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CHANGES TO THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FULL-TIME FORCE

BY

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Army National Guard

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

CHANGES TO THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FULL-TIME FORCE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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The issue of using active Army officers and noncommissioned officers in the full-time force in support of the Army National Guard was debated in the Armed Services Committees in both houses of Congress from July 1990 through October 1990. Because the leadership in the Senate committee prevailed, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 reduces the end strength of Army National Guard members serving on active duty (Active Guard/Reserve) over the next six fiscal years and directs the transition of active Army members into the Army National Guard full-time force beginning on 1 October 1991. The implications of this action on the composition and duties of the Army National Guard full-time force, the organizational culture of the Army National Guard and the institutional knowledge gained from the last time active Army members were used in the Army National Guard full-time force are discussed in this report. This report is based on official documents and publications, and interviews with personnel who were involved with the last active Army participation in Army National Guard full-time manning. Observations include the notion that active component personnel generally lack the expertise, background and insights required to function effectively in the unique reserve component environment and, furthermore, erode the organizational culture and community support base that are essential in the success of the National Guard and the concept of the citizen-soldier.

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CHANGES TO THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FULL-TIME FORCE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The past two years have been filled with many dramatic changes in world conditions, especially within the Warsaw Pact nations and Western Europe. The Soviet Union, while trying to maintain control over its own republics, has for economic and political reasons refocused its priorities on internal issues and has generally been content in letting the satellite nations pursue their own domestic policies and concerns. The perception of these dramatic changes by the government of the United States, and the fears and concerns about budget deficits and public debt, have evolved into calls for troop reductions in all military services. These troop reductions, although not finalized, have been projected to include over 200,000 active Army personnel. This proposal has raised a number of concerns regarding the proper utilization of these skilled personnel and their future potential unemployment or underemployment as well as the possible impact their discharge from the service will have on the nation's economy and work force.

Since 1973 the United States has maintained a Total Force Policy. This policy has called for the effective integration of the active duty and Reserve components into the Department of Defense (DOD) war planning process. This policy integrated the Active Component (AC), Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) forces into a single military force in terms of resourcing, planning, equipping, training and ultimately readiness. The

perception that conventional war in Southeast Asia or Europe could occur with extremely little warning led the military services and civilian policy makers to place most of the "tooth" or combat functions in the AC, while the RC were largely given the "tail" or support functions. With the perceived changes in the military threat to our national security interest, there is strong congressional sentiment for fundamental changes in our national military strategy for dealing with this new threat. A perception that has emerged in recent months is the notion that there will be an increase in warning time which makes it possible to adopt fundamentally new approaches to fielding conventional forces. With the substantial greater warning times and the need to preserve as much combat capability as possible during this period of budgetary austerity, many members of Congress believe that the Department of Defense should place greater dependence on the reserve forces as they develop long range plans and force structure requirements. A growing number of Congressional leaders feel that reserve forces should be able to shoulder a greater share of the national defense burden with the recent changes that have occurred in warning time.'

In an effort to enhance the utilization of the reserve forces, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in July 1990 recommended a comprehensive set of legislative proposals impacting all Reserve components. One of these proposals would provide an infusion of high quality, trained manpower from the active force into the Reserve components. This will provide active force personnel, during the build down of the Army, with opportunities to serve as part of the full-time force in the Reserve components.² This paper will discuss and analyze the utilization of active component personnel in the full-time force of the Army reserve components, with the focus primarily on the Army National Guard. The other reserve components, which include the Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and

the Coast Guard Reserve were not impacted by the final legislation that was eventually approved by both houses of Congress.

The SASC, in a July 1990 report, recommended a provision that would reduce the total authorization of the Reserve components serving on full-time active duty in the reserves by 7400 from the fiscal year 1991 budget request. In addition, each reserve component was provided a prescribed end strength. The committee's recommendations further reduced the full-time active duty end strengths by approximately 7400 for each fiscal year 1992 and 1993. For the Army National Guard, the FY 1991 full-time active duty end strength request of 26,199 would have been reduced by 2,618 (10% of the force) to an end strength of 23,581. The expectation of the committee was to have the military services make up the reductions in the full-time active duty manning requests by assigning AC personnel to perform full-time support duties in the RC. This action was intended to move toward a mix of full-time AC personnel in the reserve components of 70 percent RC and 30 percent AC by the end of fiscal year 1993. The SASC intended for these actions to strengthen the Total Force integration of active and reserve components as the military services restructure over the next five years. To compensate for the possibility of one or more components being severely affected by the committee's recommendation, authority was provided to the Secretary of Defense to reallocate up to 10 percent of the total authorization among each of the reserve component's end strength. This authorization recognized that the varying sizes of the current full-time force supporting the separate Reserve components, and the requirement for using AC personnel as reserve advisors to reserve headquarters or as advisors to foreign governments, may result in a component being severely affected by the prescribed fiscal year 1991 end strength.'

During this same time period, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) considered their own provision for greater interaction between the active and reserve components. Congress recognized that as the forces are reduced over the next five years there is a great probability that the Department of Defense will place increased reliance on the Total Force Policy. Concern was also expressed over the reduction in AC advisors in the Army reserve components in recent years. Currently, there are only 547 AC personnel assigned as advisors to the Army National Guard which has units in over 2600 armories and has a personnel end strength of almost 460,000. This is a significant reduction from the number of advisors assigned to ARNG units during the mid 1970's through the early 1980's. There were several significant differences between the Senate and House Armed Services Committee provisions. For example, for fiscal year 1991, the House provision authorized reserve full-time support end strengths at the levels requested by the Department of Defense while the Senate provisions reflect the reduced numbers already discussed.*

After some give and take by both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 contains a provision for integration of the active component into the reserve full-time force. In addition, the Act establishes an end strength for ARNG personnel serving on full-time National Guard duty for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing or training the National Guard for fiscal years 1991 through 1997. Even though the requested end strength levels for fiscal year 1991 were approved, the authorization of 26,199 full-time ARNG personnel on duty in FY 1991 is reduced by 1310 each fiscal year for an authorization of 18,340 in FY 1997.* During this same time period, the number of AC personnel assigned to support the ARNG will go from 0 in 1991 to 7,860 in 1997.

The National Defense Authorization Act provides certain caveats for the Secretary of Defense. In the implementation of these reductions, no member of the ARNG serving on full-time National Guard duty, for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing or training the ARNG may be involuntarily separated. The end strengths in full-time ARNG personnel may be exceeded each fiscal year to the extent necessary to comply with the requirements of the Act. In addition, the accession of members of the ARNG to serve on full-time National Guard duty for a fiscal year will be two percent of the total authorized end strength provided for that fiscal year. The accession of AC members into the full-time force would begin in fiscal year 1992. •

CHAPTER II

PRESENT ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FULL-TIME FORCE

The full-time support for the Army National Guard is divided into two primary categories, the Military Technicians (MT) and the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR). At the end of fiscal year 1989, 28,120 Military Technician and 25,914 AGR positions were authorized for support of the Army National Guard.⁷

The authorization for the Military Technician program is the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968. Under this regulation, persons are employed as military technicians (civilians) assisting in the administration and training of the **ARNG**, and the maintenance and repair of supplies for the **ARNG**. Military technicians, as a condition of civilian employment, are required to be members of the **ARNG** and hold a military grade and MOS compatible to that position. In addition, these civil service positions enjoy a noncompetitive status. The noncompetitive status is necessary for the technicians in view of the requirement **that technicians must be assigned to a concurrent military National Guard position as a condition for employment. The importance of this is reflected in the fact that civilian employment is terminated when the concurrent military status ceases to exist.**

While 95 percent of the technicians hold noncompetitive positions and are required to be members of the **ARNG**, approximately 5 percent of the technicians, principally clerk typists and security guards, are in a competitive Federal **category**. Military Technicians are subject to certain supervisory controls at the State **government** level which is not the case for typical civil service employees. As Federal employees, **military** technicians are included under laws providing for various fringe benefits including group health and life insurance, leave, Federal employees death and injury

compensation, severance pay, tenure and status. Additionally, with respect to accidents which might occur within the scope of their employment, military technicians receive coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act.*

The Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) manning program originated as part of Public Law 96-154 in December, 1979 and was an all encompassing program that included all Full-Time Support (FTS) personnel of the Reserve components with the exception of the Military Technicians. **ARNG members are authorized by law** for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing or training the National Guard. The justification for establishing the AGR program was the **consistent low levels of readiness reported by ARNG units**. In 1979, for example, the **ARNG** had a 9.5 percent level of **FTS** within its total force and the Air National Guard had a 25.9 percent level of **FTS** within its total force. Comparing the readiness of **ARNG** and **ANG** units, the **ANG** had a relatively high rate of 45 percent fully ready, while the **ARNG** had an **extremely low rate of 6 percent fully ready**.* The readiness levels of the **ARNG** increased significantly during the 80's and at the same time the percent of **FTS** personnel authorized by Congress was increased to 12 percent. Although this is a significant increase over the relatively low percent of **FTS** in the late 70's, it continues to be significantly less than the 16.7 percent requirement for **FTS** personnel that has been identified by the **ARNG** as necessary to achieve the readiness levels expected by the Department of the Army.

A forerunner to the AGR program was the Full Time Manning (FTM) program. This program provided for a mix of **ARNG** members on active duty and active Army personnel providing full-time support to the **ARNG**. When the AGR program was established, it encompassed the FTM program and continued for several years

with a mix of National Guard and active Army personnel within the full-time support force. Caveats to the AGR program included a ceiling for each enlisted and officer grade.

During the early years of the AGR program there were a number of management and personnel problems associated with uncertainty about long term congressional and DOD support for the program as well as issues involving promotions and personnel assignments. The clarification and revision of policies and regulations during recent years have resulted in a successful and reliable program. Participants in the ARNG AGR program must be assigned to a military position within the supported unit of assignment which is compatible with their military rank/grade and Military Occupation Specialty (MOS). Furthermore, these personnel are required to mobilize with their unit to support any state or national emergency. On the other hand, active Army members assigned to support the ARNG in the AGR program maintained their assignment with the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) designated to support the respective unit of assignment. The AC member was, however, required to be qualified for a military position in the supported unit and to mobilize with the supported National Guard unit in the event of a national emergency.¹⁰ Even though the AGR program experienced phenomenal growth during the 1980's as a result of congressional oversight and appropriations, participation by the AC in this program was discontinued in the mid 1980's.

CHAPTER III

MANAGING THE TRANSITION

The Army Manpower Division (NGB-ARM) is the office within National Guard Bureau having responsibility for the management of the Active Guard/Reserve program for the Army National Guard. This includes managing the program in fifty-four separate states, territories and the District of Columbia. NGB-ARM had responsibility for the Full Time Manning (FTM) program and therefore has extensive historical as well as institutional knowledge and expertise in developing policies and implementing the program which provided for the transition of the active Army members into the National Guard full-time force.

IMPLEMENTATION

One of the difficult challenges for NGB-ARM in implementing the FTM program was the equitable distribution of the authorized AC personnel among the fifty-four separate National Guard headquarters. Each state headquarters varies greatly in the types, numbers and sizes of assigned units. In addition, the allocation of manpower resources is typically based on the deploying status of units as identified in the Force Accounting System (FAS). The basic premise is that the "first to fight" is the "first to man." This means that high priority early deploying units are expected to achieve and maintain a higher status of combat readiness than those with lower priorities and later mobilization dates. Therefore, the prioritization of fill is 100% for the early deploying units, 75% for the later deploying units and 65% for the last deploying units.

Historically, states and territories have varying rates of attrition in their AGR programs. This makes it very difficult to identify locations of future vacancies in the AGR program. To facilitate the requisition process

for personnel replacements, each vacancy has to be identified as either being an officer or enlisted, in a particular military grade and qualified in the appropriate military career field. It is important to be able to project vacancies accurately in order to insure replacement personnel are available in a timely manner.¹¹

Tour rotations of AC personnel caused some major problems for supported units during the years of the FTM program. The AC members were assigned to a National Guard unit for a three or four year tour. Many times replacements arrived several months after the previous AC member departed for his/her next assignment. In one case, for example, an E-5 AC clerk (75B) on the job only 15 months, reenlisted for a 54B (Chemical NCO) and a promotion to E-6. This individual transferred out almost immediately and the unit was without a replacement for twenty-seven (27) months. All efforts to obtain an earlier replacement were in vain.¹² This type action affects the Total Force readiness and leaves a unit without vital full-time support for a long period of time. The result is that the other unit personnel have to assume the responsibilities of the vacated position. The consequence is reduced efficiency and other duties not being accomplished. Timely replacement of full-time support personnel is critical, since there are typically only two or three full-time personnel assigned to a remotely located unit. This example clearly demonstrates the concern of many RC senior leaders. The AC personnel assignment and replacement system has historically been very inefficient and unresponsive in properly assigning AC personnel to support RC units in a timely basis.

Utilizing AC personnel in full-time support of the ARNG creates an additional manpower category. This results in other types of personnel management problems. As previously noted, the full-time support force presently consists of AGR members, noncompetitive military technicians and

some technicians in a competitive status. A supervisor typically will have subordinates representing any combination of these three manpower categories. The membership in each of these manpower categories has to be managed separately because regulations and policies are unique to each category. For example, there are major differences in policies pertaining to issues such as types, accrual and use of leave, union representation and agreements, different income levels for identical work loads, employee benefits, hiring and disciplinary procedures qualification standards, work schedules and work hours. A supervisor, who is a member of one these categories, has to be technically knowledgeable in these and many other employee disciplines within each manpower category. Adding an additional manpower category to the existing programs will further complicate personnel management problems.

LEGAL ISSUES

The role of the National Guard is essentially a dual role with responsibility to both the federal government and the state government. The Constitution establishes the principle that the American military system is to be built around the concept that each state have a state militia and that the members are citizen soldiers. When the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the power to organize, arm and discipline the militia, they were attempting to ensure that the experience during the Revolutionary War with poorly trained, armed and organized militia would not be repeated. The modern National Guard has evolved over the last two centuries with this Constitutional guidance being the cornerstone for changes that have taken place. As a modern military organization, the ARNG is required to be ready for immediate service to the nation, by Presidential call, for war or national emergency. When National Guard units are mobilized for active federal service by the President of the United States, the chain of command is established within the active Army. The ARNG can be called by the Governor for a state

mission such as preserving the peace and order, local emergencies or civil disasters. When National Guard units are not in federal status, the chain of command is established within the state under the control of the Adjutant General. This highly qualified military officer is normally appointed by the Governor.¹³

The congressionally mandated use of AC members in the ARNG full-time force creates a number of legal problems. The actions recently taken by Congress suggest that the intent is to have active Army members be an integral part of National Guard units and their full-time force. Currently, the members of the full-time force are required to hold a military position in the unit which they support. It is very likely that AC members assigned to ARNG units will be expected to hold key military positions during peacetime and upon mobilization. Key positions can be identified as any of the Section Sergeants (Supply, Motor, Administration, etc.) or the unit leadership positions such as Platoon Sergeant, Platoon Leader, Section Officer or even Unit Commander. The AC member takes an oath to support the President of the United States (Title 10, U.S. Code) but does not have any legal responsibility to the governor of a state as does the ARNG member who swears a dual oath (Title 32, U.S. Code) to the governor of the state.¹⁴ The governor is always the commander-in-chief of the National Guard in the state, except during those times when the National Guard has been called to federal status, and has the authority to call the National Guard to state duty; however, the governor has no authority to call an AC member to serve the state in an emergency. An ARNG unit mobilized for state duty would be in a very precarious position if a key member, Supply sergeant and/or the Commander, were not available because of their AC membership. During an emergency is not the time to change key leadership personnel in an organization.¹⁵ In addition to creating hardships on a unit as the result of failing to mobilize key personnel for state duty,

this type of policy could very likely lead to morale and unit cohesion problems.

The ARNG is very active in providing assistance to state and local drug/law enforcement agencies in the war against illicit drugs within their states. The same legal issues regarding AC participation in state mobilizations would exist in support of the counternarcotics operation program. The *Posse Comitatus Act of 1878* and subsequent legislation prohibits the use of military forces for police functions; however, the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982, authorized the Department of Defense to provide military support to law enforcement under Sections 371 through 380, Title 10 of United States Code. These Sections allow members of the National Guard while in Title 32 status, but not in federal service, to be exempt from the *Posse Comitatus Act*. AC members in the ARNG would be prohibited from supporting these state counternarcotics operations and this would create a very undesirable situation.¹⁶

THE ACTIVE COMPONENT PERSPECTIVE

During the years of the FTM program, the AC members assigned to the ARNG full-time force had to deal with a number of attitudes and stereotypes associated with their RC assignment. Many of them felt they were being punished as a result of being assigned to an RC unit or that the assignment was so undesirable that it would result in poor performance ratings and therefore the end of their military career. Many AC soldiers had been led to believe the ARNG was a token military organization and their assignment to the RC would not provide a challenging and meaningful learning environment. Others were worried about being taken out of the AC mainstream of career assignments which resulted in a fear of jeopardizing their potential for promotion.¹⁷

A senior Army official at the U.S. Army War College recently provided a Department of the Army mandatory briefing to the students on the "build down of the Army." During the briefing, it was noted that as a result of the positions they would hold in future assignments, these students would be involved in determining whether AC soldiers should continue in AC assignments or be assigned to RC duty. Another senior Army official, during a recent briefing at the U.S. Army War College, noted that fifteen percent of the noncommissioned officers would be mandatorily removed from the active force during the next few years. Based on historical experiences, it appears the Army is considering plans for the top quality soldiers to be retained in the active Army while the less qualified soldiers will be assigned to provide full-time support to the RC. Unless the RC has an opportunity to become involved in the selection process or refuses to take AC members into their full-time ranks for at least two years to allow time for the most undesirable AC personnel to be separated from the AC, there will be the perception of receiving a less than top quality soldier for full-time support.

AC members have an institutional perception of the chain of command and the assignment of functional responsibilities within their military organizations. Assigning AC personnel to the full-time staff of National Guard units, has traditionally caused a large number of problems associated with understanding supervisor relationships, establishing work priorities and performing duties in a variety of functional areas. AC members typically have a great deal of difficulty understanding the hierarchy within the National Guard structure and diverse functions and responsibilities of various supervisors and leaders. The chain of command within National Guard units generally resembles active duty units during scheduled periods of training. These are normally described as two days a month and one two-week period during the training year. At other times, full-time support personnel

typically work in the hierarchical environment of the full-time staff. This full-time staff, though representative of the different elements within the command, has its own supervisors at the various organizational levels, namely the Administrative Officers. To add to this confusing work environment, the personnel administration for the individual AC member in the past has been handled by the Army Readiness Region designated for each state. The Senior Army Advisor (SAA) was the only Unified Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority within the state and was the career manager for the AC members in that state. The SAA was also the final authority for approving the AC members individual evaluation report. As a result, each active Army member serving in an ARNG full-time support position, who came from an active duty organization where there was one first-line supervisor, now worked in an organization which gave him/her the perception of there being at least three first-line supervisors.'*

Many of the major shortcomings of the FTM program can be attributed to the operational differences of the active services and the ARNG. For example, the AC members working in personnel administration were trained to operate in a specialized area and only worked with a limited and usually very specific portion of an individuals personnel record. In the National Guard, however, personnel specialists are required to have a working knowledge of all aspects of personnel records management. It requires a tremendous amount of effort and time to train an AC soldier on the administrative and clerical tasks associated with recruiting, enlisting and reenlisting personnel into the National Guard system. In addition to many individual forms that have to be manually prepared, the automated personnel system within the National Guard (NG SIDPERS) is a unique system and therefore any prior training on the Army's SIDPERS was of very little benefit. These types of shortcomings were also prevalent in the other functional areas. In the supply area, for example,

there are major differences in the automation systems and the associated manual input methodology. The AC member again had to learn the National Guard unique programs for requisition, storage and disposition of supplies and equipment. Generally, the ARNG receives equipment from the Army that has been replaced by new or updated systems. The AC member receiving an assignment in the ARNG has typically been trained on the newer equipment and is unfamiliar with the utilization, operation and employment of the older equipment and its systems. One of the key lessons learned in the FTM program was that it took, as a minimum, the first year to train the active Army members to a competency level of being able to work with little supervision. After being a productive member of the full-time force for about eighteen months, the productivity would decline because of the anxiety to make preparations for the move to the next assignment.'*

AC and RC soldiers receive identical Initial Entry Training and training in a Military Occupational Speciality (MOS). The AC soldier develops a career through working in the assigned speciality on a daily basis as he/she progresses upward through each military grade. The AC soldier normally does not perform duties outside of the awarded MOS. The same is true for the RC soldier who trains approximately 39 days each year; however, this is not the case for the RC soldier in a full-time support position with the ARNG. The RC soldier in a full-time support position has to perform in a multifaceted job where responsibilities cross a diverse number of career fields and functional areas. For example, one of the full-time members of a company-sized unit performs the duties outlined in a position description for a Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge (NCOIC). This individual represents the commanding officer in day-to-day operations and supervises at least three subordinates with diverse duties. Although the NCOIC typically has only one MOS, their responsibilities include personnel, supply, maintenance and training

administration. He/she is responsible for the administration associated with recruiting, enlisting, reenlisting, transfer, discharge and MOS qualification of personnel, the maintenance of the individual personnel records, financial records management and personnel accounting. Other duties include the scheduling, enrollment, requests for orders and the transportation of unit members to military schools/training, and the requisition, storage, disposition and turn-in of individual and unit items of supply. As the commander's representative, this full-time staffer is responsible for the physical security of the unit facilities, all the administration (planning, programming, storage and accountability) involved with unit arms and ammunition, readiness reporting, the scheduling and coordination of community events in the unit armory, public relations, mail distribution and keeping the unit leadership and members informed on all regulations, policies and procedures.²⁰ There is a considerable amount of effort and time expended to train an individual to become knowledgeable in all the regulations, policies and procedures inherent in accomplishing each of the responsibilities of this position. ARNG full-time soldiers establish a foundation of cumulative expertise that cannot be nurtured by AC personnel during their normal career progression. The extensive detailed knowledge associated with these functions cannot be acquired during a relatively short assignment to full-time support duty with the RC. What is equally as important is that the AC soldier returning to the active force after a three year assignment may have gained a lot of knowledge about the reserve system, but they can expect to have some erosion of knowledge about the active duty systems as a result of not being available to learn any of the new technological advances within the active system.

AC participation in the FTM program consisted primarily of enlisted soldiers in the grades of E-4 to E-7. These soldiers were typically

accustomed to the family and individual soldier support services and facilities available at most all of the major active military installations. In most cases it was a significant hardship for an AC soldier to be assigned to a remote location in a rural area or a location distant from a military installation. For example AC soldiers expected medical support as a service benefit. However, with the decentralization of National Guard units within the states, there are no, or very limited, military medical facilities. As a result medical services are typically acquired from local community sources. In some cases this results in additional and often unexpected expenses to the AC soldier. For the same reasons, hardships are created for AC soldiers who are accustomed to commissary and post exchange, post theatre and other benefits. For many of the AC soldiers, this was the first time military housing was not available for them. In some cases, a lack of experience in dealing with the process of obtaining suitable housing, buying furniture, paying for deposits on utilities and having to take care of the yard and lawn led to financial problems. Some minority soldiers and their families felt a tremendous amount of pressure to be exemplary citizens. Being a minority uniformed soldier in a rather small community and very visible to the public created unexpected pressures and tensions that many had never experienced. The family support programs, like those available at the major military installations, were nonexistent in ARNG unit locations. It was very difficult, for example, to provide assistance to soldiers who had problems with substance abuse.²¹

CHAPTER IV

A UNIQUE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Some definitions are necessary to discuss the unique organizational culture in the National Guard. First of all, a widely accepted definition of an organization is a collection of people working together in a division of labor to achieve a common purpose. This definition fits a wide variety of fraternal groups, clubs, voluntary organizations, and religious bodies, as well as entities such as businesses, military services and governmental agencies.²² Organizational culture is a term used to describe systems of shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that create behavior norms (the way things are done around here) to guide the activities of organization members. As a system of shared values, the organizational culture reflects a climate within which people value the same things and apply these values to benefit the organization as a whole. An example is the dominant value of "customer service" at IBM. This value helps keep everyone from top management on down to persons on the factory floor pulling in the same direction.²³ Another example is the Minuteman emblem which symbolizes the National Guard and is rooted in the concept that able-bodied citizens have the privilege and responsibility of bearing arms for the common defense. This tradition began in America in the 17th century with the organization of militia units in the various colonies. Another symbol, the unit crest, represents to the members in an individual ARNG unit the common heritage for those who have served in the unit.

A popular argument among social scientists is that a strong organizational culture facilitates high performance. There are certain common elements present in a strong organizational culture. First of all, there will

be a widely shared philosophy that is not just an abstract notion of the future, but a real understanding of what the organization stands for and often being embodied in a slogan or symbol. A strong organizational culture will have a concern for individuals and this concern often places individual concerns over rules, policies, procedures, and adherence to job duties. Recognition will be given to those individuals whose actions illustrate the shared philosophy and concerns of the organization. Furthermore, management understands that rituals and ceremonies are real and important to members and to the process of building common identity. The final element in a strong organizational culture is that employees understand what is expected of them and believe what they do is important to others.²⁴

In a military establishment, rules and norms are established through elements or values which permit the shaping and reinforcing of attitudes and behavior and, ultimately, readiness. Core values common to all good armies and soldiers are described as skill, loyalty, stamina, discipline, professionalism, teamwork and duty. The strength of a military unit's culture is directly proportional to the strength of these core values among its members. These shared values of the group constitute the basis of the organizational culture in the unit. In the active Army, members spend between two and three years in a unit and then are typically reassigned to another unit at a different installation. For this reason the AC soldier may have the feeling of belonging to this large organization called Army, but in the ARNG, the members serve most or all of their careers in the same unit and in the same community. The long-term sharing of beliefs and values produces a stronger bonding of members within the organization.²⁵

There are two major factors for the unique organizational culture in the ARNG. The first factor is the quality of leadership. The National Guard has a large number of senior noncommissioned officers and mature

commanders. The noncommissioned officers, or "old timers" are the transmitters of culture. Many of these noncommissioned officers serve their entire careers in the same organization, as did some of their friends and in many cases 3 or 4 generations of their relatives. They pass down to the newer members and younger soldiers the unit's history, lineage, myths, rituals and stories. Another important factor is that aid to the community has always been a traditional part of the National Guard heritage. The ARNG is relied upon extensively for assistance ranging from medical evacuations to fighting forest fires. The opportunity to be of useful service to one's community in time of need and the experiences derived from actually employing and utilizing one's military skills and exercising of teamwork binds the cohesiveness and skills within the organization. The National Guard's role and involvement in the community, an activity which is not generally available to the active Army, creates a strong tie to the community. These experiences, passed on to unit members in the form of stories, become over time almost legends creating a distinct unit character. The National Guard members work together as professional soldiers and concerned citizens and it is these shared experiences that bond them together, and to their unit. National Guard members believe they do make a difference, they are truly needed and feel like a part of the organization.²⁰

Members of the National Guard typically sense a bond with the local unit even before they join the unit. They have seen the local National Guard armory as a part of their community organization since early childhood. Throughout their childhood and young adult years they have driven by the armory, seen members of the National Guard attending drills and know community members who belonged to the unit. In many cases it was "natural" and even expected that they join the local National Guard unit at the appropriate age. With the exception of the period when the Full Time Manning (FTM) program was

in effect, the personnel for the full-time support program in the ARNG has come from within its ranks. The personnel for these full-time support positions has primarily been at the entry level for both the officer and noncommissioned officer positions; therefore, the careers begin at the grade of E-4 or Lieutenant. Unit members vigorously compete for a position on the full-time staff and spend a considerable amount of their own time and effort to become a qualified applicant for an anticipated vacancy. During the six year period beginning on 1 October 1991, 7,800 citizens of the 54 states and territories and members of the National Guard will not have the opportunity to compete for entry level full-time positions because they will be preempted by AC soldiers.

In small communities where the National Guard is the major employer, the economic impact of not using RC soldiers full-time support positions is an important consideration. The AC soldier on a tour rotation does not make a lifetime investment in the community as does a guardperson who is planning for an entire career that will span many years. Given the home town nature of most ARNG units, local identification of full-time personnel enhances their effectiveness. Utilizing AC soldiers in these community oriented units erodes the community support base that sustains National Guard units. The success of the Army National Guard is largely due to experience levels and stability.²⁷ The impact of the AC soldiers on the National Guard full-time force is not only at the entry level, but also will have significant affect on those persons who are currently serving in the force. An infusion of AC company and field grade officers as well as senior noncommissioned officers will adversely affect the career progression of large numbers of ARNG officers and senior noncommissioned officers because promotions and upward mobility will be stagnated. All these impacts will negatively affect the strong organizational culture prevalent in the ARNG today.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The Full-Time Support (FTS) program is critical to the combat readiness of the ARNG. The level and importance of full-time support increased significantly with the inception of the Active Guard/Reserve program in 1979. The combat readiness of ARNG units has increased from the 1979 level of 6 percent of all ARNG units being combat ready to a level of almost 85 percent today. This dramatic increase in combat readiness of ARNG units has taken place during the time when the AGR program not only increased in the number of personnel, but also during a time when large number of AGR personnel were becoming technically knowledgeable in their full-time duties. It is clearly evident that the full-time support program existing from and within the unique organizational culture of the ARNG has been very successful. ARNG AGR soldiers have the same technical competencies as their AC counterparts while at the same time they provide RC unique expertise in the areas of supply, maintenance, recruiting and administration.

Utilizing AC personnel in full-time support positions will erode and probably destroy the organizational culture and community support base presently existing in ARNG units. The inability of the AC to participate in ARNG assistance to state and local drug interdiction, law enforcement, civil upheavals and natural disasters as a result of existing laws is a serious concern. The expertise required to function effectively in the unique RC organizational environment is not commonly found in the active Army. There is a tremendous amount of cultural adjustment required for AC soldiers to be effective in the RC system. An extensive period of on-the-job training will be required for AC soldiers to make the adjustment to the operational systems

utilized in the ARNG. Because of the remote locations of most National Guard units, the active Army family will have to adapt to being without the total family support services and systems available when residing on or near a major active military installation.

The Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, and the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, do not favor moving active Army personnel, who will be removed from active duty because of the build down of the Army, to the Army National Guard in place of the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel already on duty.²⁰ The Army senior leaders recognize the complex and insurmountable problems associated with such a program.

The Defense Authorization Act approved by Congress for Fiscal Year 1991 reduces the end strength for members of the ARNG on full-time National Guard duty by 1,310 spaces each fiscal year for the next six years for a total of 7,860 spaces. During the same time period, the United States Army Reserve loses an authorization of 3,332 reserve members from its full-time force. The concurrent build down of the Army over the next six years will result in a much reduced end strength and some major losses in force structure. The utilization of 11,190 active Army members from the reduced end strength to support the ARNG and USAR, is equivalent to taking an additional light division out of the force structure. In reviewing the threats to our country's national security and the national security requirements to deal with these threats, the Army leadership may determine that a smaller Army can not support all its missions. It would be devastating to the readiness of the ARNG if the Army could not provide personnel for full-time support at the same time there was a congressionally mandated reduction in National Guard members serving in a full-time status.

General Maxwell R. Thurman, former Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, recently acknowledged that there would be a temptation to

reduce the full-time manning in the ARNG as major reductions are made in AC strength levels. He recommended an increase in the full-time manning levels in the ARNG and the USAR to a level of 16 percent. This level is consistent with the full-time manning level in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve and the requirements documented for the ARNG and USAR based on previous studies in the mid 80's. General Thurman has also recommended that for a period of five years members of the active Army should be permitted to transfer to the ARNG and the USAR as full-time support personnel. General Thurman believes that the opportunity to transfer should be attractive to many fine officers and soldiers as a way to continue careers and perhaps reach retirement.^{2*}

The full-time manning program in support of the ARNG in recent years has been accomplished without any AC personnel. Although some senior government officials have been inclined to describe the lack of AC personnel support as a weakness of the program thereby contributing to inadequate levels of readiness in the ARNG, a number of important statistics present a much different accounting of ARNG readiness. For example, as recently as the fall of 1990, ARNG statistics show that ARNG unit readiness has steadily increased to the highest level ever with over 88% of all ARNG units achieving a readiness rating of C-3 or higher. This statistic is not significantly less than the readiness rating for AC units during the same period. This high level of ARNG readiness was accomplished with a full-time force of 12 percent of authorized strength which is significantly less than the 16.7 percent which had been documented as the ARNG requirement.

Adding another category of full-time support further exacerbates differences that currently exist and makes the full-time manning program more difficult to manage. Therefore, any AC transition to the ARNG should occur to either the Active Guard/Reserve or Military Technician program, but only if the end strength combined level of these two full-time manning programs is

increased to 16.7 percent and personnel are assigned to the RC for the duration of their military career. The permanent accession of the active Army members into an expanded level of full-time force would allow for an eventual assimilation into the unique organizational culture of the ARNG and negate most and minimize the remainder of the problems involving legal issues, AGR career advancement, training, timely replacements and erosion of the community support base. Congress, by expanding the end strength of the full-time support program, can provide an opportunity to increase RC readiness while making the difficult transition to a smaller military force.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1991, Title XIV. pp. 256-257.
2. Ibid., p. 257.
3. Ibid., pp. 161-162.
4. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1991, Sec. 412, p. 600.
5. U.S. Congress. House. Congressional Record-House, October 23, 1990, p. H11955.
6. Ibid.
7. Herbert R. Temple, Jr, Annual Review of the Chief National Guard Bureau Fiscal Year 1989, p. 22.
8. U.S. Law, Public Law 90-486, 90th Cong., August 13, 1968, pp. 1-6.
9. Francisco J. Estrada, LTC, New Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Manning Requirements for the National Guard, p. 3.
10. Harold W. Chase, Policy on Selection, Utilization, and Reporting of Personnel Providing Full-Time Support for the Reserve Components, pp. 3-5.
11. Interview with Richard O. Carter, COL, Office of Manpower Division, National Guard Bureau, Washington: 4 December 1990.
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13. Joseph Galioto, An Analytical Study Describing the Organizational Culture of the Army National Guard and Its Effects on Readiness, Thesis. University of Southern California, December 1988.
14. La Vern E. Weber, The National Guard Association of the United States, letter to The Adjutant General, 9 October 1990.
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19. Rodney K. Green, South Dakota Army National Guard, letter to author, 26 October, 1990.
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21. Thomas E Taylor, Office of Manpower Division, National Guard Bureau, letter to author, 4 December 1990.
22. John R. Schermerhorn, Jr., James G. Hunt, and Richard N. Osborn, Managing Organizational Behavior, p. 14.
23. Ibid., p. 103.
24. Ibid., p. 372.
25. Galloto, pp. 25-52.
26. Ibid., pp. 40-51.
27. Thomas E Taylor, Office of Manpower Division, National Guard Bureau, letter to author, 4 December 1990.
28. "Active Army Personnel to Fill Army Guard Full-Time Slots," National Guard, Vol. XLIV, No. 12, pp. 12-14.
29. Maxwell R. Thurman, GEN, United States Southern Command, letter to Congressman G.V. Montgomery, 27 July 1990.

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