, more bipolar, and

infinitely more dangerous. Because of the state of the nuclear balance, the United States cannot escape from the task of leading the quest for peace. No other country can provide a deterrent counter weight to Soviet nuclear power.

As a result, considerations of self-preservation now compel the United States to adapt, reform, and carry out the foreign policy of coalition diplomacy through which it has sought for nearly forty years to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union. We cannot remind ourselves too often that wise diplomacy in the style of Churchill could have stopped Germany's drive for hegemony and prevented both the First and the Second World Wars. Confronting the Soviet Union's bid for dominion in a nuclear setting, the United States and its allies must not repeat the mistakes of the weak and dilatory Western leaders before 1914 and 1939. Their goal now can be nothing short of genuine peace. The First and Second World Wars did unspeakable damage to the fabric of civilization. The potentialities of nuclear war are manifestly worse.

Peace, whether domestic or international, is a complex idea. It involves much more than the absence of violence. It posits a relationship of tranquility among people and states such that no person and no state need fear its neighbors. Peace is a condition of organized society--of a society organized under a humane and effective system of law. Law can never be enforced without some invocation of force at the margins. But law cannot be imposed by force alone. It arises from the consent of the governed, not from the barrel of a gun. Law implies a social order, but law is much more than order. There can be order in tyrannical societies. The streets of the Soviet Union are quiet, and there is no open warfare between the Soviet Union and the states of central Europe and--except for Afghanistan--the states of central Asia.

But there is no peace within the Soviet Union, and no peace between the Soviet Union and its satellites and other neighbors. The notion of peace--the notion, that is, of the rule of law--denotes a society governed by a code of law derived from the customs and shared morality of the society and its culture--a law constantly growing in response to experience, and to the changing moral aspirations of the people it purports to govern.

Is the diverse and turbulent community of states in the world a "society" and a "culture" in the sense in which I have been using these words--a system of states bound together by an accepted and effectively enforced corpus of international law, or is it no more than a wilderness through which the wary pilgrim must progress fully armed, always prepared for the worst, and alert to danger from every quarter? Is the code of law to which the international state system is nominally committed, the Charter of the United Nations, "law" in any meaningful sense or simply a collection of philosophers' dreams?

I shall start my answer to these questions with the distinction between "ideas" and "beliefs" made by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset.

Beliefs . . . are all those things that we absolutely take for granted even though we don't think about them. We are so certain they exist and that they are just as we take them to be, that we never question them, but instead take them automatically into account in our behavior. When we go down the street we never try to walk through the walls of buildings; we automatically avoid bumping into them without even having to think: "Walls are

impenetrable." But there are also things and situations regarding which we find ourselves without a firm belief: we sometimes wonder whether certain things exist or not, whether they are one way or another. When this happens we have no alternative but to formulate an idea, an opinion regarding them. Ideas, then, are those "things" we consciously construct or elaborate because we do not believe in them. (emphasis in original)

Thus beliefs are part of the realm of intuition, and ideas are tools of thought--the tentative hypotheses we advance, test, and discard, one after another, as we try to think rationally about our experience.

In Ortega's terms, most people "believe" that there is a viable state system which functions effectively throughout the world in accordance with an accepted code of international law. This is necessarily the unstated premise behind proposals and resolutions one hears and reads about nearly every day suggesting that the United States withdraw its troops from Europe and Asia, call the Navy back to home ports, and return to the halcyon days of isolation and neutrality. After all, we can telephone to London or Tokyo, ski in Switzerland, and send letters or cargoes to Australia or even to Beijing. Planes and ships criss-cross the earth, satellites fly above it, their paths organized by international agreement and often regulated by international agencies or national agencies cooperating with great precision. We are accustomed to assume that the pattern of international organization we see and sense around us is immutable, and that it will continue to exist without regard to the behavior of the United States.

But the nearly universal belief in the continuity of the state system is an error. In its political structure, international society is as

fragile as a stage set. This century has witnessed the breakup of ancient empires and the disappearance of dynasties more than a thousand years old. Once we liberate our minds from the illusion of the super-obvious, it does not require much imagination to contemplate the circumstances under which the state system of our intuitive beliefs could be brought under Soviet control, and the evidence supporting the view that it is the goal of Soviet foreign policy to achieve that end. No doubt international arrangements for the control of the mail, aviation, and telecommunications would survive under a Pax Sovietica. But the state system would no longer be an association of the free and independent sovereignties which it is the goal of our policy to preserve.

The state system within which the United States and other free societies exist has evolved like other human institutions, and has ebbed and flowed many times since the fall of Rome. When we can bring ourselves to think about the state system at all, two visions jostle for dominance in our minds: the vision of the jungle, on the one hand, with the nations in a Hobbesian state of nature where clubs are trumps and, on the other, a vision of Utopian harmony where the relations among the nations are governed by pious respect for the rules of international law. Reality encompasses both elements in different combinations over time--the element of order, and that of anarchy. Sometimes one factor is in the ascendant, sometimes the other. Modern history is a counterpoint of these two themes, a persistent but not a sustained nor a uniformly successful effort to impose the rule of law on the nations, especially with regard to the international use of force. There can be no question as to which of these themes is in the ascendant today.

The modern state system emerged from the moral and intellectual climate of the Enlightenment, and from the experience

with war of the preceding two centuries. Its dominant idea is that the strongest states have a special responsibility for keeping the peace by preventing, confining, and limiting the practice of international war. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the diplomacy of the Victorian age proved to be both creative and important in shaping the modern state system and establishing its basic rules.

After Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, the state system began to take on its modern form. It was a balance of power system, maintained for a century by the cooperation and restraint of the European Great Powers. But the methods initiated by the Congress of Vienna failed tragically in 1914. The men who met at Versailles in 1919 tried to recreate the Vienna system through the League of Nations, but their effort lacked conviction, and the League collapsed within a few years.

After the Second World War, the yearning for peace expressed itself again, this time in San Francisco through the conference which adopted the United Nations Charter. In 1945, Western opinion was convinced that if only the great powers had enforced the rules of the League Covenant against aggression in Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, and the Rhineland, the Second World War would never have taken place.

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter categorically condemns the international use of force--"force," it should be noted, not "armed force" alone--against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, except where justified by the inherent and historic right of individual or collective self-defense, which is not qualified in any way by the Charter. Enforcement of these rules is the chief function of the Security Council, which, on paper at least, has far

more authority than any institution of the League. Its nominal power recalls that which Palmerston, Disraeli, and Bismarck exercised in fact during some of the diplomatic Congresses of the nineteenth century: the power to guide, direct, limit, cajole, conciliate, and, if necessary, to command and dispose of controversies which threaten the peace.

It would have been difficult to fulfill the hopes of the Charter even if the great powers had remained together after 1945. The old state system, after all, had tenacious habits of aggressive warfare, and the end of West European imperialism has given those habits new opportunities. But the Soviet Union withdrew from the alliance which won the Second World War once victory was assured, and since then moments of consensus among the Great Powers have been rare. Between the late nineteen-forties and the nineteen-seventies, the Western nations helped to enforce the rules of minimal world public order prescribed by the Charter quite effectively in their effort to contain Soviet expansion, but it has been obvious for the last fifteen years that the Charter of the United Nations is going the way of the Covenant of the League of Nations as an influence on the state system. At the moment, as the Secretary General of the United Nations warned in his 1983 Annual Report, the great danger facing the world is anarchy itself--a condition of affairs which has always led to war.

The root of the matter is that the Soviet Union has never accepted Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter as applicable to it. From the beginning of the Charter era, the Soviet Union has claimed for itself--and only for itself--the privilege of using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states which are not governed by socialist regimes, and indeed of using force even against socialist states if they are under the control of socialist heretics, revisionists or

schismatics, or if they show dangerous signs of backsliding to capitalism or democracy. One of the most familiar of the Soviet tactics of aggression is the international use of force in support of insurrections within a state--a violation of state sovereignty which international law has condemned as war for centuries.

This feature of the political landscape since 1945 is so familiar to us that we take it to be the order of nature, and assume that it has somehow been legitimized. But the special privilege of the Soviet Union to commit aggression at will cannot be legitimized under the Charter of the United Nations. Whether practiced by the Soviet Union or by any other state, aggression--including the international use for force to support revolutionary movements--breaches the basic rule of the Charter system: the integrity of states.

When pressed, Soviet diplomats or scholars say that for the Motherland of Socialism to obey Article 2(4) would be to give up its nature as a society and a state. To this, the only answer an American can offer is that the Soviet Union can preach the gospel of communism as much as it likes, but that in the nature of the state system, it cannot be allowed to propagate its faith with a sword.

The Soviet program of expansion, sedulously pursued since 1945, has gone too far. It threatens the most fundamental security interest of all other states--their interest in the world balance of power--and has, therefore, touched nerves of great sensitivity in countries as diverse as China, Japan, Egypt, the NATO countries, and the small nations of Southeast Asia. Unless the policy of Soviet expansion is stopped--and stopped soon--it will destroy the last vestiges of the rule against aggression the world has struggled so hard and so long to establish. The

state system cannot live by a double standard. Nations do not stand idly by and allow themselves to be nibbled to death, as Adlai Stevenson remarked a generation ago. This is not a result the Western nations want. Indeed, it is a result they fear profoundly. But it will come about, inevitably, if the Soviet Union continues on its present course.

Recognizing this state of affairs, the United States, its allies in NATO, Europe, Japan, and other Western countries have soberly and reluctantly begun to restore the military balance between the Soviet Union and the West. This giant step, indispensable as it is, is only half the job. The United States has not yet put forward a coherent vision of Western foreign policy--a vision to which our people and those of our allies and other friendly nations could rally.

The reason for our silence on that subject is not obscure: it is Vietnam. We have not seriously begun to recover from the shock of the Vietnam experience in defining the ends and means of our foreign policy; politicians and others are afraid of reviving the passions of the Vietnam period.

One can distinguish a number of positions beneath the surface of the American and Western debate about the future of American foreign policy.

An increasingly influential body of American opinion implicitly or explicitly supports the view that in a nuclear world, it should be the policy of the United States to defend only "Fortress America." Voices from every part of the American political spectrum tell us that the state of nuclear balance requires us to accept such a posture and the political impotence it implies. This would be a fatal mistake; our

foreign policy since the time of President Truman has not been dominated by altruism, but by the hard necessity of achieving and maintaining a worldwide balance of power. The revival of American isolationism would abandon that task.

Others suggest that we ignore the Third World, so turbulent and unsettled in the aftermath of Empire, and confine our security horizon to the NATO allies. This line of policy would also be suicidal for the United States and the other Western industrial democracies. The world is round, and the industrial democracies can be enveloped and neutralized from the Third World. And the Third World is full of raw materials, developing industries, and strategic choke points of great importance to sea and air transportation. The Third World matters a great deal. Both the First and Second World Wars were triggered by conflicts which began in the Third World. So did the innumerable wars which have occurred since 1945. Even if we exclude the moral factor from our foreign policies completely, there is no way for the industrial democracies to wash their hands of the Third World, and leave it sink into a morass of anarchy, famine, and Soviet domination.

Others believe we could survive by defending the NATO allies and Japan and our interests in the Middle East, or other areas which become critical to the balance of power in the context of Soviet campaigns of expansion. While this position comes closer to reality than proposals for a return to isolationism, a NATO-only policy, or a policy of ignoring the Third World, it too is fatally flawed. There are no parts of the Third World which could not become significant elements in the Soviet policy of expansion. Angola, South Yemen, and Afghanistan seem unbelievably remote from the United States. Yet they are all fronts in the worldwide struggle.

Finally, we must ask ourselves whether the national security interests of the United States in a nuclear world can be defended only by pressing for a policy against all or nearly all aggression and organizing regional coalitions to fulfill that principle.

Until these questions are clearly and firmly answered, there will be no general consensus in the West on what our armed forces are for, or on when and how they should be used. Consequently, the influence of our armed forces in deterring aggression will be uncertain.

Those pressing questions constitute the next great task of American leadership. How should they be answered? What are the vital security interests of the United States, the interests for which we should fight if necessary, in a world which has been transformed by revolutions in politics, technology, and demography?

It is a truism of history that the most fundamental national security interest of every nation committed to peace is the balance of power. The phrase embodies the oldest and most familiar idea in the lexicon of thought about international affairs, indeed, of thought about social organization more generally. The Constitution of the United States and many of our laws apply the balance of power principle directly to the problem of preventing any one center of government, any part of the country, or any social class from accumulating enough power to dominate society. This is what the separation of powers, federalism, the antitrust laws, and the decentralized structure of our banking system are about. The problems of achieving a stable equilibrium between order and freedom in international society are the same as those which faced the men who established and then developed our national and federal union. Thus Thucydides wrote that the true

cause of the Peloponnesian War was not one or another of the episodes of friction which occurred between Greek cities, but the rise in the power of Athens, and the fear this caused in Sparta. And when Napoleon invaded Russia, even Jefferson, who had been a devout supporter of France and the French Revolution, became alarmed. If France, already the master of Western Europe, conquered Russia, Jefferson commented, it would have so much power that it could readily spare some to send against us in America.

The consciousness of the balance of power as the ultimate foundation of peace is universal, often giving rise to strong and even violent reactions almost as conditioned reflexes. Under such pressures, people and nations react in patterns they can rarely explain. But those patterns nonetheless are rational and predictable. Thus for centuries Britain sent troops to fight on the Continent in order to keep Spain, or France, or Germany from dominating Europe; for the same reason, the United States entered the First World War in 1917, although most Americans thought we were fighting to protect the freedom of the seas and to make the world safe for democracy. Similarly, Britain and France fought the Crimean War to keep Russia out of the Middle East and the Mediterranean--a policy, incidentally, which worked for about a century. The younger Pitt tried repeatedly to appease revolutionary France and remain neutral in the war on the Continent of Europe. He realized that his effort was hopeless only when France attacked Holland and the mouth of the Scheldt, thus engaging in aggression against one of Britain's ultimate security interests, which was also protected by treaty.

But the idea of the balance of power is no more than a starting point in analyzing the national security interests of the United States.

In considering the security of the United States or any other particular country, the first question to face is what geographical areas are relevant. Obviously, the question would be answered differently in the age of sailing ships and in that of ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, airplanes, and submarines. Thucydides wrote about the security of Athens and Sparta in a corner of the Mediterranean; Persia and the barbarians of the north were the most distant factors in his calculations, and the weapons affecting his analysis were swords, javelins, and ships propelled mainly by oars. The problems of Caesar and Alexander were regional, and so were those of Europe, China, and Japan until the explorers and adventurers of the last few centuries brought the entire globe into a single magnetic field.

The United States was born by taking advantage of what Washington called the "occasional convulsions" of European politics, and from the beginning it has been a significant element in the process of European and world politics. The profound involvement of the United States in world affairs, even during the nineteenth century, was not a matter of choice, accident, or temperament. On the geo-strategic map, the United States has been and remains a country of great importance, and it is as apparent today as in the time of Thucydides that "geography is destiny." The American colonies were pawns in the European wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. After the United States was established, it was universally recognized as a potential great power and then as a great power in fact. I might recall for you an episode illustrating this fact which took place not far from here. While the United States Government was preoccupied with the Civil War, France and Austria, with the support of French troops, installed Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico. Immediately after Appomattox, while some hostilities were still going in the South, we sent General Sheridan and

50,000 hardened troopers to the Mexican border, while our diplomats in Paris and Washington expressed grave concern to the Government of France. France decided that discretion was the better part of valor, and withdrew, leaving Maximilian to his fate. It was considered so urgent to dispatch Sheridan to the Mexican border that he was denied permission to delay his departure for a few days in order to march up Pennsylvania Avenue in the Victory Parade.

If the United States is inevitably involved in world politics, either as participant or as victim, how shall we set about delineating the security problem the nation faces for the foreseeable future?

The place to begin answering that question is with the map of world politics--the famous map created by Mackinder and later developed by Spyckman and others, as it looks now, when planes and missiles can fly over the Arctic ice, submarines can navigate under it, and naval vessels are at risk, as the Falkland Islands conflict showed, as never before.

If one looks at the globe as a whole--and in defining American security, no lesser perspective is possible--9/12ths of its surface are occupied by the oceans and 2/12ths by what Mackinder called the "World Island"--Europe, Asia, and Africa, connected by land, and backed by the Arctic Circle which in Mackinder's day was impregnable. Britain, Japan, and the Americas occupy 1/12th of the earth's surface, and should be viewed as satellite islands off the coast of the vastly larger World Island. In 1919, when Mackinder published his most important book, 14/16ths of the world population lived on the World Island--the single continent of Europe, Asia, and Africa; 1/16th on Great Britain and Japan, and 1/16th on the American Continent and the smaller

islands. These proportions changed a little by 1978, the last year for which I have been able to find the relevant statistics. In that year 13/16ths of the world population lived on the World Island, a drop of about 6 percent; the share of Great Britain and Japan in world population fell about 2 1/2 percent to 0.6/16th in 1978; and the percentage of the world's population living in the Americas and the other islands rose 8.5 percent to 2.4/16ths.

What Mackinder called the Heartland of the World Island--the great central patch of Asia and Europe extending from the Arctic shores of Siberia to Persia and Baluchistan and from the Pacific coastal regions of Asia to the larger part of Germany--has until recently been inaccessible from the sea. As Catherine the Great once remarked during a period of diplomatic tension between Russia and Great Britain, "Let Pitt send his ships to Moscow." The Heartland area constitutes an enormous center of power from which military forces have attacked the coastal regions of Asia and Europe (the Rimlands, in Mackinder's terminology) since the beginning of time, and regions beyond the coasts as well. The moral of history is by no means a matter of merely antiquarian interest. The Soviet Union today is outflanking Norway showing great interest in Iceland and directly threatening Iran and Baluchistan; a brilliant American student of strategy once said Russia should never be allowed to go south of the line between Tehran and Kabul. Today the Soviet Union occupies Afghanistan, and has forces in Indo-China, putting pressure on China and Japan, and is devoting enormous efforts to its central goal, the separation of Europe from the United States, and the neutralization of Europe, and therefore of Japan and China as well.

Those who have attempted to view history in this perspective have seemed to disagree about the relative importance of sea power and

land power in the wars and diplomacy of the past. Equally, they seem to disagree today about the relative significance of air power and nuclear power as compared to the older forms of land and sea power. Some advocates of sea power have undoubtedly exaggerated the military value of blockades and of economic warfare more generally, just as the enthusiasts for air power and nuclear power have made excessive claims in their turn. Nonetheless, the main positions in the literature of strategy are easily reconciled. Sea power is of immense utility in enabling the Island and Rimland powers to prevent any one power from dominating the Heartland, and thus achieving domination. But the bases of sea power are sometimes vulnerable to attack from the land, as Singapore was captured in World War II. And to be significant, sea power must be amphibious; its purpose is not to control the fishes, but to project military power on land. The defeat of the Spanish Armada did not end Spain's thrust for dominance in Europe; Elizabeth I had to fight with allies on the Continent to achieve that end, as her successors did against different aspirants for hegemony in the time of Marlborough, Wellington, and the leaders of the Western alliances in both the World Wars of this century. Similarly for all the immense importance of air power as an adjunct to land and sea operations, it has not become an independent dimension of warfare, while the principal function of nuclear weapons thus far has been political, in permitting or not permitting states to use conventional or unconventional nonnuclear weapons.

In modern world politics, given modern technology in transportation, communication, and war, the military potential of the Eurasian-African land mass is even more overwhelming than in the past, provided that it is brought under the control of a single power bent on conquest. Western and Central Europe have formidable military

resources; Russia is stronger than ever before; and Central Asia is no longer the home only of nomad horsemen armed with spears or old rifles. China is modernizing, and Japan is, of course, extremely powerful.

For the United States, an island state like Britain and Japan, the first problem of national security is therefore to help prevent the emergence of a decisive aggregation of power either in Europe or in Asia. We fought in two World Wars during this century to keep Germany from achieving a position of dominance in Europe. For the same reason, the Western allies united in NATO are preventing the Soviet Union from attaining the same goal. It is this consideration which makes Central Europe such an important pivot in the geography of power, and the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania therefore so important to the security of the West. In 1962, President Kennedy told the Soviet Union that there could be no peace between our peoples until the Soviet Union carried out the promise of free elections in Eastern Europe it made at Yalta and Potsdam. That judgment will remain valid indefinitely.

Our security interest in the Pacific Basin is exactly parallel. As President Nixon and Chou En-Lai declared in their Shanghai communique of 1972, the United States and China are agreed in opposing "any hegemonial power in Asia." Later, despite intense Soviet pressure, Japan adhered to that declaration: a classic instance of Island and Rimland powers combining to deter the strongest land power of the day from gaining ascendancy. This was the strategic consideration for which we fought the Korean and Vietnam wars. It justifies our interest in the Philippines, Taiwan, the ASEAN states, and of course the island nations of the South Pacific.

The security of the United States, then, must be viewed on a world wide scale. Our problems in maintaining that security are the same as those with which Great Britain had to deal over the centuries, first within the European region, and more recently throughout the world. While the NATO alliance holds firm, we do not have to be concerned with modern Germany as a candidate for dominance. The Soviet Union is playing that role in world politics at the moment. For the simplest of geo-political reasons, we cannot allow one power to control the Soviet Union, Germany, and Central Europe, on the Atlantic side, or the Soviet Union, China, and Japan in the Pacific basin.

If the United States conducts a calm, steady deterrent policy, the Soviet quest for hegemony will fail, as all such quests have failed since the heyday of the Roman Empire. The nations determined to protect or to restore their political independence and territorial integrity far outweigh the Soviet Union in political and military power. If those nations are well and prudently led, the Soviet Union should come before too long to see the folly--and the immense cost--of its imperial adventure.

The nuclear weapon and the state of the nuclear balance give a special dimension to our task in maintaining the solidarity of the regional coalitions indispensable to our national security. The Soviet Union views nuclear weapons as primarily political in character, and we should do so as well. No one can promise that the world will be spared nuclear war, especially if irrational political leaders acquire nuclear weapons. But the Soviet Union is most unlikely to wage a nuclear war so long as the United States retains a credible capacity for nuclear retaliation. The Soviet Union is building its nuclear force to astronomic levels not to unleash nuclear war, but to separate the United States

from its allies and associates in the Atlantic and the Pacific, and compel American neutrality while it gains control of the Eurasian land mass, Africa, and even the Caribbean through the use of conventional forces, proxies, terrorism, and propaganda. In the nuclear arms negotiations, the Soviet position has been clear and obvious. They have been using every conceivable weapon of propaganda and intimidation to persuade us and our European allies to accept a Soviet position of nuclear superiority. This is why they have pressed for the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in the negotiation, although they know that those forces are no threat to the far superior Soviet arsenal, but exist for quite different national purposes. And they have held out so far for agreements based on the principle of equal reduction, not reduction to equal levels, which was the basis for the 1922 Washington naval agreements. The Soviet approach to the negotiations would make the crucial Soviet advantage in ground based ballistic missiles even bigger and more intimidating than it is now.

To accept the Soviet position in the nuclear arms negotiations--or indeed to compromise with it in any way--would make it impossible for us to protect our most fundamental national interest in world politics, that in achieving and preserving a stable balance of power. The Soviet Union has so far been seeking arms agreements incompatible with true detente--agreements which would compel us to withdraw from Europe and Asia, and return to a position of dependant neutrality in world affairs. President Reagan's greatest foreign policy success so far--and it is a major success--is that he has led the NATO allies and Japan to support our insistence in the Geneva negotiations that agreement be based on Soviet-American equality. The diplomacy of the nuclear arms negotiations has been complex and demanding. It has required not only intense bargaining with the Soviet representatives but frequent and

anxiety ridden consultations with the NATO allies and Japan as well. Thus far, it has been altogether successful, as the Soviet Union has now recognized. The Allies have calmly overcome intense Soviet propaganda efforts, and carried out the NATO two-track decision of 1979, made while President Carter was in office; that decision called for the deployment in Europe of modern American intermediate range ground-based missiles unless the Soviet Union reached a satisfactory agreement on that class of weapons. The NATO two-track decision was not a wise basis for negotiations, since it invited maximum Soviet intransigence. But it would have been catastrophic for the Allies to have changed their policy under Soviet propaganda pressure. The result was a major defensive victory for the Western alliance systems--a victory like the battle of the Marne in 1914, Gettysburg, Midway, or the Battle of Britain in 1940, a victory which makes other victories possible in the future.

When I refer to possible future victories in the muscular diplomatic struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western industrial democracies, I am not referring to the possibility of reaching agreements on the control of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Such agreements could be useful in the quest for peace if they are compatible with true detente, that is, if they do not deny the United States the capacity to reach and sustain deterrent equilibrium against Soviet aggression. They could be disastrous if they prevent us from maintaining the balance, or serve to legitimize the Soviet program of indefinite expansion based on the aggressive use of nonnuclear forces. For arms control agreements are not a substitute for peace, or a magical device for achieving peace by a stroke of the pen. For nearly twenty-five years, we have done ourselves terrible injury by treating arms control agreements as if they were talismans of peace.

The fever of self-deception in the West about the value of arms control has by no means run its course.

People often speak about the Cold War as if it were a distasteful Great Power Game, in which the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union could be equated. This comforts some as a convenient excuse for self-righteously declaring "a pox on both your houses" and avoiding the responsibility of choice and action. But it profoundly mistakes the nature of Soviet policy, and the role of law in the social process. The rules against aggression of the Charter of the United Nations are not empty formalities. They distill the lessons which the finest minds of our civilization have drawn from centuries of experience in the struggle to control the demonic plague of international war. The United States and the other industrial democracies respect those rules, and are still abiding by them, although they cannot afford the luxury of that policy much longer. The Soviet Union is openly violating the law of the Charter both in open aggressions, like those in Cambodia and Afghanistan, and in its support of insurrection and terrorism from the Caribbean to South East Asia. The diplomacy of the Cold War is not a game. It is one facet of a politico-military contest conducted in the nuclear environment by methods which the nuclear balance makes not unreasonably imprudent. The most fundamental interest of the Western nations is in restoring the integrity of the rule against aggression, and the stability of the state system, conceived as a loose association of independent and sovereign states. The goal of the Soviet program of expansion is something quite different--the ancient dream of imperial dominion.

Whether we achieve future victories in this politico-military struggle depends entirely on the wisdom and spirit with which our

affairs are conducted. Of all the revolutions which have transformed world politics in the last seventy years, the most important in my view is the revolution in the climate of opinion in the West. For I regard the decline of optimism, energy, and self-confidence throughout the West as the main source of the widespread Western anxiety and defeatism with regard to our future in the world community. There is no objective basis for such pessimism. As Lord Carrington recently reminded us, the West has all the cards in its hand--a far superior economy; humane social systems; devoted populations; adequate military potential; and above all the cause of peace. We can, and in the nuclear world we must, insist on peace, true peace, as the goal of our foreign policy. The globe is smaller than it used to be, but it is still spherical; it is hard to imagine wars which can be allowed to rage unchecked without providing the Soviet Union opportunities for further expansion in areas of strategic consequence.

A great historian of the Roman Empire was once asked why Rome fell. "They lost their nerve," he replied. We should take his comment to heart.



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