

AD-A232 929

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE DEC. 1987		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED FINAL	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE SOVIET OPERATIONAL MANEUVER IN A PERIOD OF REFORM				5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) DAVID M. GLANTZ					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE ATTN: ATZL-SAS FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-5015				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT STATEMENT A APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) Reprint of a <u>Military Review</u> article concerned with the impact of military reform on Soviet concepts for conducting operational maneuver.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS OPERATIONAL MANEUVER, MILITARY REFORM, FORCE STRUCTURE				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 18	
				16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT		

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SOVIET OPERATIONAL MANEUVER

IN A PERIOD OF REFORM

**SOVIET
ARMY
STUDIES
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**Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas**

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SOVIET OPERATIONAL MANEUVER
IN A PERIOD OF REFORM

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This article was published in the Military Review,
December 1989, pages 31-43.

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90-1312

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Availability Codes	
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A-1	20

Soviet Operational Maneuver in a Period of Reform

Colonel David M. Glantz, US Army

Recent Soviet announcements call our attention to changes that will result in a recognizable defensive orientation in its armed forces. Actual structural changes have already begun. The author observes that it is as yet too early to determine if these moves will fulfill their intended purpose. He notes that political, economic and military factors will all influence the new structure as it evolves. He advises Western analysts and planners to keep close watch on the "heavy" versus "light" mix of these restructured organizations.

OVER THE SPAN of some 70 years, there has been remarkable continuity in certain fundamental aspects of Soviet military science. One of those perceived continuities has been Soviet dedication to, and faith in, the utility of the offensive. Another equally important continuity has been Soviet concern for operational maneuver, or simply stated, the ability to conduct deep operations. Since 1985, Soviet theorists have published at least two books reiterating that point. General M. M. Kir'yan's *Fronty nastupaly* (The fronts have attacked), published in 1987, is the first comprehensive Soviet study of front offensive

operations.¹ General I. M. Anan'yev's *Tankovyie armii v nastuplenii* (Tank armies in the offensive), published in 1988, is yet another in a long series of Soviet works dealing with mobile group (operational maneuver group) operations.² Today, one of the central issues confronting the Soviets and, by extension, the West, is the degree to which these continuities remain valid. Parenthetically, I must state that I believe the Soviets themselves may not yet have fully answered that question.

During the 1920s, the Soviets developed the concept of operational art as an intermediate, but indispensable, stage between the tradi-

tional military realms of strategy and tactics. The operational level of war, so defined, provided a vehicle for studying, preparing for and conducting war under complex 20th century

By the early 1930s, the Soviets had identified the capability for conducting deep, sustained operational maneuver as the principal prerequisite for achieving success at the operational level of war. They articulated this capability in the twin concepts of deep battle (glubokiy boy) and deep operations (glubokaya operatsiya).

conditions, which were created by improvements in mobility, firepower and communications. By the early 1930s, the Soviets had identified the capability for conducting deep, sustained operational maneuver as the principal prerequisite for achieving success at the operational level of war. They articulated this capability in the twin concepts of deep battle (*glubokiy boy*) and deep operations (*glubokaya operatsiya*). Deep battle, a tactical concept, evolved to fruition by 1933, while deep operations, an operational concept, received full definition in the 1936 *Field Regulation (USTAV)*.³

As a result of mobilizing and harnessing the economic power of the nation through forced collectivization and industrialization, by 1936 the Soviets were able to field forces capable, at least in theory, of carrying out their advanced operational concepts for deep operations. The Soviets tested these operational concepts by extensively employing armored, motor-mechanized and air assault forces in field exercises during the mid-1930s.

The military purges of the Red Army (which began in 1937 and continued through 1941) and Soviet misreading of the combat experiences of the Spanish Civil War inhibited the development of deep operations and prompted the Soviets to severely truncate their opera-

tional maneuver forces.⁴ Soon, however, successful German application of these same techniques in Poland and Western Europe spurred the Soviets (in 1940 and 1941) to attempt frenetically to reconstruct strong operational maneuver forces. The subsequent fate of Soviet forces during the initial period of the Russo-German (or as the Soviets call it, the Great Patriotic) War clearly demonstrated the folly of attempting to implement fundamental force structure changes and a major rearmament program during a period of impending crisis.

During the first two years of war on the Eastern Front, while the Red Army suffered grievous losses, the Soviet High Command painstakingly reconstructed its mobile forces and experimented with their combat use. By July 1943, a modern Red Army had emerged, formed around a nucleus of tank armies and tank and mechanized corps, whose combat employment was guided by a sophisticated and effective system for the analysis and exploitation of wartime combat experience. During the last two years of war, these operational maneuver forces spearheaded Soviet offensive efforts and conditioned ever greater offensive success.

By war's end, the six tank armies and over 35 tank and mechanized corps, which operated as *front* and army mobile groups, had written a new chapter in the annals of mobile warfare. These mobile groups, the forerunners of modern operational maneuver groups, represented the essence of modern armored and mechanized warfare. Their experiences have since provided guidance and inspiration for Soviet military theorists.

From 1945 to the late 1950s, the Soviets tailored their mobile forces to operate in Central Europe in high-intensity modern war. During the 1960s, the Soviets de-emphasized operational theory because of their fixation on the inevitability of nuclear war. In the 1970s, however, Soviet military theorists revitalized and modernized their operational maneuver techniques and forces under the general rubric of conducting antinuclear maneuver (*protivoyader-*



Soviet T-34/76B medium and T-60 light tanks destroyed at an intersection in Voronezh, July 1942.

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ny maneuver).⁵ In essence, the presence on the battlefield of tactical nuclear weapons prompted renewed Soviet interest in operational and tactical maneuver. A dialectical process of change governed this evolution of military techniques and force structure, as multiple influences forced the Soviets to refine their concept of antinuclear maneuver and increasingly to emphasize operational and tactical maneuver (fig. 1).

This process continued in the 1980s as new stimuli provided impetus for Soviet definition of new forms of combat, new operational concepts and combat structures and formations (echelonment) to carry them out.

Not coincidentally, Soviet views on the nature of contemporary combat evolved, and the Soviets redefined the requirements for a force to achieve offensive success. One writer articulated the chief characteristics of future battle as:

- Transformation of traditional land actions into land-air actions.
- Broadening of the role of mobility in all troop actions.
- Development and dissemination of the practice of combat actions within enemy formations, especially raid actions.
- The initiation of battle at increasingly greater distances.

STIMULUS	CHANGES
1956-1969 Nuclear Instability (US Superiority)	Single nuclear option and the decline of operational art
1969-1975 Nuclear Parity	Emerging dual option for conventional war
1970s ATGMs (1973 Mid-East War)	Increased emphasis on mobility Better combined arms mix (Front and army level)
1975-1985 Tactical Nuclear Threat	Antinuclear maneuver Re-emergence of operational and tactical maneuver concepts Shallower strategic echelonment
Helicopter Technology	Air assault dimension of tactical maneuver
1980s AirLand Battle	Emphasis on operational maneuver Shallower operational echelonment Hardening of rear areas "Defense during the offense"
Neutron Weapons Changing Terrain • reforestation • urbanization High Precision Weapons Afghanistan War	Automation of command Better combined arms mix (division level) Emphasis on tactical maneuver Shallower tactical echelonment Emergence of air assault echelon Emphasis on raid tactics Emergence of recce-strike concept Task organization at regiment and battalion (brigade) Emphasis on radio-electronic combat, surprise and deception
1985-Present <i>Perestroika</i>	"Defensiveness" and "reasonable sufficiency" in strategic realm <i>Peredyshka</i> (breathing space) in weapons development Increased emphasis on deep operations and rapid initial tactical and operational maneuver Emergence of brigade and corps structure Stress on <i>khitrost'</i> (cunning) as adjunct to <i>Maskirovka</i> (deception) Air assault capability within divisions
1990s Weapons based on "New Physical Principles" Possible SDI Measures	De-nuclearization of traditional major theaters of operations Combined arms tailoring of all forces
Emergence of New Nuclear and Regional Forces	Reduction of armor and traditional artillery Creation of mobile new type weapons

Figure 1. The dialectic in Soviet military science

● The growth of the significance of the "information struggle," having as its goal the steering of the enemy in the direction of one's own plans and intentions.⁶

This offensive scheme posited certain distinct requirements, among which were:

● The achievement of a degree of surprise to create necessary force superiorities and to gain initial advantage. This involves deception regarding attack intentions, timing, location and scale.

● Avoidance of major attack indicators. This requires extensive prewar theater preparations and use of selective covert mobilization techniques for all services of the armed forces to minimize key attack indicators prior to war.

● In the armed forces as a whole, deployment of nuclear submarines, concentration or dispersal of military transport aviation (VTA); removal of nuclear weapons warheads from permanent facilities, and so forth.

● Reliance on shallow strategic, operational and tactical echelonment to offset less-than-full mobilization, to reap maximum surprise and to establish high initial offensive momentum.


● Preemptive destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear delivery, command and control, and deep attack systems.

● Early commitment of tactical and operational maneuver forces to achieve rapid penetration, to enmesh forces quickly, to avoid enemy nuclear response and to diminish the effectiveness of enemy high-precision fires.

● Development and proliferation, to the lowest command level (battalion), of advanced cybernetic applications to speed planning and increase the efficiency of command and control during combat.

More recent Soviet works have emphasized the increased difficulty confronted in meeting these requirements.

As late as 1985, buttressed by analysis of the impact of new, high-precision weapons on combat, the Soviets still reiterated their firm belief that a combination of operational and tactical maneuver, conducted by tailored forces operating in relatively shallow echelonment and



T-34/85 tanks, the mainstay of Soviet armored might during the last years of World War II.

By July 1943, a modern Red Army had emerged, formed around a nucleus of tank armies and tank and mechanized corps, whose combat employment was guided by a sophisticated and effective system for the analysis and exploitation of wartime combat experience. During the last two years of war, these operational maneuver forces spearheaded Soviet offensive efforts and conditioned ever greater offensive success.

employing deception to achieve surprise, could produce success in contemporary and future war. The military solution to the problem of waging contemporary warfare seemed to rest in the creation of a force structure that encompassed, in its entirety, the attributes of operational and tactical maneuver forces; namely, a corps, brigade and combined arms battalion structure. The works of V. G. Reznichenko, D. A. Dragunskiy and many other theorists conveyed this impression.

In the late 1980s, however, the dialectical process continued, and the Soviets were able to project possible changes in military conditions in the 1990s as well.

The Soviets responded to these stimuli with a range of military and political responses, whose adoption would depend directly on exist-

ing political, economic, social and military realities. Solutions to the problems of contemporary and future war include:

- Political: Arms limitations; force reductions; and denuclearization of theater of operations.
- Economic: Revitalization of the military economy (as well as civilian) by restructuring; increasing research and development competitiveness.
- Social: Reducing social tensions within the military (problem of first-year soldiers); and solving the nationalities problem.
- Military: Preemption in the initial period of war; surprise (deception); and operational and tactical maneuver (antinuclear maneuver).

It appears that the political and economic components of these realities have, at least tem-



Soviet artillerymen digging in their 2S1 122 mm self-propelled howitzers.

Impelled by economic, political and perhaps even military considerations, during the past two years the Soviets have emphasized anew the concept of "defensiveness" in their military doctrine and have argued that defensiveness contradicts and alters what admittedly had been a longstanding offensive orientation in the component levels of military science—the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

porarily, triumphed and are shaping the future Soviet force structure and concepts for conducting operational and tactical maneuver.

Impelled by economic, political and perhaps even military considerations, during the past two years the Soviets have emphasized anew the concept of "defensiveness" in their military doctrine and have argued that defensiveness contradicts and alters what admittedly had been a longstanding offensive orientation in the component levels of military science—the strategic, operational and tactical levels. They have underscored this declaration of defensiveness with proposals to create a new military force structure, which, by its very nature, must be construed by the West as defensive.⁷

As the shape and form of that new force

structure has emerged in open Soviet statements over the past months, it is clear that there is a sharp dichotomy between the offensively oriented force so evident in Soviet writings up to and through 1985 and the new and apparently defensive force currently being proposed. In essence, the former force, which was offensive in its orientation, seemed to accord with strictly military requirements, while the new defensive structure appears to reflect the dictates of economic and political reality. What is clear is that the ultimate form the Soviet force structure takes can have a profound impact on Soviet capabilities for conducting effective operational and tactical maneuver, both in an offensive and in a defensive posture.

This emerging dichotomy, concerning po-

Soviet TMS-65 chemical decontamination vehicle.



During the 1960s, the Soviets de-emphasized operational theory because of their fixation on the inevitability of nuclear war. In the 1970s, however, Soviet military theorists revitalized and modernized their operational maneuver techniques and forces . . . The presence on the battlefield of tactical nuclear weapons [had] prompted renewed Soviet interest in operational and tactical maneuver.

tential future Soviet force structures and the relative offensive and defensive potential of whatever structure finally materializes, poses certain fundamental questions that collectively form the central issue confronting those in the West who formulate arms control policies and verification regimes. Those issues relate to the conceptual basis of operational art and tactics and to force structuring as well.

The most critical issue at stake in the operational and tactical arenas is to what extent longstanding Soviet views on the value and feasibility of offensive action have been altered by contemporary military, economic and political factors. Recent and continuing Soviet efforts to assess the changing dialectical relationship between the offensive and the defense from a

military standpoint clearly indicate a dichotomy existing among Soviet military theorists regarding the potential impact of high-precision weaponry and changing geographical factors on future warfare.

While some theorists argue that the new precision guided munitions and more thoroughly urbanized or reforested terrain are likely to hinder implementation of traditional offensive concepts, others maintain that even greater reliance on deception, surprise and a combination of operational and tactical maneuver will facilitate and justify continued emphasis on offensive action.

If those who question the continued feasibility of offensive action in the initial period of future war predominate, a future defensive pos-


ture within the Soviet military is likely to result, with increased reliance on extensive and rapid prewar mobilization during periods of crisis. If, however, the traditional offensive school prevails, in light of current economic and political realities, the Soviets will likely opt for a leaner military establishment with greater stress on rapid, selective prewar mobilization, preemptive or rapid military operations and full wartime mobilization and deployment, if required.

Economic, social and political realities may override those military imperatives that argue for supremacy of the offensive to produce a genuinely defensive Soviet operational and tactical force posture. If economic and political motives converge with and reinforce military arguments

for the wisdom and feasibility of adopting a defensive posture in the future, a sharp break will have occurred in Soviet military thought. This change will have major implications for the utility of wartime operational maneuver, for the nature of Soviet restructuring and for the nature of the perceived threat. Assuming that the Soviets do not consider war to be imminent, a political corollary for dealing with future military uncertainty could be to display a defensive posture and slow the pace of change in order to gain the requisite time and resources to undertake research and development and to restructure those forces necessary to deal with the uncertainty.

Whatever operational and tactical views the Soviets embrace will have to be considered

As late as 1985, buttressed by analysis of the impact of new, high-precision weapons on combat, the Soviets still reiterated their firm belief that a combination of operational and tactical maneuver, conducted by tailored forces operating in relatively shallow echelonment and employing deception to achieve surprise, could produce success.



T-62 tanks crossing
a mobile bridge.

carefully within the context of their potential enemy's operational and tactical views. Specifically, they must be considered within the context of current NATO and US concepts of forward defense, flexible response, follow-on force attack AirLand Battle, and, even more important, within the context of whatever concepts succeed them. Future analysis of Soviet operational art and tactics must pay particular attention to such critical and volatile questions as surprise, mobilization, echelonment, maneuver, rapidly changing military technologies (such as directed energy weapons, genetic engineering, microcircuitry, and recce-strike), missions and objectives, and command and control.

Equally important issues emerge in the area of force structuring at the operational and tactical levels. By Soviet admission, the existing "heavy" force structure of the Soviet army has been best suited for conducting offensive operations. The future Soviet force structure will directly reflect the varied (social, economic, political) requirements of military doctrine, as well as satisfy the demands of operational art and tactics. As such, it will respond to economic and political, as well as military, imperatives.

Militarily, the final form of the restructured Soviet army will indicate Soviet attitudes regarding the nature of future combat, specifically the relative utility of an offensive or defensive posture. Soviet adoption of a lighter force structure, whose forward deployed elements lack components critical to the large-scale conduct of contemporary maneuver (armor, air assault and assault bridging) may indicate that the defensive school predominates. The adoption of a heavier force structure, in terms of armor and mobility assets, may indicate the reverse.

A heavy force structure will probably incorporate, partially or fully, corps, brigade and combined arms battalions as shown in figures 2 and 3.⁸ Tank battalion tactical groups, depending on their parent unit, will perform the func-



A Hind-D gunship overflies T55s during a training exercise.



The former force, which was offensive in its orientation, seemed to accord with strictly military requirements, while the new defensive structure appears to reflect the dictates of economic and political reality . . . The ultimate form the Soviet force structure takes can have a profound impact on Soviet capabilities.

Battalion Tactical Groups

Tank Battalion

3 tank cos (10 tanks each)
1 mot rif co (BMP)
1---2 SP arty btrys (8-122-mm)
1 mortar btry (8-120mm)
1 AT btry (ATGM, guns)
1 recon plt
1 SAM plt (9-SA14)
1 aslt-bridge plt
1 engr-sapper plt
1 sig plt
1 mat spt co
1 med section

Strength: 31 tanks

Motorized Rifle Battalion

3 mot rif cos
1 tank co (10 tanks)
1---2 SP arty btrys (8-12-mm)
1 mortar btry (8-120-mm)
1 AT btry (ATGM, guns)
1 recon plt
1 SAM plt (9-SA14)
1 aslt-bridge plt
1 engr-sapper plt
1 sig plt
1 mat spt co
1 med section

Strength: 10 tanks

Heavy Weapons Battalion

3 hvy wpns cos
1 arty btry
1 mortar btry
1 AT btry
1 recon plt
1 SAM plt
1 engr-sapper plt
1 sig plt
1 mat spt co
1 med section
1 tank co (optional)

Brigade Configurations

Tank Brigade

3 tank bns
(31 tanks each)
1 mot rif bn
(BMP, 10 tanks)
1 SP arty bn
(24-122mm or 152mm)
1 SAM btry (4-SPAAG,
4-SA13)
1 AT btry (or bn)
(ATGM, guns)
1 air aslt co
1 aslt crossing co
1 recon co
1 engr-sapper co
1 sig co
1 chem def co
1 mat spt co

Strength: 104 tanks

Mechanized Brigade

2 mot rif bns
(10 tanks each)
2 tank bns (31
tanks each)
1 SP arty bn
(24-122mm or 152 mm)
1 SAM btry (4-SPAAG,
4-SA13)
1 AT btry (or bn)
(ATGM, guns)
1 air aslt co
1 aslt crossing co
1 recon co
1 engr-sapper co
1 sig co
1 chem def co
1 mat spt co

Strength: 82 tanks

Motorized Rifle Brigade

3 mot rif bns
(10 tanks each)
1 tank bn (31 tanks)
1 arty bn
(24-122mm or 152 mm)
1 SAM btry (4-SPAAG,
4-SA13)
1 AT btry (or bn)
(ATGM, guns)
1 recon co
1 aslt crossing co
(optional)
1 engr-sapper co
1 chem def co
1 mat spt bn

Strength: 61 tanks

Fortification Brigade

3 hvy wpns bns
(10 tanks each)
1--2 arty-mortar bns
1--2 AT bns
1 SAM btry
1 recon co
1 engr-sapper bn
1 sig co
1 chem def co
1 mat spt co

Strength: 31 tanks

Corps Configurations

Tank Corps

3 tank bdes
(104 tanks each)
1 mech bde
(82 tanks)
1 air aslt bn
1 arty bde
1 SAM bde
1 aslt crossing bn
1 recon bn
1 engr-sapper bn
1 chem def bn
1 mat spt bde
2--3 avn sqdns

Strength: 395 tanks

Mechanized Corps

2 tank bdes
(104 tanks each)
2 mech bdes
(82 tanks)
1 air aslt bn
1 arty bde
1 SAM bde
1 aslt crossing bn
1 recon bn
1 engr-sapper bn
1 chem def bn
1 mat spt bde
2--3 avn sqdns

Strength: 372 tanks

Motorized Rifle Corps

3 mot rif bdes
(62 tanks each)
1 mec or tank bde
(82--104 tanks)
1 arty bde
1 SAM bde
1 aslt crossing bn
1 recon bn
1 engr-sapper bn
1 chem def bn
1 mat spt bde
1 avn sqdn

Strength: 265--287 tanks

Fortified Region (Corps)

2--3 fortification bdes
(31 tanks each)
1--2 mot rif or
mech bdes
(62--82 tanks)
1 arty bde
1 SAM bde
1 recon bn
1 engr-sapper bde
1 chem def bn
1 mat spt bde

Strength: 152--224 tanks

Figure 2. Soviet "heavy" force structure

Army Configuration

Combined Arms Army

2--4 motorized rifle corps or fortified regions
1 tank or mechanized corps (optional)
1 air assault corps (wartime)
support elements

Strength: 465--870 tanks

Mechanized Army

1--2 tank corps
1 mechanized corps
1 air assault corps (wartime)
support elements

Strength: 767--1,162 tanks

Figure 2. Soviet "heavy" force structure (continued)

tion of infantry support or conduct tactical maneuver in their own right; or conduct tactical and operational maneuver as part of a larger unit or formation. Motorized rifle battalion tactical groups will perform a wide range of offensive or defensive tasks depending on the function of their parent unit and formation. The heavy weapons battalion will perform primarily a defensive function within fortification brigades, although it can also take part in offensive operations as an economy-of-force subunit, by occupying large sectors of the front while

other forces concentrate in key penetration sectors.

This heavier structure corresponds closely to evolving Soviet military judgments concerning the nature of combat from the mid-1960s to 1985. A lighter force structure, evidenced by recent Soviet defensive pronouncements, will likely contain significantly less armor strength and fewer specialized forces suited to conduct operational and tactical maneuver as shown in figures 4 and 5.

This light structure reflects recent Soviet

Future "Heavy" Soviet Force Structure

Front
1-3 combined arms armies 1-2 mechanized armies
Combined Arms Army
2-4 motorized rifle corps or fortified regions 1 tank or mechanized corps
Mechanized Army
1-2 tank corps 1 mechanized corps
Tank Corps
3 tank brigades 1 mechanized brigade 1 air assault brigade
Mechanized Corps
2 mechanized brigades 2 tank brigades 1 air assault brigade
Motorized Rifle Corps
3 motorized rifle brigades 1 mechanized or tank brigade
Fortified Region
2-3 fortification brigades 1-2 motorized rifle or mechanized brigades

Figure 3. Future Soviet "heavy" force structure

Future "Light" Soviet Force Structure

Front
2-3 combined arms armies 1-2 mechanized armies
Combined Arms Army
3-4 motorized rifle divisions (corps) or fortification (defensive) divisions (corps)
Mechanized Army
1-2 motorized rifle divisions (corps) 2-3 tank (mechanized) divisions (corps)
Tank (mechanized) Division (corps)
2-3 tank regiments (brigades) 1-2 motorized rifle regiments (brigades)
Motorized Rifle Division (corps)
4 motorized rifle regiments (brigades)
Fortification (defensive) Division (corps)
3-4 machinegun-artillery regiments (brigades)

Figure 4. Future Soviet "light" force structure

Battalions		
Machinegun/Heavy Weapons 3-5 heavy weapons companies	Motorized Rifle 3-4 motorized rifle companies 1 tank company (10 tanks)	Tank (Mechanized) 2-3 tank companies (10 tanks each) 1-2 motorized rifle companies
<i>Strength: 0 tanks</i>	<i>Strength: 10 tanks</i>	<i>Strength: 20-30 tanks</i>
Regiments/Brigades		
Machinegun/Artillery 2-3 MG/HW battalions 2-3 artillery battalions 1 tank company (10 tanks)	Motorized Rifle 4 motorized rifle battalions (10 tanks each)	Tank (Mechanized) 3 tank battalions (20-30 tanks each) 1 motorized rifle battalion (10 tanks)
<i>Strength: 10 tanks</i>	<i>Strength: 40 tanks</i>	<i>Strength: 70-100 tanks</i>
Divisions/Corps		
Fortification (Defensive) 4 MG/artillery regiments (bdes) (10 tanks each)	Motorized Rifle 4 motorized rifle regiments (bdes) (40 tanks each)	Tank (Mechanized) 2-3 tank regiments (bdes) (70-100 tanks each) 1-2 motorized rifle regiments (bdes) (40 tanks each)
<i>Strength: 40 tanks</i>	<i>Strength: 160 tanks</i>	<i>Strength: 250-280 tanks</i>
Armies		
Combined Arms 3-4 motorized rifle divisions (corps) or fortification (defensive) divisions (corps)		Mechanized 1-2 motorized rifle divisions (corps) 2-3 tank (mech) divisions (corps)
Fronts		
2-3 combined arms armies		1-2 mechanized armies

Figure 5. Soviet "light" force structure

pronouncements concerning the reorganization of tanks and motorized rifle formations, the creation of artillery-machinegun formations and the ceiling of tank strength in these formations. The rough ceilings were 160 tanks for a motorized rifle division and 250-280 tanks for a tank division. Precise TOE (table of organization and equipment) strengths are derived from these announced figures.⁹

The Soviets could conceal their wartime structure and a combined arms battalion configuration by retaining key elements of combined arms battalions, such as the tank company, under regimental control (in a single tank battalion). Companies of this battalion could train and exercise with a specific motorized rifle

battalion, but only fully integrate into that battalion during prewar mobilization. Similarly, they could transform their division-regiment structure into a corps-brigade structure in a prewar period by shifting a minimal number of subunits between organizations. In essence, determining whether this can be done will be one of the priority tasks of those verifying changes in Soviet force structure.

The capabilities of whatever Soviet force ultimately emerges will depend on the compositions, task organization and mobilization potential of forward deployed forces, as well as forces within the Soviet Union. Of special concern to the West should be Soviet capabilities for rapidly reinforcing forward deployed forces that

appear "defensive" with offensive components not present in the peacetime structure.

Politically, Soviet pronouncements to date have promised creation of a force that, if fully fielded, will be markedly defensive in its composition and capabilities. The validity of these political declarations will, to a great degree, be measurable by concrete force structure changes and stringent verification. In this regard, it is essential that the Soviets abandon their past practice of concealing their force structure and instead, openly reveal the composition and structure of their forces as do Western nations. Similarly, the Soviets should openly publish their regulations as do Western nations.

Regardless of which force structure emerges, it will likely emphasize qualitative improvements to compensate for reduced quantity of forces and will stress creation of tailored forces, that can fulfill combat functions more flexibly.

If . . . the traditional offensive school prevails, in light of current economic and political realities, the Soviets will likely opt for a leaner military establishment with greater stress on rapid, selective prewar mobilization, preemptive or rapid military operations and full wartime mobilization and deployment, if required.

Finally, it is critical to understand that, in the future, the strength and capabilities of the Soviet military must be measured not only by the form of that structure, but also by the overall correlation of forces, comparative mobilization and deployment potential and the political will of the Soviets and their opponents to employ their military forces. ^{MR}

NOTES

1. M. M. Kir'yan, *Fronty nastupaly* [The fronts have attacked] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987).

2. I. M. Anan'yev, *Tankovyye armii v nastuplenii* [Tank Armies in the Offensive] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988).

3. *Vremennyy polevoy ustav RKKA 1936* [Temporary Field Regulations of the Red Army 1936] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1937), (trans. Translation Section, the Army War College, Washington, DC, September-October 1937). See also, David M. Glantz, *Soviet Military Operational Art* (London: Frank Cass, 1989).

4. David M. Glantz, "Soviet Operational Formation for Battle, A Perspective," *Military Review* (February 1983):5. The full debate over the consequences of Spanish Civil War experiences is apparent from declassified interwar US attaché records.

5. For more detail on the nature of antinuclear maneuver, see David M. Glantz, "Operational Art and Tactics," *Military Review* (December 1988):32-41. See also, David M. Glantz, "Soviet Operational Art and Tactics in an Era of Reform," *The Soviet Army in an Era of Reform* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office [SASO], 1989).

6. Stanislaw Koziej, "Anticipated Directions for Change in Tactics of Ground Forces," *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych* [Ground Forces Review], no. 9, (September 1986) 9. Translated by Harold Orenstein in *Selected Translations from the Polish*

Military Press, vol. 1, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SASO, 1988). 7. Koziej, a graduate of the General Staff Academy of the Polish Armed Forces, has written extensively in the Polish journal of the General Staff, *Mysl Wojskowa* [Military thought], on, among other topics, air land operations and the Polish theory of operational art.

7. Jacob W. Kipp, "Gorbachev's Gambit, Soviet Military Doctrine and Conventional Arms Control in an Era of Reform," *The Soviet Army in an Era of Reform* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SASO, 1989). To be republished in a forthcoming issue of the *The Journal of Soviet Military Studies*. This article exhaustively investigates the roots of Soviet defensiveness.

8. See also COL David M. Glantz, "Force Structure: Meeting Contemporary Requirements," *Military Review* (December 1988):58-71. Glantz, "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform," *The Soviet Army in an Era of Reform* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SASO, 1989). This structure mirrors the pre-1945 Soviet corps and brigade structure, with adjustments for changing technology. The armored strengths are based on the assumption the Soviets will move toward a tank company strength of 10 tanks.

9. For example, see D. T. Yazov, "V interesakh obshchey bezopasnosti mira" [In the interest of general security and peace], *Izvestiya* [News] (February 1989), 3.

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