Corps Tactical Deception: Who's Fooling Whom
Abstract
This monograph examines tactical deception from the US Army corps perspective. Through an examination of the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz, five criteria are distilled that form the framework for the study. The Criteria are centralized planning, enemy commander as deception target, plan aimed at all enemy collection assets, adequate forces allocated, and short duration. The criteria are then examined through historical examples. A study of a corps level deception in British North Africa, 1941 is followed by two American efforts in France in 1944, a Soviet deception in 1943, and the Israeli reaction in the Sinai in 1973. The historical examples flesh out the theoretical criteria which then are applied to the current deception methodology used by the US Army. Finally, future challenges are examined in terms of current capabilities. The monograph concludes that the current deception methodology is not taken seriously by most leaders. Doctrine and leader development admit the need for deception training, but offer few specific guidelines. Training produces few examples of effective deception. Organization and equipment may be too divided between corps and division to be used effectively; some form of centralized control over all the assets is required.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 20, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA233249
Entities
People
- Paul C. Jussel
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College