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THE CASE FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION IN NATO MULTINATIONAL CORPS

by

Thomas-Durell Young, Ph.D.

Colonel Karl H. Lowe

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Bonn's neighbors of its continued benign external intentions. The solution to both challenges is the organization of multinational corps in NATO in the Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) command area, accompanied by the abolishment of CENTAG and NORTHAG with multinational corps reporting directly to AFCENT. This study describes the political rationales for the creation of multinational corps in NATO, and presents a notional corps structure for the AFCENT region. It also argues the case for the organization of special functional multinational corps to meet future European and U.S. security requirements. Keywords: NATO, Joint military activities, military strategy, Military forces (United States), military forces (foreign). (RWT) ←

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FOREWORD

This study, initiated by the Strategic Studies Institute and the Conventional Arms Negotiations Division of the Army Staff, analyzes the political and security rationales for the creation of multinational corps in NATO. In view of the massive changes underway in Europe, NATO's future role will likely be to maintain the strategic balance, preventing the region from becoming dominated by any power or bloc. Moreover, despite the Federal Republic of Germany's unassailable record of democracy and unswerving support of the Western Alliance, it will be a number of years before Europeans are at ease with a unified Germany of 80 million souls. The successful management of the German "Question" will be a difficult challenge for the West; however, basing future NATO force deployments in the Federal Republic on the multinational concept could mitigate this difficult mission.

The authors provide both the political imperatives for the creation of multinational corps in NATO, as well as outline a proposed structure. Their proposal is sure to stir controversy. Command structure is designated for streamlining and units are specified for integration, where command could be based on a rotational scheme. One should not, however, focus exclusively on the recommended force and command structures. Rather, the importance of the study is to demonstrate that besides being politically essential, these formations can be created from stated and projected reductions in allied forces in the Federal Republic.

The authors are grateful to Colonel Robert R. Ulin for his assistance in the preparation of this study. Colonels Phillip W. Mock and John J. Hickey also provided valuable suggestions.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this essay as a contribution to the field of European security studies.



KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG has been a National Security Affairs Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1988. Prior to this appointment, he was a country risk analyst for BERI, S.A., a Swiss-based consulting firm. Dr. Young received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland; his M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University; and is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has published extensively on U.S. alliance issues with particular emphasis on Western Europe and the Southwest Pacific. His publications have appeared in such journals as *Comparative Strategy*, *Conflict*, *Asian Survey*, *Defense Analysis*, *Armed Forces and Society*, *Naval War College Review*, *Parameters*, *International Defense Review*, and *Proceedings*. He is currently completing a book critiquing Australian defense policy.

KARL H. LOWE has been Chief, Conventional Arms Negotiations Division on the Army Staff since December 1989. Prior to assuming his present position, he was a Senior Fellow at National Defense University's Strategic Concepts Development Center and was previously Chief of the Strategy Division on the Joint Staff. Colonel Lowe is a career infantry officer and has served twice in Germany and served two combat tours in Vietnam. His decorations include the Silver Star, Bronze Star for Valor, and the Purple Heart. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College, and holds a Master's degree in Political Science from the University of Alabama.

THE CASE FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION IN NATO MULTINATIONAL CORPS

INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the massive political changes sweeping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union's announcement that its forces would withdraw from Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1991 and from Eastern Germany by 1994, it is natural that there will be questions raised, as a result of the conclusion of the 2 + 4 Talks, concerning the rationale for keeping allied forces in Western Germany. The only legitimate answer to that question is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains committed to the maintenance of a strategic balance in Europe, preventing any military power or bloc from dominating the region. Regardless of the outcome of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty limiting forces on the continent,¹ the Soviet Union will retain its capacity for military dominance and could be in a position to coerce or intimidate its Western neighbors unless NATO remains cohesive and retains U.S. forces on European soil to serve as a link to the U.S. strategic arsenal. An unfortunate legacy of World War II is that those U.S. forces are primarily on German soil and, given today's budgetary realities, it is unlikely that they can be dispersed among the alliance's three regions to avoid singularizing the Federal Republic.

A concurrent reality is that fiscal austerity will become an increasing imperative in the years ahead, not only in the United States, but also in Western Europe where the cost of aid to Central and Eastern Europe and increasing oil costs will take an enormous bite out of a regional economy which several years ago saw only the brightest prospects. The reality will force on NATO a unique degree of cooperation among its members, obliging standardization, interoperability, and some redistribution of the common security burden. Both realities dictate a multinational approach to Europe's long-term security needs. The alliance must make Americans indivisible from their European brethren and must achieve a higher level of

efficiency from diminishing defense resources. A natural offshoot of those needs is the multinational approach adopted as policy by the alliance's leaders at the July 1990 London Summit.²

There can be no question that the postwar European security calculus has been fundamentally changed following the monumental events which transpired in Europe in 1989. The Soviet Army's projected withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe, the morbidity of the once bellicose Warsaw Pact, the emergence of a unified Germany within NATO, and increasing fiscal deficits among NATO members have combined to confront the North Atlantic Alliance with the challenge of rethinking existing strategies (e.g., forward defense and the layercake deployment of forces) and formulating a new strategy with altered force structures for the post-cold war European security environment.³

While Europeans are overwhelmingly in favor of the continued existence of NATO⁴ and the United States continuing to maintain forces on the "Old Continent," they acknowledge that current U.S. force levels can and should be reduced as a result of the diminution in the Soviet threat to Europe. For, while the Soviet military threat to Europe has appreciably receded, it is acknowledged that Moscow still remains the largest military power in Europe.⁵ The Soviet military, for instance, continues to modernize its strategic forces,⁶ and since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, its conventional arms production in tanks and artillery exceeds the existing combined inventories of the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Britain.⁷ Moreover, according to Christopher Donnelly, the Soviet military may be developing a new capability that will allow the Red Army to conduct rapid strikes into Europe for *limited* objectives.⁸

The Western Alliance must also recognize that the unification of the Federal Republic and Democratic Republic of Germany poses inter- and extra-alliance problems which must be addressed in the reformulation of NATO strategy, consultative structures, communications, and force deployments. A primary guiding principle for Western defense

planners during this delicate period of transition from the cold war to post-cold war Europe must be to assuage German public opinion that it will not be the sole member of the Western Alliance playing host to large numbers of foreign forces, particularly following a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Germany. If German public sensitivities are not acknowledged and dealt with intelligently, there is the potential that this political and economic giant could turn eastward, or adopt a policy of ambivalence toward the Western Alliance.⁹ Such an eventuality could destroy the Atlantic Alliance and other important Western European political and economic institutions. It could also fulfill one of Moscow's long sought after objectives in Europe: the dissolution of diplomatic unity in NATO. Such an eventuality would enable the Soviet Union to exploit what Robbin Laird calls its anticoalition strategy against the West, thereby allowing it to play member off against each other.¹⁰ Support for this interpretation of Soviet foreign policy is found in Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's June 1990 letters to NATO member states urging them to abandon their mutual treaty obligation (Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty) to come to the aid of any allied partner that is attacked.¹¹

Finally, at a time when it is expected in the West that NATO should take on a more political character following German unification, NATO defense planners will have the new and daunting task of having to plan for the alliance's defense of the newly acquired eastern portion of Germany, with a Bundeswehr limited to 370,000, to include former members of the moribund *Nationale Volksarmee*. One of the constraints involved in this planning forbids NATO forces stationed in the new Laender of the Federal Republic, while Soviet forces remain in East Germany. Thereafter, the agreement reached between Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev at Stavropol proscribes the stationing of any foreign forces on the territory of the former Democratic Republic. In addition, Chancellor Kohl announced in July 1990 that this territory would be permanently denuclearized following unification.¹² These new operational objectives will have to be met when many NATO members' defense budgets and force structures are already slated for what could be massive reductions (as

recently announced in the Netherlands¹³), particularly following a CFE accord.

NATO'S CONTINUED RELEVANCE

While it may be presumptuous to claim that there is unanimity in the Western Alliance that this association of like-minded states will endure well into the post-cold war era, it is safe to speculate how the current period of alliance metamorphosis will eventually affect NATO. Note that it is not necessarily a question of what this process of *Tod und Verklarung* will actually do the ultimate character and mission of NATO, e.g. evolving into some new metastatic amalgamation of NATO states. Rather, from the perspective of defense planners, what should be of immediate concern is how NATO force structures must evolve in the short term to meet the altered security environment. The reason for this is three-fold.

First and most importantly, NATO still has a legitimate defense mission in Central Europe. As poignantly recognized in a 1990 Western European Union report, an impressive and modernizing Soviet military, a difficult and still to be concluded arms control negotiation process with Moscow, the almost overnight creation of a belt of "soft" states extending from the Baltic to the Balkans, and a growing proliferation of sophisticated weapons along the Mediterranean, combine to make a strong case for a continued need for NATO.¹⁴ Moreover, Europe is in the difficult process of searching for a new regional balance of power, which, with luck, will be accepted as legitimate by all the concerned states and therefore produce a welcome period of stability. Regrettably, it is during this very process of creating a new and accepted balance that instability and challenges to the *status quo* are most likely to develop. All one has to do is contemplate the almost insurmountable domestic political, economic, and ethnic minority challenges facing the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (let alone the Soviet Union itself) as they initiate reform measures, to conclude that this process of becoming democracies with

market economies is not the utopia many may have initially hoped.

Second, NATO's continued existence, let alone its relevance in the post-cold war world, will obviously depend upon how its members see it as providing for their individual security interests. NATO defense planners should be actively engaged in ascertaining if and where NATO standing and mobilized forces could contribute to the maintenance of Western security in the future. This could necessitate the formulation of new force structures and command arrangements, given the altered regional security environment. Hence, while the Central Front continues to hold the highest stakes in the European theater, new force structures and joint allied doctrines are needed, for example, for major contingencies on the flanks where the alliance is increasingly vulnerable to regional and extra-regional instability.¹⁵

Third, and related to the above, there is a growing consensus in many West European countries, to include the Federal Republic, that future challenges to their security are more likely to emanate from the South, as opposed to the East. In this respect, while it is unlikely that NATO would ever reach complete unanimity on conducting out-of-area operations as an alliance, there is considerable room for *ad hoc* multilateral operations between select alliance members, as seen by the deployment of naval forces to the Persian Gulf in 1986 and 1987.¹⁶ Yet, it is instructive to note that the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait produced, according to news accounts, a new consensus among European members of the alliance that their shared security interests require protection outside of the immediate NATO area.¹⁷

Members of NATO, therefore, need to develop plans and combined capabilities for such contingencies, in addition to addressing the security concerns of the two NATO members on the flanks, Norway and Turkey, who have not seen a significant diminution in the Soviet military capabilities in their own respective regions.¹⁸ The creation of NATO multinational corps formations would contribute to the achievement of all three of the above objectives.

WHY MULTINATIONAL CORPS?

That some in the U.S. defense community have not been enamored with the thought of participating in multilateral structures is probably due to two basic misunderstandings. The first is that multinational units by definition would result in the surrender of national command to a foreign military power. Since U.S. forces serve in wartime under a German commander in Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and the United States has been a participant in the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force (Air and Land) since its creation in 1960,¹⁹ the precedents suggest that such concerns may be self-serving and overstated. The allocation of units to AFCENT or the ACE Mobile Force does not include the transfer of national command. Moreover, the U.S. Army's VII Corps has long had a close operational and wartime contingency relationship with the Bundesheer's 12th Panzer Division, which is given operational control over a U.S. brigade in wartime. Thus one must be clear about the difference between national command and operational control. The real fear seems to be the loss of a national identity and associated command positions—a lesser value to long-term U.S. security interests.

The second and more severe misunderstanding is the recognition that military forces, by definition, must be responsive to the political needs of a state. As publicly recognized by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, it is evident that the current high visibility of U.S. forces stationed in the Federal Republic simply must change if the domestic political conditions allowing for their retention are to remain unaffected.²⁰ Since the government of the Federal Republic requires, and its population supports, the retention of allied (albeit smaller) forces in Germany for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense planners must accept this new political reality and plan accordingly.²¹

Today's U.S. Seventh Army, with 17 armor-heavy brigades and regiments, concentrated entirely in the Federal Republic, is no longer affordable, and is out of step with the emerging politico-military environment in Europe. The U.S. Army is concentrated overwhelmingly in Germany where the greatest

threat has been since 1948, but the threat is changing and the Army must adapt or become irrelevant, both for European security requirements, as well as for being an instrument of securing U.S. objectives. The time is ripe to move beyond the current VII Corps/12th Panzer Division relationship to more closely integrated multinational commands in which most combat support and select service support functions are shared at the corps level, allowing corps to become operationally integrated in peace, as well as in war. This concept is beneficial to U.S. security interests and should be supported vigorously. Its potential for furthering U.S. security interests in Europe should be articulated and the concept used to help clarify the necessary role and size of the U.S. Army in relation to residual missions in Europe and adjacent areas in the near term.

The benefits to be gained by the United States are numerous. These formations would reduce the cost of a U.S. forward deployment in Europe by spreading tactical support structure requirements among our allies. Although supply, maintenance, personnel, food service, finance, and postal services must remain national responsibilities carried out by national units, there is no reason that transportation, chemical decontamination, laundry and bath, tactical intelligence, communications, water supply, bridging, and construction engineer functions cannot be fully integrated at corps level. Similarly, air space management, fire support coordination, and barrier operations are roles requiring close coordination and cooperation, which can best be planned by staffs which are fully integrated and carried out by allies operating under a common command.

Integration of U.S. forces with allies among whom they live make them less a likely target in that country's domestic political debate. In Germany, where heavily armored forces have become exceptionally obtrusive in a crowded and ecologically sensitive country, that has become a clear imperative.²² Germany will soon become the only country in Europe with foreign ground combat forces on its soil, except for a single U.S. airborne battalion stationed in Italy. That gives some political parties an opportunity to claim that "when the

Russians leave Eastern Germany, the Americans will only be here to keep us down." Credence is lent to this position by announcements made by all NATO members with forces stationed in the Federal Republic of their intention to reduce their standing forces in Germany. For example, to forestall the embarrassment of being asked to leave, French President François Mitterrand hinted in July 1990 that following German unification all French forces could be withdrawn from the Federal Republic and Berlin.²³ That viewpoint needs to be discredited by the visible integration of U.S. Army and Bundesheer forces on German soil.

Multinational units could also provide the impetus for creating greater allied consensus for, and participation in, operations on the Southern Flank. There is ample evidence that all European countries have grown anxious about their southern and southeastern flanks and some have undertaken steps to prepare themselves for military operations outside Europe proper.²⁴ Population growth that far outstrips industrial expansion has sent a surge of Arabs to Europe in search of jobs now being taken by equally desperate, but more welcome East Europeans. At the same time, West European investment and aid is being redirected eastward, leaving North African countries as an increasingly destitute playground for radical anti-Western fundamentalists and pan-Arab nationalists with increasing access to long-range weapons of mass destruction. This situation is fraught with risk for Europe as well as for the United States and should be addressed in common, as recently demonstrated by the North Atlantic Assembly's unanimous condemnation of the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.²⁵ Setting the stage for such cooperation through interoperability exercises, perhaps followed by contingency planning, is now pertinent.

The United States and the Western Alliance could take advantage of their mutual interest in force projection through the generation of a larger, in place, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Strategic Reserve, with a theater-wide contingency orientation and, perhaps, an out-of-area role. Such a force must be created to address the uncertainties on Europe's geopolitical horizon and to adapt to

the exceptional distances over which forces must be deployed to reach likely areas of crisis. By the mid-1990s, the threat to Germany, Norway and Turkey will be far from the centers of NATO's main strength. To reach those areas with sufficient strength to deter, or to stop, an attack while heavier forces are brought in requires a relatively light and highly mobile corps-size reaction force.²⁶

One of the possible implications of the creation of such an enlarged strategic reserve with expanded missions could be to induce France to participate more in NATO activities, if not rejoin the NATO command structure. There is virtually no prospect of Paris moving toward reintegration into NATO under the alliance's existing C³ architecture, as recently reiterated by Defense Minister Chevènement.²⁷ Such an eventuality would oblige French politicians to deny their political heritage and their population's demand for a position of respect and leadership in the affairs of the Old Continent. Moreover, the change in NATO nuclear strategy announced by President Bush at the end of the 1990 NATO summit has further alienated Paris from NATO strategy, thereby obviating any formal and complete rapprochement.²⁸ Notwithstanding this reality, there remains the possibility of gaining French interest in cooperating more closely in the defense of Europe and projecting force to protect European interests outside of the alliance's area of operation.

A final advantage of multinational corps, and a not inconsequential one in these days of budgetary constriction, would be the opportunity to streamline NATO's command structure. It is certain that there will be several fewer national corps²⁹ and substantially fewer in-place divisions in ACE in the coming years. As recognized by the SACEUR, General John Galvin, it will be very difficult in any case for a number of the smaller allies to maintain national corps formations if, through a CFE agreement or domestic budgetary restrictions, their respective land force structure is reduced by only 15 percent.³⁰ What must be an absolute guiding principle for future U.S. military force structure development in Europe is to ensure that within the numerical limits imposed by a CFE accord, as large a percentage of forces as possible should be combat-related,

as opposed to layered in redundant headquarters. In such an environment of sparsity, there is little reason to keep two Army Groups arrayed between corps and AFCENT. There is also reason to question the continued need of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and 7th Army headquarters layered atop a single U.S. corps. Essential national logistical and other national support functions are the legitimate role of the 21st Theater Army Support Command, making USAREUR Headquarters a dubious "requirement." Realignment of that command echelon would significantly streamline C³ and substantially reduce outlays for manpower, facilities, and communications infrastructure.

A more prudent use of existing resources might be to transform USAREUR headquarters into a multinational corps, combining the assets of USAREUR and NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG), collocated at Campbell Barracks in Heidelberg. The four-star USAREUR commander would remain the Army component commander for U.S. European Command and his three-star deputy would become the multinational corps commander with a genuine wartime operational mission. That would permit the elimination of U.S. Corps headquarters at both Frankfurt and Stuttgart, removing a controversial U.S. presence from crowded German metropolitan areas. The impact would be to place two U.S. Army and two Bundesheer divisions in a collective command structure exercising the same functions in peace as in war. That is already the case at Army Group and AFCENT levels, why not at corps level as well?

PROPOSED STRUCTURE

In essence, the above considerations suggest that a multinational corps structure within NATO would support U.S. and European security needs. This proposed structure must flow from the missions ACE will face as Europe's political geography undergoes a series of changes expected in the years ahead. By proceeding from what is known and applying creativity, there is indeed a method to generate a more appropriate force structure for Europe's emerging security

requirements in the post-cold war world. The following proposed force realignment could conceivably evolve following the implementation of a CFE accord and national budgetary restrictions which will generate substantial reductions of standing NATO forces. Our model assumes the elimination of both NATO Army Group headquarters (NORTHAG and CENTAG), with multinational corps reporting directly to the AFCENT commander. It also reflects announced proposed reductions in allied forces in Europe. While specific units designated for inactivation are identified, in a sense these proposals are notional. The conversion and standing down of units are offered here solely as evidence that the raising of these corps formations is militarily feasible and viable, in addition to being politically realistic. Finally, our position is that Allied divisions would not have to be forward deployed *in toto*. What is *crucial* is the presence of their "flags," initial covering force, and key logistic infrastructure for the wartime deployment of these and follow-on divisions should the need arise.

Baltic Approaches (Reassigned from AFNORTH to AFCENT). COMLANDJUT is already a multinational corps with the 6th Bundesheer Infantry Division and the Danish Army's Mechanized Jutland Division, reinforced in time of crisis by the U.S. Army's 9th Motorized Brigade and the British Army's 1st Infantry Brigade. Given the movement of the threat away from the former Inter-German Border, it is reasonable that this force be reduced in size and reoriented to screen the Baltic coast of East Germany in an emergency. The Bundesheer's 6th Division and the Danish Jutland Division should each incorporate an airmobile brigade to cover the significant distances involved in this command's mission. The British Army's 1st Infantry Brigade should be reallocated to the Central Region, reducing the nationalities involved in a defense of the Baltic approaches and reducing the corps' logistic complexity.

North Germany. Another multinational corps could be formed through the consolidation of the British and Bundesheer's I Corps. Units assigned to this formation would be the British Army's 1st and 4th Armored divisions and the Bundesheer's 3rd and 7th Armored divisions. The operational

mission of this corps would be to reinforce German Territorial forces in eastern Germany north of Berlin in an emergency, serving as a mobile reserve to repel attacks via the Szczecin axis. Corps command could be rotated between Britain and Germany. This formation assumes the withdrawal of Britain's 3rd Armored Division and the Dutch Army's 41st Armored Brigade from Germany. It also assumes the inactivation of the Bundesheer's 1st and 11th Armored Infantry Divisions. The British Army's 3rd Division (reorganized as a motorized division with 1st, 19th and 49th Brigades—all based in the United Kingdom), would reinforce the corps in a crisis.

The Netherlands's I Corps could serve as a second echelon of reinforcement in an emergency. Its components would be the Dutch Army's 1st and 4th Armored Infantry divisions and the 101st Infantry Brigade. These formations would be reinforced by the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry and 4th Mechanized Infantry divisions and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. The force would deploy in a crisis behind the British/German Corps as a mobile reserve in depth north of Berlin. Headquarters U.S. III Corps Forward would be consolidated with Headquarters Netherlands's I Corps to form the multinational command. Corps command in this formation would also be on a rotational basis alternating between American and Dutch commanders. For missions outside of Europe and general mobilization, Headquarters III Corps, located at Fort Hood, should be kept intact as a national command. In a war involving NATO, III Corps would deploy its active component divisions to the U.S./Dutch corps and then assume command of mobilizing National Guard heavy divisions.

Central Germany. It is assumed that Belgian I Corps will be withdrawn from the Federal Republic.³¹ Because of the scarcity of facilities in Belgium, it is also likely that most of the corps will be inactivated, as predicted by Robert Ulin.³² What is likely to remain in Belgium's active inventory is the 1st and 7th Mechanized Brigades and the Paracommando Regiment. It would be prudent to restructure that force as a mixed mobile division assigned to SACEUR's reserve. The Belgian Army's reserve force could then be restructured as a single three brigade division (4th, 10th, and 12th) to be attached to the

French First Army in time of war. The revised structure would substantially simplify Belgium's defense establishment, reduce its cost, and improve its viability. Adding Belgium's reserve mechanized division to the French III Corps would strengthen the latter and make both forces more viable. Employment of the entire French First Army in conjunction with the Bundesheer II Corps (4th and 8th Armored Infantry Divisions) in southern Germany as an AFCENT reserve force in depth behind the U.S.-German Corps in an emergency would array NATO forces in Central Europe in depth, providing flexibility to cover the mountain approaches from Czechoslovakia if that country is again invaded by the Soviets.

Southern Germany. Another multinational corps would be formed through the consolidation of the U.S. Seventh Army and Bundesheer III corps. Assigned units would be the U.S. Army's 1st and 3rd Armored divisions, the 2nd and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments, and the Bundesheer's 2nd and 12th Divisions. This corps' operational mission would be to reinforce German Territorial forces located southeast of Berlin along the Bautzen and Cottbus approaches in an emergency and to screen passes through the Sudeten Mountains. This plan assumes the inactivation of the Bundesheer's 5th and 10th Armored Divisions and the withdrawal of the U.S. 3rd and 8th Infantry divisions, as well as part of the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. Command of this corps could rotate between the United States and the Federal Republic. Significantly, corps support structure, except personnel and select logistics functions, would be fully integrated, with U.S. and German elements under common operational control. The First French Army with two corps would remain under French command in peacetime and "chop" to AFCENT in an emergency as a dedicated reinforcement for central, or southern, Germany.

AFCENT REACTION FORCE

As a theater reserve for AFCENT, a multinational corps would be formed around the nucleus of British, German, Belgian, Dutch, Canadian, and U.S. units. Specifically, these

would include, the British Army's 2nd Division (5th Airborne, 15th Infantry, and 24th Airmobile Brigades), the Bundesheer's Airborne Division, the Belgian Army's restructured mobile division, the Dutch Army's Commando Battalion, a Canadian Airmobile Battalion Task Force (formed from the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group enabling Ottawa to retain a token ground force in Europe³³), and a U.S. Army Airmobile Brigade (formed by reorganizing the armored brigade at Garlstedt). The principle of the rotation of command between participants would also apply in this corps. The corps' theater mission would be AFCENT-wide and thereby range from the Baltic to Austria, applying its weight to wherever the situation required. It might also serve as an enhanced version of the ACE Mobile Force, deploying elements of all AFCENT countries to a threatened area early in a crisis.

SACEUR REACTION FORCE

While it can be predicted that out-of-area operations will continue to be a contentious issue in NATO, given the growth in rapid reaction forces in some European countries, it would be prudent for NATO to develop a corps formation within which these forces could deploy, assuming the existence of a political mandate by their parent governments. Numerous Western European countries are far advanced in the development of forces for these types of contingencies. The French created the *Force d'Action Rapide* (FAR) from the *Forces d'Actions Extérieures* in 1983 for the purpose of providing a hard-hitting mobile force for both European and Third World operations.³⁴ The Italian Army subsequently created the *Forza di Intevento Rapido* (FIR) in 1985³⁵ and the Spanish in 1988 tested for the first time its *Fuerze de Accion Rapida* (FAR), a formation modeled on the French and Italian examples.³⁶ The military and political advantages to the United States of operating in cooperation with these types of units in the Third World are too great not to pursue. Yet, in order to be in a position to participate with these forces, the United States must have like units stationed in Europe.

Such a multinational corps would be formed around the nucleus of the French FAR, which is comprised of the French

4th Airmobile, 6th Light Armored, 11th Airborne, 9th Marine, and 27th Alpine "divisions" (or reinforced "brigades" depending upon one's definition). Other allied units would include a U.S. Army Airborne Brigade (formed by expanding the Airborne Battalion Task Force in Italy), the Italian Army's FIR (2 Brigades), the Spanish Army's FAR (2 Brigades), and the Portuguese Army's Airborne Brigade. These forces would remain based within their home countries (with the exception of the U.S. contingent, which would expand in size) and would be supported by dedicated air transport. Obviously, not all forces earmarked would be used for every contingency, but the existence of the force would afford SACEUR a wide range of forces from which to tailor an appropriate force in order to demonstrate alliance resolve, to include peacekeeping operations in, for instance, the Balkans. This need not be a standing force, but a small planning and exercise staff headed by a French commander would exist in peacetime to serve as the essential foundation for emergency deployment. Interoperability and command and control would be exercised routinely.

SACEUR MULTINATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF FORCE

While Eckhard Luebckemeier is correct in stating that NATO is ill-suited for nonsecurity and political roles³⁷ (e.g., economic development missions in Central and Eastern Europe), it is capable of playing an active role in a realm of what is sure to become an important political forum in Europe in the future, security and confidence-building measures within the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Thus, not all multinational forces would, by definition, need to be oriented toward combat missions. Indeed, a strong case could be made for the creation of a force specifically intended to convey a more cooperative NATO mission, both within, and possibly even outside of Europe. To that end, an on-call multinational force could be organized with contingents from all NATO members for disaster relief operations. The force would include transportation, medical, engineer, and demolitions units for use as disaster relief forces and possibly

for environmental clean-up operations. Command could be rotated among the contributors to the force. Dedicated forces could remain based in their respective home countries, but would have air and sea transportation allocated for planning. The force could engage in annual cooperative disaster relief exercises with neutral and Eastern European countries, and possibly even in conjunction with the Soviet Union.

FUTURE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Taken together, the above proposed multinational force structures have the potential to generate substantial benefits for NATO in a time of significant change. The creation of these multinational units would provide innumerable advantages to NATO during a period which could be very destabilizing, prior to the creation of a European collective security regime, as envisioned, for example, by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.³⁸ These units would be less costly for all involved, provide a continuing physical manifestation of alliance solidarity, and, in the event of a major conflict in Europe, buy time for the arrival of U.S. reinforcements from North America.

What the senior U.S. defense leadership must recognize and accommodate is that unless the Soviet Union reverts to its pre-Gorbachev bellicose nature, domestic political conditions have been fundamentally altered in regard to the future stationing of foreign forces on German soil. For instance, in April 1990 the Hesse Government advocated that serious consideration be given to a major reduction of U.S. forces in Hesse following a CFE accord.³⁹ The Minister President of Hesse has made a major issue of getting U.S. forces out of the Frankfurt, Wiesbaden and Mannheim areas to ease urban overcrowding.⁴⁰ The United States will continue to have vital interests in Europe that will necessitate the maintenance of U.S. forces on the western side of the extinct Inter-German Border. Moreover, the U.S. Army, of all the three Armed Services, is particularly well-suited for playing a significant role in the post-CFE era, alongside a smaller Bundesheer with increased defense responsibilities. It is widely accepted that for the U.S. nuclear

guarantee to Europe to remain convincing in general, and to the Federal Republic in particular, U.S. *ground* forces need to remain. Without the specter of American forces at risk alongside of German and other European forces on German soil, the U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe, as poignantly observed by *The Economist*, would be worthless.⁴¹ In short, ships and aircraft may come and go and are subject to the impulsive political vicissitudes of the day: armies are stuck to the ground on which they are stationed and cannot easily be removed, or withheld, in a crisis.

The obvious implication for U.S. defense officials is that if we are to continue protecting U.S. security interests with a forward strategy, they must evaluate U.S. military commitments for Europe within a totally new and politically-sensitive context. To be sure, U.S. commanders will face new and different management, doctrinal and possibly even operational "challenges" in a multinational corps environment, especially with combat support and combat service support. However, senior leaders could very well be left with little choice but to accept these nettlesome challenges, particularly if this is the only manner by which U.S. ground forces are permitted to remain forward deployed in Europe. It is essential, therefore, that the U.S. Army's leadership seek and find ways to make multinational formations at corps level a viable and operative part of U.S. Army doctrine and structural planning.

It is not going too far to state that the key to the continuation of stability in Europe and the favorable outcome from the Western perspective of change on the Old Continent comes down to the effective "management" of the ever-present German "Question." A country which will be a world power in its own right within an emerging psuedo-superpower, the European Community, will continue to be a major factor in the European security calculus. As an outside power with recognized vital interests in the region, the United States is the sole country capable of acting as an honest broker in regional affairs. This is no small responsibility if one recalls the outcome of regional affairs when the United States abdicated its political and security responsibilities in Europe following the end of the First World War.

In short, the future for the U.S. Army remaining in Europe is assured if it is capable of changing to meet the altered security realities in that region. With its state-of-the-art, in-place intelligence gathering and assessment capabilities and personnel trained in verification and Soviet area studies (which will be important contributions to the Western Alliance in a post-CFE Europe), in addition to its formidable combat capabilities, the U.S. Army is singularly well-suited to play a constructive role in this potentially unsettled period in Europe. While U.S. naval and air assets will continue to play crucial roles in aiding in the defense of Western Europe, the continent's historical and future central security concern will be the sanctity of borders, an imperative secured only by ground forces. However, in order to accomplish this new mission, cold war force deployments and structures will perforce need to change. The active support of Secretary Cheney's endorsement of the NATO multinational force concept by the nation's military leadership will ensure its future mission on the Old Continent.⁴²

CONCLUSIONS

- The massive political and security changes which have taken place in Europe throw into question the current stationing regime of NATO forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is clear that through a CFE treaty and reductions in national defense expenditures by NATO countries, forward deployed forces in the Federal Republic will decrease significantly at a time when their continued requirement is without question.
- While Germans recognize the need for a continued allied force presence in their country, the alliance needs to be careful not to singularize the Federal Republic and produce the very domestic political backlash in that country the West needs to avoid. In other words, allied forces need to be seen as comparable to Bundeswehr units, in addition to being significantly reduced in large metropolitan areas.

- The solution to the alliance's and the Federal Republic's security concerns and political requirements is the adoption of a multinational corps structure in AFCENT. Multinational formations have been used in NATO for many years and already exist at Army Group level, so then why not at the corps level as well? The creation of multinational corps would provide a means by which NATO would be able to continue to fulfill its security role in an altered security environment.
- Multinational forces could provide the basis for the joint response to future threats to Europe emanating from the South, as well as possibly for out-of-area operations through the creation of a multinational allied airmobile reaction force. NATO's new cooperative stance toward the East could be reinforced by the creation of a multinational disaster relief and environmental clean-up force (with possible Soviet participation), both for European and extra-regional operations. Such a formation would make an important contribution toward the creation of meaningful security and confidence-building measures.
- The creation of multinational corps in NATO would not result in the surrender of national command, but would instead entail the transfer in some cases of operational control—something with which the United States has much experience. In view of the assured reduction in U.S. forces in Europe, the formation of multinational corps would allow a reduction in redundant headquarters personnel and increase the ratio of needed combat forces in Europe.
- The two essential requirements for the continuation of stability in Europe are the successful management of the ever-present German "Question" and the continued stationing of U.S. Army forces in Europe. The domestic political sensitivities of a unified Germany must be recognized by the alliance and managed with intelligence and creativity. Without the continued

stationing of U.S. Army forces in the Federal Republic, Washington's commitment of extended nuclear deterrence to Europe, eroded through existing and future arms control accords, would be unconvincing. The adoption of NATO multinational corps in the AFCENT area of operation would meet both of these challenges.

ENDNOTES

1. See, *Strategic Survey, 1989-1990*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990, pp. 201-208.
2. See, "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," 5-6 July 1990, Press Communique S-I (90)36, Brussels, NATO Press Service, July 6, 1990; and, *The New York Times*, July 7, 1990.
3. See, *The New York Times*, July 8, 1990.
4. "...because of the many, many uncertainties which lie ahead, the West is better off with NATO than without it." Peter Corterier, "Quo Vadis NATO?" *Survival*, Volume 32 (2), March-April 1990, p. 147.
5. The diminution in the Soviet threat in Central Europe has not been seen on the northern flank of NATO. See Norwegian Defense Minister Per Ditlev-Simonsen's article in *Aftenposten*, June 29, 1990, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-90-129*, July 5, 1990, pp. 18-19.
6. See, *Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change*, 1989, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 42-49; 57.
7. See the statement by Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Rethinking NATO in a Europe Whole and Free," *Defense Issues*, Volume 5 (28) May 9, 1990, p. 2.
8. See, Christopher Donnelly, "The Development of Soviet Military Policy in the 1990s," *RUSI Journal*, Volume 135 (1), Spring 1990, pp. 14-15.
9. See, Thomas-Durell Young and Samuel J. Newland, "The Inevitable Partnership: The Franco-German Security Relationship," *The Land Warfare Papers*, No. 4, (September 1990).
10. Robbin F. Laird, "The Soviet Union and the Western Alliance," in *The USSR and the Western Alliance*, ed. by Robbin F. Laird and Susan L. Clark, Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1990, pp. 4-5.

11. See Hilversum International Service, June 30, 1990 in *FBIS-WEU-90-128*, July 3, 1990, p. 1.

12. See, *The New York Times*, July 17, 1990.

13. "Over the next ten years the Armed Forces must be reduced by one-third: cuts of 35 percent for the Army, 30 percent for the Air Force, and 25 percent for the Navy." See, *NRC Handelsblad*, June 29, 1990, in *FBIS-WEU-90-131*, July 9, 1990, p. 3.

14. Assembly of the Western European Union, *Establishment of a Just, Peaceful and Secure Order in Europe—Prospects Stemming from Developments in Central and Eastern Europe*, Report, Document 1216, Paris: March 12, 1990, pp. 23-24.

15. See, Wolfgang Schloer, "Armaments and Arms Control—Assessing the Impact of Conventional Defense Programs on CFE," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington: April 10-14, 1990), especially pp. 11-20.

16. See, Ian Gambles, "Prospects for West European Security Cooperation," *Adelphi Papers* No. 244, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989, pp. 35-41.

17. See, *The Washington Post*, August 8, 1990.

18. For example, 40 MIG-27 aircraft, removed from Hungary in spring 1990, were reported to be relocated to the Kola Peninsula. "The main task of these planes is to attack targets from the rear, and their range makes it possible for them to reach targets throughout Norway from [their] bases..." *Aftenposten*, June 15, 1990, in *FBIS-WEU-90-132*, July 10, 1990, pp. 43-44. For a Turkish view see retired Admiral Tanju Erdem's comments in, *Cumhuriyet*, April 15, 1990, in *FBIS-WEU-90-130*, July 6, 1990, pp. 36-39.

19. See, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures*, Bruxelles: NATO Information Service, 1989, pp. 351-352.

20. See the Secretary's remarks in, *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1990.

21. See comments by Chancellor Kohl's foreign policy advisor, Horst Teltschik, in *FBIS-WEU-90-141*, July 23, 1990, p. 4.

22. Note, for example, West German Defense Minister Stoltenberg's reported initiative to NATO to halt as soon as possible low-altitude flying. See, *Die Welt* (Hamburg), June 22, 1990. For a comprehensive assessment of the low-altitude flying controversy in Western Europe see, Assembly of

the Western Europe Union, *The Future of Low Flying*, Report, Document 1222, Paris, April 24, 1990.

23. See, *Le Monde* (Paris), July 8-9, 1990. It has subsequently been agreed to by France and the Federal Republic that one French division will remain stationed in Germany. See, *FBIS-WEU-90-181-U*, September 18, 1990, p. 3.

24. It is interesting to note that the "deep" defense cuts announced by the Thatcher government are intended, in principle, to result in the creation of forces better capable of conducting out-of-area operations. See, *The Independent* (London), June 25, 1990; and, *The Washington Post*, July 26, 1990.

25. See, *The New York Times*, August 3, 1990.

26. See, Guy Willis and Gérard Turbé, "Airmobile Formations—Shaping the Helicopter's Influence on the Land Battle," *International Defense Review*, Volume 23 (4) 1990, pp. 377-381; and, R.D. Grist, "Airmobile Forces in Central Europe," in *Seaford House Papers*, 1987, London: Royal College of Defence Studies, 1988, pp. 123-141.

27. See, *Le Monde* (Paris), May 22, 1990.

28. See, Defense Minister Chevènement's comments in *Le Monde* (Paris), July 10, 1990.

29. It has been reported that the U.S. Army has already proposed the reduction of 50,000 personnel and the elimination of one corps from Germany. See, *Defense News* (Washington), July 23, 1990.

30. See comments by General Galvin to the *Wall Street Journal* editorial board in *ACE Output*, Volume 9 (3), August 1990, pp. 13-15.

31. Belgian Defense Minister Guy Coeme directed the Belgian Joint Staff in January 1990 to prepare plans for the return of the 1 Belgian Army Corps from the Federal Republic. See, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, February 3, 1990, p. 180.

32. For an excellent assessment of Belgium's defense challenges and political conditions as they relate to defense expenditures see, Robert Ulin, "Belgium," (paper presented at the conference on "Force Mobilization, the Revolutions of 1989, and the Future of European Security," National Defense University, Washington: June 19-21, 1990).

33. Canadian Defense officials have indirectly acknowledged that Canada's military commitment to Europe is likely to decrease. See,

"Update: Canadian Armed Forces," Special Supplement in *The Ottawa Citizen*, June 29, 1990.

34. See, Dominique David, *La Force d'action rapide en Europe: Le dire des armes*, Paris: Foundation pour les Etudes de Défense national, 1984.

35. See, Carlo Jean, *Studi strategici*, Milano: Franco Angeli Libri, 1990, pp. 171-172.

36. See, Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Spain's Security Policy and Army in the 1990s," *Parameters*, Volume 20 (2), June 1990, pp. 95-97.

37. Eckhard Luebke-meier, "The Future of NATO," (paper presented at a symposium sponsored by the Swedish Defence Research Establishment, Department of Defence Analysis, Stockholm, June 11-13, 1990), p. 8.

38. See, *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (foreign edition), March 25, 1990.

39. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, April 4, 1990.

40. See, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, August 24, 1990.

41. *The Economist* (London), April 28, 1990, particularly p. 14.

42. See, *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1990.

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