The Malvinas Conflict: Argentine Practice of the Operational Art
Abstract
This monograph focuses on Argentinian practice of the Operational Art during the Malvinas/Falklands conflict of 1982. It seeks to determine to what extent Argentina's defeat can be attributed to shortcomings at the operational level. Following a review of Argentinian doctrine, the Argentinian operational proficiency is evaluated using the following criteria: reasonableness of assumptions; consideration of branches and sequels; center of gravity analysis; and adequacy of the sustainment effort. The monograph concludes that Argentinian of the Operational Art was inadequate, and contributed to the defeat. It suggests that the principal error made was the failure to develop branches to the basic plan that addressed possible and dangerous contingencies.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 25, 1990
- Accession Number
- ADA234161
Entities
People
- Francis X. Kinney
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College