


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OPERATION GHOST DANCER: THE USE OF ACTIVE DUTY ARMY
FORCES IN MARIJUANA ERADICATION

BY


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United States Army

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OPERATION GHOST DANCER: The Use of Active Duty Army Forces in Marijuana Eradication

An Individual Study Project

by

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The "War on Drugs" is the number one domestic issue confronting the Nation today. Since the 1980's, the Department of Defense (DOD) has played a role in the "War on Drugs," although reluctantly. In 1990, there was an increased emphasis on the part of the Department of Defense to perform its fair share of the national effort. This effort included five major drug eradication missions which the Department of Defense supported. In one of these operations, Operation Ghost Dancer, the active Army contributed the majority of the military forces in support of a Bureau of Land Management drug eradication mission. This was the Nation's first large scale use of active duty Army soldiers in counter-drug operations. Many lessons were learned that apply to all levels of civilian and military command. However, of particular importance are the lessons learned that apply to the senior Army leadership. These areas include the need for an improved vision of where we are heading; standardization and clarification of the Posse Comitatus requirements and the rules of engagement; and clarification of resource request procedures. Additionally, the senior leadership of the Army must address improved measures of effectiveness, and establish guidance for correlating warfighting tasks to drug mission tasks. Ghost Dancer was a successful operation worthy of detailed analysis to improve our ability to support the numerous civilian law enforcement agencies fighting the "War on Drugs."

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OPERATION GHOST DANCER: The Use of Active Duty Army Forces in Marijuana Eradication.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The "War on Drugs," as it is termed today, is not a new problem that our nation is fighting. As early as the late 1800's and early 1900's, America fought it's first great cocaine epidemic.¹ Although cocaine was initially legal, its debilitating effects began to be noticed by the medical community. By 1887, numerous states had begun enacting their own laws against cocaine and other drugs. In 1913, New York passed the toughest statute to date which completely outlawed cocaine, except for specific medical uses. By the beginning of World War I, all 48 states had anti-cocaine laws with fourteen states having drug education programs.

These initial efforts to combat drugs were primarily at state level with little federal involvement. It was not until Elihu Root, President Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State, began his attempt to regulate the international opium trade, that cocaine was officially declared Public Enemy Number 1 in 1910.² In December 1914, Congress finally responded with passing the Harrison Act. This act was our

nation's first attempt to legally regulate the distribution and sale of drugs, to include cocaine.

It was not until the 1980's that our nation truly began a consolidated effort in the "War on Drugs." Stirred on by increased media attention and an outcry from the American public, the Reagan Administration initiated this increased federal emphasis.

The policy and strategy of the Reagan Administration provided the initial efforts to reduce the supply-side of the problem. Legislation during this period provided for the increased use of the Department of Defense (DOD) support. The Defense Authorization Act of 1982, the Presidential National Security Decision Directive 221, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 all addressed means for providing an expanded role of the U.S. military forces to support counter-drug operations. These initial legislative attempts were developed, in part, to overcome the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 which limits the use of military forces in domestic law enforcement.

More recently, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the Defense Authorization Act of 1989, and the Secretary of Defense guidance of 1989 have further increased the involvement of DOD resources in the "War on Drugs." In September 1989, President Bush presented his first National Drug Control Strategy. In January 1990, he

followed with the details of his counter-drug strategy. Clearly, President Bush has set the tone for the nation. In his National Security Strategy of the United States, published in March 1990, President Bush has included, as a survival interest, the requirement to win this "War on Drugs."³

In relating ends, ways, and means, the President has proposed two lines of defense for the Department of Defense. The first line of defense is at the source-- in those countries where illicit drugs are produced and processed before being sent to the United States. The second line of defense involves the increased deployment of U.S. military forces with the primary role of detecting and monitoring the transportation of drugs through U.S. borders.

The Department of Defense response, although initially slow, has accelerated after President Bush declared the drug problem as the number 1 domestic problem and essential to the survival of the Nation.⁴ Today, Department of Defense initiatives have been implemented across the entire spectrum of the problem. Three task forces have been established to support the detection and monitoring missions and to facilitate military support to the civilian drug law enforcement agencies. Four Regional Logistic Support Offices have been established to provide military assistance for federal, state, and local support requirements.

Cooperating nations are receiving training, operational support, material, advice, and logistical support. Additionally, military personnel are detailed to federal law enforcement agencies to perform liaison, training, and planning functions.

This list of initiatives is only a beginning and highlights only a few areas of Department of Defense involvement. In 1990, five major marijuana eradication missions were performed as a result of increased public and foreign pressure to reduce the source of marijuana within the United States. Of these five major operations, one mission, Operation Ghost Dancer, involved the extensive use of active duty Army units.

Although the use of active duty forces in the drug war is not new to the other military services, it is relatively new to the active Army; and it is essential that we learn from our experience in this operation. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to provide an examination of Operation Ghost Dancer, to capture the lessons learned, and to provide recommendations to our senior leadership for future employment of active duty Army forces in support of other drug eradication missions.

CHAPTER 2

Background

Two important areas must be discussed to provide the necessary background information before an analysis of the lessons learned from Operation Ghost Dancer can be attempted. First, a discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and subsequent legislation as they relate to the employment of active federal military forces (Title 10 soldiers) and National Guard forces (Title 32 soldiers) must be reviewed to provide the legal requirements for the employment of military forces. Secondly, a detailed description of the operation is required to set the framework and to provide the necessary historical information about the conduct of the mission.

Posse Comitatus Act of 1878

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 provides guidance on the employment of federal military forces participating in law enforcement activities. This law prohibits the use of federal military forces from providing police functions. However, the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982, authorized DOD to provide increased military support to law enforcement agencies under Sections 371 through 378, Title 10 of the United States Code.⁵ Generally, these sections gave federal military forces an expanded role in drug

operations by authorizing the loan of equipment and facilities, and providing training to civilian law enforcement agencies.

In response to the perceived increased drug problem, the Defense Authorization Act of 1989 expanded the role of the federal military forces and the National Guard while in Title 32 status, but not in federal service, Title 10.

Generally, the Act has been interpreted to allow active Army Title 10 soldiers to perform the following:

1. Provide administrative and logistical support.
2. Provide air and ground transportation.
3. Conduct reconnaissance of areas such as marijuana gardens.
4. Assist law enforcement personnel in navigating and traveling.
5. Participate in marijuana eradication.
6. Assist law enforcement personnel in the removal, destruction of contraband.
7. Use minimum force in self-defense, defense of law enforcement personnel, and civilians.

Additionally, the Act has been defined to restrict active Army Title 10 soldiers from performing the following:

1. No surveillance of specific civilians.
2. No surveillance of civilian to establish probable cause for an arrest.

3. No chase or pursuit of civilians to slow, stop, or detain.

4. Cannot backup or reinforce civilian law enforcement agents except in defense to protect them from death or serious injury.

5. Cannot position themselves where there is a likelihood of a law enforcement confrontation.

6. Cannot search people or places.

Since Title 10, Section 3062 of the U. S. Code specifically states that the National Guard is not a part of the Army when not in federal service, the Defense Authorization Act of 1989 has been interpreted to exempt members of the National Guard while in Title 32 status from the restrictions placed on active duty Army soldiers. Therefore, a Title 32 National Guard soldier, in addition to performing all the duties that Title 10 soldiers can perform, can conduct the following duties, subject to the appropriate state laws, that Title 10 soldiers cannot:

1. Conduct observation and reporting.

2. Film activities at suspected target locations.

3. Assist civilian law enforcement agents in apprehension.

4. Assist civilian law enforcement agents in the movement of prisoners.

5. Possess and use weapons on approval of both the supported state and civilian agency.

6. Maintain intelligence files on suspects, vehicles, and target areas.

However, under the current leadership, it is the policy of the National Guard Bureau that members of the National Guard not be used to enforce civil law, hold no arrest authority, or directly seize evidence. Additionally, the agreements that the National Guard establish with the civilian law enforcement agencies requires that there be a member of the law enforcement agency with a National Guard team or individual at all times when deployed for operational missions.

In the past, Congress has considered provisions that would grant arrest and seizure authority to all military personnel involved with law enforcement, but they felt it was inconsistent with our national traditions against using armed forces for these purposes. Until the Posse Comitatus Act is changed or amended, and even with the current policy of the National Guard Bureau, the National Guard remains the most capable, by law, to perform the counter-drug mission.

Operation Ghost Dancer

In late 1989, the three principle Latin American countries; Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia; responsible for the majority of the illicit trade of drugs into the United States, began to complain to the United States

Government about our lack of internal efforts to conduct eradication of our marijuana crop. As a result and with the strong encouragement of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, five major drug eradication operations were planned and conducted in 1990 in the United States to show these Latin American countries our resolve to fully participate in counter-drug operations.

Operation Ghost Dancer was the largest of the five operations. It was conducted in the state of Oregon as a joint operation composed of numerous federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to include the largest use of active duty (Title 10) Army personnel. The initial planning commenced in early 1990 under the direction of a state organized committee. This committee, known as the Operation Oversight Committee, included representatives from the following agencies:⁶

1. Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
2. Drug Enforcement Administration
3. Department of Defense
4. United States Forest Service
5. United States Attorneys Office, Portland
6. Oregon National Guard
7. Oregon Attorney General's Office
8. Oregon State Police
9. Oregon State Sheriff's Association

As a result, the Bureau of Land Management was given the responsibility for the operation. The goals and objectives of the BLM Task Force (TF) for the state of Oregon were to:⁷

1. Increase the number of arrests and aggressively seek prosecution of drug users, manufactures, growers, and traffickers on public lands.

2. Increase the number of cannabis gardens and plants eradicated by aggressively seeking to detect illegal drug activity on public lands.

3. Actively work with and support state and local law enforcement agencies, reducing the opportunity to cultivate, manufacture, and traffic illicit drugs on public lands.

4. Provide a drug free environment for recreational users, public employees, and legitimate commercial activities on public lands.

5. Increase employee and public awareness, safety, and reporting of drug related crimes on public lands.

The Department of Defense (DOD) had been requested by the Department of Interior to be a support agency providing equipment, personnel, and facilities. It was envisioned that DOD personnel would be afforded the opportunity to plan and execute military exercises involving land navigation, troop transport, air/land radio communications and aerial photography.

Operation Ghost Dancer was scheduled to be conducted from 16 July 1990 to 15 October 1990. As the planning progressed, it became apparent that the Oregon National Guard, the DOD military portion of the BLM Task Force, could not provide the required resources needed for the mission. Therefore, on 2 July 1990, Forces Command (FORSCOM) tasked the 9th Infantry Division to provide the military component to the BLM Task Force. The tasking was sent through 6th Army to I Corps, and finally to the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized).⁸ The formal sequence of events is contained in appendix E.

The late notification to the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) infringed upon the five week lock-in period which is most commonly known as the Green-Amber-Red Time Management System.⁹ This system is a procedure that Army units use to plan, resource, and conduct prime-time training. Units rotate from red to amber to green periods while changing their training focus from support, to individual and crew training, to collective unit training when in the green period. Additionally, the cycle system allows commanders, at all levels of command, to adequately plan for and allocate resources to accomplish priority training requirements. When this cycle system is broken, the impact is felt across all levels of command necessitating a reallocation of training priorities and resources. This, more often

then not. has a negative impact upon units and it influences their ability to conduct meaningful training.

With only 14 days until execution, the Green-Amber-Red cycle was interrupted and coordination between BLM and the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) began immediately. The mission for the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) was as follows:

"Mission: 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) conducts ground and aerial reconnaissance to support the BLM drug eradication operation in Western Oregon during the period of 6 August to 15 October 1990."10

This mission required the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) to deploy from Washington State to Oregon State and conduct operations in an area they were not familiar with. The area of operations (Appendix A) comprised that portion of Oregon between it's northern border with Washington and it's southern border with California and west of the Cascade Mountain Range to the Pacific Ocean. The area of operations was divided into three zones. One long range surveillance platoon (LRS), with associated law enforcement officers and direct support helicopters, operated in each zone. Command and control (C2) was achieved by establishing a Task Force headquarters at the Oregon Air National

Guard Base in Portland, and a separate C2 headquarters at Klamath Falls. Personnel covering Zone 1 and Zone 2 were based out of Portland and Zone 3 personnel were based out of Klamath Falls.

Units from the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) and personnel from BLM were initially task organized into three teams. Team Air consisted of one UH-60 company and organic support elements. The division's long range surveillance (LRS) company made up Team Echo. Team Cav consisted of a ground cavalry troop and the headquarters reconnaissance platoon. Team Cav was on call from Ft. Lewis, Washington in the event operations necessitated the commitment of additional forces. As operating experience was gained, the task organization was further developed to include a mature staff organization and a refined zone structure. Appendixes B, C, and D describe the task organization and equipment used throughout the operation.

All aviation assets were centrally managed by the Task Force headquarters but positioned with each zone team. This facilitated direct planning and coordination between the zone team and the aviation crews, which included 18 utility and observation helicopters. During the operation, the UH-60 aircraft were augmented by OH-58 aircraft to facilitate the spotting requirements.

Support for Operation Ghost Dancer was provided by elements of the 109th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion; 9th Signal Battalion; 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry; 54th Medical Detachment; and the Oregon National Guard. Staff support was provided by the 9th Infantry Division staff to both the military and civilian (BLM) components of the operation.

Logistic support for this Task Force was provided from Ft. Lewis, Wa. Food, fuel, repair parts, and medical supplies for everyday operations were furnished by forward deployed teams from Ft. Lewis, Washington. Major repair requirements for vehicle and helicopter maintenance was provided from Ft. Lewis on an as needed basis. Those individuals in isolated areas were provided food tickets to purchase required meals from civilian facilities. Additionally, helicopter crews used U.S. Government credit cards to purchase fuel when military fuel was not available. When the surveillance teams deployed to a target location, they deployed with all their estimated supplies which included field rations known as Meals-Ready-To-Eat.

For tactical planning, the marijuana garden plots were the central focus of the operation. Target lists and folders were created by the intelligence cell based on information about the gardens gathered from human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, and from helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft overflights. These targets were

then prioritized for action by the operations cell. Upon approval by the BLM agent-in-charge, the operations cell would pass the target list to the ground commander who would then assign targets to the appropriate zone. After receiving the target folder, the zone teams would plan the mission and request approval from the Task Force headquarters prior to execution.

Three missions were executed by the zone teams. These were aerial spotting, eradication, and insertion (surveillance leading to arrest).¹¹

1. Aerial spotting: Spotting missions were the backbone of Ghost Dancer. They were conducted using military aircraft and civilian observers. BLM lands and/or suspected targets were overflown in an attempt to identify marijuana garden locations. As the gardens were located, an estimate of the number of plants was made by the spotter.

2. Eradication: Once a garden was located and its plant count determined, a decision was made at the TF headquarters whether to conduct surveillance on the garden or to eradicate it. Generally, if the garden contained less than 100 plants, the garden was photographed and cut; plants were counted and grouped in bundles of 10; and transported to the nearest incinerator for destruction. Transportation was by aerial or ground extraction depending upon the terrain

and weather. If the garden contained 100 plants or more, an insert mission was planned.

3. Insert: The objective of the insertion was to make an arrest of a grower in the garden. Insertion missions were conducted on gardens containing 100 plants or more, or on gardens containing less than 100 plants if there were extenuating circumstances, such as prior convictions of the suspected grower which warranted surveillance and arrest. The limit of 100 plants was selected from past historical experience when dealing with the local judicial system. Generally, offenders with no previous arrests and having gardens less than 100 plants received very light sentences, therefore, eradication was desired by the law enforcement agents over that of conviction. It is important to note that all arrests were made by law enforcement officers (LEO's). Active duty military personnel are prohibited by law from making arrests in these circumstances.

Communications are extremely important in the success of this type of operation. It appeared that in previous drug eradication operations, communications were poor and often compromised the success of many of these operations. Communications in Operation Ghost Dancer were, on the contrary, extremely effective and not compromised due to the personnel and equipment support provided by the 9th Signal Battalion.

Communications between the TF headquarters and the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) headquarters at Ft. Lewis were achieved by secure land line. Each LRS platoon was equipped with FM, HF, and Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) communications for ground operations. Additionally, secure telephone connected the TF headquarters and the Zone headquarters. BLM personnel were equipped with civilian King (VHF) radios to augment those provided by the military for ground operations. Medical evacuation personnel were given civilian beepers and cellular telephones provided by the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) and I Corps. Telephone credit calling cards were issued to key personnel such as zone commanders, teams leaders, and medical evacuation crews, to access commercial lines when AUTOVON was not available.

Another significant area of importance was the task force training program. With the numerous agencies involved, and having never worked together, the Commander, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), developed and executed a two week training plan as a dress rehearsal for Operation Ghost Dancer. Ft. Lewis was used as the training area to replicate the terrain and time distance factors as closely as possible. Additionally, a Mission Essential Task Force List (METL) was developed. The METL contained both individual and collective team tasks essential for all

personnel, to include the law enforcement officers. Individual tasks included land navigation, weapons qualification, reporting, camouflage, booby trap recognition, rules of engagement, rappelling, first aid, and communications.¹² Collective tasks included patrolling, aerial movement, staff operations, aerial scouting, helicopter sling load operations, hasty eradication battle drills, and ground reconnaissance battle drills.¹³ The results of the training program were the training and development of task organized teams that were cognizant of their strengths and limitations prior to employment.

The results of Operation Ghost Dancer proved to be quite impressive. Approximately 7,000 plants were eradicated which equates to an approximate street value in excess of 30 million dollars. Additionally, over thirty arrests were made and over 10 thousand dollars in liquid assets were seized. More importantly, the signal was sent to the people of Oregon that the United States Government and the Oregon State Government were serious in their efforts to combat the drug problem. Additionally, the operation added creditability to the United States position when dealing with the Latin American countries on the drug issue.

CHAPTER 3

Lessons Learned

This chapter is designed to capture the critical lessons learned from Operation Ghost Dancer. The lessons learned span the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of employment. Although a very successful mission, and a first of its kind to employ large numbers of active Army soldiers in support of drug eradication, Operation Ghost Dancer presented an excellent opportunity to evaluate the lessons learned in order to improve future military support to civilian agencies.

The lessons learned encompass a number of different areas which are critical to future operations. Therefore, each lesson learned will be discussed in its applicable area of concern. The general areas addressed include command and control, operations, intelligence, communications, service support, and public affairs. If an area or lesson learned requires senior leadership input or awareness, it will be discussed and highlighted at that particular point. It is also important to note that both positive and negative lessons learned will be addressed in order to capture the total perspective of Operation Ghost Dancer.

Command and Control:

1. The Operation Oversight Committee (OOC):

The concept of an Operation Oversight Committee is valid and essential. As addressed in Chapter 2, the Operation Oversight Committee was the key element for initial coordination and plan development. The Operation Oversight Committee formed the foundation for all agencies involved in the operation. The operation was a success because the Operation Oversight Committee gave all agencies and departments the opportunity to assist in the development and planning of the operation. However, because of the late change in task organization, the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) did not participate in the early plan development. It is critical that all members of an operation this complex participate in the entire planning process.

From the senior leadership perspective, the Army must insist on early notification and integration into the entire planning process. These are high risk operations both from a safety perspective and a public image perspective. Adequate planning and coordination is required to insure resources are available, the Green-Amber-Red Time Management System is upheld, and adequate time for planning is available. This early notification will reduce turbulence and the risks associated with operations of this nature.

2. Command Relationships:

Operation Ghost Dancer was a Bureau of Land Management operation. The BLM senior special agent was appointed as the Task Force Incident Commander-in-Charge, responsible for all aspects of the mission. The Army's role was solely support. Given the restrictions imposed upon the active military by the Posse Comitatus Act and the Defense Authorization Acts of 1982 and 1989, this command relationship gives the authority for command and control to the civilian leadership and, legally, it must remain so. However, there is the potential for the Army's leadership to become overly aggressive and possibly frustrated in the conduct of their duties. Generally, the civilian leadership does not understand the military planning system or the inherent can-do attitude that is institutionalized within the Army. This potential area of misunderstanding could be magnified if the senior civilian leadership lacks the knowledge or prerequisites to properly utilize the Army support elements. This situation could lead to the Army leadership's attempt to take charge of the mission, thereby, compromising the intent of the law.

Therefore, it is essential that the Army leadership involved in counternarcotics support operations clearly understand their capabilities and limitations for supporting the civilian authorities. This requirement

applies to the entire chain of command from the team leaders in a fox hole to the senior military leader in the task force. The clear delineation of duties, responsibilities, and command relationships must be defined and known by all participants prior to any mission execution.

3. BLM Span of Control:

Although Operation Ghost Dancer was a BLM mission, supported by 237 active duty soldiers, BLM had only 5 full-time agents assigned to the operation.¹⁴ This shortage of manpower for the civilian agency is the precise reason the agencies are asking for military assistance. However, even with the additional military forces, operations are limited because of the legal restrictions placed on Title 10 soldiers. To overcome these limitations, BLM was required to utilize the full-time agents in the field and limit the participation at the staff level. In order to provide adequate control and direction for the operation, drug law enforcement agencies should look at providing, at a minimum, the following additional personnel for future operations:¹⁵

- Deputy Incident Commander
- Intelligence Officers
- Operations Officers
- Deputy Zone Unit Leader

These positions would allow for better command and control of operations; provide better interface at the staff level between civilian and military participants; and free the Incident Commander to supervise the operation and increase his span of control.

4. Title 10 vs Title 32 Soldiers:

The span of control issue just discussed above was presented from an operational perspective. From the strategic perspective, this issue is clearly linked to the capabilities and limitations of utilizing Title 10 soldiers as compared to utilizing Title 32 soldiers. There are clear differences for employment which limit how, when, and in what capacity Title 10 soldiers are used. Specifically, Title 10 soldiers can not arrest, search, seize, or conduct surveillance of individuals. These restrictions do not apply to Title 32 soldiers, although, as previously discussed, the National Guard policy is that members of the National Guard will not be use to enforce civil law, or hold any arrest authority, or directly seize evidence.

The civilian agencies are beginning to understand the differences and, now, prefer using Title 32 soldiers because of the added flexibility they provide to an operation. Therefore, before tasking military resources to support an operation, the senior leadership should conduct an analysis of the proposed

operation to include the civilian agency structure in order to determine the proper military task organization to support the proposed operation (Title 10 vs Title 32).

5. Requests for Military Assistance:

Operation Ghost Dancer was initially programmed to use elements of the Oregon National Guard. Very late in the planning process, it was determined they did not have the resources to support this large scale operation. The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) was finally tasked to provide the required support on 2 July 1990, just two weeks before the planned execution date. This late notification was compounded by no clear published Forces Command procedure for requesting assistance.

This is a critical problem that was apparent throughout 1990. At the Department of Interior Counternarcotics Seminar held 30-31 January 1991, the request for military assistance procedure was a major issue discussed. It was quite apparent that all agencies were confused about the proper chain for requests. Different procedures are conducted in every state, further confusing civilian agencies who's jurisdiction often crosses state lines.

The solution to this problem is for each state National Guard Headquarters to publish and distribute

its request for military assistance procedures. Furthermore, there must be a clear chain of coordination between the National Guard office handling drug operations and the appropriate CONUS Army Headquarters. This will ensure mutual coordination internal to the military structure. The active component and the reserve component must coordinate and communicate to ensure the right type and number of resources are provided to meet the mission requirements. Without this cross coordination, the military response to support for the drug war could be interpreted as piecemeal and uncoordinated. Additionally, by establishing clear request for military assistance procedures with enhanced coordination between the active and reserve components, we would be in a better position to optimize the employment of Title 10 and Title 32 soldiers' capabilities.

6. State and Federal Laws:

While the importance of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 cannot be over emphasized, it is equally important to understand the appropriate state laws. National Guard soldiers should have an advantage here in that they live and work in the state; therefore, they should be more familiar with the state laws. However, this may not be the case. As observed in Operation Ghost

Dancer, active duty soldiers were deployed from Washington State to perform missions for Oregon State. Extensive research and training about Oregon State laws was required before any missions could be executed. This problem can slow up the mission execution process and must be included in the analysis before committing active duty forces.

From the senior leadership perspective, the problem can be overcome by publishing contingency plans for specific regions or installations. These contingency plans would identify areas or states of responsibility. This preparatory planning would allow installation commanders the opportunity to develop their contingency plans and training programs to facilitate their capability to respond in a more timely manner.

7. Internal Task Force Coordination:

During Operation Ghost Dancer, a close working relationship developed between the BLM Incident Commander and the Military Commander and staff. However, law enforcement officers did not comprehend the staff structure and functions. This tended to inhibit their communication and coordination with the Task Force headquarters. Agents preferred to coordinate and communicate with specific individuals over that of working with a staff section. Not understanding the purpose of the staff section, the

agents would not discuss requirements with other individuals within the staff section. Therefore, if a specific individual was not available, the agent would wait until the individual was available instead of discussing the matter with another member of the staff section. On several occasions, this caused unacceptable delays in planning, coordination, and execution.

The only solution to this issue is education. The military must be more pro-active in training the civilian agents about the military staff structure and procedures.

Operations

1. Boundary vs Threat:

In Operation Ghost Dancer, the BLM leadership divided the area of operation (appendix A) along known and published county boundaries. This was accomplished to facilitate legal and jurisdictional requirements for law enforcement agents. Additionally, the Task Force Headquarters was positioned in the vicinity of Portland to facilitate communication with state officials. An alternate headquarters was established at Klamath Falls because of the availability of government facilities to enhance security and to reduce overall costs.

These decisions were made without considering the principles of mission; enemy; troops and equipment; terrain; or time (METT-T). As the operation developed, it was determined that the major effort for the Task Force was centered just south of Zone 2 and in the northern portion of the zone 3. Travel times were extensive requiring increased logistical support. Additionally, weather was a considerable hindrance to successful mission accomplishment, along with increased command and control problems.¹⁶

In planning for future operations, the civilian authority should be trained in the principles of METT-T. Given these principles along with their knowledge of legal and jurisdictional requirements, the civilian leadership will be in a better position to make the proper decision for establishing the boundaries of the operation, or perhaps even phasing the operation for enhanced command and control, and resourcing.

2. Task Organization:

The proper task organization is essential for the success of military operations. In this respect, Operation ¹Ghost Dancer was a success. Given the restrictions that the Posse Comitatus Act imposed on Title 10 soldiers, the Commander, 9th Infantry Division, determined that it was essential to task organize with soldiers and units that were trained to

observe, deploy and report over that of soldiers trained to close with and destroy the enemy. This training develops a mind set within the individual that influences his actions. Therefore, the Commander, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) believed that by utilizing soldiers that were trained to stay hidden, over those that were trained to aggressively confront the enemy, he would be less likely to compromise the laws imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This mind set of the soldier plus their previous training were critical factors in establishing this task organization. As a result, Operation Ghost Dancer was accomplished without major incident.

The senior leadership must consider this factor when selecting units for counternarcotics operations. If the Army uses units especially trained to close with and destroy the enemy, we can expect an increase in incidents that would undoubtedly lead to negative press coverage. Additionally, a reduction in warfighting proficiency would occur. Units that are especially suited for counternarcotics support include cavalry, military intelligence, aviation, transportation, long range surveillance, special forces, and engineers. Armor and infantry units may not be the best choice of units because of there battlefield orientation to close with and destroy the enemy.

3. Mission Essential Task List (METL):

This area was another success story for Operation Ghost Dancer. Because the task force was properly task organized (para 2 above), it was extremely easy to develop a mission essential task list to support the drug operations. Of particular importance was the fact that the METL for this mission corresponded directly to each soldier's and the unit's warfighting mission. Every individual and collective task was evaluated to determine its correlation to a warfighting task. Those few tasks, less than 10 percent, that did not correspond to war fighting tasks were analyzed. Tasks, conditions and standards were then developed and incorporated into a training program.¹⁷

It is essential that the senior leadership of the Army require units participating in drug operations to task organize properly and ensure METL development. This, in turn, will ensure the least impact on readiness and no loss of warfighting proficiency. Those units that are not task organized properly, for example, using M1A1 tank gunners to man observation posts, will see a major degradation of warfighting proficiency.

4. Planning Time:

Given the political and public sensitivity to these types of missions, it is paramount that adequate

planning time be provided before mission execution. This did not occur in Operation Ghost Dancer as previously discussed in Chapter 2. Historically, the civilian agencies, to include BLM, are not staffed or trained to conduct the detailed planning that the military requires for operations of this nature. Inadequate planning time hinders the level of detail during the analysis and increases the risk associated with an already risky mission. In other words, reduced planning time limits the time available for a detailed analysis of all courses of action and their potential second and third order effects. Additionally, adequate resource availability may become a problem which could impact on the success of an operation. Furthermore, the Green-Amber-Red Time Management System used within the Army is essential for coordination and the allocation of resources.¹⁸ As previously discussed, infringing upon this system adversely impacts on all levels of command.

Senior leaders must strive to support and uphold the Green-Amber-Red system, especially considering that today the growing and harvesting seasons are known and relatively fixed events except for, possibly, Hawaii. As the growers become more sophisticated and move their operations to indoor environments, the eradication effort will probably move to a year-round operation. The senior leadership must still strive to uphold the

Green-Amber-Red system which will force civilian planners to focus more long range. However, the development and utilization of contingency plans could be used for emergency short notice requirements. These contingency plans would be written and prepared in advance which, in turn, allows for adequate planning. The execution of these contingency plans should be the exception to the rule and not become the norm.

5. Training Program:

This was another area of success for Operation Ghost Dancer. From receipt of the mission, the Commander, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), directed that military troop leading procedures would be followed. These procedures included planning, back briefs, rehearsals, execution and after action reviews. Prior to deployment, the Task Force organized and conducted a two week training program at Ft. Lewis, Washington. The participants included all the military and civilian personnel. The training program included all the individual and collective tasks that were expected to be performed (see Chapter 2). Additionally, a final field training exercise (FTX) was conducted to replicate the missions expected to be conducted. This program brought the Task Force together as a cohesive unit in addition to allowing for the development of standard operation procedures.

Furthermore, it enabled the Task Force to progress beyond the trial and error method and develop clear tactics and concepts for employment while remaining within the context of the law.

Any further operations of this magnitude must include time for training. Again, the high risk associated with drug operations and the benefits received far outweigh the additional costs associated with this prior training.

6. Rules of Engagement:

This area is in need of improvement. During the planning stages for Operation Ghost Dancer, much confusion centered around this area. Every state has developed it's own rules of engagement. JTF 6 has published it's rules of engagement. Some of the rules are the same. Different local interpretations of state and federal laws further compound the problem. However, some standardization is required. Therefore, it is recommended that Forces Command develop, with input from critical players such as JTF 6 and the National Guard Bureau, standardized rules of engagement. Each state National Guard Headquarters could then modify these rules to meet state laws. Although not completely standardized, this procedure would be more in the right direction.

The kind of guidance needed might look like this:¹⁹

- A. Use Minimum force in self defense.
 - 1. Limit detention and searches for self protection.
 - 2. Law enforcement agents control the situation.
- B. Use deadly force only for:
 - 1. Self defense from death or serious injury.
 - 2. Defense of another individual from same threat.
- C. Deadly force must not unnecessarily increase harm to innocent civilians.
- D. Weapons will be employed with selectivity:
 - 1. No indiscriminate firing.
 - 2. No Automatic firing unless situation demands.
 - 3. No warning shots - Verbal warning ok.
 - 4. Aim shoots - shoot to wound if situation permits.
 - 5. Carry pistols instead of rifles if situation permits.
- E. No deadly force against escapees unless threat of death or serious injury.

7. Spotter Training:

The backbone of marijuana eradication operations are aerial observers with an eye for marijuana. It is quite apparent that most law enforcement agencies, to include BLM, lack qualified and proven spotters. In Operation Ghost Dancer, when trained military scouts were introduced, identification of gardens increased. When interviewed, CW4 Charlie Bos, a senior instructor pilot, indicated that no additional training was required for military scout pilots.²⁰

Their training at Ft. Rucker, Alabama was sufficient. Additionally, no changes were required to their aircrew training manuals. However, because of the lack of civilian spotters, several missions had to be cancelled or rescheduled. It is expected that this lack of civilian spotters will persist unless increased funding is provided to the civilian law enforcement agencies.

8. Small Unit Operations:

Operation Ghost Dancer was one of five large scale operations conducted during 1990. Hundreds of other small scale operations were conducted throughout the United States. During the Department of Interior Counternarcotics Seminar conducted 30-31 January 1991, the majority of the participants stated that although

large scale operations were successful, small scale operations were better and more productive.

Generally, the participants felt that small operations provided less risk and presented fewer opportunities for negative publicity. Additionally, the civilian law enforcement agencies are not manned or trained to manage and conduct larger operations.

Although Operation Ghost Dancer was classified as a large operation, it's success was contributed to the execution of several decentralized small unit events. Col. William Gavan, military commander of Operation Ghost Dancer, has stated that small, well trained teams are essential to success.²¹ Their visibility to the public is significantly reduced and their effectiveness is enhanced. Senior Army leaders should be aware of this trend away from large operations and they should be prepared for increased requests to support smaller operations.

Intelligence

1. Intelligence System:

The intelligence system is a major area of concern. Although at the National level there is a centralized intelligence network, it does not link to the state or numerous agencies within each state. For the most part, every state and agency maintains their own files

and historical data. Additionally, there is a hesitancy to share intelligence between agencies for fear of compromise.

To overcome these difficulties, intelligence assessments must start early in the planning process. A detailed review of historical data and trends must be analyzed to develop a detailed collection plan. After the collection plan is developed, the aerial reconnaissance effort should be conducted early in the growing season. These steps should be completed prior to deployment of the main body to conduct the eradication operations.

2. Aerial Reconnaissance:

As stated earlier, aerial reconnaissance sets the stage for eradication operations. In Operation Ghost Dancer four different aircraft were used. They were the OH-58c, the UH-60, the Mohawk and Air Force RF4's. Overall, the Mohawk and RF4 flights did not provide the intelligence that was expected. The UH-60, although providing an increased safety factor, also was ineffective. The poor visibility and dual pilot requirement severely hindered its effectiveness as a spotter aircraft.²² On the other hand, the OH-58c was an extremely effective spotting aircraft. Specifically designed for observation, this aircraft provided the best platform for conducting the spotting mission.

Other significant factors favoring the use of the OH-58c included:

- A. A reduced noise signature.
- B. A reduced potential for causing wind damage.
- C. A reduced cost for operation and maintenance.

The Army has designed and employed specific aircraft for specific missions. We should not change or modify the employment of these assets. When we use UH-60's as scouts, we not only use the aircraft for a mission it was not designed for, we are using pilots that have to learn new skills which are not included in their warfighting skills. Additionally, the Army should stop using the Mohawk aircraft in support of drug eradication missions. The results do not support the costs or benefits of using this platform. During Operation Ghost Dancer, the product that was provided by the Mohawk aircraft did not give any useful information or data that was used during the operation. On the other hand, helicopter observation provided real-time usable intelligence.

3. Terrabase Products:

Operation Ghost Dancer intelligence analysts used a Terrabase computer software program developed by the U.S. Military Academy.²³ The program converts

geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) to Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM). Additionally, the terrabase produces perspective plots of a target, line of sight analysis and relief analysis. The product was used very effectively for selecting observation points, routes into and out of an objective area, and landing zones.

It is recommended that Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) obtain a copy of the Terrabase software and conduct an analysis to determine its potential use for not only drug eradication missions but other military operations.

4. Maps:

Navigation during drug eradication operations are extremely important. Trespassing on private land for Title 10 soldiers is a violation of law and creates numerous problems that are not needed. Therefore, accurate, up to date, maps are essential. Operation Ghost Dancer used a number of different maps for both planning and execution of specific missions.

A. 1:100,000 scale maps: the 1:100,000 scale maps show land ownership and were used to determine the land status (BLM, U.S. Forest, private, etc).

B. 1:24,000 scale maps: The 1:24,000 scale maps were used by ground teams for detailed planning

and execution. Additionally, air crews used these maps in the objective area for more precise navigation.

C. Other maps: Other maps providing essential information include:

- (1) U.S. Forest Service maps.
- (2) Resource area maps.
- (3) BLM Special maps showing land ownership and jurisdiction.
- (4) Environmental maps showing endangered specific areas.
- (5) 1:25,000 Joint Operations Graphics maps showing potential ground and air hazards.

5. Threat:

The threat is changing. Gone are the large plots in large open areas. Today, the marijuana grower is becoming sophisticated and deceptive. Plots are smaller and hidden. Growers are importing the water supply and using more fertilizers to overcome the reduced light exposure. The use of booby traps vary by region. In California, booby traps are employed to protect gardens from thieves, while in Kentucky, they are used to hinder law enforcement efforts.

The important lesson is to study the threat in detail prior to commencing any operation. A detailed historical analysis of the patterns or trends in the

area of operation should be conducted. Upon development of the expected threat profile, aerial reconnaissance should be used to confirm and update the profile prior to implementing ground operations.

Communications

1. Multiple Resources:

One critical factor in the success of Operation Ghost Dancer was the Task Force's ability to communicate. Redundant means of communication were essential when one considers the size and diversity of the area of operations. Each type of communication equipment was utilized to perform specific functions and to provide a means of backup should the primary system fail.

A. FM, TAC SAT, and HF communications: These tactical single channel radios worked very well in support of both operation centers and the deployed teams. Deployed teams were able to effectively communicate to the operations centers via signal relay teams, strategically positioned, using short range FM radios. The relay teams then retransmitted traffic to the operations centers by HF or tactical satellite.

B. Use of TC3V: The use of the tactical, command, control, and communications vehicle (TC3V)

allowed both operations centers to maintain reliable communication throughout the area of operations.

C. King Radios: The use of BLM commercial King radios greatly enhanced inter-operability between the deployed teams and civilian law enforcement agencies. However, security is reduced with the use of this radio.

D. Commercial Telephones: Commercial telephone service enhanced the communications capabilities of the Task Force using the following means:

- (1) Autovon
- (2) Telephone credit cards
- (3) Facsimile
- (4) Cellular Telephones

Conference calling capability was not used, however, future operations should plan for and use this capability.

2. Security:

This is a major area of concern while conducting drug eradication operations. In today's sophisticated drug environment, growers are using simple but effective scanning devices to monitor law enforcement transmissions. This increases the potential for compromise and reduces the effectiveness of any operation. Therefore, it is essential that the Army

continue to use, as the primary means of communication, secure communication devices. The law enforcement agencies have determined that unsecured communication is a critical weakness and the military has the resources to correct this situation. In the future, we can expect an increase in requests for this type of equipment.

A related problem that must be addressed is the security clearance that is required to operate the military secure equipment. Procedures must be developed at the DOD level to overcome this issue and ensure we do not compromise the codes and technology associated with this type of equipment.

Service Support

1. Regional Logistics Support Offices (RLSO):

The Regional Logistics Support Offices have been developed to support federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in their resources needs. Currently, the Regional Logistics Support Offices are organized into regions that do not directly correspond to the CONUS Army regions. At the Department of Interior Counternarcotics Seminar, many law enforcement agencies stated that they were confused with the system. The drug law enforcement agencies normally communicate with either the state National Guard, or

the CONUS Headquarters, or one of the Joint Task Force Headquarters. These headquarters are not related to the Regional Logistics Support Offices. This structure adds multiple channels that the law enforcement agencies must use and understand to obtain the necessary support.

Therefore, to eliminate confusion, it is recommended that the DOD re-evaluate the geographical structure of the Regional Logistical Support System. Perhaps aligning the Regional Logistic Support System with the geographical areas of the CONUS Armies would reduce the confusion and streamline the support request procedures.

2. Facilities:

The facilities used during Operation Ghost Dancer were positioned at the north and south ends of the area of operation. The facilities were government facilities which reduced expenditures for the operation. However, the locations were not convenient, nor proximate to the operating areas. As discussed earlier, a poor threat analysis contributed to not knowing where the majority of effort had to be concentrated.

Subsequently, increased travel time was required to deploy from base facilities to the majority of the

garden plots. Future exercises must consider these factors when selecting base locations.

Additionally, security is a major factor. Selection of base locations should be in isolated areas, secured from general public traffic, and preferably on military installations.

3. Medical Support:

Medical support is a critical element of support that is too often overlooked. Operation Ghost Dancer provided its own internal medical evacuation capability but this may not be the case in other operations. It is essential that a medical plan be developed and rehearsed. During the planning stage, all local area clinics and hospitals should be identified. All personnel should be provided with the location and phone numbers of medical treatment facilities. Additionally, dress rehearsals should be conducted. This exercises the system and increases soldier confidence should there be an accident or injury.

4. Claims:

During Operation Ghost Dancer a small amount of damage was done to civilian property. Several delays were incurred in paying the claims.

To solve this problem, future operations should include a maneuver damage control section as part of

the logistical package. This maneuver damage control section could be structured to investigate the claims, file the necessary reports, and pay the parties involved, if required. The efficiency and speed of this requirement will pay great dividends, in the long run, by reducing the anxiety and uncertainty for private land owners, further enhancing our public image.

Public Affairs

1. Public Affairs Counternarcotics Plan:

Most news stories dealing with the active Army's involvement and role in Operation Ghost Dancer were balanced and factual.²⁴ However, there were some instances where the active Army, the National Guard, and the civilian law enforcement officers were seen as the same entity with similar capabilities and authority, furthering a misconception on the part of the civilian community. This confusion arose as a result of publicity about California's Operation Green Sweep.

Based on these experiences and the results of Operation Green Sweep, a detailed public affairs plan should be developed, coordinated with numerous agencies, and implemented before the operation commences. Essential resources for the public affairs

plan include a dedicated public affairs team, BLM, DOD, FORSCOM, the supporting Army headquarters, the state National Guard public affairs officer, and the U.S. Attorney's Offices. Waiting until after an incident occurs to think about public affairs is too late.

From the senior leadership perspective, the Army lacks adequate resources to provide major coverage to every drug eradication operation. However, due to the sensitivity and potential for extreme negative publicity, it is paramount that adequate public affairs coverage be provided to missions of this nature.

Therefore, every approved mission should be evaluated and public affairs assets provided where the risk is determined to be moderate to high.

Additionally, the DA Public Affairs Counternarcotics Plan which was completed in December 1989 was not distributed to active Army units.²⁵ This plan should be sent to all Army installations for review and comment as appropriate.

2. Uniforms:

During Operation Ghost Dancer many law enforcement agents wore the same uniform as the military soldiers. As addressed earlier, the civilian population perceives law enforcement officers wearing battle dress uniforms as military personnel. When these law enforcement officers confront civilians, the potential for negative

military publicity increases dramatically. Furthermore, to facilitate command and control (C2) and public recognition, military soldiers and law enforcement agents should not wear the same uniform. This problem can not be corrected at the local level. There must be a national effort to correct this problem. Possibly the Office of National Drug Control Policy could request all support agencies to have their law enforcement officers affix insignia, or a means of recognition, to their battle dress uniform to clearly show that they are civilian law enforcement officials, not military personnel. This is not an end all solution, however, some means for distinguishing civilian law enforcement officials from military support personnel is clearly needed.

3. Weapons:

The visible presence of weapons is another area of concern. During Operation Green Sweep, numerous photos of soldiers carrying M-16 rifles presented a negative picture for the military. This was not a problem during Operation Ghost Dancer. The military commander made the decision to carry pistols to reduce the weapons signature, but still maintaining the capability to provide self defense, if needed.

Although this technique worked for Operation Ghost Dancer, it may not apply to another operation. The

senior leadership should allow the local military commander to make the decision of which type weapon should be carried. The local military commander's decision should be based on a detailed threat analysis while considering all factors of METT-T.

4. Local Events:

During Operation Ghost Dancer, several days were lost because of a local hunting season. Had this not been identified, confrontations with local hunters could have resulted. In Operation Green Sweep, a planned festival was not identified until late in the execution phase. Therefore, during the planning phase it is critical that the public affairs detachment conduct an analysis of scheduled events for the areas of operation. This analysis would then facilitate planning for the execution phase, thereby, reducing the potential conflict that could result between the execution of a eradication mission and a local civilian event.

5. Measures of Effectiveness:

Measures of effectiveness is an area of increasing concern. Body counts from Vietnam bring back memories of undesired results. This "body count" syndrome has found its way into the "War on Drugs." Today, it is not atypical to see statistics such as the number of

plants eradicated, number of arrests, number of booby traps, and, of course, a street value attached to the confiscated plants. Operation Ghost Dancer was no exception. The measures of effectiveness were evaluated as all other drug operations were evaluated.

The Army should not get involved in this numbers game. Let the agencies do that if they desire. However, we should measure our success from the feedback provided by the agencies. How effective were we in providing the support requirement? Were they pleased with our support? How much time and effort did we save them? Do they want us back? These are all questions that when answered by the supported agency will provide us the measure of effectiveness we need for future operations.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusion

The National Drug Control Strategy for fiscal year 1992 was released on 31 January 1991. It is apparent that the Department of Defense mission in support of the "War on Drugs" will continue. In fact, many believe that upon the termination of Operation Desert Storm, the support requirements will escalate. This implies that the continued use of active duty Army forces will increase tremendously. Given the fact that the Department of Defense is in the "War on Drugs" to stay and the potential for the increased involvement of active duty Army forces will increase, we must begin now to capitalize on the lessons learned from previous operations.

Operation Ghost Dancer was one of those operations from which to learn. It was the first large scale drug eradication mission involving active duty Army forces. The lessons learned were many and covered the entire spectrum from command and control to public affairs activities.

Although drug eradication is one small aspect of the total "War on Drugs," senior Army leadership is required in several areas. Of particular importance, the Army in the field needs guidance. A vision of where we are heading is required. Today, the trend by

the growers is to smaller and more sophisticated operations. Additionally, most law enforcement agencies are turning to smaller operations and they are asking for more sophisticated equipment. This indicates a trend toward more but smaller operations with increased requests for equipment. The senior leadership must be prepared to meet this challenge of increased requirements.

Additionally, the senior leadership must understand that the units in the field desire early notification for mission taskings. If the senior leadership upholds the Green-Amber-Red Time Management Systems, this will reduce this problem. However, to facilitate rapid emergency responses, the development of regional contingency plans will reduce the burden at unit level and allow them to increase their capability to rapidly respond when required. The implementation of contingency plans should not become the norm to overcome poor planning by the civilian agencies.

Furthermore, standardization and clarification of many areas, including Posse Comitatus, the rules of engagement, and resource request procedures all need to be addressed by the senior Army leadership. The Army leadership must understand the capabilities and limitations for supporting the civilian authorities. We must expect that until the laws are changed, the civilian leadership may place an increased emphasis on

the use of National Guard forces because of the legal restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act for the employment of active Army soldiers. By streamlining and formalizing the request for military assistance procedures, the Army would be in a better position to optimize the employment of both active and reserve component soldiers. This would also display a more solidified Total Army approach to the mission.

The measures of effectiveness used by the Army must also be addressed by our senior leadership. It is essential that the Army stay away from the "body count" approach currently in use. Our effectiveness must be viewed in terms of how well we enhance the effectiveness of the civilian law enforcement agencies. Let them tell Congress how we have added to their effectiveness and how essential our support is for the accomplishment of their mission. We must remember that our mission is strictly a support mission, therefore, we must refrain from taking the lead.


Furthermore, additional guidance relative to the correlation of warfighting tasks to drug mission tasks, and the development of a mission essential task list is needed. Commanders in the field must be required to properly task organize and develop Mission Essential Task Lists that will minimize the impact on our combat readiness. We have passed the point of using the possible negative impact of our readiness as an excuse


to minimize our support to this national effort. The mission has been received, the Army must now seek to effectively accomplish the counternarcotics task while it maintains its warfighting readiness.

Finally, the Army must institutionalize the lessons learned from our experiences in counternarcotics operations. The Center for Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth must become actively involved to capture, analyze, and disseminate the lessons learned.

Operation Ghost Dancer was a success. As the first large eradication operation involving the use of active duty Army soldiers, it has provided the Army a vehicle from which to learn. The results of the mission indicate that the future employment of active duty Army soldiers is both feasible and productive. Furthermore, it has shown that the mission can be accomplished without a reduction of combat readiness if units are properly task organized. Now that Desert Storm is approaching conclusion, and with the potential for the Army's increased involvement in this mission, we must learn from our past experiences to effectively provide the required support to the Nation's counternarcotics efforts.

Appendix A: Area of Operations






- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| USDI, Bureau of Land Management | USDA, National Forest | USDI, Bureau of Indian Affairs |
| Bureau of Land Management Offices | Forest Service Offices | Bureau of Indian Affairs Office |
| District Boundaries | National Forest Boundaries | Indian Reservation Boundaries |

Appendix B: Task Force Task Organization

1. Overall Task Force Structure:



2. Initial Military Task Organization:

TF Spector

Tm Air

B/2-9 Avn (OPCON)

Spt/HYHT/2-9 Avn

Tm Echo

E/109th MI

BLM Agents

Tm Cav

A/1-9 Cav (Gnd)

Recon/HHT/1-9 Cav

TF Troops

BLM(-)

HHC, 9th ID (MTZ)


HHC, 109th MI

Sig Tms/9th Sig Bn


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Appendix C: Zone Task Organization

1. Zone Structure.



2. Task Force C2 Structure.



Appendix D: Personnel and Equipment Requirements

1. Personnel.

a. Military (Title 10)

Officer	26
Warrant Officer	18
Enlisted	193
<u>Total Title 10</u>	<u>237</u>

b. Law Enforcement/Title 32

BLM	22
NG (Title 32)	10

c. Total Personnel 269

2. Equipment

a. Vehicles

CUCV	7
HMMWV	6
Pick-up (TMP)	1
Sedan (TMP)	1
Bus (TMP)	2
Van (TMP)	4

b. Aircraft

UH-60	9
UH-1H	1
UH-1V	2
OH-58	6
<u>Total</u>	<u>18</u>

3. Weapons

M18A2	65
M1911A1	34

4. Communications

TACSAT	
PSC-3	10
URC-101 (TC3V) 1	2
HF	
PRC-104	10
GRC-193 (TC3V)	2

Appendix D: Personnel and Equipment Requirements

4. Communications (Continued)

FM	
PRC-77	10
PRC-126	12
Telephones	
STU-III	13
Cellular	7
Fax	2

5. Observation Devices

M19 Binoculars	10
M22 Binoculars	10
PVS-5	22

6. Miscellaneous

Ground Positioning Systems	9 (one per UH-60)
Loran-C (positioning system)	6 (courtesy of BLM)
Longline	3 (used to extract marijuana plants from gardens)

Appendix E: Sequence of Events

2 July	Mission received. Division begins planning
13 July	Training delayed. Training was initially planned to commence on this date; however, due to BLM constraints arranging facilities, LEO's, etc., training was delayed.
23 Jul-3 Aug	Joint training involving LRS and BLM personnel.
31 July	TF C2 changed. The original command and control was vested in the 109th MI Bn; however, to many questions about the legality of using intelligence assets. Division G3 assumed command and control.
6 August	Main body deploys to Portland and Klamath Falls.
7 August	TF HQ operational. Spotting missions using military aircraft begins.
6-10 August	Operation EMERALD. Operation EMERALD was a joint operation between the BLM and the Oregon State Police (OSP) which involved 2 vehicles and 2 UH-60's from the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized).
12-15 August	First insert mission.
13 August	Task organization changed. B/2-9 Aviation was replaced by C/2-9 due to other mission requirements. A TF XO position was added to the staff structure to free up the TF commander.
15 August	Battle drills developed to streamline mission planning and execution. These two drills were to conduct hasty eradication of a marijuana garden and conduct a ground reconnaissance of a marijuana garden.
22 August	Task organization changed. 1 UH-1V's from the 54th Medical Detachment was replaced by 2 UH-1H's from the 1-9 Cavalry due to other mission requirements.

Appendix E: Sequence of Events

28 August	Task organization changed. 6 OH-58's from 1-9 Cavalry deployed to Portland to assume spotting duties from UH-60's from 2-9 Aviation.
31 August	Task organization changed. 1 UH-1V from the 237th Medical Detachment, 7th Infantry Division (LT) replaced by UH-1H from 1-9 Cavalry due to other mission requirements.
31 Aug-5 Sep	Labor Day Stand down. Provided an opportunity to conduct sputter missions and locate gardens.
5 October	Last day of operations. Klamath Falls begins redeployment to Ft. Lewis.
6 October	TF After Action Review conducted at Camp Bonneville.
7 October	TF Specter (Portland) redeploys to Ft. Lewis. All TF elements close Ft. Lewis. Redeployment complete.

NOTES

¹ David F. Musto, "America's First Cocaine Epidemic," The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1989: 60.

² Musto, 62.

³ George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1990), 2.

⁴ Henry J. Richter, "The Use of U.S. Military Forces in the War on Drugs," USAWC, 15 October 1990: 3.

⁵ Aleksandra M. Rohde, "Pushing the Limits of Posse Comitatus," National Guard Magazine, Vol. 43, No. 8, August 1989: 51.

⁶ Greg Assmus, Operation Ghost Dancer (U.S. Department of Interior, 1990), n. pag.

⁷ Assmus, Operation Ghost Dancer, n. pag.

⁸ Col. William H. Gavan, Operation Ghost Dancer, Lecture. San Francisco, Ca., 30 January 1991. (Cited with special permission of Col. Gavan.)

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-100: Training The Force. Washington: GPO, 15 November 1988.

¹⁰ Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division (MTZ), After Action Report for Operation Ghost Dancer (Ft. Lewis, Wa., 1990), Tab J.

11 Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division (MTZ), Tab G.

12 Col William H. Gavan, Operation Ghost Dancer, Lecture. Ft. Lewis, Wa., 29 November 1990. (Cited with special permission of Col. Gavan.)

13 Gavan, Operation Ghost Dancer, Lecture. Ft. Lewis, Wa., 29 November 1990. (Cited with special permission of Col. Gavan.)

14 Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division (MTZ), Tab E.

15 Major Christensen, Personal Interview, 30 November 1990.

16 Christensen, Personal Interview, 30 November 1990.

17 Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division (MTZ), Tab M.

18 Col. William H. Gavan, Operation Ghost Dancer, Lecture. USAWC, 10 December 1990. (Cited with special permission of Col. Gavan.)

19 Gavan, Operation Ghost Dancer, Lecture. USAWC, 10 December 1990. (Cited with special permission of Col. Gavan.)

20 CW4 Charlie Bos, Personal Interview, 29 November 1990.

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22 Gavan, Operation Ghost Dancer. Lecture. Ft. Lewis, Wa.. 29 November 1990. (Cited with special permission of Col. Gavan.)

23 Captain Mixon, Personal Interview, 30 November 1990.

24 Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division (MTZ). Tab G.

25 Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division (MTZ). Tab G.

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