The Indian Wars and American Military Thought 1865-1890

Abstract

The period 1865-1890 represents the final years of Indian warfare conducted by the United States Army. The Army fought over 900 separate engagements during these years against foes who used unconventional tactics. Although this was a significant period in its history, the Army did not develop or record a useful unconventional war doctrine. This study explores several significant reasons the Army continued its emphasis on a philosophy of total, conventional war. The increased isolation of the Army after the Civil War caused its leaders to realize that a new mission was required to insure its survival as an institution. Most importantly, this realization, combined with the transient and minor nature of the Indian threat and the emergence of a trend towards professionalism in society, led the Army to see its future as a force dedicated to modern, conventional war.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 15, 1991
Accession Number
ADA234224

Entities

People

  • Clyde R. Simmons

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil War
  • Civil War (United States)
  • Congress
  • Doctrine
  • Governments
  • House Of Representatives
  • Instructions
  • New York
  • Security
  • Students
  • Terrorists
  • Unconventional Warfare
  • United States
  • Universities
  • War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Cyberspace Operations against Adversarial Threats.
  • Military Leadership and Professional Education.
  • Strategic Security Studies