


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LIFE AFTER ANZUS

BY

COLONEL PETER J. DUNN  
Australian Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 1991



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America as well as Australia's nearer neighbors is suggested. It is proposed that the new military linkage replace the ANZUS Treaty and that it be incorporated into a regional organization known as the Asia Pacific Council (APAC) which would also embody the other existing linkages that affect national security.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

LIFE AFTER ANZUS

by

Colonel Peter J. Dunn  
Australian Army

Colonel (Ret) Arthur F. Lykke Jr.  
Project Advisor

U.S. Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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## ABSTRACT

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In 1985 the newly elected New Zealand Government declared a policy banning the visits to New Zealand ports of nuclear armed or powered ships. This action effectively closed New Zealand's ports to all U.S. warships as the U.S. refused to alter its policy of "neither confirm nor deny" in relation to the carriage of nuclear weapons on naval ships. The U.S. and Australia protested vigorously to New Zealand but to no avail. As a result the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty in relation to New Zealand were suspended. The Treaty is now a "lame duck" and its future unknown. This paper examines Australia's regional position and the elements of its national strategy: economic, political, socio-psychological and military. American and Japanese regional involvements are also considered in the light of the reduction in Superpower tensions and economic strength. The paper concludes that a "geographic dislocation" exists in the main military element of Australia's national strategy, the ANZUS Treaty, and that Australia's security is reduced as a consequence. To address this weakness a new security arrangement based on a Non-Aggression Pact and extending to include Japan and America as well as Australia's nearer neighbors is suggested. It is proposed that the new military linkage replace the ANZUS Treaty and that it be incorporated into a regional organization known as the Asia Pacific Council (APAC) which would also embody the other existing linkages that affect national security.

## LIFE AFTER ANZUS

### INTRODUCTION

The ANZUS Treaty was signed in San Francisco in 1951 between the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand. For 34 years the Treaty provided a strong basis for defence cooperation in the South East Asian and Pacific region. In 1985 the ANZUS Treaty contracted a serious illness when New Zealand banned US warships from port visits if they were nuclear powered or carried nuclear weapons. Because of the U.S. policy of neither confirming or denying the carriage of nuclear weapons on warships (NCND policy), this action effectively closed all New Zealand ports to US warships.

The aim of this paper is to examine the historical basis of ANZUS and assess its utility for the future in the context of other bilateral and multi-lateral agreements entered into by Australia and her neighbors. In looking forward, a new approach to treaty formulation in Australia's region will be suggested.

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Australia's concerns about regional security were

voiced as early as May 1937 when Prime Minister Lyons expressed the view that a Pacific regional defense treaty was required to protect against growing Asian hostility and material power. Subsequently, Australia's Minister for External Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt sponsored a world security organization proposal which included: "a regional defense council in the Pacific"(1).

After World War II, Australia and New Zealand believed that the "soft peace" with Japan proposed by the USA allowed for the potential re-emergence of Japan as a Pacific military power(2). This approach encouraged Australian and New Zealand representatives in Washington to argue for a much harder line to be taken against Japan(3). The United States Government adopted the view that a treaty with draconian provisions would be counter-productive. This view was reinforced by the popular belief that the reparation provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were instrumental in forcing Germany to secretly rearm after World War I (4). Furthermore, a weak Japan would become easy prey for the now aggressive Soviet Union(5).

Australia was also concerned with developments in China. The success of Mao Tse Tung in ousting Chiang Kai Shek in 1949 reverberated throughout the Pacific region. The presence of another large, regional, communist nation sparked grave security concerns in the antipodes. Communism also began to appear elsewhere as the disguise of post war nationalism was discarded. A communist revolt in Indonesia

had to be quelled in 1948 and strong communist movements appeared in India, Malaya, Japan, the Philippines and Indo-China(6). The outbreak of the Korean War heightened these concerns.

In Europe, the Cold War had begun in earnest and containing the spread of communism was increasingly a plank in American foreign policy. The world had been polarized. Effective containment of communism required collective security arrangements and support existed within America for bilateral and multilateral links with friendly nations. Security links with Australia and New Zealand were welcomed.

After lengthy negotiations, during which Australia sought security guarantees from the USA, agreement was reached on a "soft peace" with Japan. In view of this, and taking due cognizance of the threat of Soviet and communist Chinese expansion into the Southeast Asian and Pacific region, the ANZUS Treaty was signed in 1951 and subsequently ratified in 1952.

The Treaty was developed specifically in response to military threats from communism and Japan. The Treaty did not, however, contain any specific guarantees of military support to any of the signatories. Rather, a promise to consult was given and the provision of military support was implied. Australia and New Zealand both adopted the Treaty as a major feature of their foreign and defence policies.

### EMERGING PROBLEMS

Even during its early days the Treaty had its critics. In Australia, Mr Paul Hasluck, MP(7) expressed the view that the proposed pact (ANZUS Treaty) without the participation of China and Japan "*would be either to imply that they would not be called upon to take part in Pacific affairs or to place them indefinitely on the other side*"(8).

It was apparent from the beginning of the ANZUS era that the signatories had differing views on how the Treaty should be applied. Over time, four events generated consideration of the ANZUS Treaty. The first was in 1955 when tension developed over Taiwan and its offshore islands. The ANZUS Treaty was next cited during Indonesia's military actions in West Irian and Borneo (1958-1964). In 1964 the Treaty was cited in relation to the Vietnam war and most recently, the Treaty was cited during operations in the Indian Ocean in 1979-1981 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan(9). Only in the case of the Vietnam war was their sufficient coincidence of view to lead to direct military action against a common enemy. In each of the other cases the concerns expressed by the signatory nation most affected by the event were not shared equally by the others. Rather, each signatory chose to interpret the situation relative only to their own direct interest.

In 1985 the fragility of the ANZUS Treaty was clearly exposed when New Zealand's newly elected Labor Government declared a ban on nuclear powered or armed warships entering New Zealand's ports. Despite extreme diplomatic and economic pressure, New Zealand has remained firm in its resolve. The ANZUS Treaty is now a "lame duck" as its provisions in relation to New Zealand have been suspended. In effect , ANZUS has become a bilateral treaty between the USA and Australia.

Today, New Zealand's position appears as well entrenched as ever. Given the concern in the Pacific over continued French nuclear testing on Mururoa Atoll and the sinking of the Greenpeace vessel "Rainbow Warrior" in 1985(10) this stance is not surprising. Additionally, the collapse of European communism has strengthened many New Zealanders' perception that nuclear weapons are not required(11).

No treaty can retain its utility if the commitment of its signatories is questionable. In this case, New Zealand's action and the American and Australian response brings into debate the Alliance's continued relevance. Rather than allow its strength to be sapped away over time, consideration should be given to whether the ANZUS Treaty has become an anachronism in need of replacement or whether it should be modified to become a bilateral arrangement between America and Australia.

AUSTRALIA'S EXISTING LINKAGES IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN/SOUTH  
PACIFIC (SEASPAC) REGION

During recent years many linkages have been established between Australia and the nations of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (SEASPAC) regions. These linkages cover a broad spectrum of interests. The importance of this broad range of interests has been clearly recognized by Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Hon. Gareth Evans, QC in his December 1989 statement on Australia's Regional Security where he said:

*"...policy responses or instruments available to protect Australia's security are multidimensional. They go well beyond strictly military capabilities, essential though they are...The relative importance of this large variety of policy instruments will vary from situation to situation, but none exist in isolation, and all should be regarded as mutually reinforcing contributions to our security"(12).*

**ECONOMIC LINKAGES**

Australia is a significant economic power in the SEASPAC region. This was demonstrated in 1988 when Australia's GDP of \$US248 billion was larger than the combined Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) GDPs of \$US234.7 billion. Australia's GDP dwarfed the combined Pacific Island countries GDP of \$US7.2 billion(13).

Notwithstanding the relative size of Australia's GDP, its economic influence in the region is not large. This situation results from the strong international economic positions retained by the USA, Japan and Europe. Australia's economic links with these three economic giants are much stronger than any maintained with close neighbors.

The geographic orientation of Australian and regional economies away from the SEASPAC region is, however, only relative to the notion that "Australia's region" does not extend further into the Pacific. If, for example, Australia looked further out into the Pacific, it would find itself regionally associated with two of its major trading partners, namely the USA and Japan. Should ASEAN countries do the same, then a similar confluence of regional interests would emerge. Such a broadening of perspective could also serve to include the other emerging "golden tigers": South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Singapore, the fourth "golden tiger", being a member of ASEAN).

The establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989 was a significant step towards establishing a broader set of parameters for Australia's regional involvement. This forum has brought together representatives of the six ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) plus Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the USA in an economic dialogue. In the future, China, Taiwan and Hong Kong may be invited to join(14). Such a

broadening of contacts is an excellent way of removing the geographic dislocation stemming from too narrow a regional approach to economic linkages.

Notwithstanding the significant advances achieved with the establishment of the APEC forum, economic links between Australia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific nations could be further strengthened. This progression could extend to the point where all nations in this very large region are economically interdependent. Should this situation be achieved, the continued development of any particular regional country becomes a matter of importance to each other country in the regional grouping. As each of the individual economies grows, so too does the collective economic strength of the region and security is enhanced.

Extending economic interdependence does have the potential to generate friction over areas of competition. Such friction can obviously serve to decrease regional security and therefore a mechanism is required to allow free and frank exchanges on economic policies that affect regional nations. This mechanism is as important to regional security as is a regional defence arrangement. The complexity of today's economic issues and the speed with which decisions have to be made, virtually dictate the need for a standing regional economic forum. Such an organization would then be in a position to absorb the myriad other economic linkages that currently exist in the SEASPAC region.

## POLITICAL LINKAGES

Australia's regional political relationships stem, to a large degree, from an evolving understanding of where Australia belongs in the world. Prior to World War II Australia was clearly concerned to retain political ties with the United Kingdom. This relationship was so close that Australia readily agreed to British requests for troops to fight against Germany at the outbreak of the war even though the Australian mainland was not threatened.

When Japan entered the war, Britain's inability to provide an effective defense from the Singapore garrison forced Australia to develop a more independent view on political linkages. Necessity generated an Australian military dependence on the USA.

The end of World War II saw the close of the colonial era in the SEASPAC region. Australia's foreign policies did not, however, encourage the newly emerging nations to see Australia as a regional partner(15). Indeed, as late as 1972 Australia was still voting with South Africa in the United Nations on colonial issues(16).

The latter part of the 1980's have seen a marked shift in political focus for Australia. The Government has adopted a regional outlook and now identifies as a Western based, multi-cultural society which is as much a part of the SEASPAC region as any other regional nation. This shift in

focus has been matched by actions and policies and is permanent. Australia no longer sees itself as a "subsidiary" of Great Britain or America when developing policies although Western values are pursued.

The act of shifting Australia's international focus does not, in itself, endow immediate acceptance by regional nations. Australia will have to earn this over a period of time. However, the removal of the "identity crisis" that has affected Australia's past relations with her regional neighbors will greatly enhance future relationships. This will be especially so with regard to the ASEAN nations. Australia will be able to play a vital role in the region by acting as a bridge between the SEASPAC nations and the West and between ASEAN and the Pacific.

Australia's regional political linkages are maintained through a well established diplomatic service and ministerial visits and consultations. In the South Pacific, diplomatic and ministerial contacts are further strengthened by Australia's active participation in the South Pacific Forum (SPF)(17). The establishment of the SPF has provided a mechanism for the regular meetings of Heads of State of South Pacific nations. The formalization of these discussions is an effective means of airing contentious issues with a minimum amount of acrimony between countries with differing views. While such a mechanism will not resolve all political disputes it provides an excellent vehicle for open discussion. The SPF is a growing body with

subsidiary organizations that now include interests ranging from the environment to education(18).

The lack of membership by Australia in a similar forum in Southeast Asia is a deficiency in that relationship. Australia is not a member of ASEAN and thus does not participate in the regular political exchanges that occur. Australia has "dialogue partner" status in ASEAN but this annual meeting of foreign ministers is no substitute for membership of an active political body. It is desirable that Australia share formal recognition with the ASEAN countries in a regular forum. This is particularly so when it is recognized that, apart from Papua New Guinea (PNG), ASEAN constitutes a grouping of Australia's closest neighbors.

Now that Australia has established herself as a member of the regional community, participation in a soundly based political forum is highly desirable. The SPF provides a basis for Australia's South Pacific involvement but an improved mechanism for participation in dialogue with Southeast Asia is required. Furthermore, formal political contact with Northeast Asia and the Northern Pacific should be extended.

#### **SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL LINKAGES**

Australia's socio-psychological linkages in the region have suffered from the same dilemma discussed in

relation to political linkages - namely the perplexing question of identity. Now that this fundamental issue has been resolved in favor of a regional identity, advances can be made in developing more durable socio-psychological linkages than have been possible in the past.

This is not to say that effective linkages have not existed previously. Indeed they did(19), however, they have not been able to mature. Now is an appropriate time to expand and formalize Australia's socio-psychological links within the region.

Such links can be made in a variety of forms from sports to cultural activities to tourism. Immigration policies also play a prominent role in this aspect. In the past, the immigration policies of successive Governments in Australia have been the source of considerable regional criticism. Major changes have been made to these policies over the years(20) and now good opportunities exist for regional immigrants. Provided the immigration policies of Australia's regional neighbors are kept in view (and the majority are very restrictive) and provided clear signs of Australia's genuine adoption of regional status are visible, past criticisms should fade and not generate socio-psychological conflicts.

The provision of high grade tertiary education is an area where Australia can offer considerable expertise regionally. This form of cooperation exists(21) now and holds the potential for considerable expansion subject to

the availability of student places at the appropriate academic institutions.

Socio-psychological linkages do not readily lend themselves to collective organizations on a singular basis. However, these important linkages can be greatly aided by establishing a mechanism or forum for open discussion and development of ideas and principles. It would be a significant advance in regionalization if a multilateral agreement was developed and a forum covering socio-psychological matters permanently established.

#### **MILITARY LINKAGES**

Australia's international military linkages comprise the ANZUS Treaty, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)(22), the Joint Declaration of Principles Between Australia and PNG(23), the America, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA) Programs(24), the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP)(25) and the Radford-Collins Agreement(26). Two notable deficiencies exist in the structure of these military relationships. Firstly, only the FPDA and DCP include Southeast Asian and Pacific nations. Secondly, none of the agreements include Japan.

All of Australia's existing defence relationships are important, however, the ANZUS Treaty remains preeminent. In view of Australia's recently adopted regional perspective, it is ironic that the ANZUS Treaty is comprised

only of Anglo-Saxon nations. Furthermore, the origins of the Treaty make its relevance questionable now that Japan has become a major trading partner and communism has been exposed as a bankrupt ideology.

It is evident that Australia's national security would benefit from two changes in policy. Firstly, endeavors should be made to incorporate the various linkages that currently exist into one "umbrella" organization. Secondly, Australia's military associations should place emphasis on relationships that more closely mirror those linkages that exist in the economic, political and socio-psychological fields.

**ANZUS AS A COMPONENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY-STRENGTH AND GEOGRAPHIC INTERACTIONS**

In determining the relevance of ANZUS to Australia's present situation, consideration of the Treaty's contribution to Australia's national strategy is necessary. National strategy is a complex subject to analyze, however, it can be described as: *"the art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives"*(27). For a strong national strategy to develop, all four of these contributing areas must be soundly based as there is no clear dividing line between any one of them. A weakening in the military

component may weaken one or more of the others as a strength interaction exists between components. For example, New Zealand's action in relation to ANZUS: *"not only introduced perceptions of serious division in the Western camp but also a new element of uncertainty..."*(28).

In using this concept of national strategy it is suggested that, in addition to a strength interaction between the four components, there is also a geographic interaction. That is to say each of the components must complement each in the geographical areas in which they focus. Australia's military component of national strategy is based on an alliance which was originally conceived as a guarantee against military threats from communism and Japan. Today, however, Japan is one of Australia's largest trading partners and, until Tiananmen Square, China was a rapidly developing partner. A geographic dislocation therefore exists between the military and economic components of Australia's national strategy.

Australia occupies a pivotal geographic position between Asia and the Pacific countries. Rapid development is occurring in this region and Australia's national strategy should be focused into these two areas. By combining military relationships with economic, social and political relationships of equal strength and geographic focus, a new and better form of alliance could be forged. Such an alliance would be "multidimensional" and therefore likely to be more durable than a single issue treaty. Efforts have

been made in the past to incorporate economic matters into ANZUS consultations. In 1976 the ANZUS Council discussed economic issues and the American delegate observed that: *"...economic considerations will be more important, or at least an important element, in our overall consideration of strategic problems"*(29). Non-military matters are now considered, however, the formal expansion of ANZUS to cover these issues has not occurred and Australia's national strategy is unbalanced.

#### A REGIONAL SECURITY GROUPING-JAPANESE AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

When Australia ratified the ANZUS Treaty many countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific were emerging from colonial domination. The European Powers, particularly Great Britain, France and The Netherlands had previously spoken for large areas of the region. Concurrent with the decline of European involvement in the region, the USA took an increased role in Asian and Pacific affairs as a result of its actions in World War II.

If Australia is to adopt a new national security strategy it is desirable that a network of countries with similar national security interests be established. A regional system based on collective security would allow Australia to interact with its neighbors on an equal basis and independent of any "colonial" backdrop.

In the 1950's little credence was given to the possibility of Japan's future development as an economic power. Similarly, there was nothing at this time to give any hint of the future economic success of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. The rise to economic superpower status of Japan and the success of the four "golden tigers" is already legend. With this new found power comes an expectation of fuller participation in international events and decision making.

Japan's potential to participate militarily in regional security is limited by two major factors. Firstly, Japan's constitution prohibits the use of her military forces for anything other than self-defence of the Japanese Islands(30). Secondly, fear of a resurgent militarist Japan is still present in many areas of Southeast Asia and the Pacific(31).

Attitudes are, however, beginning to change in positive directions. In Tokyo recently, Australia's Prime Minister, Mr Bob Hawke, made it clear to senior Japanese politicians that he would welcome Japanese military involvement in the military blockade of Iraq(32). Mr Hawke further stated that: *"If indeed the new world order is to be peaceful and safe - if we are to create a new Concert of Nations which... can provide a durable multipolar balance of power - then make no mistake, Japan will have a critical contribution to make"*(33).

National security has already been described as

consisting of more than just military capability. The vigorous employment of the multidimensional approach leads to the use of economic, political and socio-psychological means to maintain national security before military means are used as a last resort. Japan would therefore be able to make a major contribution to regional security before any consideration of the use of the Self Defence Force (SDF) was necessary. The requirement that exists now is to provide a mechanism whereby Japan can contribute to regional security while not being forced into a constitutional crisis or stimulating fears of a re-emergent militarized Japan.

The Persian Gulf crisis highlighted Japan's national security dilemma. Japan is heavily dependent on Middle East oil for energy production and the war has directly affected her vital interests. However, domestic pressure prevented any Japanese military response in either combatant or non-combatant roles as this was seen as unconstitutional(34). Japan has provided large amounts of financial assistance (\$US11 billion) to offset part of the cost of the multi-national war effort. Many commentators would argue that a "cash donation" is totally inadequate when the lives of combatants from their countries are being put on the line in an operation in which Japan's vital interests are also at stake(35).

A significant development resulting from Japan's direct involvement in the Gulf crisis is the awakening of the world to Japan's unique security position. Domestic

attention has also been sharply focussed on the problem. Although one can only speculate about future conflicts, it is unlikely that other nations would be prepared to sacrifice their peoples' lives to protect Japan's vital interests while Japan is spared that agony. Japan needs the ability to protect her vital interests and this must be constructed within a pacifist environment(36). An accommodation is necessary whereby legitimate defensive measures are understood and accepted by the Japanese population. The end result of Japan being thrust into the center of an international conflict management stage is an increasing demand for Japan to be ready to do more to contribute to the defense of her vital interests.

Within Australia's region, however, Japan could enter a multidimensional arrangement which covered all the components of national security. Major contributions to regional security could initially be made in the non-military fields with no change to the existing limitations on the employment of the SDF.

The USA has been a welcome new member of the Southeast Asian and Pacific communities proper since the end of World War II. However, the USA's post war focus has been on Europe and the Cold War. The SEASPAC region has not commanded the same priority from the USA as Europe even though it reverberated to the shocks of the Korean and Vietnam wars. The newly found economic strength of the region, coupled with a reduction in past Cold War tensions,

has now intensified US interest in the area. The USA does have strong military relationships with Southeast Asian and Pacific nations through bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand(37). Of these: "the core of Asian security has been, and will continue to be, the US-Japan security relationship"(38).

Existing US regional treaty arrangements were established in a vastly different set of international circumstances than those that exist now. Several major events have contributed to the atmosphere of change that surrounds these links and they can be summarized as follows:

1. The incorporation of Hawaii into the USA as the 50th State;
2. The enunciation of President Nixon's Guam Doctrine;
3. U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War;
4. Japan's emergence as an economic Superpower;
5. Instability in the Philippines;and
6. The economic collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War.

The incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands as a state moved the USA abruptly from the position of being a Pacific Rim nation with small dependencies in the Pacific to a full member of the Pacific community. This change was a positive one because it meant the continuation of a permanent American presence in the region. At the time, this provided regional countries with a high degree of security against Communist expansionism.

The importance of the Pacific to the USA continued to grow along with Japan's economic resurgence. America's trade with Japan increased rapidly as did that of the other SEASPAC nations. In 1989 U.S. trans-Pacific trade totaled \$US310 billion whereas U.S. trans-Atlantic trade totaled \$US240 billion(39).

The end of the Cold War, the signing of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Agreement and the proposed European political union in 1993 all point to a possible reduction in US influence in the European theatre. The USA will have finished a phase in its role as a Superpower-force reductions will be possible in the future. Europe will seek to put its own house in order with a consequent diminution in US influence. In view of the USA's national and economic involvement in the Pacific region and its reducing commitment to Europe, it is possible to envisage an increased commitment to US national security in the Pacific region.

US experiences in Southeast Asia have not been as satisfactory as the outcome of events in the Pacific. Defeat in the Vietnam War and the acrimony currently being experienced over the bases negotiations in the Philippines are cases in point.

Prior to the loss of the Vietnam War President Nixon's statement of the "Guam Doctrine" was heard very clearly in Southeast Asia and Australia. The assumption that the US would provide a guaranteed military response to a

regional request was invalidated. As a consequence, regional states set about improving their own military self-reliance(40).

The acrimony in the Bases debate generates a different effect. Namely, it serves to highlight the fact that the USA may not retain large forward deployed forces in the Philippines for ever. US tenure in the Bases will be characterized by uncertainty and may even be terminated in the future.

The synergistic effect of the ongoing changes in Europe, Japan's economic strength and changes in direct US involvement in the Southeast Asian and Pacific region is to generate a requirement for a revised US military strategy. This new strategy should complement existing economic, political and socio-economic linkages where they are strong. The strategy should also be one that recognizes the USA's membership as being derived from its membership of the neighborhood rather than from its Superpower status.

#### A REPLACEMENT FOR ANZUS

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent marked reduction in Superpower tensions will generate the development of dispersed power centers throughout the world. Bipolarity will be replaced by multipolarity. The end of the international competition between the USA and the USSR has ushered in an era of unprecedented internationalism. This

has already evidenced itself in the UN in the context of UN Resolution 660 which authorized the use of force against Iraq after its annexation of Kuwait.

The reduction of tensions between the USA and the USSR will also impact in Australia's region. Concerns over the real intentions of Soviet activities in the region, such as attempts to establish bases for fishing fleets and frequent hydrographic research voyages, have already been reduced. As these concerns dissipate further, the need for SEASPAC countries to seek security guarantees from the US to counter the "Soviet threat" will reduce. As a consequence, it is likely that SEASPAC countries will become more inclined to follow independent foreign policies. While this is a desirable state the frictions that this can cause cannot be ignored.

Tensions already exist in the SEASPAC region. For example, the tranquil nature of the Pacific was upset when two coups occurred in Fiji in 1987(41). Vanuatu has also experienced instability and Papua New Guinea is currently dealing with a secessionist movement on the resource rich island of Bougainville. In Southeast Asia major problems continue to be experienced by the Aquino government in the Philippines, Cambodia is wracked by civil war and Vietnam is suffering economic collapse. Major political changes are also on the horizon with Indonesia preparing for a Presidential election in 1992 and Hong Kong facing its return to China in 1997. A reduction in Superpower

competition in the SEASPAC region may well remove one of the stabilizing influences previously active there and this may exacerbate current and future problems.

As has already been shown, a diverse series of linkages already exist in the SEASPAC region. These linkages cover the spectrum of national power components and reflect the national strategies of each regional country. In Australia's case, the combining of these linkages under a central "umbrella" organization would serve to produce a larger multilateral linkage that would increase regional interdependence and thus security.

Australia does not currently maintain a security mechanism that encompasses all four components of its national strategy (economic, political, socio-psychological and military). Each of these components has been developed and maintained independently and the resulting web of relationships does not now reflect Australia's regional identity. For example, the ANZUS Treaty does not reflect the the progressive changes that have occurred vis-a-vis economic relationships with Japan. For Australia to realize fully the military component of its national strategy a new framework that incorporates countries with which links exist in other component areas is required.

Rather than attempt to resuscitate ANZUS, the uncertainty that currently surrounds it could be used as a catalyst to move towards a fundamental change in Australia's military alliance structure. The proposed change would

emphasize regional military linkages extending north to include Japan. The USA would participate as a regional member nation rather than as a global Superpower pursuing a policy of containment of communism.

Australia's security would be enhanced by the establishment of such an organization. The opportunity would be provided to engage in a much wider military dialogue and one that more accurately reflects other regional linkages. Once Australia's military linkages are brought into line with the other components of its national strategy a permanent body could be established to coordinate the activities of each component to ensure efficiency and consistency of policies. Such a body could be known as the Asian Pacific Council (APAC). The proposed APAC arrangement would minimize the geographic and strength dislocations inherent in existing Australian linkages.

APAC would also provide sufficient flexibility to allow it to accommodate new members in some, but not all, component areas of the association. Such flexibility is evident in the NATO Alliance and the practice of "partial" membership of the organization by some nations has worked well (for example, France is a member of the political arm of NATO but not a military member).

Unlike NATO, however, collective defence would not be appropriate as Japan would simply be unable to comply with the demands that this would generate. Rather a "Non-Aggression Pact" is more suitable as a basis for the

military component of APAC. Such a basis would also serve to ameliorate regional fears of a resurgent Japanese militarism. Alternatively, Japan could opt to remain linked in all APAC components except the military one.

New Zealand's current dilemma could also be solved by establishing a multidimensional APAC. Such an alliance would remove the need for national security issues to be decided solely on military factors. Regardless of New Zealand's policy on nuclear issues, it shares a common interest in belonging to a stable, secure region. New Zealand could contribute fully to the non-military components of APAC and have a limited membership of the military component if necessary. However, given that the military basis proposed for APAC is a non-aggression pact, no obstacles to full membership for New Zealand are envisaged.

The establishment of the proposed APAC would generate significant benefits for the USA. Unlike existing alliances in the region, the members would not primarily be seeking "protection" by the military might of the USA. APAC would seek to support the military foundation of the non-aggression pact by the other components of national security. The USA would not necessarily be the the only source of support during times of tension. The region would be more collectively responsible for its security and the role of "world policeman" currently afforded the USA would be reduced.

It is unlikely that every member nation of the region would seek to join APAC even if for no other reason than just wanting to wait and see how the new organization performed. From the Australian perspective, however, it would be desirable for the USA, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea to be members. This combination would provide a sound and sufficiently broad basis to reasonably claim to cover the general geographic area proposed for APAC. Furthermore, a military alliance with these countries would closely follow other linkages already established.

Countries which did not initially join APAC should have the opportunity to do so at any later time should they express the desire to do so. In this way APAC would be able to grow as it gains in credibility. This process may continue over many years and may not, in fact, ever be complete. Again, the NATO example is relevant, as even after some 40 years, membership issues are still being considered.

A permanent assembly of APAC members is preferred to an organization that gathers only for meetings on specific agenda. The permanent establishment of an APAC headquarters somewhere within the region would give substance to the organization and add to the regionalization process of all member countries.

Cultural diversity is extreme in the region and has in itself been the source of disagreement. By providing a formal, permanent organization for regional nations, cultural diversity may be developed as a strength provided

mutual understanding is increased. Military linkages will form only a part of the overall APAC foundations. It would be desirable, therefore, to have the organization headed by civilians. This would also ensure that the correct civil-military relationships are maintained within the region.

### CONCLUSION

The ANZUS Treaty has served as a critical component of Australia's national security policy since 1951. During that time, however, changes have taken place that have made the Treaty less relevant today than when it was signed.

Australia has now developed into a nation with a distinctly Asian-Pacific focus. This process of "regionalization" was completed in 1989 with the statement on Regional Security made by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Hon. Mr Gareth Evans, QC. This policy statement directed Australia's foreign policy towards Australia's participation in regional affairs.

National security stems from policies founded on four components, namely, economic, political, socio-psychological and military. A strong national security strategy can be developed only if all four of these components are developed in unison as a strength interaction exists between them. If one component is weak the

interrelationship between each of the components will allow that weakness to permeate the others. The components must also focus in the same geographic direction if strength is to be achieved. For example, if economic policy looks towards one set of international relationships and political policy looks toward another, a "geographic dislocation" of policies can be said to exist. Such a dislocation can weaken a nation's national security.

Australia has developed strong economic, political and socio-psychological links with countries in Asia and the Pacific. Military links have not, however, followed suit. Militarily, reliance has remained on the ANZUS Treaty and the membership of the Treaty does not reflect Australian "regionalization".

Australia's links with Japan are strong. Japan is now Australia's second largest trading partner and political relationships are expanding. Japanese tourism and cultural links are firm and capable of further expansion. Military connections between Australia and Japan are not, however, well developed and this is a deficiency in the bilateral relationship.

Concurrent with these changes in Australia's environment is the recent reduction in Superpower rivalry. As the Cold War subsides, Superpower influence in Australia's region of interest will reduce as regional nations feel a declining need for US protection against communism. In this case the US should alter its basis of

involvement in the region away from that of "protector" to one of "active member" of the Pacific community. Such an involvement would be both legitimate, because of the geographic location of the US (especially Hawaii and the Trust Territories), and welcomed as a sign of easing East-West tensions.

In order to match the existing matrix of regional relationships in other areas, Australia's military linkages require extension. A basis of military association needs to be established which includes Southeast Asian nations, Pacific nations (including the US) and Japan. The focus of Australia's military policies would therefore be coincident with the focus of the other components of national security.

In deriving the nature of the military basis of association cognizance must be taken of the sensitivities that surround Japanese regional military involvement. Japanese constitutional constraints on the use of the SDF and extant pacifist sentiments that are held by a significant percentage of the Japanese population must be accommodated. Regional fears of a re-emerging militarist Japan must also be recognized. To this end a "Non-Aggression Pact" would seem to offer a workable basis for military association of regional countries. The establishment of such a Pact would remove the geographic dislocation that currently exists between Australia's military policies and the other components of national security.

To enhance the regionalization process a permanent

body should be established to draw together the various regional links that already exist. The organization thus produced would encompass economic, political, socio-psychological and military areas of regional inter-action. As the military component of the proposed organization is not intended to dominate, control of the body should be vested in a civilian authority. Membership by every regional nation would be desirable but not essential to the success of the organization. From an Australian perspective, membership would need to include at least one or more of the ASEAN countries, Papua New Guinea and at least one or more other of the Southwest Pacific countries, Japan and the USA. A suitable title for the regional body that would be generated would be the Asia Pacific Council or APAC.

The ANZUS Treaty is laboring under a severe disability now that New Zealand has passed legislation banning port visits by nuclear powered or armed ships. The Treaty has become a bilateral arrangement by default. Rather than continuing to hope for a reversal of the New Zealand position, a new military agreement should be sought to reflect more accurately Australia's regional focus and other regional linkages. The current difficulties should be used as a catalyst to bring about increased national security rather than be the cause of a reduction in national security. Life after ANZUS does exist and properly managed it can bring with it enhanced regional security.

NOTES

1. R.N. Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan 1945-51, p.5.
2. Ibid., p.8. See also Roderic Alley, "The Evolution of ANZUS", in ANZUS In Crisis, ed by Jacob Bercovitch.
3. Sir Percy Spender, then Australia's Minister For External affairs, argued for commitments similar to those contained in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. See Alley, op cit., p.31.
4. Rosecrance, op cit., p.200.
5. Ibid., p.102.
6. Ibid., p.137.
7. Later Sir Paul Hasluck, Governor General of Australia.
8. Alley, op cit., p.33.
9. Ibid., p.34.
10. The Greenpeace vessel "Rainbow Warrior" was sunk in July 1985. France was implicated and subsequently two French Secret Service agents were convicted of the crime.
11. David Lange, "Of Defence, Dinosaurs and Dogma", The Australian, 1 August 1990, p.11.
12. Gareth Evans, Australia's Regional Security, p.2.
13. Ibid., p.25.
14. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1991, p.68.
15. Evans, op cit., p.42.
16. Ibid., p.42.

17. Membership of the South Pacific Forum includes:  
Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and West Samoa.
18. Far Eastern Economic Review, op cit., pp.56-58.
19. The "Colombo Plan" is an example. This Plan extended educational opportunities to students from the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions after World War II. This was a valued and successful scheme.
20. Australia has a non-discriminatory migration policy. It allows entry for permanent residence by people with close family ties in Australia, people with capital and business expertise, people with skills, qualifications or other qualities needed in Australia and others accepted under refugee or special humanitarian programs.
21. In 1987 approximately 28,000 overseas students studied in Australia.
22. The FPDA comprises Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom. It is currently the only functioning security arrangement in Southeast Asia of which Australia is a member (while the Manila Treaty remains technically in effect, its treaty organization, SEATO, is no longer functioning). Under the FPDA Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom cooperate to support the security of Singapore and Malaysia.

23. The Joint Declaration of Principles Between Australia and PNG commits Australia to consultation and cooperation on the full range of defense issues with PNG. An annual Ministerial Forum has been established under the Declaration and other high level defense consultations are held annually.
24. The ABCA Program is mainly focused on achieving interoperability and standardization between member nations. The program was extended in 1988 to include a multinational CPX, "Caltrop Tyro", and a FTX, "Caltrop Force", in California.
25. The DCP is structured around five components: PNG, ASEAN, South Pacific, Other Regional Activities and Facilities For Training in Australia. Activities include in-country training assistance, support for equipment and infrastructure projects and attendance at training courses in Australia.
26. The Radford-Collins Agreement provides for Australian responsibility for the naval control of allied shipping in wide ocean areas around Australia's region. The Agreement is a useful peacetime planning measure to exercise procedural doctrine and command and control. Under Australian treaty practice the Agreement would not be categorized as a treaty.
27. JCS Pub 1: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p.244.

28. Ross Babbage, "Australian Interests in the South Pacific", in Albinski et al., The South Pacific: Political, Economic and Military Trends, p.67.
29. Henry Albinski, The Australian American Security Relationship, p.9.
30. Douglas H. Mendel Jr, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy, p.73.
31. Institute For The Study of Conflict, Japan's Triangular Diplomacy, p.23.
32. Tony Wright, "PM Backs Armed Role For Japan", Australian Financial Review, 20 September 1990, p.3.
33. Ibid., p.3.
34. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prevents the employment of the SDF in any role except defense of the Japanese Islands. The concept of self-defense has been extended to SLOC protection out to 1000 nautical miles but the Diet strongly resisted any SDF involvement in the Gulf War.
35. David Lague, "Gulf Triggers a Tougher Japan", Australian Financial Review, 1 October 1990, p.10.
36. Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, Challenges and Response, p.3.
37. Existing U.S. Treaties in this region (in addition to ANZUS) are:
  - a. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan;
  - b. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States

and Korea;

c. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines;

d. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (which remains in effect on a bilateral basis with Thailand).

38. Richard H. Solomon, Asian Security in the 1990's, p.5.

39. U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress, p.1.

40. The Defence of Australia 1987, para 1.14.

41. On 14 May 1987 LTCOL Sitiveni Rabuka, accompanied by masked army personnel, stormed into the Fijian Parliament when it was in session, arrested the entire Cabinet and proclaimed the abrogation of the Constitution, Parliament, the Judiciary and the free press. On 22 September 1987 Rabuka staged another coup to cement Fijian control over the Indian population.

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25. U.S. Department of Defense. JCS Pub 1: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington: 1 June 1987.
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