A New Paradigm for Understanding Nuclear Strategy
Abstract
With the end of the Cold War as we have known it since the late 1940s and the apparent success of U.S. containment policy, old, familiar questions demand answers in a new and unfamiliar context. The Cold War is over but the Nuclear Age is not; nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. Collapse of the Warsaw Pact and dramatic reduction of tensions between the United States and the USSR compel re-examination of fundamental strategy issues. What is the purpose of nuclear weapons? How should we plan for their use? What kinds of weapons and delivery systems should we develop and deploy? How many should we have? Why have any? This essay does not seek to provide a comprehensive review of nuclear strategy since 1945, nor does it provide detailed recommendations for future strategy. Rather, it introduces a new paradigm, a new structure, a new set of lenses, which permits the strategist to seek old familiar information in a different context. Taking strategy to include ends, ways, and means, the new paradigm introduced herein interprets the past 45 years as three discernible time periods, each with a different characteristic.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 04, 1991
- Accession Number
- ADA234225
Entities
People
- Joe C. Dixon
Organizations
- United States Army War College