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STUDY PROJECT

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

BY

BRIGADIER MUHAMMAD SAHOOL AFZAL
Army of Bangladesh

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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

INTRODUCTION

General

The military historians and the specialists on "unconventional" warfare defined this war in different terms depending on the period, the background, the region and the objective of the campaigns. Some termed it partisan or guerrilla war. While others termed it revolutionary war or insurgency. Whatever may be the term used to identify this type of warfare, basically they all refer to a form of war other than the Conventional War, where certain accepted rules are followed. The term which is more commonly used now to refer to this form of unconventional war is insurgency.

A nation, fighting for its liberty, ought not to adhere rigidly to the accepted rules of warfare. Mass uprising, revolutionary methods, guerrilla bands everywhere--such are the only means by which a small nation can hope to maintain itself against an adversary superior in numbers and equipment. By their use, a weaker force can overcome its stronger and better organized opponent.¹

These were the words written by Karl Marx more than a hundred years ago and yet they have a distinctly current touch, because they still form the basis of any revolutionary war or insurgency.

A British Army Field Manual elaborates, "Revolutionary war is directed towards the takeover of a state by a revolutionary party. It involves the destruction of the existing system of government and its social structure."²

Colonel Dennis M. Drew, USAF, defined insurgency as "nothing more than an armed revolution against the established political order."³ Joint Pub 1-02 defines insurgency in the following words, "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."⁴ FM 100-20/AFP 3-20 defines insurgency as "An organized, armed

political struggle whose goal may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government."⁵ Frank Kitson has stated,

Insurgency will be held to cover the use of armed force by a section of the people to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things which they do not want to do. This would seem to be the sense in which the terms are understood by British authorities such as Sir Robert Thompson.⁶

It is difficult to cover every circumstance by defined terms. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, insurgency will be considered to be a form of rebellion in which a dissident group that has the support of a sizeable portion of the population instigates widespread acts of civil disobedience, sabotage, terrorism and wages guerrilla warfare in order to overthrow a government or to extract political, economic or social concessions. A state of insurgency implies that the insurgents have control over some areas of the country.

Counterinsurgency is the term used to describe the political, economic, social and military actions undertaken to maintain or restore law and order and to win over the support of the hostile population, by an established government, whose authority has been threatened by an insurgency. The counterinsurgency actions vary depending on the nature, cause, and circumstances of insurgency.

The difference in circumstances determines the difference in the guiding laws of war; the difference of time, place, and character. The laws of war in each historical stage have their characteristics and cannot be mechanically applied in a different age. All guiding laws of war develop as history develops and as war develops; nothing remains changeless.⁷

This was stated by Mao-Tse-Tung while discussing his philosophy of revolutionary war.

B. H. Liddel Hart stated, "It is not too late to learn from the experience of history. However, tempting the idea may seem to replying to our opponents 'camouflaged war' activities by counteroffensive moves of the same kind, it would be wiser to devise and pursue a more subtle and far-seeing counterstrategy."⁸ Those of us, who are involved with the process of policymaking and its application, need a better understanding of the subjects—insurgency and counterinsurgency. This is what this paper endeavors to attain.

Aim and Scope

The aim of this paper is to review the current insurgency environment and propose a strategy for countering the insurgency. In the process, the causes of insurgency and essentials of insurgency movements shall be discussed. Case studies of insurgencies in Oman, Malaysia and Bangladesh will also be conducted in brief, in order to draw lessons from them.

INSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT

As of now, a large number of Third World countries all over the world are facing insurgencies of some form or the other. With the changed attitude of the Soviet Union and the dampening of the Cuban spirits, there appears to be an improvement of the situation in Latin America. However, the United States must be prepared for crises in areas of strategic significance such as Mexico.⁹

The situations in Africa and Asia remain somewhat unpredictable. In Africa, the satellite countries of the Soviet Union with one party rule will remain under constant political pressure for more democratic reforms. Whereas in Asia a large number of countries are confronted with insurgencies of varied scales which have their origin in racial, religious or economic discriminations. India faces insurgency situations in Punjab and Kashmir. Pakistan remains under constant threat from its minority provinces of Sind, Baluchistan and Frontier Province. Afghan Mujahideens are still waging war to remove the Soviet-backed government. Bangladesh is trying to overcome an insurgency in its southeastern region. Sri-Lanka is fighting for its existence with a very serious separatist movement in the Tamil dominated areas. In Burma, one-third of the country is beyond government control. Thailand still has elements of "Communist" and "Muslim" insurgencies. The situation in the Philippines is uncomfortable. Kampuchea is in the midst of a triangular war. These problems pose serious security problems to the countries concerned and add to the element of uncertainty in the regions in particular and the world at large. Recent examples abound: The United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, India in Sri-Lanka and Vietnam in Kampuchea.¹⁰

The current situation in the Middle East may add a new dimension to the insurgency environment even if the present crisis is over.

A policy study conducted by the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. State Department reveals:

. . . It appears evident that internal conflict in the Third World will continue at least at its present level. Further, it is altogether possible that such conflict will expand in coming decades with population growth and environmental degradation adding new pressures to weak economies and unstable political systems. It is equally certain that geopolitical circumstances will continue to compel regional and world powers, including the United States, to engage directly and indirectly in these struggles.¹¹

CAUSES OF INSURGENCY

A review of the past and the current insurgency movements would reveal that the following are the primary causes of insurgency:

Political or Social Discrimination

During the colonial period, the unfair political arrangements gave rise to nationalist movements in almost all the regions of the world which ultimately brought an end to colonialism. After the independence of the colonized countries, due to similar discrimination, many countries were faced with insurgencies organized by minority races or religious communities. Frank Kitson in his book titled Low Intensity Operations states:

For the first fifteen years after the Second World War, nationalistic fervour in the context of freedom from colonialism was the most usual cause of uprisings, and twelve of the twenty examples quoted as 'World-Wide Insurgencies' by Julian Paget come under this heading. For the future it may well be that social discontent and racial ferment will be more important, and disturbances arising out of dissatisfaction with society, often allied with racial problems which have not yet been mastered, are already commonplace.¹²

Economic Disparity

The failure to attend to the economic inadequacies of the population led to communist movements all over the Third World during the post-World War II period. "There is no doubt that Russia has exploited these influences wherever possible and that she has done her best to foster them as a means of weakening the will of certain countries to resist the spread of communism."¹³ Some countries fell into communist hands. Even today, though the threat of communism has subsided, some countries are facing insurgencies because "Developing Third World nations display stark contrasts

between incredible poverty for the bulk of the population and fabulous wealth for the ruling elite."¹⁴

Interstate Rivalry

Based on the experience of communist movements, some countries have found out that they can achieve more political gains at much less cost by instigating or supporting insurgencies inside their rival countries. "We are witnessing in the 1960's a new development in insurgency of armed interference by neighboring countries in support of next-door subversive and insurgent movements."¹⁵ This practice is very common in Asia and Africa. "The fact is that most countries which would formerly have been prepared to go to war in pursuit of a particular interest, would now be prepared to pursue it by encouraging subversion or insurgency, providing that they knew how to do so."¹⁶

ESSENTIALS OF INSURGENCY

No insurgency can succeed unless certain conditions exist. They are:

A Genuine Cause

Study of insurgency campaigns would reveal that those with a good cause succeeded while others failed due to the absence of a genuine cause. This is important because without a convincing cause it is difficult to win popular support, which is vital for the success of an insurgency movement. Frank Kitson states:

. . . if no cause exists it will have to be invented. If a genuine one exists but is not capable of attracting sufficient support, it must be amended until it does. If a good one exists but has lost its appeal for one reason or the other, it must be revived. If it is absolutely impossible to produce a cause with enough popular appeal, the enterprise will have to be abandoned because it will be found useless to try and promote subversion or insurgency without one.¹⁷

Sir Robert Thompson also states in his book Defeating Communist Insurgency, "Every Insurgency, particularly a communist revolutionary one, requires a cause."¹⁸

Popular Support

No insurgency movement will make headway and expand without popular support. As Roger Trinquier says: "The Sine Qua Non of Victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population."¹⁹

Guevara lost his life and brought disaster to his followers in Bolivia partly because he insisted on basing his campaign there on a cause--revolution throughout South America--which did not command popular support in Bolivia.²⁰

Mao-Tse-Tung also points out, "the people are the water in which guerrilla fish swim."²¹

Good Leadership and Balanced Organization

Good leadership and a balanced politico-armed group organization is a prerequisite for launching an insurgency movement. These two factors played a key role in the success of the Chinese and Vietnamese communist movements. Whereas in Malaya faulty leadership and lack of a coordinated political-military organization contributed towards the failure of the movement there.²²

Any insurgency movement will have a joint organization composed of political, military and the support wings. The political wing is the most important organ and provides overall direction of all activities. "To carry out these aims there is a joint political and military organization, with the military always subordinate to the political."²³ The members of this wing are usually well educated, highly motivated and devoted to the cause of insurgency. The military wing is initially created with a small group of hard core, committed, ruthless guerrillas which expands with the growth of the movement. Its expansion depends on the success in the field. This wing usually ends up with the units and formations organized and trained in conventional lines. The support wing is formed by the sympathizer groups from among the population. They provide the insurgents with information, essential commodities and recruits for the military wing.

Guerrilla Warfare

The adoption of the Guerrilla Warfare techniques based on "hit and run" tactics has been vital to the success of an insurgency movement. The guerrilla campaign starts with ambushes and raids and culminates with major operations. They only confront the security forces when they are sure to win.

Seldom have properly led, organized and conducted guerrilla movements been destroyed militarily when they have avoided the temptation to engage in pitched battles

against regular forces, and the suppression of such guerrilla forces has in fact always remained a virtually unsolvable problem to regular troops.²⁴

External Support

Though some suggest that external support is not essential, such a support could prove indispensable in an insurgency movement. The dying down of certain communist movements in Asia and Latin America after the change of Chinese and Soviet policies and the existing tense situation in the Indian subcontinent are evidence of this fact. The support may be in different forms--moral and psychological through political or diplomatic means, providing financial or material support including weapon and equipments, and providing base facilities.

In many cases other nations took advantage of these uprisings and gave support of one sort or another, either because they genuinely sympathized with the aims of the subversive movement, or because it was in their interest to see the existing government replaced by the insurgents.²⁵

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN OMAN

Geography

A Muslim state on the Arabian Sea, it has an area of 212,460 km² and a population of approximately one and a half million. It has borders with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and South Yemen. The gross domestic product of the country is \$7.8 billion and it has a per capita income of approximately \$6,000. An absolute monarchy exists and Sultan Qaboos bin-Said Al Said has been the ruler since July 1970.²⁶

Strategic Importance (Appendix 1)

Oman borders on both the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. More significant is the Gulf of Oman, which dominates the Straits of Hormuz, through which pass over two-thirds of the oil supply from Persian Gulf countries to the free world. Once the British withdrew from Aden in 1967, it was renamed People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen and a Marxist government with strong Soviet backing took control of the state. The USSR for the first time established a foothold in the strategically vital area of Southwest Asia.²⁷ Dhofar--the southern most province of the Sultanate of Oman had a common border with South Yemen.

Cause of Insurgency

The insurgency in Oman was confined to its southern province of Dhofar which historically and culturally was dominated by a tribe different from the inhabitants of Oman. Having no source of oil within its area, the province's pace of development was slower than that of other areas of Oman. The primary cause of the insurgency was the poor standard of living due to the totally indifferent attitude of the then ruler Sultan Said bin Taimur. This weakness

was exploited by the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the area from South Yemen. Ranulph Fieness writes in his book,

Readily available to help the Marxist with their initial moves was Musallim bin Nuffl, leader of the local rebels inside Dhofar, who had become fed up with the Sultan's repressive measures as far back as 1964. When foreign oil prospectors had arrived in Dhofar, bin Nuffl had been lucky enough to obtain one of the few new jobs available, as a lorry mechanic. He soon learned of the prosperity in other oil-rich Arab lands and he noted that the Sultan used Indian and African laborers to help the American oilmen in Dhofar, not Dhofaris. No bicycles, no transistor radios; not even dark glasses might be brought by Dhofari townsfolk and none were allowed to hold any position of influence. Frustrated and enraged, bin Nuffl stirred up others of his tribe and after killing a few oil workers and destroying some lorries, he had taken his fledgling force off to Saudi Arabia and Iraq to train, calling them the Dhofar Liberation Front.²⁸

The cause of the insurgency in the Sultanate of Oman therefore was economic backwardness.

Essentials of Insurgency in Oman

Economic backwardness and social discriminations provided a fair cause for the initiation of insurgency. The rebels also found no difficulties in gaining popular support from amongst the Dhofaris. Gradually the insurgents got organized along communist guerrilla warfare lines with the leadership going over to the well-trained Marxist. Ranulph Fieness mentions, "They were simple-minded nationalists who would ultimately have to be purged from the rebel leadership once Russian and Chinese trained Dhofaris were ready to take the helm".²⁹

The Dhofar Liberation Front with guidance and training in the Soviet Union and China got fairly well organized and had the three basic organs of an insurgency movement--political cadre, guerrilla organization and the support element. John Akehurst states, "And with all this external attention came the standard communist framework organization for the rebellion. The command and

cell structure was backed by mobile 'Idaarat' or action groups who enforced the new regime by coercion and terror."³⁰

The Dhofar insurgent leaders being trained in China and in South Yemen soon picked up the art of guerrilla warfare. Enemy policy was simply to dominate as much of the Jebel (mountain) as possible and to give Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) a hot reception wherever they appeared, but to avoid being out-gunned by fading away when air, fire support or reinforcements arrived.³¹

From the very start of the movement the insurgents got all-out support from the Soviet and the Chinese communist regimes through the Marxist South Yemen government across the borders. John Akehurst again mentions,

Until 1972 China has provided a good deal of support, but was then persuaded by the Shah to desist, agreeing because of its economic and cultural interests in Iran. Russia then became the dominant supporter, although Libya and Cuba also sent money, supplies and training staff.³²

Counterinsurgency Strategy

On replacing his father as the Sultan of Oman, Sultan Qaboos immediately identified the root cause of the insurgency and concentrated on its remedy in the shortest possible time. "In Oman, meanwhile, Sultan Qaboos came to power in a frenzy of national rejoicing and lost no time in kicking the legs from under the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf's (PFLOAG's) platform."³³

The Sultan lost no time in implementing ambitious plans for development. Medical and education facilities were geared up and made available at either no cost or on minimal payments. An amnesty was declared and a two-months cease-fire was announced. With all these done the process of elimination of the cause of insurgency was initiated.

Sultan Qaboos, who was also the Commander in Chief, from the very beginning remained fully involved with the planning and conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign. He was in constant touch with the military commanders.³⁴

For the coordination of civilian and military activities of the campaign a committee was formed under the chairmanship of the Wali of Dhofar.³⁵ This committee was composed of political leaders, military commanders, including the Commander of British Military Assistance Team, and officers from civil and intelligence agencies. The committee would meet once every week to review the situation and to make policy decisions for immediate execution without fear of red tape. The committee, through consultation among themselves and with the local leaders, worked out a politico-military strategy which John Akehurst describes in the following terms:³⁶

- o A SAF operation in strength supported by a Firqat (Paramilitary Organization) secures a position of the Firqat's choice which dominated its tribal area;
- o Military engineers build a track to the position giving road access, followed by an airstrip if possible;
- o A drill is brought down the track followed by a civil action team with shop, school, clinic and mosque;
- o SAF thins out to the minimum needed to provide security;
- o Water is pumped to the surface and into the distribution system prepared by military engineers to offer storage points for humans, and troughs for animals;
- o Civilians come in from miles around and talk to Firqat, SAF and government representatives. They are told that enemy activity in the area will result in the water being cut off;

- o Civilians move out in surrounding area and tell the enemy not to interfere with what is obviously "a good thing";
- o Enemy, very dependent on civilians, stop all aggressive action and either go elsewhere or hide;
- o Tribal area is secure;
- o All SAF withdrawn.

The whole purpose of the Dhofar campaign was, "to secure Dhofar for civil development."³⁷ This continued to be the strategic objective of the counterinsurgency campaign until the campaign was won.

The counterinsurgency campaign in Dhofar (Oman) lasted for ten years and was successfully concluded in December 1975, when the Sultan announced unequivocally that the war had been won, thus hitting the headlines all over the world.³⁸

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MALAYSIA

Geography

Malaysia covers an area of 329,750 km² and has a population of approximately 18 million. It has Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand as neighboring countries. The gross domestic product of the country is \$37.9 billion and the per capital income is \$2,270. The country has a parliamentary form of government with a bicameral legislature.³⁹

The population of Malaysia is divided into Malaya (59 percent), Chinese (32 percent) and Indians (9 percent). Religion wise, the Malaysians are Muslims, the Chinese are mostly Buddhists and the Indians are Hindus.⁴⁰

Strategic Importance (Appendix 2)

The peninsula of Malaya dominates both the strategically important Strait of Malacca and the South China sea, through which most of the trade between Pacific and Indian Oceans passes. The country is the only ASEAN country to be run by a genuinely democratic system since its independence in 1957.

Cause of Insurgency

The Malayan Communist Party, initiated the insurgency after the fall of Malaya to Japanese forces during World War II, aimed at forcing the Japanese out of Malaya and Singapore. After the defeat of the Japanese, they took over the control of the peninsula and reorganized themselves till the British administration assumed full control of the area. The basic cause was ready at hand: Anti-colonialism.⁴¹

Based on this basic cause they also capitalized on the postwar political and economic uncertainties and offered, through communism, the cheapest and quickest passport to modernity to the war-ravaged, frustrated population.

Essentials of Insurgency in Malaya

As mentioned, the political and economic desperation and uncertainty in a postwar period provided an attractive cause to the Malayan Communist Insurgent Movement. To start with, the slogan managed to gain support from all ethnic groups of the population. The leadership of the Communist Party, which earned the respect of the people for their significant anti-Japanese movement during World War II, had no problems in consolidating their authority among the rural populace.

The Malayan Communist Movement was organized like any other Communist guerrilla movement and had the three essential elements--political, armed and the support cells. Frank Kitson states,

At the top of the tree was the central committee of the Malayan Communist Party which operated under the chairmanship of the secretary general, and which included on it the Commander of the Malayan Races Liberation Army. Under the central committee were committees for each of the states or regions of Malaya.⁴²

Since the insurgency was being conducted by the communists, the insurgents followed the guerrilla warfare methods. Sir Robert Thompson stated,

The guerrillas are now operating within the population, and this is the period when one can apply Mao-Tse-Tung's dictum that guerrillas must be to the population as little fishes in water. The population is not only providing the guerrilla with his food and intelligence, but giving him perfect cover and concealment. Dressed as a peasant, the guerrilla, except when he is carrying arms, is indistinguishable from the rest of the people. In fact, he can be both a peasant by day and a guerrilla by night.⁴³

Again since the Malayan Communist Party was a recognized Communist Party, it had received external support from both the Soviet Union and China. "In case of Malaya, it is now known that instructions were received from Moscow through a Communist Conference held early in 1948 in Calcutta."⁴⁴

Counterinsurgency Strategy

In 1957 the new Malayan government under the leadership of Mr. Tunku Abdur Rahman was quick in appreciating the seriousness of the insurgency situation and offered amnesty to end the war. Since the British granted independence to Malaya the principle cause of the movement "anti-colonialism" was removed.⁴⁵ Therefore, the offer of amnesty was timely and gained positive response from the people in general. The Communist Party agreed to a meeting, but the meeting broke down when their demands for legalizing the Communist Party as a political party was turned down by the government. However, the damage was done when the offer of amnesty had positive impact on the people and the movement suffered a setback.

The second shock was suffered by the communists when the government succeeded in identifying the movement with the Chinese and therefore, the majority of Malaysians started regarding it as alien. As a result, Malayan nationalism, reinforced as it was by the second force of the Islamic religion rallied to the government.⁴⁶ The government then set down to win over the Chinese community. The government offered Malayan citizenship to the Chinese and other communities which created hope for fair participation in the political and economic activities of the country by all races. This offer received a positive response and gave birth to the Alliance Party, which combined the leading Malaya, Chinese and Indian political association. Thus, the first strategic objective--"political unity of all races" was achieved.⁴⁷

This done, the government formed a National Security Council with the Prime Minister as the chairman and with the prominent cabinet members, the Chief of Defense Forces, the Inspector General of Police, the head of the National Intelligence Agency and senior members of civil administration to

plan, coordinate and monitor the implementation of other aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign.⁴⁸ Similar committees were also formed at the state level with the state chief minister as the chairman and local military commanders and civil administrative officers as members. The National Security Council worked out the following strategic principles through trial and error:⁴⁹

- o Have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable;

- o The government must function in accordance with law;

- o The government must have an overall plan which should include political, social, economic, administrative and other measures which have a bearing on insurgency;

- o The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas; and

- o In the guerrilla phase of insurgency, government must secure its base areas first.

The insurgency movement in Malaysia finally came to an end after about 50 years in December 1989 when the remnants of the Malayan Communist Party leadership agreed to call off their movement and return to normal life.

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN BANGLADESH

Geography

Bangladesh has an area of 144,000 km² with a population of approximately one hundred million. It has common borders with Burma and India. The gross domestic product is \$20.6 billion and the per capita income is \$180. The country has a presidential form of government with a unicameral legislature. The population is divided into Bengali (98 percent) and others (2 percent) which includes half a million tribal population of Mongoloid origin (.5 percent). The religious composition is Muslims (83 percent), Hindu (16 percent) and Buddhists, Christians and others (less than 1 percent).⁵⁰

Strategic Importance (Appendix 3)

The country is sandwiched between the two regional powers--China and India. Being the third largest country of South Asia it provides a moderating influence on two larger and historical rivals--India and Pakistan. Two of the Indian states which have common borders with Bangladesh, Tripura and West Bengal, are ruled by Communist (Marxist) governments which have strong organizational bases in other neighboring states of India.

Cause of Insurgency

The southeastern region of Bangladesh which is comprised of the three districts commonly known as Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is the area where tribal people of Mongoloid origin live. The total area of CHT is approximately 5,000 square miles and the total tribal population is about 500,000. The tribal population is again divided into 13 tribes of which Chakma tribe is most dominant as a single majority tribe.⁵¹ The Bengalis from the other parts of the country have been coming over to this part of the

country over the years and now forms approximately about 40 percent of the total population.

CHT, besides being dominated by the tribals, has also been an area neglected due to two reasons. First, being tribal, they wanted to maintain their tribal culture free of external influence. Second, the tribal chiefs of the three districts were indifferent towards the development of the area.⁵²

When Bangladesh became independent in 1971 and was framing the constitution, the tribal leaders headed by Mr. M.N. Larma met the then President of Bangladesh and requested a constitutional provision giving political autonomy to CHT. The request was turned down by the government.⁵³ This resulted in a growing discontentment among the tribal population which ultimately gave birth to the insurgent political organization in 1972 and to the armed group in 1973.⁵⁴ The Parbatta Chattagram Jana Shanghati Samiti (PCJSS) started their movement for the "political and economic emancipation" of their people. The cause of insurgency in CHT therefore was politico-economic.

Essentials of Insurgency in CHT

The insurgents in Bangladesh's CHT area had no problems in identifying a cause which would rally people around their organization and movement. Their cause was political and economic discrimination by the Bangladesh government. Since the cause was genuine it had won popular support in no time.

The insurgent organization (PCJSS) was headed by Mr. M. N. Larma who was an elected member of Bangladesh parliament and was educated and was committed to the tribal cause. The other leaders were also equally good and committed.

The insurgents organized themselves in line with the Communist Revolutionary Movements elsewhere in the world and had three basic elements--a political wing, an armed wing and the support group from amongst the

population.⁵⁵ They therefore, had a sound and balanced organization ideal for an insurgency movement.

The PCJSS conducted their armed actions based on the concept of guerrilla warfare and on Mao-Tse-Tung's "hit and run" tactics. This method helped them, even being a small armed group, to inflict casualties on security forces and thereby in winning more support from tribal population.⁵⁶

The leadership of the insurgency under pressure from the security forces and on receipt of assurance of safety from Indian government established its headquarters and the bases for training of the armed wing in the adjoining areas of Tripura, India. Since then they have been getting all-out support from the Indian government.⁵⁷

Counterinsurgency Strategy

Being a newly independent country and faced with political instability in the initial years, Bangladesh took time to workout a strategy to deal with the insurgency situation. However, taking lessons from the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya it soon identified the political and economic backwardness as the primary cause of the insurgency. The cause identified, it formed a "council committee" for providing the overall direction to the counterinsurgency campaign. The committee is headed by the President, who is the Chief Executive of the country. The other members of the committee are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/Home Affairs/Finance, and the Chiefs of the Army/Navy/Air Force.⁵⁸ The committee, through consultations and the trial and error method, adopted the following strategy:

- o Rapid deployment of forces to contain the insurgent armed activities.⁵⁹

- o Carry out administrative reforms to meet political demands, and make the administration more efficient and development oriented.⁶⁰

- o Undertake a \$457 million five-year-development plan to remove economic disparity.⁶¹

- o Attain a balanced population ratio without disturbing the tribal dominance.⁶²

- o Meet the political aspirations of the tribal population through creation of district-level, autonomous political institutions.⁶³

Coordination committees at all administrative levels were also formed with joint political-military-administrative structures to monitor the progress of implementation of government counterinsurgency strategy.

STRATEGY FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

Current Strategy

Before getting into the discussion on strategy, it is advisable to deliberate on the current strategy on counterinsurgency. The national security strategy of the United States as indicated is, "Aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking."⁶⁴ This short but important statement announces the firm commitment of the U.S. government at the highest level to assist democratic governments against insurgency.

The U.S. military's approach to counterinsurgency is,

The United States supports host nation counterinsurgency efforts based on the concepts of internal defense and development (IDAD), which assumes that host nation is responsible for the development and execution of program to prevent or defeat subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency.⁶⁵

Here again the commitment to assist in counterinsurgency operations has been indicated. Furthermore, the policy guidelines also make it clear that the country concerned is responsible for the preparation and implementation of the programs and that the United States would assist in all possible manners. The policy also states that more direct combat forces support may be provided where it is deemed to be in the security interest of the United States.

Strategy for Counterinsurgency

The most striking difference between the insurgencies of the post-World War II era and the current and future insurgencies is that in the past most insurgencies were aimed at taking over state control by communist revolutionary movements, and the current and future will be the outcome of the political and economic discrimination by a larger community within a country.

While the earlier version posed a threat to the free democratic world philosophy and the free world economic system, the latter poses no such threat and therefore, is of lesser interest to the United States. However, if the insurgency threatens the security and stability of a region which is of vital or major interest to U.S. national security, then the U.S. attitude would be of more concern. It is for this reason that the U.S. must continue to include insurgency and counterinsurgency in its national and military strategy considerations, as is rightly being done.

While approaching the problem of insurgency, the strategy should aim to identify the root cause of insurgency and to eliminate the cause. As the case studies have revealed, each of the insurgencies depended significantly on the existence of a reasonable cause, for the expansion of the movement and when the causes were removed, the movements died down. If this phenomenon is related to what Carl von Clausewitz had described as center of gravity--"The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."⁶⁶ Then it would be crystal clear that there is no better center of gravity in a counterinsurgency strategy than the cause of insurgency. Mao-Tse-Tung, the greatest exponent of guerrilla warfare and the most successful strategist on this form of warfare stated, "We have applied Marxism to solve not only political problems, but also military problems and the most essential thing in Marxism--the living soul of Marxism--is the concrete analysis of conditions."⁶⁷ The case studies also revealed that the causes were always politico-economical rather than military and the strategy to counterinsurgency required the encompassing of political and economic aspects with the military playing only the role of containing the armed wing of the insurgency movement. There is no other form of war where the establishment of unity of purpose among Clausewitz's

paradoxical trinity--the people, the military commander and army, and the government, is so essential than counterinsurgency.⁶⁸ This is what the three countries concerned could attain at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Mao-Tse-Tung again stated,

Guerrilla warfare steps out of the bounds of tactics and knocks at the door of strategy, demanding that problems of guerrilla warfare be considered from a strategic viewpoint. What deserves our particular attention is that such an extensive and protracted guerrilla war is quite a new thing in the whole history of war. If our enemy neglects to take this into account he will certainly come to grief.⁶⁹

Counterinsurgency strategy must therefore, have three dimensions--political, economic and military, involving training that demands more than pure military skills. President John F. Kennedy stated in 1962, "To win this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission."⁷⁰

As has been discussed, the causes of insurgency are primarily political or economic. Since these two elements are beyond the military's domain, they must be addressed by relevant political institutions of the concerned country as well as that of the U.S., if it decides to get involved. Marshal Chuh Teh stated,

Without a correct political policy there can be no correct military policy. The people's war can end in victory only if its course is guided by a correct political policy pursued by a democratic coalition government with the people as the mainstay.⁷¹

The basis of U.S. involvement should be:

o No Secession. The U.S. government must make it clear to all concerned that it shall oppose the secession of a part of the country from the country itself. This is in keeping with the principle for which the USA fought a civil war. However, exceptions could be made based on U.S. national security interests.

o Just and Fair Political System. Again, in accordance with the U.S. democratic values, it must demand and influence the government fighting the insurgency to change the political institution to remove political discrimination against a community or a region, if that be the cause of the insurgency.

o Removal of Economic Disparity. If this is the cause, then the U.S. government not only should insist but also assist in making up the shortcoming within the shortest possible time.

o Public Support. As was discussed earlier, one of the causes of insurgency could be the serious gap between the economic condition of the ruling elites and the common people. In such cases, the ruling elites often are corrupt and repressive. Under these circumstances, the U.S. government without any hesitation should side with the people and assist in working out an arrangement for the change of the government through democratic means.

o Ensure Adequate Military Capability. To counter the insurgency instigated by a neighboring country against a democratic government, the U.S. must insist upon and assist the country concerned to organize and train its own security forces to an appropriate level. This is in keeping with the declared U.S. policy on insurgency. While referring to Sultan of Oman's efforts to strengthen his security forces, John Akehurst states,

Sultan devoted at least half of his national income to 'defense,' recognizing wisely that the greater the investment in expanding the forces, arming and re-equipping them, the sooner the expensive and frustrating problem of the war would be solved.⁷²

o Prevention is Better than Cure. Efforts should be made to preempt the insurgency. This could be done through close monitoring of the situation in the countries of the regions which are of vital or major interest to U.S. national security. If need be, the governments of the countries could be

influenced or controlled through use of economic and diplomatic means to make necessary changes in their political and economic policies as has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

- o No Military Participation. Use of military personnel in direct combat roles should be avoided at all costs, "Employing our forces almost indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our diplomatic efforts," Caspar Weinberger has pointed out, "Would surely plunge us headlong into the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam War, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed our forces."⁷³ Moreover, experience shows that the involvement of foreign troops provides a scope for propaganda to the insurgents, thus strengthening the insurgents' position among the population.

Military Strategy

In case the U.S. vital national security interest dictates, and military forces are deployed in a host country for conducting counterinsurgency operations, then the following policies may be adopted:

- o The U.S. Ambassador and the senior operational commander in the host country must be included as members of the National Coordination Committee formed to workout and for implementation of the counterinsurgency strategy. Both of them should insist and assist the committee in identifying the primary cause of insurgency and evolve a strategy to eliminate the cause;

- o Joint politico-military committees, at all administrative levels, should be formed to execute and monitor the progress of all national committee decisions;

- o Immediate action should be taken to secure the areas free from insurgent activities and to contain insurgent armed activities using the secured areas as bases. Simultaneously, the political and economic programs

are to be undertaken. The operation should aim to strike at all three wings of the insurgents--political, armed and administrative--simultaneously, at the relevant level and at the earliest opportunity;

- o U.S. forces to participate in advisory or training roles only;
- o If necessary, the U.S. Army may take over certain operational responsibilities in peaceful areas, thereby sparing troops of the host country to conduct the counterinsurgency operation; and
- o In worst case, if U.S. troops are committed in counterinsurgency roles, they should take over the entire operational responsibility or an independent operational region or zone to avoid the command and administration complications of a "mixed up" command.

Operational Doctrine

During the period of operation, the following should be kept in mind by military commanders at all levels:

- o There is no pure military solution to an insurgency. The solution lies in the combined political, economic and military handling of the situation;
- o The military is not in control of the situation but is in aid of civil power;
- o There is no quick solution to an insurgency. It is time consuming. Commanders at all levels and men must have adequate patience to win over the situation;
- o The lower the level of counterinsurgency operation is kept, the lower the insurgency intensity remains;
- o The adoption of insurgent tactics and method is extremely rewarding. They must be beaten in their own game;
- o Keeping the casualties on one's own side low is a critical factor in a counterinsurgency operation;

- o The culture, tradition, social and religious customs/institutions of the host country must be understood and respected; and

- o Emphasis should be on winning the "hearts and minds" of the people in order to isolate the insurgents from the population--the source of their moral and administrative support.

CONCLUSION


Insurgency is a form of armed movement aimed at overthrowing a government. Counterinsurgency is the operation undertaken by security forces to restore government authority. With the change of attitude of the communist countries, the situation all over the world has shown some improvement vis-a-vis the insurgency environment; yet the political, economic and interstate rivalry factors will keep the issue alive beyond the year 2000. The latest development in the Middle East also may create insurgency complications during the postcrisis period.

The insurgency situations of today and of the future will not challenge the free world philosophy, but they may destabilize the situations in regions vital or of major interest to U.S. national security. Therefore, U.S. national security strategy must continue to include counterinsurgency. The U.S. strategy should aim to prevent the insurgencies by closely monitoring the situations in regions of interest and by bringing in essential political and economic changes through diplomatic pressure and financial aid programs.


The study of successful counterinsurgency campaigns reveal that though the insurgencies varied in nature, from country to country, depending on their national characteristics, political situation, strength and weaknesses in the political systems and administration, terrain and climatic conditions yet, the identification of the primary cause of insurgencies and their elimination through a well-thought-out strategy executed by a joint political-military leadership at the strategic, operational and tactical levels has been the key to the success of each of the campaigns. This is vital to the success of any

counterinsurgency campaign. The U.S. military strategy, when the military is involved due to U.S. national security interest, should also be based on this principle.

APPENDIX A-1



APPENDIX A-2



APPENDIX A-3



ENDNOTES

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