

Corps Tactical Deception: Who's Fooling Whom?

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

CORPS TACTICAL DECEPTION: WHO'S FOOLING WHOM? by MAJ Paul C. Jussel, USA, 45 pages.

This monograph examines tactical deception from the US Army corps perspective. Through an examination of the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz, five criteria are distilled that form the framework for the study. The criteria are centralized planning, enemy commander as deception target, plan aimed at all enemy collection assets, adequate forces allocated, and short duration.

The criteria are then examined through historical examples. A study of a corps level deception in British North Africa, 1941 is followed by two American efforts in France in 1944, a Soviet deception in 1943, and the Israeli reaction in the Sinai in 1973. The historical examples flesh out the theoretical criteria which then are applied to the current deception methodology used by the US Army. Finally, future challenges are examined in terms of current capabilities.

The monograph concludes that the current deception methodology is not taken seriously by most leaders. Doctrine and leader development admit the need for deception training, but offer few specific guidelines. Training produces few examples of effective deception. Organization and equipment may be too divided between corps and division to be used effectively; some form of centralized control over all the assets is required.

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SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION

"All warfare is based on deception."

Sun Tzu, 500 BC

"Deception is common sense soldiering."

GEN Carl Vuono, 1986

The two quotes, though almost twenty-five hundred years apart, represent an attitude towards conflict that suggests a need to do everything possible to win a war. In addition to the preparations for and the conduct of war, deceiving the enemy as to the real objective of an engagement, battle, or campaign could very well be the key to success. Misleading the enemy into orienting the wrong way for an engagement and thus gaining an advantage represents General Vuono's common sense approach. This common sense approach to a difficult task, that of deceiving an intelligent enemy, becomes even more difficult in light of a dwindling force and competing interests for the resources of that force.

The US Army most frequently deploys ground forces under the command and control of a corps headquarters. This organization is responsible for the operational planning and employment of its subordinate elements within the area of operations, as well as the tactical planning for battles. To maximize the advantages of its units, the corps staff must carefully plan when and where tactical forces should be employed. To gain and maintain an advantage, deception measures are used to feed the enemy wrong information about the intentions and capabilities of US forces. Therefore, the corps G3 cell, specifically the plans cell, must be well-

trained in the art of tactical deception and the use of available tactical equipment.

As the Army grows smaller, the requirement to effectively employ the remaining units increases. The employment of friendly units depends on how effectively any potential enemy is misled as to the use or show of force. Tactical deception involves the use of soldiers and resources that are scarce; the deception operation must provide a proportional increase in force capabilities. Does the US Army's current deception methodology represent an effective system to provide that proportional increase? Is the corps Military Intelligence Operations Battalion the right organization to hold the key for the deception effort? Perhaps more importantly, and the question this study seeks to answer, do the corps deception planners effectively train to deceive in a combat environment?

There are several terms that must be understood before continuing with the examination of deception. Those measures that are, or should be, routinely accomplished by a unit to hide or deny information about itself to an enemy are grouped under the heading of operational security (OPSEC). OPSEC includes many subsets of security that should occur on a continuous basis. Portrayal is oriented towards showing the enemy something that is not real. Together, they form the basis for deception. Deception involves specific planning to cause an enemy to "do something counter to his interests."¹ Surprise results from an enemy not anticipating a friendly event in time to react effectively; it is what a successful deception operation hopes to achieve. However, neither OPSEC, portrayal, nor deception in and of themselves produce surprise; rather they can lead to it.

¹ US Army, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols (1985): p. 1-22.

Training in deception is far more than sending false messages and taking circuitous routes to an objective. It calls for the integration of many assets and activities to effectively dupe an enemy into believing what we want him to believe. The corps is chosen for this study because of its relationship to the tactical and operational levels of war. Its influence on both levels needs to be examined in terms of deception. Corps operations, in regards to deception, are governed by several areas. Doctrine gives the corps commander and staff methods, techniques, and procedures for operating. Organizations provide a basis for conducting operations. Materiel and equipment are part of those organizations and must be used efficiently and effectively to accomplish the assigned mission. Finally, training and leadership allow the planning and estimate process to bring the doctrine, organizations, and materiel together against an enemy. If all five do not mesh well, victory is difficult to achieve.

This study examines the background to deception, how the US Army currently trains in deception, and implications for the future. Section Two of this study examines what the classical theorists Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Clausewitz have said about deception and how deception applies to tactical operations. This will establish the theoretical basis for the study's evaluation criteria. The third section examines deception operations from World War II and the Middle East conflicts and aids in the validation of the theoretical criteria. Section Four examines the current capabilities of the US Army corps and how deception is integrated in doctrine, organization, leadership, materiel, and training programs. Section Five attempts to outline the challenges to be faced by the Army in the years ahead. It will indicate where potential training shortfalls exist and where resources may

be inadequate to maintain a high state of deception readiness. The last section will summarize the conclusions and provide implications for today's deception planners.

SECTION TWO - THEORY

War and human conflict have remained constant for thousands of years. When Sun Tzu wrote his Art of War nearly twenty-five hundred years ago, he expressed the same concerns over offense and defense that modern writers wrestle with. Sun Tzu was concerned about where the proper place and time for a battle was and how a campaign should be conducted. In order to properly bring an enemy to battle, Sun Tzu estimated that deceptive measures must be employed.²

He reasoned that an enemy was certainly capable of knowing the friendly order of battle and could make an estimation about strengths and weaknesses. What an enemy could not predict was what the friendly forces would do in a particular situation. Sun Tzu took that uncertainty and reasoned that every action a friendly force took must be done for a purpose, to maintain or enhance the uncertainty. To expand the uncertainty, every action must be designed to give or create a certain impression in the mind of the enemy.³ That is, all of the different units within an army were focused on why particular actions and movements were necessary.

Sun Tzu called for the implementation of a deception plan before armed conflict began. Even as an enemy nation began to gear up for war,

²Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. S. B. Griffith (1971): 66-71.

³Sun Tzu: 105.

they were deceived about the friendly nation's army and dispositions. As armed conflict grew imminent, Sun Tzu urged a continuation of the confusion in the mind of the enemy. He advocated never giving the enemy a clear picture of what friendly troops were doing or preparing for. Every maneuver was designed to confuse the enemy as to where friendly units were going to strike.⁴ Thus the multiplicity of moves by the friendly units would keep the enemy off-balance and uncertain over where the assault would strike.

The enemy's uncertainty was the key to this theorist's focus. If success was defined as making the enemy do what you, the friendly force, wanted him to do, then everything your force did had to be a part of that effort. To do that, centralized planning had to be performed to produce an integrated plan that moved units to where they were needed, yet left enough doubt in the enemy's mind as to what their intentions could be.⁵ The centralized planning was key because of the different elements of the army. Spies and other information gatherers had to be focused on certain information to look for as well as to provide to the enemy. The army itself was moved and supplied in different ways in order to create a certain impression for the enemy. All of the movement and preparation for the movement was done in secret or masked by false preparations designed to keep the enemy guessing.

Sun Tzu's main contribution to the art of deception was the need for centralized and integrated planning. This becomes the first theoretical criterion for this study. The overall coordination of the army's real and

⁴Sun Tzu: 66, 102.

⁵Sun Tzu: 93, 100.

deception effort was paramount. The two plans had to be synchronized to produce the desired effect in the enemy's mind. Everything had to be integrated, from supplies to movements to routes used, to create the right impression. The only way to ensure effective and efficient coordination was to centralize the planning of each deception operation.

Hundreds of years later, Antoine Jomini, in his book The Art of War, echoed many of the tenets of the earlier Chinese theorist. He was an advocate of the utility of "... reconnaissances, spies, bodies of light troops ..., and questioning of deserters and prisoners" to uncover the intentions of his enemies. However, he cautioned against placing too much credence in these reports and warned a commander to seek information from a multitude of sources.⁶ This caution was a demonstration of the belief in a capable deception effort.

By not giving credence to his reconnaissance efforts, Jomini endorsed the effort an enemy placed in deception. The implication was that the spies would hear what the enemy wanted them to hear; the reconnaissance would discover what the enemy wanted discovered; and the light bodies of troops would find what the enemy wanted found. For Jomini, only the weight of the army's main body would force the enemy to reveal their true intentions. The deception had to be geared to force a commander to place his main body in the wrong place at the wrong time. A second theoretical criterion can be drawn from this: the main body commander must be the deception target so that he will make the desired decision.

Jomini went further. The deception target must be deceived by the information made available to him. This information must come not only

⁶Antoine Jomini, The Art of War, ed. J. D. Hittle (1987): 539-540.

from his usual sources, spies and reconnaissance units, but also from his own view of the battlefield. He can be deceived by a demonstration of troops or a false movement of units.⁷ But he must be the person fooled; though duping the commander's staff may help, the man in charge is the final arbiter.

The third theoretical criterion for deception has already been alluded to: the deception effort must be broad based and cover all of the enemy's collection assets. Jomini's distrust of reconnaissance troops and spies was countered by his endorsement of detachments as a ruse. Together they combine to indicate the need for a thorough plan that will provide the appropriate indicators to all information gathering sources. The planned deception must address each possible source of information that the enemy might use to uncover friendly plans. This sort of all-encompassing plan will feed the enemy information that is confirmed from a variety of different sources.

Perhaps the most important theorist that considered surprise and deception was Carl von Clausewitz. He considered surprise a key element of war and believed it should be used regularly to gain an advantage over an enemy. Deception and surprise were considered together when he wrote "... of the desire to surprise the enemy by our plans and dispositions, especially those concerning the distribution of forces."⁸

Secrecy and speed were the two components of Clausewitz's surprise. The implication was that plans had to be kept secret from the army as a whole; the deception plan had to work on a need-to-know basis. Speed also

⁷Jomini: 516.

⁸Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (1964): 198.

reflected a level of training that was required to execute as well as exploit the plan.⁹ To ensure both speed and secrecy, adequate forces had to be allocated to the deception plan. If too many forces were involved, the plan could easily be compromised. Its execution may also be slowed because of the friction involved with too many troops. If too few or the wrong type of troops were allocated, the plan would not seem believable to the enemy commander. The fourth criterion of deception planning could be characterized as adequate forces allocated for a believable plan.

This dilemma was Clausewitz's greatest caution against deception. Though he firmly believed that the best way to achieve surprise was through deception, he did not believe that anything truly significant would come from it.¹⁰ His fear was that, even if adequate forces were allocated to the deception plan, the enemy would quickly uncover the plan, assess the dispersion of friendly units, and defeat them in detail. The "... risk that nothing will be gained ..." was an overriding concern. The expected result of the operation had to be balanced against the resources necessary to conduct an effective plan. Clausewitz did not feel the deception effort warranted the dispersion of forces.

This leads to the fifth criterion. Clausewitz estimated that effective deception and surprise could only be achieved at the tactical level. Because time and space were "limited in scale", surprise through the use of deception was possible.¹¹ At any level above tactics, it became more and more difficult to hide the activities of an army or nation. Thus, it may be

⁹Clausewitz: 198.

¹⁰Clausewitz: 199-200; 203. Though not specifically mentioning deception, the sentence reads: "Only the commander who imposes his will can take the enemy by surprise; ..."

¹¹Clausewitz: 198.

possible to flank an enemy or steal a march, but it would be almost impossible to prepare for war without an enemy knowing it. The conclusion was made that only short-term, tactical deceptions are possible. Any attempt at higher deception will require an unacceptable amount of resources and effort. It may even contribute to defeat.

In summary, five effective criteria can be gleaned from the three theoretical writings. From Sun Tzu comes the need for centralized planning. Jomini offers the enemy commander as the deception target and the need for a plan aimed at all collection assets. Clausewitz offers the requirement for the allocation of adequate forces and the effectiveness of a short-term plan. With these theoretical criteria as a beginning, an analysis of historical examples is necessary to establish the basis for study of current deception practices.

SECTION THREE - HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Deception has been used for centuries as an integral part of war. Though many historical examples may be cited of corps-sized units conducting deception operations, this analysis will focus on deception operations starting with World War II and continuing up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The criteria discussed earlier will be assessed in light of the operations cited.

One of the earliest deception operations was the British preparation for counterattack against Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's forces in October, 1942. Rommel had experienced tremendous success in attacking the British forces in northern Africa throughout most of 1941 and 1942. Now, with a

change of leadership and proper preparation, the British hoped to regain the initiative. The key to the attack was the successful masking of the X (BR) Corps movement forward.

In late 1940, General Sir Archibald Wavell created a central deception planning cell known as "A" force. This group performed fitfully throughout 1941, but was tasked to do the centralized planning for Operation *Crusader*, the British offensive at El Alamein.¹² The entire plan was titled "Bertram" and consisted of several coordinated deceptions. They portrayed the movement of forces from Alexandria forward into both real and fake assembly areas. They also portrayed the formation of a false supply base to the south along a false axis of advance while the real supply depot at El Alamein was hidden.¹³

The X (BR) Corps movement was hidden by plans "Martello", "Meltingpot", and "Murrayfield". The former two plans were designed to hide the movement of the 1st and 10th Armored Divisions from assembly areas forty miles in the rear to forward, concealed positions just behind the front lines. The latter plan was designed to hide the fact the Corps had departed the rear area.

The British "A" force used a broad based plan to portray their deception story. False vehicles, visually modified vehicles, fake radio traffic, and prepared traffic patterns were designed to give German and Italian intelligence networks the proper signals. The story proved effective. German General Georg Stumme, stand-in commander for Rommel, did not suspect the British were ready or strong enough to attack, let alone attack

¹²Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (1980): 19.

¹³Cruickshank: 22-23, 26.

in the direction that they did. The entire "Bertram" deception was executed in two weeks, ending with the 23 October bombardment and assault. The Germans were so thoroughly convinced by the deception that they did not move two *Fanzer* divisions from the deception area for four days; two days after Rommel personally took command at the front.¹⁴

This was a deception success that a corps readily executed. Planned thoroughly by a central cell, sufficient assets were available to execute the plan. The story was broad enough to fool the enemy's information collection sources; yet, it was not so lengthy that the sources became overly suspicious. Perhaps most importantly, the story was good enough to lull the Germans into a secure defense, with no intention of recalling Rommel from his rest.

Once the United States entered the war, every effort was made by the other Allies to pass on the lessons learned about deception thus far in the war. American Army leaders were not convinced by the weight of evidence; practical experience was necessary to teach them.¹⁵ It was not until 1944 that the 23rd Special Troops was formed to centrally control the deception efforts in the European Theater of Operations. This special unit consisted of several engineer units, a signal unit, and a controlling headquarters. They were involved in every major deception operation for the rest of the war.

The XX (US) Corps was one of the first recipients of the centralized deception effort. In support of the operations against Metz, the XX (US) Corps had to cross the Moselle River. To shift attention from the real

¹⁴Cruikshank: 31-33; David Irving, *The Trail of the Fox* (1977): 259-267.

¹⁵Michael B. Weimer, "Tactical Deception Capabilities in the Heavy Division--Myth Versus Reality" (1987): 11-12.

crossing site of the main effort (90ID), the 23rd Special Troops and the 1/377 IN/95ID were detailed to replicate elements of the 90ID downriver from the actual site.¹⁶

Enough time existed for the 23rd Special Troops to orchestrate and implement the deception plan. From the 4th through the 9th of November, the deception troops fabricated assault boats, moved vehicles around, and created the appearance of an impending crossing. Sound trucks were emplaced and visible evidence of bridge building was orchestrated along the banks of the tributary streams of the Moselle. Soldiers of the 1/377 IN went so far as to change shoulder patches from the 95ID to the 90ID to enhance the operation.¹⁷

Though no German evidence is readily available to interpret the results of the deception, certain deductions can be made. The effort was centrally controlled by the 23rd Special Troops under the name "Task Force Cheese." Electronic intelligence, human intelligence and signal intelligence were all targeted for the deception, though no value judgement can be made on the effectiveness of the plan against the German collection effort. Sufficient forces were made available to execute the plan. Sufficient time was also available for the story to be established and confirmed before the real assault crossing took place on the 9th of November by the real 90ID.

This deception had limited success. Though an infantry battalion was detailed to execute the deception plan, it received a different mission shortly before the attack commenced. Its focus was then oriented on making an actual assault crossing to seize ground on the east bank of the

¹⁶"Report on Tactical Deception Operation Casanova, 4-9 December 1944": 2.

¹⁷"Report . . . Casanova": 3, 6-7.

Moselle. To the battalion commander, LTC Joseph E. Decker, the dilemma had only one logical conclusion and what should have been a demonstration was turned into the real thing.¹⁸ Once identified as a real threat by a unit other than the one portrayed, Lt. General Herman Priess, Commander of the XIII SS Corps, turned his focus to the north and the real 90ID.

Later in 1944, as the Americans continued to slug their way through the Lorraine region, portions of the 23rd Special Troops were directed to the effort in Belgium. There they participated in the effort to penetrate the Huertgen Forest by the V (US) and VII (US) Corps. V Corps had not succeeded in its attempt to penetrate the region, so First Army Commander Lt. General Courtney H. Hodges ordered a reinforcement of VII Corps and the resumption of the attack. 4ID became the focal point for the reinforcement.

The 23rd Special Troops planners had to operate under the assumption that German intelligence already knew the troop list of both Corps and would know if new units arrived in theater. The deception plan had to show the Germans exactly what they expected to see: business as usual.¹⁹

Allied units were routinely rotated off the front line to Camp Elsenborn in Belgium. There units were able to rest and refit before returning to front line duty. The deception plan called for the replacement of 4ID on the front line by 9ID from Elsenborn; 4ID would then rotate to Belgium. The actual plan did switch 4ID and 9ID but sent 4ID north to join VII Corps and become the main effort in the Corps attack.

The 23rd Special Troops and assets from both V and VII Corps participated in the deception plan under the name Task Force Elsenborn. The

¹⁸"Report . . . Casanova": 8; Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign (1950): 48, 377.

¹⁹"Report on Tactical Deception Operation Elsenborn, 3-12 November 1944": 3.

4ID was carefully studied to determine its patterns and habits so a faithful representation could be produced in Eisenborn. As 4ID units began their move north, 23rd Special Troops replicated their movement to the rest area. Though the real unit moved at night under tight discipline, false 4ID convoys moved at dawn and dusk for the purpose of being seen and reported. The effect was exactly as anticipated. The Germans did not suspect the real movement of the division until shortly before the VII Corps attack commenced; they could not react in time.²⁰

The problem of adequate forces became significant as the small TF Eisenborn tried to portray the three Regimental Combat Teams of the 4ID. Not enough vehicles nor the right type vehicles were available to fully replicate the division. Special timings had to be worked out to approximate an actual convoy. The easiest portion of the deception story was the signals deception. TF Eisenborn signallers replicated the special nuances and accents of 4ID signallers to accurately portray them. Even the frequency of mail delivery was noted and produced by the TF.²¹

The plan was successful. Centrally planned and executed by elements of two corps as well as the special deception organization, it created a picture that German intelligence believed. It was the same operation that the Americans normally performed for their units on the front lines. The Germans fully expected to see what was portrayed and did not question the reports of their collection and intelligence efforts. The two most significant problems of the operation were enough forces and the duration.

²⁰"Report ... Eisenborn": 5, 25.

²¹"Report ... Eisenborn": 22.

The size of TF Elsenborn has already been alluded to. Without enough vehicles, skill at timings and a great deal of luck were necessary to replicate the 4ID convoys. None of the combat units of the division nor corps assets could be easily diverted to assist in the deception plan. With few combat vehicles available, representing the Regimental Combat Teams and their supporting arms was difficult. Therefore very judicious mixing of false convoys and real, slightly rerouted convoys was essential in making the plan work.

The desire to make the deception plan last for almost two weeks raised the question of how long a corps-level tactical deception could be sustained. The planning for the movement of 4ID took place two weeks before the actual move. When it began on 3 November, assumptions had to be made about the destination of the division. Vehicle convoys and radio nets could represent the units moving; they could also represent the advance of the division arriving at Elsenborn. But the Germans had to know how long it would take for the division to close on the rest area as well as what the traffic patterns should look like at Elsenborn. Other factors such as the build up of supplies behind VII Corps, increased vehicle traffic, and more than usual combat support units could not easily be hidden. The fact that the deception worked until 11 November highlights the dedication and skill of the 23rd Special Troops as well as the emphasis the Corps and Army commanders placed on a successful operation.²²

The Soviets became great practitioners of the art of deception during World War II. Though they did not have great opportunity during 1941 and some of 1942, they did evolve techniques that stood the test against the

²²"Report . . . Elsenborn": 7.

German troops for the remainder of the war. Perhaps one of the more successful corps-sized deception operation was executed around Kiev in November, 1943.

The Red Army had established a small bridgehead across the Dnieper River several miles north of Kiev. With attacks stalling elsewhere along the line, Front Commander General N. F. Vatutin was directed to exploit the apparent advantage of the bridgehead. No additional forces were allocated to the Front to make the attack; some other method was needed to concentrate enough forces for the attack. Vatutin elected to withdraw certain units, principally the 3rd Guards Tank Army, from one end of his line and secretly move them to the other end for the attack. The distance to be covered was over two hundred kilometers.²³

The planning and control of the deception operation took place at Vatutin's headquarters. The remaining Soviet divisions were to keep continuous pressure on the German units while the 3rd GTA withdrew. Key to this portion of the operation was backfill of the gap in the Soviet lines as the 3rd GTA moved out. Other front line units spread north and south to fill in the hole while simultaneously maintaining contact in their original front.

The challenge to the 3rd GTA staff was to withdraw from enemy contact, reorient north, march over two hundred kilometers, rearm and refit, and finally launch into the attack. They apparently met the challenge for less than thirty-six hours after being told to disengage, the Army was moving. To mask the movement, broken and destroyed vehicles as well as

²³Richard Armstrong, Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak (1988): 9; David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in World War Two (1989): 263. An important note here: the 3rd GTA had about as many vehicles, both combat and combat support, as an American Corps. Thus the selection of this operation as part of Corps tactical deception.

fake vehicles were emplaced along the old front; contact with the Germans was maintained by rear guards until relieving units arrived. The Soviets were favored with bad weather, the effects of which they sought to multiply through the use of smoke. Command posts continued their normal radio traffic until 3rd GTA was well on its way to the north.

Of course, through the 3rd GTA and Front assets, enough resources were available to execute the operation. Engineers built fortifications and trenches and artillery units continued their normal fires. Rehearsals by relieving units created the impression that activity was increasing south of Kiev, rather than the build-up to the north. The buildup occurred over a short period which further confused the Germans. Though the 3rd GTA had been moving for two days, German intelligence on 29 October could not pin down which unit it was. None of the front-line German units discovered the 3rd GTA until the operation was complete and the Soviet attack was well on its way.²⁴

This successful deception operation indicates the validity of the criteria earlier established. The operation was centrally planned at 3rd GTA headquarters. Adequate forces were available to execute the plan; indeed the entire Army executed it. All of the German collection assets were targeted to receive the right signals from the stay-behind and relieving units. German intelligence was thoroughly duped. They were unable to penetrate the deception not only because of the effective "cloak" placed over the movement, but also because of the short life it needed to live. The deception had only to last from 27 October, when the movement began, to 3 November, when the attack was launched. Though indicators were available

²⁴Glantz: 265-267.

to uncover the move, there was not enough time to thoroughly analyze the information. Thus the German commanders in the area were blind to the possibility of a significant armored push in the area north of Kiev.²⁵

By the end of World War II, the Allies were convinced in the utility of deception. However, there was not much need for it at the corps tactical level in the next conflict, Korea, nor in the jungles of Southeast Asia.²⁶ The next place deception took on any significant tactical role was in the Middle East as Israel became a perceived threat to the surrounding Arab nations. Though the subject of Israel's deception involves echelons above corps, it is significant to study the division stationed in the Sinai and its reaction to the Egyptian attack.

As October, 1973 opened, very few Israelis expected a war. Certainly tension was high between Israel and her neighbors; but that was nothing new. The Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal was manned by the Jerusalem Brigade, a reserve unit, while the remainder of Major General Avraham Mendler's division was stationed further back in Israel. The Egyptians kept the execution of their plan at a very high level and so sought to deceive the Israel high command. As a result they also deceived the staff of the division manning the Bar-Lev Line. This prevented General Mendler from activating his division until it was too late. In this case, the targets of the deception, the Israeli General Staff and political leaders, were duped and therefore influenced their subordinates. This could only be accomplished through the centralized Egyptian planning cell.²⁷

²⁵Glantz: 268-270.

²⁶Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War (1969): 167.

²⁷Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (1982):242-243; Sead el Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (1980): 201-203.

The Israeli division in the Sinai relied heavily on national sources to gain information. They also relied on their own bits of information to gauge what was going on in Egypt in the first days of October. Though there was activity, it was passed off as normal mobilization training. The Israelis could not see the night moves by the Egyptians either through their national technical means or through their local sources. As the Egyptians openly prepared for the assault, the Israelis believed there was nothing out of the ordinary going on.²⁸

The Egyptians certainly devoted adequate force to the execution of the deception plan, five divisions and the assets of two armies. They also relied on the necessarily short duration of their deception to hide what was really going on. Though they had practiced mobilization many times over the past years, this mobilization was slightly different. It had to hold to the standard story of "normal exercise" for as long as possible. The fact that most commanders did not know they were going to attack until the day before underscores the duration aspect of the plan.²⁹

The reaction of Mandler's units is entirely consistent with a completely surprised unit. The forward elements of the division were notified only hours before the attack commenced. The remaining brigades of the division were notified after it was too late to be in position for the attack. Though the Egyptian plans were uncovered at the last minute, there was no time to react for the Israelis. The Egyptian's surprise was overwhelming.

²⁸Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (1980): 76-78.

²⁹Shazly: 211.

This short look at historical examples of successful deception have confirmed the validity of the theoretical criteria. The planning for deception must be centralized to achieve the maximum effect. The opposing commander must be the target of the deception; he is the final decision maker for enemy forces. Every type of collection asset the enemy controls must be targeted to ensure all sources of information are covered and provide the right type of information. Enough forces must be dedicated to the deception plan to make it a believable plan as well as an executable plan. Finally, the plan can not be carried on for a very long time; its duration must be carefully gauged to gain the maximum effects.

SECTION FOUR - ANALYSIS OF CURRENT CAPABILITIES

With the previous sections as a background, this section assesses the US Army's current deception capabilities. It looks at the doctrine behind deception use, the organization of forces tasked to plan and execute tactical deception, the specific materiel they have available, the leadership attitude necessary, and how deception is integrated into training. It also assesses how the US Army has "revitalized the 'lost art'" of deception since the publication of FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception in October, 1988.³⁰

Current doctrine identifies the corps as the interface for operational and tactical levels of war. The responsibility of a corps commander is to employ his forces in consonance with directions from above as well as with the situation on the ground. With US forces relatively small in number, and projected to get even smaller, the need for a corps commander to employ his

³⁰US Army, FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception (1988): 1-0.

forces efficiently becomes even greater. He must fight them skillfully to accomplish his mission; tactical deception becomes a key ingredient in the fighting potential of the corps.

The current keystone manual for all operations, FM 100-5, Operations, establishes the start point for deception considerations. It describes deception as "... a vital part of tactical operations ..." as well as being simple and believable. It correctly identifies the enemy commander as the target and reaffirms the risk of dedicating adequate forces to deception. The G3 is specifically identified as the deception coordinator; he "assembles the deception plan..."³¹ Though the manual does identify the necessity to consider deception, it does not go far enough in establishing the necessity to use every deception method available in the conduct of operations. In the five chapters that cover offensive and defensive operations, deception is mentioned only three times in the context of an idea that has some merit. As the keystone manual for all operations, deception should be woven throughout FM 100-5 as a corollary to surprise.

The next manual down the hierarchy, FM 100-15, Corps Operations, tasks the corps with "planning and execution of tactical level battles." It then describes the need for the corps to control "collateral operations" that assist in mission accomplishment. Logically, the requirement for corps to control the collateral operations is sound for reasons of economy; there are never enough resources, so if two related activities can be combined, so much the better. One of the collateral operations identified is deception.³²

³¹US Army, FM 100-5, Operations (1986): 53.

³²US Army, FM 100-15, Corps Operations (1989): 1-1, 1-2.

The corps G3 plans cell is the only identified element required to "incorporate" deception into anything. Though listed under G3 functions, no other element is tasked to plan or execute deception operations.³³ The G3 section does receive assistance from the Military Intelligence Brigade's Operations Battalion in the form of a Battlefield Deception (BAT-D) element. This cell is specially trained at the US Army's Intelligence School to aid the G3 with deception.

The BAT-D, according to FM 90-2, has some significant responsibilities for deception. It recommends the deception objective and story to the commander for his approval. It develops the plan, prepares the annex, and recommends the necessary actions to accomplish the objective. It also monitors the execution of the plan, recommends changes, and interprets results.³⁴ All of these actions are performed by the 12-man cell during every corps operation.

Does the current doctrine measure up against the established criteria? There are some apparent gaps in the doctrine that need to be closed. Planning is centralized under the corps G3 plans cell. However, the requirement to actively integrate deception planning into courses of action (COA) developed by the plans cell is missing. According to FM 100-15, "integration of deception . . . should be an integral part of the development and analysis of each COA."³⁵ Not only is "should" too weak a word, but the plans cell is physically separated from the major corps staff in the development of COAs. Though FM 90-2 recommends several methods of

³³FM 100-15: Appendix C.

³⁴FM 90-2: Appendix A.

³⁵FM 100-15: 4-15.

planning for deception, it does not recommend the full integration of the staff until a decision has been reached by the commander as to which COA will be followed.³⁶

The enemy commander is correctly identified as the target of deception operations, though not in the corps operations manual. FM 90-2 gives the correct target picture as the enemy decision-maker that controls enemy forces that will react to the deception operation.³⁷ The focus of that idea must be translated to the corps manual to guide the G3 planners in the design of a deception operation. FM 90-2 also outlines the requirement to target all of the enemy's collection assets and to present a picture that represents a complete mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support assets. Once again FM 100-15 does not give the full picture of requirements for the blanketing of enemy intelligence collecting sources and the portrayal of fake forces. Neither manual alludes to the short survivability of deception operations, though FM 90-2 does indicate surprise, the result of deception, is fleeting.

This look at doctrine indicates a problem with deception. It is not pervasive in manuals such as FM 100-5 and 100-15, but is relegated to discussion in supporting manuals such as FM 90-2. The doctrinal requirements for deception should be noted and discussed in all levels of manuals and especially in the key manuals that planners turn to for guidance. As shown with FM 100-15, the manual that addresses the considerations for unit operations, from corps to battalion, only say

³⁶FM 90-2: 4-2. The plans cell works out of a separate van from the rest of the corps main. The physical distance and separation from the major staff officers can lead to planning in isolation.

³⁷FM 90-2: 1-37.

deception is a consideration and it must be done well. Doctrinally, deception procedures must be fully integrated into all unit manuals. Only then will deception be accepted as a requirement and integrated into operations.

The organization of the cells tasked to plan and execute deception and their distribution throughout the Army is the second area of current considerations. The 12-man deception cell alluded to above is only one of several possible cells in the corps. The divisions subordinate to the corps also have deception cells assigned to the Military Intelligence Battalion and working for the Division G3. The cells range from 19 men in the heavy, airborne, and air assault divisions to 6 men in the light divisions. Are these separate cells capable of doing what doctrine says they should do? Measured against the established criteria, there appears to be a duplication of effort and a dilution of assets.

The duplication of labor between the corps and division cells does not work towards the common goal of deceiving the enemy. The division cell becomes an executor of the corps cell's plan; no specialized organization needs to exist to do this. The deception effort can better be controlled by the corps than it can be by division. The integration of the corps staff, with both the operational and tactical objectives in mind, will produce a better orchestrated deception effort. The centralized corps control would obviate the need for a division to be read into the full extent of the deception plan; the division becomes an executor and not a planner for deception. The requirement for the division cells to plan and execute a certain portion of a deception operation becomes nothing more than the normal execution of any

mission. The intent of the deception must be clearly understood, but no specialized deception cell needs to exist in the division.³⁸

The target and focus of the cells' deception efforts are based in doctrine. But what assets are available to the corps deception cell to assess and influence the enemy collection capability that are not available to the division cell? There are certainly more assets at corps levels that can be tasked to assist in targeting enemy collection assets as well as determining the enemy's acceptance of the friendly deception operation. Though the division can task those assets also, the time required to pass from the division G3 through the corps G3 to the MI Brigade, for instance, is reduced if the corps G3 is centrally controlling the deception operation.

The forces allocated specifically for deception planning may be misaligned as indicated previously, but there appear to be enough total personnel within the corps (including the division cells) to plan deception. Based on the factors of METT-T, adequate forces exist to execute any planned deception operation as long as the appropriate level commander is willing to commit the necessary forces. The real decision is who the appropriate level commander should be. Based on the deception being centrally controlled by the corps G3, the decision to allocate forces for a deception operation should be a corps decision. The division staff may not have the same perspective that the corps staff has. Furthermore, the corps has a broader range of assets from which to select. The corps deception cell can also be tasked to assist a unit in the execution of their deception. The allocation of adequate forces is easier for the corps to absorb based on

³⁸An outgrowth of the division as executor only is the discussion over "Should a unit be told it is doing a deception?" and thus risk a half-hearted effort. This author's position is the division will execute what it is told to do; no discussion of a deception operation is necessary.

the assessment of the duration of the desired deception. Units can be tasked to participate in deception operations that are not immediately involved in the real operation. The tasked units may be part of a follow and support force or even the reserve, both of which have greater time and space considerations at corps level than a division is capable of handling at its level.

The organization of the current deception cells leaves something to be desired. With the corps as the interface between the operational and tactical levels, an organization should exist at that level to integrate the deception requirements for both levels. Having a large deception cell at division level may be counterproductive to the desired result of an integrated deception operation.

Deception operations are designed to aid friendly survivability as well as enemy manipulation. In order to manipulate, specific visual and electronic signs are required to deceive the enemy. As stated previously, specific units can be tasked to participate in a portrayal operation. Corps has a broader base of combat, combat support, and combat service support assets with which to support the deception. There is also specific deception equipment designed to portray false or fake images of real equipment. This materiel area of the deception field is considered next.

One set of this deception specific equipment is known as multispectral close combat decoys (MCCD). They currently exist as two-dimensional replicas of M1 tanks and M2/M3 fighting vehicles and are placed in the deception cell of the division's M1 battalion. Test models of a second set of deception specific equipment, called the communications deception

system (CDS), exist in some divisions. These devices are all designed to assist in the replication of real vehicles and units. But to what effect?

The established criteria indicate the MCCD and the CDS may best be employed under the centralized control of the corps deception organization. For reasons enumerated previously, the corps deception cell may best handle the portrayal devices in an integrated manner with a tasked real unit to portray a much larger unit. Currently, this capability is divided between corps and division, with each level have some deception equipment. Each heavy division has some MCCDs, but not enough to portray a viable threat to an enemy.³⁹ Centralized planning and control is thwarted if corps must first retrieve the MCCDs from divisions and redistribute them to the tasked deception unit. CDS does not exist in sufficient numbers to replicate anything now. However, the potential for it to portray communications nodes associated with battalions, brigades, and possibly divisions exists.

Both devices have the potential to deceive most of an enemy's intelligence collection assets. With the augmentation of these devices to a real unit, the capability to blanket an enemy's signal, electronic, and human intelligence sources is certainly enhanced. Enough real equipment is mixed with fake equipment to indicate the portrayed unit to any collection asset. With redundant enemy collection assets indicating the existence of a unit in a specific location, the enemy decision-maker can be led to believe the fake unit is the real thing. The decoys, if available in sufficient numbers, could represent an adequate force for deception. Properly augmented with actual combat, combat support, and combat service support equipment, the decoy

³⁹A viable threat at division level is probably best defined as a task force sized unit. Currently, each heavy division has different numbers and types of MCCDs

devices could readily portray a force significant enough to the enemy commander for him to react against it.

Once the MCCD and CDS are type classified and procured in sufficient quantity, the ability to manipulate the enemy through portrayal of fake units will significantly increase. Again, the need for a specialized unit to control and use the deception specific material is evident.⁴⁰ The advantages of centralized control of that unit as well as the equipment seem to outweigh the disadvantages.

With the previous assessment of deception capabilities in terms of doctrine, organization, and material, an examination of deception capabilities in training is necessary. Since there is little actual training involved in the use of specific deception devices, training is addressed in terms of how deception is integrated in the command and control process of a corps exercise such as REFORGER or those conducted by the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth.

The normal command and control process is followed by the corps staff when planning an operation. It remains a centralized function of the commander and the G3. The estimate process is not centrally controlled, though it is centrally orchestrated. The separate staff sections make their own estimate of the situation based on the commander's guidance and the intent of the operation. Here lies a rub with the deception process. As individual staff sections produce their estimates, they rely on the G3 to provide them with guidance on what sort of COAs are being considered; this includes how deception will be integrated. The G3 is supposed to

⁴⁰This study does not purport to establish the need for a new unit. See Charles Toomey, "Tactical Deception in the Corps--The Design and Employment of the Corps Deception Battalion" for information on that subject.

orchestrate the estimate process to provide and receive information to and from the other staff sections. The G3 section cannot provide accurate information on deception operations to other staff sections if it has not decided on how to integrate deception into COAs yet. Therefore the estimate finally presented to the commander for decision is flawed; no coordinated thought is given by the integrated staff to deception. After the commander makes his decision on which course of action is approved, then deception planning typically begins.

This afterthought integration of deception is true even if the commander has given initial planning guidance on the integration of deception. Compliance with the initial guidance takes time for the G3 section to work out. If the G3 does not complete the COAs with deception integrated before the commander makes a decision, the problem is further compounded by the requirement to keep the staff together to integrate deception into the approved plan. For example, the requirement to target all enemy collection assets must be integrated with the G4's plan as well as the subordinate maneuver commander's plan. In the sense of centralizing the command and control process and integrating deception considerations into the approved COA, the initial focus of the commander and staff must be on active manipulation of the enemy from the beginning of the process. It is too difficult to try to integrate into a plan once the plan is approved.

The G2 plays a significant role in the formulation of the deception plan. His early involvement will assist in the targeting of all enemy collection assets as part of the deception planning. This will focus the intelligence received by the enemy commander to exactly what the friendly plan wants him to receive. The G2's ability to identify and pinpoint specific

enemy collection assets for information passing or for electronic countermeasures to prevent information passing is valuable to the G3. The G3 then tasks specific units to pass or block information. The G2 also assists in determining how well the enemy commander is accepting the deception story. These intelligence considerations help guide the corps staff in assigning missions to subordinate units, particularly the MI Brigade. The effective placement or guiding of receivers, transmitters, and jammers is a result of the integration of the G2's assessment of how the enemy sees friendly forces and expected reactions to that view.

Thus far, this section has described how the corps is organized currently for deception, the equipment available to it, and the planning process for its employment. How is it all put together in training now? The answer is poorly. From 1980 to 1987, REFORGER exercises show an amazing lack of deception planning. Only one case of deception was revealed in a review of USAREUR and Corps after-action reports.⁴¹ Very little effort was placed in deception as no plans, annexes, or reports of deception operations could be found.

REFORGER '88 provided a very different picture than the previous years. A very definite emphasis was placed on deception by the V (US) Corps against the VII (US) Corps. Though the effort paid some dividends to V Corps, there were some problems identified. The creation of a special task force to control the units assigned to the operation centralized the control of the deception effort under the Corps G3. Through a battalion TOC, operating as a brigade TOC, three battalions, and portions of two companies participated in the deception operation. The plan was aimed at the VII Corps

⁴¹Welmer: 28.

commander through his staff and his staff's intelligence collection assets. The most significant problem identified was the failure to integrate the signature of key units into the deception plan. Without that integration, the units were identified, linked to their parent organization, and the entire deception operation fell apart. Though the effort collapsed, the actual plan allowed for a short duration deception that would have ended as the real unit, supposedly elsewhere on the battlefield, revealed its actual location. Indications from VII Corps participants reveal the willingness to believe the initial picture presented by V Corps as well as the disbelief of events as they unfolded. It was not until multiple assets were focused on the target area that the deception cover was blown apart.⁴²

Indications from corps level BCTP exercises are that deception is not integrated into the planning process until a COA is approved by the commander. As indicated above, the difficulty in deciding how to integrate deception is not resolved in time; the senior commander must decide on a course of action and integrate deception into it. Further, when deception is integrated into the plan, it fails due to the inability to cover all of the enemy's intelligence collecting assets. Artillery is not placed in conjunction with the deception plan or the logistical indicators are opposite indicators to the deception story.⁴³

The failures to either integrate or not fully integrate deception into training programs like BCTP are a direct result of the scant attention paid to deception in previous years. The reluctance of senior commanders to

⁴²Paul Heyeles, "Deception Operations in *REFORGER '88*" (1990):37-41; John O'Brien, "Deception: A Victim's Perspective" (1990): 6.

⁴³Jack Spencer, "Deception Integration in the U.S. Army" (1990): 60, 65.

employ deception is understandable in some instances. A large-scale training event, like REFORGER, does not occur often enough to keep the cutting edge of corps operations sharp. Therefore, every effort is made to include units in the actual play of the wargames by not dissipating them in operations that may not yield the desired results. As evidenced by the revival of FM 90-2 and the V Corps deception effort in *REFORGER '82*, senior commanders are becoming aware that deception can work to a unit's advantage. Opportunities can be made through the use of deception at corps level to exploit the speed, protection, and shock effect of our current heavy divisions and aviation units.

SECTION FIVE - FUTURE CHALLENGES

The challenges to effectively employ deception in operations in the next five years will remain significant. All indications are that the Army will continue to shrink in size, while the number of possible missions will remain the same. This will require the leadership that commits and leads the Army into difficult situations to maximize the capabilities of the smaller units involved. Hopefully the benefits of increased capabilities from equipment and techniques will somewhat offset the size reduction.

The focus of the corps is fighting to defeat the enemy. The challenge to the corps commander and staff in this regard is twofold. They must first concentrate in time and space to defeat the enemy. Secondly, they must know enough about the enemy to effectively apply deception. In order to successfully meet both challenges, commanders at all levels must understand and accept the capabilities and limitations of deception. They

must appreciate the role of the deception cell from the MI Brigade's Operation Battalion as well as the capabilities of the MCCD available to them. More significantly, they must appreciate the integration of assets to employ deception.

Without echoing the "Do more with less" slogan of past years, how can the corps of the near future effectively use deception? The requirements of the battlefield will be different and the resources to fulfill them will be varied. The framework of the battlefield will be more diffuse and require greater coordination among units. Therefore, the effects of being discovered and targeted by the enemy will be greater. Where once stood an almost solid line of forces, a rather porous line may be formed. Only one misplaced unit could cause a serious gap in the line. The ability to hide or mask units rises in importance as the significance of their loss increases.

As the battlefield becomes more non-linear, a critical requirement will be concealing the locations of friendly units. Tank and mechanized infantry forces need to be masked or dispersed for their own protection. They need to take advantage of both OPSEC and survivability measures to reduce their own signature; enemy ability to identify and target units is also reduced. Corps plans, exercised through divisions, must include deception designed not only to hide the units, but also to hide their strength, disposition, and intentions. The greatest ability of corps planning is to create enough false certainty in the enemy's mind over where and how forces will be committed that the enemy will be unable to effectively counter a friendly action.

The corps is capable of creating the dispositions that mask friendly intentions. By assigning dispersed areas to units, forcing them to

reconnoiter movement routes and finely tune timetables, conditions for rapid concentrations can be created. These functions can be controlled by a subordinate division headquarters. However, the deceptive measures necessary to conceal real units and create false ones need to be controlled by at least the corps headquarters. The complete understanding of the mission requirements, as well as the link with operational and strategic intelligence assets and deception plans, resides more appropriately at corps than at division. Therefore, the best headquarters to plan and control deception through the movement and positioning of forces should be corps.

With the advent of Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar (JSTARS), the All Source Analysis System (ASAS), and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), corps will become the best focus for intelligence analysis. Since a critical function of effective deception is targeting the enemy commander, corps will have the best assets to judge whether the deception is being effective. It will best assess whether the enemy is accepting the deception and whether they are reacting to it rather than the real plan. These future systems will enable corps to focus the deception effort on the enemy commander, judge how well it is being executed, as well as how well it is being received, and make necessary corrections. This process can be handled by the corps G3 cell, mainly due to its size, better than the division G3 cell.

Again, because of the proliferation of intelligence systems in the near future, the corps' ability to target all collection assets an enemy employs is great. Whether the enemy uses sophisticated satellite intelligence systems or rudimentary human intelligence, the corps is capable of presenting a clear, but false, picture to the opposing side. The

onus rests with the planners and intelligence analysts, in this case, to determine what the enemy is capable of seeing and deciphering. Then the proper deception plan is formulated in conjunction with the operations plan to send the appropriate deceptive signals to the intelligence network seeking to gather the information. In the near future, the ability of the corps to judge the magnitude of this effort will be greater than the division staff's ability.

The second challenge to successful deception in the near future will be the necessary assessment of potential enemies. Because a corps can be called on for missions in a contingency or reinforcing environment, as well as the maintenance of the forward deployed force, the number of potential enemies will be great. Deception relies very heavily on knowing and understanding an enemy. The understanding will help the deception planners create a viable deception plan that will be believable by the enemy. The groundwork that is necessary for the three identified roles of the corps will be extensive. It will also have to be continuously updated and reviewed in the light of changing political environments.

This sort of enemy analysis is beyond the capabilities of the corps G2 cell and will have to be fulfilled through requests from national assets. A contingency or reinforcing corps, in the near future, will have to deploy into an area of operations that it has studied, but may not have studied in depth. It will have to face an opponent that may have come to power recently, or face an army that was only recently judged a threat. This will make deception exceedingly difficult. If the corps cannot create a deception plan that is believable by the enemy commander, the effort will be in vain. A full

understanding of the enemy collection systems and decision process must be present before effective deception can take place.

The next five to ten years holds great promise in the areas of weapons lethality, intelligence-gathering assets, and communications capabilities. All of these assets must be synchronized through the corps during any operation. They must be synchronized for any deception plan to be effective. Because of a corps' requirement to focus on different missions, the G2 and G3 planning cells will have many potential enemy threats to plan against. This will require them to be expert enough in their deception ability to use the most effective techniques to develop and execute a deception plan in several different areas of operation. They will need to focus the corps assets against the proper enemy commander. In this case, the deception effort must not be diluted by dysfunctional efforts from lower echelons; the directions for deception must come from corps. As before, corps is the link between operations and tactics; it is the focus and downlink for high level intelligence. Corps can best judge whether deception is being received and accepted by the enemy; corps should focus on blanketing the enemy intelligence collection assets.

All of the considerations of events over the next five to ten years point to two major deficiencies for deception; both relate to the centralized planning aspect. The first considers all the new equipment that is projected to be available in this time frame. The sheer requirements of learning to integrate these assets into a centrally produced and controlled deception plan cannot be measured. Indications exist that the Maneuver Control System (MCS), JSTARS, ASAS and UAVs will significantly enhance the

collection, analysis and intelligence effort. How they can all be orchestrated for a single, focused deception effort has yet to be determined.

The second deficiency may lie with the deception organization itself. Based on future considerations the importance of the division deception cell decreases while that of the corps cell increases. A careful assessment of the missions assigned to both cells and their individual abilities to execute the missions needs to be made. The results of that study should indicate the proper alignment of resources to orchestrate the deception effort.

SECTION SIX - CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Throughout this study, five criteria have been examined through theory and history to assess the US Army's current capability to perform deception operations effectively. These five criteria are centralized planning is required, the enemy commander is the deception target, all collection assets must be targeted, adequate forces need to be used, and tactical deception lasts only a short time. The current capabilities for deception fall short of these criteria.

Centralized planning is a target only. All indications are that the planning commences and continues with a specific course of action before any deception is mentioned. The integration of deception must begin with the first planning guidance and be controlled and integrated by the G3. Without the G3 orchestrating the deception concept, no unified effort can be assured. There is sufficient doubt over which organization level should deception cells be assigned to explore the question more. Can a division cell perform the missions assigned to it? The tentative answer is no; corps

should control and orchestrate the deception plan and leave the execution for division.

The current target of deception planning is the enemy commander with the authority to implement the desired reaction. This remains a credible requirement into the future. Though the enemy commander is the target of the deception, there may be great difficulty in determining what will influence his decision making process. The difficulty lies in having sufficient information on potential enemies to create a viable deception plan and to make the deception effort believable. That sort of information may not be available.

Targeting all enemy collection assets is the common sense soldiering that General Vuono referred to in 1986. Yet the current ability to target those assets is not fully understood. There is a definite mix of targeting the enemy and hiding the friendly. The enemy must be blocked from receiving certain information as well as allowed to receive some very specific information. We must assume the enemy's position and look at ourselves to imagine what we look like to the enemy. From the enemy's standpoint, blocking information as well as receiving information is part of the deception operation.

Clearly, adequate forces to perform the deception operation is a must. Corps commanders must be willing to invest the effort into effective deception before it can pay off. The single greatest stumbling block for the assignment of forces is the risk factor on the investment and return from deception. If leaders do not appreciate the importance and effects of successful deception, there is little chance any deception operation will work. Therefore, leaders at all levels must be educated in deception

capabilities and techniques to be able to push their subordinates into the correct mindset.

The timing and duration of any proposed deception is directly related with the effectiveness of the other four criteria. Any plan can be executed in a short time, but is enough time made for the enemy to receive the correct picture before he reacts the way we want him to? Only a centrally organized and controlled plan, using adequate forces, aimed at the entire range of collection assets can buy that amount of time.

The implications of this study are twofold: our current capability to plan and integrate deception into an operation is broken and the organization of deception cells serves to dilute rather than intensify the deception effort.

The current mindset and understanding of the planning process results in deception being only an afterthought and rarely a starting idea. This mindset too often results in an ineffective plan. The mindset must be changed throughout the leadership of the Army as well as in doctrine and the training bases that support the Army. How to make deception a believable operation will require careful analysis and instruction as well as full emphasis in the field.

The organization of the deception cells do not support the overall ability to perform tactical deception at the corps level. The focus of the division effort should be that of a participant; it should simply execute. It is too close to reality and too busy surviving and performing its routine missions to dedicate enough effort for effective deception. Corps has greater capability, because of its distance from actual unit operation, to conduct the planning and initial orchestration of a deception plan. Based on

that reasoning, the deception equipment and personnel should be assigned to the corps staff. This will increase the ability of the corps to practice an effective deception operation.

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