North African Campaign: A Case Study
Abstract
This paper will show that the British strategy for a cross-Channel invasion in 1942, while largely political, was the correct strategy. On the other hand, the American position for an early cross-Channel invasion was not practicable in view of the Western Allies war posture in 1942. The United States experienced difficulties in executing the North African landing, even though relatively unopposed. This revealed that they were unprepared for a cross- Channel landing against well-training German forces. I will show that the United States was logistically unprepared to support a modern mechanized force, additional training and planning were needed in airborne, combined, and amphibious operations. The North African Campaign provided the laboratory to test equipment and correct major deficiencies in the employment and control of air assets. Further, it demonstrated to US military leaders and soldiers the importance of what would be decisive at Normandy -- air superiority. Finally the North African Campaign was not only a significant military victory; as well, it provided Allied military leaders and soldiers the operational, tactical, and logistical foundation for future Mediterranean operations and the assault on Fortress Europe.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 02, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA233870
Entities
People
- John S. Bird Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army War College