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Leadership for the Future Battlefield

**A Monograph
by
Major Philip S. Thompson
Armor**



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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

"The Cemetery." The very name evoked images of fear, destruction, and death. The sector's official designation was Bravo 7, but the soldier-given moniker seemed more appropriate. Patrols in this area, southeast of Saigon, were continually ambushed or encountered booby traps. The chain of command considered the casualties only "minor patrolling losses." One company commander, Anthony Hartle, viewed the patrols as missions that did not justify the costs. What were his options? If he disobeyed orders, he would be relieved and the problem would fall to his successor. If he followed instructions, men would continue to die for no discernible purpose. There was a third alternative: the commander could force villagers in Bravo 7, suspected guerrilla sympathizers, to lead patrols through the mine-infested area. No civilian casualties seemed to occur from the booby traps, indicating that they knew the locations of such devices. ¹ Hartle later wrote, "My military background, with its emphasis on completing the mission despite obstacles, prompted me to consider such alternatives."²

While isolated, this case indicated a shortcoming, an inadequacy, in U.S. Army leadership doctrine and training. Moral collapse in leadership leads to military disintegration. Leaders who condone violations of international law give tacit approval to future atrocities committed by their subordinates. Stanley Karnow wrote that incidents such as the American massacre of Vietnamese civilians at My Lai, "...prompted GIs to assume that their commanders were covering up other atrocities."³

As we prepare for future war, the question arises: Does U.S. Army leadership doctrine adequately prepare officers to lead on the future battlefield? Current leadership doctrine focuses on command climate, unit cohesion, and team

building. While important, are these areas sufficient for the battlefields that lie ahead? Several analysts, as we shall see, feel that future battle will place a premium on individual character and heavy reliance on low-level decision making. Does our doctrine provide for these aspects of leadership?

The adequacy of our leadership doctrine will be evaluated using the following criteria:

1. Does our leadership doctrine contain a vision of the next war?
2. Is our leadership doctrine adaptable to new realities?
3. Does our leadership doctrine provide flexibility?
4. Is our leadership doctrine culturally dependent?
5. Is our leadership doctrine suitable?
6. Is our leadership doctrine coherent?

Doctrine is derived from theory; therefore, a survey of the works of prominent theorists offers a suitable starting point for this study. The monograph will examine leadership theories espoused by Carl von Clausewitz, Ardant du Picq, S.L.A. Marshall, and Anthony Kellest. The purpose is to determine which theoretical leadership principles are reflected in our current doctrine and which, if incorporated, could prove beneficial.

History offers valuable insight into the leadership traits of past battlefield leaders and their applicability to future crises. This paper will study Daniel Morgan defeating Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens; Louis Davout sealing victories for Napoleon at Austerlitz and Auerstadt; T.E. Lawrence assisting Allenby's operational plan by successfully pinning down Turkish troops with raids along the Hejaz railroad; and Vo Nguyen Giap defeating the French at Dien Bien Phu.

Current U.S. Army leadership doctrine will be scrutinized to determine how we presently train leaders. The leadership family of manuals is extensive. Our concentration, however, will be on FM 22-100, Military Leadership, and

FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, which are the Army's flagships for basic leadership doctrine. FM 100-5, Operations, will also be briefly considered.

What of the future? Many analysts predict that military leaders of tomorrow will face a more complex array of problems than those faced by leaders in the past. Future battle, and its concomitant leadership requirements, will be seen through the eyes of Chris Bellamy, John Keegan, Martin van Creveld, W.J. Wood, and James Hunt.

This essay will determine the adequacy of our leadership doctrine for future battle and the implications of that determination. Decisions such as those faced by Anthony Hartle at Bravo 7 will confront commanders in future battles. They should not feel, however, that , "No logic or training I had received gave me a clear right answer. Obedience to legal orders demanded one course."⁴

Ardant du Picq wrote of the, "...need to research with a focus on the future, not the past and present."⁵ With that goal, this discourse will conclude by suggesting some improvements to our leadership doctrine including more focus on future battle, flexibility, imagination, and initiative. We begin our trek with a survey of theory.

THE THEORISTS' VIEW

Theory, by definition, is speculation.⁶ It is a set of hypotheses developed for a specific study or environment. Although sometimes valid for other studies, its applications should not be randomly transferred. Many theoretical tenets are reflected in our leadership doctrine; others, if incorporated, could prove beneficial.

America's theory of war reflects, to a large degree, the writings of Carl von Clausewitz. In On War, Clausewitz addresses leadership under the heading "Military Genius." It is, "...a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation."⁷ To Clausewitz, military genius is not a trait given by divine-right; rather, it is an ability which can be acquired. Successful military leadership requires high intelligence, physical and moral courage, intuition, and determination.⁸ High intelligence is required because:

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth. Average intelligence may recognize the truth occasionally, and exceptional courage may now and then retrieve a blunder; but usually intellectual inadequacy will be shown up by indifferent achievement.⁹

To Clausewitz, courage is a combination of facing personal danger and accepting responsibility.¹⁰ Intuition he explained as coup d'oeil: the ability to quickly, "...discern through the fog of war what was happening and what needed to be done."¹¹ Determination is the, "...courage to accept responsibility."¹² Michael Howard elaborated, writing that determination is the "...capacity, having taken a decision, to stick to it."¹³ Determination is rooted in intellect, study and character. Intellect refers to tenacity and reflection, not academic prowess.

Character is strength of mind, "...the ability to keep one's head at times of exceptional stress and violent emotion."¹⁴ Related to determination is presence of mind; the ability to deal with the unexpected. Such presence of mind gives the leader the will to act after weighing the risks associated with the decision.¹⁵ To Clausewitz, military genius and leadership are moral attributes that become the determining factors in battle.

Two generations after Clausewitz, a French Army officer, Colonel Ardant du Picq, constructed an analysis of the moral factors influencing battle. Battle Studies was published following du Picq's combat death during the Franco-Prussian War. Leadership, to du Picq, entails discipline, cohesion, and courage. The purpose of discipline is to make men do things they would not normally contemplate, "...to make men fight in spite of themselves."¹⁶ Leaders have the responsibility to dominate their personal fears and set the example. "Victory belongs to the commander who has known how to keep (troops) in good order, to hold them, and to direct them."¹⁷ It is essential for soldiers to believe in each other and in their leaders. Such unity of thought and effort is the product of excellent training and results in overcoming fear. Du Picq understood that all men, both leaders and followers, were "...beings in whom the instinct of self-preservation dominates...all other sentiments."¹⁸ Successful leaders, then, are those who instill discipline in both themselves and others; build, through quality training, cohesive units; and exude confidence and courage that inspire subordinates.

Seventy-five years and two major wars after du Picq, S.L.A. Marshall studied the moral dimension of soldiers in battle. Many of his conclusions echoed those of Clausewitz and du Picq. For Marshall, the commander's first, and most important, responsibility is to understand the men he leads. "True strength of will in the commander develops from his study of human nature, for it is in the

measure of how other men think that he perfects himself in the control of their thoughts and acts."¹⁹ Marshall later amplified this assertion, writing, "...the most serious and repeated breakdowns on the field of combat are caused by failure of the controls over human nature...Toward that end it is essential that the will of one give direction to the mission."²⁰

Direction provides the means for leaders to seize and maintain the initiative. Inherent in determining direction is the existence and flow of information. "The total strength of the command is the total of what all ranks know at the given moment about the strength of the command and of the position."²¹ Marshall recognized that once the battle commences, there is a natural tendency for leaders to become more concerned with their own survival than that of the unit.²² The truth of this assertion is demonstrated today in any unit exercise. Situation reports inundate a headquarters until the establishment of enemy contact. At that point, radios mysteriously malfunction and the flow of information becomes a trickle. Why? Leaders concentrate on individual engagements instead of directing the entire battle.

The weakest point in battle is that instant when a leader relaxes. Subordinates tend to follow suit.²³ The danger is that units lose their fighting edge when relaxation becomes its focus. Echoing du Picq, Marshall wrote:

The art of leading, in operations large or small, is the art of dealing with humanity, of working diligently on behalf of men, of being sympathetic with them, but equally, of insisting that they make a square facing toward their own problems.²⁴

Marshall reflected Clausewitz' notion concerning the commander's will. Specifically, he felt that a commander's will cannot run counter to reason. "What he (the commander) asks of his men must be consistent with the possibilities of the situation."²⁵ Risk must be thoroughly assessed or it becomes recklessness. Additionally, Marshall felt it critical for leaders to be at the decisive point on the

battlefield and to maintain control. While this infers a measure of personal risk, soldiers expect to see their leaders working and moving with them. To do otherwise implies that leaders are avoiding danger. Marshall's account of Lieutenant Rideout epitomized his thoughts on leadership:

I (Lieutenant Rideout) gave myself the task of remaining behind and prodding them because I am the commander. It was my plan and I had given the order. It was my duty to see that it was carried out. I considered that my post should be at the point which offered the best chance of bringing off a successful and completed action. My men know me well enough to have confidence that when I remain behind, it is for the good of the Company and not to save myself.²⁶

Although "...clear, commanding voices are all too rare on the field of battle," Marshall understood the necessity for bold, decisive leadership.²⁷ Such leadership is facilitated by knowing soldiers well enough to maximize their strengths. Many times, this ability is the difference between superb and mediocre leadership.

Writing two generations after Marshall is Anthony Kellest, the last theorist we shall examine. Agreeing with Clausewitz, Kellest believes that leadership can be taught. "Leadership is a professional quality which can be taught like any other subject. It is not metaphysical in its nature."²⁸ Essential components of leadership are discipline and training. Although agreeing with Marshall that initiative and the individual nature of battle have decreased the enforcement of rigid discipline, Kellest believes that military discipline still serves three functions:

1. It ensures that soldiers, in battle, do not succumb to the natural instinct for self-preservation, but carry out their orders.
2. It maintains orders in an army so that it may be easily moved and controlled.
3. It provides the assimilation of the recruit and the differentiation of his new environment from his former one.²⁹

Training, in Kellett's view, replaced fear and coercion as the essential ingredient for discipline.³⁰ For leaders, discipline involves learning to be a good follower. Soldiers look to their leaders as the example; part of that is demonstrating the ability to obey, as well as give, orders.³¹

Let us review the major leadership tenets advocated by Clausewitz, du Picq, Marshall, and Kellett. It is instructive to note that these four theorists span two centuries and ten major wars, yet many of their tenets are similar. All recognize the need for discipline. Discipline, far from being obdurate, is the quality that provides flexibility to well trained leaders and units. Clausewitz and Kellett endorse the philosophy that leadership can be taught. This suggests that leadership must be adaptable to different personalities and situations. Du Picq and Marshall stress the need for cohesion in units. Cohesion fosters unity, which promotes common understanding and shared values. In short, cohesion advances coherence. All see imagination, in some form, as a key difference between average and superior leaders. Marshall writes, "It is imagination primarily which distinguishes the brilliant tactician from his plodding brother."³² Clausewitz, however, is suspicious of imagination's utility beyond terrain analysis. Rational imagination enables leaders to envision future conflict. Du Picq and Kellett emphasize quality training as the means to develop imagination. All agree that leaders have the responsibility to set the example. Given the many generations and the variety of experiences that separate their writings, it is interesting that these four theorists seldom contradict each other; rather, they build on each other's ideas. We shall later see which of their thoughts are incorporated in our current leadership doctrine.

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Will Durant once wrote that "Most history is guessing and the rest is prejudice...Our conclusions from the past to the future are made more hazardous than ever by the acceleration of change." Continuing, however, he said "The present is the past rolled up for action, and the past is the present unrolled for understanding." ³³ History provides a glimpse of the leadership traits of past commanders. In an effort to understand the applicability of the past to the present and future, we proceed.

The year 1780 found the American Continental Army reeling from a string of defeats at the hands of the British. In a judicious choice, General Washington placed the Southern Theater under the command of General Nathanael Greene. Greene was a student of the military profession and had experience as the Army Quartermaster.³⁴ He also benefited from having subordinates ideally suited for command in the Southern Theater: Among these was Daniel Morgan, who had a "...knowledge of the southern States and of the customs and manners of the inhabitant."³⁵ Morgan was a Virginia backwoodsman with several years of military service, including battles at Quebec and Saratoga. Working with Francis Marion, Morgan understood the strengths and limitations of guerrilla bands vis a vis organized armies.³⁶ His goal was disruption of the enemy, not seizure of territory. "The guerrillas, while they could not recapture or even defend the southern states, forced Cornwallis to divert much of his already meager resources to securing lines of communications."³⁷ Similarly, "...active guerrillas also were effective in curbing Loyalist movements in the backcountry, robbing Cornwallis of badly needed intelligence."³⁸

In January 1781, Greene showed his mettle by committing an "...outrageous military heresy - that of dividing a weaker command in the face of one stronger."³⁹ While seeming to violate the military principle of mass, Greene's

action was ideally suited for his environment. Foraging was easier for smaller, separate forces than for a large, single force. He understood that his actions, although risky, would force Cornwallis to divide his own force. Greene wrote, "It makes the most of my inferior force, for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as to his own line of conduct."⁴⁰

Morgan commanded the larger portion of Greene's army. To oppose him, Cornwallis sent Banastre Tarleton. The two forces met at Hannah's Cowpens on 17 January 1781. This battle, later to be called an American Cannae, demonstrated the leadership abilities of Daniel Morgan. Understanding the limitations of guerrilla forces, he adopted a plan to maximize their capabilities. "The 'old wagoner' (Morgan) recognized that the guerrilla fighter normally avoids the challenge to positional combat. The value of his corps lay in harassment, and approximately half his force now consisted of militia unfamiliar with orthodox warfare."⁴¹ Morgan exhibited what Clausewitz later called *coup d'oeil*, the inward eye. Surveying his chosen place of battle, he instantly formulated his plan. Emulating his superior commander, Morgan accepted risk by doing the unorthodox, in this case leaving his flanks open. He positioned a line of Continentals in the center of the battlefield, then placed his irregulars forward to maximize their abilities as sharpshooters. As the British attacked, the sharpshooters withdrew behind the irregulars, all the while luring Tarleton forward. Morgan then closed the trap by attacking the British from both rear flanks. Throughout the battle and its preparation, Morgan was at the decisive point, encouraging his soldiers and directing his units. Besides exhibiting physical courage, his actions in devising and executing a bold plan demonstrated great moral courage. Morgan showed imagination and flexibility in his planning, as well as the strength of will to persevere in the execution of his

plan. Both Greene and Morgan correctly gauged British decisions, thereby following the teaching of Sun Tzu to "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."⁴² Proper analysis of intelligence and the ability to anticipate Cornwallis' moves enabled Greene to thwart the British campaign in the southern colonies.

Across the Atlantic Ocean, unrest in France led to the dissolution of the monarchy and the eventual establishment of the French Empire under Napoleon Bonaparte. The empire was created and maintained through battle. Among those responsible for Napoleon's military success was Marshal Louis-Nicholas Davout, commander of III Corps. Napoleon's greatest triumphs, Austerlitz (1805) and Jena-Auerstadt (1806), were sealed by Marshal Davout.

At Austerlitz, Napoleon faced the Third Coalition Army, composed of Austrian and Russian forces. Napoleon deceived the Coalition concerning the "Grand Armee's" disposition by withdrawing from the dominant terrain (Pratzen Heights) to lure the enemy forward. He simultaneously weakened the French right flank to make it more inviting to Coalition attack. Fighting a mobile defense, he then launched Soult's IV Corps in a massive counterattack to destroy Coalition forces on the Pratzen. Success was ensured by Davout, who marched his corps from Vienna to Austerlitz, some 70 miles, in 46 hours.⁴³ Demonstrating great flexibility and initiative, III Corps arrived in time to prevent the collapse of the right flank. Trapped on icy marshes between Davout and Soult, Coalition units died under a barrage of direct fire artillery.

Ten months later, Davout again demonstrated his leadership abilities at Auerstadt. Napoleon's plan called for Davout to "...cut off the Prussian line of retreat toward Magdeburg or to envelop the foe's flank and rear near Apolda."⁴⁴ History records that through a huge error in calculation, Napoleon, "...with 96,000 men - had only been engaging the Prussian flank forces (at Jena), jointly 55,000

strong, while Davout - the subordinate, a mere 26,000 troops under his command - had been locked in mortal conflict (at Auerstadt) with Brunswick (63,000).⁴⁵

On several occasions, the battle was in doubt. Davout denied a Prussian opportunity to overwhelm the intentionally weakened French left flank by personally leading two regiments into battle. Exhibiting great tactical flexibility and initiative, Davout formed his units into a "menacing crescent-shaped formation"⁴⁶ and advanced upon the Prussians, demoralizing the King of Prussia to the point where he could only concede defeat and order a full-scale retreat.

What enabled Davout to achieve such success? First, he had a clear understanding of Napoleon's intent at both Austerlitz and Auerstadt. This allowed him to pursue his missions with tenacity and singleness of purpose. At Auerstadt, Davout correctly anticipated the Prussians' moves and accepted risk by intentionally weakening his left flank. Davout's initiative and discipline were evident in the march from Vienna to Austerlitz, while his courage was ever present. The "Iron Marshal"⁴⁷ served as an inspiration to his subordinates. His tenacious attitude was contagious and inspired his division commanders to continue fighting despite numerical odds. This was evident at Auerstadt, where some divisions continued to fight after suffering 40% losses.⁴⁸ Without their perseverance, the battle could easily have turned in favor of the Prussians. Determination, initiative, and discipline are, then, the attributes that characterize Marshal Davout's leadership.

Determination was also the strong suit of T.E. Lawrence, who served on the staff of the Hejaz Expeditionary Force and later on the staff of General Allenby during World War I. Lawrence's success in training and commanding Arab irregular forces eventually isolated Medina and kept more than 25,000 Turkish troops pinned down along the Hejaz railway.⁴⁹ Inherent in his success were the teachings of Sun Tzu to study both your enemy and your own forces. Also

evident were lessons from Daniel Morgan to plan for a limited objective when using irregular forces.

Lawrence's value to Allenby was his understanding that, "Our aim was to make action a series of single combats."⁵⁰ His limited objective was the Hejaz railroad. This, however, had a twist: the goal was not the complete destruction of the railway; rather, "Our ideal was to keep his railway just working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort to him."⁵¹ Recognizing that Turkish forces could not occupy the whole of Arabia, Lawrence devised a plan to contain the enemy within the expansive desert until the moment of attack. Having established his goal, Lawrence proceeded to develop his forces. He studied the nomadic habits of the Arabs, as well as their culture, religion, and language.⁵² His study of Arab instincts indicated that Arab war was "simple and individual"⁵³, as opposed to the traditional Western concept of a disciplined army where individuality is secondary to the good of the unit. Lawrence also understood the value of intuition, the ability to quickly envision the future battle, Clausewitz' coup d'oeil.

The nature of irregular warfare necessitated the support of the local population. Without civilian support, the Arab forces would be unable to continue fighting. "We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom."⁵⁴ The extent of Lawrence's perception was evident when he wrote, "...it occurred to me that perhaps the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face, and that it had been the threat of attack by them upon the Turkish northern flank which had made the enemy hesitate for so long."⁵⁵ Lawrence followed the yet-unpublished dictum of S.L.A. Marshall that leaders should study human nature. Lawrence possessed Greene's and Morgan's ability to analyze enemy intentions. The determination seen in Davout was also evident in Lawrence's leadership. Combined with his understanding of human nature,

these attributes gave Lawrence the capacity to plan objectives that maximized the capabilities of his forces and minimized those of the enemy. By recognizing the requirements for insurgent success, T.E. Lawrence exposed Western military thinkers to a form of warfare long dormant in their thinking and absent from their doctrine.

Far removed from Western thought were the subtle changes in warfare unfolding in Southeast Asia. The full impact of irregular battle became a startling reality at Dien Bien Phu. The architect of the Vietnamese victory over French was Vo Nguyen Giap. Two words best describe him: flexible and improvisational. General Giap's initial concept was to open a breach, penetrate to the interior, hold the breach, then use successive assault waves to force the capitulation of French forces.⁵⁶ Frontal attacks against the fortresses at Dien Bien Phu quickly proved too costly. The siege, "...absorbed perhaps five per cent of the French battle force (in Indochina),...the same battle tied down fifty per cent of the Communist forces and an overwhelming share of the military supplies provided by Red China."⁵⁷ Understanding that such losses could not continue and that trying to conquer Dien Bien Phu with piecemeal frontal attacks would benefit the French, Giap reverted to the trench warfare reminiscent of World War I.⁵⁸ This form of strangulation prevented the French from fighting an economy of force battle.

Raids against French air bases forced the French commander to withdraw all but minimal forces from his airstrips. The French were thus unable to amass the volume of supplies necessary to withstand a siege. Giap's dictum was that no one escape.⁵⁹ Understanding the problems caused by mass casualties, he refused to allow French ambulances to land, nor would he allow the French to evacuate their wounded and dead by ground.

Using four divisions and more than two hundred artillery pieces, General Giap effectively sealed Dien Bien Phu.⁶⁰ He continually assessed his strengths and moved to maximize them. In addition to 80,000 well-trained first-line troops, Giap had a large reserve that was in a constant state of training.⁶¹ Moreover, Giap ordered diversionary attacks throughout Vietnam which prevented the French from concentrating forces at Dien Bien Phu.

His scattered assaults ...tied down the French in different areas, so that they could not reinforce one threatened spot without inviting attack on another. Vietminh terrorists stepped up their assassinations of pro-French officials, and guerrillas constantly harassed French convoys transporting supplies inland from Haiphong.⁶²

Like Morgan and Lawrence before him, Giap understood the value of a limited objective in irregular warfare. His leadership was innovative. While the French were prevented from evacuating their forces, the civilian population cared for the wounded Vietminh. Similarly, Giap showed innovation in resupplying his forces. The road network leading to Dien Bien Phu was a series of narrow dirt trails. Aside from the fact that the roads could not support great vehicular traffic, Giap's supply of trucks was not plentiful. Bicycles, therefore, were converted to carry up 450 lbs of supplies.⁶³ Thus, "...if Giap had, say, 50,000 bicycles he was bringing up somewhere around 10,000 tons of ammunition, spare weapons, petrol, food, etc..."⁶⁴

Another feature of his victory was patience. Time favored the Vietnamese. The French were incapable of holding out indefinitely, whereas Giap, assisted by the local populace, kept fresh troops on the line. Recognizing the need to achieve victory before the Geneva Conference considered the Indochina situation, Giap again revised his plan. The strangulation objectives were accomplished: French morale was still intact, but ammunition and food were

running out. With an intuition worthy of Clausewitz' inward eye, Giap launched his forces in a mass attack. Seven days later, the weary French forces surrendered. 65

What commonalities exist among these examples? Daniel Morgan used guerrilla tactics against a numerically superior force. "It involved an assortment of methods: hit-and-run raids, assaults on supply lines, sieges, and fixed battles... always bold, but never rash, always flexible, always willing to give up the battlefield in order to return for a better day."⁶⁶ These qualities are equally applicable to T.E. Lawrence and Vo Nguyen Giap. Each identified the limitations of their forces and sought to maximize their strengths. Morgan, Lawrence, and Giap developed leadership traits that capitalized on the cultural strengths of their forces. Morgan and Giap fostered local creeds which they shared. Lawrence put aside his occidental upbringing and created a force based on tribal strengths. In each case, their leadership suited their forces and provided cohesion. They were flexible enough to be content with a limited objective that aided in the accomplishment of the overall plan. These commanders, fighting irregular battles, were supported by the local population. Perhaps most important, they each possessed the determination deemed so important by Clausewitz. They immediately envisioned a plan of battle and exhibited exemplary discipline, both personal and in the training of their subordinates. Clausewitz and Kellett argued that leadership can be taught. Given the backgrounds of Morgan and Giap, and the inexperience of Lawrence, their argument appears sound.

What of Davout? The commander of III Corps exhibited all of the leadership traits found in our current leadership doctrine. He was a man of character in his service to Napoleon, and he exhibited tenacity, flexibility, and initiative. Davout was a student of his profession and led by example. The difference between

Davout and the other leaders examined is that all of his battles were linear. The thought of withdrawing from the battlefield to fight another day was unthinkable for one of the "Grand Armee's" Marshals.

So why is Davout even considered in a paper about leadership in future battle? Our leadership doctrine, as we shall see, is based heavily on the type of warfare fought by Marshal Davout. Morgan, Lawrence and Giap demonstrated an ability to adapt to new realities. Their imagination and innovation contained a vision of what war could be, as opposed to what it had always been. The United States Army did not totally discount the lessons of Morgan, Lawrence, and Giap, but it did consider them aberrations in the history of warfare. Our current leadership doctrine, with its fixation on linear battle, is the result.

A LOOK AT DOCTRINE

History indicates that successful battle captains assimilated theoretical tenets into their leadership philosophies. What of the U.S. Army's current leadership doctrine? Does it reflect the same theories and lessons learned? More important, does it provide direction for the future? Our two base leadership documents are FM 22-100, Military Leadership, and FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels. FM100-5, Operations, discusses the relationship of leadership to AirLand Battle operations.

FM 22-100 emphasizes aspects of leadership that it calls "Be, Know, Do."⁶⁷ The "Be" category includes such things as determination, initiative, flexibility, loyalty, and integrity.⁶⁸ Clausewitz would applaud the inclusion of determination, as would Morgan and Giap the mention of initiative and flexibility. Davout personified loyalty in his service to France. Other than stating that these are examples of what a leader should be, however, FM 22-100 does not elaborate on the significance of the attributes. Those things which a leader must "Know" are standards, self, human nature, job, and unit.⁶⁹ An understanding of human nature is, according to S.L.A. Marshall, the starting point for understanding war. The discussion on knowing one's unit addresses discipline and cohesion, both of which are primary tenets of du Picq. Kellett's writings agree with the necessity of discipline, but he cautions that cohesion is not the panacea for unit strength. Cohesion, to Kellett, is a function of compatibility, minimal personnel turbulence, healthy competition and size.⁷⁰ The danger lies in substituting unit esprit for cohesion.

As for the things a leader must "Do", the manual mentions providing purpose, direction, and motivation.⁷¹ Morgan and Davout understood their superior's purpose and were able to transmit that intent to their subordinates. Lawrence

and Giap developed a sense of shared purpose between themselves and their followers. Inherent in providing direction is decision making. FM 22-100 equates decision making with problem solving. Clausewitz disagrees, writing:

During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be no time to review the situation or even think it through. Usually, of course, new information and reevaluation are not enough to make us give up our intentions: they only call them in question. We now know more, but this makes us more, not less uncertain.⁷²

Problem solving entails a methodical thought process. However ideal, Clausewitz realizes that such a process is probably unsuited for battle because combat decisions are routinely instinctive.

The role of character is highlighted in FM 22-100 and reminds one of S.L.A. Marshall's admonition to study human character. Character is seen as the link between values and behavior.⁷³ Its importance is that soldiers look to their leaders as the example and they then emulate that example. When leaders relax, soldiers relax. Had Anthony Hartle used civilians as mine detectors, he would have opened a Pandora's box that allowed his subordinates to commit comparable crimes.

While character and the "Be, Know, Do" aspects of leadership are essential, it is noteworthy to remember du Picq's counsel to research with the focus on the future, not the past and present. It is here that FM 22-100 is most lacking. Its discussion of future battle highlights the fatigue and stress of continuous operations, reemphasizes the need for unit cohesion, and the importance of physical training. Technology is seen to provide a more lethal battlefield, where communications are disrupted and nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) warfare are prevalent.⁷⁴ Ardant du Picq and Jean de Bloch would agree that technological advances mean a more lethal battlefield where critical decisions are often made at the lowest levels. FM 22-100, however, misses one of their

more cogent points: Du Picq and Bloch also recognized that technology would create more isolation on the battlefield. As we shall see, that thought was echoed by others.

The 1983 edition of FM 22-100 devoted an entire section to leader development programs. The 1990 edition deletes that chapter and put the onus for leader development on schools, experience, and self-development.⁷⁵ Missing, however, is the direction to be taken by these programs.

FM 22-100, then, emphasizes the importance of character in relation to values and behavior. It also categorizes leadership under the headings of "Be, Know, Do." It omits, however, both an analysis of future battle and the construction of leader development programs to enhance junior leadership on the battlefield of tomorrow. Let us now examine our manual for senior level leadership.

Written as leadership doctrine for senior levels, FM 22-103 places a premium on the commander's vision. Characteristics required of senior leaders are an ability to rapidly assess the situation and form a battlefield vision; a high tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty; and the capability to learn rapidly. Together, these provide the capability to make timely decisions.⁷⁶

Vision, however, is the start point. It is "...the hub or core from which flows the leadership and command force that fires imaginations, sustaining the will to win."⁷⁷ From this vision flows the senior level version of "Be, Know, Do." In this case, they are referred to as "Attributes, Perspectives, and Imperatives."⁷⁸ "Attributes" are those things that senior leaders represent to their units. They are standard bearers who provide an ethical framework for the organization; developers who teach and coach their subordinates; and integrators who keep the unit's focus on the future.⁷⁹

"Perspectives" are the knowledge that confirm the soundness of the commander's vision. Historical perspectives provide core knowledge and a common reference point. Operational perspectives are knowledge of current doctrine, an understanding of the art of war. Organizational perspectives are knowing your soldiers.⁸⁰ Given these definitions, Clausewitz, du Picq, Marshall, and Kellett would agree that each are critical to success in battle. Morgan, Davout, Lawrence, and Giap would also attest to their validity.

"Imperatives" provide purpose, direction, and motivation. Purpose establishes the rationale for a unit's mission; direction is the blueprint for accomplishing the mission; and motivation is the moral force necessary to execute the plan.

What skills are necessary for a commander to implement his vision? FM 22-103 divides them into three categories: Conceptual, Competency, and Communications.⁸¹ Under conceptual skills are such things as decision-making, forecasting, creativity, and intuition. Decision making is recognized as a difficult, but essential element of leadership and is closely tied to intuition. Field Marshal Montgomery once wrote, "The acid test of an officer who aspires to high command is his ability to be able to grasp quickly the essentials of a military problem."⁸² This strongly reflects the coup d'oeil concept of Clausewitz.

Competency skills include risk taking, endurance, and coordination. Risk taking, not recklessness, was a critical element of success discussed by Clausewitz. "Boldness will be at a disadvantage only in an encounter with deliberate caution, which may be considered bold in its own right."⁸³ A century later, General Wavell summed it up with typical British aplomb by simply stating that great commanders "must have a spirit of adventure."⁸⁴ Endurance encompasses both physical and mental capacities. Hard work and study are keys to victory. Morgan accepted risk at Cowpens by leaving his flanks

unprotected, but he did so only after studying Tarleton's combat habits and correctly anticipating the British tactics. Similarly, Davout intentionally weakened his left flank at Auerstadt after visualizing the probable Prussian course of action. Lawrence and Giap also studied the capabilities and limitations of both their own forces and those of the enemy. They then established objectives for their forces and determined the risk associated with their limitations.

Communications skills are listening, teaching and persuading. The ability to plan operations is only as good as one's ability to sell that plan to both superiors and subordinates. A commander's intent must be clearly articulated. Orders verbally encoded to a staff may be decoded into a variety of meanings. One of the factors in Davout's success was his clear understanding of Napoleon's intent at Austerlitz and Auerstadt. Conversely, Marshal Bernadotte, commanding I Corps, did not understand the Emperor's intent at Jena-Auerstadt and successfully avoided both battles, although he was only a few miles from each. Had Napoleon or Davout been defeated, Bernadotte's absence could easily have been the cause.

After discussing conceptual, competency, and communications skills, FM 22-103 devotes much time to team building and unit cohesion. Unlike FM 22-100, however, the manual for senior level leaders keeps an eye on the future by focusing on the commander's vision. Napoleon wrote:

If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and meditation.⁸⁵

Its focus on vision indicates that FM 22-103 understands the value of commanders who can fight the current battle, yet simultaneously plan for future engagements.

Having examined the army's two basic leadership manuals, it is helpful to see where leadership fits into our operational philosophy. FM 100-5, the U.S. Army's operations doctrine, states that, "The most essential element of combat power is competent and confident leadership."⁸⁶ FM 100-5 places a premium on a leader's character. Likewise, FM 22-100 and FM 22-103 predicate many of their guidelines on individual character. Don Higginbotham wrote:

The essential quality of a great captain is what most perceptive students and practitioners of warfare have called 'character.' That elusive quality, defying easy delineation, involves moral courage, plain nerve, relentless determination, combined with the ability to dominate any situation, to obtain a psychological initiative over one's adversary.⁸⁷

What role does a leader's character play on a technologically advanced battlefield? As we shall see, many analysts feel that the future battlefield will place greater demands on individual character and decision making than previous conflicts. It will also require leaders with the ability to operate independently, with little guidance, for a great length of time. Alongside character, FM 100-5 harkens back to the theories of du Picq and Marshall and identifies the necessity for commanders to understand their men and the effects they may suffer in battle.

Both of our base doctrinal manuals for leadership emphasize, in various forms, the type of individual that a leader must be, what he must know concerning his profession and his unit, and how he should go about the business of making decisions that impact upon that unit. FM 22-100, geared for junior leaders, focuses on the past as an instructional tool and spends little time discussing the complexity of the future battlefield. FM 22-103 is better in terms of keeping the leader focused on his vision of the coming war. All other attributes of leadership are subordinated to vision. Both documents are coherent and appear suitable for acceptance by the army. This means they are well written manuals with no

technical errors. Their weaknesses are ones of omission. FM 100-5 clearly recognizes the importance of leadership on the future battlefield, but does not provide any depth regarding how leadership influences battle. What can we expect from the future battlefield? Does our doctrine have the flexibility to adapt to new realities? These issues will be addressed in the following sections.

THE NATURE OF FUTURE BATTLE

Before continuing, it is instructive to form a concept of future battle. Will it be a mere derivative of the past or an event unlike anything preceding? Chris Bellamy, in The Future of Land Warfare, writes of a battlefield that is empty in terms of the number of targets, but crowded by the number of forces trying to gain supremacy in any given area. "In immediate terms the battlefield must be fairly empty, except for limited moments when forces concentrate for the attack."⁸⁸ This thought reminds one of the cautions of Jean de Bloch at the beginning of this century. An empty battlefield was forecast for World War I, if for no other reason than because technology would force greater dispersion of forces. Yet Bellamy points out that "Dispersion at the lower levels, paradoxically, led to clogging of the battlefield at the higher...(divisions) clogged up the entire breadth of front and prevented a decisive breakthrough or envelopment."⁸⁹

Aside from dispersion, what characterizes future battle in Bellamy's eyes? In many ways, Bellamy sees future battle as a return to the slaughter that was World War I. The technology of destruction is far advanced from that age, but technology does not necessarily change the conduct of war. Rates of advance for combat forces, tied as they are to logistics capability, will probably not achieve the technological capability of the tanks and personnel carriers. No army, in fact, "...has ever attained the 27 kilometre per day norm of the Mongols."⁹⁰ This suggests that advanced technology cannot guarantee faster battles or unsullied battlefields.

Together, these indicators imply a war of long duration and present a myriad of challenges to leaders. As wars lengthen, history shows that our national will slowly dissipates. Leaders are then faced with the prospect of convincing soldiers that their war is just. Additionally, as units are replaced, new soldiers

come from the very source of the apathy, increasing the disruption within a unit. Bellamy, writing in 1987, said, "Guerrilla wars, internal wars or internal wars with external intervention have become the most prevalent forms of war."⁹¹

Others echo Bellamy's thoughts. John Keegan predicts wars of greater duration. Battles themselves, when compared with history, may be of equivalent length, but the "occasions on which battle - the same battle - may summon him (the soldier) to its service," have multiplied.⁹² Keegan foresees a battlefield that is not so much empty as it is naked. Wars subsequent to World War I have shown that the destructive capability of modern weapons, including defoliants, quickly deny the soldier any place to feel secure. The feelings of exposure and vulnerability increase the stress felt by soldiers and validate the need for leaders who are determined, imaginative, disciplined, demonstrate initiative, and possess Clausewitz' inward eye. Disagreeing with Kellett, Keegan sees coercion as the modern version of discipline under fire, "...the fire which nails him (the soldier) to the ground or drives him beneath it, the great distance which yawns between him and safety."⁹³ He agrees with Bellamy concerning the probability of guerrilla war, writing that men today:

...will fight for causes which they profess not through the mechanisms of the state and its armed power but, where necessary, against them by clandestine and guerrilla methods.⁹⁴

The challenge this poses to leaders is similar to that faced by Lawrence to create a common sense of purpose from disparate ideas and values.

Leaders and Battles, by W.J. Wood, uses history as a tool to examine the future and concludes that battle, regardless of the era, demands leaders with a healthy reservoir of courage, will, intellect, and presence.⁹⁵ Courage encompasses both moral and physical varieties; will is boldness and tenacity; intellect includes imagination, flexibility, and judgment; and presence is the ability

to inspire others. These qualities were evident in Davout and Giap, but are they applicable to the future battlefield?

James Hunt and John Blair studied the potential battlefield of the future and its requisite leadership requirements. In the technological arena, they concluded that electronic interference will prevent direct and positive control of subordinates. This will force greater reliance on junior leaders and their ability to make decisions. A century ago, du Picq and Bloch asserted that captains would, in future war, be forced to make decisions traditionally reserved for generals. The importance of coup d'oeil becomes more pronounced in battles where leaders must envision events occurring hours, even days, in the future. This factor will "require significant conceptual ability beyond that previously required in battle."⁹⁶ This image of future battle suggests continued dependence on qualities like courage, will, intellect, and presence.

Hunt and Blair, in Leadership on the Future Battlefield, continue by discussing the need for leaders to clearly understand their commander's intent, as well as that of the enemy. "Control is based on shared visions of the battlefield...(which implies) much more mentorship of peacetime leaders by their seniors - a concept of leader-teachers at all levels."⁹⁷ Recognizing this, Martin van Creveld, in Command in War, looks at future war from the perspective of the commander. He advocates decision thresholds to encourage initiative in junior leaders and create "freedom of action at the bottom of the military structure."⁹⁸ Just as Davout understood Napoleon's vision, T.E. Lawrence understood his role in General Allenby's overall concept for the Arabian Theater. By recognizing his limitations and correctly deducing the importance of the Hejaz railway to the Turks, Lawrence developed plans that maximized the potential of his irregular force.

Simply understanding the commander's intent will not, in isolation, be sufficient. Future war will require leaders with much initiative and foresight. What is right will be far more important than who is right. Advances in technology demand an increase in the technical competence of leaders. Such competence becomes vital on a battlefield where leaders are separated from their senior commanders, as well as from the non-commissioned officers on whom they traditionally rely for technical expertise. The fog of war will always be present, which necessitates the need for flexibility and adaptability in leaders. Boldness will be an essential ingredient to success and must be encouraged in leaders if they are to be innovative in their approach to combat. The influence of politics has traditionally been scorned by soldiers; however, future war will require leaders with an understanding of national will and the political / economic factors influencing the soldiers they lead and the battles they fight.⁹⁹

The future battlefield, then, will be more technologically advanced, though not necessarily more lethal than the battlefields of the past. One reason is that technological advances tend to be rapidly negated by counter-technology. Future battles are also viewed as long in duration, stagnant, and highly stressful. Incursions such as Grenada and Panama have conditioned our society and military to expect quick results. The initial lightning strikes of the German Army in World War II led many to the same conclusion about that war. Bloch, however, proved more prophetic than he hoped, for after the breath-taking successes of 1939-40, the sieges of Leningrad, Cherbourg, and Stalingrad were hauntingly reminiscent of World War I. Leaders of tomorrow can no longer gird their faculties for a single Austerlitz-type battle. Instead, they must develop plans for continuous engagements and for conflict hours, even days, in the future. The protracted nature of future combat necessitates developing leaders who are able

to cope with stress and ambiguity, are self-reliant, and can acquire the inward eye discussed by Clausewitz.

In a world that is no longer bi-polar, leaders must be flexible and adapt their leadership styles to either linear or irregular battle. Leaders at all levels will increasingly rely on their own decision making skills instead of depending on their higher headquarters to provide answers. Separation from others, whether physical or electronic, intimates a need for leaders to precisely understand the intent of their commanders. Flexibility, imagination, and boldness will be as critical to success in future battle as they were to General Morgan and Marshal Davout. How well our current leadership doctrine prepares us for war will be examined in the next section.

AN EVALUATION OF CURRENT DOCTRINE

Now that our leadership doctrine has been discussed and we have a picture of the possible nature of the future battle, what can be said of our doctrine's adequacy for preparing leaders to fight tomorrow's battles?

First, it is useful to review the criteria established for evaluation:

1. Does the leadership doctrine contain a vision of the next war? Doctrine, as the bridge between theory and reality, should determine if the leadership skills required for future wars are different from those for past wars.
2. Is the doctrine adaptable to new realities? Doctrine that is rigid will quickly become outmoded.
3. Does the doctrine provide flexibility? The nature of combat necessitates having imaginative leaders. Lack of imagination leads to doctrine becoming dogma.
4. Is the leadership doctrine developed from our cultural history?
5. Is the doctrine suitable? If viewed as morally or professionally wrong, the army will reject or ignore the doctrine.
6. Is the doctrine coherent? Doctrine must be simple and clearly understood by those it is intended to serve. If not, it will lead to confusion.

Our leadership doctrine satisfies some of the criteria. It is culturally dependent in that it reflects the democratic nature of our society. The United States military, from its birth, has existed as a subordinate of the government. As such, it has never attempted to supplant its government nor has its ideology taken on offensive characteristics. Our nation attempts to personify the virtues of democracy, but we make no effort to hide its shortcomings. We believe that successful leaders can be developed from a myriad of backgrounds and we train leaders to subordinate their individual goals to those of their unit and nation. In a democracy, we consider leadership a process of persuasion and consent. The "Be, Know, Do" concept in FM 22-100 implies that our leaders have a responsibility to study their profession, their soldiers, and themselves. This system keeps leader development focused on our nation's ideology, the army ethic, and unit success. It also justifies our belief that leadership can, in fact, be

taught. Contrast this with the Schutzstaffel Totenkopf (SSTK) discussed by Charles Syndor in Soldiers of Destruction. Their leadership took on fanatic, racist, murderous overtones. Our American cultural upbringing makes similar leadership doctrine abhorrent to us. Instead, our leadership doctrine is based on our cultural principles of freedom and democracy.

Our doctrine is suitable. The 1983 edition of FM 22-100 remained unchanged for seven years. The 1990 edition is a streamlined version of its predecessor. Both manuals underwent routine staffing and coordinating procedures before being fielded. Leaders at all levels understand the importance of sound leadership doctrine and have not rejected FM 22-100. General Carl Vuono, in approving FM 22-100, says that it is our army's basic leadership manual. He also states that FM 22-100 addresses fundamental values essential for all leaders.¹⁰⁰ This audit trail indicates that the U.S. Army finds its leadership doctrine suitable. FM 22-100 remains the basis for leadership training in units. Far from being rejected or ignored, commanders are finding ways to supplement and complement its guidance.

Coherence prevents doctrine from being confusing. Simplicity is the hallmark of successful plans and doctrine. There is nothing complicated about our current doctrine. It is concise and to-the-point. Both FM 22-100 and FM 22-103 are well written and facilitate use by leaders.

The greatest single shortcoming of our current leadership doctrine is that it makes short shrift of the probable nature of future battle. It does not, in short, contain a vision of the next war. The problem may lie in the fact that "Current doctrine indicates that battlefield success depends on the basic tenets of initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization."¹⁰¹ FM 100-5, as previously stated, proclaims leadership to be the most essential element of combat power. If so, maybe it should be one of the tenets of AirLand Battle. The problem is that,

despite its endorsement, FM 100-5 actually says very little about the role of leadership. The result is that leadership is seen as something of secondary importance to tactics. "The doctrine provides a menu for developing effective leadership, not a recipe for success."¹⁰² Neither FM 22-100 nor FM 22-103 sufficiently addresses leadership on the future battlefield, though FM 22-103 is the better of the manuals in this regard. Remember that our examination of future battle indicates that leaders must be prepared to make decisions in isolation and with ambiguous information. FM 22-103 attempts to prepare for these eventualities, but FM 22-100 ignores them, as it does the subject of creating bold, risk taking leaders.

Current leadership doctrine does not adapt to the probable realities of future battle. The majority of the doctrine's discussion concerns linear battle. This rigidity prevents FM 22-100 from giving a balanced view of future battle. The manual contains three examples of leaders in Vietnam, but they are used only to illustrate ethical decision making. Examples of leaders fighting protracted and / or irregular warfare are not included.

Finally, the issue of flexibility must be addressed. Any doctrine's flexibility is, to a degree, determined by its utility. Hunt and Blair cautioned that "Leadership is seen as merely the application of immutable principles; officers see leadership as being restricted to influencing their immediate subordinates rather than the command as a whole."¹⁰³ The temptation to see doctrine as prescriptive can be avoided if the principles of leadership highlighted in FM 22-100 and the characteristics of successful leaders outlined in FM 22-103 are used to supplement doctrine and training. Discretion must be exercised to prevent the principles from becoming dogma, thus stifling imagination. Had Nathanael Greene followed the conventional wisdom of his day, he would not have divided his smaller force in the face of Cornwallis' larger army. No doctrine taught

Ulysses Grant to cut his own lines of communication (LOC) at Vicksburg. These decisions required courage and imagination, which are attributes not included among the principles of leadership.

In summary, the current leadership doctrine of the United States Army appears to be culturally dependent, suitable, and coherent. The 1990 edition of FM 22-100 is a streamlined version of its 1983 predecessor. It contains new historical examples, but little new in the way of analysis. The manual's rigidity prevents it from being adaptable to new realities. Most important, the doctrine does not contain a vision of the next war. The historical examples it uses ignore the valuable lessons of irregular warfare from men like Morgan, Lawrence, and Giap. It thereby ignores lessons from the architects of what may be the future face of battle.

WHAT IS NEEDED

After studying leadership theories and historical examples of military leadership, we examined our current leadership doctrine and found that it ignores valuable lessons from both. We also forecast the potential battlefield of the future and found our doctrine inadequate to train the leaders of tomorrow. Where should our leadership doctrine and training focus? To be worthwhile, doctrine must remember du Picq's advice to focus on the future, not the past and present. History is a great instructional tool and its utility in doctrine is unquestioned. Doctrine, however, must use history to prepare for the future. FM 22-100 should envision future war as something beyond an outgrowth of the American Civil War or American involvement in Vietnam. Lessons learned from experiences in Lebanon, the Falklands, Panama, the Iran-Iraq war, or Namibia should be incorporated in order to develop an image of the future battlefield. In short, a vision of the next war must go beyond Gettysburg and Tet Offensive. Such a vision demands study of geopolitics and emerging technologies in Third World nations. What are the religious, social, and economic factors that make war more likely in one area of the world than another? It is through this type analysis that soldiers can cultivate leadership traits like those that aided Lawrence.

We characterized future battle as encompassing advanced technology, long duration, stagnation, and stress. Isolation will increase and leaders at lower levels will make decisions previously made by their superiors. Du Picq and Bloch stipulated this one hundred years ago. FM 22-100 briefly addresses stress and isolation. The theories of S.L.A. Marshall concerning isolation should be incorporated into our doctrine. Recalling the tenets of Anthony Kellett, more emphasis is necessary in the area of discipline on an isolated field of battle. The

foundation for this is a realistic vision of future warfare. Once developed, this vision will provide precise realities of future battle. Lawrence and Giap recognized the potential to fight a new kind of war, a war for which their adversaries were unprepared. Their success was possible because they recognized the realities of future battle. Our leaders must develop a similar ability.

To be flexible, our doctrine's utility must move beyond the realm of lists and acronyms. Doctrine is a framework, a guide for action. It provides a reference from which to depart. As stated earlier, the broad principles of leadership found in FM 22-100 are good when used in conjunction with the remainder of our leadership doctrine. Separately, however, they are not a panacea. Leadership is not something taught by rote. It is a moral characteristic that can be obtained and nurtured in all men. The degree to which individual leadership abilities develop is the result of training.

Clausewitz referred to coup d'oeil as the inward eye, the ability to instantly analyze the battlefield and envision the ensuing conflict. Roger Nye, in The Challenge of Command, says that such tactical vision comes from creativity and that "creativity occurs after the mind has been well honed and stocked with facts and ideas."¹⁰⁴ Imagination, Clausewitz' misgivings notwithstanding, is one potential area of focus. It can be stoked and developed by reading about others, such as Napoleon's development of Corps system or Sherman's logistics system for his march to the sea. An important caveat is to look at examples of failures as well as successes. Why did Hannibal succeed so brilliantly at Cannae and fail so completely at Zama? Another technique is to put leaders in positions that require decisions. Yours to Reason Why: Decision in Battle, by William Seymour, is useful in this regard. Seymour recounts several battles in history and then forces the reader to make decisions influencing the outcome of the battles. Did the

historical leader make the correct choice? How would you change the plan?

What is your concept of your commander's intent?

The leader-to-be will learn to examine each historical case through his mind's eye, and ask the following questions: What and where were the dynamics of battle that confronted the leader? What attributes of the leader's art did he employ in overcoming his problems? How should I have acted in the same situation?¹⁰⁵

These activities train leaders to be innovative, to look for alternative solutions, to be flexible.

Another area of focus should be initiative. Clausewitz emphasized the need to be bold risk takers. Again, historical readings are useful, as are Quick Reaction Drills. Leaders must learn the difference between risk and recklessness. Taking chances without first doing the background study is the latter - it is also the more prevalent.

The lethality, isolation, and stress of the future battlefield will increase the need for leaders of exceptional skill. Our army deserves a leadership doctrine that provides the framework for future war. Colonel Ardant du Picq once said that "Man does not, cannot change."¹⁰⁶ The face of battle may change, but the inherent nature of man remains relatively constant. Our responsibility is to develop leaders capable of fighting the battles of tomorrow. We should not find ourselves groping for solutions like Anthony Hartle at "The Cemetery.

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