Time Estimation at the Operational Level of War

Abstract

This monograph examines time estimation at the operational level of war. The study begins with a review of Classical Military Theory to identify the theoretical basis for time estimation. It next examines the Theory of Operational Art to discern significant differences between it and classical theory. This theoretical basis is used as a foundation to examine current approved doctrine relating to operational art focusing specifically on tasks requiring the estimation of time. The next chapter provides two historical case studies of failed time estimation: Napoleon's 1812 Campaign in Russia, and France's defeat in 1940. These historical examples illustrate the criticality of achieving harmony between the time-space-force calculations made by the commander and the nature of the conflict being fought. Organizations, processes, and technical means define the set of resources available to the commander for this task. Should those tools be inappropriate to the nature or level of the conflict, failure is a likely result.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 13, 1990
Accession Number
ADA234000

Entities

People

  • Alan D. Landry

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Boundaries
  • Civil War
  • Command And Control
  • Command And Control Systems
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Contrast
  • Control Systems
  • Doctrine
  • Field Army
  • Military History
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • Second World War
  • Students
  • Training
  • War
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Approximation Theory.
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies

Technology Areas

  • Space